1G THROUGH CULTURES Expaton iv Calta Psychology Ricriano A. Sutin res no ad challenging problems abut i nepal ind and -rpng called cultural paychology, it wil serve as a force of thrapology and paychology, In this book Richard Shweder ‘fo, Is central theme Is cht we have to understand the way and natures make eachother up, Is goal to seek the mind ‘dein the meanings and resonances that areboth its product 4 years the person as aceategory has disappeared from ethnog ts to reverse this trend, focusing on the serch for meaning Incentonal worlds. He examines the prospects fora recone: ‘and elas and define an intellectual agenda for euler ui in sce an anthropologist, Is Professor of Human Development and Jniversity of Chicago | ryPss on | il i t {i i SFUNLIND HONOWHL ONTDINTHL scemns THINKING THROUGH CULTURES Expeditions in Cultural Psychology RICHARD A. SHWENED72 Meas ofa Polytheistic Nature people. Ate all, animals have no language or conscience, and they certainly do not know how to cook. The philosopher, obviously 4 ‘asus at hea, found himelf imprisoned fr ieeverence. tis perhaps fortunate for contemporary anthropologists that ere ‘exence i the first commandment of the postmodern world, and that ‘nce again the roe ofthe jester has become an admited one, as we have remembered at long last the importance of living ieonically and by our wits, Thus there was no church injunction against lecturing, indeed it was by invitation, when in 1983 Cliford Geertz delivered the annual Distinguished Lecture, sited “Ants Ant-Relaivism,” to the American Anthropologial Association (Geertz 1984), One point ‘ofthe lecture was to rally anthropologists tothe eask of challenging the recived and unquestioned assumptions and clasifcations of our ‘own contemporary empire. (have teed my hand at it here) Unlike Abelard Geer walked off che stage unharmed, 0 applause. What ised to hea medieval heresy is now one of several currents in con: temporary discipline called anthropology, in whic, baring the reap pearance of a St, Benard, casusts can now practice thet at oF al chemy without stigma on the same stage a8 the ghost busters and psyche analyst 2. Cultural Psychology: What Is It? A discipline is emerging called cultural psychology Ii not gene psychology. Is no cross-uleural psychology It is not psychological Anthropology. Is not ethnopsychology eis cultural psychology. And its time may have arsived, once again. This essays preliminary attempt 1 $4, taxonomically and narratively, what the discipline of cultural psychology was, and ought to be about! Ulimatey itis 2 story of eylcal turn, Inthe short run, however, the essay isa story of one ofthe pills ofthe "cognitive revolation” of the 1960s, of its failure vo develop an audequate theory ofthe “person,” because ofthe prevailing Platonism implicit ints sientic agenda Ie is aleo a scouting expedition acrose the boundaries of some very treacherous disciplinary territories inthe search to recover an important ineedscplnary identiy. Cultural psychology is che study ofthe way ental traditions and social practices regulate, expres, and transform the human psyche, ‘resulting less in paychic unity for humankind than in ethnie dive ‘ences in mind, sel, and emotion, Cultural psychology isthe study of the ways subject and object, self and other, psyche and culture, per son and context, figure and ground, practitioner and practice, lve fogether, require each other, and dynamically, diaecically, and jointly make eachother up. B74 Ideas of a Polytheistic Nature Cull psychology is premised on human existential uncertainty hese for meaning) adon an eonacneption of oe stated" words. The pipe of existential cera ase hat human ngs aright ad perhaps ene) ae ay mos tated aes meanings and routes ut of sic en ronsnt hat has ben sraged prove te with mening and ‘sures ose and ote: The pencil of intentional for eos tue) works assert that bjs and objec, pacioners and pra tes, human bigs and socal evitonmens meyer tach oer dent and Canoe be asd nt indepen nd Scpeadent varies Ther nts ateimeependen eter se the supposed conan can be dened wihou boring om he ‘pectin ofthe oe The Bsc eso eral chlo isha, onthe one had no sococltirl nionment eset or hs det independey of he ‘tay human beings soe cans and resource rom whe, ot teeter han, every human beg cy and ete I re altered through the proceso seing meaning and esas am tome coc envionment and wig thes ‘Rsocioeltiral enone san ntentoal word isan nen onal world caine ts existence ay at, foc nly 50 lng as there exis a corm of persons whose ely dbs, motions, purposes, nd ater mena epesettion area reed and thesby indeed Inteonal words are human aracul wo, populated wih products of our own design An intntonal word might contain och Events as “steaing” or “taking communion such proces #8 “haemo in” ch ston 8 Sxonis sk pre ses at brotha” or “vores wach vil nes weed and Invisible nts as “natural sight ad such raed objects a8 “Teney conan tabacan? 