Shannon Purcell

Senior Seminar Philosophy Spring 2023

Summary of Buddhism & Suicide: The Case of Channa

by Damien Keown, Journal of Buddhist Ethics Volume 3 1996:8-31

This 1996 article by Damien Keown is a response to a 1983 paper called “The ‘Suicide’

Problem in the Pali Canon” by Martin Wiltshire. Keown agrees with Wiltshire that suicide is ‘an

important issue in Buddhist ethics’. Keown also quotes and discusses viewpoints regarding

suicide by FL Woodward, Carl Becker, de La Vallee Poussin and others, and states his intention

to “take another look” and decide whether it is ‘beyond dispute’ (de La Vallee Poussin) that

suicide is condoned in Buddhism.

I chose to use an article that was an answer to other papers and viewpoints so that I could

see contrasting ideas within Buddhism, and gain insight to multiple sides of the ethics of suicide.

The article begins by explaining two different ideas regarding suicide in the Buddhist

tradition. One viewpoint says that enlightened beings, or Arhat, or arahant, (spiritually perfect

beings) would not kill themselves, as it’s a disordered act of violence that doesn’t align with the

Buddhist value of life. This viewpoint also recognizes that Buddha seems to approve of suicide

in three canonical stories about those who are ill, receive a visit from a Buddhist spiritual adept,

and then take their lives by ‘using the knife’ (slitting their own throats). Arhats are spiritually

complete beings who will not incarnate again upon their deaths, non-Arhats will have another

life and be reborn after death.

Keown examines Becker’s article in which Becker argues that the morality of suicide

according to Buddhist ethics hinges on the Motivation of the act of suicide, and not on inherent

morality or immorality of the act itself. Keown addresses that this could lead to lazy subjective

thinking: the ‘roots of evil’ moral assessment of suicide based on the state of mind of the actor at
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Senior Seminar Philosophy Spring 2023

the time of the suicide means that “The presence of desire (or fear) makes it wrong, and the

absence of desire (or fear) makes it right.” (Keown) Keown goes onto point out that the state of

mind of the murderer has never had any bearing on the rightness of the action of murder. If the

desire is what is right or wrong, then “someone who murders without desire does nothing

wrong”, and Keown finds this absurd, and thus invalid. Keown points out that this subjective

viewpoint would mean moral rightness or wrongness could change as often as “desire comes and

goes”. It occurred to me that the cessation of desire is part of the point of Buddhism, isn’t it? so

hinging morality on desires seems like a poor choice.

Keown continues to point out the problems with the idea that suicide can be “right for

Arhats but wrong for non-Arhats” because non-Arhats usually imitate or emulate Arhats, but if a

Non-Arhat imitates an Arhat in suicide, they would be reborn, and their act would be immoral.

Keown argues against this ‘two tiered morality’ and ‘anomalous moral issue’. It occurred to me

that if there is no self, is it your ‘own’ life? If there isn’t a self, can you take your personal life?

Keown examines the story of the suicide of Channa most closely in the article, he states

because there is the strongest Seeming canonical evidence for Buddha’s condoning of suicide in

this story. He also examines the commentaries on the story, which appears in two different

places in the Buddhist canon. The author says that they aren’t going to define suicide, but give a

good beginning of one by mentioning “self-willed and self-inflicted death” and says he will

address other forms of “voluntary death” separately. From this section, I wonder if ‘nirvana is a

kind of suicide’ – which he mentions also wanting to address elsewhere.

The article here references Wiltshire’s article again, which talks about two cases in which

the Buddha seems to approve of the suicides of two separate gravely ill people who then took

their own lives. In the third story – ‘that of Godhika’- the Buddha voices no opinion at all on the
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Senior Seminar Philosophy Spring 2023

monk’s suicide’. It occurs to me that this is probably the way to react to suicide, to act as the

Buddha acted and not as all the commentators said. In this case, it looks like the Buddha did not

attach to an opinion or judgement on the act at all.

