CHAPTER 6 • COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: PIAGETIAN, CORE KNOWLEDGE, ANO VYGOTSKIAN PERSPECTIVES 259

: Vygotsky's Sociocultural Theory

Piaget's theory and th~ core knowledge perspectiv~ emphasize the biological side of cognitive
development. In both, the most important source of cognition is the child himself-a busy,
self-motivated explorer \vho forms ideas and tests them against the \Vorld. Lev Vygotsky also
believed that children are active seekers of kno,vledge, but he emphasized that rich social and
cultural contexts profoundly affect their thinking.
Early events in Vygotsky's life contributed to his vision of human cognition as inherently
social and language-based. As a university student, he \Vas interested primarily in a verbal
field-literature. After graduating, he first became a teacher and only later turned to psychol-
ogy. Because Vygotsky died of tuberculosis at age 37, his theory is not as complete as Piaget's.
Nevertheless, the field of child development has experienced a burst of interest in Vygotsky's
sociocultural perspective. The major reason for his appeal lies in his rejection of an individu-
alistic view of the developing child in favor of a socially formed mind (Rogoff, 2003; Tudge &
Scrimsher, 2003).
According to Vygotsky, infants are endowed V'1ith basic perceptual, attention, and memory
capacities that they share \vith other animals. These develop during lhe first 2 years through
direct contact 'vith the erivironment. Then rapid growth of language leads to a profound
change in thinking. It broadens preschoolers' participation in social dialogues 'vith more
kno,vledgeable individuals, 'vho encourage them to master culturally iffiportant tasks. Soon
young children start to communicate 'vith themselves in much the same 'vay they converse
'vith at.hers. As a result, basic mental capacities are transformed into uniquely human, higher
cognitive processes. Let's see ho'v this happens.
• ITTWLTimW~1*~
Children's Private Speech Relationship of private
speech to task difficulty
\.Vatch preschoolers going about their daily activities, and you '\'ill see that they frequently talk among 4- and 5-year-olds.
out loud to themselves as they play and explore the environment. For example, as a 4-year-old Researchers increased the dif-
'vorked a puzzle at preschool one day, I heard him say, "VVhere's the red piece? I need the red ficulty of a color-sequencing
one. No\v a blue one. No, it doesn't fit. Try it here." task, in which children listened
to a list of colors and then
Piaget (1923/1926) called these utterances egocentric speech, reflecting his belief that young placed colored stickers on a
children have difficulty taking the perspectives of others. For this reason, he said, their talk is page to match the list. The
often "talk for self" in ··which they run off thoughts in whatever form they happen to occur, longer the color list, the more
regardless of \Vhether a listener can understand. Piaget believed that cognitive development private speech children used.
(From E. Patrick and E. Abravanel,
and certain social experiences-specifically, disagreements \vith peers-eventually bring an
2000, "The Self-Regulatory Nature
end to egocentric speech. Through arguments 'vith agemates, children repeatedly see that oth- of Preschool Children's Private
ers hold vie,vpoints different from their o'vn. As a result, egocentric speech declines and is Speech in a Naturalistic Setting,"
replaced by social speech, in 'vhich children adapt 'vhat they say to their listeners. Applied Psycholinguistics~ 21, p. 55.
Vygotsky (1934/1986) objected strongly to Piaget's conclusions. He reasoned that Reprinted by permission.)
children speak to themselves for self-guidance. Because language helps children think
about mental activities and behavior and select courses of action, Vygotsky regarded
it as the foundation for all higher cognitive processes, including controlled attention,
70
deliberate memorization and recall, categorization, planning, problem solving,
abstract reasoning, and self-reflection.As children get older and find tasks easier, their 60
self-directed speech is internalized as silent, inner speech-the verbal dialogues \Ve
carry on '\'ith ourselves 'vhile thinking and acting in everyday situations.