4 Sonfesonal both” "eed ae loge” an over tenit acquts& “paycoanalyc coud" or 4 “ing som? Such intesonl (ade, bed fond abricted invented, ds ignated conte) things ext oly tensions word, Whee takes heir existence ntenonal ie ha such hing would not ext independent foo insements with eatin othe and they cure tenes nr er eee ou conepons a them (Schneider 1968, 1984, Andrade 1981 1984, 1980, Inene Sonal things ae cally ate tony by vite of our ment ‘pestis of thm Culteral Psychology: What Is Is? 75 Inetonal things have no “astral” eat or Mey separate from human undertanding and actives Ital world do ot txt independently of the itenional tats (bliy desis, emo: os) dicted at then and by tem, bythe persons who ve chem “Thus for example» weed an ern i sno icrtering or imprpes plan that you dont wa rowing Your {den Cesequent say noes agave or preps een ‘horny tos tan wn pi your eel pach mig De packed autas's weed wile one cla od intemal words in which Sabra manana, of dandctons senor cote a weet Sitter they ave cites cath cope Because a weed ia weed ios wed, ur ony in some neon sot bo ingen “oye i ne eden of human epone brani geet o “natural ind” Son of plans that an spel he aac orb omer! eich Ses cunts wees Te tan capa 0 sed bestow on STplan the power fo bes mane, the plant unwanted. Yet he ‘ate plan ts wants a he power fo produce sbundae ha Sou And there are other rues by which plant might mae ell Toubleome or become misplaced in your rn, slinatelyt0 Be weedeat Tr would sem follow that inne facinating and important ses the ween utes abr th ety bese eae plicated in ther oxen, ad we adhe ur reality a east in pr by lectin ther bso plist ou Our nis er eocete and ake cach ote into ccont. Wathot vs natite kaos [cel the extenc of weeds. Whhout thc exstence of weeds not 2 te amy actin and pacts (Wittgenstein “Tors of I") presuppose by thir asec and conse of here would Be Leora es work knowing “and becuse 4 weed 2 Wed i cd bt nl in some tee onl word wha eu tue (beau, god) win one ier onal word pr example “Tha rae thereto ought be Flocked out of the ground and dactded) ino meester Say eu tery god) in every netionl wer and wha fe ers tue (eal ood) in every inetonal wold ny Truly te Saul god} in hone orn hat one Aecrding to the rip of ntenoeal wore hte i logic requirement thatthe Myo thing ah xed snd univer Sos imensonal worl; while wibio any Paar Sten ‘ord for example te wenetcetiny eto world of Amer76 eas of a Polytheisic Nature ican baseball o the sixtenth-centuy intentional world of English witchcraft) the identity ofa thing (for example, a “foul ball” or 2 “witch” canbe teal andthe question of is real identity (for example, was that @ ful ball”? or it she a "witch”2) can be a subject for ‘ational and objective dispute.” ‘Cultural poychology isthe study of intentional worlds. It isthe study of personal functioning in’ particular intentional words. Is the study of the interpersonal maintenance of any intentional world, Its the investigation of those prycho-somaticsoco-eultural and in cvitably, divergent realities in which subject and object cannot possi- bly be separated and kept apart because they are o interdependent ‘sto need each other to be (see Kleinman 1986a; Shweder 1986; and Chapters 1 and 8 ofthis volume). Finally, cultural psychology isan interdisciplinary human science. It aims to develop several companion disciplines, especially an an- thropology (reunited with linguistic) suitable forthe analysis of 0 ‘ocutural environment (meanings and resources; “forms of life") in All thee intentionality and pariclatity, and a psychology (reunited “vith philosophy) suitable forthe analysis of pesons inal their inten Sionaliey and historicity Answering, “What Is It?” Question Ieis a principle of cultural psychology—the principle of intentional ‘worlds—that nothing real “just” cht instead realities ae the prod- tet of the way things get represented, embedded, implemented, and fected to in Various taxonomic or narative contexts or both. The fealty of cultural psychology is no