Structures 57 (2023) 105103

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Structures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/structures

Risk-based cost-benefit analysis of structural strengthening to mitigate

disproportionate collapse of buildings under abnormal blast loading
André T. Beck a, *, Mark G. Stewart b
a
Structural Engineering Department, University of São Paulo, São Carlos, SP, Brazil
b
Centre for Built Infrastructure Resilience, School of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Technology Sydney, NSW 2007, Australia

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Strengthening building structures to mitigate their likelihood of disproportionate collapse, due to initial damage
Blast loading produced by abnormal loads, has a significant impact on construction costs. The decision to strengthen or not
Malevolent attack needs to be taken under significant epistemic uncertainty related to potential blast hazard scenarios and threat
Disproportionate collapse
probabilities. In this manuscript we present a novel risk-based cost-benefit analysis to address optimal and
Alternate path method
Risk analysis
codified design options for RC buildings subject to blast hazards. Building frames of different aspect ratios
Damage propagation (number of bays × number of stories) are addressed. Three terrorist blast hazard scenarios are considered: two
VBIEDs and one smaller suitcase bomb. The large uncertainty in threat likelihood is addressed by treating annual
threat probability as the independent parameter in the analyses. This makes the blast hazard analysis, and the
progressive collapse analysis, independent of the factors that can make a particular building a target, like
location, environment, ownership, and use. The analysis reveals the break-even hazard (threat) probabilities,
which make the cost of structural strengthening equal to the reduction in expected cost of progressive collapse.
For a particular building location, use, and blast threat, if the hazard probability is larger than the break-even
probability, strengthening is cost-effective. The break-even point between the choices of strengthening with
removal of a single or of two columns is also presented and discussed. Practical recommendations for codified
Alternate Path Method include a distinction between strengthening factors for beams and columns, much in the
same way as already done in conventional design.

1. Introduction Threat-independent risk-based cost-benefit assessment for regular

RC frames subject to localized initial damage has been considered in
Design against disproportionate collapse is an important mitigation [4–6]. In this manuscript, this is combined with the terrorist blast threat
measure against abnormal loadings such as accidental or malevolent formulation of Stewart [7,8], yielding a novel threat-dependent risk-
vehicle impact or explosions. Of particular concern are terrorist based formulation for the progressive collapse assessment of regular RC
improvised explosive device attacks on a building which may result in frames.
disproportionate collapse causing large loss of life, and significant eco­
nomic and societal losses. The Alternate Path Method [APM] [1,2] is one 2. Risk-based approaches to progressive collapse
strategy to mitigate against disproportionate collapse by ensuring that
the building is stable when one or two exterior supporting columns are Under multiple hazards, the annual probability of structural collapse
removed from the structure. However, the additional structural frame can be evaluated as [9–12]:
cost for APM design is considerable and may vary from 9 to 62% [3]. ∑∑
There is a need to assess under what threat circumstances the benefits of pCol = P[Col|LD, H]P[LD|H]pH (1)
mitigating disproportionate collapse outweigh their cost, and if design
H LD

measures may be optimized to ensure more cost-effective design solu­ where Col stands for collapse, pH is the annual probability of hazard
tions. This leads to a risk-based cost-benefit assessment which is the occurrence; P[LD|H] is the conditional probability of local damage, given
focus of this paper. hazard H; P[Col|LD, H] is the conditional probability of collapse, given

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: atbeck@sc.usp.br (A.T. Beck), mark.stewart@uts.edu.au (M.G. Stewart).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.istruc.2023.105103
Received 15 June 2023; Received in revised form 26 July 2023; Accepted 19 August 2023
Available online 9 September 2023
2352-0124/© 2023 Institution of Structural Engineers. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
Fig. 1. Regular building with nC columns by nS stories, subject to initial
damage leading to loss of nr,c columns of nr,s stories. Individual bays with length
L and height H. nreinf ,S is the number of stories for which beams and columns are
strengthened.
local damage LD and hazard H.
Local damage caused by abnormal loading can lead to multiple
system damage states (SDS), depending on whether progressive collapse
is arrested or not. Risk is the product of probability of occurrence of a
damage state, and a measure of the consequences: R = P[SDS]C(SDS).
Total risk is given by the sum of direct (RD ) and indirect (RID ) risks,
associated to direct and indirect consequences [13]:
∑∑[∑
R = RD + RID = CID (SDS, LD)P[SDS|LD, H]
H LD SDS (2)
+ CD (LD) ]P[LD|H]pH
where CID (SDS, LD) are the indirect costs, for each system damage state
and initial damage, and CD (LD) are the direct costs of local damage.
This manuscript addresses optimal design of regular reinforced
concrete (RC) frame buildings, as illustrated in Fig. 1. For such regular
buildings, the initial loss of load-bearing elements due to abnormal
loading can propagate (see Fig. 2): vertically by a plastic beam bending
mechanism (denoted as B); or horizontally, either by local crushing or
instability failure of the adjacent columns (denoted as PL) or by a global
column crushing mechanism involving all ground floor columns
(denoted as PG) leading to what is known as a pancake-type collapse.
Local column crushing may also develop into a beam bending mecha­
nism involving two additional bays. Hence, the basic or primary system
damage states form the set SDS = {B, PL, PG}.
The analysis of system behavior is addressed by terms CID (SDS,
LD)P[SDS|LD, H] in Eq. (2). CID (SDS, LD) measures the consequences of
each type of progressive collapse failure, and P[SDS|LD, H] accounts for
the probabilities of occurrence of each type of progressive collapse event
conditional on the hazard. In this manuscript we address optimal design
of the structural system focusing on initial damage caused by malevolent
explosive blast loading events. The Alternate Path Method (APM)
considered herein consists of strengthening elements adjacent to po­
tential target areas, to allow the structure to bridge over the initial
damage, thus avoiding disproportionate collapse.
Herein, we dont specifically address the Enhanced Local Resistance
Method (ELRM), which looks at blast-resistant strengthening of poten­
tial target elements based on specific explosive threats to reduce term
P[LD|H]. Yet, column strengthening in APM has a compounding effect: it
increases resistance against collapse propagation, specifically in the
local column crushing failure mode, but it also increases column resis­
tance against blast loading (ELRM approach). This compounding effect
is considered herein.
In this manuscript, three specific threats are considered: a bench­
mark Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED) case, a VBIED
with reduced charge, and a suitcase bomb. The term P[LD|H] in Eq. (2)
accounts for the local strength of columns subject to different blast
loads. As will be shown, local strength is strongly dependent on the
assumed hazard scenarios. Hence, term P[LD|H] is characterized by
significant epistemic uncertainty. To address this uncertainty, three
2
Structures 57 (2023) 105103
typical hazard scenarios are considered herein. Yet, from all terms in Eq.
(2), it can be argued that the term with most epistemic uncertainty, or
over which we have less control, is the hazard rate pH .
Following Ellingwood [11,12], Stewart [7,8,14], and Stewart et al.
[15], the estimated average rate of bombing attacks on large U.S.
buildings ranges from 2 × 10–6/building/year to 8 × 10–6/building/
year. These figures apply to buildings without any specific threat.
However, for key governmental and international institutions, iconic
buildings, or other critical facilities facing a specific threat, the proba­
bility of an attack may increase to 10–4/building/year [10]. The above
rates are averages and assume that attacks and target selection occur
randomly. However, this may not be the case for some terrorist and
other malicious events [11,12,16]. Also, the above numbers make no
distinction between specific threat characteristics, such as size of charge
and standoff distance. Hence, the variable with the largest uncertainty in
Eq. (2) tends to be the likelihood of a successful attack, pH .
Considering the above, and based on the approaches developed by
Beck [4–6] and Stewart [7,8] , we consider pH as the independent var­
iable in the risk analysis. This makes the conditional hazard and pro­
gressive collapse analyses independent of the factors that could make a
particular building a potential target for a terrorist plot. By varying pH
from a very small pH = 10− 8 to a large pH = 10− 1 , we find the break-
even annual hazard probability (or threshold value pth H ) which makes
the strengthening cost equal to the reduction in expected costs of pro­
gressive collapse failure. The decision to strengthen a particular building
should then be taken based on a risk assessment [17], considering
ownership, use and surrounding environment of the structure, to find
out if for a particular hazard, pH is smaller or greater than pthH.
When the hazard probability is considered the independent param­
eter, conventional design under normal loading conditions and the
strengthening for load bridging under initial damage need to be com­
bined in the same formulation. In practice, this means that normal
loading condition is considered as one of the ‘hazards’ in Eq. (2), with
pH = pNLC = 1. For abnormal load hazards leading to very small pH ,
conventional design controls optimal frame configurations; for large pH ,
strengthening for alternate load paths controls optimal configurations.
The threshold hazard probability pth H divides the two solution spaces.
Since the abnormal load hazard pH is the independent variable, it is
not possible to consider the sum over hazards in Eq. (2).1 For each
abnormal load hazard acting in isolation, combined with the normal
loading condition, Eq. (2) becomes:
∑
R = RD + RID = CID (SDS, NLC)P[SDS|NLC]pNLC
SDS
[ ] (3)
∑ ∑
+ CID (SDS, LD)P[SDS|LD, H] + CD (LD) P[LD|H]pH
LD SDS
where NLC is for Normal Loading Condition, and pNLC = 1.
3. Structural configurations
Herein we address the optimal design of regular frame buildings
subject to initial damage by blast loading, as illustrated in Figs. 1 and 2.
The optimal design against progressive collapse changes significantly
with the aspect ratio of the building frames, as shown by [4–6]. Hence,
we consider seven frame configurations, with similar total floorspace,
and aspect ratios described in Table 1. Herein, the aspect ratio of indi­
vidual bays is fixed, with beam length (span between columns) L =
2H = 6m. Variations of bay aspect ratio have been considered in [4,5].
The frames are designed following ASCE 7 (2016) and ACI 318–19
(American Concrete Institute 2019), considering mean concrete strength
1
Considering a multi-hazard environment (such as prior earthquake damage
or deterioration) can be relevant and will be subject of future studies.
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

Fig. 2. System damage states for regular buildings subject to initial damage.

