I 1-focTof

Road traffic signs and general speed limit § 58

or should have, seen a privileged vehicle, its driver is entitled to make certain
assumptions -
... the drivers of these vehicles (privileged vehicles) are entitled to make
a much higher assumption as to what other traffic will do than the ordinary
driver may. They know that other drivers know or ought to know that they are
privileged. These vehicles, and especially fire-engines, are so attractive of
attention and they give such an unmistakable warning that the driver of
such a vehicle has to my mind a perfect right to assume that other traffic
will be careful to keep out of its way. He must look out. He cannot run
anything down. If he sees a bus coming along and sees other cars coming
along, he has a perfect right to assume that the drivers of those other
vehicles had heard his siren and seen this tremendous machine that he is
driving, and will adapt themselves to that position. If this had not been a fire-
engine but had been an ordinary motor car then t would say he should
have paid greater attention to that bus. The driver of the fire-engine was,
not only in the light of statutory ordinances but also in the light of the state
of mind which they create with users of the road, entitled to assume that
his presence on the road is to be respected.1
On the other hand--
... the driver of a privileged vehicle [who] has failed to notice traffic
approaching the green light ... is not entitled to say that he assumed that
such traffic would in any event become aware of him and would act
accordingly. He must bear in mind that it is a most unusual occurrence
that traffic proceeds against the red, and that ordinary drivers are not on
their guard against it. He must therefore be particularly careful to make
sure that no other traffic with the green light in its favour is about to enter
the intersection, or otherwise that all such traffic has become aware of his
presence and his intention to go forward against the red.2
Thus in the Rondalia case an ambulance driver, who entered a robot-controlled
intersection against the red signal relying on the fact that he was driving a
privileged vehicle, and failed to see the approaching motor cycle (although it
had its headlight on) was held to be negligent.
The Regulations prescribe the identification lamps with which privileged
vehicles may be equipped (reg 176) and permits a privileged vehicle to use a
warning device which emits special tones of pitch (reg 201).

safety of other road-users see Central News Agency Ltd "Schocher 1943 TPD .155; R ., Marois
1946 CPD 261; Minister of Justice I' Bristow-Jones 1950 (4) SA 362 (n: R v Ei,a11s 1962 (3) SA
358 (SR).
1
Joha1111esb11rg City Co1111cil ,, P11tco I 963 (3) SA 157 (W) at 160D-F, cited with approval
in Ronda/fa Assurance Coq> of SA "Collins NO supra at 347E. See further S v Labuschagne 1979
(3) SA l 320 (T) at I 324G-H.
2
Randalia Assurance Co111 of SA v Collins NO supra al 347E-G, see S v Labuschag11e supra at
1324O-H.

[REVISION SERVICE 2, 2012] 89-7

§ 59 Cooper's Motor Ul-w: Criminal Liability

59 Speed llmit
(1) The general speed limit in respect of-
(a) every public road or section thereof, other than a freeway, situated
within an urban area;
(b) every public road or section thereof, other than a freeway, situated
outside an urban area; and
(c) every freeway,
shall be as
prescribed.
(2) An appropriate road traffic sign may be displayed on any public road in
accordance with section 57, indicating a speed limit other than the
general speed limit which applies in respect of that road in terms of
subsection (1): Provided that such other speed limit shall not be higher
than the speed limit prescribed in terms of subsection (1)(cJ.
(3) The Minister may, after a decision has been taken in the Shareholders
Committee, in respect of any particular class of vehicle prescribe a
speed limit which is lower or higher than the general speed limit
prescribed In terms of subsection (1) (b) or (c): Provided thatthe speed limit
so prescribed shall not replace a lower speed limit indicated in terms of
subsection (2) by an appropriate road traffic sign.
[Sub-s (3) substituted bys 30 of Act 21 of 1999, wet 20 November 2010.)
(4) No person shall drive a vehicle on a public road at a speed in excess
of-
(a) the general speed limit which In terms of subsection (1) applies in
respect of that road;
(b) the speed limit indicated in terms of subsection (2) by an appropriate
road traffic sign in respect of that road; or
(c) the speed limit prescribed by the Minister under subsection (3) in
respect of the class of vehicle concerned.
In terms of s 93A(c) any reference to the 'Shareholders Committee' shall be
regarded as a reference to the 'MECs'. This interpretation applies from 1
August 2000 until a notice is published by the Minister in the Gazette
indicating that the functionary in section of the Act shall be regulated as stated
in the relevant section.
It has been held that the interest sought to be protected by this section is the
protection of the physical safety of members of the public, and not just the
arbitrary setting of a speed limit.1 Although speed is evidently an important
contributory factor to collisions on roads, it is not the only factor to be taken into
account in this regard.2
The general speed limits are prescribed by reg 292, as follows:
(a) 60 kilometres per hour in respect of every pubHc road or section thereof,
situated within an urban area;
(b) 100 kilometres per hour in respect of every public road or section thereof,
other than a freeway, situated outside an urban area; and

