Ata 21 WTT May 24 25 20207052023020253

737NG/MAX ATA 21-51
Topic: Temperature Control

Valve (TCV) Discussion
Working Together Team (WTT) Meeting
May 24 – 25, 2023
Boeing: Honeywell:
Melissa Grenier Greg Pearse
Adan Guzman Rob Ray
Yajie Li
Doug Kern
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Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

Boeing & Honeywell
Team Org Chart
Environmental Control Systems (ECS)
737NG/MAX Fleet Chief Office
Service Engineering
ECS SE Manager Vitor Amorim Fleet Chief David Roberts
ECS Service Engineers Yajie Li Deputy Fleet Chief Melissa Grenier
Lisa Khalaf SRP Leader Adan Guzman
Julian Anthony
Kevin West Reliability, Maintainability & Testability (RM&T)
Lead RM&T Engineer Hiep Nguyen
737NG/MAX Design Engineering 737NG/MAX Supplier Management

DE Manager Matt Ranson Supplier Customer Support Focal Kathleen Houlihan
DE Technical Lead Tony Martin-II
DE Technical Doug Kern
Honeywell
Greg Pearse
NG/MAX Platform Program Manager
Ron Jablonsky
TCV Test Engineer Rob Ray

TCV Working Together Team (WTT) Overview
Problem Statement
• Temperature Control Valve (TCV) / Trim Air Valve (TAV) P/N 398908-6 continues to see a high rate of NFF/NCFR
Summary
• Approx. 86% of the part number (P/N) 398908-6 removals returned to Honeywell for repair have tested as No Fault Found (NFF)
or No Cause for Removal (NCFR)
• Ongoing investigations continue to determine root cause for NFF/NCFR removals via analyses of MAX QAR/NVM/EDR data for
TCV faults identified during Engine Start
• Continuing to understand limit switch contamination’s impact on TCV pack faults and identify ways to mitigate such findings to
extend TCV’s on-wing service life
Goals & Objectives
• Revisit TCV NFF Investigation History & Path Forward Based on MAX AHM Data Analyses
• Reiterate improved troubleshooting to help reduce TCV NFF removals
• Discuss Mitigating Actions & Efforts Currently in Work
• Actively engage operators in this WTT process: seek feedback and in-service experience
• Discuss Next Steps & Go-Forward Plan based on RCCA Efforts

Agenda
• How TCV/TAV Works
• History/Background for -6 and -7 TCVs
• MAX Data Analysis & Findings
• -6 Fleet Reliability Data Review Recap
• -6 Shop Findings
• In Service Issue – Reasons for Removals
• Limit Switch Fault and Contact Resistance
• Mitigating Plan/Actions
• Go Forward Plan toward Root Cause Corrective Action (RCCA)
• Closing Comments / Action Items Recap