Table 1
Variants of aspect ratio (number of stories × bays) of frames studied.
Aspect ratio Number of stories × bays (ns × Axial strength of columns, Column cost factor (w.r.t. cost of Whole frame cost factor (w.r.t. cost of
(ar) (nc − 1) ) RD [kN] conventional beams) conventional 8x8)

Tall frame (16 × 4) 9, 359 3.33 1.39

Intermediate (13 × 5) 7, 900 3.09 1.25
Intermediate (11 × 6) 6, 639 2.86 1.14
“Square” frame (8 × 8) 5, 624 2.45 1
Intermediate (6 × 11) 4, 709 2.04 0.93
Intermediate (5 × 13) 3, 895 1.70 0.84
Low frame (4 × 16) 3, 181 1.37 0.76

Fig. 3. Frame aspect ratios, column cross-sections and detailing.

3
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
Fig. 4. Overview of the blast hazard progressive collapse analyses (design-verify-strengthen loop).
√̅̅̅̅
fc′ = 40 MPa, tangent elastic modulus Ec = 4.73 f ′c GPa, reinforcing
steel strength of 500 MPa, and total distributed design loads on all
beams of all floors of q = 50 kN/m, roof included. All beams have the
same design, with a cross-section of 200 × 500 mm2 (width × depth);
three bars of 20 mm diameter (3Φ20) on top side (924 mm2 of steel);
2Φ16 + 1Φ12 at the bottom (515 mm2). The ratio of nominal live-to-
dead loads is DLnn = 0.6 for all frames. Floor and roof loads are assumed
the same, as while different design loads will affect member sizing, they
do not affect the optimal design factors.
The conventional design resulted in the four column cross-sections
and detailing shown in Fig. 3, for four of the seven frames. The hazard
analysis addresses conditional failure probabilities P[LD|H] and damage
to these four columns, with results for frames of intermediate aspect
ratios being obtained by quadratic regression. Same regression curves
are employed later for column strengthening. Naturally, the tallest
buildings have more sturdy columns, which suffer smaller damage under
the same blast loading.
4. Overview of the blast hazard progressive collapse analyses
The blast-hazard and progressive collapse analyses performed herein
follow a typical design-verify-strengthen cycle of structural analysis, as
Table 2
Hazard scenarios considered.
Hazard case Range R(m)
Benchmark VBIED 10
VBIED with Reduced W 10
Suitcase bomb 3.5
4
Structures 57 (2023) 105103
illustrated in Fig. 4. The frames are initially designed considering the
usual dead and live loads, as shown in Section 5. First-floor columns are
exposed to blast hazards, where column damage and their failure
probabilities are evaluated (Section 5). At this point, columns could be
strengthened to reduce damage and failure probabilities, but this would
characterize the Enhanced Local Resistance Method (not our target).
Instead, we proceed with a risk-based progressive collapse analysis,
where expected progressive collapse costs are evaluated. Based on the
risk analysis, for given hazard probability pH and for each blast hazard,
we decide whether each frame should be strengthened or not. If not, the
conventional design is deemed sufficient, and the design-verify-
strengthen loop is exited. If frame strengthening is found to be
required, this leads to strengthening of beams and columns, typically by
first considering discretionary removal of a single column. Column
removal leads to load redistribution, which controls the amount of
strengthening required. Strengthening columns has a dual effect: it re­
duces the probabilities of cascading progressive collapse failures, but it
also increases the local resistance against the blast loading. Therefore,
the hazard analysis needs to be updated for the strengthened columns,
characterizing the loop. The strengthened frame is then subject to pro­
gressive collapse analysis. If no further strengthening is required, the
loop is exited. If further strengthening is required, this will involve for
instance discretionary removal of two columns.
Charge Wmass APM strengthening options studied
(kg) of ANFO
1000 nAPM
r,c = 1 and nAPM
r,c =2
500 nAPM
r,c =1
50 nAPM
r,c =1
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

While the terrorists may, for example, plan for a 1000 kg charge, in
reality there may be weighing and mixing difficulties resulting in a mass
tolerance of ± 10%. If Wmass is normally distributed, then the COV of
Wmass is 0.05.
The effectiveness (energetic output) of explosives is measured in
terms of TNT equivalency. As ANFO manufactured by terrorists is
typically home-made (as there are restrictions on purchasing materials
for commercial grade ANFO in many countries), the TNT equivalency of
home-made explosives can be quite low, especially as terrorists in
Western countries tend to be self-starters or lone-wolves (e.g. [16,18])
with no access to commercial or military explosives, or to high grade
bomb making materials, and often lack any training, and lack the op­
portunity to test their product [19]. Hence, it is assumed herein that
WTNT is modelled as a triangular distribution with lower bound of 0.6 (a
poorly built IED), upper limit and mode equal to 0.82 (a well-built IED).
This results in a mean value of WTNT = 0.75, i.e., 1000 kg of ANFO has
Fig. 5. Layout of IED and building RC columns. Dashed line around the lower an average TNT equivalency of 750 kg of TNT.
3rd column indicates influence area for this column. For a more detailed discussion of terrorist threats and the quantifi­
cation of R and W see Stewart [20–22].
The design-verify-strengthen loop in Fig. 4 is done throughout the
manuscript, treating in a batch approach the seven frames described in 5.2. Conditional probabilities of column loss, and damage indexes
Section 5, the three blast hazards described in Section 5, and considering
different hazard probabilities pH . The effect of explosive blast loading on damage and failure proba­
bilities of structural elements is a complex phenomenon. Damage to RC
5. Blast hazard analysis columns can be modelled by pressure-impulse (P-I) curves developed by
Mutalib and Hao [23]. The level of damage is represented by a damage
5.1. Terrorist blast hazard scenarios index defined as:
Rdesign − Rdamage
For sake of illustration, three hypothetical blast hazard scenarios are DI = (5)
Rdesign
assumed, as summarized in Table 2. These represent a range of terrorist
threats. A VBIED being a favoured mode of attack on large buildings or
where Rdesign is the axial load carrying capacity of the undamaged col­
public spaces where the minimum distance the vehicle may get to a
umn, and Rdamage is the axial load carrying capacity of the column due to
building is assumed as 10 m (due to fencing, bollards, or other protective
blast damage. If the column is undamaged by the blast then DI = 0. The
security). A suitcase IED represents a smaller IED, but since it is person
derived P-I curves are based on numerical modelling that considered
delivered it may be able to get closer to the building, in this case, 3.5 m.
shear and flexural damage. The probability of damage DI given an
The range (R) and explosive mass (W) are taken as random variables.
explosive hazard is a function of the random variability of column width,
The probabilistic distributions of these variables are heuristic and
column depth, column height, concrete compressive strength, reinforc­
selected to help illustrate the uncertainty and variability of predicting
ing yield strength, longitudinal and transverse reinforcement ratio, and
the placement, mass, and quality of IEDs.
P-I curve model errors MEPo and MEIo (see Table 3). Airblast variability
for peak reflected pressure and impulse is dependent on the random
5.1.1. Range
variability of explosive mass and range (see Section 5.1). Added to this
The VBIED location will be variable in x and y directions (see Fig. 5).
are blast loading modelling (air blast) errors MEP and MEI developed by
The variability of range is measured along the x-axis. The range is
Stewart et al. [24] where the predictive model for blast loading is taken
assumed to be a uniform distribution − 0.5 m to + 0.5 m from mean.
from the Kingery and Bulmash [25] model widely used for structural
This represents the fact that even though a terrorist will aim to get the
design and damage assessment (e.g., [26]. More recently, Stewart [27]
IED as close to a perimeter fence or bollard, it may be ± 0.5 m from the
showed that blast loading model errors are not statistically independent
desired location. Moreover, in a car the IED may be placed on one side of
for adjacent building columns. There is air blast spatial variability with
a vehicle, or maybe in the middle, etc. There is also uncertainty about
correlation coefficients ρP = 0.45 and ρI = 0.58 for pressure and im­
where along the building the IED will be placed. A reasonable assump­
pulse, respectively. For more details see Mutalib and Hao [23] and
tion is it will be desired to have it centrally placed (i.e., directly in front
Stewart [27].
of the middle column) with a 95% tolerance of ± 2 m leading to a
standard deviation of σy = 1.0 m assumed normally distributed.
Table 3
Statistical parameters for analysis of conditional column loss probabilities, P[LD|
5.1.2. Explosive mass
H] (adapted from [27]).
The equivalent explosive mass is estimated as
Mean COV Distribution
W = WTNT × Wmass (4)
Column width and breadth 1.005 0.04 Normal
Column height 1.00 0.03 Normal
where WTNT is the TNT effectiveness factor, and Wmass is the actual Longitudinal reinforcement 1.02 0.05 Modified Lognormal
(charge) mass of explosives. Transverse reinforcement 1.03 0.06 Modified Lognormal
The terrorist blast scenarios involve IEDs containing home-made Concrete compressive strength 1.00 0.15 Normal
ANFO (ammonium nitrate fuel oil). For the benchmark case, Wmass is Yield stress 1.15 0.05 Normal
Model Error for axial capacity (ME) 1.01 0.08 Normal
assumed as 1,000 kg of ANFO, 500 kg for a smaller VBIED, and 50 kg for Model Error for P-I curves (MEPo , MEIo ) 1.00 0.05 Normal
a suitcase bomb. The latter may be seen as a large amount of ANFO for a Dead load - D 1.05 Dn 0.10 Normal
suitcase; however, ANFO has a bulk density of 840 kg/m3 meaning a Arbitrary point-in-time live load -Lapt 0.5 kPa 0.72 Gamma
large mass can be concealed inside a typical 60 L suitcase. Airblast Model Error (MEP , MEI ): [24] Lognormal

5
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

Table 4 failure probability is a high 91% and 39% for these columns, respec­
Computed failure probabilities P[LD|H] for frame columns and three hazards. tively. For the (4 × 16) frame, with significantly smaller RC cross-
Hazard scenario Frame 1st Column 2nd Column 3rd Column sections, the DI is 1.0 and 0.96 for the 1st and 2nd columns respec­
tively. The corresponding failure probabilities are both 100%. However,
(16 × 4) 0.91 0.39 7.5 × 10− 6

