Fortifications and the Imagination of

Colonial Control
The Dutch East India Company in Malabar 1663-1795

Erik Odegard, Leiden University

e.l.l.odegard@hum.leidenuniv.nl

Urban History Conference, Lisbon

September 2014
Session: Imagined and Imagining Cities:
Conquest and Appropriation of Unknown Worlds (1400-1850)
Table of Contents
Introduction............................................................................................................................................. 3
Conquest and control .............................................................................................................................. 4
Climate and Geography ....................................................................................................................... 4
Backwaters and a prospective pepper monopoly ............................................................................... 5
The Sieges of Cochin ............................................................................................................................ 5
Building the system: imaging dominance ............................................................................................... 6
Rebuilding the forts, design principles and execution ........................................................................ 8
Pepper, ports and forts: the failure of the monopoly, 1663-1700.......................................................... 9
Mapping Malabar: Hans Georg Taarant and the 1689 maps ............................................................ 10
The system maintained and expanded, 1700-1740 .............................................................................. 13
Cannanore: between retention, destruction and sale ...................................................................... 15
Between Scylla and Charybdis: the VOC between Travancore and Mysore ......................................... 17
The Rise of Travancore ...................................................................................................................... 18
1766: Mysore invades ....................................................................................................................... 18
Managing decline: the VOC as a minor power on the Malabar Coast, ca. 1766-1795 ......................... 19
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 23
Bibliography........................................................................................................................................... 24
Sources .................................................................................................................................................. 25
Maps .................................................................................................................................................. 25
Introduction
The Dutch East India Company (VOC) established itself on the Malabar Coast in southwest India in
1663, after expulsing the Portuguese from some of their oldest possessions in the process of no less
than three campaigns in 1658-1663.1 After the initial conquest of the cities of Cochin, Cranganore,
Quilon and Cannanore, the question arose what the company was to do with these possessions. This
paper will examine the history of the Dutch presence on the coast from a novel perspective: the
imagination of control afforded by the new fortifications the VOC erected.

Figure 1: The south Malabar Coast, from Chetttuwa in the north, to Quilon in the South. With the exeption of
Cannanore further north, this is the area of greatest VOC activity. The location of VOC establishments on the
connections between backwaters and the ocean is apparent. Also shown are overland trade routes through the
Wetsern Ghats to the Coromandel Coast. Map slightly adapted from the map on p. 62 of Malekandathil,
Portuguese Cochin and the Maritime Trade of India: 1500-1663 (Pondicherry 1998).

Over the course of almost one-and-a-half century, the VOC, through its various servants, would
devise a number of quite different strategies to make its presence on the Coast pay its way. The
Malabar was, for the most part, an unprofitable possession and consecutive commanders were

1
H. s Ja o , De Nederlanders in Kerala, 1663- 1701: De memories en instructies betreffende het
commandement Malabar van de verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Den Haag 1976) XL – XLI.
always hard pressed to devise strategies to make it profitable. This paper will argue that these
imagined schemes always had to interact with the fortifications that were present. In some schemes
more fortifications were alled fo , hile othe s alled fo deep uts i the VOC s ilita p ese e to
cut costs. In this way, the consecutive commanders all created imagined cities and forts. This
imagination always had to cope both with the realities on the coast and the retice e of the VOC s
High Government in Batavia towards sending yet more money there. Ultimately, very few projects
came even close to being realized. This paper will seek to explain why this was so. In doing so, it will
give an important contribution to our understanding of the working of the Dutch Malabar command,
and it will underline the importance of the formative years just after 1663. It was above all the
i agi atio of VOC ge e al ‘ij kloff a Goe s hi h i flue ed the VOC s postu e i the a ea fo at
least the next century.

Conquest and control

The VOC was initially interested in the Portuguese possessions on the Malabar Coast mainly ofr
strategic reasons. The Portuguese-controlled fortified ports at Cannanore, Quilon and, especially,
Cochin could all be used as staging areas for a Portuguese counteroffensive to retake Ceylon. The
coastal regions of the island of Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka) had been taken by the VOC from the
Portuguese in a number of hard-fought campaigns in the period 1638-1658. The VOC leadership in
the West, primarily vice-admiraal en veld-overste Rijckloff van Goens were very concerned about a
pote tial Po tuguese ou te offe si e a d had the efo e de ided to se u e the fla ks of the isla d.
In 1659 Negapatnam on the Coromandel Coast had been taken, eliminating that city as a potential
base for operations. To secure the northwestern flank, the cities of the Malabar Coast, with Cochin as
main target, had to be taken. This is the proper moment to briefly examine implications of the
Monsoon system on grand strategy in South Asia and the Dutch position on Malabar.

Climate and Geography

The location and placement of European coastal fortifications in South Asia are intricately tied up
ith the egio s ai disti guishi g climatic feature: the monsoon. Shipping in the Indian Ocean
was determined by the monsoon winds. From November until March, the Northeastern monsoon
winds prevailed, from April to August the Southwestern monsoon. June and July were generally
considered too stormy, so voyages on the southwestern monsoon winds had to take place in April-
May or in August. In addition, the southwestern monsoon brings heavy rains to the west of India and
Sri Lanka.2 There are precious few suitable natural anchorages where large ocean-going ships could
ride out the adverse winds. In the Entire Bay of Bengal there was only one: Trincomalee. Most ships
thus exited the are affected by the winds to avoid being blown upon a treacherous lee-shore.
This system had a profound impact on VOC military planning. Afraid as it was about a
potential attack on Ceylon, the company tried to secure its possession by taking potential bases of
operation from which enemies could organize a counter-offensive. All potential sites for
disembarkation in Ceylon were heavily fortified. This meant that any attack would have to feature a
regular siege. An adequate defense on Ceylon could thus try to keep an enemy occupied throughout
the good season (depending on the coast that was being attacked) during which troops on land could
be supplied by ships. Since larger expeditions had to be organized somewhere, most likely southern

2
M. Pearson, The Indian Ocean (London and New York 2003) 20.
India, the Portuguese fortifications on the Coromandel and Malabar Coasts were obvious targets.3
Taking these fortifications would render them harmless as bases of operation against Ceylon. An
attacking enemy would even be forced to spend precious time during the good monsoon season to
besiege these places first, before making any attempt on Ceylon. At least, this was the strategic
perceptio o i agi atio that oti ated the VOC s i itial de isio to atta k the Mala a Coast. This
initial idea was expanded upon by Van Goens who saw an opportunity to seize a near total monopoly
in Malabar pepper due to a particularity of the Malabar geography: the backwaters and their access
to the sea.