Over the past three decades, almost all studies have supported Vygotsky's perspec-
50

'Q 40
J
tive (Berk, 2003).As a result, children's self-directed speech is no'v called private speech
.il
instead of egocentric speech. Research sho,vs that children use more of it \vhen tasks are ,E 30
difficult, after they make errors, and 'vhen they are confused about ho'v to proceed. :z
For example, Figure 6.18 shows ho'v 4- and 5-year-olds' private speech increased as 20
researchers made a color-sequencing task more difficult. Also, just as Vygotslqr pre-
10
dicted, private speech goes underground with age, changing into 'vhispers and silent lip
movements (Patrick & Abravanel, 2000; Winsler & Naglieri, 2003). Furthermore, chil- 0
dren \Vho freely use private speech during a challenging activity are more attentive and 2.5 3.S 4.5
involved and sho'v greater improvement in performance (Berk & Spuhl, 1995; Winsler, Mean Length of
Color Sequences
Diaz, & Montero, 1997).
 260
@This 3-year-o!d makes a
sculpture from p!aydough
and plastic sticks with the
aid of private speech, As
Vygotsky theorized, pre-
school children often guide
their thinking by talking to
themselves while they play
and tackle other challenging
tasks.
© Laura Dwight Photography
li
PART Ill • COGNITIVE AND LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT wW'/1,ablongman,com/berk
Finally, compared \Vith their normally achieving agemates, children \Vith
learning and behavior problems engage in higher rates of private speech over a
longer period of development (Berk, 200lb; Paladino & Berk, 2005). They seem
to call on private speech to help compensate for the impairments in cognitive
processing and attention that make academic tasks more difficult for them.
Social Origins of Cognitive Development
Where does private speech come from?Vygotsky (1930-1935/1978) believed that
children's learning takes place within the zone of proximal development-a
range of tasks too difficult for the child to do alone but possible \Vith the help of
adults and more skilled peers. Consider the joint activity of 3-year-old Sammy
and his mother, >vho helps him put together a difficult puzzle:
Sa1n1ny: I can't get this one in. [Tries to insert a piece in the wrong place.]
Mother: \Vhich piece might go do,vn here? [Points to the botto1n of the
puzzle.]
Samn1y: His shoes. [Looks for a piece resetnbling the clo1v11's shoes but tries the
1vrong one.]
Mother: \.Veil, \vhat piece looks like this shape? [Points again to the bottotn of
the puzzle.]
Sa1111ny: The bro\vn one. [Tries it, and it fits; then attenzpts another piece and
looks at his n1other.]
Nlother: "Try turning it just a little." [Gestures to shou him.]
1
Sa111n1y: "There!" [Puts in several n1ore pieces 1vhile his n1other 1vatches.J
Sammy's mother keeps the puzzle \Vithin his zone of proximal development, at a manageable
level of difficulty, by questioning, prompting, and suggesting strategies.
To promote cognitive development, social interaction must have certain features. The first
is intersubjectivity, the process \vhereby t\vo participants who begin a task \Vith different
understandings arrive at a shared understanding (Ne,vson & Ne\vson, 1975). Intersubjectivity
creates a common ground for communication, as each partner adjusts to the perspective of
the other. Adults try to promote it \Vhen they translate their O\Vn insights in "\Vays that are
·within the child's grasp. As the child stretches to understand the adult, she is dra\vn into a
more mature approach to the situation (Rogoff, 1998).
The capacity for intersubjectivity is present early, in parent-infant mutual gaze, exchange
of emotional signals, and imitation. Later, language facilitates it. As conversational skills
improve, preschoolers increasingly seek others' help and direct that assistance to ensure that
it is beneficial (Whitington & Ward, 1999). Bet\veen ages 3 and 5, children strive for intersub-
jectivity in dialogues "\vith peers, as \Vhen they affirm a playmate's message, add new ideas, and
contribute to ongoing play to sustain it. They can also be heard saying, "I think [this "\vay].
What do you think?"---evidence for a willingness to share vie\vpoints (Berk, 2001a). In these
\vays, children begin to create zones of proximal development for one another.
A second important feature of social interaction is scaffolding-adjusting the support
offered during a teaching session to fit the child's current level of performance. When the child
has little notion of how to proceed, the adult uses direct instruction, breaking the task do,vn
into manageable units, suggesting strategies, and offering rationales for using them. As the
child's competence increases, effective scaffolders-such as Sammy's mother-gradually and
sensitively \Vithdra\v support, turning over responsibility to the child Then children take the
language of these dialogues, make it part of their private speech, and use this speech to organ-
ize their independent efforts.