How TCV/TAV (398908-3/-5/-6) Works

How TCV/TAV (398908-3/-5/-6) Works
Temperature Control Valve (TCV):
• TCV is used by PZTC/PFTC/IASC to control pack temperature. When pack is running, it is commanded by PZTC/PFTC/IASC to open or
close until the pack temperature target is reached. If the pack cooling target cannot be reached, aka hot cabin, the TCV would be
commanded to the fully closed position without being faulted
• The pressure differential across the TCV could be as high as about 30 psig, so a pack heating target can be easily reached when the TCV
is commanded partially open by the PZTC/PFTC/IASC with pack air temperature up to 450F
• A TCV at the fully opened position would result in unbearable hot temperature for the flight deck and passenger zones, so it would never be
commanded to that position by PZTC/PFTC/IASC. Except for BITE, the TCV would not reach the fully opened position in operation
• When pack is not running, the TCV would be commanded by ACAU to be fully closed
• TCV could cause hot cabin issues when it is commanded to a partially open position then fails – the condition would be faulted by
PZTC/PFTC/IASC
• Limit switch fault – TCV is determined by PZTC/PFTC/IASC to be at the fully closed and fully open the position at the same time, could only
happen when the TCV is physically at the fully closed position, so it would not cause hot cabin issues
Trim Air Valve (TAV):
• TAV is used by PZTC/PFTC/IASC to control zone temperature. If the airplane is powered regardless if packs are running or not, TAV would
be commanded by PZTC/PFTC/IASC to open or close until the zone temperature target is reached. If the target cannot be reached, the TAV
would be commanded to the fully closed position in cooling mode, or fully opened position in heating mode, without being faulted
• The pressure differential across the TAV doesn't exceed 4 psig when packs are running. A zone heating target may not be reachable
sometimes even when the TAV is commanded to the fully opened position by the PZTC/PFTC/IASC with the trim air temperature up to
450F, aka cold cabin or cabin temperature uncontrollable
• TAV could cause hot cabin issues when it is commanded to a partially or fully open position then fails – the condition would be faulted by
PZTC/PFTC/IASC
• Limit switch fault – TAV is determined by PZTC/PFTC/IASC to be at the fully closed and fully open the position at the same time, could
happen when the TAV is physically at the fully closed or fully opened position, and it could cause hot cabin issue when the fault occurs with
the TAV at the fully opened position
TAV/TCV without faults, or TCV with limit switch fault do not cause hot cabin.
TCV/TAV (398908-3/-5/-6) Faults
Maintenance Previously Investigated for -6/-
MMSG Description PFTC Fault Codes Fault Discerption Seeing in MAX data May cause hot cabin
Messages 7 Roadmap
260 TCV Open Motor Open Fault Yes No
261 TCV CLOSE Motor Open Fault Yes No
263 TCV Close Motor Short Fault No No Yes
21-55090/55091 Left/Right Pack TCV 264 TCV Seized Fail to Open Fault No Yes
265 TCV Seized Fail To Close Fault No No
266 TCV Open Limit Switch Fault Yes Yes No
267 TCV Fault (Collector) N/A – Collector
268 F/D TAV Open Motor Open Fault
269 F/D TAV CLOSE Motor Open Fault
271 F/D TAV Close Motor Short Fault Same as TCV Same as TCV
Flight Deck Trim Air Yes
21-65150/-65151 272 F/D TAV Seized Fail to Open Fault (different fault codes) (different fault codes)
Valve
273 F/D TAV Seized Fail To Close Fault
274 F/D TAV Open Limit Switch Fault
275 F/D TAV Fault (Collector) N/A – Collector
276 Zone TAV Open Motor Open Fault
277 Zone TAV CLOSE Motor Open Fault
279 Zone TAV Close Motor Short Fault Same as TCV Same as TCV
FWD/AFT Zone Trim Yes
21-65226/65227 280 Zone TAV Seized Fail to Open Fault (different fault codes) (different fault codes)
Air Valve
281 Zone TAV Seized Fail To Close Fault
282 Zone TAV Open Limit Switch Fault
283 Zone TAV Fault (Collector) N/A – Collector
TAV/TCV without faults, or TCV with limit switch fault do not cause hot cabin.
. Distribution Limited to Boeing Commercial Airplanes & 737NG/MAX Owners and Operators
History for TCV/TAV 398908-6/-7
• Based on NVM data captured around 2017 from returned -002 PFTCs due to power supply issues, and the assumption that the NVM data
(from 2016-2017) in those PFTCs represented the fleet, Boeing/Honeywell concluded that:
• TCVs had 50% limit switch failure rate and 50% AC motor failure rate
• Honeywell also performed shop testing confirming that both failure modes were real
• Based on the above info, Boeing/Honeywell proposed the following TCV Roadmap:
• -6 TCV to address the motor fault, -7 to address the switch fault
• Honeywell never had actual shop data to confirm the 50/50 split assumption
• Latest MAX data suggests that:
• There are other failure modes and failure conditions that were not accounted for previously, as shown on table below
• Motor fault occurrences are unknown
• Many faults occur on the ground (predominantly during Engine Start) that Boeing/Honeywell do not fully understand.
• -6 TCVs removed might not be due to switch failure
• As of APR 2023, there about 4,250 TCVs installed on NG/MAX. Per Honeywell, only 8 out of 300 TCVs removed had confirmed switch
failure(s)
• Logbook write-ups suggest many TAV/TCVs are removed due to Hot/Cold Cabin or Pack/Zone Temp Light without Master Caution Recall
TCV/TAV AHM MMSG Summary since Introduction (July 17, 2022)
On the Ground In Flight
Message Position Total
Power On Engine Start Taxi Out All Phases
21-55090 Left Pack TCV 131 8 (6.1%) 76 (58.0%) 40 (30.5%) 7 (5.3%)
21-55091 Right Pack TCV 208 16 (7.7%) 127 (61.1%) 56 (26.9%) 9 (4.3%)
21-65151 Flight Deck Zone TAV 62 5 (8.1%) 42 (67.7%) 15 (24.2%) 0
21-65226 FWD Zone TAV 32 0 17 (53.1) 6 (18.8%) 9 (28.1%)
21-65227 AFT Zone TAV 42 0 32 (76.2) 6 (14.3%) 4 (9.5%)
Due to these new findings, -7 TCV as an NFF/NCFR solution is premature.

