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Petition Invoked Under Art. 139-A of The Constitution of Indiana
Petition Invoked Under Art. 139-A of The Constitution of Indiana
TC-O
______________________________________________________________________
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S
COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS................................................................................................ 16
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..................................................................................................... 18
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1.The imposition of the President’s rule was not done in accordance with the provisions
of Art. 356 of the Constitution. ........................................................................................... 39
2. The breakdown of the coalition government and the peaceful protest does not
amount to the failure of the constitutional machinery of the state? ............................... 42
2. Proper Mechanism was not followed which is required before invoking Art. 356. 47
PRAYER ...................................................................................................................................... 53
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& And
Art. Art.
Anr. Another
All Allahabad
Comm. Committee
Del Delhi
Edn. Edition
Hon’ble Honourable
HC High Court
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Ken Kenya
Kar Karnataka
Ker Kerala
MANU Manupatra
MP Madhya Pradesh
Ors. Others
SC Supreme Court
US United Nations
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v. Versus
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
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Other Authorities
Quran, Chap. 24: The Light, verse 31 ........................................................................................... 19
Srinivas burra, Where Does India Stand on the Right to Self-determination ?,52,(2), Economic
and Political Weekly, 21,24 (2017), available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/44166882 last
seen on 03/02/22. ...................................................................................................................... 32
Su˜ra xxxiii (Ahzāb), Quran ......................................................................................................... 20
Foreign Cases
Art. 356(1). The Constitution of India. ......................................................................................... 38
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. ............................................................. 32
Books
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
In the case of Aliza Firdos and Ors. v. State of Kaloshia, the petitioners have approached the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana to hear and adjudicate over this instant matter under special
leave to appeal given in Art. 136 of the Constitution of Indiana.
In Re: Presidential reference case, the President of Indiana has approached this Hon’ble court to
seek its advisory opinion under Art. 143 of the Constitution of Indiana.
In the case of Akhandanand Tripathi v. Union of Indiana, the petitioners have approached the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indiana to hear and adjudicate over this instant matter under Art. 32 of
the Constitution of Indiana.
All three petitions have been accepted and clubbed by the Supreme Court by exercising its power
under Art. 139-A and are pending for further hearings.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
• Feloshia, a first world country, became prosperous after the Industrial Revolution and
started making colonies strategically. It originally practiced absolute monarchy however,
became a constitutional monarchy after unanimous protest by people. The monarch signed
the first Charter on Civil and Political Rights- the Magna Carta. In the later 17th century,
the policy of 'divide and rule’ between the Ethicals and the Genials was used to overthrow
the constitutional monarchy. The king, belonging to the Ethicals, started the persecution of
Genials and forced them to flee to Northern Czar, a country having a diverse local
population dividing into several communities with Genials in majority.
• Due to Feloshian dominance, the Northern Czar was assumed to be a colony of Feloshia,
to overcome economic depression, Feloshia levied a heavy tax on all its colonies, including
Northern Czar. Northern Czar challenged the imposition of taxes. This led to a war between
the people of Northern Czar and the Government of Feloshia.
• To face it, Communities in Northern Czar entered into 'Articles of Confederation.’ and
became independent after defeating Feloshia. In the Agreed Confederation, every
community provided the right to withdraw from the Union. The first written and federal
constitution was enacted in the world in 1787 which came into force in 1789 on getting
approved by 9 out of 13 communities. Since then, the Northern Czar became known as the
United States of Czar (USC).
• Soon, the Legislature of USC introduced fundamental rights to its citizens except to the
minority Zebestians community. In the 18th century, a person from the Zebestian
community became the president of USC and advocated those rights be provided to
Zebestians as well. This was denied by some federal states, especially the State of Vexas
so violently that the President was forced to march troops in Vexas to stop the revolt, which
resulted in Vexas demanding secession from the USC. The case regarding the same was
filed before the Supreme Court of Czar.
• The Supreme Court of Czar held that the State of Vexas will continue to be a federal state
of USC and cannot secede from it and USC has received definite form, character, and
sanction from the Articles of Confederation.
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• Until the 19th century, the success of the Industrial Revolution resulted many countries to
look for a new colony and exploit its unused resources, resulting in two massive World
Wars. After the end of the Second World War, an international organization UNO was
formed to prevent the exploitation of people's basic human rights worldwide.
• UDHR and ICCPR are the two most important documents which provide for basic human
rights to all human beings throughout the world and these rights are inalienable,
indestructible and cannot be taken away or infringed by the states who are part of the
convention without any proper justification. Art. 1 of the ICCPR provides for the right to
self– determination. Many countries, such as the USSR, had provided for the right to secede
from the Union but still many countries do not offer the right.
• Indiana got independence from Feloshia in 1947. Indiana was able to include the State of
Kaloshia in its territory by making the king of the state sign the Instrument of Accession.
Section 6 of the Government of Indiana Act, 1935 stated that if a state wants to be part of
Indiana, it can be so by expressing its consent through an Instrument of Accession on such
terms and conditions as agreed.
• Having ratified the Charter of the United Nations & ICCPR, Indiana brought the 106th
Constitutional Amendment Bill, 2020, providing the states with the right to secede from
the Union.
• The majority population of Indiana practices Induism, while in Kaloshia, its Drakism. This,
sometimes, causes conflict of interest but gets resolved quickly. Since 2014, IJP a right-
wing party has attained majority in the centre, increasing tussle between centre and State
of Kaloshia. Though, ISP, a regional party has always been in majority in Kaloshia in 2022,
they had to form a coalition government with IJP.
• In Kaloshia, a girl following the Drakism religion was denied entry into school because
she wore a Hijab, a part of their custom. To settle this issue, the Government of Kaloshia
notified under Sec 133(2) of the Kaloshia Education Act that a student wearing Hijab will
not be allowed to attend educational institutions, be it government or private. This fumed
the ongoing protests.
• Aliza Firdos, and many others, challenged the notification before the High Court of
Kaloshia a writ petition for violating the doctrine of proportionality. High Court of
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Kaloshia held the notification to be constitutionally valid, remarking that wearing Hijab is
not an essential religious practice. Protests arose further after the judgment was passed with
the ISP backing away from the coalition for not being consulted before releasing the
notification. Due to the intensifying demonstrations, the government imposed President’s
rule in Kaloshia on the ground of failure of constitutional machinery.