Scaffolding captures the form of teaching interaction that occurs as children \Vork on
school or school-like tasks, such as puzzles, model building, picture matching, and (later) aca-
demic assignments. It may not apply to other contexts that are just as vital for cognitive devel-
opment-for example, play or everyday activities, during >vhich adults usually support
CHAPTER 6 • COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: PIAGETIAN, CORE KNOWLEDGE, AND VYGOTSKIAN PERSPECTIVES 261
children's effortJ \V'ithout deliberately instruCting. To @ By using gestures and
account for chil<lren's diverse opportunities to learn !>imple words, this father
through involvement \Vi th others, Barbara Rogoff (1998, helps his child figure out
2003) suggests the term guided participation, a broader how to fit the dolls into their
concept than scaffolding that refers to shared endeavors spaces on the toy bus. By
behveen more expert and less expert participants, \vith- presenting a task within the
out Specifying the precise features of communication. child's zone of proximal
development and fine-tuning
Consequently, it allo,vs for variations across situations
his support to the child's
and cultures. needs, he promotes his child's
What evidence supports Vygotsky's ideas on the cognitive development.
social origins of cognitive development? A \vealth of © Laura DvtighVPhotoEdit
research indicates that \vhen adults establish intersubjec-
tivity by being stimulating, responsive, and supportive,
they foster many competencies-attention, language,
complex play, and understanding of others' perspectives
(Bornstein et al., 1992b; Charman et al., 2001; Morales et
al., 2000). Furthermore, children of effective .scafful<ler.s
use more private speech and are more successful 'vhen
attempting difficult tasks on their O\Vn (Berk & Spuhl,
1995; Conner & Cross, 2003). Adult cognitive support-teaching in small steps and offering
strategies-predicts children's mature thinking~ And adult emotional support-----offering
encouragement and transferring responsibility to the child-predicts children's effort (Neitzel
& Stright, 2003). The result is a 'vinning combination for successful learning.

Vygotsky's View of Make-Believe Play

In accord '\vith his emphasis on social experience and language as vital forces in cognitive devel-
opment, Vygotsky (1933/1978) regarded make-believe play as a unique, broadly influential
zone of proximal development in \vhich children advance the111selvesas they try out a vridevari-
ety of challenging skills. In Vygotsky's theory, make-believe is the central source of develop-
ment during the preschool years, leading development fonvard in hvo 'vays. First, as children
create imaginary situations, they learn to act in accord 'vith internal ideas, not just in response
to external stimuli. Children's object substitutions are crucial in this process. VVhile pretending,
children continually use one object to stand for another. By making a stick represent a horse or
a folded blanket represent a sleeping baby, they change an object's usual meaning. Gradually
they realize that thinking (or the meaning of words) is separate from objects and that ideas can
be used to guide behavior.
A second feature of make-believe-its rule-based nature-also strengthens children's
capacity to think before they act. Pretend play, Vygotsky pointed out, constantly demands that
children act against their impulses because they must follo'v the rules of the play scene
(Duncan & Tarulli, 2003). For example, a child pretending to go to sleep obeys the rules of
bedtime behavior. Another child imagining himself to be a father and a doll to be a child con-
forms to the rules of parental behavior. As children enact rules in make-believe, they come to
better understand social norms and expectations and strive to follo'v them.
Much evidence fits \Vith Vygotsky's conclusion that make-believe play serves as a zone of
proximal development, supporting the emergence and refinement of many competencies.
Turn back to pages 232-233 to review evidence that make-believe enhances a diverse array of
cognitive and social skills. Pretend play is also rich in private speech-a finding that supports
its role in helping children bring action under the control of thought (Krafft & Berk, 1998).
In a recent study, preschoolers 'vho engaged in more complex sociodramatic play sho,ved
greater gains in follo,ving classroom rules over a 4-month period (Elias & Berk, 2002).