1
S v Fourie 2001 (2) SACR 674 (C) at 680e; see also S v Meyer 2000 (unreported) (0), cited in
S l' Orton 2001 (I) SACR 433 (0) al 435e-f.
2
SI' Orton supra 437f-g.

B9-8 [REVISION SERVICE 2, 2012]

Road traffic signs and general speed limit § 59

(c) 120 kilometres per hour in respect of every freeway.

The word 'general' is intended to draw a distinction between speed limits which
apply generally in the prescribed area, and those which apply in particular
areas and are other than the prescribed speed.1 By displaying a road
traffic sign

1
See S v Van Sc/Joor 1972 (2) SA 67 (C).

(REVISION SERVICE 2, 2012} B9-8A

Road traffic signs and general speed limit § 59

indicating a different speed limit a new speed limit is fixed for the road and,
since the only offence created bys 59(4)(a) is that of exceeding the prescribed
general speed limit, there will be a contravention of s 59(4 }(b) where the new
speed limit is infringed. There must be adequate notice given of the new speed
limit however.1 On a charge of contravening s 59(4), it is essential to allege
and prove that the accused:
(i) unlawfully
(ii) drove a vehicle
(iii) on a public road or section thereof
(iv) at a speed in excess of the prescribed speed limit
(v) with the necessary fault.
The Act exempts certain drivers from observing the general speed limit
provided that the vehicle concerned is driven in accordance with particular
conditions.2 Necessity is a defence to a charge of exceeding a statutory speed
limit, eg when a driver exceeds a speed limit to take a seriously ill person to a
hospital.3 In S v Myute,4 a doctor hastening to hospital to treat a patient was
held
to be 'not above the traffic regulations', and thus the court confirmed his conviction
for speeding, although it altered his sentence to a caution and discharge. In S
v Fourie supra a magistrate denied that his conduct in exceeding the
prescribed speed limit was unlawful, in that his actions, directed at getting to
court timeously, were consonant with the legal convictions of the community
and promoted the interests of the administration of justice. However, the court
demurred, allowing the DPP's appeal in terms of s 310 of Act 51 of 1977, in
holding that there were other actions the accused could have taken to achieve
his objective, and that it could not be said that the accused's actions accorded
with the legal convictions of the community.
The prosecution is assisted by the presumptions in the Act to the effect that
the accused drove the offending vehicle5 and did so on a public road, freeway,
or public road in an urban area.6
As indicated above, there are three types of speed limit established in terms
of s 59: a general speed limit (sub-s (1)), a speed limit, specified by a road
traffic sign, for a particular road {sub-s (2)), and a speed limit in respect of a
particular class of vehicle (sub-s (3)).
A charge is not defective for referring solely to s 59(4) and not to the
sections and regulations which have to be read with it. However, if the speed
at which the accused travelled, along with the prescribed speed limit, is not
included in a summons, it will be regarded as fatally defective.7 Evidence of
speeding may be obtained in differing ways:

1
Rossouw v S 1970 (1) PH H(S) 28 (0).
2
See s 60 infra.
3
S v Pretorius 1975 (2) SA 85 (SWA).
4
1985 (]) PH H16 (E).
;-; Section 73, discussed infra.
6
Section 69. discussed infra.
7
S v Jacobs 1995 (2) SACR 437 (T).