exception to the principle. As a Constructed intellectual discipline cultural psychology has a caxo- ‘nomic and narrative identity whose realty is nt independent of our Sharing with each other, debating, and acting upon our conception oft "Tosay what something i, taxonomically, sto say what itis not to say what itis a kind of, and to point to instances oft Testo subsume itas a particular example of something more general and to general inci so a5 to turn something more particular than it into its example. "To say what something is, narratives, i to describe its origination (once upon a time”) and its density (ts aim, purpose, or function) land to comprehend its current status, inthe here and now, as part of 4 longer story of stevings, achieves, obstacles, growth, adapta- tions failures, dormancy or never-ending cyclical return Cultural Paychology: What Is I? 77 Placed in its taxonomic context an ideal cultural psychology has qualities that distinguish it from general psychology, cross-clraral ‘eychology, psychological anthropology, and ethnopsychology. It Is Not General Peychology First cultural psychology most be distinguished from general psychol- on. “lpcople are the same whetever you go” is a line from the song, “Ehony and Ivory" by Paul McCartney and Stevie Wonder; that line deseibes pretty well a basic assumption of general psychology. The ‘Seumption is somesimes refered to as the principle of psychic unity ‘of humankind General paychology assumes tha its subject matters a central (a stract and transcendent = deep or interior or hidden) processing thechaniam inherent (fixed and universal) in human beings, which en- bles them to think (casi, iner, remember, imagine), experience (emote, fel, deste, need, slf-refled),ace (strive, prefer, choose, eva ate) and learn. The aim of general peychology isto describe that ‘Ena inherent processing mechanism of mental life. Since the c= tral processing mechanism s presumed o be a transcendent, abstract feed, and universal property ofthe human psyche, general psychot- ‘ogy has the look, taste and smell ofa Platonic undertaking. Fortis thu presupposed central and inherent processing mechanism that is the true objet of fascination in general psychology and not all the “concrete, apparent, variable, and particular stuf, substance, or con {one that is operated upon by the processor or may interfere with is operation. eis necessary step in the general psychology enterprise 0 distn- mish intrinsic psychological structures and processes from extrinsic Environmental conditions, 0 procedurally abstract and analytically ‘Sithdraw the knower from what he or she knows, and o insist on 2 Tandameneal division berween the processing mechanism ofthe per ‘son veras his or ee personal or group history context, stimulus and thek environment, instittional sting, resources, belies, values, and knowledge. "Of course, people are not the same wherever you go. Not even Paul McCartney and Stevie Wonder are the same. And no general psycho: ogy is s0 unworldly as to overlook that fact. Te tncal paychology may be Platonic bu iis certainly not chought- less The principle of general psychology that “people are the same78 eas ofa Rolyteitic Nature winereer you go” does not mean that people are the same in every Fespect. It means that transcendently, “deep down” or “inside,” ‘where the central processing mechanism lives people are the same {or alternatively, what gives people “psychic unity” is what makes them all the same “deep down” or “insde”) ‘All the other stuf—simuli, contexts, resources, values, meanings, knowledge, religion, rituals, language, technologies, institutions— conceived to be exteral to or outside ofthe central processing mech: anism, Observations on Rajput widows in India, motivated by special beliefs and desires, immolating themselves along with their deceased husband on his funeral pyte; or observations on Chinese abacus ex- pert, asisted by special mental representational techniques, solving [ethmetic problems “in their head” ata speed several orders of mag: nitude faster than the eet of humanity all hat may be rch material for humanistic inquiry, journalistic teporting, and literary represen- tation, yet all of it must, given the Patonist impulse, be viewed, in fand of itself as incidental of secondary to the aim of general psy chology "The sim, as noted: to get behind superficial appearances, local ‘manifestations, and external resources to isolate the intrinsic central processing mechanism