Finally, Vygotsky took issue vrith Piaget's view that make-believe arises spontaneously in
the second year of life. Vygotsky argued that, like other higher cognitive processes, the elabo-
rate pretending of the preschool years has social origins. Research revie,ved in the From
Research to Practice box on page 262 supports the vie'\v that children learn to pretend under
the supportive guidance of experts.
 ·. . --~-~~,~=,~~RCH TO PRACT2S§-=
Social Origins of
Make-Believe Play
to do with our t\'vo sons when they were
young was to bake pineapple ups!de·down
cake, a fovortte treat. One Sunday afternoon
when a cake \.VOS In the making, 21·month·
ofd Peter stood on a choir at the kitchen s!nk.
bus!ly pourtng water from one cup to another.
"He's In the \'Joy, Dodi" comp!olned
4-yeor-old David, trying to pull Peter away
from the s!nk.
"Maybe If we let him help, he'll give us
some room.~ Ken suggested. As David stirred
the batter, Ken poured some Into a small
boi,.vl for Peter, moved his chair to the side
of the sink. and handed him a spoon.
"Here's how you do It. Petey,n Instructed
David, \'i/!th on air of superiority. Peter
watched as David stirred, then tried to copy
his motion. When It was time to pour the
batter, Ken helped Peter hold and tip the
small bowl.
"Trme to bake It." sold Ken.
"Bake It, bake It,~ repeated Peter. as he
watched Ken slip the pan Into the oven.
Several hours later, we observed one of
Peter's earliest Instances of make-believe
ploy. He got his poll from the sandbox and,
ofter ftl!lng It with a handful of sand. carried
!t Into the kitchen and put It down on the
floor In front of the oven. "Bake It. bake It.~
Peter called to Ken. Together, father and son
placed the pretend coke Inside the oven.
Untll recently. most researchers studied
moke·be!leve p!ay apart from the social
environment In which lt occurs, by observing
children as they player! alone. Probably for
this reason, Piaget and his followers con-
cluded that toddlers discover make-believe
Independently, once they ore capable of
representational schemes. Vygotsky's theory
hos challenged this view. He believed that
society provides children with opportunltles
to represent culturally meon!ngful actMtles In
play. Make-belleve, !Ike other complex
mental octlv!tles, Is first !earned under the
guidance of experts (Berk. 2001 a). Jn the
example Just described. Peter extended h!s
capacity to represent dolly events when Ken
drew him Into the baking task and helped
him act It out Jn ploy.
Current evidence supports the Idea that
early make-bel!eve ls the combined result
~
of ch11dren's readiness to engage In It and
social experiences that promote It. ln one
observational study of middle-SES toddlers,
75 to 80 percent of make-believe Involved
mother-chJJd Interaction (Haight & Mll!er,
1993). At 12 months, make-belleve was
fairly one-s!ded; almost al! play episodes
were Initiated by mothers. By the end of the
second year. mothers and chlfdren displayed
mutual Interest Jn getting make-believe
started: half of pretend episodes were Initi-
ated by each.
Y-/hen adults participate, toddlers' make-
bel!eve Is more elaborate (O'Rel!ly & Born-
stein, 1993). For example, play themes are
more var!ed. And toddlers ore more llkely to
combine schemes Into complex sequences,
as Peter did when he put the sand In the
bucket rmak!ng the batterl, cmrled lt Into
the kitchen, and (With Ken's help) put It In the
oven ("baking the cake"). The more parents
pretend with their toddlers, the more time
their chlldren devote to make-believe. And Jn
certain collectfvlst societies, such as Argen·
tlna and Japan. mother-toddler other-
drrected pretending, as In feeding or putting
a dol! to sleep, Is particularly rich In mater-
nal expressions of affection and praise
(Bornstein et al., 1999a).
In some cultures. older s!b!lngs ore tod-
dlers' first p!ay partners. For example, ln Indo-
nesia and Mexico, where extended-foml!y
households and sibling careglvlng are com-
mon, make-believe Is more frequent and
complex With older siblings than With moth·
ers. As early as 3 to 4 years of age. children
provide rich, cho!!eng!ng st1mu!at1on and sup·
port to their younger brothers and sisters,
toke these teaching responslbllltles seriously,
and. with age, become better at them
(Zukow-Goidrlng. 2002). In a study of
Zlnacanteco Jnd!an chlldren of southern
Mexico, by age 8, slbllng teachers were
hlgh!y skllled at showing 2-year·o!ds how to
ploy at everyday tasks. such as washing
and cooking. They often combined verbal
descrlptlons with demonstrations, explained,
provided feedback, Ond guided toddlers
physlcolly through the task (Maynord, 2002).
