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Emerging as the ‘Victor’(?): Syria and Russia’s

Grand and Military Strategies

Marina Miron & Rod Thornton

To cite this article: Marina Miron & Rod Thornton (2021) Emerging as the ‘Victor’(?): Syria and
Russia’s Grand and Military Strategies, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 34:1, 1-23, DOI:
10.1080/13518046.2021.1923991

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THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES
2021, VOL. 34, NO. 1, 1–23
https://doi.org/10.1080/13518046.2021.1923991

Emerging as the ‘Victor’(?): Syria and Russia’s Grand and

Military Strategies
Marina Miron and Rod Thornton
King’s College London

ABSTRACT
The war in Syria, given its complexity and geopolitical impor­
tance, has received much recent analytical attention. Although
many perspectives have been covered, there is still a need in
Western sources to view the conflict more through Russia’s lens.
This article thus looks at how Russia has designed and executed
its military strategy in Syria to fit into its overall grand strategy. It
examines exactly how the Russian ‘strategy of limited actions’
has been employed and why Russia has now been proclaimed
as the one true ‘victor’ in the whole Syrian imbroglio.

Introduction
The eight-year-long conflict in Syria had seemed to be winding down. In
a four-way summit held in Istanbul on 27 October 2018, Russia, Turkey,
Germany, and France discussed a way forward in Syria that – despite dis­
agreements – resulted in the recognition that the war must end and that the
Syrian people should determine their own future (albeit with the input of
major external players).1 At that time, according to the United States’ special
representative to Syria, James Jeffrey, the participants in the war had taken
significant steps toward the resolution of the conflict in their calling for
a political solution. Especially important here was the Idlib deal between
Turkey and Russia, to create a demilitarized zone around the city and to
clear the area of rebels, resulting in what was hoped to be a ‘frozen conflict’.2
Following this Idlib arrangement, on 19 December 2018, US President Donald
Trump ordered his initial (but not followed through) ‘full’ and ‘rapid’ with­
drawal of US troops from Syria.3 At the time, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey

CONTACT Marina Miron marina.miron@kcl.ac.uk Defence Studies Department, King's College London,
Faringdon Rd, Shrivenham, Swindon SN6 8LA, United Kingdom
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of The
Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
1
O. Al-Sharif, ‘Istanbul Summit Fails to Deliver Plan to End Syrian Conflict’, Arab News, 30 October 2018, http://www.
arabnews.com/node/1396531.
2
Agence France-Presse, ‘Syria Summit Took “Huge Steps” Toward Ending War: US’, Daily Mail, 30 October 2018,
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-6334633/Syria-summit-took-huge-steps-ending-war-US.html.
3
B. Starr, R. Browne, and N. Gaouette, ‘Trump Orders Rapid Withdrawal From Syria in Apparent Reversal’, CNN,
19 December 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/19/politics/us-syria-withdrawal/index.html.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published with license by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, and is not altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
2 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

Lavrov — although not without suspicion — described this proposed with­

drawal as ‘a step in the right direction’.4
The war in Syria, however, is still far from over with Idlib — where joint
Russian and Turkish patrols are now taking place — and much of northern Syria
and the area east of the Euphrates River (from which US Coalition forces had
been operating) are once again in turmoil.5 At the time of writing, and after what
seems to be the actual US pullout (in October 2019), the Turkish operation
against the Syrian Kurds is now taking the conflict in a new direction.6 Overall,
though, it can be said that the intensity of the conflict in the rest of Syria has
substantially reduced compared to the situation in 2014 and 2015. This is
especially true in that region now controlled by the Syrian government and its
Russian allies.7 With the original anti-Assad rebellion drawing down and with
Russian troops emerging as the power brokers on the ground across the whole of
Syria, it is clear that it is Moscow that has become the most influential interna­
tional player in Syria and perhaps, indeed, in the entire Middle East. Russia, it
seems, has emerged as the one true ‘victor’ in the whole Syrian conflict.8
This conflict is perhaps one of the most internationalized that the world has
witnessed in recent times. The presence of not only second-party state actors but
also a variety of local and foreign militia groups, private military companies — and
obviously the forces of the government in Damascus — has been making the
operational environment extremely complex in Syria. If we accept Clausewitz’s
premise that war is a duel on a larger scale,9 then the Syrian conflict can be
perceived as a complex series of interacting duels. What is more, the various
allegiances are constantly shifting; old players retreat while new players emerge.
How then has it been possible for Russia, which first committed its troops in 2015,
to have navigated its way through the murky waters of this Syrian imbroglio and to
have maintained a path toward its specific goals? Indeed, what have been Russia’s
goals in Syria? What initially was its hoped-for strategic endgame? This article adds
new insight in answering these questions by relying not only on original Russian-

4
K. Ivanova, ‘Putin Zayavil Ob Otsutstvii Priznakov Vyvoda Voisk SSHA iz Sirii’ [Putin Announced That There is a Lack of
Signs of Withdrawal of the US Troops from Syria], Federal’noe Agenstvo Novostei, 20 December 2018, https://riafan.
ru/1133843-putin-zayavil-ob-otsutstvii-priznakov-vyvoda-voisk-ssha-iz-sirii; K. Ivanova, ‘Lavrov Nazval Vyvod Voisk
SSHA Iz Sirii Shagom v Pravil’nom Napravlenii’ [Lavrov Called the US Force Withdrawal from Syria a Step into the
Right Direction], Federal’noe Agenstvo Novostei, 21 December 2018, https://riafan.ru/1134232-lavrov-nazval-vyvod-
voisk-ssha-iz-sirii-shagom-v-pravilnom-napravlenii.
5
E. C. Zontur, ‘Turkey Neutralizes 6 PKK/YPG Terrorist in Northern Syria’, AA, 24 March 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/
en/turkey/turkey-neutralizes-6-pkk-ypg-terrorists-in-northern-syria/1777028; ‘Rossiya i Turciya Proveli Vos’moe
Patrulirovaniye v Idlibe’ [Russia and Turkey Conducted the Eighth Patrol in Idlib], RIA Novosti, 5 May 2020,
https://ria.ru/20200505/1570982259.html; J. Spyer, ‘Syria’s Civil War Is Now 3 Civil Wars’, Foreign Policy,
18 March 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/18/syrias-civil-war-is-now-3-civil-wars/.
6
‘Turtsiya Nachala Nazemnuyu Fazu Operatsii v Sirii’ [Turkey Has Launched the Land Phase of the Operation in Syria],
RIA, 9 October 2019, https://ria.ru/20191009/1559603888.html.
7
J. Spyer, ‘Syria’s Civil War’.
8
K. Gogitidze, ‘Voyna v Sirii: Putin Pobedil, Zapad Proigral. Vzglyad iz Frantsii’ [The War in Syria: Putin Was Victorious,
the West Lost. Views from France], BBC, 30 September 2019, https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-49508531;
A. Nemtsova, ‘Russia Gloats Over Trump’s Syria Debacle and Putin’s “Victory”’, The Daily Beast, 17 October 2019,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/russia-gloats-over-trumps-syria-debacle-and-putins-victory.
9
C. von Clausewitz, On War [Peter Paret, Trans.] (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1976) p. 13.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 3

language sources but also those from the Middle East region. It also examines these
questions through a specifically strategic lens. It considers Russia’s strategic
approach — at the levels of both grand and military strategy — in relation to
Syria and judges how successful this has been and what effect it has had on the
overall conflict, on regional political dynamics, and on wider geopolitics.

Key terminology
Before proceeding with the analysis, it is necessary first to establish a sound
theoretical framework to help shed light not only on what Moscow has done
militarily up to this point but also on how its military actions have fitted into its
greater foreign policy design. To this end, this article uses Colin S. Gray’s
definitions of grand and military strategy. The former he defines as ‘the direction
and use made of any or all among the total assets of a security community in
support of its policy goals as decided by politics’.10 ‘Military strategy’ is, naturally
enough, subordinate to grand strategy and is defined as ‘[t]he direction and use
made of force and the threat of force for the purposes of policy as decided by
politics’.11 Military strategy, according to Russia’s Ministry of Defense
Encyclopedia, is seen as a sub-category of military art, which includes the theory
and practice of the state’s military activities. It is seen as subordinate to a desired
political objective that sets the tone for a specific military strategy.12
The current Russian Chief of the General Staff, General Valeri Gerasimov,
defines military strategy as ‘a system of knowledge and actions for preventing,
preparing for and conducting wars’.13 Noticeably, there is no mention here of
‘force’ or the ‘threat of force’. Indeed, the notion of military strategy seems, for
Gerasimov, to have moved on. Given the Syrian experience, Gerasimov would
appear to have broadened his understanding of military strategy to add that its
substance now lies in ‘planning and coordinating the joint military and non-
military actions of the Russian troops (forces) and the formations of the armed
forces of interested states [and] the paramilitary structures of those states that are
participants in a conflict’.14 He has thus expanded the idea of military strategy

10
C. S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010) p. 19. A similar definition of
strategy is offered by the Soviet military theorist Alexandr A. Svechin; however, Svechin does not refer to it as
‘grand’ and instead calls it simply ‘strategy’ (strategiya). See A. A. Svechin, Strategiya [Strategy] (Moscow: Voennyi
Vestnik 1927) p. 15.
11
C. S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge, p. 19. For a more detailed definition of military strategy, see, for instance,
A. J. Echvarria, Military Strategy: A Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2017) p. 1, https://doi.org/
10.1093/actrade/9780199340132.003.0001.
12
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, ‘Strategiya Voennaya’ [Military Strategy], Enciklopedia, http://
encyclopedia.mil.ru/encyclopedia/dictionary/details_rvsn.htm?id=14383@morfDictionary.
13
V. Gerasimov, ‘Genshtab Planiruyet Udary’ [General Staff Is Planning Strikes], Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kur’er 9(772)
(March 2019) pp. 1, 6, https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/48913.
14
V. Gerasimov, ‘Vektory Razvitiya Voennoi Strategii’ [Vectors of Military Strategy Development], Krasnaya Zvezda,
4 March 2019, http://redstar.ru/vektory-razvitiya-voennoj-strategii/; V. Gerasimov, ‘General Staff Is Planning Strikes’,
pp. 1, 6. This emphasis on paramilitary structures is in line with the Soviet military thought as articulated by Evgenii
Messner. See E. Messner, Khochesh’ Mira, Pobedi Myatezhvoynu [If You Want Peace, Win the Rebellion War]
(Moscow: Military University Russkii Put’ 2005).
4 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

into one that is at once both more detailed and nuanced, especially so with his
inclusion of the activities of other ‘participants’.
In regard to Syria, he also points out the importance of the use of
smaller, but more effective, Russian force groupings designed to achieve
a specific strategic objective in coordination with such other ‘participants’.
Gerasimov calls this the ‘strategy of limited actions’ (strategiya ogranichen­
nykh deysvtiy).15 Noting this change in the Russian approach — in increas­
ing the granularity of the understanding of military strategy — will help to
gain a better understanding of Russia’s actions in Syria. It should be noted,
however, that these ‘actions’ were designed to achieve not only short-term
military objectives but also, and perhaps more importantly, specific long-
term military strategic and grand strategic foreign policy aims as well. Such
‘actions’ were specifically linked to strategic intent. Thus, when considering
what Moscow has sought to achieve with its military strategy in Syria, the
adjective limited seems actually — and as this article will highlight — to be
something of a misnomer.