ofthe mental ife and describe th invariant laws of its operation” Tes that Platonic impulse, one suspects, that was behind the mem ‘rable temark from an anthropologist who, upon hearing about “Mike Cole and John Gay's research in Liberia (1972), argued to the ‘eflect that the thinking processes of West African tribesmen do not fiffer from our own only thee values, beliefs, and classifications dit. {ec, whichis why the Kpelle perform 50 diferenly on psychological tests [see Cale and Gay 1972, p. 1066) tis that same impulse, one suspects, that once led Melford Spiro (1955), with his intrest in group differences in personality, to express the methodological concern that in demonstrating emotional and be- havioral difeences across diferent sociocultural contexts, anthro- pologists had not demonstrated the existence of genuine personality Uiferences tall, They "have merely demonstrated tat diferent stim- bli evoke difleren responses” (p. 257) “The methodological “merely” in Spto's analysis is revealing. For one might have argued, methodologically and non-Patonicaly that the power ofa particular stimals 6 evoke a particulaizing response is nor independent of the way 2 person or people get particularly involved with ic prychologically—clasify it, reason about i, el st0- Cultural Peychology: What Is I? 79 ries about it, appropriate it to their purposes —and that thats what igoruine personality differences aze about. In intentional worlds ‘fimul are not external to oF independent of our understanding of them, and those understandings ae a large part of what we mean by “personality” (sce, for example, Mischel 1973) in other words, one might have argued, from the point of view of| ‘nentional worlds, thatthe study of genuine psychological diferences between ethnic groups should be conceived as the study of how di ferent sociocultural environments become diferent by virtue of the sways they are diferently constituted psychologically by diferent peoples so as to possess diferent response evocation potentials. Phatonism is an ancient and formidable schoo of interpretation. I is crucial to recognize thatthe long-lived and imaginative idea of an inherent (fixed, universal) and central (transcendent, abstract) pro- cessing mechanism, a psychic unity to humankind, wll never be set ‘usly threatened by the mere existence of performance diferences be ‘ween individals or populations. Those performance diferences can “ways be interpreted, and shouldbe interpreted, as the consequence ‘Of incomparablities, incommensurablite, or just some plain dir nces inal the other stall, which leaves permanently unsettled and ‘ermaly unsetlabl the question whether there reall is, deep down, Sn inherent and central processing mechanism hidden behind all the ‘ther stall Paton and its alternatives wil always be with us, of. fering differen interpretations and competing visions ofthe nature of the human psyche. eis equally crucial to recognize that general psychology with its Platonie imagery and premises is not the only imaginative and intr pretaive game in town for understanding the mental life. Ione sub- [Seribes to an alternative, non-Platonic principle of intentional worlds ‘hat nothing in particular exists independently of our involvement ‘wth cand interpretation oft, iis possible to conceive ofthe mental Iie at variable and plural and substanive and constructively stimulus bound. °xnd i is possible to characterize large part ofthe mental lif in tecms ofthe partcularzing ways peoples constitute and get involved ‘with particulars, thereby giving co those constructed simul, task en ‘irontmens, and sociocultural contexts the powers they have to evoke the special responses they evoke ‘Nevertheless the aim of general psychology i Platonic, and is Pla- tonic aim i to seek outa presumed central processing mechanism of hhuman beings and to isolate i from all the other stuf80. eas of a Polytheitic Na Given that si, its not surpeing tha general peychoogy hs con- sorued its own speci intellectual wanards for knowledge repre Sentaon fs prefered ontology) and knowledge seeking fis re fered epistemology). Ontlogeay speaking, knowledge general porcbology ithe aempt fo imagine and characterize the for ot thtpe oft inheen cena processing mechanism for pychlogal fenton (daciminaon eporizaton,mexory,leaiing nova thon nference, and s0 on). Epemologcaly speaking, knowledge srkingin pst peyehlogy the amp opt ook atthe co tral procsing mechansm Untied by cote and context