Backwaters and a prospective pepper monopoly

In order to enforce a monopoly on the export of Malabar pepper, it was important to control the
access to the backwaters, as only here could products be loaded on ocean-going vessels. The largest
of the backwaters is Lake Vembanadu, which stretches from Cochin 84 kilometers to the south and is
at places 32 kilometers wide. The lake is fed by seven rivers, which formed the natural routes to the
pepper-growing lands in the interior. In the north, the lake is connected to Cranganore Lake. This
lake extends 25 kilometers north of Cochin and is fed by two rivers. The two lakes connected to the
o ea i t o lo atio s. At Co hi i the south a ide i e e ptied i to the sea. At Cranganur in the
North there existed a rather shallower and narrower entry point. In addition, there were river
mouths which gave access to the interior at Chettuwa (present day Chowghat) farther to the north
and at Quilon in the south. These locations were the obvious points for foreign traders to settle, as
well as the obvious sites for construction of forts to control and direct trade. It is therefore not
surprising that first the Portuguese and later the Dutch established forts at these locations. Further
north, the city of Cannanore (Kannur) was an important trading place. We have studied the
Portuguese history of this city earlier. When the VOC captured the town and fort, it reduced it to a
much more compact fortification. These five fortifications, Cochin, Cranganore, Cannanore, Quilon
and Chettuwa formed the backbone of the Portuguese and later Dutch military presence on the
Malabar Coast. From these forts the minor lodges could be supported and an attempt could be made
to control trade. To the east, the Western Ghat Mountains isolated the Malabar Coast from the
interior and the eastern coast of India. Overland communications to the east had to use the
mountain passes, shown in map one is the Kumily pass, while the Palakkad (Palghat) gap further
north was another important route into and out of the Malabar Coast.

The Sieges of Cochin

Cochin was the heart of Portuguese Cochin, but to make an attempt to besiege this city, a base of
operations was required. Van Goens captured Quilon as early as 1658, but the city was lost the next
year. In 1661, Cranganore was taken and this would serve as the base of operations against Cochin
during the two sieges of that city. The first attempt was made in 1661-1662, in cooperation with the
Zamorin of Calicut, the traditional enemy of the alliance between the Portuguese and the kings of
Cochin. This attempt would fail however, as the good monsoon season ran out before the siege had
proceeded far enough to attempt an attack on the walls. However, Cranganore and Quilon had been
taken and would be retained. Cranganore especially would be important in the siege of the next year,

3
The VOC, and Van Goens especially, was still most worried by the prospect of Portuguese, potentially a joint
Portuguese-English counteroffensive.
as it o t olled it o e tio s ith the la ds of the )a o i f o he e the VOC s t oops ould e
4
supplied.
After this first failed attempt, plans were made for a renewed siege in the following
campaigning season. In October 1662 Hustaert arrived at Cochin with an army of some three
thousand men, supported by thirteen warships, reinforcing three warships and a small army under
Godske who was still on the coast. This strong fleet was all the more powerful for having some
purpose-built warships in its midst. These ships, ‘t Huys te Swieten, Nagelboom and Dordrecht had
been built as warships during the First Anglo-Dutch war, nearly a decade before.5 Maintaining
supremacy at sea was important for a number of reasons. In the first place, the supply lines to the
besieging force at shore had to be maintained. In the second place, reinforcements from Goa had to
be intercepted before they could help Cochin. Time now worked against the company. Van Goens
knew a peace treaty was in the works in Europe. Cochin had to be captured before peace was
concluded. In addition, additional goal was the conquest of Diu if time still permitted. An additional
threat was formed by the Portuguese-English marriage. VOC leaders knew that England would
acquire some Portuguese possessions, but were unsure of with and were afraid the Portuguese
would use English flags as a ruse. Al these considerations dictated a quick end to the siege.
Operating from the forts of Cranganore and Paliporto, Godske occupied all of Baypin in mid-
September 1662, depriving Cochin from the food produced there and placing Dutch troops across
from the city on the other side of the river. On September 24, a small fort, constructed of coconut
trees and earth was completed. This fort, protected a small coastal battery which prevented
Portuguese ships from sailing through the river.6 Though speed was of the essence, a regular siege
was still necessary to capture the strongly fortified city. the siege works (see map 2 for the Dutch
siege works at Cochin) progressed only slowly, partly due to a lack of building supplies, partly due to
the necessity to attack the Portuguese allies at Ernakulam in December 1663. This success deprived
the Portuguese garrison in the city from all supplies and by early January 1663, there were two
breaches in the walls which could be stormed. On the 6th of that month, the calvetty-bastion in the
northeast was stormed and taken, and the city formally surrendered the next day.7 After winding
down the siege, expulsing all Portuguese citizens, the attentions of Van Goens were now drawn to
the question of what to do with the new conquests.

Building the system: imaging dominance

In the wake of the fall of Cochin, Cannanore, a hundred and fifty miles to the north was also quickly
taken. Further operations, preferably against Diu were precluded by the proclamation of peace
between Portugal and the Dutch republic. This concluded the expulsion of the Estado from the
Malabar Coast. Though the operations on the Malabar Coast had been conceived on purely strategic,
military grounds, Van Goens now became convinced that it could be transformed into a profitable
possession for the VOC. Hence, rather than destroying Portuguese fortifications or handing them
over to local allies, Van Goens sought to retain a VOC military presence in all conquered forts. This
was against the wishes of the Heren XVII. Jacob Hustaert, who had taken Cannanore was so

4
Roelofs, De vestiging der Nederlanders ter kuste Malabar (Den Haag 1943), 263.
5
Ibiddem, 305-306. The three named ships would be loaned by the VOC to the Dutch navy during the second
Anglo-Dutch war, see: HaNa, 1.01.02, States-General, inv.nr. 9227 and HaNa
6
Roelofs, De vestiging, 317-319.
7
Ibidem, 334-335.
impressed by the strength of the fort, that he retained a garrison there, a decision which was backed
by Van Goens.8 Only the small Portuguese fort at Cranganore was handed over to the Zamorin of
Calicut. While the directors of the company in the Republic wished to retain only a small, regular,
quadrilateral citadel at Cochin (to ensure rivals could not take possession of the excellent harbor),
Van Goens insisted on a larger, walled city to be retained. The original plan (shown in figure 2) would
have meant a more humble role for the company on the coast. In the original plan, the company was
to hand over control of most captured forts and cities to the local allies that had supported the Dutch
against the Estado, mainly the Zamorin of Calicut. A small fort at Cochin would be retained to keep
other Europeans from settling there and to keep the Portuguese form returning. This was not to be,
as Van Goens insisted on retention.9 Instead of taken a minor role on the Coast, the VOC would take
over the former role of the Portuguese as the arbiter between the south Malabar kingdoms, allied
with the king of Cochin.10 The VOC would not, as some literature would have us believe, settle a
hegemony o the oast, ut it ould take o a ole that as u h la ge tha oth the Heren XVII
and the High Government in Batavia had envisioned before the fall of Cochin.11

Figure 2: HaNa 4.VEL 0894. 1663 map showing both the Dutch sieges lines of the second siege, as well as the
proposed fort, a quadrilateral structure in the upper center. This minimalistic plan is a marked contrast with the
subsequent VOC fortifications around a reduced city.