[0RrGJNAL SERVICE, 2007] B9-9

§ 59 Cooper '.s Motor Law: Criminal LiabUity

1 Estimates of speed
A witness is entitled to give his estimate of the speed of a vehicle1 and if a court
is satisfied that an estimate of speed is reliable it may convict the accused of
exceeding a speed limit.2
In general, however, the courts approach estimates of speed with great
caution.3 Among the factors which will weigh with a court before convicting on
an estimate of speed are the experience of the observer,4 his or her opportunities
for accurate observation, the distance over which a vehicle was observed5 and
the obviousness of a vehicle's speed in excess of a speed limit. 6 A court is
also entitled to have regard to a driver's failure to testify, 7 and the reading of
an untested instrument.8

2 Speedometers
A court is entitled to rely upon the evidence of a speedometer reading provided
that the State proves that at the relevant time the instrument was functioning
properly.9

3 Speed traps and timing devices

A speed trap involving the use of a timing device by which the speed of a
vehicle is determined is the usual method employed by the traffic authorities to
detect drivers exceeding a speed limit.
The stop-watch is the conventional timing device used in speed traps,
the vehicle being timed while travelling over a measured distance. This method
has however become outdated (for a fuller discussion of the legal aspects of the
use of stop-watches, see the previous edition of this work at 482). Where the State
relies on a stop-watch trap the court will convict a driver of exceeding a speed limit
only upon proof-
(i) that the stop-watches used were functioning accurately;10 and
(ii) that the distance over which the accused's vehicle was timed was accurately
measured.11

1
R v Van der Westhui;:,en 1929 CPD 484; R v Frankel 1940 TPD 159; R v Hickey J 963 (3) SA
96 (SR); see too R v Freeman 1931 NPD 460.
1
R v Hickey supra.
3
See eg R 1· De Kock 1922 EDL 222: R v M;tchell 1929 SR 94; Heneke v Royal J11sura11ce
Co Ltd 1954 (4) SA 606 (A) at 613: Coet;:,ee v Van Rensburg 1954 (4) SA 616 (A) at 618; Ho.
(fman v
SAR & H 1955 (4) SA 476 (A) at 479.
4
RP Mitchell supra: RF Brick 1938 EDL 71 at 73.
5
R v Hickey supra.
6
R v Frankel supra.
7
R v Hickey supra.
8
R v Frankel supra.
9
R 1· Mante/11959 (I) SA 771 (C): R i· Hickey supra: see also R v X (also reported as R i: Fischer)
1938 OPD 155; S v Hengst 1975 (2) SA 91 (SWA).
10
R v Ma((/tews 1921 TPD 422; R v Downing 1922 NPD 139: R v Veale 1929 TPD 447; R v
X (Fischer) supra; R v Epstein 1941 (2) PH 023 (T): R v Kruger 1957 (2) SA 354 (Cl; R v O'
Linn 1960 (I) SA 545 (N).
11
R v Hodges 1928 TPD 654: R ,, Reilly J 929 CPD 156: Khan v Durban Co1poratio11 ( J) 1945
NPD 314; R v Van Coppenhagen 1949 (4) SA 205 (T).

B9-10 [ORIGINAL SERVICE, 2007]

§ 59 Cooper's Motor Law: Criminal Liability

1 Estimates of speed
A witness is entitled to give his estimate of the speed of a vehicle1 and if a court
is satisfied that an estimate of speed is reliable it may convict the accused of
exceeding a speed limit.2
In general, however, the courts approach estimates of speed with great
caution.3 Among the factors which will weigh with a court before convicting on
an estimate of speed are the experience of the observer,4 his or her opportunities
for accurate observation, the distance over which a vehicle was observed5 and
the obviousness of a vehicle's speed in excess of a speed limit. 6 A court is
also entitled to have regard to a driver's failure to testify, 7 and the reading of
an untested instrument.8

2 Speedometers
A court is entitled to rely upon the evidence of a speedometer reading provided
that the State proves that at the relevant time the fnstrument was functioning
properly.9

3 Speed traps and timing devices

A speed trap involving the use of a timing device by which the speed of a
vehicle is determined is the usual method employed by the traffic authorities to
detect drivers exceeding a speed limit.
The stop-watch is the conventional timing device used in speed traps,
the vehicle being timed while travelling over a measured distance. This method
has however become outdated (for a fuller discussion of the legal aspects of the
use of stop-watches, see the previous edition of this work at 482). Where the
State relies on a stop-watch trap the court will convict a driver of exceeding a
speed limit only upon proof-
(i) that the stop-watches used were functioning accurately;10 and
(ii) that the distance over which the accused's vehicle was timed was accurately
measured.11