nd "The main force in general pachology i the idea of that cata parang ds Te pss api anh Oe md ove orwansends al ch taf upon whch it operae. le engages the slo car conte, ask and sins matron. Given that image the ental proceso inet be context and content independent. That mea nee, that he procesor mux i deseribable in terms of properties that ae either eof conte ntet abtect, forall prope) or eral oa co ‘exedontent ivan nivel proper) Sil peaking ontological, that ape of an inherent (xe, nivel and central (abstract, tancendem) proceing mech thisnea comexicontentindepndent and omnipresent; metal thitythat the explanation forthe pret exer confer ing ‘ral oyhology upon acount of the mena if in tems of univer tratematialfaneons and invariant formal iis or contains (foe ‘ample, exponential decay functions mapped i an abstract paycho- Ioel space fr representing the pbabity of generalization be wen paso simu evets in ay domain fray sesory modal iy for any specie, asin Shepard 1987; or agi umber, seven plus or mins two, o represent the mania capacity of he central Procexing mechanism for itinguising values, whatever he vale, {long any singe dimension, whatever the dimension, sn any single inn wheres an when he nt ie 150. ent ete bao confered within general pychology upon ct tin ways of eking nol. Koved king in gees sy ‘Shlogy the attempt ro ain det acre to the central procaine echnin withing me guage nal he her “General pacholgis que general pycologss ae typically wary GultralPeychology: What Is Ie? 81 ‘of rain forests, swamps, and the complex textures and tones of every {ey life, langeage, and Inswional stings. They take comfort in a ‘adically simplifying (some would call ita cadically “surveal”) article Ut faits namely thatthe central processor is mos kel to reveal its pee oem when ey meaning fe rafal or oe i ‘lus items ino 2 context-free envionment.” ‘Nonsense syllables, white coats, and darkened bare rooms may be snisguided or monstrous anachronisms fr serous researchers in ge ‘a poycholog, ye he experimental lab still eated as a privileged. Sr here, qe fantastically and against much evidence, itis com ‘Rahendy assumed that we ean physically enter a transcendent realm Whore the efees of context, content, and meaning can be eliminated, Watdardized, or kept under control, and the central processor ob- ‘ved inthe raw. The image of a central processing mechanism and {he search for a window or a peephole through which to view it ma- Tea and pure may explain why in general psychology there has be- ome entrenched the intuition that real scientists do experimen 0 ab. Unions cven if the presumed iheen but iden ena processing mechanism does exist, the paychologcal laboratory is Probably not the mythical enchanted doorway through which we can ap eaight away info a more fundamental reality. Indeed one sus- Par thatthe sococultucal environment of lab life i no even plau- iy equivalent to the physicis’s vacuum or the physiologists X-ray for dred accessing things that are basic, deep, or hidden from view. ‘Phe ideas of 2 context free environment, meaning fee stimalis yont and fixed meaning are probably best kept where they belong, ‘Tong with plaeless space, evemles time, and squared cles on that Fran and fabulous ist of impossible notions. For when it comes £0 the investigation and examination of psychological functioning, there probably ino way to ge id ofall the other stuff, even inthe Lb. Ot course, nothing I have said argues against studying “stuf” in a lab Ife aca brought into the lab (or simulated there) is interesting, ramagh sett seedy, and fone can bring tito the la (or fepro~ Rent? here) withour spoiling it (those are big is"), then one can aesainly stady it there, and there may even be very good reason tO {fax for example, Milgram 1974). Whether there isa royal road run- (Si through the lab tothe land ofthe central processing mechanism ‘of the mental lifes, however, quite another issue. Roger shepards recent discussion (published, appropriately in Sei nce magazine) (1987) of "universal law of genetalization for psy-82 eas ofa Potytheistic Nature chological science” isa revealing illustration of Platonist presupposi- tions in general psychology and the way they guide a research ‘enterprise and structure the interpretation of evidence by even the ‘most brilian practioners. Shepard begins and ends by holding out Newton's mathematical and universal lave of gravitation asthe standard by which to judge the successor failure of che