Instead of handing over the cities of Cannanore, Quilon and Cochin to local allies, these three
fortified cites were to be reduced in size and refortified on new lines. Only the Portuguese fort at
Cranganore was handed over to Calicut. Why did the plans change so drastically? The answer lies in a
new imagination of the role of the Malabar Coast forts within the lager VOC scheme for South Asia.
The chief propagator of this view was none other than Rijckloff van Goens himself. Van Goens had
sold the idea of attacking the Malabar Coast to his superiors mainly on strategic grounds. Now that
the VOC was present in force on the Coast, Van Goens presented his superiors with the idea that it
was possible to seize for the company the monopoly of Malabar pepper. In addition, Van Goens saw
8
Ibidem, 346-347 and 563-364.
9
Rossa, W. and J. Mattoso (eds.), Portuguese Heritage around the World, architecture and urbanism: Asia and
Oceania (Lisbon 2011) 375-376.
10
Pannikkar, Malabar and the Dutch, 7.
11
See for instance, Dutch Hegemony in Malabar
the Malabar Coast as a part of his larger plan for the new conquest of Ceylon. Here, Van Goens
wanted to create Dutch settlement colonies, plantation and predominantly Dutch cities.12 The
Malabar Coast, isolated from the rest of India could form a part of the colony. In addition to pepper,
the Malabar would provide areca nuts, and ocean-going ships could be constructed of teak in
Cochin.13 The VOC would take the role the Portuguese had always enjoyed and would become the
arbiter of affairs between the small kingdoms on the South Malabar Coast. Cochin would become the
new ally of the company. For these aims to succeed, fortified establishments larger than the minimal
fo ts e isio ed Bata ia e e i po ta t. Va Goe s e-imagination was successful, and the
forts were retained and were rebuilt, at high cost, over the next two decades. Van Goens also
reimagined his own role and that of the areas under his command. Malabar became a part of the
Ceylon governorship (with Van Goens as governor), and even became a separate destination for
ships from, and to, the Republic. This allowed Van Goens to see himself as operating parallel to,
instead of under the direction of, the High Government in Batavia. 14 This of course caused
considerable tensions between him and the High Government and this would hamper him later in his
career. It does, however, underline the interconnectedness of private gain and interests with visions
for company policy. This also was the reason why Van Goens was fiercely opposed to the detachment
of Malabar from the Ceylon governorship in 1670, with the appointment of his former protégé
Adriaan van Reede as the first independent commander (commandeur) of the Malabar Coast.

Rebuilding the forts, design principles and execution

The hea t of the e pla fo the VOC s p ese e o the Malabar Coast was the reconstruction of
the fortifications. The Portuguese cities would be (partially) razed and reduced in size. This would
make them more defensible with smaller garrisons. The forts were placed to enforce a VOC
monopoly on the export of pepper. Though the company did not control the actual production areas,
contracts with the local kings gave the VOC claims at exclusivity a legal basis. However, the VOC paid
to little for the peppe a d a li el s uggle t ade e ol ed. The VOC fo ts e e thus e essa to
o t ol this illegal outflo . Fo this, the e e ell pla ed, as ap illust ates. All fo ts e e o o
near places were the backwaters connected to the sea. However, the passes through the Western
Ghats could not be controlled and a lively overland trade evolved by which the pepper reached the
Deccan plain and the Coromandel Coast.
An ambitious and comprehensive reconstruction program was taken under hand for the
reconstruction of Cochin, Cannanore and Quilon. Cranganore would also be taken under hand after
that place had been retaken from the Zamorin in 1666.15 The small original Portuguese fort was
retained and surrounded by a regular front of one whole and two half bastions, as can be seen on the
first map made of the fort by engineer Taarant in 1696.16 Later in the eighteenth century, loopholed
walls were added on the river side to give more fire on passing boats.
Portuguese Cochin had grown organically, and its defenses had had to cope with this
irregular shape. In contrast, Dutch Cochin would be planned from the ground up, utilizing Portuguese
structures where possible. Rather than planning a city which was then surrounded by walls, as Van

12
For plantations, see: Pieters, S., Instructions from the Governor-General and Council of India to the Governor
of Ceylon, 1656 to 1665. To which is appended the memoir left by Anthony Pviljoen, Commandeur of
Jaffnapatam, to his Successor, in 1665 (Colombo 1908).
13
s Ja o , De Nederlanders in Kerala, XLI - LI
14
Gaastra, Geschiedenis van de VOC (seventh revised edition, Zutphen 2002) 52.
15
s Ja o , De Nederlanders in Kerala, 41, 44-45.
16
See map HaNa 4.VEL 0893, Grond Teekeningh van de Fortresse Cranganoor.
Oers suggested was Dutch practice, Cochin reveals the priorities of the VOC in rebuilding captured
cities: the shape of the city of Cochin was decided by the circuit of the walls.17 The fortifications of all
these forts as rebuilt show some st iki g si ila ities: the a e all i so e a pe i sula fo ts, uilt
with one side to the water and one side to the land. Most extreme of these is the fort at Cannanore,
with only a short land front which cuts off a long and narrow peninsula. Cochin is the least striking
example, with land and water fronts of near equal length. In all cases, it was connecting the water
and the land fronts of the fortifications that gave the greatest problems. At Cochin this was most
serious, illustrated by the presence of so e dead g ou d i f o t of the ight fa e of astio
Holland, where land and sea fronts met.18 The exact shape of the forts is of importance to us here as
they reveal the idea of the company, in this case mainly the VOC as personified by Van Goens, for its
possessions on the Malabar Coast. In all cases, though the VOC reduced the size of the Portuguese
ities, it etai ed uite la ge fo ts, o e of hi h as to a sta da d uad ilate al desig as
employed for minor forts in Ceylon and the Indonesian archipelago. The fortifications, ans especially
Cochin, still needed sizable garrisons to defend them, at least 600 men for Cochin alone, and more to
be really effective. This did not bother Van Goens as he envisioned an active military policy in
support of his goals of settlement and pepper monopoly (or rather: monopsony)

Pepper, ports and forts: the failure of the monopoly, 1663-1700

The system did not remain in its finished form for long. Even before completion of Cochin around
1672 and the other forts later in the decade, criticism had mounted against the ever mounting costs
of the whole project.19 Van Goens had designed the system as a part of much more ambitious
scheme of control of land and colonization. This, however, did not come through. In a commercial
sense at least, the company restricted itself to a passive role, signing monopolistic agreements with
local states for pepper contracts and letting indigenous traders take care of bringing the produce
from the production areas in the foothills of the este Ghats to the o pa s a ehouses i the
coastal fortifications. The o pa s a ed fo e as used to fo e o plia e ith this s he e.
However, it soon appeared that the income from controlling the trade was insufficient to cover the
costs of the fort and garrisons intended to enforce compliance.20 The question then arose why the
company actually needed such costly defensive schemes. The quest was then to reimagine the
physical presence of the company on the Malabar Coast to better match the requirements of the
trade, rather than grand schemes of conquest, colonization and control. The system as built proved
tough to change, however. For the better part of the next century, an on-gain, off-again, debate was
had over the right expenditure and military presence and posture of the company on the coast. At