Benchmark VBIED (11 × 6) 0.99 0.61 3 for a lesser 500 kg VBIED the DI and P[LD|H] both reduce as expected.
1.0 × 10−
(6 × 11) 1 0.67 1.1 × 10− 3 Similar trends are also observed for the 50 kg suitcase bomb. The trends
(4 × 16) 1 0.87 4.4 × 10− 3 in mean DI are shown in Fig. 7. As expected, damage indices are smaller
(16 × 4) 0.16 3.1 × 10− 3 0 for sturdier columns of the taller frames and for columns at a greater
VBIED Reduced W (11 × 6) 0.37 1.8 × 10− 2 0 distance from the IED (Fig. 7).
(6 × 11) 0.44 2.0 × 10− 2 0 Conditional column loss probabilities (Table 4 and Fig. 6) and
(4 × 16) 0.75 7.8 × 10− 2
2.0 × 10− 6
damage indices (Table 5 and Fig. 7) show that the increasing order of
(16 × 4) 3.7 × 10− 2 1.5 × 10− 7 0
Suitcase bomb (11 × 6) 0.25 5 0
blast load damage is Suitcase bomb, Reduced Charge W VBIED and
1.7 × 10−
(6 × 11) 0.42 7.5 × 10− 5 0 Benchmark VBIED, with one exception. For the weaker columns of the
(4 × 16) 0.8 7.8 × 10− 4 0 lower (4 × 16) building, the suitcase bomb results in larger conditional
column loss probabilities and larger damage index, in comparison to the
Reduced Charge W VBIED. This occurs because the standoff distance for
The probability of failure for a column i conditional on a hazard H is: the suitcase bomb is smaller (3.5 m against 10 m of the VBIED), and this
[ ( ) ]
P[LD|H] = P[Gi (X)⩽0] = P Rdesign (1 − DI) − D + Lapt ⩽0 (6) appears to have a greater effect on weaker columns.
As illustrated in Fig. 4, strengthening the columns against damage
where Rdesign is the undamaged axial strength for a column ([28]), DI is propagation also influences their direct resistance against blast loading.
the damage index, D is the actual dead load effect, Lapt is the arbitrary This leads to a reduction of conditional failure probabilities and of
point-in-time live load effect for a single column, and Gi (X) is the limit damage indices. This strengthening is addressed in Section 8.5, as it
state function equal to resistance minus load where failure occurs if applies only to those frame and hazard combinations for which
Gi (X) ≤ 0. For more details on the structural reliability analysis for blast-
induced damaged columns see [27].
Table 5
Conditional column loss probabilities P[LD|H] computed for the three
Computed mean and C.O.V. of Damage Index for frame columns and three
hazards, for up to three adjacent columns (Fig. 5), are presented in hazards.
Table 4. As illustrated in Fig. 6, failure probability trends are as ex­
Hazard scenario Frame 1st Column 2nd Column 3rd Column
pected: they are smaller for the sturdier columns of the taller frames; for
the less intense blast hazards, and for the 2nd and 3rd columns, due to (16 × 4) (0.92,0.06) (0.75, 0.20) (0.098, 0.83)
Benchmark VBIED (11 × 6) (0.98,0.034) (0.85,0.12) (0.13,0.79)
larger stand-off distance and angle of incidence from the IED. Note that
(6 × 11) (0.996, 0.014) (0.91,0.07) (0.21,0.7)
failure probabilities for the seven frames of Fig. 6 are evaluated by (4 × 16) (1.0,0.0) (0.96,0.050) (0.34,0.57)
quadratic regression, from the four columns of Fig. 3 (values in Table 4). (16 × 4) (0.61,0.30) (0.22,0.57) (0,0)
The same regression curves are later employed for the strengthened VBIED Reduced W (11 × 6) (0.78, 0.18) (0.31,0.58) (0,0)
columns (Section 8.5). (6 × 11) (0.87,0.083) (0.51,0.44) (0,0)
(4 × 16) (0.93, 0.058) (0.69,0.26) (0.06,0.95)
The damage index statistics for the frame columns and three hazards
(16 × 4) (0.32, 0.65) (0,0) (0,0)
are shown in Table 5. It is observed that for the benchmark VBIED Suitcase bomb (11 × 6) (0.59,0.45) (0,0) (0,0)
located centrally in front of column 1 for the (16 × 4) frame the damage (6 × 11) (0.83,0.13) (0,0) (0,0)
index is a very high 0.92 (i.e., loss of 92% of capacity), and a high 0.75 (4 × 16) (0.96, 0.04) (0.024, 3.10) (0,0)
for the adjacent columns. As expected, Table 4 then shows that the

Fig. 6. Conditional column loss probabilities P[LD|H] for all buildings (e.g., columns of Fig. 3) for the three threats considered (1st CL = first column lost, …).

6
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
Fig. 7. Mean damage index (DI) for all buildings (e.g., columns of Fig. 3) for the three threats considered (1st CL = first column lost, …).
strengthening is found to be cost-effective.
6. Progressive collapse and system damage analysis
6.1. Mechanical model
The progressive collapse analysis is made using the simplified
analytical model of [61]. The model is applicable for steel or RC frames,
and considers plastic bending failure of beams, and (brittle) crushing
failure of columns. The model considers regular frames with nc columns
and ns storeys, and initial damage events leading to failure of nr,c col­
umns of nr,s stories, where subscript r is for ‘removed’. Here, nr,s refers to
the vertical extent of the initial damage.
The analytical model has some known limitations:
1. Only gravity loads are considered. No lateral loads nor second-order
effects;
2. Slab, infill, and other three-dimensional effects not considered;
3. Compressive arch and catenary action effects not considered;
Fig. 8. Cascading progressive collapse events, triggered by removal of n0r,c columns, indicating two sequential local column failures involving four addi­
tional columns.
7
Structures 57 (2023) 105103
4. Failure of beam-column connections not considered, and
5. Geometric non-linearities are not considered.
Slab and infill effects [29–32], compressive arch [33,34] and cate­
nary actions [35–37] significantly contribute to progressive collapse
resistance. The model of [38] does allow consideration of catenary ac­
tion, within nonlinear static APM [39] yet, within the optimization
problem this leads to beams of very small bending strength which do not
respect vertical displacement service limit states [4] . Such combined
effects should be studied with more explicit numerical models
[2,40–42]. In summary, due to the above limitations, this study provides
conceptual insight, and specific numerical results should be considered
as indicative. Numerical results obtained recently by the authors [42],
considering geometrical and material non-linear FE modelling, have
been confirming the conceptual insight obtained with the simplified
analytical model.
Epistemic uncertainty in the mechanical model was not considered,
mainly because hazard epistemic uncertainty will dominate the out­
comes of the risk assessment. However, this is a topic for future research.
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

In the following, superscript I is employed for the intact structure. 6.3. Strengthening for alternate load paths
Superscripts B and P refer to bending and column crushing (pancake)
collapse. Local column crushing (PL) refers to failure of the columns Three situations need to be accounted for in the formulation for
adjacent to the damaged area, including cascading column failures alternate load paths:
(Fig. 8). Global column crushing (PG) refers to the instantaneous failure
of all columns of the first floor, leading to a pancake-type collapse a. The discretionary initial damage against which the frames are
(Figs. 2 and 8). Furthermore, perfect brittleness is denoted el, whereas strengthened in design stage (APM strengthening);
ideal plastic behavior is written as pl. This notation follows [38] for easy b. The initial damage scenarios the structure will be subject to during
cross-referencing. The entire formulation is presented in terms of ver­ normal service, and;
tical distributed load capacities qu . The plastic hinge moment for beams c. The potential for cascading failure of the structure, in case of initial
is By , and crushing strength of columns is Rc . damage.
For the intact structure, the ultimate strength in bending collapse is:
Equations (8), (10) and (11) can be employed in the three situations
16By
qI,B,pl
u = (7) above. Yet, to differentiate between these situations, nAPM
r,c is used for the
L2
discretionary number of columns removed in APM strengthening (a.); n0r,c
This plastic solution is derived from the kinematic theorem,
is used for the number of lost (collapsed) columns (initial damage sce­
considering a triple-hinge plastic mechanism. In case of loss of nr,c col­
narios) resulting from blast loading (b.); and nr,c is used for the cascading
umns, bending collapse strength is reduced leading to:
failure of columns in damage propagation phase (c.).
4By In the following, it is assumed that any column of the first (ground)
qB,pl
c (nr,c ) = (8)
L2 nr,c floor could be lost due to a blast damage; hence, all columns and all
beams of the first two floors need to be strengthened.
For the intact structure, static crushing of all ground floor columns
Beams and columns are strengthened in such a way as to provide an
occurs when maximum compressive force at base equals total axial
alternative path to the loads supported by the removed elements [1]. For
strength, leading to the global pancake collapse strength:
the beams to bridge over nAPM r,c removed columns, the required bending
qI,PG =
Rc nc
(9) strength is [1,44]:
u
Lns (nc − 1)
L2 nAPM L2 nAPM
In case of initial damage, local and global column crushing (pancake) (14)
r,c r,c
BAPM
y (nAPM
r,c ) = qB,pl
c = (1.2Dn + 0.5Ln )
4ϕ 4ϕ
collapses are possible. In case of local crushing, loads are redistributed to
the two nearest columns. Brittle failure occurs for: Considering load redistribution, required strength for adjacent col­
umns is:
Rc 1
qPL,el (nr,c , nr,s ) = ( ( )) (10) [ ( ( )) ]
c
Lns 2 − nc − 1
+ nr,c 1 −
nr,s
APM APM NLC Lns nc − 1 APM nAPM
r,s
nc ns RAPM
c (nr,c ,n ) = Max R c , 2− +n r,c 1− qP,loc,el
c
r,s ϕ nc ns
In case of loss of nr,c columns, brittle global crushing collapse occurs (15)
for:
with qP,loc,el
c = (1.2Dn +0.5Ln ). In Eq. (15), operator Max[] is used to also
Rc nc (nc − nr,c )
qPG,el (nr,c , nr,s ) = ( ) (11) consider the required column strength under normal loading conditions.
c
Lns (nc − 1)( nc + nr,c ) − 2 nr,s nr,c nc
ns This operator is not required in Eq. (14) because the impact of a lost
column in bending moments is large for L ≥ H.
As shown above, herein we consider ductile failure of beams, and In codified APM strengthening, ϕ = 1 is recommended [45], with no
brittle failure of columns, which is representative of RC frame building distinction for beams and columns. To address optimal design within an
behavior. The Dynamic load Amplification Factors (DAF) as a result of APM framework, herein we introduce independent strengthening fac­
sudden column removal included in Eqs. (8), (10) and (11) are DAF = 1
tors for beams (λB = 1/ϕAPM B ) and columns (λC = 1/ϕAPM C ), such that
for beams, and DAF = 2 for columns, following [38]. This is closely
λB = λC = 1 recovers the code-recommended strengthening [1,45], with
related to the recommended DAF values for deformation-controlled
ϕAPM = ϕAPM = ϕ = 1.
plastic failure of beams, and load-controlled brittle failure of columns B C