i R v Van der Westhui::,en 1929 CPD 484; R v Frankel J 940 TPD 159; R v Hickey l 963 (3) SA
96 (SR); see loo R v Freeman 1931 NPD 460.
2
R v Hickey supra.
3
See eg R 1· De Kock 1922 EDL 222: R v Mitche/11929 SR 94; Heneke v Royal insurance Co
Ltd 1954 {4) SA 606 (A) at 613: Coel':,ee 1· Van Rensburg 1954 (4) SA 616 {A) at 618: Hoffman v
SAR & H 1955 (4) SA 476 (A) at 479.
4
R v Mirchelf supra: R v Brick 1938 EDL 71 at 73.
:'IR v Hickey supra.
6
R v Frankel supra.
7
R v Hickey supra.
ts R v Frankel supra.
9
R 1· Ma11tefl 1959 (I) SA 771 (C): R v Hickey supra: see also R v X (also reported as R v Fischer)
1938 OPD 155; S v Hengst 1975 (2) SA 91 (SWA).
10
R v Marthews 1921 TPD 422; R v Downing 1922 NPD 139: R v \leale 1919 TPD 447; R v X
(Fischer) supra; R v Epstein 1941 !2) PH 023 (n: R v Kruger 1957 (2) SA 354 (C); R 1' O' U1111
1960 (1) SA 545 (N).
11
R v Hodges 1928 TPD 654: R 1• Reilly 1929 CPD 156; Khan v DurbaF1 Co17>oration (I) I
945 NPD 314: R v Hm Coppe11hage11 1949 (4) SA 205 (T).

B9-10 (ORIGINAL SERVICE, 2007}

Road traffic signs and general speed f imit § 59

To establish the accuracy of a stop-watch it is necessary to adduce

evidence that it was tested shortly before and after the alleged offence against
a chronom eter or some other accurate timing device and found to be
accurate.1
In -recent years various electronic timing devices have been used in speed
traps.2 Cameron Jin S v Meaker3 stated that the use of technological
equipment to detect and record violations in traffic law enforcement in general
is essential, and specifically that camera prosecutions are indispensable,
because, aside from limited human resources, 'it is impractical and extremely
dangerous, both to traffic officers and other motorists, particularly on freeways,
for speedsters ... to be physically intercepted and identified'. In prosecutions in
which the State has relied upon a speed recorded by such a timing device the
courts have applied the principle that to prove a recorded speed is reliable the
State has to establish that the timing device concerned was functioning
properly at the time of the alleged offence.4 The courts require the State to prove
that before and after the time of the alleged offence the timing device was properly
tested.5 In Pieterse it was held that the State had to prove the accuracy of a stop-
watch used to check the accuracy of a gatsometer.6
The State is also required to lead evidence of how the timing device
functions and those factors affecting its accuracy so as to enable a court to satisfy
itself that the speed recorded by a timing device was accurate.7 Such evidence
is required since an understanding of an electronic timing device requires
highly technical knowledge which the court normally does not have and of
which it cannot take

1
R v Matthews supra; R v Veale supra; R v Epsrein supra.
2
A discussion of the various devices and the way they work falls outside the scope of this work.
For discussion of the Truvelo speed camera device, see S v Fuhri 1994 (2) SACR 829 (A) at
830g-83 lc: S 11 Shull 1996 (2) SACR 374 (W) at 376a-g. For discussion of speed measurement
using a laser device, see S v Snyman 2001 (1) SACR 354 (N) at 356c-358b. See further Smart.
Nysschen and Bosman AA Guide ro Motor law (1994) 109-123.
:; 1998 (2) SACR 73 (W) at 80a-c.
4
S,: Currin 1961 (4) SA393 (0); S ,, Margolis 1964 (4) SA 579 (T); S v Dawson 1966 (I) SA
259 (N); S 1· Du Plessis 1966 (1) SA 607 (C); R v Peche 1967 (4) SA 252 (RAD); S v Lucas 1968
(2) SA 592 (E); S v Vos 1968 (2) PH H242 (E); S v Pieterse I 968 (4) SA 585 (T); R v Harvey 1969
(2) SA 193 (RA.D); S ,, Snbotker 1970 ( 1) SA 206 (C); S v Chetry 1970 (2) SA 640 (N); S v Sneddon
1970 (4) SA 241 (T); SI' Stapela 1971 (I) SA 380 (T); S 1• Wiesner 1971 (2) SA445 (0); Sv Ludick
I 972 (I) SA 84 (T): S 1 Motarmg 1972 (4) SA 687 (0); SI' Skele 1974 (4) SA 386 (0); S v
1

