What is Ethical Relativism?

Recall that in lessons 2, we emphasized the fact that personal morality is acquired from
various sources and factors. For this reason, persons tend to make value judgments based on
moral standards that may not be valid to all persons and to various contexts. In lesson 3, we
argued therefore for the need to arrive at moral principles that have universal validity, that
prevail over other values, and are based on the adequacy of reason that supports them. Ethics,
we argued, is the philosophical discipline that can achieve that. Through Ethics, we can
establish objective moral standards that can stand as universal principles that apply to all
people regardless of race, age, culture, gender, ideology, or religion.
The above reading, however, threatens our notion of such universally valid moral
standards true for all. If the above observation is true, then morality is no other than a set of
culturally bound standards. This would mean The main points of Cultural Relativism according to
that Ethics as thinking about morality is James Rachels (pages 18-19):
therefore impossible. Morality therefore is 1. Different societies have different moral codes.
not objective but relative to each culture. 2. The moral code of that society determines what is
There are, therefore, various moral codes in right within that society; that means, something is
every culture, and each has no privileged right in a society and only in that society.
3. There is no objective standard that can be used to
status over the other. This view is called judge one society’s code better than another’s.
Cultural Relativism (Rachels 2003, 18). 4. The moral code of our own society has no special
status; it is merely one among many.
Without a universal standard for 5. There is no “universal truths” in Ethics; that is,
morality, there are no standards against there are no moral truths that hold for all peoples
which we can judge a cultural norm to be at all times.
right or wrong. Cultural relativism argues that 6. It is mere arrogance for us to try to judge the
each culture has its own values valid only for conduct of other peoples. We should adopt an
attitude of tolerance toward the practices of other
their people. As a consequence, morality cultures.
then is relative—what is right varies from one
person
to another, and from one culture to another. This view of morality is called Ethical Relativism
(Mabaquiao and Evangelista 2020, 12).
The view that morality varies from one person to another is called ethical subjectivism
(individual ethical relativism). This means that a person has his/her own moral standards and
what is right or wrong depends solely on his/her standard. From this view, the value judgment
of an individual is an attitude, preference, or opinion and there can be no other standards out
there which can be used to judge that standard since morality is personal. Ethical subjectivism
therefore makes a value judgment and reasoning this way: “an act is morally right or wrong
depending on the approval or disapproval of the person of interest” (Mabaquiao and
Evangelista 2020, 13).
What is the consequence of this view if accepted? For instance, there was this burglar
who was interviewed a few months ago and asked why he broke into another’s house. He
claimed that the owner did not close their house so he was tempted to do so and added, in a
manner of advice, that we should all secure our homes before leaving so that burglars won’t be
tempted. It appears that in the mind of the burglar, he was right in doing so because it is wrong
for the owner of the house to leave their properties unattended. So, what is right of an
individual is the right thing to do regardless whether it is not right for another. The basis for
what is right or wrong is in one’s personal morality—ethical subjectivism.
Would you agree to this? Let us hope not! For if this is the case, there is nothing to gain
in thinking about morality and letting this be would of course result to chaos and unending
dispute among individuals who can insist on their own version of good or bad. Thinking about
morality—Ethics—is our way of resolving conflicting values among individuals so we can build a
better society and promote a good life.
The view that morality varies from one culture to another is called ethical
conventionalism (cultural ethical relativism). The difference this view has from ethical
subjectivism is that at least it considers the social nature of morality by claiming that there are
valid moral principles by virtue of cultural acceptance. That means, there are moral standards
accepted by members of a certain cultural group. It however rejects the notion of universal
moral principles valid for all. It is still relativism because, while morality is no longer a personal
matter, it is rather a cultural one—valid only for people who share the same culture, traditions,
and customs. Other cultures can also have their own moral standards. But there can be no
universally valid standards which can be used to judge the moral standards of one culture or
another. This is precisely the point shown by our two examples above; the Callatians, Greeks,
and Eskimos.