• The President’s rule further aggravated the hurt sentiments of the Kaloshian people so
much so that the Article 3A of the Constitution was invoked to secede Kaloshia from the
Indiana Union.
• Meanwhile, IYLA approached the President stating the 106th amendment to be
unconstitutional and against Art. 1 of the Constitution. The President of Indiana transferred
the dispute to the Supreme Court for adjudication under Art. 143 of the Constitution of
Indiana.
• The former Deputy Chief Minister of Kaloshia, Akhandanand Tripathi, filed a writ petition
before the Supreme Court of Indiana against the imposition of the President’s rule. He
stated that the Governor was not allowed to give an opportunity to possible governments
nor the state government was given the opportunity to control the ongoing protests.
• Along with these two petitions, a Special Leave Petition on the Hijab-ban issue by Aliza
Firdos and other students is clubbed before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
It is well established that Art. 25(1) of the Constitution of Indiana protects not only
religious beliefs but also religious practices which are integral or essential to religion. The
counsel most humbly submits that the practice of wearing a Hijab is an ERP. Further
Uniform Dress Code and a ban on Hijab is no way justified on the grounds of public order,
health and morality which are engrafted in art. 25(2) as exceptions to art. 25(1).
The uniform dress code violates the substantive equality clause mentioned under Art. 14.
The prohibition on wearing a hijab and other religious clothing/symbols within the school
is violative of the fundamental rights to privacy, dignity, and right to education under Art.
21, and freedom of expression under Art. 19(1)(a).
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political parties were not given a chance to form the government and it was unjustly assumed that
no party had the majority even before considering any option and thus invocation of president's
rule was not justified in the state of Kaloshia.
IV. WHETHER THE STATE OF KALOSHIA CAN BE GIVEN THE RIGHT TO SECEDE
FROM THE UNION OF INDIANA?
The counsel humbly submits that Kaloshia cannot secede from the Union of Indiana. Neither the
Indian Constitution as before 106th amendment nor any other statute expressly defines the right to
self-determination. Under the federal scheme of Indiana, no State can secede from the Union by
its unilateral act. The Indiana Union is an indissoluble union. Thus, secession as demanded by the
state of Kaloshia from the Union of Indiana cannot be met with.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1
Hasanali v. Mansoorali, (1948) 50 BOMLR 389
2
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Laxmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt,1954
SCR 1005
3
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay & Others, 1954 SCR 1055
4
Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1.
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5
A.S. Narayana Deekshitulu v. State of A.P., (1996) 9 SCC 548.
6
R. Goldman, What’s That You're Wearing? A Guide to Muslim Veils, THE NEW YORK TIMES (2016), available
at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/world/what-in-the-world/burqa-hijab-abaya-chador.html. last seen on
31/01/2023.
7
Supra 14.
8
Ibid
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(9) Therefore, covering the head by women is a fundamental part of the religion.
The right of women to have the choice of dress based on religious injunctions
is a fundamental right protected under Art. 25(1) when such prescription of
dress is an essential part of the religion. 9
(10) It is also submitted that practice of wearing hijab is practiced from time
immemorial. This practice has cultural roots dating back before the time of the
Prophet.10 Veiling was a sign of a woman's social status within those societies.
In Mesopotamia, the veil was a sign of a woman’s high status and respectability.
Women wore the veil to distinguish themselves from slaves and unchaste
women.11 This practice of wearing hijab became religious after a series of
divine revelations in the Quran12 and this permeation of religion into cultural
practice has been accepted by the Court. 13
Therefore, the counsel firmly contends that the practice of wearing hijab is from time
immemorial.
Foundation of the practice of wearing hijab precedes the religion itself:
(11) The petitioner has sufficiently proven the existence of the practice of wearing
hijab has been present before the religion itself and was formally included in
the religious scriptures at the time of its origin. Therefore, it is humbly
submitted that practice passes the second condition of ERP.
Practice of wearing hijab forms cornerstone of religion.
(12) What constitutes an essential part of a religion or religious practice is required
to be decided by Courts with reference to the doctrine of that particular religion,
and would include practices which are regarded by the community as a part of
its religion.
The Kenyan court held that practice of hijab is ingrained in the religion. 14 The
wearing of hijab is a fundamental aspect of their religion. So, the counsel
9
Ibid
10
Psychosocial Aspects of Niqab Wearing: Religion, Nationalism
and Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 24-25, N. Bosankiu
11
S. Slininger, Veiled Women: Hijab, Religion, And Cultural Practice, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
(2014), available at, https://www.eiu.edu/historia/Slininger2014.pdf, last seen on 31/01/2023
12
Quran, Chap. 24: The Light, verse 31.
13
Resham v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 341.
14
Fugicha v. Methodist Church in Kenya, 2016 SCC OnLine Ken 3023.
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humbly submits that the practice of wearing hijab forms the cornerstone of the
Islam religion.
Such practice must be the binding nature of the religion itself and it must be
compelling.
(13) In dealing with the question of freedom of religious practices, the Court must
dwell on to find such practices are essential to maintain the identity of a person
to profess his faith in the religion he practices and if not allowed, whether it
would result in the wrath of the injunctions of the religious doctrine he
professes.15
(14) One of the salient features of the religious tenets is the moral obligations that
one has to carry in formulating his conduct in obedience to the command of
superior power, similar to the legal obligation under temporal law. This moral
obligation cannot be allowed to be interpolated by outside ethos. 16
(15) Further, it is mentioned 17 relating to women privacy that their bodies must be
covered in outer garments.18
(16) According to the Lisan al Arab, jilbab refers to the headscarf. This verse
specifically states that women wear the headscarf in order to be known and
recognized as believing women and to be protected. This verse is similarly
reinforced by- "When the Quranic verse (33:59) was revealed, the women of
al-ansor tribe [in Medina] went out with a black cloth on their heads.”19
(17) Another commentary asserts that Umar ibn al-Khattiib said: God and I were in
agreement over the Verse of the Veil - I said to the prophet: 'If only you would
order your wives to veil themselves, for they are spoken to by wicked men as
well as those with honourable intentions!' And so, the Verse of the Veil was
revealed."20
15
Amnah Bint Basheer v. Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE), 2016 SCC OnLine Ker 41117.
