Policy Analysis

David L. Weimer
University of Wisconsin-Madison

Aidan R. Vining
Simon Fraser University, Vancouver

Longman
Boston Columbus Indianapolis New York San Francisco Upper Saddle River
Amsterdam Cape Town Dubai London Madrid Milan Munich Paris Montreal Toronto
Delhi Mexico City Sao Paulo Sydney Hong Kong Seoul Singapore Taipei Tokyo
Editor in Chief: Eric Stano
Editoria l Assistan t: Elizabeth Alimena
Marketi ng Manage r: Lindsey Prudhom me
Supplem ents Editor: Donna Garnier
Media Supplem ents Editor: Regina Vertiz
Product ion Manage r: Kathy Sleys
Ganesan
Project Coordin ation, Text Design, and Electronic Page Makeup : Chitra
GGS Higher Educatio n Resources, A division of PreMedi a Global Inc.
Creative Director : Jayne Conte
Cover Designe r: Mary Siener/M argaret Kenselaar
Cover Illustrat ion/Phot o: Getty Images
Printer/B inder/Co ver Printer: Courier Compan ies

Library of Congres s Catalogi ng-in-Pu blication Data

Weimer, David Leo.
Policy analysis /David L. Weimer, Aidan R. Vining. -5th ed.
p.cm.
Includes bibliogra phical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-78130-0 (alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-205-78130-6 (alk. paper)
1. Policy sciences . 1. Vining, Aidan R. II. Title.
H97.w45 2011
320.6-dc 22
2010000429

Copyrig ht © 2011, 2005, 1999, 1992 by Pearson Educatio n, Inc.

stored in a retrieval system, or transmit ted, in
Al! rights reserved . No part of this publicat ion may be reproduc ed,
photoco pying, recordin g, or otherwis e, without the prior written
any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical,
permissi on of the publishe r. Printed in the United States.

12345 6789 1O-CRS --1312 1110

Longman
is an imprin t of

-----
PEARSON
www.pearsonhighered.com
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-78130-0
ISBN-10: 0-205-78130-6
274 Part III: Conceptual Foundations for Solution Analysis

Punctuated Equilibrium
The separation of the legislative and executive functions, the bicameral legislature,
the necessity for supermajorities to stop filibusters in the Senate, and the interpreta-
tion of statutes by the courts creates many veto points that contribute to policy stabil-
ity in the United States. Policy entrepreneurs attempt to overcome this stability by
creating policy images (frames) to appeal to the normally apathetic electorate. They
also search among venues for those most favorable to their efforts. In this context, the
interaction between the creation of policy images and venues creates the possibility
for substantial change. Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones labeled this process of
general stability interrupted by large changes punctuated equilibrium.30 As this frame-
work largely integrates the other policy process frameworks, it shares their implica-
tions for policy analysts.
Moving beyond the other policy process frameworks, however, the punctu-
ated equilibrium framework has evolved to be a characterization of the general
problems of information processing facing all political systems. 31 Interestingly,
it produces a testable implication about the output of any political system over
time: the problems of information processing should produce distributions of pol-
icy changes that are leptokurtic (more very small and very large changes, but
fewer moderate changes, than would occur if policy changes followed a normal
distribution). Empirical tests based on outputs such as budget changes appear to
favor this hypothesis. Unfortunately, aside from anticipating stability with occasional
punctuations, this generalization does not appear to have implications for policy
analysts.

Practical Approach to Assessing and Influencing

Political Feasibility
The policy process frameworks and theories offer general insights into political fea-
sibility useful for policy analysts. However, policy analysts must assess the political
feasibility of specific policy proposals in specific contexts. One of the few political
scientists to speak directly to the question of how policy analysts can predict and
influence the political feasibility of policy proposals is Arnold Meltsner. 32 He pro-
vides a checklist of the information needed to assess the political feasibility of
adoption: Who are the relevant actors? What are their motivations and beliefs?
What are their political resources? In which political arenas will the relevant deci-
sions be made? Although we discuss these questions sequentially, in practice we
answer them iteratively, moving among them as we learn more about the political
environment.

30Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, A gendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1993).
31Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. Baumgartner, The Politics of Attention: How Government Prioritizes
Problems (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
32Arnold Meltsner, "Political Feasibility and Policy Analysis," Public Administration Review 32(6) 1972,
859-67.
 Chapter 11: Adoption 275

Identifying the Relevant Actors

Which individuals and groups are likely to voice an opinion on an issue? Two, usually
overlapping, sets of actors need to be identified: those individuals and organized
groups with a substantive interest in the issue and those with official standing in the
decision arena. For example, imagine a proposal before a city council that would pro-
hibit firms within the city from subjecting their employees to random drug testing. We
expect unions to support the measure and business groups to oppose it. Further, we
expect unions and business groups that have been politically active in the past, such as
the Labor Council and the Chamber of Commerce listed in Table 11.2, to be the ones
most likely to become active on this issue. At the same time, we identify the members
of the City Council as actors by virtue of their rights to vote on legislation and the
mayor by virtue of her veto power.
We expect union and business leaders to be active because their direct interests
are at stake. Civil libertarians might become involved because values they perceive as
important are at issue. (Some may see the ordinance as necessary to protect the right of
workers to privacy; others may view it as an unwarranted interference in the decisions
of firms.) Perhaps certain community groups such as the Urban League will become
active either because they have a direct interest or because they usually ally them-
selves with one of the interested parties. As noted in the discussion of the interest
group theory, we expect concentrated and organized interests to become involved.
Other public figures besides the members of the City Council may also be rele-
vant. For example, although the city attorney does not have a vote on the council, his
opinion on the legality of the proposal may carry considerable weight with council
members. The opinion of the director of public health on the accuracy of testing may
also be influential. The editor of the local newspaper has no official standing whatso-
ever, yet may be an important participant by virtue of the editorials she writes and the
influence she exerts over the coverage of the news and how it is framed.
How should analysts compile lists of potential actors? Obviously, assume that
anyone with a strong interest, whether economic, partisan, ideological, or professional, will
become an actor. Also, include those in official positions. If you are new to the issue or
arena, then try to find an experienced person to be your informant. Use newspapers or
other written accounts to discover who participated in public debates on similar issues
in the past. Finally, when doing so will not adversely affect your client or the future
prospects for your proposals, contact potential actors directly to question them about
their views and to assess the likelihood that they will become active participants.

Understanding the Motivations and Beliefs of Actors

The motivations and beliefs of organized interest groups will often be apparent. When
they are not, you can usually make a reasonable guess about how they will view par-
ticular proposals by comparing the costs and benefits that the leaders of the groups are
likely to perceive. If their perceptions are based on what you think are incorrect
beliefs, then you may be able to influence their positions by providing information.
For example, the president of the local Urban League chapter may support a ban on
random drug testing because he believes that the ban would protect minority workers,
one of his constituencies. He might decide to oppose the ban, however, if he comes to
believe that the ban will result in a net loss in minority jobs because some firms will
leave the city to avoid its restrictions.
276 Part III: Conceptual Foundations for Solution Analysis

Table 11.2 A Political Analysis Worksheet: Feasibility of a Ban on Random Workplace Drug Testing

Actors Motivations Beliefs Resources

Interest Groups
Labor Council Protect workers from Testing would be used Large membership;
harassment unfairly ties to Democrat
Party
Chamber of Protect firms' rights Testing may be necessary to Influential
Commerce to weed out dangerous detect and deter employee membership; ties to
and unproductive drug use Republican Party
workers
Civil Liberties Protect rights of Testing infringes on right to Articulate
Union individuals privacy spokesperson
Libertarian Party Protect right of contract Testing limits should be Vocal membership
a matter of negotiation
between labor and
management
Urban League Protect minority Testing disproportionately Can claim to
employees hurts minorities speak for minority
interests
Daily newspaper Support business Testing ban not appropriate Editorials
environment at city level
Unelected Officials
City attorney Support mayor and Ban probably legal Professional
protect city from law suit opinion
Director, Public Fight drug abuse Testing probably desirable Professional
Health if not punitive opinion; evidence
on effectiveness
of tests
Elected Officials
Council Member A Support labor Ban desirable Vote
(Democrat)
Council Member B Support labor Ban probably desirable Vote
(Democrat)
Council Member C Support community Ban probably desirable Vote; agenda
(Democrat) groups control
President of
Council
Council Member D Support business Ban probably undesirable Vote
(Republican)
Council Member E Support business Ban undesirable Vote
(Republican)
Mayor (Democrat) Maintain good relations Ban probably undesirable Veto power; media
with labor and business attention
 Chapter 11: Adoption 277