Arguments for Cultural and Ethical Relativism

There are people who agree with cultural relativism and its consequence to our
understanding of morality as ethical conventionalism. There are three arguments that support
this as presented by Mabaquiao and Evangelista (2020, 14-16) in their book, Ethics.
1. Diversity Argument—There is strong evidence that cultures are unique on their own
and each has their own moral views and standards. There is therefore a variety of
moral beliefs in various cultures. Muslim societies observe polygamy, most western
societies accept homosexual union, Eskimos practice infanticide, Callatians eat their
dead, and many more to mention. Moreover, there is also evidence that moral
standards change over time. Women before cannot work because their role as home
caregivers as it were was essential to society. Slavery was considered right over a
hundred years ago. Views about the morality of abortion, euthanasia, and same-sex
marriage changed over time in every society. All this contradicts the notion of a
universally valid set of moral principles that Ethics hopes to establish. These
evidences can explain the nature of morality in favor of cultural and ethical
relativism. This leads to the second argument in favor of cultural and ethical
relativism.

2. Dependency Argument—morality depends on and are mere products of an

individual’s particular social environment. This social environment refers to cultural
norms, customs, traditions, and religious traditions that surround the individual
since birth. These factors affect the way an individual view what is right or wrong
because individuals are determined by the very social environment they grew up in.
 As a consequence, a moral standard therefore is valid only in that certain culture and
does not apply to another culture. Thus, morality varies from one culture to another
and it is a product of social acceptance and approval by the people of a certain
culture over time. If this is true, then our approach to these cultural and moral
differences leads to the third argument.

3. Toleration Argument—this is the view that acknowledges these differences among

cultures and societies especially in morals, such that, each should approach these
differences with respect in favor of social harmony and peaceful co-existence with
others. Human atrocities in the past were due to the absolutist view that one’s
standards are the right ones and considered everyone else as inferior. This is called
ethnocentrism. Another approach is xenocentrism which views other cultures as
superior than one’s own. The toleration argument values the truth of each cultures
and affirms that each society or culture should not be judged in terms of another’s
standards.
Challenges to Cultural and Ethical Relativism

The relativist views on culture and morality may appear convincing to others but this
does not go so much without some opposition and critique from other philosophers and
thinkers.
The first objection is concerned with the argumentative flow of relativism and the
validity of its conclusions. The relativist argument goes like this:

 Premise 1: Social environment determines how individuals view values and morals
 Premise 2: There is evidence of these differences in morals among various cultures.
 Conclusion 1: Therefore, morality is relative.
 Conclusion 2: Therefore, there are no universally valid and objective moral
standards outside these cultures which can be used to judge their standards.