16
Ibid.
17
Su˜ra xxxiii (Ahzāb), Quran
18
Resham v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine Kar 315.
19
Supra10.
20
Women in islam: An Anthology from the Qur'an and Hadiths, ( N. Awde, 1st ed., 2000).
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(18) Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan in his commentary21 made the following
explanation of Verses 4758 and 4759 which reads that Hijab is an essential
practise to be followed by women.
(19) Therefore, the counsel for the petitioner firmly contends that wearing of hijab
is a fundamental aspect of the religion of the petitioner and fulfils the test of
essential religious practice and be set aside.
2. Whether banning hijab violates the fundamental right to freedom of conscience
and the right to practice their religious faith constitutionally guaranteed under
Art. 25?
(1) Art. 2522 protects both religious beliefs and practices, and the practice of
wearing hijab is by its nature a religious practice.
i. Art. 25(1) guarantees to every person the freedom of conscience and the
freedom to profess, practice and propagate religion. Freedom of conscience
refers to the mental process of belief or non-belief, while profession,
practice and propagation refer to external action in pursuance of the mental
idea or concept of the person. 23
ii. In Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, 24 when students of the Jehovah
community were expelled from school for not singing the national anthem,
the Supreme Court held their expulsion to be in violation of their
Fundamental Rights. It was held that “Art. 25 is an Art. of faith in the
Constitution, incorporated in recognition of the principle that the real test of
a true democracy is the ability of even an insignificant minority to find its
identity under the country's Constitution. This has to be borne in mind in
interpreting Art. 25.”25
iii. The hijab is worn by the concerned petitioners as an Art. of their faith and
believed to be a part of their religion and social practice. The counsel,
21
The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari’, (Dr. M. M. Khan, 1997)
22
Art. 25, The Constitution of India
23
Commentary on the Constitution of India 3459 (DR. D.D. BASU, 6th edn. 2010).
24
Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala,1986 3 SCC 615.
25
Ibid.
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26
Commissioner Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shirur Mutt, 1954 SCR 1005
27
Durgah Committee v. Syed Hussain Ali, (1962) 1 SCR 383.
28
Supra 26.
29
Supra 32.
30
Supra 15.
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that there are good foundations to the claim that wearing the hijab is an
obligation under Islam, despite the existence of other interpretations. Hence,
wearing it is protected under Art. 25(1). Since the wearing of the hijab did
not adversely affect public order, morality or health, the court directed the
CBSE to permit candidates to wear the hijab during the examinations.
v. Therefore, the counsel humbly submits that hijab is essential to the Islamic
faith and in the absence of any conditions referable under Art. 25(1), the
essential practice cannot be restrained as attempted by the Government
notification issued under Sec 133(2) of Kaloshia Education Act.
(3) The practice of wearing hijab in the present case is based on a sincerely held
religious belief and is protected under freedom of conscience under art. 25.
i. In case of Bijoe Emmanuel v State of Kerala 31, court had evolved genuine
belief test and held that the question is not whether a particular religious
belief or practice appeals to our reason or sentiment but whether the belief
is genuinely and conscientiously held as part of the profession or practice
of religion. If the belief is genuinely and conscientiously it attracts the
protection of Art. 25 but subject to the inhibitions contained therein.
ii. In accordance with this ‘genuine belief’ standard, what matters is not the
content of the belief but what is genuinely held by the believer to be a part
of her faith. A court’s role is limited to ascertaining the genuineness of this
belief, and does not include a determination of the validity of that belief.
Once this threshold is crossed, then courts can inquire into whether religious
practice could be restrained under Art. 25 or not.
iii. In the present case, the only relevant question in determining the
applicability of Art. 25 to the hijab is whether those who wear it genuinely
believe it as a part of their religion. The Drakist women clearly choose to
wear the hijab genuinely believe it as their religious duty, even in a
relatively similar religion, there is no reasonable dispute that several
interpretations of Islamic doctrine do prescribe the wearing of the hijab.32
31
Supra 26.
32
Supra 36.
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33
Supra 37.
34
Supra 32.
35
7 R (Watkins-Singh) v Governing Body of Aberdare Girls' High School, [2008] EWHC 1865 (Admin).
36
Supra 33.
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37
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
40
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438.
41
Supra 39.
42
Aishat Shifa v. State of Karnataka, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1394.
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43
Ibid.
44
19(1)(a), the Constitution of India.
45
Art. 21, the Constitution of India.
46
Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1992 SC 1858.
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(3) School circular violates the freedom of expression under art. 19(1)(a)
i. Clothing as a means of expressing one’s identity was recognized and protected
under Art. 19(1)(a).47 It is now clear that the protection under Art. 19(1)(a) is
not restricted to verbal speech but also covers forms of expressing one’s
identity.
ii. There are very specific grounds on which reasonable restrictions can be
imposed under Art. 19(2) and the basis for the actions by the state or the schools
clearly do not satisfy any of the grounds in that constitutional provision.
4. Whether the action of the State and the schools suffers from the violation of
‘doctrine of proportionality under Art. 14 of the constitution of India?
(1) Art. 14 comprises of two kinds of equality: ‘formal’ and ‘substantive equality’.48
The formal equality requires likes to be treated alike. Whereas, substantive equality
demands that unequal should not be treated equally. Substantive equality is aimed
at producing equality of outcomes through different modes of affirmative actions.49
(2) The counsel humbly submits that legislation which arbitrarily or excessively
invades the right cannot be said to contain the quality of reasonableness. The
limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or
of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. 50
(3) The action of the State suffers from the violation of ‘doctrine of proportionality’
inasmuch as in taking the extreme step of banning the hijab. The possible
alternatives that pass the ‘least restrictive test’ have not been explored as stated in
Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh51 and Mohd. Faruk v. State of
Madhya Pradesh.52 Under this, the State is duty-bound [A] to recognize the
consequence of its act. [B] to accommodate differences and aim to achieve
structural change. [C] to avoid indirect discrimination.
Consequence of the act
47
NALSA v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438
48
Nitisha v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 261.
49
Ravinder Kumar Dhariwal v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1293.
50
Chintaman Rao v State of MP, AIR 1951 SC 118.
51
Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2016 7 SCC 353.