Russia’s grand and military strategies: Overview

To fully appreciate Russia’s military strategy in the Syrian theater, it is impor­
tant to properly contextualize it by looking at the overarching grand strategy
and its defining features.

Strategic deterrence
At the grand strategic level, the concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ (strategicheskoe
szderzhivaniye — although a better translation is probably ‘strategic
containment’16) has always been deeply embedded in the Soviet Union’s and
later in Russia’s strategic thought. During the Cold War, this idea of ‘strategic
deterrence’ was closely linked to nuclear deterrence. This had served as the main
pillar for helping avert a war between the superpowers in the second half of the
20th century and where the deterrence logic was based on the ability of both sides
to destroy the other in a nuclear exchange. An equilibrium was established, and
war could be avoided.17 Grand strategy is, after all, as much about avoiding a war as
it is with its conduct.

15
V. Gerasimov, ‘General Staff Is Planning Strikes’, p. 6.
16
See T. L. Thomas, ‘The Evolution of Russian Military Thought: Integrating Hybrid, New-Generation, and New-Type
Thinking’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29(4) (2016) pp. 558–59, 564.
17
A. I. Podberezkin and A. V. Zhukov, ‘Oborona Rossii i Strategicheskoe Sderzhivanie Sredstv I Sposobov
Strategicheskogo Napadeniya Veroyatnogo Protivnika’ [Russia’s Defense and Strategic Deterrence of Means and
Ways of Strategic Attack of a Potential Adversary], Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta 6(63) (2018) pp. 142–45. The primary
focus during the Cold War was thus ‘military power, territorial integrity and sovereignty’. See also G. Herd, ‘Security
Strategy: Sovereign Democracy and Great Power Aspirations’, in M. Galeotti (ed.), The Politics of Security in Modern
Russia (Burlington, VT: Ashgate 2010) p. 7.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 5

However, in the 21st century, and as Russian sources now stress, the deterrent
power of nuclear weapons has started to lose its potential. This is due to these
weapons’ overly destructive capacity (and thus their inflexibility) and to the
development of other, more focused, non-nuclear strategic weapons that can
today be equally as effective. Most notable here are precision-guided missiles
(PGMs). In this regard, the greatest military threat to Russia — in the
Kremlin’s view — now comes from the thousands of US PGMs that form
the US Prompt Global Strike (PGS) system.18 A pre-emptive non-nuclear PGS
attack against Russia’s military and civilian infrastructure could have
a devastating effect. Moreover, the Kremlin logic is that the likelihood of
such a US PGS strike has grown in recent years.19
Indeed, the rhetoric currently emanating from Moscow now speaks of an
increasing threat to both Russian interests and to Russia itself posed by the
West and its NATO Alliance.20 This is evident not just, for instance, in the
general expansion eastwards of NATO in Europe but also in its active military
interventions in various parts of the world, including in Yugoslavia (1999),
Iraq (2003), and Libya (2011) and in encouraging the so-called color revolu­
tions in Georgia (2003) and a more long-term one in Ukraine.21 The intention
of such activities is judged — again from the Kremlin perspective — to be to
erode its influence over both its neighboring states and those it sees as within
its sphere of vital interests.22 What is seen as specifically under threat here is
Russia’s notion of ‘sovereign self-assertion’ (derzhavnoe samoutverzhdenie) —
its right, as Moscow would see it, to be a constant and influential player in
world affairs.23
18
‘Genshtab RF Rasskazal o Razrabotke SSHA Strategii Cvetnykh Revolyuciy s Ispolzevaniyem Oruzhiya’ [The General
Staff of the Russian Federation Spoke About the US Development of Color Revolutions Strategy with the Use of
Weapons], TASS, 2 March 2019, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/6178016.
19
V. I. Slipchenko, ‘K Kakoy Voyne Dlozhny Gotovitsya Vooruzhennye Sily’ [For What Kind of War Should the Army
Forces Prepare], Otechestvennye Zapiski 8(9) (2002a), http://www.strana-oz.ru/2002/8/k-kakoy-voyne-dolzhny-goto
vitsya-vooruzhennye-sily; V. I. Slipchenko, Voyny Shestogo Pokaleniya [Sixth-Generation Wars] (Moscow: Veche
2002b). It should be noted that the ideas related to the modernization of military technology were not new but
rather an extension of the Soviet-era thought, such as that put forward by Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai
Ogarkov in the 1970s and 1980s. See, for instance, A. Sidorchik, ‘Chelovek Kotoryy Mog Razgromit’ NATO.
Pobednaya Doktrina Marshala Ogarkova’ [The Man Who Could Defeat NATO: Victorious Doctrine of Marshal
Ogarkov], Argumenty I Fakty, 23 January 2019, http://www.aif.ru/society/history/chelovek_kotoryy_mog_razgro
mit_nato_pobednaya_doktrina_marshala_ogarkova.
20
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Strategiya Nacional’noi Bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federacii [National
Security Strategy of the Russian Federation], Moscow: Kremlin, 31 December 2015, Art. II, para. 18, http://static.
kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/l8iXkR8XLAtxeilX7JK3XXy6Y0AsHD5v.pdf; A. I. Vladimirov, Konceptual'nye Osnovy
Nacional'noi Strategii Rossii: Politologicheskii Aspekt [Conceptual Foundations of Russia's National Strategy:
Politological Aspect] (Moscow: Nauka, 2007) ; V. Gerasmov, ‘Cennost’ Nauki v Predvidenii’ [The Value of Science
in Foresight], Voenno-Promyshlenyi Kur’er 8(476) (27 February 2013) p. 4; A. A. Barthosh, ‘Strategiya
i Kontrastrategiya Gibridoi Voyny’ [Strategy and Counterstrategy of Hybrid War], Voennaya Mysl’, 10
(October 2018) pp. 5–19.
21
O. Falichev, ‘Goryachie Tochki Nauki [Hot Spots of Science]’, Voenno-Promyshlenyi Kur’er 12(725) (March/April 2018)
p. 2.
22
S. Karaganov, ‘Prichina Etogo Konflikta — Zabluzhdeniya Zapada, Poetomu Russkie Ne Sdadutsya’ [The Reason for
this Conflict — The Error of the West, so the Russians Will Not Surrender], Rossiya v Global’noi Politike,
17 September 2014, https://globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/Prichina-etogo-konflikta–zabluzhdeniya-Zapada-poetomu-russ
kie-ne-sdadutsya-16975; A. I. Podberezkin and A. V. Zhukov, ‘Russia’s Defense’, pp. 146–47.
23
D. Trenin, ‘Vneshnepoliticheskie Perspektivy Rossii’ [Russia’s Foreign Policy Perspectives], in M. Lipman and
N. Petrov (eds.), Rossia 2020: Szenarii Razvitiya [Russia 2020: Development Scenarios] (Moscow: ROSSPEN 2012)
6 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

The Kremlin also looks upon Russia itself as being the victim of so-called
hybrid warfare24 and hybrid intervention25 campaigns sourced to NATO
countries. The country is ‘under attack’, mostly through information warfare
means designed to create internal instability. Thus, overall, with NATO
representing both a threat to Russian geopolitical interests and to Russia itself
through the twin threats of PGS and hybrid warfare, a new set of strategic
countermeasures has been seen as necessary to both deter and contain NATO
actions. This has led to a change in Moscow’s thinking about the original Cold
War concept of ‘strategic deterrence’. It has now become far more expansive in
concept.26 It is described in the Russian National Security Strategy (NSS) of
2015 as a set of ‘Interrelated political, military, military-technical, diplomatic,
economic, informational and other measures’. These measures are necessary
to prevent ‘the use of military force against Russia, [and to] defend its
sovereignty and territorial integrity’.27
The new counter-measures presented within today’s Russian idea of
‘strategic deterrence, and because the strategic utility of nuclear weapons
is now being questioned, have also come to be referred to as a system of
strategic non-nuclear deterrence (strategicheskoe neyadernoe szderzhiva­
niye). This is manifest as a nexus of conventional military means (includ­
ing high-precision munitions, hypersonic missiles, and anti-aircraft missile
defense systems) along with the foreign policy, economic and informa­
tion-related measures that are specifically mentioned in the NSS. It is all
designed to constrain any feared restriction on Russia’s ‘sovereign self-
assertion’ by NATO or even any aggressive intent toward Russia itself
from the Alliance.28
Both facets of ‘strategic deterrence’ — supporting ‘sovereign self-assertion’
and defending the country — are evident in the case of Moscow’s Syrian
intervention.