MAX Data Analysis & Findings: QAR Data (TCV Fault at Engine Start)
• Left TCV Limit Switch Fault active at start of QAR data
• Left TCV Limit Switch fault clears about 1 hr 19 mins later in data while in cruise at FL360

MAX Data Analysis & Findings: QAR Data (TCV Fault at Engine Start)
• Right TCV Limit Switch Fault active at start of QAR data
• Right TCV Open Limit switch goes inactive 9 seconds after right pack turned on
• Right TCV Limit Switch Fault clears 1 minute later

MAX Data Analysis & Findings: QAR Data
• Majority of TCV faults occurred on ground – predominantly shown in AHM at Engine Start phase
• Collected MAX QAR data on 14 flights from 9 aircraft with TCV faults
• Data collected from 4 operators who experienced TCV AHM alerts during Engine Start phase
• QAR data recording starts after 1st engine is started
• All QAR data has shown valve simultaneous limit switch faults; no valve motor faults have been seen in data
• QAR data shows valve Open and Close limit switches both active from start of data
• For Simultaneous Limit Switch Fault, controller must detect both valve limit switches active for ~8 seconds AND at least
one air conditioning pack must be running
• For events where Limit Switch Fault is active from start of QAR data, fault must have occurred prior to engine start
when packs were running (Running packs using APU Bleed)
Breakdown of QAR Data from 14 Flights
Valve Position Faulted Count Fault Sets Fault Recovery

Aft TAV 3 Fault Already Active at QAR Data Start 9 Fault Clears Before Takeoff 2
Left TCV 4 Fault Goes Active After Engine Start 5 Fault Clears During Flight 4
Right TCV 7 Fault Doesn’t Clear 8
• Seeing a trend in data where AHM TCV Faults reported during Engine Start phase are occurring after the aircraft has
been parked for several hours or overnight (e.g. first flight of the day / aircraft power-up)
• Further investigation needed to understand if this could be some type of nuisance fault rather than real TCV issue

MAX Data Analysis & Findings: NVM and EDR Data
• IASC NVM data was collected from aircraft with multiple Right TCV faults
• 4 TCV faults occurred from period between Oct 2018 through Jan 2023
• All faults occurred with aircraft on the ground with the air conditioning packs running
• Two types of TCV faults seen in the NVM data history: TCV Limit Switch Fault and TCV Seized Fail to Open
• The TCV Limit Switch Fault occurs when the Pack Temperature Controller detects that the TCV full open limit switch
and full close limit switch both report TRUE simultaneously
• The TCV Seized Fail to Open occurs when the Pack Temperature Controller has sent TCV open commands for
more than 60 seconds and the TCV full open limit switch still reports FALSE
• This is the first instance of seeing TCV Seized Fail to Open fault in collected data
• This fault could be caused by an issue with the open limit switch of the TCV (open limit switch fails to activate)
• Boeing and Honeywell team are working with operators to capture EDR data to obtain air conditioning pack data for
when packs are running prior to Engine Start when TCV faults are occurring