discipline of psychology. Psychology, She- pard aves, should strive to be the science ofthe invariant mathemat- teal forms underlying poychological functioning. Three hundred years after the publication of Newton's Prixipia Shepard thinks psycho ‘ogy can finally point to a success, a mathematical law of simulus ‘generalization which “is invariant across perceptual dimensions, mo- alte, individuals and species” and which shows that psychology “may not be inherently linited merely tothe descriptive character zation ofthe behavior of particular terrestrial species” or the proper- ties of particular stimulus domains (pp. 1317-18, 1323) ‘Shepard's “universal law" is basically an abstract spatial represen- tation of an exponential decay function for stimulus generalization likelihoods berween pairs of stimuli. The exponential decay function is derectable in several data sets from humans and pigeons, which record for selected domains (for example, consonant phonemes, t= angles of diferent sizes and shapes) the probability that a response learned to any one stimulus within the domain will generalize to any ‘other stimulus within the domain. Shepard believes tha this exponen tial decay function is the central processing mechanism for stimu lus generalization in its pristine form—abstract and transcendent (= deeply interior), fxed, and universal (p. 1318). ‘Tohavea glimpse a his abstract transcendent processing function Shepard is quite prepared--indeed, feels compelled —to extriorize, treat as illusory, and withdraw his attention from several levels of realty that ply a major part in human classiicatory behavior. First he must withdraw his tention from measurable smulaiies nd differences in the stimulus materials themselves. For it has been shown—he views the relevant findings as “troublesome” and “die- ‘couraging”—thar there exist no universal mathematical function for predicting the probability ofa generalization esponse from measur- able physical characteristics of pairs of stimuli those mathematical functions seem to vary by stimulus domain (p. 1317) For example, the mathematical function forthe color space may differ from the function for tonal scales, and thee may difer by species or individu als; and within a parculr stimulus domain, suchas the colo space, Cultural Peychology: What Is Ie? 83 «response to particular color chip may generalize toa distant hue atthe opposite end of the spectrum. So if there isto be a universal law of generalization it is not going to bea law of the stimulus env- ronment. It must be a pure psychological funtion, not apsychophys- ical function (p. 1318). I cannot tell us which simu items in any ddomain will be generalized to, only that the likelihood of generaliza- tion aross pais of stimulus items (whichever they should turn outro be) will decay exponentially. To reach the central processing mechar nism of simulus generalization Shepard must get beyond the stimulus “Then he must also get beyond learning processes. For he does not expect his universal law of generalization to describe generalization behavior under multiple learning teal, because “differential rei forcement could shape the generalization function and contours around a particular stimulus into a wide variety of forms” (p. 1322). Finally he must get beyond reconstructive memory processes. For it {is known that the universal law is ot descriptive of generalization behavior when leasningtils are delayed. This Shepard interprets ax 2 failure of the aw because of interfering “‘noisein the internal rep- tesentation ofthe stimuli” (p. 1322). ‘At this point a reader of Science interested in similarity and difer- ‘nce judgments might be tempted to ask what we have leaned about human classifcatory behavior. Having withdrawn his attention from the stimulus envionment and from processes of learning and mem- ‘ory why does Shepard think he is looking at something fundamental such as a central processing mechanism of mind? "The answer i clear and Platonic. Late in his article Shepard points ‘out that, trialy speaking, his universal law i descriptive of stimulus generalization behavior only when “generalization is tested immedi- Stely after a single leaening tial with a novel stimulus” (p1322). Here we come to the great and unbreachable divide between gen- «ral psychology and cultural psychology. Moved by the Platonic im- pulse (and perhaps by the prestigious image of Newton’ gravitational forces operating in a vacuum), Shepard seems to think