52
Mohd. Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh,(1969) 1 SCC 853.
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i. The principle of substantive equality makes it a duty of the state to recognize the
consequence of its act. The state action barters the petitioners right to education
with their fundamental right to privacy, dignity and culture.
ii. According to Mathew J., if the State is extending you a privilege, state cannot exact
a barter from you on a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. 53 Such a
barter if enforced will defeat the purpose of the Constitution. 54
iii. The Bijoe Emmanual case55 rejected the contention that a student citizen is
expected to surrender her fundamental rights under Art. 19, 21 and 25 as a
precondition to access education. The practice of tolerance as preached by our
Constitution shouldn’t be diluted. 56
iv. Asking the girls to take off their hijab before they enter the school gates, is
ultimately a denial of secular education. These are clearly violative of Art. 19(1)(a),
Art. 21 and Art. 25(1) of the Constitution of India. 57
Reasonable Accommodation
v. ‘Reasonable accommodation’ is a principle that promotes equality, enables the
grant of positive rights, and prevents discrimination based on disability, health
condition, or personal belief. The Supreme Court recognized reasonable
accommodation as a substantive equality facilitator58 and held that failure to
provide reasonable accommodation amounts to discrimination. 59
vi. If wearing of hijab disrupts the public order, the State should take action against
those responsible for such disruption and not ban the wearing of hijab. It’s a positive
duty on the part of the state, i.e., to create an atmosphere where a person can
exercise his/her right in accordance with Art. 25 of the Indian Constitution 60.
53
Ahmedabad St. Xavier’s College Society v. State of Gujarat, (1974) 1 SCC 717.
54
Olga Tellis v Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545.
55
Supra 33.
56
Ibid.
57
Supra 45.
58
Jeeja Ghosh v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 761.
59
Vikash Kumar v. UPSC, (2021) 5 SCC 370.
60
Gulam Abbas v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 1 SCR 1077.
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vii. In addition, such a right cannot be curtailed based on the actions of the disrupters,
i.e., the ‘hecklers don’t get the veto’ principle61 affirmed by the Apex Court in
Union of India v. K.M. Shankarappa.62 This duty is made more onerous because of
positive secularism contemplated by the Constitution.63
Avoid Indirect Discrimination
viii. The action of the State and the school authorities is in derogation of International
Conventions64 that insist on curtailing discrimination. The circular issued by the
government school, has a disparate impact on female students whose self-
expression and religious practices have been jeopardised.
ix. Similar to the facts of the case at hand, in Fughicha v. Methodist Church 65 in Kenya,
the Court of Appeal held that the restriction on female students wearing hijabs on
their uniforms was an act of indirect discrimination.
x. Principle of reasonable accommodation needs to be applied for a holistic view of
the substantive equality under Art. 14 and 15. 66 There exists no rational nexus
between such a ban and protecting public order. The role of the State is to “not to
remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the
competing groups tolerate each other.” 67
xi. Further, the ban is not only limited to the Hijab, but also other articles of clothing
of religious significance. The restriction imposed by a measure should not be
“arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the requirement of the
interest of the general public.”68 There exist better alternatives to an outright ban.
For these reasons the circular issued by the government fails the test of
proportionality and hence causes indirect discrimination.
61
Terminiello v. Chicago,337 U.S. 1 (1949, Supreme Court of the United States) ; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131 (1966, Supreme Court of the United States); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969,Supreme Court of the
United States)
62
Union of India v. K.M. Shankarappa, (2001) 1 SCC 582.
63
Aruna Roy v. Union of India, AIR 2002 SC 3176.
64
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. Document 217 A (III)(1948), available at:
https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html last seen on 4/02/23 , Supra 1.
65
Supra 14.
66
Lt. Col. Nitisha v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 261.
67
Serif v. Greece, No. 38178/97, ECHR (Second Section), 14 December 1999.
68
M.R.F. Ltd. v.Inspector Kerala Govt., (1998) 8 SCC227.
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69
Raja Ram Pal v Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184.
70
Prof. Narendra Kumar, Constitutional Law of India, 41, (8th, 2014).
71
S.R Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
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(3) The declaration states that the Government of the Republic of India declares that the
words 'the right of self-determination' apply only to the peoples under foreign
domination and that these words do not apply to sovereign independent States or to a
72
Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2014) 10 SCC 1.
73
A. Velusamy v. Additional Director General of Police and Inspector General of Prisons and Others) AIR 1982
SC 82
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section of a people or nation which is the essence of national integrity. 74 It is also the
legal position of the Government for both internal and external purposes and this
position, thus, clarifies that the right to self-determination is confined to the specific
context of foreign domination, like colonialism, and is clearly against its application to
postcolonial and other situations. The consequence of this position is that this right
cannot be extended to any situation in Indiana as it is not a context of foreign or colonial
domination, with Indiana having attained independence from colonialism.
(4) As observed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of secession of Quebec 75, a
right to secession only arises under the principle of self-determination of people at
international law where the people as such involved in the secession are governed as
part of a colonial empire, where they are subject to alien subjugation, domination or
exploitation; and denied any meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination
within the state of which it forms a part. None of these conditions hold true for the
Union of Indiana.
(5) A state whose government represents the whole of the people or people’s resident
within its territory, on a basis of equality and without discrimination, and respects the
principles of self‑determination in its internal arrangements, is entitled to maintain its
territorial integrity under international law and to have that territorial integrity
recognized by other states. 76
(6) In the absence of any specific reference to this right in the Constitution or in other
statutes, it becomes imperative to evaluate Indiana’s position by examining its views
expressed at the international fora but here as well Indiana’s stand clearly states that no
state has the right of secession.
(7) The International Covenants on Human rights: i.e., ICESCR and ICCPR both have a
common norm of self-determination. One of the most authoritative positions expressed
by India on the right to self-determination is its declaration, which was made when it
became a party to the two human rights covenants in 1979. India made a declaration to
74
Srinivas burra, Where Does India Stand on the Right to Self-determination?52, (2), Economic
and Political Weekly, 21,24 (2017), available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/44166882 last seen
on 03/02/22.
75
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
76
Ibid.