MAX Data Analysis & Findings: Data Collection Challenges
• 737 MAX ECS investigations heavily rely on data obtained from the IASC. This data can only be downloaded directly
from the IASC and requires special Honeywell proprietary software (UNITY) that is not available to operators, only to
Honeywell and Boeing representatives
• Current process is to have a Boeing and/or Honeywell representative travel to the operator location to download the data,
but timing is critical and often they do not get there on time to capture all essential data due to limited data persistency
window and airplane flying schedule. There are also import/export concerns that have delayed/inhibited travel in the past
• Data Persistence:
• EDR: 24 operating hours (anytime the PACKS are running)
• EDR can provide recorded data over time for a subset of Air Conditioning Pack Parameters
• NVM: 64 flight legs
• NVM logs a fault entry and takes a snapshot of some Air Conditioning Pack Parameters when fault occurs
• Since QAR recorded data is limited to after an engine has started, IASC NVM and EDR data is needed to better
understand what is occurring when TCV limit switch fault sets prior to engine start
Operator data and partnership is crucial to the investigation

-6 Fleet Removals – Fleet Data MAX vs. NG
• Boeing/Honeywell are tracking and reviewing all P/N 398908-6 removals that Honeywell received:
• Boeing’s ability to track/investigate non-Honeywell returns (3rd party MROs) is limited
• All NG returns will be reviewed but limited to logbook review only because there is no engineering/systems data
• All MAX returns will be reviewed – in addition to logbook review, Boeing will perform engineering/systems review if
warranted provided that the QAR data can be obtained from operators
• -6 TCV in service installation as of APR-2023:
• About 2,040 production -6 TCV in-service – assumed to be all on MAX but some might be on NG
• About ~1,850 upgraded -6 TCV in service – assumed to be all on NG
• -6 TCV in service removals as of APR-2023:
• About 23 removals on MAX
• About 277 removals on 737-800/900
• About 35% removals are due to PZTC/PFTC indictment and CRoC oscillations
• Up to 65% removals might be unnecessary – due to Pack trip, uncontrollable temps, etc.
Removal
MODEL REMOVALS* Estimated -6 Inservice
Percentage
737-800/900 277 1,850 15%
MAX 23 2,400 < 1%
Recent FIM improvements can help minimize NFF/NCFR removals

-6 Fleet Removals – Honeywell Shop finding summary
300 total 398908-6 returns as of 4/28/2023

86% of returns are NFF or NCFR.
27 total confirmed failures over 4200 -6 units in service ( <1%)
• 17 units Motor / actuator failure
• Calibration / alignment
• Motor failure
• Noisy drive
• 8 units Switch failures
• Single point failure contamination events – Workmanship issue (potting compound): Corrective Action
in place
• Switch deformation - Workmanship issue (improper installation / washer improvement): Corrective
Action in place
• Switch mechanical failure (failed brazes) - Under Investigation
• 2 units
• Corrosion
• Bearing seized
Approximately 50% reduction with motor fault removals since -6 release

In Service Issues – Reasons for Removals
Reasons for Removals (based on operator data):
1. NG Master Caution Pack/Zone lights and associated PZTC red lights on TCV/TAV - TCV/TAV indicted by PZTC
2. NG Master Caution Pack/Zone lights and associated Fault Codes on TCV/TAV - TCV/TAV indicted by PFTC
3. MAX IASC Maintenance Lights and associated Status Messages on TCV/TAV – TCV/TAV indicted by IASC
4. NG Master Caution Pack/Zone lights with no associated PZTC red lights on TCV/TAV - TCV/TAV not indicted by PZTC
5. NG Master Caution Pack/Zone lights with no associated Fault Codes on TCV/TAV - TCV/TAV not indicted by PFTC
6. NG hot cabin
7. NG cold cabin or temperature not controllable
8. Failed the 2 ohms resistance check per AMM
Boeing considers any TCV/TAV removals due to reasons 4 through 8 above to be unnecessary
Why?
• Not indicted TCV/TAV do not cause hot cabin
• Not indicted TCV/TAV do not cause cold cabin or uncontrollable cabin temperatures
• Not indicted TCV/TAV do not cause unknown Master Caution Pack/Zone lights
• The 2 ohms resistance check in AMM is premature and will be deleted
• Only resistance of 3.3 - 6.3kΩ for PFTC, and 5.6kΩ for PZTC could fool the controller into seeing an Open Circuit
• Boeing/Honeywell do not know if the switch contact resistance transition from less than 2 ohms to fault condition is
random or gradual
Recent FIM improvements can help minimize NFF/NCFR removals