that something truly fundamental about the mind—an inherent central processing ‘mechanism—can be divined only if we can transcend the noise and clutter of the environment by bleaching i of familiar things and im poverishing i of feedback, and by isolating the mind from ite own mental supports. “The alterative interpretation—that of cultural psychology—is thatthe mind lef o its own devices is mindless. From that perspec:84 Leas ofa Polyheistic Nature tive, Shepards proposed “univercl law of generalization for psycho- logical sience” i little more than an extremely unqualified descrip- tion of the special, restrictive (and, we might add, rather peculiar) cefects on similarity and diference judgments of unfamiliar self {novel stimuli) examined i one-ral learning environments. ‘According to the principles of cultural psychology the effects of stuff will no go away, even inthe lab, for there is no context fce ‘environment. We are intentional beings who live in an intentional ‘world of constituted and represented pariculare—domain-speciic, concrete, subject-dependent artifactual things. Absolute transcend ‘ence is great and marvelous thing, bur not if we want to keep the psyche in psychology. “The implication, ofcourse, is that genuine succes for psychological science wll come when we stop trying to get beyond the “noise” and start tying to say interesting things about some of the more robust and patterned varieties oft? ‘That isthe challenge for cultural peychology. But 1 am getting ahead of my story. First we must consider cros-caltral psychology {not to be confused with cultural psychology), which can be very “noisy,” pethape too noisy. Its Not Cross-Cultural Paychology ‘One of the harards of general psychology as a Platonic undertaking is the inhereardificulty of disingushing statements about a pre: sumed inherent central processing mechanism from statements about all the other stuf. I is tha dificuly chat has kept the discipline of ‘cross-cultural psychology in business. CCrosscultural psychology is a subdscipline of general psychology that shares with i the Platonic aim of characteriing the inherent cen- tral procesing mechanisms of the mental Ife. Practitioners ofthe subdiscipline cary the general psychologist’ tests and research pro- cedures abroad. Occasionally cross-cultural psychological research replicates some regularity observed in Western-educated subjects (Ekman 1989), The tain discovery of cros-cultural psychology, however, is that many descriptions of mental functioning emerging from laboratory research with Westerneducated populations do’not travel very wel to subject. populations in other culate. Thus although almost all adults in Ge- ‘eva, Paris, London, and New York display so-called concrete oper- atonal thinking on Piaget's conservation of mas, umber, and liquid Caleural Prychology: What Is Ie? 85 uany tu, many ads in any Third Wold apis 3 ot ae TsEtine 74 Haye The de pm of eats er aa i Pe eho wn poo See arene en clog sands ‘pi eee of Po ig ey poe Bin cd oy sth peorganes Siencese tee y Sco ena posing met oe ne mart faye bcoe al decped anong can pots of eaten ite 19 ae Seder 190 fr venga The als rhe ese dire mary Seer cn kn nd bs oa vee OL ey te 2a eyportny 1 pon Some eee ema cong mechan he mid (Oe soda 7 So cpr reaps eps of chic ni Ae cn ern, pce ny we snipe SREP roceor lope ba he nel sd unfor scene teed mona te eo SASS thi sone cones pyle be ceed wa abel santo of poh of Sag mechs Theacy holmes di See eet rng be end sma pec ee eats petal ern ne mn yee wy hat Sr a ewig eee it ede Sree! prehopie tbe cnc with ec? ce a hc menor rappin wine maar each san ead hen hel Brea nel sec ny ce so eet teaay le whee cea proc hcg er say be clo naar cto fy cra rromens Serle hs ed on he map re essay ante py and tot wo onder SPR Pinte real peo ofc no beat Te iat te Rane pipe af pol poly the nc apne ony Moore if ous el pb Te etd nee one tn ee oo eel Satay mor nd ore sb he gene ope me hcg cle of cvionaent oh dep of Ste pty ncn the Snob nod y sane86 eas ofa Polytheinic Nature lation or by diferences inthe understanding of the test situation oF by cultual variations in the norms regulating the asking nd answer: ing of questions. Rather, if you area general psychologist, you will want to transcend those appearances and reach forthe imagined ab- steact forms and processes operting behind the extrinsic crushes and restains and distortions of this or that performance enviran- Pethaps that is why, in general psychology, cross-cultural