The error here appears to be in deriving Conclusion 2 from premises 1 and 2. Even if
these premises are true, it does not necessarily follow from these premises that there are no
universally valid objective moral standards (Conclusion 2). What
these premises can only logically support is
Conclusion 1 which affirms that there are varied
moral standards across different cultures. The proof
for this is that, there have been cases in the past
when the view of a certain society has been proven
false. For instance, people believed before that the
earth is the center of the universe. This view has
been held as even Biblically supported that led to
the persecution of those who disagreed with them
such as Galileo. In 1992, Pope John Paul II
lifted the
Church’s condemnation of Galileo since 350 years. (The link of the article is here for those
interested: https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/31/world/after-350-years-vatican-says-galileo-
was-right-it-moves.html. Therefore, it is not logical to conclude that there are no objective
moral principles out there that can be discovered by reason as Ethics suggests.
The second critique against cultural and ethical relativism is concerned with the
negative consequences of such view. The following are three consequences that are rationally
unacceptable if we adhere to cultural and ethical relativism:
We cannot judge another culture even
if what they are doing is wrong. Since
 no culture must be judged outside its
own context, and we cannot use other
standards to judge another culture,
that would mean that we cannot
criticize therefore a cultural practice or
belief even if it is abhorrent or
inhumane. An example of this is the
belief that to kill your enemies is God’s
will as perpetuated by terrorist
extremists. Based on cultural and
ethical relativism, religious-based
terrorism is right according to their
customs and belief systems even if it
results to the death of innocents. If we
accept cultural and ethical relativism,
we can never condemn these acts of
terrorism as wrong for that would
mean we are using standards to judge
the values of a certain group’s
customs, beliefs, and religious
interpretations.
 You are now bound to accept as right
something that is considered correct in your own cultural group even if your reason
tells you that it is wrong. For example, there were issues regarding legitimizing
divorce in our country. Once that would be approved as legal, you will be morally
bound to consider is as alright. Think about abortion as well when legalized in our
country. If you adhere to cultural and ethical relativism, you must accept that
whatever values agreed upon, preferred, and approved by your culture must
automatically be considered right.
 There could be no moral progress for such culture. How can a culture know that
their values are wrong if there are no standards to be used to critique these?
Changes in a society happen because of some important realizations that some
beliefs, practices, and customs are no longer applicable ang beneficial to the people.
These realizations are the reasons for further development and improvement for a
society. But how can such realizations occur to a society which considers their own
values as the only truths and valid standards?
The third, and perhaps the strongest argument against cultural and ethical relativism is
the fact that there are really objective standards of what is right or wrong that are valid to all
people regardless of culture, customs, traditions, race, ideologies, and religion. This can be
shown by the common values shared by all cultures. All cultures value the respect for life,
pursuit of truth and justice, desire for peace, and a lot more. These show that beneath the
differences that each culture has are general principles of rightness and goodness that are true
and valid for all.

Moral Personhood
What are moral persons?
We have learned that certain situations are moral because these situations involve
moral persons. We need to understand therefore what moral persons are. When a lion eats a
gazelle, there seems to be no moral issues going on. Is it because lions and gazelles are not
persons? When a boulder, by chance of nature, rolls down a hill and tramples over a number of
trees, few animals, and various insects, there seems to be no moral issues going on as well. Is
this because a moving boulder and the creatures that perished under its path are not persons?
What then is a moral person?
 When a human being kills another human or, at least does something that harms
another human, the situation is moral. We say that the person who killed another is
accountable because humans should know that murder is wrong and that humans can choose
to act in one way or another. But the case is different when humans feed on animals and
plants. Does this mean that killing is a moral issue only if it is an act done by a person against
another person? What is in humans that makes this situation moral while the lion feeding on a
gazelle is not?
In lesson 1, you learned that humans are moral by nature as moral agents. Agency is
the human capacity to make decisions and impose those decisions upon others, animals,
plants, and things in the world. Human agency follows from the fact that persons are both
rational and free. This is understood better in the context of a deterministic universe that
orders all except partly humans who, we claim, can act otherwise.1 The lion is not accountable
because it behaves in accord to its survival instincts and has no capacity to deliberate on
whether harming the gazelle is good or not. Human beings are moral persons because they are
moral agents. As moral agents, they can choose their action in the light of rational deliberation
guided by moral standards. As moral agents, moral persons are sources of moral actions.
In the same lesson 1, you also learned that we have moral standards as set of principles
that deal with matters that can harm or benefit others. That means, morality considers the
welfare of persons as recipients of actions. Humans are not mere sources of actions—agents—
but recipients of these actions themselves who can feel pain or suffering. This points to the
human capacity to feel and to sense—sentience. Morality then safeguards persons from
actions that can harm them in one way or another, and guides persons at the same time to
ensure actions that can rather benefit them and contribute to their welfare. As sentient
creatures can feel and sense pain, moral persons, therefore, are also moral patients.
It seems, therefore, that an entity is a moral person, if and only if, such entity is both a
source (moral agent) and a recipient (moral patient) of a moral action. Now this explains why
there seems to be no moral issues involved with animals who eat their prey and boulders that
cause death. Animals and things are not sources of actions. That means, these are not agents
who can deliberate rationally and make a choice after. Be that as it may, there are other living
creatures aside from humans which are sentient and hence receivers of moral actions. Animals
are sentient creatures which can feel pain and hence be recipients of harmful actions. This
explains why we still feel bad for the prey or for those victims of natural calamities even if their
deaths were not resulting from deliberate intentions. This also explains why we can talk of
animal welfare and environmental ethics when humans inflict unnecessary harm to animals and
to the environment. This is the case when netizens expressed their disdain over the fate of dogs
every Yulin Lychee and Dog meat festival among the Chinese. Therefore, non-humans, such as
animals and other sentient creatures (aliens) can be considered moral persons as well. Some
even argue that moral patients include as well non-sentient entities which can be recipients of
moral actions such as collective agents like corporations.
That means, all moral agents are moral recipients as well, but not all moral recipients
are moral agents. To clarify this, let us define two types of moral persons.