p. 61; D. Trenin, ‘Demands on Russian Foreign Policy and Its Drivers: Looking out Five Years’, Carnegie,
10 August 2017c, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/72799.
24
The origin of the concept is attributable to a retired US Marine, Lt. Col. (ret.), Frank Hoffman. See F. G. Hoffman,
Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 2007) pp. 17–
34.
25
S. Charap, ‘Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention’, Survival 55(1) (2013) p. 37; G. Herd, ‘Security Strategy’,
pp. 8–9; Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, Voennaya Doktrina Rossijskoi Federacii, Moscow: Kremlin,
26 December 2014, para. 12l, para. 14v, http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf;
D. Trenin, ‘Rossia Voyuyet Po Novomu’ [Russia Is Waging War in a New Way], Carnegie, 1 June 2017, https://
carnegie.ru/2017/06/01/ru-pub-71303; A. A. Barthosh, ‘Strategy and Counterstrategy’, pp. 9–15.
26
See A. I. Podberezkin, M. V. Kharkevich, M. V. Aleksandrov, and O. E. Rodinov, Proyekt Dolgosrochnoi Strategii
Bezopasnosti Rossii s Metodologicheskimi I Metodicheskimi Kommentariyami [Project of Long-Term National Security
Strategy of Russia With Methodological and Methodical Comments] (Moscow: MGIMO Universitet 2016);
V. A. Veselov, ‘Smena “Yadernyh Vekov”: Strategicheskaya Stabil’nost’ I Kontury Novogo Mirovogo Poryada’
[Changing ‘Nuclear Ages’: Strategic Stability and Outlines of the New World Order], Vestnik Moskovskogo
Universiteta 1, Serie 25, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya i Mirovaya Politika (2018) pp. 102–41.
27
Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 683, On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation,
31 December 2015, Art. IV, para. 36, http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/40391/page/2.
28
A. I. Podberezkin and A. V. Zhukov, ‘Russia’s Defense’, p. 148. K. Ryabov, ‘Novaya Voennaya Doktrina Russkoi
Federacii’ [New Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation], Voennoe Obozrenie, 13 January 2015, https://topwar.
ru/66527-novaya-voennaya-doktrina-rossiyskoy-federacii.html.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 7

Russia’s endgame in Syria

Having discussed the concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ and the degree of both
military and geopolitical logic supporting it, the rationale behind Russia’s
initial intervention in Syria can be better understood. This is, though, actually
a complex rationale involving several specific drivers.

The search for allies

To withstand what is portrayed in Russia as the pressure being imposed on it

by the West, the striving for ‘strategic deterrence’ has to include the cultivation
of allies. This is nothing new, of course. In the past, the Soviet Union had
sought allies in the Middle East, Latin America, North Africa, and Southeast
Asia through the offering of economic and military assistance.29 In the new
Russia, the champion of Moscow continuing to seek allies is the prominent
Russian student of geopolitics and former speaker of the Russian Duma (or
parliament), Aleksandr Dugin.30 He has strongly advocated that Russia seek
new overseas ties, especially in the Middle East and Asia.31 Dugin is a very
influential figure when it comes to Kremlin policy. He has even been referred
to as ‘Putin’s Rasputin’.32
Indeed, allies were important to the Soviet Union and remain important to
Russia today to a degree that is not really appreciated in the West. The old
Soviet idea of generating a ‘correlation of forces’ across the world by encoura­
ging, mostly, ‘Third World’ states to align themselves with Moscow rather
than the West has not gone away.33 It is the case now that allies are officially
seen as playing a vital role in helping to ensure Russian national security in
that they help support not just the concept of ‘sovereign self-assertion’34 but
also the idea of ‘strategic deterrence’.35
This search for allies allows for a preliminary understanding of Moscow’s
need to be involved in Syria. It was judged to be imperative in September 2015
and when Russian troops were first sent to Syria to, as Putin put it, ‘save’ Syria
and the regime of President Bashir al-Assad — one of the few actual allies

29
See J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press 1963) pp. 118–
28; D. S. Papp, Soviet Policies Towards the Developing World During the 1980s (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air
University 1986) pp. 8–20, 225–56.
30
Alexander Dugin, ‘Biografiya’ [Biography], n.d., http://dugin.ru/biography.
31
A. Dugin, Osnovy Geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe Budushhee Rossii [The Foundations of Geopolitics: Russia’s
Geopolitical Future] (Moscow: Arktogeja 1997) pp. 91–93.
32
A. Barshad, ‘Putin’s Rasputin’, Long Reads, 11 July 2019, https://longreads.com/2019/07/11/putins-rasputin/.
33
See M. J. Deane, The Soviet Concept of the ‘Correlation of Forces’ (Arlington, VA: Stanford Research Institute 1976)
pp. 4–19.
34
This aspect is expressed in Russia’s official conception of its foreign policy. See Ministry of Interior of the Russian
Federation, Koncepciya Vneshnei Politiki Rossiyskoi Federacii [The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian
Federation], in force from 30 November 2016, Article I, para 3 g); d), https://www.garant.ru/products/ipo/prime/
doc/71452062/.
35
K. Stoicescu, Russia’s ‘Allies’ (Tallinn, Estonia: International Centre for Defence and Security, January 2018), https://
icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/ICDS_Report_Russia__s_Allies_Kalev_Stoicescu_January_2018_web.pdf.
8 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

per se that Moscow still had around the world.36 And it was not just a question
of supporting him, it was also a question of the West not being given free
license, within the dynamic of the then-ongoing ‘Arab Spring’, to replace him
with a leader who would be pro-Western and thus inevitably anti-Russia.37

Defeating the Islamic State

The deployment of Russian forces took place after an official request from the
Syrian government. This provided Moscow with a legal footing for its
intervention.38 The Kremlin line was that the troops had gone to help defeat
the threat from the Islamic State (IS). The establishing of an Islamic caliphate
in Syria could, this line stressed, lead to a spillover effect into Russia itself. At
least 4,000 IS fighters, for instance, were identified as being Russian citizens by
Russian military intelligence (i.e., the Glavnoe Upravleniye General’nogo
Shtaba Vooruzhennykh Sil or GU — formerly the GRU). These could poten­
tially return home if Russian forces in Syria ‘did not fight against international
terrorists’.39 Although this was a legitimate concern for Moscow,40 the ‘terror­
ism’ rhetoric was largely seen as merely providing superficial legitimacy for
Russia’s true underlying regional aim. This was to serve the overarching goal of
‘strategic deterrence’ by not just keeping Assad (an ally) in place but also, and
on the back of it, by establishing Russia itself as a leading power broker in the
Middle East.41 This was also Russian ‘sovereign self-assertion’ in action.42 But
to achieve both ends, Russia had not only to defeat IS but also to deny
Washington’s Syrian allies — most notably the Syrian Democratic Forces
36
‘Putin Nazval Osnovnuyu Zadachu Rossiyskih Voennyh v Sirii’ [Putin Named the Main Aim for the Russian Military in
Syria], Interfax, 11 October 2015, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/472593. The Soviet Union, during its ‘golden years’
(1960–1980), had a very close relationship with Middle Eastern regimes, including but not limited to Syria. Its
footprint was significant until the final collapse in 1990. Thus, Russia’s current foreign policy reflects a continuation
of — not a departure from — Soviet foreign policy. For more on the USSR’s relationship with the Middle Eastern
countries, see V. Gusarov, Arabskiye Strany Zapadnoi Azii i Severnoi Afriki [Arab Countries of Western Asia and North
Africa] (Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniya Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk 1997).
37
D. Frolovskiy, ‘What Putin Really Wants in Syria’, Foreign Policy, 1 February 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/
01/what-putin-really-wants-in-syria-russia-assad-strategy-kremlin/.
38
Agreement Between the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic On the Deployment of an Aviation Group of
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation to the Territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, Russia-Syria, 26 August 2015,
ratified by Federal Law No. 376-FZ of 14 October 2016, Art II, http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/
0001201601140019; ‘Syria’s Ambassador to Russia Urges all Countries to Join Syria and Russia Against Terrorism’,
Syrian Arab News Agency, 1 October 2015, https://sana.sy/en/?p=56454; V. Gerasimov, ‘Po Opytu v Sirii’ [On
Experience in Syria], Voenno-Promyshlenyi Kur’er 9(624) (2016b) p. 4.
39
S. Val’chenko, ‘Eks-Glavkom VKS Podvel Itogi Operacii v Sirii za Tri Goda’ [Former Commander-in-Chief of the VKS
Summed Up the Results of the Operation in Syria Over Three Years], MK, 30 September 2018, https://www.mk.ru/
politics/2018/09/30/eksglavkom-vks-podvel-itogi-operacii-v-sirii-za-tri-goda.html; Islamnews, ‘Islamskoe
Gosudarstvo Ugrozhaet Rossiyskomu Kavkazu’ [The Islamic State Threatens Russian Caucasus], Umma-24,
3 September 2014, http://www.umma-42.ru/news-58540.html.
40
V. Frolov, ‘Vneshn’aya Politika Rossii: Strategii Konfrontacii i Ih Posledstivya’ [Russia’s Foreign Policy: The Strategies
of Confrontation and Their Consequences], in K. Rogov (ed.), Russia’s Political Development 2014–2016 (Moscow:
Fond ‘Liberal’naya Missia’ 2016) p. 68. Frolov argues that, as far as its aims in Syria are concerned, Russia used
disinformation directed at the West and at the United States in particular. Such actions fall under the rubric of
Russia’s diplomatic ‘maskirovka’.
41
D. Frolovskiy, ‘What Putin Really Wants in Syria’.
42
M. V. Kazanin, Siriiskii Konflikt: Ocenki Kitaiskikh Specialistov [Syrian Conflict: Evaluations of Chinese Specialists]
(Moscow: Institut Blizhnego Vostoka 2017) p. 73.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 9

(SDF) — a victory against an Assad regime friendly to Moscow.43 Defeating

the SDF may indeed be viewed as more important for Russian purposes than
defeating the IS (see the following).