[1]. No uncertainty is considered in DAF values [43]. Other damage In the following risk-based optimization, strength equations (Eqs. (7)
modes may also be important, such as to beam-column connections, but to (11) are computed with By replaced by By = λB BAPM y , and with Rc
this is a topic for further research. replaced by Rc = λC RAPM
c , where BAPM
y and RAPM
c are the initial values of
beam plastic hinge moment and column crushing capacities, respec­
6.2. Conventional design under normal loading conditions tively, resulting from APM strengthening with discretionary removal of
nAPM
r,c columns.
For conventional design under normal loading conditions, the Strengthening beams and columns of a frame to support removal of
required beam strength is [28,44] : one or two columns leads to increase in bending moment and axial load
L2 I,B,pl L2 capacities. The APM design strengthening factors are obtained by
BNLC
y = q = (1.2Dn + 1.6Ln ). (12) dividing the design capacity of the strengthened element, by the design
16ϕB u 16ϕB
capacity from conventional design. For the frames addressed herein, and
where superscript (•)NLC refers to the normal loading condition, and for λB = 1, the resulting strengthening factors for beams, with removal
ϕB = 0.85. The required axial column strength is: of a single (nAPM
r,c = 1) or of two columns (nAPM
r,c = 2), are:
⃒
Lns (nc − 1) I,P Lns (nc − 1) ⃒
RNLC = qu = (1.2Dn + 1.6Ln ) (13) BAPM
y (nAPM ⃒
r,c )⃒
c
ϕC nc ϕC nc SF B = NLC ⃒ = 2.06
By ⃒
nAPM
r,c =1
where ϕC = 0.65, due to the brittle crushing failure mode of columns.

8
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

Table 6
Required percentage increase in column axial strength, for updated hazard analysis.
Aspect ratio (ar) Number of stories × bays (ns × (nc − 1) ) *Required % increase in RD with:
nAPM
r,c = 1, DAF = 2 nAPM
r,c = 2, DAF = 2

Tall frame (16 × 4) 28.0 116

Intermediate (13 × 5) 40.0 120
Intermediate (11 × 6) 48.0 125
“Square” frame (8 × 8) 53.0 131
Intermediate (6 × 11) 55.0 139
Intermediate (5 × 13) 58.5 147
Low frame (4 × 16) 62.0 157

* Evaluated by FE analysis for damaged frames, with DAF × (1.2Dn + 0.5Ln ), w.r.t. conventional design (1.2Dn + 1.6Ln ), assuming the floors above have not collapsed
(Fig. 2).

⃒
⃒ CCF (ar) is the cost factor for columns normalized to conventional beam
BAPM (nAPM ⃒
r,c )⃒
SF B =
y
⃒ = 4.13 (16) construction cost. Values of CCF (ar) for the different frames are shown in
ByNLC
⃒
nAPM
Table 1. Hence, the total construction cost for each frame is:
r,c =2

CREF (ar) = Lns (nc − 1) + Hns nc CCF (ar) (20)

where SF refers to design strengthening factor, and subscript (•)B refers
to beams. The resulting design strengthening factor for columns is given
by Eq. (17), with numerical values given in Table 6 for λC = 1.
RAPM (nAPM
r,c )
c
SF C =
RcNLC
6.4. Limit states for probabilistic progressive collapse analysis
For the intact structure, the limit state function for bending and
global pancake collapse is:
gI (λB , λC , X) = RI rI (λB , λC , ⋯) − D − L50
where rI (⋅) is a deterministic strength function for the intact structure, RI
is a non-dimensional random variable describing uncertainty in strength
of the intact structure, including model error, D is the dead load, L50 is
the fifty-year peak live load, and X is the vector of random system pa­
rameters. The strength rI (⋅) for bending failure is given by Eq. (7), and
for global pancake by Eq. (9).
In case of localized initial damage, the limit state function is given
by:
( )
gLD (λB , λC , X) = RD rD λB , λC , nr,c , nr,s ⋯ − D − Lapt (19)
where rD (⋅) is a deterministic strength for the damaged structure, RD is a
non-dimensional random variable describing uncertainty in strength of
the damaged structure, including model error, and Lapt is the sustained
component of live load. In Eq. (19), the strength rD ( • ) for bending is Eq.
(8), for local crushing is Eq. (10), and for global pancake failure is Eq.
(11). The above equations are valid for any number of removed columns,
which includes the initial triggering damage (n0r,c ), as well as cascading
progressive failure of columns.
Herein, approximate failure probabilities are computed based on the
Cornell reliability index, as the limit state functions are linear in the
random variables, but also by approximating the distributions of L50 and
Lapt as Gaussian. Formulation for Cornell reliability indexes and data for
the probabilistic progressive collapse evaluation are presented in [4].
6.5. Cost functions: construction, strengthening and expected costs of
failure
6.5.1. Construction and strengthening costs
Since all beams of all frames are the same size, the elementary
building block for construction costs is the unitary cost of a RC beam
(CB = 1, per meter), in arbitrary units (Dollar, Euro, etc.). The cost of
columns depends on frame aspect ratio, as taller frames have more
expensive columns. It is given by CC = CB CCF (ar) (per meter), where
As suggested in Eq. (16), the cost of strengthening beams to bridge
over a lost column is higher than the cost of strengthening columns.
Strengthening beams usually involves increasing the reinforcement
ratio, or the amount of steel. Hence, the additional cost of strengthening
(17)
one meter of beams for bridging over nAPM removed columns, is pro­
r,c
portional to:
CstB (λB ) = Max[0, λB αB SF B + (1 − αB ) − 1] (21)
where αB is participation factor of steel cost in total construction costs of
a beam. Following [4], herein we consider αB = 0.7, assuming the cost
(18) of steel to be 70% of a RC beam cost, with the other 30% given by cost of
concrete, formwork, workmanship, etc. In Eq. (21), operator Max[⋅] is
used such that strengthening costs are not smaller than zero for λB →0, so
that conventional design is not bypassed.
Accordingly, the additional cost of strengthening one meter of frame
columns is proportional to:
CstC (λC ) = Max[0, λC αC SFC + (1 − αC ) − 1] (22)
where αC is the participation factor of steel cost in strengthening a frame
column where αC depends on concrete strength, load eccentricity and
other factors. Based on [4], herein we consider αC = 0.5 in all analyses,
as we understand there is greater contribution of concrete to strength of
columns. The impact of varying strengthening cost factors α is investi­
gated in [4]. Cost factors α affect the threshold column loss probabilities
which are discussed in [4]. Larger strengthening cost factors imply in
larger threat probabilities to justify APM strengthening of the frames to
resist local damage.
The total construction cost is:
[ { } ]
1 L(nc − 1) ns + nreinf ,s CstB (λB )
Cconst. (λB , λC ) = (23)
CREF (8 × 8) +Hnc CCF (ar){ns + nreinf ,s CstC (λC )}
where nreinf,s is the number of stories for which beams and columns will
be strengthened.
Eq. (23) is normalized by CREF (8 × 8) such that the “square” frame is
the reference for frame construction cost with no strengthening (nreinf,s =
0). Table 1 shows the cost factors for all frames addressed herein. By
considering the (8 × 8) frame construction cost as unitary, collapse costs
can be related to construction costs by a simple multiplication factor k.
Herein, we assume that any column of the first floor of the buildings
is a potential target for the bombing. Therefore, when the decision is to
strengthen the frames to produce alternate load paths, we require
strengthening of all columns and all beams of the first two floors; hence,
nreinf,s = 2. This goes inline with recent findings of [41], that optimal
strengthening reinforcement should be limited and placed in the first