1. Agentive persons—moral persons who can be both agents and recipients of moral
actions. Examples of agentive persons are mature human persons who can function
rationally and freely under normal conditions. They are sources of deliberate and
willful actions. As such, only agentive persons can be held morally accountable—that
is, deserving of praise or blame.
2. Non-agentive persons—moral persons which can only be moral recipients and not
agents of moral actions. Examples of non-agentive persons are the fetus, infants,
mentally challenged individuals, the comatose patient, animals, and other creatures
that can be recipients to moral actions. Since these cannot be agents, these cannot
be held accountable for their actions. But, as moral patients, we can morally
evaluate actions that are done to them and assign praise or blame to these actions.
For example, there are views which allow abortion during the first trimester of the
 fetus because it is not yet a person for lack of agentive properties. This is true if we
do not consider moral patients or non-agentive persons as moral persons. The
affirmation of the moral status of moral patients or non-agentive persons would
resolve the moral status of the unborn child. The same argument covers the case of
the comatose patient or the vegetative patient.
What are these conditions that make one human? What are the criteria by which
entities are regarded as moral persons?

Theories of Personhood

What are the conditions that make one a moral person? There are two approaches to
this question. The first is the uni-criterial approach which argues that there is a single criterion
that makes one a moral person, and the second view is the multi-criterial approach which
argues that there are two or more such criteria.
The competing views for the uni-criterial approach are the genetic, life, rational,
sentient, and the relational theories.
1. Genetic theory—this view argues that the single essential quality that makes one a
moral person is the possession of human DNA. This means that, only humans are
moral persons and excludes other non-humans like animals, plants, aliens, and
spiritual beings. The strength of this position is that it protects the notion that
zygotes and comatose patients are humans by virtue of their DNA and hence, moral
persons with moral rights, at least, as moral patients. The weakness of this view is
that the moral value of the human DNA is yet to be defended. So, what makes the
human DNA morally special? The common answer to this however comes from the
religious perspective. Another problem with this view is that it appears to be
discriminatory as it excludes animals and other living creatures which can be subject
to moral acts as moral patients as is the concern of environmental ethics.
2. Life theory—this view argues that the defining feature of a moral person is simply
the possession of life. This would mean that all living creatures are moral persons
including microbes and insects. The strength of this view is the affirmation that life is
sacred. The problem with this view is that it appears to be impractical since killing
insects, for example, seems to be unavoidable. An example of this is Jainism, a
religious belief that respects all living creatures, in which, each monk carries a broom
to sweep the floor of insects to avoid stepping on them.
3. Rational theory—this view suggests that the defining feature of a moral person is
being rational and free. But that would mean that only beings with reason and free
will can be considered moral persons. The dangerous implication here is that it
excludes human beings who lack such capacity such as the fetus, infants, mentally
challenged individuals, and the comatose patient or those in a vegetative state.
4. Sentient theory—this view argues that the essential quality of a moral person is the
capacity to feel pleasure and pain; or simply the capacity to suffer. There are difficult
implications to this view. First, this will exclude human beings who have lost their
sentience due to disease or accidents such as the paralytic or the vegetative state.
Second, this will exclude non-sentient ecological systems such as trees, rivers, lakes,
or coral reefs for example. And lastly, since the defining quality is sentience, the
healthy animal will have more priority over the sickly human.
5. Relational theory—this view argues that the defining feature of a moral person is its
capacity to be in a relationship with other entities. It however focuses on the caring
relationship that brings about duties and obligations to another. For example, the
relationship between a mother and a child gives moral status to the child as a moral
person in need of care. This can also be extended to animals, plants, and the
environment. The problem with this view is that, it limits the moral status of the
individual in a caring relationship only. What of humans outside caring relationships?
The child for example has value regardless whether the mother abandoned the
 unwanted child in a garbage pit to die. Another problem is that, a caring relationship
would mean that every object of care must be a moral person. This is not true in the
instances when we care about objects. The movie, Castaway (2000), showed how
the actor cared for the volleyball which he treated as a companion in the island.
The multi-criterial approach argues that there is no single criterion but rather a
combination of two or more criteria above. The combination of these criteria is still
controversial up to this day. And the debate is still open regarding which combinations could
really account for moral personhood. The emerging view considers rationality, sentience, and
relational theories together. The genetic theory restricts the category to humans only while the
life theory expands it to include unnecessary creatures to the category.