17
Fo Va Oe s ideas o VOC u a pla i g, see: ‘. a Oe s, Dutch town planning overseas during VOC and
WIC rule (1600-1800) (Zutphen 2000).
18
consecutive engineers who visited the city would not this defect and propose remedies, see for instance the
discussion a out the astio i ‘ei e s e aluatio of the fo t ess i : HaNa . . . Colle tie Ve huell,
inv.nr. 19, Memorie van C.F. Reimer over de staat van defensie van de vesting Cochin, 1790. See pages 20-21 of
this paper for his views.
19
The critiques started quite early and focused on Ceylon and Malabar. See for example the critical appraisal of
the costs and impossibility of adequately garrisoning the forts there by Adriaan van Reede, written on request
of the High Government: HaNa, 1.04.17, Hoge Regering Batavia, inv. nrs. 543-544, Aanmerkingen door Hendrik
Adriaan van Rheede en Rijklof van Goens de jonge aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden over de staat van de
Compagnie op Ceylon. Met bijlagen.Copieën. 1677, 1680.
20
M.O. Koshy, The Dutch Power in Kerala (1729-1758) (New Delhi 1989) 34-35.
the center of this were the fortifications. But tearing down or reducing forts proved to be a difficult
task and was met with fierce opposition from the Malabar Coast commanders. Indeed, in the last
decade of the seventeenth and the first sixty years of the eighteenth century, the system was added
to, rather than reduced. This happened first by retaking Cranganore and later by building an entirely
new fort and Chettuvai. Proposed plans for reducing the Cannanore, Cochin and Quilon forts were
not carried to fruition. In this section I will examine these plans and the arguments put forth for them,
as well as examining the reasons for the failure of all the reduction plans. The focus will lie on Cochin,
as this was the largest and costliest of the fortifications. Malabar was a profoundly unprofitable
possession: in the period 1663-1700, the whole command made a profit only in four years, 1679,
1680, 1682 and 1683. Over this period the Malabar command ran a total deficit of 4.308.210 guilders,
with the period of 1663-1677, when the forts where under construction, as the period of most
concentrated losses.21

Figure 3: HaNa, 4.VEL 0899 Map of Cochin, Hans Georg Taarant. Map from 1696, based on measurements
taken in 1689. In red is the inset shown in map 3.

Mapping Malabar: Hans Georg Taarant and the 1689 maps

The refortification of Cochin had been rushed to completion in 1672, a period in which a French
attack was feared.22 Though the French fleet did appear before the Malabar Coast, hostilities were

21
H.K. s Ja o , De Nederlanders in Kerala, 1663- 1701: De memories en instructies betreffende het
commandement Malabar van de verenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (Den Haag 1976) LXXXV.
22
Van Reede in his memorie for his successor, Ibidem, 176.
opened only with the French attack on Trincomalee, later that year.23 The rush to complete the
works had serious effects however. The fausse-braye and outworks had not received proper
fou datio s. Whe the aa d ig a d Lieute a t Ha s Geo g Taa a t ade the first accurate map of
Dutch Cochin in 1689-1696 (see figure 3), it showed the altered design state (minus the ravelins in
the moat which had already been demolished), rather than the actual situation. By this time, the
fausse-braye had crumbled, the moat was filling up with silt and the seaward wall at the bastion
Altona was undermined by the action of the waves. The map (map 3) of Cochin of 1696 then shows
the design state rather than the actual situation. This is also process of imagination. The purpose of
the map was not to highlight the actual state of the fort, but rather to show its design and propose a
new plan to reduce the circumference of the works which needed to be maintained and manned.
This plan (see figure 4) was to only fortify the company s a ehouses a d the pa t of the ship a d
within the walls. Two new curtain walls and one small new bastion were proposed, running from
bastion Groningen to Altona on the river. This is a striking plan. Despite the heavy losses the
command had endured in the ies a d ies, Va Goe s o igi al vision of the town had been
fulfilled, at high costs. B the ies a d ies, ho e e , it e a e lea that Va Goe s isio of
the profitability of Malabar and Cochin would not be realized and plans for reductions were
proposed, for Cannanore and Quilon as well as Cochin. The insurmountable problem was however
the high costs the company had suffered to build the fortifications. This would all be wasted if they
were to be demolished, again at high costs. In addition, reduction would mean a loss of face amongst
the South Malabar kingdoms whom accepted (with the exception of Calicut) the VOC as the arbiter of
their disputes.

23
G.J. A es, Col e t's I dia O ea St ateg of 4-1674: A ‘eapp aisal , French Historical Studies 16:3
(1990) 536-559, 551-552.
Figure 4: detail from 4.VEL 0899 showing the northeastern corner of the fortress. In thin lines the proposed
edu tio is isi le the ed T sho s a p oposed e astio . O l the o pa s sto ehouses a d a d-
buildings would be retained within these new walls. The image also shows the problem with the plan: the right
face of bastion Groningen would be remain unswept by fire in this plan.

Finally, the original reason for the VOC to attack the Malabar Coast, defending Ceylon from
possible attack also mitigated against reduction. From this perspective, the outrage of Van Goens at
the separation of Malabar from Ceylon was entirely legitimate, though in his case anger at a loss of
personal power played a larger role. Strategically, Malabar was a part of the Ceylon command,
though it would appear over time that Malabar was less a shield to Ceylon than a drain on its
resources.
Figure 5: Schematic map of Cochin, based on the 1696 Taarant map, with the names of the bastions
and outworks. The Fausse-braye is still shown here, though it was by now in a much rundown state
and would be abandoned over the next decade. Altona would collapse due to the effect of the river
in the next decade. Erik Odegard, 2014.

The system maintained and expanded, 1700-1740

Despite the growing concerns about the costs incurred on the Malabar Coast, it proved very difficult
to do anything about it. The VOC depended upon the local kings to deliver pepper to its warehouses.
In return, the VOC had promised to support these kingdoms against foreign competition and
aggression in return. The kings deftly used this provision to draw the VOC in as a powerful ally in their
continuous internecine warfare. The VOC could thus not reduce its military costs sufficiently as this
could prompt the local kingdoms to deny compliance with the treaties. In addition, it could not
reduce its fortifications and garrisons because this would be perceived as a loss of face and would
prompt the Malabar kings to look for other allies or stop their support of the trade agreements.24 The
EIC had established itself at Tellicherry in 1682 and the French would do so at Mahé in 1724. Dutch
offi ials had t ied to ake Co hi , the VOC s ai all a le to fa e the atta ks of the Zamorin alone,
but this proved a difficult task. The VOC had taken over the traditional Portuguese role in relation to
Co hi , e e o i g the e ki gs ith a o e lazo ed ith the VOC s o og a . The
ki gdo s fi a es proved difficult to sort out and the intervention of VOC commander Adriaan van
‘eede i the ki gdo s i te al affai s, the U io of Mouto i , a e o side ed