9
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
story above the lost column. Other strengthening decisions are studied
in [4].
In Eq. (21), cost of strengthening beams depends on factor λB αB SFB .
Similarly, cost of strengthening columns depends on factor λC αC SFC , Eq.
(22). In the risk optimization, a continuous transition is obtained be­
tween the decisions to strengthen, or not to strengthen the frames, by
considering λB and λC as design variables. If a particular frame should
not be strengthened, the algorithm will reduce λB and λC , compensating
for the strengthening factors SFB and SFC . Eventually, for λB = 1/SFB and
λC = 1/SFC , the cost of strengthening is zero (see Eqs. (21) and (22)),
which corresponds to conventional design. Progressive collapse strength
equations (Eqs. (7) to (11)) are updated accordingly. Any values λB , λC <
1 indicate that codified APM strengthening for load bridging over nAPM r,c
removed columns is not economical. By codified strengthening, we
mean use of Eqs. (14) and (15) with λB = λC = 1.
6.5.2. Cost of initial localized damage
The ith local damage state LDi is characterized by loss (collapse) of n0r,c
columns of n0r,s stories. Herein, we consider n0r,s = 1, and n0r,c ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
For the strengthened frame, and considering that collapsed (lost) col­
umns are from strengthened floors, the cost of the ith local damage is:
⎡ ( ){ } ⎤
L n0r,c + 1 n0r,s CstB (λB )
CD (LDi ) =
kdirect ⎢
⎣ {
⎥
}⎦ (24)
CREF (8 × 8) +Hn0 C (ar) n0 C (λ )
r,c CF r,s stC C
where kdirect is a consequence multiplication factor. For kdirect = 1, the
direct consequence of local damage CD (LDi ) is a fraction of whole frame
construction cost, corresponding to the fraction of the frame cross-
section area affected by local damage. For the frames considered here­
in, and for n0r,c = n0r,s = 1, this fraction varies between 0.025 and 0.033.
6.5.3. Expected costs of progressive collapse failure
The cost of progressive collapse failure is accounted for by means of
cost multiplication factors kj , which relate to the unitary cost of the
structure, and by the frame frontal area aj affected by each failure mode
(Fig. 8). Hence, the expected cost of progressive collapse failure, for the
ith initial damage state, is given by:
1 [⋃ ] column of the frame.
CEFi = CID (LDi )P[LDi |H] = P[LDi |H]P pj aj kj ,j ∈ {B,PL,PG}
CREF (8×8) j
(25)
where {B, PL, PG} represents the set of possible damage propagation
events (bending failure, local and global column crushing). Cascading
damage propagation is addressed in the next section. By considering
collapse failure costs proportional to the affected frontal area (aj in Eq.
(25)), we assume failure costs to be proportional to building occupancy
(equipment, people), occupancy to be uniform, and total losses to be
significantly higher than building construction costs.
Failure cost factors kj in Eq. (25) have been investigated in [4], based
on results by [3] which relate the cost of the structural frame, to total
construction cost of different buildings. The analysis in [4] compares
cost of construction to the cost of collapses for the Alfred P. Murrah
Federal Building, 9/11 World Trade Center and Pentagon, and considers
cost multipliers considered in studies such as [8]. The analysis by [4]
results in failure cost factors in the range kj ∈ (40, 80).
One relevant point in a structural risk analysis is to distinguish be­
tween the more severe consequences of brittle failure of columns, from
the ductile failure of beams. [4] use kbrittle = 2 kductile , and they arrive at
very realistic relation between the design factor for columns and the
10
Structures 57 (2023) 105103
design factor for beams (0.85 0.65 = 1.3), which suggests that the brittle/
ductile cost ratio considered is realistic. Following the arguments in [4],
in Eq. (25) we consider kductile = 40 for plastic beam bending failures
(j ∈ {B}), and kbrittle = 80 for brittle crushing failure of columns (j ∈ {PL,
PG}). For the direct consequences of local damage in Eq. (24), we
consider kdirect = kbrittle , since blast loading produces immediate load-
controlled failure of beams and columns. With the above figures, if for
example building cost is $50 million, and there is global pancake
(brittle) collapse, then total failure cost is expected to be $4 billion (for
kbrittle = 80). Yet, if only 30% of the building suffers progressive collapse,
then failure costs reduce to $1.2 billion. This roughly accounts for the
fraction of building occupancy directly affected by collapse, plus the cost
of reconstructing the whole building.
6.6. Evaluation of system damage probabilities
A blast event leading to loss of n0r,c columns of a frame produces
localized damage, which may propagate upwards due to a plastic beam
bending mechanism, or horizontally, due to column crushing mecha­
nisms. The basic set of damage propagation events is given by {B, PG}.
Yet, the local crushing failure of adjacent columns leads to nr,c = n0r,c +
2, and this may again propagate upwards by beam bending, affecting
two additional bays, or lead to global crushing, with nr,c = n0r,c + 2, and
so on (Fig. 8). Hence, the total indirect risk of damage propagation is
given by:
P[LDi |H]
CID (LDi )P[LDi |H] =
CREF (8 × 8)
[ ] (26)
( )
×P ∪j,n0r,c aj pj kj ˝ + ˝∪n0r,c +2→nFr,c pPL nr,c ∪j aj pj kj , j ∈ {B, PG}
where pPL (nr,c ) is the probability of crushing failure of the adjacent
columns, which is the main parameter controlling the cascading prop­
agation of failure. This term is directly affected by blast damage, by way
of the damage indexes shown in Fig. 7. The ˝ +˝ sign in Eq. (26) also
represents a union of events. In Eq. (26), nFr,c is the maximum number of
symmetric cascading local column failure events, given by nFr,c =
floor[(nc − n0r,c + 1)]/2. This corresponds to initial damage at the central
The unions of events in Eq. (26) correspond to series systems, with
failure consequences accounted for each event. Evaluation of the prob­
ability in Eq. (26) involves the probability of occurrence of individual
events, as well as dual and multiple intersections [46]. As damage
propagates by means of local column crushing, the impacted frame area
increases, but the event probabilities decrease, especially due to the
conditioning on local column failure, controlled by conditional proba­
bility pPL (nr,c ). Importantly, the failure events in Eq. (26) involve a su­
perposition of frame areas, but each frame element can fail only once. If
the individual event probabilities were added, accurate intersections
would have to be discounted. As it is difficult to accurately compute such
intersections, we employ the max[.] operator to evaluate the probabilities
of event unions. Hence, among all terms in Eq. (26), only the system
damage state leading to maximum risk is considered.
7. Risk-based cost-benefit analysis
The risk-based cost-benefit analysis is composed of the initial dam­
age and damage propagation events, their occurrence probabilities, and
the cost terms discussed in Section 6. The solution leading to minimal
total expected cost is found by solving the following optimization
problem:
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
Given pH and for a given blast loading scenario,
find:(λ*B , λ*C )
which minimizes:
CTE (λB , λC ) = Cconst. (λB , λC )
⋃
+ SDS CID (SDS, NLC)P[SDS|NLC]pNLC
⋃3
+ i=1 [USDS CID (SDS, LDi )P[SDS|LDi , H] + CD (LDi ) ]P[LDi |H]pH50 ,
where pH50 = 1 − (1 − pH )50 is the fifty-year probability that the struc­
ture is exposed to a threat with annual hazard rate pH . In Eq. (27), line
(b) corresponds to the expected cost of failure under normal loading
conditions. Bending and global pancake collapse failures are considered
for the intact structure, such that line (b) becomes:
Lkductile [ ] [ ]
Φ − β50 50
B (λB ) + CPG Φ − βPG (λC ) (28)
CREF (8 × 8)
where β50 B is the 50-year reliability index for plastic collapse of beams,
and β50PG is the 50-year reliability index for global pancake collapse, both
calculated from Eq. (18). Although all beams are identical, it is assumed
that under normal loading conditions only one span of one floor would
fail, due to (partial) independence of live loads in different spans and
floors. The cost of a global pancake failure is CPG = Cconst. (λB , λC )kbrittle .
3
The ∪i=1 [⋅] union in line (c) of Eq. (27) corresponds to the different
initial damage states which may be caused by blast loading. Considering
the conditional failure probabilities in Fig. 6, and the mean Damage
Indexes in Fig. 7, herein we consider initial damage leading to loss of one
to three columns. Hence, the ith local damage state LDi is characterized
by loss of n0r,c columns of n0r,s stories, where n0r,c ∈ {1, 2, 3} and n0r,s = 1.
For all blast scenarios considered herein, the conditional probability of
losing four columns as a direct result of the blast is insignificant and can
be neglected.
Note that the sums over system damage states in Eq. (3), SDS [⋅],
∑ to the discretionary column removal option considered.
have been replaced by unions of events in Eq. (27), since each element of
the frame can fail only once. Also in Eq. (27), the union of events is
handled by means of the max[⋅] operator.
8. Numerical results
8.1. Summary of results and problem variants investigated
When considering blast hazard threats, the first relevant design
question is whether a particular threat is significant to justify the
spending in strengthening beams and columns of a particular structure.
By considering the hazard probability pH as the independent parameter
in the risk-based formulation, this question is addressed by finding the
break-even point (pth H ), or the point where the two alternatives
(strengthening for APM or conventional design) have the same total
expected cost. This decision also relates to the choice on the number of
columns to be removed in the APM strengthening, given by nAPM r,c . As
observed in Fig. 6, for the Benchmark VBIED blast the probabilities of
losing one or two columns are significant. Hence, the options nAPM
r,c =1
and nAPM
r,c = 2 are considered for the Benchmark VBIED threat, starting in
Section 8.2. This is followed by a discussion of the break-even hazard
probabilities pth
H in Section 8.3. For the Reduced W and Suitcase hazard
cases, the intuitive choice is nAPM = 1, as the probabilities of losing a
r,c
second column in the blast are one order of magnitude smaller than the
11
Structures 57 (2023) 105103
probability of losing the first column.
In Section 8.4 we investigate optimal reliability indexes, in terms of
hazard probabilities pH . This helps to interpret how the optimum solu­
tions adapt to increasing hazard probabilities. In this section we also
(a)
(b) (27)
(c)
observe that the break-even hazard probability (pth H ) is associated with
beam bending reliability indexes becoming zero, which aids in inter­
preting optimal strengthening factors discussed in Section 8.7.
From Section 8.5 onwards we consider a fixed hazard probability
large enough to justify strengthening all frames addressed herein, for the
three blast hazards. Hence, in Section 8.5 we address the increased local
resistance of the strengthened columns against the blast loads. In Section
8.6 we study how optimal reliability indexes vary in terms of frame
aspect ratio, and in Section 8.7 we discuss optimal strengthening factors,
with relevance to codified APM strengthening.
8.2. Frame strengthening for alternate path method
As observed in Fig. 6, a terrorist bombing blast hazard can lead to
loss of one, two or three columns. For the benchmark VBIED case, the
probability of losing a second column, as direct result of the blast, is
significant, and of the same order of magnitude as the probability of
losing the first column. Hence, for this case it is important to consider
the options of removing one or two columns in the APM strengthening.
This choice relates to use of design codes (Eqs. (14) and (15)), as well as
to the risk optimization. As will be shown in the sequence, the risk
analysis can “partially compensate” for an inappropriate choice of nAPM
r,c .
Yet, the optimal beam and column design factors, λ*B and λ*C , are related
Column strengthening has a dual role in the progressive collapse
analysis under blast loading. The first and immediate role discussed in
Section 6.3 is the axial strengthening required for the adjacent columns
to absorb the load redistributed from failed column(s). The second role is
to increase column resistance against blast loadings, reducing the term
P[LD|H] addressed in the Hazard Analysis (Section 5). Yet, this increase
in column strength against blast loading does not apply when the
optimal decision is not to strengthen the frames. Hence, an interactive
analysis (Fig. 4) would be required to find the break-even hazard
probability pth th
H , while considering the strengthened columns for pH > pH ,
and the unstrengthened columns for pH < pth H . Herein, to avoid the
interactive analysis, this secondary column strengthening effect is
initially neglected in the risk analysis for pth
H (Sections 8.3 and 8.4). This
effect is considered, however, in the analysis of optimal reliability in­
dexes and optimal safety factors resulting from the risk analysis (Sec­
tions 8.6 and 8.7), for a hypothetical threat above the break-even point,
that is, for a hazard probability which justifies strengthening all frames
studied herein.
8.3. Objective function and hazard probability thresholds
8.3.1. Objective function
Figs. 9 and 10 illustrate the total expected cost (objective functions)
in Eq. (27) for the Benchmark VBIED case, for the “square” frame (ar =
8 × 8), considering strengthening options with a single (nAPM r,c = 1,
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

Fig. 9. Total expected cost (objective function) for the benchmark VBIED case, nAPM
r,c = 1, ar = (8 × 8), showing an annual hazard threshold of (pth
H )OPT = 3.9 ×
10− 4 , for which two alternative optimal solutions are obtained: one with λB ≈ 0.48, corresponding to conventional design (no strengthening), and one for λB ≈ 1.43,
corresponding to APM strengthening of beams to bridge over a single lost column.