Secondary objectives
Of course, the intervention in Syria was not completely a case of helping
an ally and of establishing Russia as a regional player. It also served the
concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ in other ways. First, this theater of
operations presented a unique opportunity for the Russian military to
gain combat experience. The personnel of Russia’s recently revamped
military have been operating in Syria in a complex operational environ­
ment and have faced a taxing enemy.44 As political scientist Dmitri
Estaf’ev has noted, Russian forces have gained experience ‘in conducting
asymmetric combat operations’ against a ‘well-armed and very well-
trained enemy’. They have additionally acquired practical skills in ‘parti­
san and counter-sabotage forms of combat’ and in enhanced coordination
between air and ground forces.45 The number of Russian troops in Syria
at any one time has not been high — in the low thousands — but some
48,000 military personnel (mostly officers) had been rotated through Syria
by the end of 2018 (the last time a figure was given). Putin himself noted
that they had undergone ‘good training’ and a ‘unique’ combat
experience.46 This experience has then been carefully studied to make
future improvements and to enhance the military’s ongoing moderniza­
tion process.47 The Russian military has become, by any measure, much
better for its Syrian experience. As a by-product, its deterrence quality
must also have been objectively enhanced.
Second, Syria has provided an environment for the testing of new weapons
(including some that can be considered to be ‘strategic’ — such as long-range

43
It should be noted that Russia had to proceed with caution in Syria given Iran’s and Hezbollah’s presence and their
support of the Syrian regime so as not to compromise Russia’s relationship with Israel. See ‘Suriye’de kim kime karşı
savaşıyor?’ [Who Is Fighting Against Whom in Syria?], T24, 30 January 2016, https://t24.com.tr/haber/suriyede-kim-
kime-karsi-savasiyor,326157.
44
See M. Barabanov, K. Makienko, and R. Pukhov, Voennaya Reforma: Na Puti k Novomy Obliku Rossiiskoi Armii [Military
Reform: On the Way to a New Appearance of the Russian Army] (Moscow: Valdai 2012).
45
‘Politolog Ocenil Opyt, Poluchennyi Rossiyskimi Voiskami v Sirii’ [Political Scientist Evaluated the Experience Gained
by Russian Troops in Syria], RIA, 28 June 2018, https://ria.ru/radio_brief/20180628/1523585196.html.
46
E. Radugin, ‘Putin o Siriyskoy Operacii: Trenirovka Dlya Rossiyskih Voysk’ [Putin On the Operation in Syria: Training
of Russian Forces], Politikus, 17 February 2018, https://politikus.ru/events/104739-putin-o-siriyskoy-operacii-trenir
ovka-rossiyskih-voysk.html.
47
‘Putin o Sirii: My Tam Dostatochno Dolgo Mozhem Trenirovatsya Bez Susshestvennogo Ussherba Dlya Byudzheta’
[Putin on Syria: We Can Train There Long Enough Without Any Significant Damage to the Budget], GordonUA,
17 December 2015, https://gordonua.com/news/worldnews/putin-o-sirii-my-tam-dostatochno-dolgo-mozhem-
trenirovatsya-bez-sushchestvennogo-ushcherba-dlya-byudzheta-111295.html; V. Gerasimov, ‘The World on the
Brink of War’; V. Baranets, ‘Nachal’nik Genshtaba Vooruzhennyh Sil Rossii General Armii Valeri Gerasimov: “My
Perelomali Hrebet Udarnym Silam Terrorizma”’ [Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Army
General Valeri Gerasimov: ‘We Broke the Backbone of Terrorism’s Strike Force’], Komsomol’skaya Pravda,
26 December 2017, https://www.kp.ru/daily/26775/3808693/.
10 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

missiles and anti-aircraft/anti-missile defense systems; see the following).48

This testing of weapons was important for several reasons. Obviously, it was
a case of seeing if new weapons actually functioned effectively under opera­
tional conditions, but it also represented a demonstration of modern Russian
military capability. The first benefit here was that it would help Moscow secure
arms sales abroad. This was important not only from the economic perspective
but also, and perhaps more importantly, from the viewpoint of Russia’s desire
to expand its geopolitical influence. This would come from building long-term
relationships with any state customers for its military hardware.49 Allies would
be cultivated.
But there was also a messaging role here. The projection of Russian military
power was an important component of the Syrian campaign and a prominent
demonstration of not just military professionalism but also of Russia’s state-
of-the-art weapons. Their use was seen as acting as a warning and thus as
a deterrent to NATO.50 This is an important aspect of the ‘strategic deterrence’
role now being fulfilled by the Russian presence in Syria. It will also be
expanded upon in the following.

The degree of commitment

Russia’s initial goal in search of its strategic endgame in Syria can thus be seen
as keeping Assad in power and preventing a regime change that could lead to
the emergence of a pro-Western government in Damascus. Certainly, it has
also been important to defeat (or at least neutralize) the IS from a Russian
domestic security point of view. More broadly, Moscow has conducted
a ‘sovereign self-assertion’ exercise in Syria that can be looked upon as
a part of Russia’s long-term plans of (re-)establishing spheres of influences —
especially in the Middle East. Additionally, the Russian military has rattled its
sabers. It has gained vital operational experience, and its weapons have been
advertised to foreign buyers. This military has displayed both its operational
efficiency and the effectiveness of its weapons. It has shown its NATO adver­
saries its considerable potential.

48
‘Kadry Zenitnogo Raketnogo Kompleksa S-400 v Sirii’ [Footage of Anti-Aircraft Missile Complex S-400 in Syria], TV
Zvezda, 26 November 2015, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201511261535-m6hb.htm;
S. E. Babkin, ‘O Voennoi Situacii v Sirii (12–19 Marta 2016)’ [On the Military Situation in Syria (12–
19 March 2016)], Institut Blizhnego Vostoka, 20 March 2016, http://www.iimes.ru/?p=27801; ‘Putin, Vysoko
Oceniv Rossiyskoe Oruzhie, Poruchil Razobratsya i s Nedochotami’ [Putin, After Highly Rating the Russian
Weapons, Ordered to Address the Shortcomings], Ria, 12 May 2016, https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20160512/
1432092358.html; V. Gerasimov, ‘Mir Na Granyah Voynu’ [The World on the Brink of War], Voenno-Promyshlenyi
Kur’er 10(674) (2017), https://vpk-news.ru/articles/35591; V. Baranets, ‘Chief of the General Staff’; O. Falichev,
‘Intellekt Dlya Samoleta [Intelligence for an Aircraft]’, Voenno-Promyshlenyi Kur’er 31(744) (2018), https://vpk-
news.ru/articles/44363.
49
‘Russian Modern Weaponry Enjoys Strong Demand Among Arab Countries’, TASS, 12 November 2018, http://tass.
com/defense/1030384.
50
From a military perspective, there was no need to use high-precision munitions. The targets could be easily struck
with normal unguided bombs.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 11

However, although all of these activities serve the aim of the ‘strategic deter­
rence’ logic, they do not satisfactorily collectively explain what appears to be
the degree of Russian commitment to the Syrian theater.
This commitment to secure Russian interests in the region was highlighted
in an article in Novaya Gazeta in July 2018.51 In this article, it was explained
why Russian troops had not been withdrawn after Putin had said that they
would be in late 2017 and after he himself had declared ‘victory’ over, at that
time, IS.52 Novaya Gazeta reported that Putin confirmed that his forces would
actually be staying in Syria for ‘as long as it was in Russia’s interests’.53 And it
certainly is ‘in Russia’s interests’ in the long term because, if nothing else, of
the need to fulfill another goal of the Russian presence in Syria. As this article
now goes on to describe, what has a special place within the ‘strategic deter­
rence’ logic is the ability, and with Assad’s acquiescence, to have powerful
Russian naval and air power assets operating from Syrian bases, along with
sophisticated air-defense systems.54 These are not present simply to defeat IS
or even the SDF. Of course, they do serve to create considerable military and
hence diplomatic leverage across the wider Middle East. More importantly
though, the majority of these assets are acting to form a security barrier
between Russia and what Moscow sees as the military threat from NATO.
This barrier now based in Syria and off its coast is a crucial contributor to the
portfolio of ‘strategic deterrence’ measures. It is known in Western circles as
an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) matrix. This Syrian system is one of
several A2/AD ‘umbrellas’ that are now arranged along or near Russia’s
borders. It will be analyzed in due course not just as an element of Russia’s
military strategy but also of its grand strategy. First though, aspects of Russia’s
military presence in Syria bear considering in more detail.

Detailing Russia’s military strategy in Syria

To fully appreciate Russia’s military strategic approach in Syria, it has to be
considered within the context set by the broader grand strategy, and as set out

51
‘Rossiya Ne Namerena Vyvodit’ Voennyh Iz Sirii’ [Russia Does Not Intend to Withdraw Military Forces from Syria],
Novaya Gazeta, 7 July 2018, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/06/07/142325-rossiya-ne-namerena-vyvo
dit-voennyh-iz-sirii.
52
‘Vladimir Putin Posetil Aviabazu Khmeimim v Sirii’ [Vladimir Putin Visited the Khmeimim Airbase in Syria], Kremlin,
11 December 2017, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56351; ‘Vladimir Putin: Rossiyskiye Voyenny’e
Vozvrashhayutsya Iz Sirii s Pobedoi’ [Vladimir Putin: Russian Military Is Returning From Syria with a Victory],
Vesti, 11 December 2017, https://www.vesti.ru/doc.html?id=2964463; ‘“Polnyi Razgrom”: Rossiya Obyavila Ob
Okonchatel’noi Pobede Nad IG* V Sirii’ [‘Complete Defeat’: Russia Announced the Final Victory Over the IS in
Syria], RIA, 6 December 2017, https://ria.ru/20171206/1510372695.html.
53
‘Rossiya Ne Namerena Vyvodit’ Voennyh Iz Sirii’ [Russia Does Not Intend to Withdraw the Military Forces from Syria],
Novaya Gazeta, 7 July 2018, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/news/2018/06/07/142325-rossiya-ne-namerena-vyvo
dit-voennyh-iz-sirii.
54
S. Blank, ‘The Real Reason Putin Is Sending Troops to Syria’, Newsweek, 27 September 2015, https://www.news
week.com/real-reason-putin-sending-troops-syria-376682; D. Gorenburg, What Russia’s Military Operation in Syria
Can Tell Us About Advances in Its Capabilities, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 424, March 2016, p. 4, http://www.
ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos-pdf/Pepm424_Gorenburg2_March2016_2.pdf.
12 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

in the NSS, of strategic deterrence. It was a flexible approach. There was no

generic military strategic template to follow; rather, the strategy in its entirety
was specifically tailored to the Syrian scenario. Throughout Russia’s involve­
ment in Syria, it was crafted and continuously readapted to better respond to
the realities on the ground. It unfolded gradually, taking into account Russia’s
capabilities and specific limitations (e.g., economic and military), as well as the
actions of Moscow’s opponents in Syria.
This military strategy relied, of course, on Russia’s own military assets but in
limited numbers; overall troop count was kept to a minimum. The principal
use of Russian force came from the Aerospace Forces (Vozdushno-
Kosmicheskiye Sily or VKS), the Special Operations Forces (SOF), ground-
based fire support, and the fire of warships operating offshore (Moscow having
secured the right to use Syria’s naval base at Tartus).55 These elements worked
in concert with each other and with Assad’s regular forces and focused on
offensive operations.56 An important element of this strategy involved Russia
seeking to delegate military tasks to various local non-state proxy actors
(discussed in the next section) to benefit from their local knowledge of the
terrain, language, and culture and from their limited logistical demands. Their
use, as with using Assad’s forces, minimized cost and avoided major Russian
casualties. Such casualties could potentially threaten the acceptance of the
Syrian adventure within Russia and thus also Putin’s domestic popularity.
As noted, this desire to keep the Russian footprint to a minimum came to be
called by Gerasimov the ‘strategy of limited actions’. The main rationale
behind this ‘strategy’, according to Gerasimov, was that it was the best way
of ‘defending and advancing [our] national interests beyond Russia’s
territory’.57 This idea of ‘limited actions’, however, and as noted, did not
necessarily equate to the limited utilization of Russian strategic assets in the
Syrian theater to serve the end of ‘strategic deterrence’.