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Art. 1 of both the covenants. The declaration states that the Government of the Republic
of India declares that the words 'the right of self-determination’ apply only to the
peoples under foreign domination and that these words do not apply to sovereign
independent States or to a section of a people or nation ... which is the essence of
national integrity, 77
(8) It is also the legal position of the Government of Indiana for both internal and external
purposes as there is no other explanation found either in the Constitution or elsewhere.
This position, thus, clarifies that the right to self-determination is confined to the
specific context of foreign domination, like colonialism, and is clearly against its
application to postcolonial and other situations. The consequence of this position is that
this right cannot be extended to any situation in Indiana as it is not a context of foreign
or colonial domination, with Indiana having attained independence from colonialism.
(9) The Declaration on principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations: The
Declaration proclaims the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people.
This right of self-determination could be implemented in any of the following forms:
“the establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or
integration with an independent State, or the emergence into any other [freely
determined] political status.
(10) However, when the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970 was drafted, Indiana stated
that this right did not apply to sovereign and independent states or to integral parts of
their territory, or to a section of people or nation, limiting it to the liberation of colonies
and other non-self-governing territories, as one of the objectives of the United Nations.
(11) The Declaration itself mentions that it doesn’t authorizes or encourages any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political
unity of sovereign and independent states conducting themselves in compliance with
the principle of equal rights and self-determination.78
(12) The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples,
1960: This Declaration for the first time provided a definition of the right to self-
77
Supra 70.
78
Para 7, Moot Proposition.
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79
Para 3, 4 and 5, Moot Proposition.
80
R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963), 8,9.
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Indiana under Art. 1 says Indiana shall be a union of State, therefore the Indiana
Constitution does not provide for the right to self-determination.
(18) The counsel submits that the international law right to self-determination only
generates a right to external self-determination in situations of former colonies; where
a people is oppressed, as for example under foreign military occupation; or where a
definable group is denied meaningful access to government to pursue their political,
economic, social and cultural development. In all three situations, the people in
question are entitled to a right to external self-determination because they have been
denied the ability to exert internally their right to self-determination. Such exceptional
circumstances are manifestly inapplicable to Kaloshia under existing conditions.
Accordingly, neither the population of the State of Kaloshia, even if characterized in
terms of "people '' or "peoples' ‘, nor its representative institutions, Legislative
Assembly or Parliament, possess a right, under international law, to secede from
Indiana.
Thus, the council humbly submits that neither ICCPR covenant or any other
international law per se, be cited to disturb the current political structure of the state.
3. The Clause (c) of the 106th Amendment Act is arbitrary and hence violative of Art.
14 of the Constitution of Indiana.
(1) Art. 14 of the Constitution of Indiana strikes at any arbitrary and unreasonable action
A legislation is said to violate Art. 14 if it is manifestly arbitrary, is obviously
unreasonable and, being contrary to the Rule of law.81 The clause (c) of the 106th
amendment here is not only manifestly arbitrary but also unreasonable against the rule
of law.
(2) Clause (c) mentions that to enforce secession an amendment shall be approved by a
referendum in which -
(i)At least twenty percent of the registered voters in the state that wants to secede
vote in the referendum; and,
(ii)The amendment is supported by a simple majority of the citizens of the state
voting in the referendum.
81
Supra 38.
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The Counsel contends that sub clause (i) of clause (c) which makes the voter turnout
of meagre 20% as a valid turnout is a manifestly arbitrary clause. Manifest arbitrariness
is something done by the legislature capriciously, irrationally and/or without any
adequate determining principle when something is done which is excessive and
disproportionate, it would apply to negate legislation under Art. 14. 82In the present
case, the base of making 20% negates the principle of equality as in a democracy and
rule of law, where the base for just voters’ turnout be at least 50%, here the current
limit proves to be unreasonable.
(3) In the Quebec Secession case of Canada 83, where 49.42 percentage of population had
demanded secession, The court, although declared the referendum as unconstitutional
since their federal structure which closely resembles to the Indiana’s before the 106th
amendment Act do not recognize right to secession, but respected the Majority opinion
of people as their voting percentage was 93.53% and not a meagre turnout. In Australia
as well in the case of secession of western Australia, where approximately ⅔ of the
population demanded secession through referendum, the court although disallowed
secession owing to their constitutional limitations, but respected the voice of people
out of their sheer majority84. In the present case, the validation of a meagre 20% of the
turnout as just and proper is not only unreasonable but also far from the real voices of
the people of the state.
(4) The principle of equality propounds that where there is no reasonable basis of
classification appears on the face of the law, the Court can strike down the law as an
instance of naked discrimination. 85In the present case, the state made an unreasonable
classification and set the limit of 20% of the voter’s turnout as against the principle
propounded.
(5) Classification means segregation in classes which have a systematic relation, usually
found in common properties and characteristics. It postulates a rational basis and does
not mean herding together of certain persons and classes arbitrarily. 86 A plea of
82
Ibid.
83
Supra 73.
84
Ibid.
85
Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra v. State of Uttarakhand and Ors, AIR 1958 SC 538.
86
In Re the Special Courts Bill, 1978, (1979) 1 SCC 380.
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discrimination can only be raised by showing that the impugned law creates two classes
without any reasonable basis and treats them differently.87 The amendment in the
present suffers in this aspect as there is a lack of reasonable differentia. Classification,
in order to be constitutional, must rest upon distinctions that are substantial. 88.A
reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none
who are not. The question then is: what does the phrase 'similarly situated' mean? The
answer to the question is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of
the law.
(6) The counsel submits that a reasonable classification is one which includes all persons
who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. In the present case
the classification does not commensurate with the object that sought to be achieved.
Secession is a grave issue and making the voter turnout as meagre as 20% requiring
only a simple majority of the citizens voting raises questions and hints at manifestly
arbitrariness and shows lack of legislative drafting capabilities.
(7) In State of Bombay and Another v. F.N Balsara, it was held that if on the face statute
itself, there seems to be no classification on the face of the statute/rule, then there is no
classification at all. If. There is no peculiar difference between the one set of individuals
from the other set, and yet the law hits or favours only a particular set of individuals or
class, then the statute is manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable. 89 The impugned
amendment in the present case, shows no reasonable basis as to how the majority
among the 20% of the population of the citizens can become the voice of the whole
state.