Fig. 10. Total expected cost (objective function) for the benchmark VBIED case, nAPM
r,c = 2, ar = (8 × 8), showing an annual hazard threshold of (pth
H )OPT = 3.3 ×
10− 4 , for which two alternative optimal solutions are obtained: one with λB ≈ 0.24, corresponding to conventional design (no strengthening), and one for λB ≈ 0.73,
corresponding to APM strengthening of beams to bridge over two lost columns.

Fig. 9) and with two (nAPMr,c = 2, Fig. 10) columns removed. The figures
show total expected cost as a function of λB , for λC at the optimal value
λ*C . Four total expected cost functions are shown, for pH going from small
to large.
For one particular value of pH in each figure, two points of local
minima are observed, with almost the same total expected cost. This
occurs due to a transition, from the optimal solution corresponding to
conventional design (no strengthening) to the optimal solution being an
APM strengthened design. The beam strengthening factors λB ≈ 0.48 ≈
1/SFB (Fig. 9) and λB ≈ 0.24 ≈ 1/SFB (Fig. 10) correspond to conven­
tional design. The strengthening factors λB ≈ 1.43 (Fig. 9) and λB ≈ 0.73
(Fig. 10) relate to APM strengthening, following Section 6.3. The hazard
probability value characterizing this transition, or cost break-even point,
is called the hazard probability threshold, pth H . In Figs. 9 and 10, we use
(pth
H )OPT to refer to numerical values evaluated from the risk-based
optimization.
It can be observed in Figs. 9 and 10 that the risk-based optimization
can “compensate” for an inappropriate decision on the discretionary
number of removed columns (nAPM r,c ) against which the frames are
strengthened. Due to the large probability of losing two columns in the
Benchmark VBIED blast event (see Fig. 6), strengthening the frame for
nAPM
r,c = 2 seems to be a more intuitive decision, which leads to λB ≈ 0.73.

12
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

Fig. 11. Total expected cost for the benchmark VBIED case, showing three cost break-even points, for three code-based solutions: conventional design, and APM
strengthening for nAPM
r,c = 1 and nAPM
r,c = 2, frame with ar = (8 × 8).

Fig. 12. Annual hazard thresholds (pth APM

H )CD , in terms of frame aspect ratio, for the three blast threats, nr,c = 1 unless stated otherwise.

Yet, if the frame is strengthened for nAPM

r,c = 1 only, this is compensated
by increasing the (optimal) beam strengthening factor to λB ≈ 1.43. This
represents a 43% increase in the APM strength factor for beams, leading
to an overall SFB = 2.06 × 1.43 = 2.95 (see Eq. (16)). These values also
show that the optimal solution is an intermediate one, with nAPM
r,c = 1 but
43% higher beam strength, or nAPM = 2 but 27% smaller beam strength.
r,c
This intermediate solution is addressed in Section 8.5.
8.3.2. Hazard probability break-even point from codified design
The hazard threshold values pth
H shown in Figs. 9 and 10 correspond
to the break-even points, for which a conventional design and an
alternate load path design would have roughly the same total expected
costs. The conventional design would be cheaper to construct, but with
higher associated expected costs of progressive collapse failure. The
APM strengthened design would be more costly to construct, but with a
corresponding reduction in expected costs of failure. Hence, frame
strengthening as a measure to reduce the likelihood of disproportionate
collapse would be justified for hazards leading to pH > pth
H.
Conventionally, the decision about strengthening a frame or not is
based on use of design codes, such as [1,44,45]. Yet, the hazard
threshold values observed in Figs. 9 and 10 are computed from a risk-
based optimization; hence, these values do not directly relate to codi­
fied design. Fig. 11 compares the total expected costs obtained from use
of codes, for conventional design and for APM strengthening with λB =
λC = 1, with those resulting from the optimization. Three cost break-
even points are shown in Fig. 11. Point A is the break-even between
costs of conventional design and codified APM strengthening consid­
ering nAPM
r,c = 1. Point B is the break-even between costs of conventional
design and codified APM strengthening considering nAPM
r,c = 2. Point C is
the break-even between costs of APM strengthening considering nAPM
r,c =
1 and nAPM
r,c = 2. Point A corresponds to Fig. 9, and Point B corresponds
to Fig. 10. Points A and B have been identified and studied previously
[4–6], in hazard-independent analyses. Herein, points A and B are dis­
cussed within a hazard-dependent analysis. Point C is identified for the

13
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
first time in this manuscript and is discussed later in the paper (Section
8.5 onwards).
The concept of a break-even point is the same for codified design and
in risk optimization. Yet, the numerical values are not the same, but of
similar magnitude. Hence, for hazard thresholds computed by cost
comparison from codified design (as in Fig. 11), we use label (⋅)CD for
Codified Design. Yet, when referring to the concept, we continue to use
simply pthH . Note that the total expected cost for the optimal solutions
(blue dashed line in Fig. 11) is always below the cost functions for the
codified designs. This occurs because the optimization can fully repre­
sent the entire spectrum of possible design factors, leading to the
optimal design factors for any hazard probability.
Fig. 12 illustrates the annual hazard thresholds, (pth
H )CD , for the three
blast threats studied herein, computed by comparing costs resulting
from codified design (conventional, and APM with λB = λC = 1, nAPM r,c as
indicated). Fig. 12 also includes a constant pH = 10− 3 per building per
year, an arbitrary value chosen for discussion purposes. As shown in
Fig. 12, for any hazard leading to pH = 10− 3 , frame strengthening
against the VBIED (Benchmark and Lower W) bombing cases is only
cost-effective for the frames taller than 6 stories (ar ≥ (6 × 11), left in
Fig. 12), since for these frames, pH = 10− 3 > pth
H . As expected, for less
damaging hazards like the suitcase blast, pth H increases as strengthening
becomes less cost-effective.
In Fig. 12, the cases identified as Lower W w’DI and B. VBIED w’DI
include the damage to adjacent columns, in the progressive collapse
analysis. As observed in Fig. 6, a blast with Lower W characteristics
(Table 4) produces loss of a first column, with probabilities varying from
0.16 for the stronger to 0.75 for the weaker columns (Fig. 6). The blast
also produces damage to the adjacent columns, which are the most likely
to fail, in a cascading collapse. Following Fig. 7 and Table 5, mean
damage index for the second column varies from 0.22 for stronger col­
umns, to 0.69 for the weaker columns. As observed in Fig. 12, this
additional damage has a significant effect on the optimal decision on
strengthening the frame or not. For a hazard leading to pH = 10− 3 , for
instance, strengthening of all frames in Fig. 12 would be cost-effective
for Lower W w’DI, if the damage to adjacent columns is considered, as
it should. Results for the Benchmark VBIED w’DI case for the taller
buildings with stronger columns are similar. Yet, for the lower buildings
with weaker columns, an unusual result is obtained: strengthening has
an impact on construction costs, which is not enough to reduce the
probability of progressive collapse, due to high damage index of the
second and third columns. The threshold probability increases, sug­
gesting that strengthening is not cost-effective for any hazard proba­
bility, but this trend may change if the effect of column strengthening on
direct damage is considered, as shown in Section 8.5. For the Suitcase
blast case, damage to the second column makes no difference to results,
as this damage is very small.
8.4. Optimal reliability indexes × hazard probabilities
8.4.1. Benchmark VBIED case
Optimal reliability indexes for beam bending β*B (λ*B ), local β*PL (λ*C )
and global β*PG (λ*C ) column failures are obtained as by-product of the
risk-based optimization stated in Eq. (27). These indices correspond to
the optimum reliability for each primary failure mode, which depends
on threat probabilities and frame aspect ratios, as explored herein.
Optimal reliability indexes reveal how optimal frame designs adapt
to initial damage, considering its occurrence probability. The behavior
of the bending reliability index, in particular, is illustrative of the
transitions observed in Figs. 9 and 10. Fig. 13 shows optimal reliability
indexes conditional on initial damage with one column loss only (n0r,c =
1) for beam bending β*B , local β*PL and global β*PG column failures, in
terms of annual hazard probabilities, for the Benchmark VBIED threat.
The optimal reliability against beam bending is most affected by
14
Structures 57 (2023) 105103
hazard probabilities pH . For large hazard probabilities (left in Fig. 13),
optimal β*B′s are quite large, around β*B ≈ 3.7; this occurs because beams
were strengthened considering removal of two columns (nAPM = 2), but
r,c
Fig. 13 shows reliability indexes conditional on loss of one column.
Around pH = 7 × 10− 4 , for low frames, and around pH = 10− 4 , for
tall frames, the optimal reliability index for beams drops significantly,
eventually becoming zero. Since this is the optimal bending reliability
for beams strengthened to bridge over two removed columns, this sharp
drop corresponds to the two equivalent solutions shown in Fig. 10,
which is also related to the threshold hazard probabilities shown in
Figs. 11 and 12. For smaller pH , the drop in bending reliability reveals
that it is not optimal to strengthen the frames to bridge over two
removed columns. The optimal reliabilities for the column crushing
failure modes are more uniform in terms of hazard probabilities, with
some difference for low and tall buildings. Perhaps surprisingly, the
optimal reliability of columns of lower buildings is higher than for
higher buildings. This is a consequence of horizontal propagation of the
column crushing failure modes, which affects a greater frame area for
the wider buildings. This effect could be partially limited by including
structural fuses (not considered herein) or by considering the natural
arrest of horizontal failure propagation, which occurs when slabs of
collapsing floors rest on the ground, no longer exerting horizontal pull of
adjacent elements (also not considered).
8.4.2. VBIED with Reduced charge W threat
Fig. 14 illustrates optimal reliability indexes conditional on one lost
column (n0r,c = 1) for beam bending β*B , local β*PL and global β*PG column
failures, in terms of annual hazard probabilities, for the VBIED with
Reduced W threat. In comparison to the Benchmark case (Fig. 13), one
observes that optimal bending reliability indexes are smaller (APM
strengthening is for a single removed column, nAPM r,c = 1), and the drop
for smaller pH is not as sharp; hence, the transition between the optimal
solutions involving strengthening or not is also not as clear-cut, as for the
Benchmark VBIED case. Optimal reliability indexes for column crushing
are uniform for different threat probabilities, with slightly smaller
values for larger pH′s (left in Fig. 14).
Fig. 15 illustrates the impact of considering blast damage to the
adjacent columns, quantified through the Damage Index DI (Fig. 7).
Fig. 15 addresses the Reduced W threat; hence, it can be directly
compared to Fig. 14. It is noted that optimal column crushing reliability
indexes increase significantly, indicating the need to strengthen col­
umns, to compensate the initial damage to adjacent columns, and the
greater probability of horizontal damage propagation by means of local
column crushing. In comparison, the impact on optimal bending re­
liabilities is opposite: these are reduced, compensating the increase in
optimal column crushing reliabilities, as a result of competition for the
strengthening budget. The optimal bending reliability for lower frames
is zero, because it is not worth strengthening those frames (cost of
strengthening to mitigate the probability of progressive collapse is larger
than the reduction in expected costs of progressive collapse). This sce­
nario changes, however, when the columns are strengthened against the
blast hazard, as shown in Section 8.5. Similar results are obtained for the
Benchmark VBIED case with damage index, but are not shown for
brevity.
8.4.3. Suitcase bomb case
Results for the Suitcase bomb case are similar to those obtained for
Reduced W case (Fig. 14) and are omitted for brevity.
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