psychol- ‘ogy has diminutive status, and why sts research literate tends to be ‘gored. Not surprising’, developmental psychology —the study of age-graded differences in performance on psychological tests and rasks—has suffered a similar fate, and for sinilar reasons. Tes doubrful that anyone is going to divest general psychology of its fascination with the imaginative idea of an inherent central pro- cessing mechanism. And certainly this disenchantment isnot going to be produced by merely showing thatthe regularities observed inthe ‘Western lab do not wavel well to other contexts, or generalize ro sub jects from other culture (or age levels) oo stimulis materials fom everyday lf (see LeVine n.d). The Plaonis framework for interpre tation is likely to remain enshrined in general psychology and defi tive ofits intellectual agenda. Like the scripeute of some great religion ‘ofthe world it ses the terms for its own assesment, and ithas enor ‘mous appeal, especially for those devoted toi to whom i appeals, [A problem with cross-cultural psychology is that iis not heretical enough, even asit raises its serious concerns I would not be too eat an exaggeration to aser that so-called method effects (major varia- tions in research findings as a result of slight variations in research procedute, elicitation technique, wording of questions, description and representation of problems, expectation of examiners, subject, population, and so on) ate the main effects to emerge out of decades Of laboratory eesearch in general psychology. The method effect phe- nomenon (see Campbell and Fiske 1959; Cronbach 1975; Fiske 1986) is quite consistent with the discovery that generalizations from psychological research on one population do not travel very wel across cultual, historical, and institutional boundaries, ‘Unfortunately inthe face ofthat evidence most cross-cultural psy: chologists have been unable to free themselves of the hegemony of Platonisic presuppositions in general psychology. They have contin ted fo assume a paychic unity to husnankind and to earch for the resumed central processing mechanism in growth-rtimulating envi Calteral Paychology: What Is Ik? 87 ronments lterae, Wester industrialized urban centers) or through Coltrefair o everyday simuls materials. Cltualpaycholgy i far more heterodox vis@-vis the canon of poychic unity, For cultural pychology i uit ovt ofa fundamental epticim concerning al shoe fateful and presupposed disintons intone properties of mind venus exinsc properties of envton- mens form rernis content, the “deep” versus the "superia”the inerens central processing mechanism (psychic unity) versus al the other st ‘Cultural prychology offers an alternative discipline of interpret tion ofthe fondamentals ofthe mind. The mind, secording to eutural aychology, i content driven, domain specific, and constructively Smulus Bound; and it cannot be exeicated rom the historically ve lable and crow cata diverse itesonal words ia which it plays 4 coconstiting part. Consequently, cultural psychology interprets Seatemene about repuaries observed in lab or observed anywhere cls om the street or ina eassooms, in Chicago or in Khartoum, not Se propositions about inherent properties of a central procesing mmechanim for human peychologiealfenctoning but rather as de- ‘ctptions of local response pate contingent on context, rescues, insrucionl se, authori rlabons, faming devices, and modes of constual* Tei thc aim of coral paychology to understand th organization and evocative power of al that stat to sty the maioe vanities of it and to seek the mind where ies mind, ndsocably embedded in the meanings and resources that ae bth its product and its com ponents It I Not Peychological Anthropology ‘Whereas crose-cultural peychology is 2 subdiscpline of psychology, paychological anthropology is a province of anthropology; which ‘means that prychological anthropology is less concerned with behav- jor in laboratories or on standardized tess or with novel stimulus materials and more concerned with other kinds of stuf. The staff of anthropology includes rituals and folktales, games and art forms, family life pracices and religious doctrines, kinship categories and inherited systems of knowledge. Anthropologists in general lke t0 ‘muck around in the suf of everyday lite and language, and psycho~ logieslantheopologiss are no exception.90. Leas of a Polyheistic Nature logical anthropologists assume chat the substantive domains ofa $0-