(8) Among the several tests, to decide whether a classification is reasonable or not, is
whether it is conducive to the functioning of modern society. 90 In the present case the
unreasonable differentia that the clause(c) has made is against the spirit of modern
democratic society, as it disregards the voice of the majority of the people.
87
Binoy Viswam v. Union of India (2017) 7 SCC 59.
88
Akhil Bhartiya Shoshit Karamchari Sangh (Railway) v. Union of India, MANU/SC/0058/1980
89
State of Bombay and Another v. F.N Balsara, AIR 1951 SC 41.
90
Supra 86.
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It is therefore submitted that, in the light of Indiana's approach towards the international
laws and on the basis of basic structure doctrine and other domestic laws, the said
constitutional amendment is unconstitutional.
III. WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF THE PRESIDENT'S RULE IN THE STATE OF
KALOSHIA WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID?
1. The imposition of the President’s rule was not done in accordance with the provisions
of Art. 356 of the Constitution.
Art. 356(1)91 provides that if the President, “on the receipt of report from the Governor of a
State or otherwise” “is satisfied” that “the situation has arisen in which the Government of
the State cannot be carried on” “in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution” then
he may proclaim presidents rule.
(1) The conditions precedent to the issuance of the Proclamation, therefore, are :
i. that the President should be satisfied either on the basis of a report from the
Governor of the State or otherwise,
ii. that in fact a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State
cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Therefore, the President's satisfaction has to be based on objective material.
That material may be available in the report sent to him by the Governor or
otherwise or both from the report and other sources.
92
(2) The court has summed up the guidelines of Sakaria Commission in the following
points when the constitutional breakdown may justifiably be invoked, these are -
(i) large-scale breakdown of the law and order or public order situation;
(ii) gross mismanagement of affairs by a State Government;
(iii) corruption or abuse of its power,
(iv) danger to national integration or security of the State or aiding or abetting
national disintegration or a claim for independent sovereign status and
91
Art. 356(1). The Constitution of India.
92
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93
Ibid
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(8) Regarding the scope and power of Art. 356 (earlier draft Art. 278) anxiety was voiced
by some members that in the name of an emergency that there should be roads into the
autonomy of the units. Shri H.V. Kamath contended that the President thereby have
ample powers to intervene in a State even without a threat to peace and order, on the
ground that the Government of the State could not be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. Shri Sibbanlal Saxena supported Shri Kamath and in his
view, the Art. would reduce the provincial autonomy to a farce’.
(9) The prime architect, Dr. Ambedkar who although advocated this provision expressed
the view that before suspending the Constitution in a State, the Central Government
would first give warning to the State concerned, and that if the warning failed, it would
order an election, allowing the people of the State to settle matters themselves; it was
only when these remedies failed that the President would resort to the power of
imposition of President’s rule.94 Dr. Ambedkar even accepted that ‘I hope the first thing
he will do would be to issue a mere warning to a province that has erred, that things
were not happening in the way in which they were intended to happen in the
Constitution.”95The Assembly then only accepted the provisions that the Union action
under the Art. must not be a pure invasion on provincial autonomy.96
(10) In the present case, instead of invoking alternate options to resolve the situation, Centre
had taken a drastic measure of imposing president’s rule.
(11) It is further submitted that in the Sunderlal Patwa case97 incapacity or helplessness of
a State to meet a threat to public order or peace is not a permissible ground unless it
results in non-functioning of the Government in the State. In fact, Art. 355 of the
Constitution enjoins upon the Union to help the State in maintaining its Government.
That duty is not to be discharged only by Proclaiming the Presidential rule. “Internal
disturbance”, which falls short of resulting into ‘failure of the constitutional machinery’
in the State so as to make it impossible to function, is not intended in the Constitution
94
Sunderlal Patwa v. Union of India, 1993 SCC OnLine MP 53.
95
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 177.
96
See also “The Indian Constitution Cornerstone of a Nation” Granville Austin, 213.
97
Supra 79.
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to be a valid ground for making complete inroads by the Union by taking over
completely all executive and legislative wings of a State. 98
(12) Therefore, relying on the case cited and the argument presented, it is humbly submitted
that the imposition of the President’s rule was not done in accordance with the
provisions of Art. 356 of the Constitution.
2. The breakdown of the coalition government and the peaceful protest does not amount
to the failure of the constitutional machinery of the state?
(1) It is most humbly argued before this court that protest and demonstrations that took
place in state of Kaloshia were completely peaceful in nature and represent the
essence of democracy, the imposition of state emergency is violation of constitution
and disregard to constitutional makers who cautioned about the use of the said
provision and termed it as a dead letter.
(2) Court being the sentinel on the qui vive of the Constitution, is under the obligation
to see that the democracy prevails and not gets hollowed by individuals. The
directions which have been given on the last occasion, were singularly for the
purpose of strengthening the democratic values and the constitutional norms. The
collective trust in the legislature is founded on the bedrock of the constitutional
trust.”99
(3) The Hon’ble court by referring to the observation made in Shrimanth Balasaheb
Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly 100, held that there is a requirement of
imbibing constitutional morality by the constitutional functionaries and
undemocratic and illegal practices within the political arena should be curtailed. 101
The current exercise of power by imposing the president's rule is arbitrary and
unjust and must be set aside to maintain the constitutional ethos.
(4) In NCT of Delhi v Union of India, court held that representative democracy is a
basic feature of the Constitution, and that the Constitution should be interpreted to
advance - and not retard - this principle.102.
98
Ibid.
99
Union of India v. Harish Chandra Singh Rawat, (2016) 16 SCC 744.
100
Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Karnataka Legislative Assembly, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1454.
101
Shiv Sena v. Union of India, (2019) 10 SCC 809.
102
NCT of Delhi v Union of India 2018 8 SCC 501.
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(5) To exercise power under Art,356 and to dissolve the State Assemblies solely on the
ground of peaceful protest and without exploring various option to form a
government betray intolerance on the part of the Central Government and,
therefore, legally mala fide. 103
(6) The said power used in the current context is definitely a colourable exercise of
power. The learned commentator Basu wrote about this kind of misuse and made
the following comment
“The broad category of improper use of the extraordinary power is where it
is used for political purpose against a State Government which does not
belong to the party in power at the Union or to secure the purposes of that
party in forming a government of their own in a particular State, taking
advantage of fortuitous circumstances.”104
(7) In the case of SR Bommai v. Union of India105, it was said that Art. 356 has a vital
bearing on the democratic parliamentary form of Government and the autonomy of
the States under the federal constitution. The questions before the Court for
consideration was -
“Whether the President has unfettered powers to issue Proclamation under
Art. 356(1) of the Constitution.”