24
Fo the ole of fo e a d the fo tifi atio s i the VOC s o igi al ideas of t ade, see: Kosh , The Dutch Power in
Kerala, 192-196.
unfortunate as it precluded the creating of a strong centralized mercantile-dominated kingdom.25
The VOC would need to retain enough forces in Malabar to sustain the kings of Cochin in power.
Regardless of the pla s the o pa s offi ials ight ha e had to edu e the o pa s
expenditure on the coast, starting from the late seventeenth century the company was drawn
fu the i to lo al po e st uggles its allies o the oast. Du i g Ad iaa a ‘eede s etu to the
coast as special commissioner in 1691, the VOC became involved in suppressing the Vettattu revolt
by the deposed branch of the Cochin royal family.26 In reward for his support of the company, the
Zamorin was rewarded with Chettuwa. This considerably strengthened the position of the ruler of
Calicut in relation to the king of Cochin.27 The VOC had tried to let Cochin stand on its own feet, an
indication of its disenchantment with its major ally and protégé. However, in February 1701, the
Zamorin invaded Cochin territory and war was quickly declared. Cochin proved unable to stand alone,
but the company was loath to fight only on its behalf. This is not the place to go into the subsequent
war which lasted until 1717 in much detail. Important for this research is the result of the war: the
company incurred costs of up to as much as two million guilders to mobilize an army of some 4000
men company troops on the coast. In the end, Cranganore and Chettuwa, the disputed territories,
were ceded to the VOC, which kept its fort at Cranganore and built a new fort at Chettuwa (see
figure 6). The king of Cranganore became a feudatory of the VOC and the area of Palponetty was
ceded to the company directly.28 The willingness of the VOC to invest large sums of money and
employ a substantial part of its European troops on the Malabar Coast in 1707-1717 shows that it
still entertained ideas of establishing a dominant position on the coast. The ability to muster this
effort, for comparatively modest gains, was at least partially contingent upon peaceful conditions in
othe pa ts of the o pa s a eas of i te est, as ell as a lea do i a e at sea. O e the o i g
decades both these factors would change, as we shall see. The end of the war in 1717, and the
construction of fort Wilhelmus at Chettuwa mark the end of a short period of modest expansion on
the coast where the company for the first time also gained a larger tract of territory for itself. This
could have provided a new model for the company as a landed power, but this was not to be. Later
commanders of the Malabar Coast would criticize the decision not to move into direct, and
concentrated land-holding at this time.
Though the Zamorin remained a potentially threatening foe for now, this would all change in
coming half-century. By the end of this period, the VOC would be a minor player caught between two
e , la ge, e t alized fis al- ilita states: T a a o e a d Mysore. The rise of these states would
sweep away the old system on the Malabar Coast. These changing conditions had great influence on
the conception of the role of the fortifications for the VOC. The following section will address these
conflicting ideas and the imagination behind them in more detail for one case: the fort at Cannanore.

25
P. Emmer and J. Gommans, Rijk aan de rand van de wereld: de geschiedenis van Nederland overzee, 1600-
1800 (Amsterdam 2012), 335.
26
Heniger, Adriaan van Reede, 80-81.
27
Pannikar, Malabar and the Dutch, 31-32.
28
Ibidem, 39-44.
Figure 6: National library of Indonesia BWN XXIX. A new fort: Wilhelmus at Chettuwa, drawing by Johannes
Rach, given as ca. 1780 by the archive (likely of an earlier date). Not the loopholed wall on the river-side
between the two half-bastions. This resembles the lagoon-side wall of the fort of Mannar in Sri Lanka and the
loopholed wall at Cranganore. This thus may have been a typical measure for defense on the water-side of
smaller fortifications intended to obstruct passage by shipping.

Cannanore: between retention, destruction and sale

Somewhat isolated to the north lay the fort at Cannanore. built on a peninsula, Cannanore could
potentially control the trade of the Kolathiris of Cannanore. However, for this it needed an adequate
garrison and support by small warships. As the VOC was unwilling to invest in these assets after the
costly rebuild of the Portuguese fort in 1663- circa 1672, it could not fulfill this promise. Another role
was as a pepper-depot on the northern Malabar Coast, in this way supporting the attempts at
procuring a pepper monopoly.29 However, this too required a costly mix of purchasing power and
military force. As the company was both unwilling to offer acceptable prices for pepper, but also
u illi g to i est i the fo es eeded to o t ol the t ade fo e, s uggli g of peppe
30
bloomed. It will not come as a surprise then to see that there were repeated plans to either reduce
the fort and garrison, to demolish it or to sell it or exchange it for a more profitable position
elsewhere. A report on the condition of the VOC on the Malabar Coast written by Jan Schreuder for
the High Government in 1765. This document gives a wealth of information on the posture of the

29
Jacob Hustaert mentioned the role of Cannanore in the VOC s pla fo o t olli g the peppe t ade, see: s
Jacob, De Nederlanders in Kerala, 15-17. He requested two small warships to patrol the northern coasts around
Cannanore.
30
S uggli g as of ou se the VOC s a of st li g this t ade: E e a d Go a s, Rijk aan de rand van de
wereld, 337.
company in Malabar on the eve of the Mysorean invasion. It notes, amongst other things, troop
numbers and armaments of forts, as well as the history of the VOC in its various possessions. In the
case of Cannanore, it highlights all the plans for the fort since its capture in 1663.31
Schreuder observes that until the time of his writing his report, there have been no fewer
than nine different schemes for Cannanore after its capture and rebuilding in the 1660ies – 1670ies.
As early as 1679 it was observed than Cannanore could not cover its costs. As it was isolated far to
the north of the other Malabar Coast possessions and could not effectively control the trade of the
Kolathiris, it was decided that the fort was to be razed. This did not go through and two years later it
was suggested to trade Cannanore with the Portuguese, preferably for Macao. Needless to say, this
proposal went nowhere. In 1686 a scheme was approved to raze the new walls and retain only the
old Po tuguese to e – the original Torre de Menagem of 1503 – with a garrison of thirty men.
However, by the late 1690ies, that structure was in such disrepair due to years of little to no
maintenance – a common problem on the Malabar coast forts – that it was decided to pull the
structure down, rather than risk an accident. This of course meant the shelving of the reduction plans.
The fort slowly fell into a state of disrepair and military irrelevance. In 1722, a part of the seaward
defenses collapsed due to the action of the waves and it was decided to see if an interior redoubt of
small fort could be built behind the landward wall so that a small garrison could defend itself there
without having to defend the whole long coastline of the peninsula. This was not carried through, but
in 1732, The High Government agreed with a plan to retain only bastion Hollandia as a fortification,
along with a couple of warehouses. Commander Maten did not agree as this would make the fort
indefensible to local enemies and in the circumstances at the time this was not judged opportune. In
1756 a new exchange with the Portuguese was proposed but this did not go anywhere, again. A new
plan two years later was more radical: it called for the retention of fort and warehouses as they were
and to turn Cannanore, along with Cochin into a free port. This was perhaps the most radical
suggestion of all and shows the greatest imagination of all the proposals. A free port meant that not
only would the company change its posture in a tactical sense, it would demand a wholly different
strategic vision: from the company as a merchant, intent on destroying competition, to the company
as land-based ruler. Profits would be accrued indirectly, ta atio , athe tha the o pa s o
trade. This idea for free ports was perhaps the only way to make the Malabar Coast possessions pay
their way. Both Cochin and Cannanore had excellent natural anchorages and the fortifications could
then have served to protect local merchant communities from the dangers and instabilities of
Southern India in the 1760ies. This is much what the British EIC did at its ports in Bombay and
Madras. The idea of free ports fit well with the general ideas on renewal and change within the VOC
in mid-century. This plan, as many other mid-century revisionist proposals were in the end not
implemented, so the question remained what the company was to do with its fort at Cannanore.
Schreuder, writing in 1765, was outspoken in his opinion: Cannanore as it was, was indefensible and
more a threat and liability to the company than an asset. Two engineers would visit the fort that year
and would propose an interior retrenchment which make the fort defensible with a small garrison. In
the ea ti e, egotiatio s ould e ope ith Aide Ali ha , ette k o as H de Ali of M so e.
If a suitable price could be agreed upon, the VOC would sell the fort and its rights and privileges to
the Mysorean prince. If not, at least the fort would be in a better state of defense and a potential
sale to other interested parties was always an option.