Hengst
supra; S v Fllfler 1975 (3) SA 340 (0): S v \Ian der Merwe 1975 (2) PH H\36 (0); S v Schoeman
1977 (2) PH Hl62 (0); S l' Murray 1979 (2) SA 677 (E); S v Hsser 1981 (3) SA 260 (NC) (also
reported at 1981 (I) PH I-163 (NC)); S v Coetz.ee 1986 (I) PH H37 (0); S v Shull 1996 (2) SACR
374 (W).
5
S v Currin supra at 395C-D: S 11 Margolis supra at 582E-H; S l' Dawson supra ut 263A-B; R
1' Peche supra at 255F-H; S v Pie1erse supra at 587A-C; S v Chelfy supra at 642F-G; S v Sneddo11
supra at 244; S v Makoera 1974 (3) SA 498 tO): Sr Skele supra at 387E; Si: \la11 Niekerk 1981 (3)
SA 562 (0) (also reported at 1981 (1) PH H72 (0)); S 1· Erasmus 1982 (I) PH H25 (0).
6
Howtver, see S v Sneddon supra at 244.
7
SF Margolis supra ut 582: S v Du Plessis supra at 608-9: R v Peche supra at 255; Sr Lucas
supra at 594E: R v Han-ey supra at 201-2: S ,_. Sabotf.:.er supra at 207D-G; S l' Cherry supra at
6-t2E-H; S 1• Wiesner supra at 446G: S 1' Ludie/.. supra at 86G; S I' Van der Mer\l'e suprn; S 1·
Mwanusi J 978 (4) SA 806 (0); S 1· Murray 1979 (2) SA 677 (E); S 1· Du Plessis I 980 (I) PH H24
(0); S 1• Stern1s 1983 (3) SA 649 (A); S v Snyman 2001 (1) SACR 354 (N).
[REVISION SERVICE 1, 2009] B9-11
§ 59 Cooper's Motor Law: Criminal Liability

judicial notice.1 In S v Wells 1990 (1) SA 816 (A)2 it was however held that
expert evidence regarding the manufacturer's specifications of the speed
measuring apparatus was not required. It would appear that the court is
entitled to take judicial notice of the working of a stop-watch.3
As regards the quantum and quality of the evidence required to discharge
the onus resting on the State of proving the reliability of a speed recorded by
an electronic timing device the court is entitled to have regard to the defence's
failure to put in issue evidence tendered by the State,4 and the accused;s
faiiure to testify.5 An admission that a timing device was functioning properly
obviates the necessity of leading evidence to prove its accuracy.6
Where a speed camera takes a photograph of a vehicle travelling through a
speed trap, such photograph is admissible evidence where it was clear that
the apparatus was properly set up, and it is not required that a witness verify
that the photograph was a true image of what appeared in front of the camera
lens at that specific moment, as the court can take judicial notice thereof.7
Moreover, the accused does not have the right to be afforded an opportunity to
inspect the speed camera apparatus, unlike the situation where a speed
measuring apparatus is used without a camera.8
In terms of s 89(1), read with s 89(3), any person convicted of a contravention of
s 59(4) is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three
years. In addition to the accused's personal circumstances and any previous
convic tions, the following factors are taken into account as being
determinative of the seriousness of the offence and the interests of the
community in respect of the offence of exceeding the speed limit: the amount
by which the speed limit has been exceeded; the nature of the road; the nature
of the vehicle; the volume of traffic on the road; weather conditions; the
circumstances giving rise to the contravention; the presence of pedestrians;
the prevalence of the offence; and the
locality in which the offence was committed.9
Generally speaking, a period of imprisonment is an inappropriate sentence
for a tirst ottence.10 l::.ven a suspended sentence of Impnsonment should not
lightly be imposed on a first offender.11
Where a fine is imposed-
... it should be one which the accused would be able to pay and the court
convicting him should therefore enquire into his general financial position
in