Limit Switch Fault and Contact Resistance
CT Scan and X-ray of a limit switch in failed

state confirm poles are correctly positioned
(contacts are closed).
Contact resistance needs to be minimum 3.3 KΩ for PFTC/IASC, 5.6 KΩ for PZTC to potentially trigger the limit switch fault
Mitigating Plans/Actions
FIM Improvement:
• FIM improvement to ensure that only indicted TCV/TAV are removed, in addition to CRoC related TCV removals for 737-
800/900 eFlow airplanes
Hot Cabin Troubleshooting Training & Knowledge Sharing
• Develop training materials with operators
• Provide training as needed
Switch Cleaning – Mechanical (Under Investigation):
• Would be enabled by the BITE and benefit the TCV position only, because TCV doesn’t physically reach the fully opened
position in operation, so the switch remains in contact indefinitely to allow the contaminants to build up, causing contact
resistance to reach 5.6 Kiloohms to trigger the switch fault when TCV is fully closed
• The goal is to quantify how many “cleanings” would prevent one condition
Aft when the open limit switch contact resistance
exceeds 5.6 Kiloohms
Switch Cleaning – Electrical (Under Investigation):
• The goal is to identify the appropriate wetting current that would clean the switch without damaging it
• Would benefit the TCV position only same as above

Go Forward Plan toward Root Cause Corrective Action (RCCA)
Boeing/Honeywell Plan and Status:

• To test the dirty switch contact cleaning with mechanical exercising to mimic the BITE procedure - preliminarily inclusive
• To test dirty switch contact cleaning with electrical cleaning – equipment and current level
• FIM improvement to ensure that only indicted TCV/TAV are removed
• Continue to track P/N 398908-6 removals that Honeywell received:
• Continue to review all MAX returns will be reviewed – in addition to logbook review, Boeing will perform engineering/systems
review if warranted provided that the QAR data can be obtained from operators
• Continue to collect NVM/EDR data from IASC, and related QAR data to determine if there are TCV/TAV faults that are
unrelated to TCV/TAV failures
• Boeing will work with operators on better troubleshooting for hot/cold cabin and non-MC Recall Pack lights
Boeing/Operator Partnership:
• Boeing would like to work with operators on monitoring P/N 398908-6 removals:
➢ Faults and logbook info
➢ QAR data – can be limited IASC Aft
➢ EDR/NVM data from IASC – either direct download at the airplane or indirect download at Honeywell with IASC return to
Honeywell
• Boeing would like to work with operators on contact resistance measurement

P/N 398908-6 TCV
-6 TCV Benefits Include:

• Completely overhauled valve (zero-timed), including new actuator assembly
• Addressed top shop finding with more robust capacitor
• Eliminates pin-socket connection with hardwired interface for extended service life
• More economical to upgrade to a -6 valve vs. -5 valve overhaul
• Warranty provisions included
Electrical retainer installs into

actuator Housing so pins are up
Bulged Capacitor Leaking Capacitor Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY
CLOSING COMMENTS / ACTIONS


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737NG/MAX ATA 21-51

Topic: Temperature Control

May 24 – 25, 2023

Proprietary: The information contained herein is proprietary to The Boeing

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

737NG/MAX Design Engineering 737NG/MAX Supplier Management

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

• Reiterate improved troubleshooting to help reduce TCV NFF removals

• Discuss Mitigating Actions & Efforts Currently in Work

• Discuss Next Steps & Go-Forward Plan based on RCCA Efforts

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

Due to these new findings, -7 TCV as an NFF/NCFR solution is premature.

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

Valve Position Faulted Count Fault Sets Fault Recovery

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

Operator data and partnership is crucial to the investigation

MAX 23 2,400 < 1%

Recent FIM improvements can help minimize NFF/NCFR removals

300 total 398908-6 returns as of 4/28/2023

Approximately 50% reduction with motor fault removals since -6 release

Recent FIM improvements can help minimize NFF/NCFR removals

CT Scan and X-ray of a limit switch in failed

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

Boeing/Honeywell Plan and Status:

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

-6 TCV Benefits Include:

Electrical retainer installs into

Copyright © 2023 Boeing. All rights reserved. | BOEING PROPRIETARY

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