Fig. 13. Optimal reliability indexes conditional on n0r,c = 1 for beam bending β*B , local β*PL and global β*PG column failures, in terms of annual hazard probabilities, for
the Benchmark VBIED threat, nAPM
r,c = 2.

Fig. 14. Optimal reliability indexes conditional on n0r,c = 1 for beam bending β*B , local β*PL and global β*PG column failures, in terms of annual hazard probabilities, for
the VBIED with Reduced W threat, nAPM
r,c = 1.

Fig. 15. Optimal reliability indexes conditional on n0r,c = 1 for beam bending β*B , local β*PL and global β*PG column failures, in terms of annual hazard probabilities, for
the VBIED with Reduced W threat, nAPM
r,c = 1, considering blast damage to adjacent columns (DI).

15
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

Fig. 16. Conditional column loss probabilities in terms of (required % increase in) column axial strength (interpolated RD × Log10 (P[LD|H]) curves).

Fig. 17. Optimal beam bending reliability indexes β*B , and those obtained by APM strengthening, conditional on n0r,c = 1, in terms of frame aspect ratio, nAPM
r,c =1
unless stated otherwise.

8.5. Strengthening columns against the blast hard
In the following analyses, we consider a fixed hazard probability
pH = 6 × 10− 3 , which is above the thresholds2 for all frames and blast
hazards considered herein, but otherwise arbitrarily chosen. This hazard
probability is identified as a dashed green vertical line in Figs. 13 to 15
2 impact on progressive collapse, the numerical results presented in Figs. 9
This is the (pth
H )OPT value computed from risk optimization, which cannot be
directly compared to values in Figs. 11 and 12.
for cross-referencing. For pH = 6 × 10− 3 , APM strengthening would be
economically justified for all frames and blast hazards; hence, it is useful
to consider the effect of column strengthening in their increased resis­
tance against the blast hazard (iteractive solution in Fig. 4). This local
strengthening is based on the load redistribution, considering two col­
umn removal scenarios (nAPMr,c = 1 and nAPM
r,c = 2). Since by assumption
the target column can be any column of the first floor, all columns of this
floor are strengthened. Yet, since local column strengthening has an
to 15 become “outdated”, in the sense of the design-verify-strengthen

16
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
cycles of Fig. 4. Specifically, local strengthening of columns leads to
smaller conditional failure probabilities due to blast, and smaller dam­
age indices to adjacent columns. This reduces the probabilities of initial
damage, given a successful attack, and reduces the probabilities of
progressive collapse. Hence, this changes the risk analysis, producing for
instance a translation of threshold hazard probabilities (upwards in
Fig. 12, to the left in Figs. 13 to 15). As a result, for some strengthened
frames pH = 6 × 10− 3 ≈ pth H . This leads to very interesting results,
related to the elementary decision on whether the frames should be
strengthened or not. In particular, this will challenge the choice of APM
strengthening for two removed columns (nAPM r,c = 2), considered in the
Benchmark VBIED scenario.
Table 6 shows the required increase in codified APM design axial
strength of all columns, for nAPM
r,c = 1 and nAPM
r,c = 2, considering dynamic
load amplification DAF = 2. These values are obtained considering the
influence area for the lost column(s), (dashed square in Fig. 5), and the
ratio:
RAPM (DAF × (1.2Dn + 0.5Ln ))
c
(29)
RNLC
c (1.2Dn + 1.6Ln )
Using results in Table 6, the blast hazard analysis (Section 5) is
repeated for columns of higher axial strength. Quadratic regression
curves RD × Log10 (P[LD|H]) and RD × DI are constructed, using results in
Tables 4 and 5, and the required additional results to avoid extrapola­
tion (up to 116% for the stronger columns of the taller frames). The same
curves are also employed to estimate P[LD|H] and DI for those columns
not investigated in the original blast hazard analyses (Section 5).
Resulting conditional column loss probabilities are shown in Fig. 16.
As observed in Table 6, for an extreme case with nAPM
r,c = 2, axial load
in adjacent columns can increase between 116 and 157%. This leads to a
significant reduction in conditional failure probabilities and in damage
indices. The round markers in Fig. 16 and their accompanying labels
identify the percentage increase in axial strength of the columns at
different points along each conditional failure probability curve.
As noted in Fig. 16, for the Benchmark VBIED blast, P[LD|H] for the
first lost column (Fig. 6) reduces from 0.91 to around 10− 2 , for an APM
strengthened column for nAPM r,c = 2. For the second lost column, P[LD|H]
reduces from 0.39 to 5 × 10− 5 . In this scenario, APM strengthening for
nAPM
r,c = 2 would not be cost-effective, as conditional failure probabilities
are very low. This is an example of overshooting: one chooses to
Fig. 18. Optimal local column crushing reliability indexes β*PL , and those obtained by APM strengthening, conditional on n0r,c = 1, in terms of frame aspect ratio,
nAPM
r,c = 1 unless stated otherwise.
17
Structures 57 (2023) 105103
strengthen a frame for nAPM
r,c = 2 based on large failure probabilities for
initial conventional column design, but the (over-) strengthened col­
umns make this choice inappropriate. This can happen for all blast
hazards and frames considered herein. One reasonable decision, and the
one first considered herein, is to strengthen all columns for nAPM = 1,
r,c
which leads to the 28% increase in axial capacity points identified in
Fig. 16 for the stronger columns. One then updates the progressive
collapse analysis, checking whether any further strengthening is
required.
A preliminary risk analysis with the choice above (not shown) re­
veals that this local column strengthening is not sufficient for the
Benchmark VBIED case. Yet, local column strengthening for nAPM r,c =2
leads to overshooting the optimal solutions. Note that the λB ≈ 0.73
(nAPM = 2) and λB ≈ 1.43 (nAPM = 1) results of section 8.3 were already
r,c r,c
pointing to an optimal intermediate solution, although those results
were obtained before the local column strengthening. Hence, to avoid
overshooting, we consider an intermediate local column strengthening
for the Benchmark VBIED case, midway between nAPM r,c = 1 and nr,c
APM
=
2. For the taller frame, this leads to a 28%+116%
2 = 72% increase in axial
capacity, as indicated in Fig. 16, with corresponding reductions in P[LD|
H] and DI. The progressive collapse risk optimization will still be eval­
uated for nAPM APM
r,c = 1 and nr,c = 2, as these are the codified strengthening
options. Yet, the resulting optimal design factors will reveal, for
instance, that APM strengthening should be made with nAPM r,c = 1 but
with larger strengthening factors for the columns, or for nAPMr,c = 2 but
with smaller strengthening factors. Importantly, herein we are not
aiming at solving a real structural design problem; instead, we are trying
to conceptually understand the tradeoffs of structural strengthening to
mitigate progressive collapse.
8.6. Optimal reliability indexes × frame aspect ratio
Figs. 17 to 19 show optimal reliability indexes conditional on first
column failure (n0r,c = 1) for beam bending β*B (Fig. 17), local column
crushing β*PL (Fig. 18) and global column failures β*PG (Fig. 19), in terms
of frame aspect ratio. The three figures also show, for comparison pur­
poses, the reliability indexes for the same failure modes for λB = λC = 1,
which corresponds to codified APM strengthening [1,45].
Results in Fig. 17 may appear surprising at first. However, recall that
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart Structures 57 (2023) 105103

Fig. 19. Optimal global column crushing reliability indexes β*PG , and those obtained by APM strengthening, conditional on n0r,c = 1, in terms of frame aspect ratio,
nAPM
r,c = 1 unless stated otherwise.