Moral Character
The term “character” is derived from the Greek “charaktêr” which was used to refer to a
mark impressed upon a coin. From this, its definition developed to refer to a distinctive mark
that can distinguish one from another. Then it further developed to refer to a set of qualities
that an individual has that can distinguish one from another. This latter definition suggests that
“character” seems to be synonymous to the term “personality” which loosely includes
mannerisms, social gestures, or habits unique to a person.
This connects in a way with how Aristotle used the term “character” in Book II of his
Nicomachean Ethics as an “excellence of character”. “Excellence in Character” in Greek, êthikai
aretai, is translated closest to the English phrase, “moral virtue”. This refers to a combination of
qualities that a person can have that are considered to be ethically admirable. Thus, to say that
“a good person is someone who has virtue” means that, this person embodies or exemplifies a
set of ethically admirable qualities. Moral issues then on character refers to either the
possession or lack of moral virtue—that is, the assemblage of ethically admirable qualities.
This set of ethically admirable qualities can be viewed as characteristic traits found in a person.
In Plato’s dialogue, The Republic, Socrates challenged Cephalus’ definition of justice. Cephalus
suggested that justice is “giving back what one has borrowed”. At first thought, this definition
seems alright not until a counter case can show an instance when “giving back what one has
borrowed” is rather foolish.
Let me show you Socrates’ counter example in our present context and experience.
Suppose that a close friend asked you to keep his gun for safety purposes. Suppose further that
this same friend became psychotic and started asking you to return his gun. If we rely on the
definition suggested by Cephalus, it is justice to return the gun to your friend who has already
gone mad. Clearly this is an instance when the definition does not guarantee a just action. It is
of course not just to give a madman his gun even if he owns it.
The example above shows that doing something good, such as returning another’s
property, does not always constitute justice or goodness. The motive, goal, and perspective of
the agent of action matters. This refers to the psychological aspect of character traits. This
reinforces the idea that only a good person can make a proper and reliable judgement on
whether an action is reasonable or appropriate relative to certain situations.
This is the reason why virtue is grounded on moral character, and we inherited this view
to this day. We subscribe to this view during times when we trust someone for, we believe that
he or she is a good person. The same view is exemplified when we receive a news that a certain
acquaintance did something bad and you seem not to accept that this is possible because you
know the person and he is a good person. The thinking that goes into all these instances is that
a good person will, most likely, not do anything bad.
The same view suggests that we should teach young children to do this and avoid that
so that they will grow into good persons. But this instance opens a new issue into our
understanding of moral character—can we learn how to be a good person? Can we teach
persons to be good? How do we develop a good character? This led the Greek moralists to
consider a second aspect of character traits—the behavioral aspect. This refers to the
particular actions that a person does, and this is what Cephalus had in mind in the above
example. This implies that, perhaps, good deeds can eventually form a good person.
Similarly, we have inherited this view to this day as well. This view is exemplified in
instances when we train children in good ways by teaching them good principles in the form of
moral laws to be followed. This is the principle behind school awards such as “Most Behaved
Pupil” received by someone who exhibited repeated admirable deeds during classes. That
means, one’s deeds are the determinant for such character.