(8) The court resolved issue by answering to the following issues-
(a) Is the Proclamation amenable to judicial review?
(b) If yes, what is the scope of the judicial review in this respect? and
(c) What is the meaning of the expression “a situation has arisen in which the
Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of
this Constitution” used in Art. 356(1)?
The proclamation is amenable to judicial review.
(9) In this context Prof. H.W.R. Wade106 has written that - “There are many cases
where some administrative order or regulation is required by statute to be approved
103
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
104
Commentary on the Constitution of India 3459 (DR. D.D. BASU, 6th edn. 2010)
105
Supra 88.
106
Prof. H.W.R. Wade, Administrative Law, 29 (6th Edn. 2010).
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by resolutions of the Houses. But this procedure in no way protects the order or
regulation from being condemned by the court, under the doctrine of ultra vires, if
it is not strictly in accordance with the Act. whether the challenge is made before
or after the Houses have given their approval is immaterial.”
(10) It was held in the case of Rameshwar Prasad (IV) v. Union of India 107 that immunity
granted to the Governor does not affect the power of Court to judicially scrutinise
the attack made to the proclamations issued under Art. 356(1) on ground of mala
fides or it being ultra vires.
(11) Even the expression "purporting to be done" in Art. 361 does not cover acts which
are mala fide or ultra vires. Hence, it would be for the Government to satisfy the
Court and adequately meet such ground of challenge under Rule of Law.108
(12) The question being of political nature is also no ground to set aside the inherent
power of the court of judicial review. The Apex Court held that -“Merely because
a question has a political complexion, that by itself is no ground why the Court
should shrink from performing its duty under the Constitution if it raises an issue
of constitutional determination. … merely because a question has a political colour,
the Court cannot fold its hands in despair and declare ‘judicial hands off’. 109
(13) In the case of Harish Chandra Singh Rawat v. Union of India and Another, 110 The
Governor set a date for the Chief Minister to request a vote of confidence, but the
Assembly was suspended in accordance with Art. 356 a day before that date. Harish
Rawat, whose government was sacked on the grounds of "breakdown of
Constitutional machinery", had moved the Uttarakhand High Court calling the
centre's decision as "arbitrary" and demanded its quashing. The High Court ordered
the floor test in the Assembly which provided relief to the petitioner and declared
the President rule in the state unconstitutional.
(14) Thus, it can be satisfactorily established that the Courts have the power to review
the proclamation issued by the president concerning president's rule.
107
Rameshwar Prasad (IV) v. Union of India (2005) 7 SCC 157.
108
Ibid.
109
State Of Rajasthan & Ors. vs Union Of India, 1977 AIR 1361.
110
Harish Chandra Singh Rawat v. Union of India and Another,(2016) 16 SCC 744.
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(15) Scope of the judicial review: Judicial review of the Presidential Proclamation is not
concerned with the merits of the decision, but to the manner in which the decision
had been reached. They are answerable to Parliament and accountable to the people.
(16) The width of the power under Art. 356 is very wide, here satisfaction of the
President is subjective satisfaction however it must be based on relevant materials.
The doctrine that the satisfaction reached by an administrative officer based on
irrelevant and relevant grounds and when some irrelevant grounds were taken into
account, the whole order gets vitiated has no application to the action under Art.
356. In the present case only, peaceful protests were going on in the state. So,
exercise of the president's rule in the present circumstances is outside the scope as
well of what the provisions asserts in the true sense. 111
(17) The expression used in the Art. is “if the President … is satisfied”. The word
“satisfied” has been defined in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 112 as-
“4. To furnish with sufficient proof or information, to set free from doubt or
uncertainty, to convince; 5. To answer sufficiently (an objection, question); to fulfil
or comply with (a request); to solve (a doubt, difficulty); 6. To answer the
requirements of (a state of things, hypothesis, etc.); to accord with (conditions).”
(18) Hence, it is not the personal whim, wish, or opinion of the President but a legitimate
inference drawn from the material placed before him which is relevant for the
purpose to proclaim the president’s rule,
(19) This scrutiny as to the nature of material is that it is not any material but that
material which would lead to the conclusion that the Government of the State
cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution which is
relevant for the purpose. Further, the objective material so available must indicate
that the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution. Thus, the existence of the objective material
showing that the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution is a condition precedent before the President
111
Supra 88.
112
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn. at p. 1792):
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113
Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 177
114
R.S Sarkaria, Commission on Centre-State Relations Report, (Pt-II,1988).
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2. Proper Mechanism was not followed which is required before invoking Art. 356.
(1) In the Bommai case,116 it was held that imposition of president’s rule should not be
resorted to unless all other recourses have failed.
(2) In the case of Mahabir Prasad v. Prafulla Chandra 117 in which it was laid down that
the power of Governor is absolute with regard to the appointment of Chief Minister
and the Court cannot call in question the same since it is his sole discretion. 118
Dissatisfied with this blatant misuse of power, the Supreme Court of India in the
S.R.Bommai case decided that the test of the Constitutional machinery has to be
decided on the floor of Legislative Assembly of the state (by voting) and not as per
the whim of the governor.
(3) It is necessary to stress that in all cases where the support to the Ministry is claimed
to have been withdrawn by some legislators, the proper course for testing the
strength of the Ministry is holding the test on the floor of the House. The assessment
of the strength of the Ministry is not a matter of private opinion of any individual,
be he the Governor or the President. It is capable of being demonstrated and
ascertained publicly in the House. Hence when such demonstration is possible, it is
not open to bypass it and instead depend upon the subjective satisfaction of the
Governor or the President. Such private assessment is an anathema to the
democratic principle, apart from being open to serious objections of personal mala
115
Mahabir Prasad v. Prafulla Chandra, AIR 1969 Cal 198
116
Supra 88.
117
Supra 98
118
Supra 92.