The Russian use of force

During the campaign in Syria, air assets have proved to be central to the overall
military strategy, especially during the first phase — September 2015 to
55
For a list of locations of Russian bases in Syria, see ‘Voennye Bazy Rossii v Sirii’ [Russia’s Military Bases in Syria],
Deutsche Welle, 26 August 2016, https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B
%D0%B5-%D0%B1%D0%B0%D0%B7%D1%8B-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%B2-
%D1%81%D0%B8%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B8/a-19505851.
56
‘Operaciya Rossiyskih VKS v Sirii [Operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria]’, RIA, 11 December 2017,
https://ria.ru/20171211/1509855252.html; D. Sergeev, ‘Udar s Morya: Glavnaya Cel’ Novoi Rossiyskoi Operacii v Sirii’
[Attack from the Sea: The Main Aim of the New Russian Operation in Syria], TV Zvezda, 16 November 2016, https://
tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201611160837-55kf.htm; A. Stanavov, ‘Srovnyat’ s Zemley: Samye Moshhnye
Udary Russkogo Oruzhiya po IG* v Sirii’ [Raze to the Ground: The Most Powerful Strikes of the Russian Weapons
Against IS in Syria], RIA, 22 September 2017, https://ria.ru/20170922/1505373802.html; V. Kiselev, G. Pis’menskii,
and V. Popov, ‘Tendencii i Vozmozhnosti: Nekotorye Formy i Sposoby Vedeniya Boevyh Deystviy v Sirii’ [Trends and
Opportunities: Some Forms and Methods of Warfare in Syria], Armeiskii Sbornik 2 (February 2016) pp. 3–7.
57
V. Gerasimov, ‘General Staff’, p. 6.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 13

March 2016. The air component was critical in turning the tide on the ground;
saving the almost defeated Assad regime. This was devoid at that time of any
viable force capabilities.58
Moscow’s aims were to use close air support (CAS) to assist Syrian
ground troops and the limited numbers of its own. Sorties were launched
primarily from the Khmeimim air base but were also made from Russian
territory using long-range strategic bombers. Their task was to break up
enemy formations — namely, those of the IS and other anti-government
factions59 (including some elements of the US-backed SDF60) — and to
destroy their infrastructure.61 Indeed, according to regional and Western
sources, 80 percent of the air campaign was actually geared toward
defeating non-IS elements of the opposition to the Assad regime. As one
Syrian source put it, ‘Russia lied about targeting ISIS’.62 The first two
months (October and November 2015) of this air campaign proved in fact
to be crucial in both saving the regime and in shaping the battlefield for
future ground offensives.63
Air operations came later to be reinforced by Russia’s maritime operations.
This made use of both the Mediterranean naval task force, which has operated
off the Syrian coast since 2015, and also vessels of the Caspian Flotilla.64 The
task of the ships involved was largely (at least outwardly) to provide fire
support for ground operations in the form of strikes by Kalibr cruise missiles
(with an effective range of 2,600 km).65
These Russian warships firing their Kalibr missiles into Syria could be seen
as not just operationally of some use in the Syrian theater but also as a means
of advertising variants of this missile to foreign buyers.66 There was, however,
a much wider and much less ‘limited’ role that these Kalibrs had to fulfill. This
aspect will also be returned to.

58
C. Strack, ‘Syrian Government No Longer Controls 83% of the Country’, IHS Jane’s 360, 24 August 2015, http://www.
janes.com/article/53771/syriangovernment-no-longer-controls-83-of-the-country.
59
‘Operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Syria’.
60
‘Russian Air Strikes Hit CIA-Trained Rebels, Commander Says’, Reuters, 1 October 2015, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-camp-idUSKCN0RV4KM20151001; A. Osborn and P. Stewart, ‘Russia Says it Will Target
U.S.-Backed Fighters in Syria if Provoked’, Reuters, 21 September 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-
crisis-syria-russia/russia-says-will-target-u-s-backed-fighters-in-syria-if-provoked-idUSKCN1BW14U.
61
‘Zaharova: Rossiya Vvela VKS v Siriyu, chtoby Predotvratit’ Razval Vlasti’ [Zakharova: Russia Deployed its Air and
Space Force to Syria in Order to Prevent the Fall of its Ruler], RIA, 27 March 2016, https://ria.ru/20160327/
1398017531.html.
62
H. Almousa, ‘Russia Lied About Targeting ISIS’, Raqqa News, 20 October 2015, http://www.raqqa-sl.com/en/?p=
1515; J. Stubbs, ‘Four-Fifths of Russia’s Syria Strikes Don’t Target Islamic State: Reuters Analysis’, Reuters,
21 October 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-strikes/four-fifths-of-russias-syria-
strikes-dont-target-islamic-state-reuters-analysis-idUSKCN0SF24L20151021.
63
‘Syria Conflict: Army Launches New Aleppo Offensive’, BBC News, 16 October 2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-middle-east-34553148.
64
D. Sergeev, ‘Attack from the Sea’.
65
A. Stanavov, ‘Raze to the Ground’.
66
See, for instance, ‘Foreign Customers Eye Russian Robots After Syria Operation — State Arms Exporter’, TASS,
16 February 2017, http://tass.com/defense/931175.
14 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

Light-footprint attrition

Other elements of the Russian military strategy in Syria bear highlighting,

including the application of the concept of attrition. With only a light foot­
print itself, Russian thinking in the Syrian context had to involve taking
a gradual approach.67. Russia’s ‘minimalist’ approach (as one Turkish source
put it) unfolded gradually.68 It involved assisting government and other proxy
forces retaking one area at a time (e.g., Homs, Aleppo, Eastern Ghouta). It was
basically a fairly slow process of wearing down through the use of Russian
firepower and proxy boots on the ground.69
The proxies were essential. Thus, the first task for Russian forces on arrival in
Syria was to resurrect and then utilize Assad’s almost defeated ground troops. For
instance, the Syrian Army’s 4th Assault Corps (AC) came to initially operate
under joint Syrian-Russian command, with reinforcements from small numbers
of Russian mechanized infantry, marines, artillery, and SOF.70 However, the 4th
AC had limited success at first under this joint arrangement — notwithstanding
extensive Russian support. This led to the creation of a new AC by the end of 2016.
This came completely under Russian command. This new 5th AC then proved to
be more successful in both its defensive and offensive capabilities.71 In short, once
the Russians had taken over full command-and-control responsibilities, their
Syrian allies proved to be far more useful, both to Damascus and to Moscow.
The Russians tasked their directly commanded Syrian proxy forces with
troop-intensive offensive operations (e.g., in attriting and then defeating the IS
in Palmyra, Hama, and Deir ez-Zor in 2017) They targeted not only the
opponents’ force formations but also their logistics trains and financial sup­
port system. This latter process is referred to in Russian sources as ‘disorient­
ing the rear’.72 At the same time, the Russians, relying on Syrian military
intelligence, also used coercive diplomacy to ‘cut deals’ with various opposi­
tion groups — regardless of which foreign state backer they had. If ever such
diplomacy failed, the groups in question could be subject to ‘neutralization’
through massive air campaigns. This certainly appeared to prove effective as
a tool of coercion.73
Another important component of the attrition process in Syria was the
operations of the Russian SOF.74 Although their principle duties included
67
V. Kiselev, G. Pis’menskii and V. Popov, “Tendencii i Vozmozhnosti: Nekotorye Formy i Sposoby Vedeniya Boevyh
Deystviy v Sirii [Trends and Opportunities: Some Forms and Methods of Warfare in Syria],” Armeiskii Sbornik 2
(February 2016), 3-7
68
H. Aksay, ‘7 soruda Rusya’nın Suriye’deki üç yılı’ [Russia’s Three Years in Syria in 7 Questions], T24,
30 September 2018, http://t24.com.tr/yazarlar/hakan-aksay/7-soruda-rusyanin-suriyedeki-uc-yili,20519
69
D. Kiselev et al., ‘Trends and Opportunities’, pp. 3–7.
70
P. Malovany and N. Burgin, ‘Mother Russia Holds the Reigns’, Israel Defense (Winter 2018) pp. 26–27.
71
Ibid., pp. 27–28.
72
D. Kiselev et al., ‘Trends and Opportunities’.
73
K. Alam, ‘Russia’s Strategy in Syria Shows How to Win a Middle East War’, Middle East Eye, 8 July 2018, https://www.
middleeasteye.net/opinion/russias-strategy-syria-shows-how-win-middle-east-war.
74
S. Sukhanin, ‘Russian Special Operations Forces: Image vs Substance’, Eurasia Daily Monitor 16(43) (March 2019),
https://jamestown.org/program/russian-special-operations-forces-image-versus-substance.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 15

reconnaissance activity and serving as ‘eyes on the ground’ to guide the

precision weapons of Russian aircraft,75 their tasks went further. The SOF
also engaged in independent and direct combat activities, according to the
then-Commander of the Russian Armed Forces in Syria, Colonel General
Aleksandr Dvornikov (September 2015 to June 2016).76 One of the main
SOF assignments has been to eliminate high-value targets (e.g., commanders
in opposition groups) — that is, ‘targeted killings’.77 The SOF accomplished
such tasks with ‘great success’, said Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu.78
Moreover, the SOF also proved to be crucial in wearing down and destabilizing
the various adversary groups the Russians faced not simply through direct
attacks but also in a more nuanced fashion by instigating ‘small wars’ between
these groups along the front lines. The aim was to generally weaken such
adversaries so as to prepare the battleground for the later arrival of formations
of Syrian government forces who would thus be faced with a weaker and more
divided opposition.79 Overall, the activities of these SOF were, according to the
Lebanese newspaper Al Modon (which examined them), very effective.80
The regular Russian forces also made use of the personnel of private
military companies (PMCs), employing predominantly Russian citizens. One
such actor was the Wagner Group. According to Russian sources, this was first
deployed to Syria as early as fall 2015.81 Its operations were conducted under
the auspices of former personnel of the GRU (GU) and of the Russian
domestic security agency, the FSB.82 Wagner’s activities in Syria have been