1
S l' Du Plessis 1966 (I) SA 607 (C) at 608E; R 11 Hww_v supra at 194D-F; S v Sabotker supra
at 207E-G: SF l-l'ies11er supra at 446D-G; S v L11dick at 86E-F; S 1' Van der Merwe supra: SF
Hengst supra.
2
At 82IE-F (also reported at 1990 (I) PH H4l (A).
3
See S v Mar_f!,o!is supra at 582C-D: S l' H'm der Meni·e supra.
S 1' Sneddon supra at 243D-G: S v Hengst at IO I -2; S l' Murray supra.
S 1· Currin supra at 395A; RI' Harvey suprn at 200B-D: see too S 11 De .!ongh 1965 (2) SA 589
(T).
6
S vfsme! 1966 (I) SA610 (C); SvSmuts 1972 (4) SA358 (T).
7
S I' Fuhri 1994 (2) SACR 829 (A) (also repoited at 1994 (1) PH I-l75 (AJ ).
S 1' Wells supra at 8201-82 ID.
,; R l-' Commai!lc 1932 (_I) PH 019 (GWJ: R ,. Hahn 1943 CPD 306; R 1· Hidey 1963 (3) SA 96
fSR\: Si· Floyd & orhers 1975 (l_) SA 653 (E1: Sr Or1on and Anmher 2001 (] l SA.CR .:133 tO) at
436b-437f.
IP Sr Floyd rnpra at 655A: Sr Shiluvani '2006 JDR 0:-74 (TJ at 4.
11
S 1· Fufler 1975 (3) SA 34-0 (0).

B9-12 [RE\'JSJON SERVICE 1, 2009]

Road traffic signs and general speed limit §§ 59-60

order to satisfy itself that the accused can pay the fine imposed. It must also
be borne in mind that a substantial fine falls more heavily on an impecunious
person than a man of substance. Where the nature of the offence is a serious one
calling for a substantial fine that fine should be sufficiently heavy to make each
individual accused realise that the offence is not worth his while and to
encourage him to refrain from committing a similar offence in future, but it
must nevertheless be a fine that he will have to pay.'1
As a general rule, and in the absence of special or aggravating
circumstances the driving licence of a first offender should not be cancelled or
suspended for contravening s 59(4)2 for cases in which the court on appeal
confirmed an order suspending the driving licence of an accused). It has been
held that the exercise of this competence would be far more appropriate in relation
to speeding in the case of a second or subsequent contravention where the
offender shows herself more pertinently to be a person who refuses point blank
to submit herself to the laws of the land.3 A short period of suspension may be
an appropriate form of punishment where the accused is not in a position to pay
a fine as long as this does not jeopardise his or her livelihood4 especially in the
case of the youthful offender.

60 Certain drivers may exceed general speed limit

Notwithstanding the provisions of section 59, the driver of a fire-fighting
vehicle, a fire-fighting response vehicle, a rescue vehicle, an emergency
medical response vehicle or an ambulance who drives such vehicle in the
carrying out of his or her duties, a traffic officer or a person appointed in
terms of the South African Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No. 68 of 1995), who
drives a vehicle in the carrying out of his or her duties or any person issued
with the necessary authorisation and driving a vehicle, may exceed
the applicable general speed limit: Provided that-
(a) h or she. shall drive the. vehicle concerned with due regard to the
safety of other traffic; and
(b) in the case of any such fire-fighting vehicle, fire-fighting response
vehicle, rescue vehicle, emergency medical response vehicle, ambu
lance or any vehicle driven by a person Issued with the necessary
authorisation, such vehicle shall be fitted with a device capable of
emitting a prescribed sound and with an identification lamp, as pre
scribed, and such device shall be so sounded and such lamp shall be in
operation while the vehicle is driven in excess of the applicable
general speed limit.
[S. 60 substituted bys 16 of Act 64 of 2008, wef 20 November 2010.]
See the discussion of s 58(3) supra.

Eksteen J in S v Floyd supra at 655A-B.

1

2
Cf S vMar/.:.man 1972 (3)SA650 (A) at 656D andS v Ungerer 1981 (2) SA466(E) at469B-C;
see too R l' Hartwing 1970 (I) PH H(S) 2 (SHC); S v Simpson 1975 (2) SA 474 (RA); see S v
Ben.istein 1964 (l) PH 014 (E) and S 1' Hengst 1975 (2) SA 91 (SWA).
3
S v Ungerer supra at 469c.
4
S v Simpson supra.

{REYISlON SERVICE 2, 2012] 89-13