Deeds or Character?

The controversial issue now is what consists in a good moral character? Is it the psychological
aspect that considers a good person whose action comes from a good motive, goal, or
perspective; or is it the behavioral aspect through which a good person is defined by habitual
good actions? This is, however, a difficult philosophical problem that has reached no consensus
yet. A brief introduction to the problem would be sufficient for now.
The Greek moralists developed the psychological aspect of a character trait.2 That
means, good action depends largely on the judgment of a good person. This view, however, is
contested by modern moralists whose emphasis was more on the behavioral aspect (but with
due consideration to the psychological aspect nevertheless). 3 That means, developing good
habits and disposition is important to becoming a good person.
The Good Person: Virtuous Life is based on Character

The view that moral character is grounded on a good person who has good motives,
goals, and perspectives is the idea of a rational and virtuous person who has the capacity to
know and to choose the correct course of action in any given situations. Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle, and the Stoics were the primary defenders of this view. Although there are differences
in their theories about a virtuous person, it can be said that they, more or less, agreed on the
following ideas about a virtuous person:
 Reason and Happiness: Rational Individuals aim to live well
(eudaimonia=happiness). If humans are rational individuals, then they can choose
and order their actions in view of happiness.
 Happiness and Virtue: Happiness requires virtuous traits such as wisdom,
temperance, courage, justice, and the like. Hence, for one to be truly happy in life,
one must have these virtuous traits.
 Reason and Virtue: If rational individuals aim to be happy, and happiness requires
virtuous traits, then rational individuals can know ways to acquire virtuous traits.
 Cognitive element: Knowledge, then, is an important condition to a virtuous life. As
Socrates claimed, “Knowledge is Virtue!” Conversely, ignorance is vice!
 Affective element: Both Plato and Aristotle later, however, argued for the
importance of the affective element in addition to the cognitive element for there
are cases when knowing what is good is not enough. In fact, your experiences can
validate this. You can memorize the 10 commandments (cognitive element), for
example, but you still lied, nevertheless. Your desires, passions, and emotions
(affective element) can interfere and silence the guidance of reason, as it were.
 Virtue as consistency within the soul: Plato argued that the soul has both rational
(cognitive) and non-rational (affective, appetitive, and spirited) aspects that may
contradict each other. The virtuous life is achieved by educating the non-rational
parts of our soul such that there is agreement within the two aspects of our soul.
 Virtue as mean between extreme vices of excess and defect: For Aristotle, the
virtuous life is achieved as a settled state of character relative to all factors that
affect a moral person—feelings, passions, desires, principles. This settled state of
character is a mean position between two extremes of excess and defect relative to
a situation. For example, in witnessing an ongoing vote buying, doing nothing is
 morally deficient, while inappropriate anger is morally excessive. The virtuous
mean is the appropriate emotional response that is in harmony with correct
reasoning.
 Virtue as human nature in accord with the natural order: The Stoic philosophers
agreed, in part, with Socrates—only the development of the cognitive aspect
matters for there are no non-rational aspects of the soul. All affective experiences
are mistaken judgments about the good. The human person is a creature of nature,
so the good life is in accord with nature (thus, with our true nature). Living in
accord with nature for the human being is the development of one’s natural
capacity— reason. The virtuous life is achieved in excellent rational activity as is
our true nature; the virtuous person is the Sage (Sophos) whose actions are guided
by one’s knowledge of the good. Knowledge of the good is knowledge of the natural
order and acting in accord to that order.
What is common in the above views from the Greek Philosophers is the idea that there
is something in a person that guarantees good actions. Socrates and the Stoics referred to this
as the cognitive aspect of the soul while Plato and Aristotle considered the role of the affective
aspect and argued for a control, or a mean settled condition between extremes. While
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle emphasized the importance of educating and developing this
rational (and non-rational) aspect of our soul, the Stoics insisted on living in accord with the
natural order. But the common ground of a virtuous life for all of them is the development of
the cognitive aspect of the soul—the motives, goals, and perspectives that cause the action.
Basically, good character (knowing what is good and disciplining one’s affective experiences)
guarantees good actions.
Good Deeds: Virtuous Life is having Good Habits and Dispositions