It may be more difficult to determine the relevant motivations and beliefs of

those in official positions. Elected officials, political appointees, and members of the
civil service all have a variety of motivations. As we discussed in Chapter 8, elected
officials are likely to be concerned with reelection or election to higher office as well as
with representing the interests of their constituencies and promoting the social good.
Political appointees may be motivated by their substantive values as well as by their
loyalties to their political sponsors, by their desire to maintain their effectiveness in
their current positions, and by their interest in opportunities for future employment.
In addition to substantive values, civil servants are often motivated by their sense of
professionalism and by their desire to secure resources for their organizational units.
It should not be surprising that it is often difficult to predict which motivations
will dominate. Indeed, such conflicting motivations can lead the officials themselves
to the sort of personal ethical dilemmas that we described in Chapter 3. How can we
understand the relative importance of officials' various motivations concerning a par-
ticular issue? We can begin by heeding the insight where you stand depends on where you
sit.33 In other words, put yourself in the position of the relevant officials. What would
you want if you were in their place? What actions would you be willing to take to get
what you want?
Obviously, the more you know about particular officials, the better you will be
able to answer these questions. If an official holds a strong substantive value relevant
to the issue, for instance, then she may be willing to act against even vocal constituent
interests. On the other hand, she may be willing to go against her own substantive val-
ues if the issue is of fundamental concern to one of her important constituencies. Of
course, such factors as the electoral competitiveness of her district and the nearness to
an election can also affect the position that she takes on the issue.

Assessing the Resources of Actors

Actors have a variety of political resources. Interest groups can claim to speak for a
constituency. They may have financial resources that can be used to pay for lobbying,
analysis, publicity, and campaign contributions. Their leaders may have ongoing rela-
tionships with relevant officials. By virtue of their memberships, analytical capacity, or
track record, the information they provide may command attention or carry weight.
All these resources can be thought of as potentially relevant. Whether they actually
come into play depends on the motivations of the groups and their leaders.
Officials have resources based on their positions and relationships. Legislators
can vote, hold hearings, and influence the agenda; elected executives, like mayors,
usually have veto power as well as considerable discretion in interpreting laws that
are adopted; unelected executives often have influence by virtue of their professional
status, programmatic knowledge, and ties to clientele groups. Any of these actors may
be able to influence others through personal relationships based on trust, loyalty, fear,
or reciprocity.
Table 11.2, which presents a simple worksheet that identifies the actors who may
be relevant in predicting the political feasibility of a city ordinance to ban random

33Some view this aphorism as the central element of effective strategic thinking. For example, see
Donald E. Stokes, "Political and Organizational Analysis in the Policy Curriculum," Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 6(1) 1986,45-55, at 52. The aphorism itself is attributed to Rufus E. Miles, Jr., "The Origin
and Meaning of Miles' Law," Public Administration Review 38(5) 1978, 399-403.
278 Part III: Conceptual Foundations for Solution Analysis

drug testing of employees, also notes their likely motivations, beliefs, and resources.
Many of the entries may be little more than guesses, especially for analysts new to the
particular political arena. The entries in the worksheet should be updated as more
information becomes available. For example, the actors' actual responses to the pro-
posal once they learn about it may very well change your assessment of their beliefs
and their willingness to use resources.