75
The SOF would provide target coordinates to bombers such as Tu-22M3s, Tu-95MCs, Su-24s, and Su-25s, which
were equipped with SVP-24 ‘Gefest’ — a digital sighting system that allows for more precision when using
unguided bombs. See, for instance, ‘Novaya Sistema “Gefest” Pozvolyayet Ispol’zovat’ Nekorrektiruyemye
Boepripasy kak Vysokotochnye’ [New System ‘Gefest’ Allows for the Precise Use of Unguided Munitions], TASS,
25 August 2017, https://tass.ru/armiya-i-opk/4507779; A. Ramm and D. Litovkin, ‘“Medvedi” Uvidyat Celi V Tylu
Vraga’ [‘Bears’ Will See Targets Behind the Enemy Lines], Izvestia, 28 June 2017, https://iz.ru/609062/aleksei-ramm/
medvedi-uvidiat-tceli-v-tylu-vraga.
76
A. Dvornikov, ‘Siria: Russkiy Grom’ [Syria: Russian Thunder], interview by Yuri Gavrilov, Rossiyskaya Gazeta —
Federal’nyi Vypusk No. 6939.21, 23 March 2016, https://rg.ru/2016/03/23/aleksandr-dvornikov-dejstviia-rf-v-korne-
perelomili-situaciiu-v-sirii.html.
77
D. Byman, ‘Do Targeted Killings Work’, Foreign Affairs (March/April 2006) p. 104.
78
‘Defense Chief Praises Russian Military’s Success in Syria’, TASS, 22 February 2017, http://tass.com/defense/932437.
79
R. Krecul and A. Ramm, ‘Boevye Prigrady: Kak Siriiskaya Operaciya Izmenila Razvedku’ [Battle Barriers: How the
Syrian Operation Changed Intelligence], Izvestiya, 24 October 2018, https://iz.ru/803382/roman-kretcul-aleksei-
ramm/boevye-pregrady-kak-siriiskaia-operatciia-izmenila-razvedku.
80
M. Al-Haj Ali, ‘En Alasetkhebarat Alerwesyh Fey Sewreya’ [About Russian Intelligence in Syria], Al Modon,
25 October 2018, http://www.almodon.com/opinion/2018/10/22/.
81
I. Rozhdestvenskii, A. Baev, and P. Rusyaeva, ‘Prizraky Voyny: Kak V Sirii Poyavilas’ Rossiyskaya Chastnaya Armiya’
[Ghosts of War: How the Russian Private Army Appeared in Syria], RBC, 25 August 2016, https://www.rbc.ru/
magazine/2016/09/57bac4309a79476d978e850d; ‘Ih Prosto Net. Rassledovanie’ [They Simply Do Not Exist.
Investigation], Novaya Gazeta, 9 October 2017, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2017/10/09/74125-ih-
prosto-net; A. Taylor, ‘What We Know About the Shadowy Russian Mercenary Firm Behind an Attack on U.S.
Troops in Syria’, Washington Post, 23 February 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/
2018/02/23/what-we-know-about-the-shadowy-russian-mercenary-firm-behind-the-attack-on-u-s-troops-in-syria;
‘Syria War: Who Are Russia’s Shadowy Wagner Mercenaries?’, BBC, 23 February 2018, https://www.bbc.com/news/
world-europe-43167697; see also N. Hauer, ‘The Rise and Fall of a Russian Mercenary Army’, Foreign Policy,
6 October 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/06/rise-fall-russian-private-army-wagner-syrian-civil-war/.
82
I. Rozhdestvenskii, A. Baev, and P. Rusyaeva, ‘Ghosts of War’; T. Grove, ‘Up To Nine Russian Contractors Die in Syria,
Experts Say’, Wall Street Journal, 18 December 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/up-to-nine-russian-contractors-
die-in-syria-experts-say-1450467757.
16 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

seen as essential in increasing Russia’s military effectiveness.83 Wagner, how­

ever, was not the only military contractor operating in Syria. Shchit (Shield),
for instance, has also provided personnel specifically to guard the installations
of the Russian gas company, Stroitransgaz, in central Syria. Some of this firm’s
men have died in combat.84
The Russians also made use of other proxies in the form of local non-state
armed groups, most notably the Syrian-Kurdish Yekineyen Parastina Gel —
that is, the People’s Protection Units or YPG. These operated out of the
Kurdish-majority regions of northern Syria. The YPG (which Western
Coalition forces also used85) represented a viable force option for the
Russians to employ in the Kurdish areas. In such areas, the Arabs of Assad’s
government forces were deeply unpopular and thus could not be used as
proxies by the Russians.86
Moscow sought to capitalize on the YPG’s distinct qualities.87 Its fighters
were an important source of intelligence and had considerable discipline and
a determination to fight to carve out their own autonomous area. The YPG
turned out to be the most effective regional opponent of the IS, and Russian
forces conducted a series of successful joint operations with them.88 In the
northern province of Aleppo, for instance, the YPG played an important role
in helping break up both the forces of the IS and of another regional Islamist
actor, Jebhat al-Nusra.89 In the province of Deir ez-Zor — which had
a strategic importance not only because of its oil fields but also as
a stronghold of the IS — YPG and Russian forces conducted joint
operations.90 In 2017, the Russian Air Force provided the YPG with CAS to
enable it to conduct offensives against the IS east of the Euphrates River. In
return, the YPG ensured protection for Russian troops operating on the east
bank — territory that had been nominally under the control of the SDF (which
included the YPG) and its US ally.91

83
I. Rozhdestvenskii, A. Baev, and P. Rusyaeva, ‘Ghosts of War’.
84
D. Korotkov, ‘Bez Shchita’ [Without a Shield], Novaya Gazeta, 28 June 2019, https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/
2019/07/28/81406-bez-schita.
85
The degree of withdrawal here is a point of debate. See J. Schogol, ‘Up to 600 US Troops Could Remain in Syria,
Milley Says’, Task & Purpose, 10 November 2019, https://taskandpurpose.com/troops-remain-syria-2641297197.
86
R. Thornton, ‘Problems With the Kurds as Proxies Against Islamic State: Insights From the Siege of Kobane’, Small
Wars & Insurgencies 26(6) (2015) pp. 865–85, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1095844.
87
‘Plemya Izgo’ev: Mogut Li Kurdy Izmenit’ Kartu Mira’ [The Rogue Tribe: Can the Kurds Change the World Map],
Russia Today, 3 March 2016, https://russian.rt.com/article/151653.
88
See, for instance, YPG’s role in retaking Kobani: ‘YPG Retakes the Entire City of Ayn Al-Arab “Kobani” After 112 Days
of Clashes With IS Militants’, Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 26 January 2015, http://www.syriahr.com/en/
2015/01/ypg-retakes-the-entire-city-of-ayn-al-arab-kobani-after-112-days-of-clashes-with-is-militants-2/.
89
A. Dvornikov, ‘Syria: Russian Thunder’.
90
A. Misa, ‘Why Syria and the U.S. Clashed for Control East of the Euphrates’, Syria Deeply, 14 February 2018, https://
www.newsdeeply.com/syria/articles/2018/02/14/why-syria-and-the-u-s-clashed-for-control-east-of-the-euphrates;
S. M. Drwish, ‘Deir Ezzor: An Unbalanced Equation in the Syrian Conflict’, Atlantic Council, 21 February 2018, http://
www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/deir-ezzor-an-unbalanced-equation-in-the-syrian-conflict.
91
‘Kurds to Provide Security For Russian Task Force on Eastern Bank of Euphrates River’, TASS, 4 December 2017,
http://tass.com/defense/978971; N. Hacıoğlu, ‘YPG, Russia Meeting “Evaluated Steps to Take After ISIL”: Russian
Defense Ministry’, Hürriyet, 5 December 2017, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/ypg-russia-meeting-evaluated-
steps-to-take-after-isil-russian-defense-ministry-123603.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 17

The relationship with its YPG proxy in the north of Syria has been hugely
beneficial for Russian forces, both in terms of generating military effectiveness
but also in terms of gaining combat experience alongside a group well versed
in irregular warfare. The YPG, like the Syrian 5th AC and the Russian PMCs,
provided the boots on the ground that allowed the Russian approach of using
a light footprint and gradual attrition to work effectively. Overall, the Russian
employment of these proxies seems to have been adroitly handled, and they
provided a significant force multiplier that was a major contributor in allowing
the Russian ‘strategy of limited actions’ to prove a very effective one on the
ground in Syria.92

Non-kinetic means
The final point to make in terms of this ‘strategy of limited actions’ concerns
the use of non-kinetic means. The success of this strategy was considerably
enhanced by such means. At the highest echelons, the activities of the Russian
military were supported by adept diplomatic maneuverings, particularly in
regard to the presence of Iranian93 and Saudi-backed forces on the ground in
Syria.94 Another tool was information warfare. The aim was to control, at all
levels, the information space and thereby the ‘narrative’ vis-à-vis Syria as much
as possible. At the grand strategic level, the information realm saw significant
Russian online troll activity used, on a worldwide basis, to discredit the West’s
intervention in Syria and to support that of Russia.95 But also, in more
operational and tactical terms, information warfare was very much evident
in the form of electronic warfare (EW), a great strength of the Russian
military.96 EW systems were again a considerable force multiplier for the
Russians in terms of their disruption of information passage. They were
used to try to ‘paralyze’ opponents — both non-state and state — at various
levels, including through activities such as disabling satellites, radars, and