After the Greeks, virtue as moral character has been a neglected position because later
moral philosophers focused more on obligation, duty, and law. Contemporary Philosophers,
such as Anscombe who published his “Modern Moral Philosophy” in 1958, suggested that this is
due to the ancient Stoic view of natural order—Natural Law—that applies to all and should be
obeyed by all most especially by human persons. This developed into the medieval notion of
God’s Law as directives from the Bible during the rise of Christianity. In the modern period, it
was framed into the secular notions of Duty and Obligation to the Moral Laws developed by
human beings. According to these views, virtue does not depend on character but on acting
rightly in accord to these laws. By doing the right things according to these laws, one may
develop good habits and dispositions which will constitute good character. Basically, habitual
good actions then, as guided by external laws, guarantee good character.
Some natural law theorists, nevertheless, did not dismiss the role of character. While
obedient actions are primary, character occupied a secondary role to action. But this
consideration is closer to the Greek notion of continence (enkrateia). Continence is simply
mastery, while its opposite, incontinence (akrasia), is lack of mastery. A continent person has
affective experiences (emotions, passions, desires) that are contrary to reason but acts in
accord with reason. An incontinent person acts against reason by giving in to affective
interference (emotions, passions, desires).
The emphasis, however, of moral law theorists is on actions done in the context of
“perfect duty”. Moral laws in perfect duty are specific and legally forced by social and political
institutions, which prescribe specific actions regardless of the motives of the agent. For
example,
Justice. Society has precise injunctions on doing just acts
and we are forced to do so because it benefits others,
regardless of one’s motives. Hence, returning a money
owed with interest is a just act even if the borrower
thinks the interest scheme further contributed to his
poverty. On the contrary, moral character considers
largely the motives of the agent. This is true for actions

Superman is a hero because he is

a good person taught by human parents to
control his abilities to be used for the
done in the context of imperfect duty which are not
forced, and which laws are imprecise. For example,
generosity. A person who lent money may feel generous
and did not require further interest for amount owed in
consideration to the borrower, but such act is not
forced and is valued based on the motives of the agent.
The debate on whether moral character consists
in a good person or good deeds is far from achieving a
consensus. The problem can be framed as a circular
reasoning of some sort:
 What makes one a good person? Good deeds!
 What enables a person to do good deeds? The person must have some good reasons to do
so!
 But how did he come by such good reasons in the first place? Because he has been doing
good deeds in the past!
 How did he know that these were good deeds? Because as a good person, he knows what is
good!
 Shall we repeat another cycle of this circular reasoning once more???

This problem is, however, crucial to ethics since the answer to the crucial question, “Can
we teach Ethics to individuals and expect to have a good person at the end of the course?”
depends on which view is more plausible. On one hand, if you agree that virtuous life is based
on character, then ethical formation must be focused on developing the rational capacities and
disciplining one’s affective properties. On the other hand, if you agree that virtuous life is about
habitual good deeds and dispositions, then ethical formation must be focused on practicing
good deeds by doing them repeatedly and habitually.