zero bending reliability indices are associated to the threshold, or break-
even pth
H , as observed in Figs. 13 to 15. Fig. 17 shows that for the taller
frames exposed to the Suitcase bomb blast, we have overshot the optimal
solutions. Apparently, this overshooting was modest because it did not
occur for the lower frames. Our interpretation is that for the Suitcase
bomb case, the threshold probability has increased to around
pth − 3
H ≈ 6 × 10 , because of column strengthening (Section 8.5). The
overshooting for taller buildings occurs because the effect of strength­
ening the sturdier columns (right in Fig. 16) is larger than the effect of
strengthening the weaker columns (left in Fig. 16), for the same nAPM =
r,c
1.
For the Benchmark VBIED blast scenario, we observe jumps in
optimal bending reliability indices β*B . Recall that local column
strengthening was made for the midway 72% increase in axial strength,
hence the nAPM
r,c = 1 and nAPM
r,c = 2 risk-based solutions are built from the
same initial condition. For the taller frames, the curves for nAPM
r,c = 1 and
nAPM
r,c = 2 both reveal that strengthening for nAPM
r,c = 1 is a better solution.
Again, this occurs because the local strengthening of columns is more
effective for the stronger columns of the taller frames. For the lower
frames, the optimal solutions are obtained for nAPM
r,c = 2. Hence, the
jumps in β*B , observed in Fig. 17 around aspect ratio of (6 × 11), corre­
spond to point C in Fig. 11, i.e., this is the break-even point for solutions
with nAPM APM
r,c = 1 and nr,c = 2. In fact, Fig. 17 shows this break-even point
in terms of frame aspect ratio, for a fixed pH = 6 × 10− 3 . Yet, a corre­
sponding point exists in terms of hazard probabilities pH , where the
break-even point for the (6 × 11) frame is pth
H ≈ 6 × 10
− 3
(this would be
point C in Fig. 11, but for the (6 × 11) frame).
In Fig. 17, the horizontal lines correspond to the bending reliability
indexes resulting from codified APM strengthening with λB = λC = 1.
The optimal β*B ’s are always below the values resulting from codified
design, suggesting that the resistance partial factor for strengthening of
beams (ϕ in Eq. (14)) could be greater than one (ϕ > 1). Note that the
jump of Benchmark VBIED solutions, for nAPM = 1 and nAPM = 2, is
r,c r,c
compatible with the corresponding codified solutions.
The Benchmark VBIED scenario considering damage to adjacent
columns (B. VBIED w’DI in legend of Fig. 17) leads to optimal bending

Fig. 20. Optimal strengthening factors for beams and columns (λ*B and λ*C ), in terms of frame aspect ratio, for the three blast threat scenarios, for pH = 6 × 10− 3 ,
nAPM
r,c = 1 unless stated otherwise.

18
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
reliabilities which are close to zero, and effectively zero for lower
frames. For this loading scenario the intermediate 72% strengthening
(see Section 8.5) is not sufficient: the increase in construction costs is not
matched by a corresponding reduction in expected cost of progressive
collapse failure, for pH = 6 × 10− 3 . For this case, strengthening for
nAPM
r,c = 2 is probably a better solution.
For column crushing, Figs. 18 and 19 show similar patterns between
local and global crushing failure modes, only with optimal reliability
indexes against global crushing failure significantly higher. For codified
APM strengthening, column crushing reliabilities change significantly
with frame aspect ratio, for nAPM = 1. Results are more uniform when
r,c
nAPM = 2 is considered. All solutions are in near agreement for low
r,c
frames. Interestingly, optimal column crushing reliabilities are closer to
those obtained in codified APM for nAPM = 2. This suggests that the
r,c
higher load redistribution promoted by removal of two columns, and
which leads to increase in required column strength, produces columns
with a reliability closer to the optimal. This suggests that the resistance
partial factor for strengthening of columns (ϕ in Eq. (15)) could be
smaller than one (ϕ < 1).
Optimal reliabilities against column crushing are larger for lower
frames to avoid horizontal propagation of damage, which would affect
larger portions of the lower (and wider) frames. Large column crushing
β* ’s for low frames could be avoided by adopting structural fuses and
compartmentalization, which is not considered herein.
For the Benchmark VBIED scenario considering damage to adjacent
columns, optimal crushing reliabilities are significantly larger, except
for the tallest frame.
8.7. Optimal strengthening design factors
Fig. 20 shows optimal strengthening factors for beams and columns
(λ*B and λ*C ), in terms of frame aspect ratio, for the three blast threat
scenarios. Recall that these strengthening factors correspond to λB = 1/ϕ
and λC = 1/ϕ, with ϕ = 1 being the strength reduction factors of codi­
fied APM strengthening (Eqs. (14) and (15)). Values of λ*B and λ*C above
one correspond to additional required strength, in the abnormal load
scenarios of [1,45], considering discretionary removal of one or two
columns. As observed in Fig. 20, the column crushing strengths could be
increased by a factor between 1.0 and 1.25, with higher values applying
to the taller frames considered herein, in case of significant threats with
annual hazard rates of the order of pH = 6 × 10− 3 .
The optimal column strengthening for the Benchmark VBIED cases
are near unitary for nAPM
r,c = 2, and between 1.0 and 1.25 for nAPM
r,c = 1.
These results reflect the intermediate 72% local strengthening discussed
in Section 8.5, meaning that optimal solutions are in-between, corrob­
orating results observed in Figs. 18 and 19. For the tall building, for
instance, the optimal solution would be obtained with nAPM r,c = 1, but
with columns of 25% larger axial strengths. From Table 6, one obtains
1.28 × 1.25 = 1.60, a 60% increase which is close to the intermediate
72% axial strength already computed in Section 8.5. Hence, this solution
is very close to the optimal.
Optimal strengthening factors for beam bending confirm results
observed in Fig. 17: for the Benchmark VBIED case and taller frames,
APM strengthening with nAPM r,c = 1 is closer to optimal; for lower frames,
nAPM = 2 is closer to optimal. For a frame with aspect ratio (6 × 11)
r,c
there is a transition, where both solutions are equivalent (green circle in
Fig. 20). This corresponds to a break-even hazard probability of pth H ≈
6 × 10− 3 for this frame and hazard, given by point C in Fig. 11. In fact,
the two risk-based solutions discussed here are the same, since as noted
earlier, the risk optimization covers the whole range of design factors.
Hence, as noted in Fig. 20, all beam strengthening factors could be
reduced by at least 20%.
For all scenarios investigated herein, two results are noteworthy:
19
Structures 57 (2023) 105103
1. columns should be strengthened beyond APM recommendations, to
avoid cascading horizontal propagation of initial damage.
Strengthening columns also reduces conditional failure probabilities
and damage to adjacent columns, conditional on a successful attack,
leading to a two-fold benefit.
2. Beam strengthening in codified APM strengthening is slightly
conservative.
These results should be taken as indicative, as they strictly apply to
the frames and hazard scenarios investigated herein, for a relevant
threat probability, and with the model limitations acknowledged
throughout the paper. Nevertheless, to incorporate such a result in
codified APM strengthening, the resistance factor ϕ of [45] could be
individualized as ϕAPM
C for columns and ϕAPM
B for beams, as already done
in [1] with conventional design values. This is a direct result of a risk
analysis, balancing the costs of strengthening beams and columns to
reduce the likelihood of disproportional collapse, with the expected
costs of failure. An indicative value found herein for taller buildings, for
one column removal, and subject to further studies, is given by the
λ*C 1.2
(optimum) ratio of strengthening factors: λ*B
= 0.8 = 1.5. Distinct resis­
tance factors are already considered in conventional design of beams
and columns, with use of ϕB = 0.85 for beams with ductile failure, and
ϕC = 0.65 for columns with brittle failure, leading to a ratio ϕϕB = 0.85
0.65 =
C
1.3. Results presented herein suggest that this ratio could be increased.
Fixing ϕAPM at the conventional ϕC = 0.65, for instance, one would
C
obtain ϕAPM
B = 0.65 × 1.5 ≈ 1. This corresponds to an intermediate sit­
uation between the ϕB = ϕC = 1 of [45], and the ϕC = 0.65 with ϕB =
0.85 of [1].
9. Concluding remarks
In this manuscript we addressed the optimal risk-based cost-benefit
analysis of strengthening RC frames to mitigate the likelihood of
disproportionate collapse under terrorist blast loading. The large
epistemic uncertainty in evaluating the probability of initial damage,
given a successful attack, was addressed by considering three blast
hazard scenarios, and by considering the annual threat probability as the
independent parameter. The cost-benefit analysis confronted the costs of
strengthening the frames, with the expected reduction in cost of pro­
gressive collapse failure. A break-even point was identified, corre­
sponding to the annual threat probability for which conventional design
and Alternate Path Method (APM) strengthening lead to same total ex­
pected costs. A risk analysis involving actual building location, envi­
ronment, ownership and use, should be conducted to evaluate if the
hazard probability is above or below the break-even point. If the hazard
probability for a particular building and blast threat is above the break-
even point, APM strengthening is more cost-effective than conventional
design. Herein, we also identified for the first time the break-even point
between the decisions to strengthen a given frame for it to bridge over a
single, or over two removed columns. We have shown how the
strengthening of columns to avoid horizontal propagation of initial
damage has a dual effect in the direct resistance of these columns against
the blast loading, which again changes the probabilities of damage
propagation. This eventually leads to an overshooting of the optimal
solutions, which was discussed in the paper. Finaly, results shown herein
provide useful insight towards the revision of guidelines and codified
strengthening factors for resistance against disproportionate collapse of
buildings. In particular, for buildings that are potential targets to ma­
levolent blast threats, a distinction should be considered between the
resistance factors for beams and columns, much in the same way as is
current practice in conventional design: strengthening of columns with
brittle failure should be slightly increased, while strengthening could be
reduced for beams with ductile failure. Specific values computed herein
are valid only for the buildings, parameters, models, and hazard
A.T. Beck and M.G. Stewart
scenarios considered herein, but the conclusions can be generalized with
further research.
10. Replication of results
All information required to reproduce results presented herein are
included in the manuscript, and in the cited references.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
Funding of this research project by Brazilian agencies CNPq (Na­
tional Council for Scientific and Technological Development, grant n.
309107/2020-2) and joint FAPESP-ANID (São Paulo State Foundation
for Research - Chilean National Agency for Research and Development,
grant n. 2019/13080-9) are cheerfully acknowledged. The support from
the Australian Research Council Discovery Project DP210101487 is also
gratefully acknowledged.
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