92
‘Kurds to Provide Security’.
93
‘Rol’ Rossii, Turcii I Irana v Siriyskom Uregulirovanii. Dos’e’ [The Role of Russia, Turkey and Iran in Syrian Settlement.
Dossier], TASS, 3 April 2018, https://tass.ru/info/5091128.
94
E. Rumer, ‘Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None’, Carnegie Endowment, 31 October 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/10/31/russia-in-middle-east-jack-of-all-trades-master-of-none-pub-80233;
F. Garner, ‘Saudi Arabia Warms to Russia’s Embrace’, BBC, 16 October 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
middle-east-50054546.
95
A. A. Shevtsov, ‘Informacionnaya Strategiya RF na Primere Voennogo Konflikta v Sirii’ [Information Strategy of the
Russian Federation in the Example of the Syrian Military Conflict], Kommunikologiya 3(1) (2018) pp. 59–67;
M. B. Dinçaslan, ‘Kremlin Trollerinin Temel Özellikleri’ [The Main Features of the Kremlin Trolls], Kırım Haber
Ajansı QHA, 10 September 2016, http://old.qha.com.ua/tr/fikir-yazilai/kremlin-trollerinin-temel-ozellikleri/148910/.
96
A. Ramm, B. Stepovoi, and A. Kozachenko, ‘Radioelektronnyi Shchit: Minoborony Razvorachivayet v Sirii Sredstva
REB’ [Radio-Electronic Shield: Ministry of Defense Is Amplifying Electronic Warfare Means in Syria], Izvestiya,
25 September 2018, https://iz.ru/792721/aleksei-ramm-bogdan-stepovoi-aleksei-kozachenko/radioelektronnyi-
shchit-minoborony-razvorachivaet-v-sirii-sredstva-reb; P. McLeary, ‘Russia Is Winning Info & Electronic War in
Syria, US & UK Generals Warn’, Breaking Defense, 9 October 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/russia-
winning-information-electronic-war-over-syria-us-uk-generals-warn/; J. Keller, ‘After Experiencing Russian
Jamming Up Close in Syria, the Pentagon Is Scrambling to Catch Up’, Business Insider, 3 June 2019, https://www.
businessinsider.com/pentagon-focus-on-electronic-warfare-after-russian-jamming-in-syria-2019-6?IR=T.
18 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

communication devices. The general effect produced was to enable the

Russian military component and its proxies to operate with both an increased
freedom of maneuver and greater control of the battlespace.97

The military strategy

Overall, this ‘strategy of limited actions’ adopted by the Russian military in
Syria falls squarely into the current understanding of contemporary military
strategy as offered by Gerasimov. Whereas Gray had highlighted the ‘use of
force’ and the ‘threat’ of such force as part of his definition of military strategy,
Gerasimov had not. The use of force in Russian military strategy is no longer
the central component it once was. This is evident in the notion of ‘strategic
deterrence’, and it has been evident in Russia’s Syria campaign. As part of the
‘strategy of limited actions’, the use of Russia’s military capabilities (air,
mostly) in tactical engagements has been limited, and to achieve their objec­
tives the Russians have employed and supported not just Assad’s forces but
also the personnel of Russian PMCs and the YPG. Indeed, once the capabilities
of the Syrian government forces had been improved, the need to make
extensive use of Air Force assets gradually declined,98 thereby further limiting
Moscow’s direct engagement. Similarly, Gerasimov’s ‘non-military’ and non-
kinetic measures have also continued throughout the conflict to good effect.99
All such activities are core to the ‘strategy of limited actions’. This did not
mean, however, that Russia’s operation in Syria was in any way limited in
strategic intent.

Deterrence: Anti-access/area denial in Syria and beyond

During its Syrian campaign, Russia’s approach has included military activities
that may be seen as not just geared to military strategic but also to grand
strategic aims (‘policy goals’, to quote Gray).100 There was a need to gain allies,
for instance, and to conduct acts of ‘sovereign self-assertion’ to gain influence
in the wider Middle East. These goals, it could be argued, do not seem to fit the
idea of ‘limited actions’. However, what Moscow has skillfully done, it seems,
is to have leveraged its limited actions into significant strategic effect. Indeed,
one particular aspect of the Russian Syrian operation demonstrates how
Moscow is using it to gain strategic effect not just regionally but also much
further afield. This is to help deter any possible NATO aggressive military
action against the Russian homeland.
97
A. Ramm, B. Stepovoi, and A. Kozachenko, ‘Radio-Electronic Shield’; P. McLeary, ‘Russia Is Winning’; J. Keller,
‘Experiencing Russian Jamming’.
98
‘Operation of the Russian Aerospace Forces’.
99
V. Gerasimov, ‘General Staff Is Planning Strikes’, p. 6.
100
C. S. Gray, The Strategy Bridge, p. 19.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 19

One of the most important elements in this regard has been the creation of the
aforementioned Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) umbrella in Syria. The
main idea behind any A2/AD arrangement (consisting of a series of defensive
weapons systems) is for the party setting it up to deny any state adversary and
its military assets access to a specific area/region or to severely limit that
adversary’s ability to operate its military assets in that area/region.101
As a primary factor in establishing this A2/AD umbrella in Syria, Russia has
deployed two S-400 surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries capable of engaging
aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and cruise missiles within a range of
250 km to 400 km (and theoretically, ballistic missiles within a range of 60 km to
400 km).102 The first deployment of S-400s took place in November 2015
following an incident when a Russian Su-24 was shot down by a Turkish aircraft
near the Syrian-Turkish border.103 The second, in June 2017, was close to the
city of Masyaf (northwest Syria).104 In addition to these SAM systems, in
October 2016, Russia also sited the latest S-300V4 at Tartus — its naval base
in Syria.105 The S-300 can engage aircraft and even mid-range ballistic missiles
within a 400 km range.106 The main purpose behind the setting up of these
systems, as pointed out in 2016 by Major-General Igor Konashenkov — the
official spokesman of the Russian Ministry of Defense — was to protect both
Russian and Syrian forces from ‘Western’ attacks within Syria.107 The range of
these missile systems though covers not only the airspace above Syria but also
a substantial portion of the Eastern Mediterranean land and maritime region. As
such, and given the capabilities and the range of the Russian SAMs, this A2/AD
arrangement has been not only protecting Russian military assets in Syria; it is
also limiting the US-led Coalition’s air operations over and near the country.
The Coalition would have to seek Russian authorization to operate in the
environs of Syrian airspace. Russia had thus created a system with
a considerable ability to control the military activities of all the state actors
involved in Syria — achieved through the creation of virtual air supremacy.

101
S. J. Tangredi, Anti-Access Warfare: Countering A2/AD Strategies (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 2013) pp. 1–3.
102
Missile Defense Project, ‘S-400 Triumph’, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 4 May 2017,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/s-400-triumf/. Prior to deploying the S-400, Russia had deployed its short-
range — 20 km range — Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) to Syria. See D. Williams, ‘Russia Sending Advanced Air
Defenses to Syria: Sources’, Reuters, 15 September 2015, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-
arms-idUSKCN0RB1Q020150911.
103
‘Intsindent s Samoletom Su-24: Reakciya Rossiiskih Politikov’ [Incident with the Su-24 Aircraft: Reaction of Russian
Politicians], TASS, 24 November 2015, https://tass.ru/politika/2467278.
104
J. Binnie and S. O’Connor, ‘Second Russian S-400 in Syria Confirmed’, IHS Janes, 24 September 2017, http://www.
janes.com/article/74500/second-russian-s-400-in-syria-confirmed.
105
‘Minoborony Podtverdilo Otpravku v Siriyu Batarei S-300’ [MoD Confirmed the Deployment of S-300 System to
Syria], Interfax, 4 October 2016, https://www.interfax.ru/russia/531103; ‘MO RF: ZRS S-300V4 Podtverdila Sosobnost’
Porazhat’ Celi do 400km’ [MoD RF: AAMS S-300V4 Confirmed a Capability to Strike Targets up to 400 km], RIA,
10 January 2015, https://ria.ru/20150110/1041996381.html.
106
‘Rossiyskiye Voyennye Rasskazali o Celyakh S-300 v Sirii’ [Russian Officers Explained the Aims of S-300 in Syria],
Lenta, 4 October 2016, https://lenta.ru/news/2016/10/04/kompleks/.
107
‘Minoborony RF: Radius Deystviya S-300 i S-400 Uvidit Lyubyye Noopoznanyye Obyekty’ [MoD of the Russian
Federation: S-300 and S-400 Active Range Will Detect Any Unrecognized Objects], TASS, 6 October 2016, https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=OLCNAwC1LqQ.
20 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

In September 2018, the degree of control this A2/AD matrix exercised increased.
The impetus for this expansion was another incident, whereby a Russian IL-20
surveillance aircraft had been mistakenly shot down by an older S-200 operated
by Syrian forces.108 This prompted Moscow to provide the Syrians with more
advanced S-300s to (allegedly) lessen the chance of future mishaps. But this also
of course increased the capacity for Russian control of Syrian airspace. In
addition, Moscow then deployed more EW systems to Syria to further tighten
control of this airspace.109 Such moves increased Russian regional influence as
Syria’s neighbors, such as Lebanon, welcomed the new deployments in the hope
that they would help bring ‘stability’ to Syria (as well as to the Palestinian
Territories, Jordan, Iraq, and to Lebanon itself) by helping to constrain Israeli
air power.110 The Western reaction has been, perhaps unsurprisingly, much less
welcoming. This additional SAM deployment by the Kremlin was described by
US Army General Joseph Votel as a ‘knee-jerk response’ (to the downing of the
Russian aircraft) and an attempt to strengthen the Syrian military; which would
of course also strengthen it against Israel.111 The French Foreign Ministry was
also concerned that the deployment of the new SAM systems would stand in the
way of a peaceful settlement to the conflict.112 Although, overall, the Western
powers regarded this Russian move as a destabilizing act, the United States did
nonetheless prove to be willing (or maybe forced to be willing) to move further
in terms of negotiating with Moscow over de-conflicting the airspace over
Syria.113 It seemed that Moscow, while originally losing an aircraft and its
crew, had through its ‘knee-jerk’ reaction actually gained increased regional
leverage.

