Sem.

Jonathan DePadua Racelis Philosophy of Language and Culture

Philosophy IV Fr. Jayson Gaite

The Problem of Naming in Plato’s Cratylus

Plato's Cratylus dialogue discusses naming and the truth of names. The topic deals
with both the natural and conventional conceptions of language. Hermogenes defends the
traditional approach, Socrates the primary participant of the conversation, argues that names
are not related to their objects randomly. Socrates thinks that a name is a technique of
teaching, informing, and expressing truth. Names classify reality and divide one thing from
another.

According to Socrates, if language is to be examined, it is vital to acknowledge that

it is a functional tool, else there is nothing to learn. In Plato's Cratylus, Socrates strives to
show the reality of names. He explores whether the names of Gods indicate the nature of
Gods and if they are merely words made up of various letters and sounds but signifying the
same thing. In Plato's Cratylus, Socrates addresses the truth of names. He contends that they
have varying degrees of accuracy and that mistakes may have happened throughout
providing primary names. The second step in Socrates' idea is about forming compound
names. Naming a thing is like sketching a picture of it. Pictures cannot be the same as
things.

Cratylus concludes with the clash of two ontological ideas; Heraclitus' notion of flux
and Plato's theory of forms. The discourse starts with the study of language and finishes with
the link between language and episteme. For Cratylus, since names express the nature of
things, they are inherently right. Socrates says that we have to understand disparities
between the constative and the identifiable. Cassirer: We should not misread the argument
expressed by Socrates implying that there is a function of conventionalism in the accuracy
of names. Socrates does not entirely accept naturalism stated by Cratylus. This may be
explained by Plato's notion of representation relating to the realm of ideas.

With all these in mind, having to seek the truth of or in names, I might say that the
truth that we are looking for is not in the mere fact that we have the authority to name a
thing or a person; instead, we can find truth in the essence of the being, on what is behind
Sem. Jonathan DePadua Racelis Philosophy of Language and Culture
Philosophy IV Fr. Jayson Gaite

the name, on what possesses the name per se. It is the function of the one who bears the
name from which the truth exists.