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fides. The floor-test is obligatory and that it is a prerequisite to sending the report
to the President recommending action under Art. 356(1).119
(4) In the present case, no opportunity of floor test was given to the leaders in the house,
hence invocation of president’s rule is barred by technicality as well. In the case of
H.S. Jain vs Union of India,120Allahabad High Court has provided the procedure
which needs to be followed by the Governor of a state before sending a report to
the president regarding the president's rule. These are-
i. “The Governor should have sent a message to the House under Art. 175(2) of the
Constitution, after summoning it under Art. 174(1) stating that despite his best
efforts he was unable to find out who is the person who can command the
confidence of the House, and hence the House itself should inform him about such
a person.”
ii. The verdict observes that in a case of a fractured electoral verdict where no party
or combination of parties appeared to have a majority in the house, “The only legal
alternative left for the Governor is to ask the Assembly to inform him the person in
whom it has confidence. Who can be in a better position than the House itself to
inform the Governor in whom it has confidence.
iii. “Although this course of action has not been expressly mentioned in the
Constitution, it logically flows out of Art. 164(2), and is the only democratic
alternative short of dissolution.”
iv. The Court also answered regarding the situation of deadlock and observed -
“If the elected members are permitted to come together and meet in the
House, then a Socratic debate may take place, and it is possible that a
solution may emerge. When two or more persons are sitting separately, they
may not be able to resolve their differences, but when they come together it
is possible that by discussions and negotiations some compromise may
come about. This is the democratic method also. The elected representatives
119
Supra 88.
120
H.S. Jain vs Union of India, (1996) SCC OnLine All 10591.1996 SCC OnLine All 739 1996 SCC OnLine All
739
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121
Paras Diwan, Kashmir and the Indian Union The Legal Position, 02(03), The International and
Comparative Law Quarterly, Jul., 1953, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Jul., 1953), pp. 333-353 Published by:
Cambridge University,333,344(1953), available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/755438, last seen
on 03/02/23.
122
Lok Sabha Debates (1963), Vol. XII, Col. 5760
123
Lok Sabha Debates (1963), Vol. XII, Col. 5760
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(a) the amendment of clause (2) of Article 19 so as to include the words "the
sovereignty and integrity of India" as one of the restrictions;
(b) The amendment of Forms of oath or affirmation contained in the Third
Schedule
(5) The Constitution (Sixteenth Amendment) Act, 1963 expanded the forms of oath to
ensure that "every candidate for the membership of a State Legislature or
Parliament, and every aspirant to, and incumbent of public office" to quote its
Statement of Objects and Reasons - "pledgex himself... to preserve the integrity and
sovereignty of the Union of Indiana.”
(6) Once a Minister takes oath to uphold the integrity of Indiana, he cannot move the
Constitutional Amendment Bill to cede an Indianan territory to a foreign country
(7) The Indiana stand has been that the State of Kaloshia after formally acceding to the
Indiana Union in 1947 has become an integral and inseparable part of the sovereign
and independent Indiana nation to which principle of self-determination is not
applicable. Those who are demanding the right to self-determination for the people
of Kaloshia have either not understood the proper meaning of the term self-
determination or knowingly misusing it for ulterior motives.
(8) Similar to the unilateral secession of Quebec, Kaloshia demand to secede cannot be
allowed as Kaloshia also does not meet the threshold of a colonial people or an
oppressed people, nor can it be suggested that they have been denied meaningful
access to government to pursue their political, economic, cultural and social
development. In the circumstances, the government of Kaloshia do not enjoy a right
at international law to effect the secession of Kaloshia from Indiana.124
2. The Constitutional Assembly debate on the point of secession.
1. The ethos of the unity and integrity of the nation even has a historical genesis and is
linked to the constitutional assembly debate itself. Article 1(3) provides that the
territory of India shall comprise (i) the territory of the States; (ii) the Union territories
specified in the first schedule, and (iii) such other territories as may be acquired.
2. Dr. Ambedkar Was trying to explain why the word "Union' was being used instead of
Federation in the 1st Chapter of the Constitution. He stressed that the use of the word
124
Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217
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'Union' was deliberate to the extent that it was deemed to be 'indestructible and no state
had the right to secede from it. He evoked memories of the American civil war to state
that secessionist tendencies would be dealt with appropriately.
3. Citing the above arguments, the counsel humbly submits that the demand of Kaloshia
is not only illogical/unwarranted but goes against the very ethos of the foundations of
our political and constitutional structure.
3. The Indiana stand related to secession is further strengthened with the help of
different statutes which even restrict the activities leading to/resulting in
secession. Some of these legislations are discussed as follows:
(1) Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 Act of secession is criticized and
termed within the definition of unlawful activity. Section 2(o)125 defines
"unlawful activity", in relation to an individual or association, as any action
taken by such individual or association-
i. which is intended, or supports any claim, to bring about, on any ground
whatsoever, the cession of a part of the territory of Indiana or the secession of
a part of the territory of Indiana from the Union, or which incites any individual
or group of individuals to bring about such cession or secession; or ii. which
disclaims, questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Indiana; or iii. which causes or is intended to cause
disaffection against Indiana.
(2) Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002: This act prescribes punishment for any act
done with intent to threaten the unity, integrity, security or sovereignty of
Indiana.126
(3) National Security Act, 1980: This act provides provisions of detention of a
person, whether foreigner or a citizen if he/she is acting in any manner
prejudicial to the defence of Indiana, the relations of Indiana with foreign
powers, or the security of Indiana. 127
125
Section 2 (o), Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967
126
Section 3 (1) (a), POTA, 2002
127
Section 3 (1) (a), National Security Act, 1980
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(4) Article 19 of the Constitution provides all its citizens the right to form
associations and unions' but this right only extends so far as to not hamper the
sovereignty and integrity of Indiana.
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PRAYER
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,
it is most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiana to graciously
adjudge and be pleased to:
1. DECLARE that wearing of a hijab is a fundamental right under art. 19 (1) (a) and art. 25
of the Constitution of Indiana
3. DECLARE that the imposition of the president's rule in the state of Kaloshia was
unconstitutional.
4. DECLARE that the State of Kaloshia cannot be given the right to secede from the Union
of Indiana.
and/or pass any other order, direction, or relief that this hon'ble court may deem fit in the interests
of justice, equity and good conscience.
FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE PETITIONER SHALL DUTY BOUND FOREVER
PRAY
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