Keown quotes FL Woodward’s retelling of the story of Channa and addresses the

Buddha’s statement translated “Without reproach was the knife used by the brother Channa”.

Keown says that much of the idea that Arhat suicide is acceptable is based on that translation of

that passage. The author backs up slightly in his exposition of the passage and points out that

what the Buddha does say is blameworthy is ‘grasping after a new body’ – or committing suicide

to be reborn- putting down one body to take up another. Here, Keown argues that Woodward,

Becker, de La Vallee Poussin and Wiltshire’s interpretations of the Buddha condoning the

suicide of Arhat’s is incorrect – instead, he says, the Buddha is “emphasize(ing) the urgency of

putting an end to rebirth” and not passing judgement on suicide as an act or choice. Keown says

“exoneration and condonation are two different things” and thinks that the Buddha is saying that

Channa personally is blameless for his own action, without condoning the behavior for all

people, in all places, at all times, or even just Arhats. “Buddha is exonerating Channa rather than

condoning suicide” says Keown. What is definite evidence of Arhat-ness?

Continuing to examine the story of Channa, Keown quotes from Channa’s friend who has

many desires to help and wants for Channa to live and plans to help expressed in their speech.

Channa’s response is without desires. Channa himself, who self identifies as in pain, does not

express desire for any earthly thing. He says himself that he will “use the knife blamelessly”.

Channa’s response is without pressing desires of his friend, and he states as much. Channa uses

the words that mean he will not take further birth after using the knife, a commentary quotes by

Keown adds. “According to the commentary then, Channa is making a factual statement-
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Senior Seminar Philosophy Spring 2023

perhaps a prediction, rather than passing a moral judgement on suicide.” Keown elaborates some

on etymological details based on specific translated words used by Sariputta in the story, and

suggests the possibility of archaic and subtle language puns may be lost in translation here. I

enjoy how thorough Keown is, addressing minor linguistic anomalies briefly but really keeping

the main thing the main thing.

In the Commentary section of the article, Keown examines even more of the commentary

notes on the stories of Channa that are present in Buddhist sacred writings. Here, Keown brings

up information from commentaries on the teachings. In the canonical story, the Buddha states

that Channa used the knife blamelessly, so “we know that Channa died an Arhat” according to

Keown. Commentaries explain that while Channa was not an Arhat at the moment that they

began to ‘use the knife’, they faced the challenge of death that came without fear, and so attained

freedom from rebirth- Becoming Arhat During the Suicide. Keown says the commentary says

“Channa was a samasisin (“equal-headed”), that is to say someone who dies and attains nirvana

simultaneously”. Keown says that there are other examples of this in the canon & commentaries.

This seems like a great development! Everyone has the best believed of them, and we don’t have

to keep worrying about it!

Then, something weird happens- some part of Buddhist theology is affected by whether

an Order of monks could “lose face in the eyes of society”? What? Doesn’t that mean that all the

people are separate and have separateness and …. The monks are worried about what those

separate people THINKS? I’m glad that Keown left that at the end of the commentary section,

because I think that something is off there.

In the Conclusion section, Keown reiterates that the Buddha certainly exonerated Channa

from guilt or the blame of suicide, and the Channa and the Buddha agreed that Channa’s use of
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Senior Seminar Philosophy Spring 2023

the knife was blameless. Here, he concludes that suicide must be inherently morally flawed and

it is not dependent on the emotional state of the suicider. He says that in Buddhism, suicide is

“incoherent” - “This is because suicide is contrary to basic Buddhist values. What Buddhism

values is not death, but life.” Within the moral system of Buddhism, suicide is wrong, says

Keown.

I appreciate and understand the author’s conclusion that within Buddhism, suicide is wrong. It

makes sense based on everything that he explained. I don’t have an opinion about whether

Channa became Arhat between suicide and death, or whether the Buddha was releasing Channa

from fault, or not attaching to or passing a judgement at all. AND, I am not a Buddhist.