Kohlberg’s Theory of Moral Development

Of all the theories about moral development, Lawrence Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral
development is one of the few influential theories for both Psychologists and moral
Philosophers (including that of Jean Piaget). Kohlberg studied the moral responses of children
by giving them moral dilemmas. He was not interested with whether the children knew that
their actions were right or wrong. His interest was to examine their moral reasoning or the
thinking process how they arrived at their moral judgments. From his experiments, Kohlberg
proposed three levels of moral development, each having two sub-stages (see Chart below).
Levels of Moral Development Stages in each level
Stage 1: “Punishment and Obedience”
 Moral motivation/reasoning: to do good to avoid
punishment and earn rewards.
 Perspective: egoistic—considers only personal views.
 Behavioral guide: pleasure principle—pleasure is
good; pain is bad.
 Example: a child who cheats in school because in her
mind this is the only way not to fail and perhaps avoid
being punished at home for failing. She does not
Pre-conventional Level know
why cheating is bad.
Morality at this level is based on
the personal views of the child.
The child does not actually
understand the rules of society.
Conventional Level
Morality here is based on
conventionalized social
standards and rules. The child
here begins to understand social
rules and that personal views
that are in conflict with
conventional social rules and
standards are most likely not
right.
Post-conventional Level
Morality here is based on
personal but idealized principles.
While personal idealized
principles may be consistent with
conventional rules and standards,
the latter is no longer the primary
basis for acting. In fact, there are
instances when personal idealized
principles may be in conflict with
Stage 2: “Instrumentalism”
 Moral motivation/reasoning: to do good to gain
something in return.
 Perspective: social relations—considers the views of
others but only to gain from the relation.
 Behavioral guide: mutual benefit—“I scratch your
back, you scratch mine”
 Example: a child who shares his answers with his
classmates during quizzes because in his mind, his
classmates must do the same in return when he will
forget answers too. He does not understand that this
is cheating and mistakenly conflates it with the values
of collaboration and helping one another.
Stage 3: “Good boy/girl Mentality”
 Moral motivation/reasoning: to do good to be socially
appreciated or recognized by others.
 Perspective: social—views situations from the
perspective of objective social rules that apply to all.
 Behavioral guide: social approval
Example: a person who does not cheat when the
teacher is looking. He does so not because he knows
that cheating is bad but because he wants to be
labeled as honest student. That is why he will cheat
when the teacher is not looking.
Stage 4: “Law and Order”
 Moral motivation/reasoning: to do good because it is
one’s social duty.
 Perspective: society—considers situations from the
perspective of the order of society at large.
 Behavioral guide: Law and Duty
 Example: a person who doesn’t cheat because
cheating is wrong according to school rules. She does
so because the law says so and it is her duty to obey
the law. Following a law is more valuable than passing
a test by deceitful means. But she cannot understand
certain instances when certain laws/rules do not
apply.
Stage 5: “The Social Contract”
 Moral motivation/reasoning: to do good because it
benefits all involved.
 Perspective: humanity—considers situations from the
perspective of the common good of all (even if, at
times, the common good may undermine my
personal good).
 Behavioral guide: common good
 Example: a person who refuses to cheat during exams
not only because the laws prohibit it but most
specially because it can have wider implications in the
long run and threaten a wide array of values
important to social cohesion such as integrity,
honesty, trust, and credibility. The person may lose
some personal goods when failing a test but secures,
in a way, a civil good of higher value in the larger
context. For this reason, a person at this stage will not
follow a law if it is not applicable to a situation or if it
violates a higher good as in the case of an unjust law.
Stage 6: “Universal Ethical Principles”
 Moral motivation/reasoning: to do good on the basis
of fundamental ethical principles that are applicable
conventional social rules and
standards.
 Perspective: Ethical Principles—considers situations
to all and understood by all rational individuals
regardless of age, social class, culture, religion,
education, and the like.
from the view of fundamental principles. Behavioral
guide: Ethical principles Example: a person who
refuses to cheat because it violates a fundamental
principle no matter what the motive, the goal, and
the situation of the case. It is difficult to clarify this
example for even Kohlberg admitted that very few
people can reach this stage. He actually named Jesus,
Gandhi, and Martin Luther King, Jr. as examples.