31
HaNa 1.04.17 Hoge Regering Batavia, inv.nr 735, Memorie over de kust van Malabar door J. Schreuder voor
Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, 1763.
 The two engineers, Elias Paravicini de Capelli and J.L. Guyard (supported by P.E. Leupke, chief
engineer in Batavia), loaned from the Ceylon command, visited the fort and made two proposals, a
small quadrilateral fort which would require the destruction of the existing massive laterite outer
la d a d all, a d a s all edou t sta fo t ehi d that all.32 Surprisingly, this last proposal was
indeed implemented and the present state of the fort however undeniably follows the contours of
the 1767 plan. Further study is necessary to know whether the plan was completely implemented by
the Dutch company, or finished on that plan by the Al Raja.33 In any case, the new interior redoubt at
Cannanore represents the last plan proposed by the VOC engineers in the west that was carried to
fruition. As late as 1769, the commander of the fort at Cannanore argued against simply abandoning
the fo t, as the VOC s i als ould be quick to profit from this. In addition pepper could be procured
at better prices than at Cochin.34 Breekpot himself was critical of this reasoning, as the profits barely
could cover the costs of maintaining the fortifications. In light of the Mysore conquest it would be
better to sell the fort, which could not be defended successfully for a long period if they chose to
attack it in any case, and seek to establish a small trading lodge.35 Cannanore was sold to the Ali Raja
of Arakkal in 1772.
The drawn-out discussions within the VOC over the question of what to do with the fort at
Cannanore - which lasted almost a century! – show many of the ideas and arguments used in similar
discussions on all Malabar forts and indeed the entire Malabar Command. Arguments of cost-
effectiveness and economy were countered by ideas on strategy and military significance. The
relations with the local kingdoms meant a loss of face was to be avoided whenever at all possible. It
was however the relation with the local state-system which would change most profoundly in the
period 174o-1770, sweeping the traditional Malabari state-system aside – and the role of the VOC
within that system along with.

Between Scylla and Charybdis: the VOC between Travancore and

Mysore
The VOC s position on the Malabar Coast would change profoundly during the thirty years from
1740-1770. This change, caused by the rise of strong centralized fiscal-military sides on either side of
the VOC s o e possesio s o the Chettu a – Cranganore – Cochin axis, would mean that the
o pa s ad i ist ato s ould agai ha e to e-imagine the role of its fortifications. Increasingly,
the purely military aspect came to dominate, with fortifications taking the role of border forts on
permanent alert.

32
See the maps 4.VEL0891flap for the quadrilateral fort and 4.VEL 0890C and 4.VEL 0891and the written
proposal by the engineers in HaNa, 1.04.02 VOC, inv.nr. 3189, Een bondel papieren nopens de Cochimse en
Cannanoorsche vestingwerken, 1767.
33
Cannanore in general is badly understood. It is often still referred to as an original Portuguese structure,
though the majority of the works that can still be seen today date from the Dutch rebuild. For example, a
recent PhD thesis of the forts at Cannano e a d Bekal efe s to it o siste tl as the Po tuguese St. A gelo s
fortress. The interior walls are not recognized as a later addition either. See: I. Nirmalagiri, St. angelo and bekal
fortresses – a comparative study (unpublished PhD thesis, Kannur University 2010) 77-90.
34
Breekpot, C. and J. Fruiter, Memoir of the departing Commander Cornelius Breekpot. Delivered to His
Successor the Worshipful Titular Christian Lodewijk Senff on the last day of February 1769: Selections from the
Records of the Madras Government. Dutch records; no. 7 (Madras 1909), 3.
35
Ibidem, 4.
 The Rise of Travancore
To the south of Cochin, the Malabar coast was again divided into smaller and smaller kingdoms, none
of which was of great importance before the 1730ies. The rise of the previously insignificant kingdom
of Travancore to become the dominating force on the South Malabar Coast in the 1730ies and 40ies
therefore comes as a great surprise and needs some explanation. Much scholarly attention has been
devoted to this striking development. The rise of Travancore has been described in many studies as a
dest u tio of the Dut h hege o o the oast. This is ot the p e ise f o hi h I ill app oa h
this topic. As has been made apparent before, the premise of this paper is that the VOC never was
hege o i o the oast i the fi st pla e. ‘athe , the VOC s role was constantly being redefined and
reimagined. The rise of Travancore meant that the company now had less freedom to redefine or
reimagine its role. Its rise was however not the result of the, relatively minor, defeat of the
o pa s t oops at Cola hel in 1741.36 It as the u illi g ess of the o pa s leade ship i
Batavia to mount an expedition similar to the one in 1715-1717 that set the VOC on a path of
negotiation and compromise, which resulted in the treaty of Mavellikkara in 1753. The Travancorean
forces had attempted to besiege Quilon after the battle of Colachel and failed in taking this fort,
sho i g the pote tial i po ta e of the VOC s fo tifi atio s i etai i g o t ol. The unwillingness of
Batavia to send reinforcements for a field army was at least partially due to the dire military situation
on Java in the aftermath of the Chinese massacre of 1741. 37 Ironically however, the rise of
Travancore to become the dominant power would usher in a unique period of constant profits on the
coast for the period 1759-1779.38 In the late 1750ies, the VOC would effectively fight of a new
challenge by the Zamorin to its conquests around Palponetty. This episode did show, however, that
the fort at Chettuwa was not capable of defending the conquest and the 18½ villages, which were
easil aptu ed the )a o i s fo es. This as the easo h o a de B eekpot ad ised the
reduction of the fort in 1765- . The appea a e of the M so ea fo es o the s e e p ee pted
this move and the fort was retained.39