Choosing the Arena

Each political arena (the collective and constitutional choice levels in the institutional
rational choice framework) has its own set of rules about how decisions are made. The
basic rules are generally written-legislatures have "rules of order" and agencies have
administrative procedures. Nonetheless, unwritten traditions and standard practices
may be just as relevant to understanding how decisions are typically reached.
Becoming familiar with these rules, both formal and informal, is important for politi-
cal prediction and strategy.
To use the information in Table 11.2 to make a prediction about the likelihood of
adoption of the drug testing ban, we must first determine the arenas in which the pro-
posal will be considered. As suggested by the entries under "elected officials," we
expect that the City Council will be the primary arena. If the council members vote
according to their constituencies' apparent interests, then the ban would pass on a
party-line vote of three to two. Passage would put the mayor in a difficult situation. If
she vetoes the ordinance, then she may alienate her fellow Democrats. If she does not
veto it, then she will alienate business interests.
The mayor might be able to get out of this difficult political position by trying to
change the arena. She might argue that, although restrictions on testing are desirable,
they are more appropriately imposed at the state level. If she can find a state assembly
member or senator to propose the ban in the state legislature, then she could argue
that a vote by the City Council should be delayed until the prospects for state action
become clear. Perhaps she would ask the council to pass a resolution urging state
action. If the council agrees, then she will have been successful in changing arenas.
More generally, we should expect that actors who lose, or anticipate losing, in
one arena to try to move the issue to another. As illustrated by the mayor's maneuver,
unfavorable outcomes at one level of government can sometimes be avoided by shift-
ing the issue to another level. For example, one reason why labor unions pushed for
the federal legislation that became the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was
their dissatisfaction with their ability to influence the setting and enforcement of
health standards at the state leveP4 The arena can also shift from one branch of gov-
ernment to another. For instance, consider the controversy over the role of geography
in the allocation of cadaveric livers for transplantation. 35 In 1984 Congress created the
Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) to develop rules for organ
allocation with oversight by the Department of Health and Human Services. In 1998
the department attempted to finalize a rule requiring the OPTN to eliminate local pri-
ority in liver allocation. Opponents were able to obtain from Congress a moratorium

34JoOO Mendeloff, Regulating Safety: An Economic and Political Analysis of Occupational Safety and Health
Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1979), 15-16.
35David L. Weimer, "Public and Private Regulation of Organ Transplantation: Liver Allocation and
the Final Rule," Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 32:1 (2007),9-49.
 Chapter 11: Adoption 279

on implementation of the rule and a requirement for a study of the issue by the
Institute of Medicine, a component of the National Academy of Sciences. Additionally,
opponents were able to get some states to adopt laws intended to blunt the rule.
Often those who lose in the legislative and executive branches try to shift the
arena to the courts. For instance, during the 1970s, advocates of busing to reduce the
racial segregation in schools caused by housing patterns routinely achieved their
objectives through the courts. Regulatory agencies that fail to establish strong cases for
rule making invite court challenges by those who oppose the rules. Of course, the abil-
ity to make a credible threat to move the issue to another arena can itself be a political
resource.

Political Strategies within Arenas

Trying to shift issues to more favorable arenas is not the only political strategy that can
be used to achieve desired policy outcomes. Policy analysts acting as political entre-
preneurs can often use one or more of four other general strategies: co-optation, com-
promise, heresthetics, and rhetoric. We briefly consider each of these in turn.

Co-optation. People, especially the types with strong egos who typically hold
public office (and teach at universities), tend to take pride in authorship. Indeed, we
are sometimes reluctant to admit the weaknesses in what we perceive to be our ideas.
Getting others to believe that your proposal is at least partly their idea is perhaps one
of the most common political strategies. In legislative settings it often takes the form of
co-sponsorship, across aisles and chambers. In administrative settings, it often
involves creating an advisory group that is constituted so as to arrive at the desired
recommendation. Potential adversaries who believe that they have contributed to the
recommendation as committee members may be less likely to become active oppo-
nents. Public officials with strong interpersonal skills can sometimes successfully co-
opt potential opponents with as little as a seemingly heart-to-heart conversation or
other gesture of personal attention. (Did you ever wonder why the dean invited you
and the other student leaders to that dinner?)
Co-optation may be useful when your proposal infringes on the turf of other
political actors.36 Politicians and bureaucrats often stake out areas of interest and
expertise. Although some of them may be natural allies by virtue of their interests and
beliefs, they may, nevertheless, feel threatened by proposals originating from other
people that appear to fall within their areas. Unless you involve them to some extent
in the design of policy proposals, they may voice opposition without seriously consid-
ering substantive merits. Furthermore, other actors who take their cues on the issue
from the recognized experts may decline to give the proposals close attention. For
example, council members may not give serious attention to a proposal for the estab-
lishment of a particular type of drug rehabilitation program unless the director of pub-
lic health says that it is worthy of consideration.

36Por a discussion of the use of co-optation at the organizational level, see Philip Selznick, TVA and the
Grass Roots (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), 13-16. Harvey M. Sapolsky identifies co-optation
of potential critics both inside and outside the navy as one of the factors contributing to the success of the
Polaris missile project. See his The Polaris System Development: Bureaucratic and Programmatic Success in
Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 15,47-54.