108
According to the official Ministry of Defense spokesman, Major General Konashenkov, Russian SAM systems
designated for export are not equipped with Identification Friend or Foe systems given that these are unique for
each country. Without IFF, the aircraft was identified as ‘hostile’ due to the presence of Israeli F-16s. See V. Maslova,
‘“Diletantskiye Fantazii”: V Minoborony RF Oprovergli Versiyu Krusheniya IL-20 iz-za Sboya Sistemy “Svoi Chuzhoi”’
[‘Amateurish Fantasies’: The MoD of the Russian Federation Denied the Version Regarding the Crash of IL-20 Due to
the Failure of the Identification ‘Friend or Foe’], Russia Today, 20 September 2018, https://ru.rt.com/bx9e. Although
the exact reasons for the incident are not known, based on the available data some sources suggest that the Syrian
S-200 system was faced with several ‘targets’ (Israeli F-16s, the Russian IL-20, and possible decoys reinforced by EW
activity) and engaged whatever was within its range, namely, the IL-20. See T. Demerly and D. Cenciotti, ‘Let’s
Recap Everything We Know About the Russian IL-20m Shot Down by a Syrian S-200 Missile System Yesterday’, The
Aviationist, 19 September 2018, https://theaviationist.com/2018/09/19/lets-recap-everything-we-know-about-the-
russian-il-20m-shot-down-by-a-syrian-s-200-missile-system-yesterday/.
109
‘Anezmh Aletshewyesh Weslet Ela Sewreya wal es-300 Sethemy Kamel Hedwedha’ [The Jamming Systems
Reaching Syria and the S-300 Will Protect All Its Borders], Al-Mayadeen, 25 September 2018, http://www.almayad
een.net; A. Ramm, B. Stepovoi, and A. Kozachenko, ‘Radio-Electronic Shield’.
110
‘The Jamming Systems Reached Syria’.
111
P. Stewart, ‘U.S. General Slams Russia’s Deployment of S-300 Missiles in Syria’, Reuters, 4 October 2018, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-russia/u-s-general-slams-russias-deployment-of-s-300-missiles-in-syria-
idUSKCN1ME1UG.
112
‘Russia Deployment of S-300 in Syria Risks Military Escalation: France’, Reuters, 5 October 2018, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-missiles/russia-deployment-of-s-300-in-syria-risks-military-escalation-
france.
113
A. Sharkovski, ‘Smozhet li Rossia sozdat’ nadezhnuyu sistemu PVO v Sirii’ [Can Russia Create a Reliable Air Defense
System in Syria], Nezavisimoye Oboronnoe Vooruzhenie, 3 October 2018, http://www.ng.ru/armies/2018-10-03/2_
7324_syria.html; A. Roque, ‘With S-300 Fielded in Syria, US Prepares to Deconflict with Moscow’, IHS Jane’s Defense
Weekly, 4 October 2018, https://www.janes.com/article/83558/with-s-300-fielded-in-syria-us-prepares-to-decon
flict-with-moscow.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 21

Russia’s A2/AD arrangement in Syria has thus served to give all the second-
party actors involved in the Syrian conflict — including the Israelis — sig­
nificant pause for thought in regard to their own operations. It has increased
Russia’s ability to influence events in the region. However, the true significance
of this umbrella and thus indeed of the entire Russian operation in Syria may
be seen in its contribution to Russia’s doctrinally advertised non-nuclear
strategic deterrence approach.114
For this A2/AD matrix has a crucial strategic deterrence role, given its ability
not only to protect Russian ground and air assets in Syria and to project regional
influence but also to protect the Russian naval vessels operating off the coast.
These are the vessels (frigates, corvettes, submarines) armed with the 2,600 km-
range Kalibr missiles. Were these long-range, highly sophisticated and very
expensive missiles really only being fired into Syria from the Mediterranean to
hit a few terrorist hideouts and to advertise Russian armaments? 115
Dmitry Gorenburg, for one, thinks not. He argues that the use of the Kalibrs
was primarily for strategic deterrent purposes. ‘The real goal’, he stresses, ‘was
to show NATO military planners . . . that Russia has a new standoff land-attack
missile capability that can be difficult to neutralize’.116 His point is that as well
as hitting IS targets in Syria, these missiles fired from the Eastern
Mediterranean could just as easily strike NATO targets (capital cities, military
headquarters, logistics hubs, troop concentrations) across most of Europe.
And they would be ‘difficult to neutralize’ because the vessels they would be
fired from can operate largely safe from NATO attack beneath the extended
cover of the A2/AD umbrella based ashore in Syria. As such, and in Kremlin
logic, this would help in deterring NATO from launching any possible future
offensive action against Russia itself (principally using PGS). There is clear
messaging here: Russia has very effective strategic non-nuclear missiles
(although nuclear warheads can be fitted to Kalibrs), and if it was quite
prepared to use them in Syria, then it must also be quite prepared to use
them against NATO targets in Europe.117
Thus, in one sense and in contrast to what has been described by Gerasimov
as a ‘strategy of limited actions’, elements of the Russian operation in Syria
have not been so limited in terms of their broader strategic effect. Firing the
Kalibrs against Syrian targets appears to be very much part of the grand
strategy of ‘strategic deterrence’.
Of course, this particular Syrian A2/AD system could potentially also be
used in an offensive manner by Russia for coercive purposes across the Middle

114
R. Thornton, ‘Countering Prompt Global Strike’; J. Altman, ‘Russia’s A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Growing
Risk’, Naval War College Review 69(1) (2016) pp. 72–84.
115
R. Thornton, ‘Countering Prompt Global Strike’.
116
D. Gorenburg, What Russia’s Military Operation Can Tell Us, p. 4.
117
M. Cecire, ‘NATO Is Focusing on The Wrong Russian Threat in Eastern Europe’, World Politics Review,
26 October 2018, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/26598/nato-is-focusing-on-the-wrong-russian-
threat-in-eastern-europe.
22 R. THORNTON AND M. MIRON

East or indeed to cover for any military adventurism of its own in the
region.118 But again, in such a light, it looks far from being part of a ‘limited’
measure.
The benefits at both the military strategic and grand strategic levels gener­
ated by this A2/AD umbrella in Syria was further in effect reinforced in
July 2019 by the sale by Putin of S-400 systems to Turkey. Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan described these as the most powerful SAMs
available.119 This deal between Russia and Turkey — which has helped to
strengthen the relationship between two countries that have traditionally been
historic enemies — has created a major problem for the United States and
NATO.120 In essence, through this sale, Moscow has managed to obtain both
a military foothold and thus significant leverage within a NATO country. This
could very well be built on in the near future. Russia, through the simple sale of
a SAM system, is thus undermining the edifice that is NATO. And as NATO is
weakened, Russia, in zero-sum terms, is thus strengthened. This again very
much serves the idea of ‘strategic deterrence’.

Grand and military strategies

The initial aim of Russia’s military strategic approach of ‘limited actions’ in
Syria was to prevent Assad’s regime from falling but without Moscow over­
committing its own forces. Russian air and naval power were employed along
with small numbers of ground troops, including SOF. Use was made of proxy
forces, of coercion, of information warfare, and of efforts to divide opposition
elements. In the end, Moscow managed to keep Assad in power and helped to
defeat the IS while avoiding major troop losses or diplomatic fallout. Beyond
immediate priorities, the military strategy chosen also directly contributed to
Russia gaining long-term geopolitical goals. Moscow has established itself as
a significant arbiter through its adept use of the aforementioned ‘actions’,
through its nuanced diplomacy, and through its intimidatory A2/AD presence
of much that now happens in Syria and the Middle East. It has successfully
supported an ally and engaged in ‘sovereign self-assertion’. Additionally,
Moscow has managed to do this while at the same time gaining combat
experience for its military, using its force presence to send a deterrent message

118
R. McDermott, ‘Moscow’s S-300 Double Bluff in Syria’, Eurasia Daily Monitor, 12 October 2018, https://www.
realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/10/12/moscows_s-300_double_bluff_in_syria_113890.html.
119
‘V Turcii Prizemlilsya Desyatyi Samolet s Komponentami S-400’ [The 10th Aircraft Carrying S-400 Components
Landed in Turkey]’, RIA, 16 July 2019, https://ria.ru/20190716/1556559052.html.
120
N. Turak, ‘Washington Wants to Sanction Turkey Over Its Russian Arms Deal — But It Could Backfire’, CNBC,
17 July 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/17/how-us-sanctions-on-turkey-over-russian-s400-deal-could-back
fire.html. For more information on the possible reasons for Turkey’s preference for Russia, see A. Stein, ‘Why
Turkey Turned Its Back on the United States and Embraced Russia’, Foreign Affairs, 9 July 2019, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2019-07-09/why-turkey-turned-its-back-united-states-and-embraced-russia;
L. Pitel and H. Foy, ‘Turkey’s Embrace of Russia Leaves US out in Cold’, Financial Times, 18 July 2019, https://www.ft.
com/content/a8ede83c-a96e-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04.
 THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES 23

to NATO, and sowing division in the Alliance through its arms sales to
Turkey. All of these measures have of course been used to support Russia’s
‘strategic deterrence’ goal as laid out in the NSS of 2015.
The Kremlin leadership and its military could have made many missteps in
Syria, but these appear to have been, by and large, adroitly avoided. Moscow
has been involved in a complex ‘duel’ in Syria and emerged as the unqualified
‘victor’. The military strategy used in Syria has not required Russia to commit
significant resources, and yet it has achieved what can only be seen as success.
And whatever positive effect has been generated on the military strategic level
has also been directly translated to and capitalized upon on the grand strategic
level as well. This success has been achieved specifically because the military
effort has been neatly integrated into Moscow’s overarching grand strategic
design and with a constant and ongoing feedback between the layers of grand
and military strategy. This speaks of no little skill. There may be a lesson here
for the United States and for NATO.

Notes on contributors
Marina Miron is a fluent Russian speaker and gained her PhD in Strategic Studies in 2018 from
the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. Prior to her
doctoral studies, she received a BA in Politics and American Studies and an MA in War and
Contemporary Conflict from the University of Nottingham Since 2012, she has worked as an
assistant editor for the Military Strategy Magazine Infinity Journal. She is currently a Research
Fellow at the Centre for Military Ethics at King’s College London, and an honorary researcher
in military science at the Colombian War College in Bogota. Her research interests include
Russian operations in Syria, strategic theory, theory of war, Clausewitz’s thought, ancient
military thought, cyber-warfare, artificial intelligence, and military ethics.
Rod Thornton is an associate professor in the Defence Studies Department of King’s College
London based at the UK’s Defence Academy at Shrivenham. As a British infantry soldier in the
Cold War, Rod studied the Soviet military. After military service, he took a degree in Russian
and Serbo-Croat and went on to take two masters’ degrees and a PhD. He has also taught at the
University of Nottingham, the University of Erbil in Iraq, and at the Qatari Defence Academy.
His current research is on Russian military strategy, operations, and tactics, particularly as they
relate to the use of cyber and AI and five-domain warfare.

ORCID
Marina Miron http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3695-6541
Rod Thornton http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9566-8956