1766: Mysore invades

The second development which would profoundly change the situation for the company was the
Mysorean invasion of the north Malabar Coast in 1766. breaking through the Palghat Gap, Mysorean
armies quickly overran the north Malabar states as far south as Calicut, while the Ali Raja allied with
their Muslim co-religionists. Though the initial invasion was met by large-scale revolt later that year,
by 1767, Mysore was firmly in power again. As Travancore had shielded the Malabari kings who had
fled their estates and had supported the revolt, Mysore declared war and attacked the Travancorean
border defense in 1767.40 The VOC was now caught between two larger fiscal-military states and
had to toe a fine line between them. Relations between Travancore and Mysore deteriorated quickly
and the VOC found it increasingly difficult to maintain a neutral position between the two, as
ordered by the High Government in Batavia.

36
Colachel is often presented as a big defeat, but the number of VOC troops was rather small, only 400 men of
whom only 150 were European troops. For the battle and its immediate aftermath, see: Koshy, The Dutch
power in Kerala, 66-78.
37
Gaastra, Geschiedenis van de VOC, 62.
38
A. Singh, Fort Cochin in Kerala 1750-1830: The Social Condition of a Dutch Community in an Indian Milieu
(Leiden 2010) 78.
39
Breekpot, Memoir 1769, 7-9.
40
Managing decline: the VOC as a minor power on the Malabar Coast, ca.
1766-1795
I light of these de elop e ts, the positio of the o pa s fo tifi atio s had to e e-evaluated.
Quilon, long a languishing possession, would now be isolated deep in Travancorean territory and was
finally reduced in 1766. This made it untenable from a military point of view, but this was now
considered less important. More attention was devoted to the north. Cannanore was finally sold in
1771, allowing the VOC to focus its attention on its Malabari heartland: the coastal area between
Chettuwa and Cochin. Here the company held much land and this now became an ever more
profitable source of income. In the years just before the Mysorean invasion, commanders Casparus
De Jong and Godefridus Weyermans broke with tradition and focused the VOC on acquiring income
from rents on land, rather than trying to control the pepper trade.41 It seemed that finally a workable
modus operandi had been found on the Malabar Coast. This seeming balance was destroyed
completely by the Mysorean invasion of the north Malabar in 1766.
The question the VOC commanders now faced was what their position in the conflict
between Travancore and Mysore should be. Should the company remain strictly neutral or try and
use M so e as a ou te eight to T a a o e s po e a d pe haps t to eesta lish itself o e
firmly? Or should the VOC ally itself with Travancore to stem the Mysorean invasion? In any event,
the o pa s fo ts ould e of u ial i po ta e to the t o elligerent powers, and the company
now had to reimagine the role it ascribe to the forts. At first neutrality was attempted. This became
untenable as Haider Ali claimed the lands the Zamorin (whose territory he now controlled) had ceded
to the company in 1759. After ongoing diplomacy and border skirmishes, Mysore took the fort at
Chettuwa after a siege in 1776. The VOC now aligned itself more closely with Travancore and Cochin,
in fact becoming responsible for a crucial part of the joint border defenses of the two states. The VOC
fought alo gside T a a o e to ai tai the Nedu kotta o de defe ses (see figure 7)

41
Singh, Fort Cochin, 81-86.
Figure 7: the situation around Cranganore, late 1770ies and 1780ies. Mysore has occupied the former
possesions of the ki g of Co hi a d the )a o i of Cali ut i the o th, as ell as the VOC s fo t Wilhel us at
Chettu a. T a a o e has fo tified its o de e te si el , ut depe ds o the VOC to lose the C a ga o e
gap , the i e a d isla ds et ee the T a a corean mainland defenses and the sea. Erik Odegard 2014.

Cranganore was now again in the front-line and more heavily armed and garrisoned. Whereas the
fo t had had a ga iso of o l e i B eekpot s ti e it o tai ed e .
Ayakotta, on the northern end of Baypin was retrenched and had 85 men European infantry and
a tille as ell as Sepaijs – sepoys. This is one of the first documents to mention sepoys in VOC
service. In addition there were 200 men locally recruited and equipped infantry, as well as 800 men
from the armies of Cochin and Travancore.42 The Cranganore – Ayakotta border area was thus
heavily fortified and manned.
Ironically, the large armed forces the company now concentrated in this area would have
been able to accomplish much half a century before, now they could only hold the line. As Lohuizen
argued, Moens now hoped that concerted action by Travancore, the VOC and Cochin could break the

42
HaNa, 1.04.02 VOC, inv.nr 3575, Instructie voor het opperhoofd en de commandant der militie te Cranganoor
in cas van een vijandelijke attacque in dato 14 Augustij 1780.
Mysorean power and herald a new age for the company in which it could transform itself as a major
landed power. This is a contrast with his predecessor Breekpot who had hoped to use Mysore to
counter Travancore and establish VOC dominance on the South Malabar Coast. Both men were
interested primarily in controlling and taxing of la d, ut the id to late s, M so e had
43
undeniably become the more threatening of the two powers. Moens also improved the defenses of
the Cochin fortress itself, constructing a full covered road with retrenched reentrant places of arms
and excavating the moat anew. The artillery had been placed an firm platforms and the breastworks
had been repaired and brought into shape.44 Interestingly, the training of the garrison now also
e ei ed o e atte tio , ith o petitio s et ee the o pa s Eu opea artillerymen and
locally recruited infantry-turned-voluntary-artillerymen. Moens now bragged about the ability of his
a tille e : Ou gu e s a e o a le to pla e a all o th o a o a he e ou ish .45 The
alliance was able to withstand a Mysorean attack in 1778, when an attempt to take Cranganore was
defeated. In 1788, Tipu Sultan vainly tried to convince the company to sell him the border forts of
Cranganore and Ayakotta, indicating their importance to his strategy against Travancore. This
provided an opportunity for the VOC to offer them to Travancore for a good price, selling them both
in 1789.46 Subsequently, Cranganore was quickly taken by Mysorean troops and destroyed.
Though the VOC had et eated f o the f o tli e, its soldie s fought o loa alo gside
Travancore troops on the Nedumkotta border defenses. Figure 8 shows a drawing sent by
commander Van Angelbeek to contacts in the Netherlands of a Mysorean attack on the border
defenses in 1790.47 Of special interest is the depiction of Mysorean rockets used in the attack (figure
8).

Figure 8: A Drawing in a letter by Van Angelbeek. Mysorean attack on Travancore border defenses.
T a a o esa as suppo ted offi e s o loa f o the VOC. Note the ‘akettes – rockets – used by
the Mysorean to bombard the fortifications.

43
Lohuizen, The Dutch East India Company and Mysore (Den Haag 1961) 100.
44
A. Moens, Selections from the Records of the Madras Government. Dutch records ; no. 2: Memoir written in
the Year 1781 A.D., by Adriaan Moens, ..., for his successor, 204.
45
Ibidem, 212.
46
Pannikar, Malabar and the Dutch, 106-107.
47 e
HaNa, 1.11.01.01 Aanw 1 afd. ARA, inv.nr 1276, Brief van J.G. van Angelbeek, gouverneur van Ceylon, uit
Cochin, aan de heer Decker, berichtend over de strijd tussen Tipoe en de vorst van Travancone. Met bijlagen,
w.o. gekleurde tekeningen, 14 January 1790.
 The VOC had retreated to its now heavily fortified outpost of Cochin. Besides this, only the
edu ed a d ui ed fo t at Quilo still was i the VOC s ha ds. A spe ial committee of the
o pa s di e to s i A ste da o o side ed selli g Co hi to eithe T a a o e o the EIC.48
This would have been the logical conclusion to the slow process of selling off its possessions, starting
with Cannanore in 1771. However, this would not happen and Cochin would get one final lease on
life when the so-called military commission inspected it in 1790. This committee had been
established in the wake of the disastrous Fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780-1784) to inspect the VOC
defenses and propose improvements. This committee would inspect Cochin in 1790, and provide
advice to bring it in a better state of defense. Its role was now again purely strategic, to shield
Ce lo s left fla k keepi g the Co hi po t i Dut h ha ds. In contrast to the other forts inspected
by the commission, Cochin was in a relatively good state of repair and was possessed of modern
outworks. The committee s e gi ee : C.F. ‘ei e proposed a few major changes to the bastions
Holland and Gelderland, the eternal trouble-spot for the defenses. Holland was to be cut off on the
inside by a moat and a retrenchment. Gelderland was to be provided with new faces (see figure 9).
Many minor changes were proposed which focused on putting the fort in better state of defense on
short notice, as it was feared that a Mysorean attack might take place any day. Palisades were to be
erected on the glacis and the seaward defenses were to be improved. Cochin was at that time
equipped with no fewer than 196 guns and a garrison of 1706 men. 49 Ironically, this great
concentration of forces in Cochin was much greater than in a period when the company played a
much larger role on the coast.

Figure 9: 4.VEL 0910. The proposal for Cochin by the military commission. The renewed covered road
completed in the 1760-1770ies is clearly visible in this image. The military commission, especially engineer
‘ei e , ei agi ed Co hi as eleague ed fo t ess, ul e a le to atta k at a o e t s oti e a d e ui ed to
be in a defensible state without long preparation times.

48
HaNa 1.04.02 VOC, inv.nr.4618, Stukken betreffende een mogelijke afstand van de VOC-bezittingen op de
kust van Malabar aan de koning van Travancore, 1790 – 1792.
49
HaNa, 2.21.004.04, Collectie Verhuell, inv.nr. 18, Brieven, memories, berichten en staten, betrekking hebbend
op het defensiewezen te Cochin, 1790.
The proposals of the commission represent a full-circle for the fortress, it was now again only
conceived of as a strategic outpost of Ceylon, rather than a center for the pepper trade, a
shipbuilding center, a free-trading port or the center of landed possessions. It was again to serve only
in a strategic military function, shielding Ceylon. Faced with an EIC attack in 1795 and without the
hope of being relieved, the fortress surrendered after a token defense of three days.50

Conclusion
Over the period of little more than a hundred-and-thirty years over which the VOC was present on
the Malabar Coast, its role in the area changed markedly on a number of different occasions. This
paper has argued that the VOC officials constantly tried to reimagine the role of the company on the
Mlabar Coast – and thus the role of its forts and fortresses. Under pressure to cut costs or to find
new sources of revenue for what was perceived as loss-making command by the High Government in
Batavia, they came up with a great variety of schemes. In principle, cutting costs by reducing the
scope of fortifications and garrisons seemed a straightforward approach. However, the fortifications
proved to be more resilient than expected. Despite repeated and continuous plans to reduce the
scope of the fortifications, they survived in an unreduced form until the end of the Dutch period.
Only the fort at Quilon was substantially reduced. New forts were even built at Cranganore (1667)
and Chettuwa. The reasons for this unexpected resilience lie in the changing role of the forts on the
coast. All schemes intended on establishing a VOC primacy or dominance – Va Goe s o igi al pla –
relied on forts with strong garrisons. These garrisons were required to intervene in the local affairs of
the Malabar states and enforce compliance with the pepper-delivery contracts. In addition, strong
fortifications (especially at Cochin) were needed to protect Ceylon. As this vision fell apart due to its
lack of success and the high costs incurred, new visions, new imaginations, struggled to be
implemented. The VOC did maintain its claim as the final arbiter of the affairs of the Malabari states
however, and this precluded reduction of the fortifications. Though in many cases the reduced
garrisons (to save costs) and the badly maintained walls meant that the forts were not credible
defensible structures, reduction was impossible both on the grounds of prestige and because of cost
considerations. Razing the walls would be very costly, and a waste of the money spent on creating
such impressive structures in the first place. In addition, reduction of the forts would be seen by the
local kings as a loss of face by the company. Confronted with a company which obviously did not
wish to maintain its position on the coast, the fears of the Dutch officials went, the local states would
be even less inclined to abide by the pepper contracts. The first phase of possible reductions lasted
until the outbreak of renewed war with the Zamorin early in the eighteenth century. This episode
presented the VOC officials with the first opportunity for radical change since the Van Reede period.
The company could at this juncture have focused on acquiring land in its own possession. This did not
correspond with the ideas company officials had on the role of the company. They still saw it more as
an active merchant, rather than a landowner, ruler and taxman. And so the majority of the lands
taken from the Zamorin were given to the VOC ally of Cochin and only Palponetty was retained, a
decision regretted by later VOC managers commanders on the coast. The situation after the end of
the war with the Zamorin was disrupted by two shocks: first the rise of Travancore in the 1730ies-
1740ies and the invasion of Mysore in 1766. These two developments completely destroyed the old
system of states on the Malabar Coast and heralded a new role for the VOC and its forts. The VOC

50
Singh, Fort Cochin in Kerala, 170.
could not effectively adjust to these new circumstances, however, and its power and possessions
were gradually reduced over the next three decades. A brief hope of regaining landed power and
wealth by using the Travancore-Mysore rivalry to its advantage was not realized and the VOC was
reduced to play a junior, but crucial, role in alliance with Travancore. After selling off its border forts
in 1789, after which Cranganore was promptly lost by its new owners, the VOC retreated in fortress
Cochin. This was now conceived of in its original function: a shield for Ceylon. However, this imagined
role had not counted on the fact that the commander of Cochin would not defend the fortress with
potentially a great loss of life if there was no hope whatsoever of being relieved. The quick surrender
of the fortress in the 1795 siege shows that even this role was imagined after all.

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