Although older slbllngs Jn Western
middle-SES famll!es less often del!berotely
teach, they nevertheless serve as !nfluentla!
IA In Mexico, where sibling caregiving is
common, younger children €ngage in more
frequent and complex make-believe play
with their older siblings than with their
mothers. This 5-year-o!d uses. a simple box
to devise a rich, challenging pretend scene
for her tittle sister.
© Karen Halverson/Omni-Photo Communication
models of playful behavior. Jn a study of New
Zealand fam!lles of Western European
descent. when both a parent and an older
slbl!ng were ovarloble, toddlers more often
Imitated the actions of the slbllng. Toddlers
were especlolly Interested Jn Imitating when
sJbllngs engaged In make·beHeve or In rou-
tines (such as answering the phone or rak-
ing !eaves) that could Inspire pretending.
Furthermore. toddlers' Jmltot!ons Included
many actions With cultural significance (Borr
& Hoyne, 2003). For example. some enacted
behaviors unique to the Ne~v Zealand Maori
culture, such as S\.Vlnglng a pol (an object
used In a ceremonial dance). lm!totlng
Western customs. such as shaking hands
and clinking two glasses together Jn o
~cheers~ gesture. was also common.
Make-bel!eve ploy Is a major means
through which children extend their cognitive
skll!s and learn about Important activities In
their culture. Vygotsky's theory, and the
findings that support It, tell us that providing
a stlmulat!ng environment ls not enough to
promote early cognitive development. Jn
addition, toddlers must be !nvlted and
encouraged by more skllled members of
their culture to participate In the social
world around them. Parents and teachers
can enhance early make·bel!eve by ploy-
ing often with toddlers and guiding and
e!aboratJng on their moke·be!!eve themes.
CHAPTER 6 • COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: PIAGETIAN, CORE KNOWLEDGE, AND VYGOTSKIAN PERSPECTIVES 263

i Vygotsky and Education

Vygots1.7's theory offers ne-i;v visions of teaching and learning-ones that emphasize the
importance of social context and collaboration. Today, educators are eager to use his ideas.
Like Piagetian classrooms) Vygotskian classrooms accept individual differences and provide
opportunities for children's actiye participation. Yet a Vygotskian classroom goes beyond
independent discovery: It promotes assisted discovery. Teachers guide children's learning, tai-
loring their interventions to each child's zone of proximal development. Assisted discovery is
also fostered by peer collaboration. Children \Vith varying abilities \Vork in groups, teaching
and helping one another.
Vygotsky's educational message for the preschool years is to provide socially rich, mean-
ingful activities in children's zones of proximal development and a 1vealth of opportunities for
make-believe play-the ultimate means of fostering the self-discipline required for later aca-
demic learning. Once formal schooling begins) Vygotsky emphasized literacy activities (John-
Steiner & Mahn, 1996; Scrimsher & Tudge, 2003 ). As children talk about literature, mathemat-
ics, science, and social studies, their teachers inform, correct, and ask them to explain. As a
result, children reflect on their o-..vn thought processes and shift to a higher level of 1.:ugnitive
activity in \vhich they think about ho\v to symbolize ideas in socially useful -..vays. Gradually
they become proficient in manipulating and controlling the symbol systems of their culture.
let's look at t\vo Vygotsky-based educational innovations, each of 1vhich incorporates
assisted discovery and peer collaboration.

Reciprocal Teaching
Originally designed to improve reading comprehension in students achieving poorly, this
teaching method has been extended to other subjects and all schoolchildren. In reciprocal
teaching, a teacher and t\vo to four students forn1 a collaborative group and take turns lead-
ing dialogues on the content of a text passage. VVithin the dialogues) group members apply
fpur cognitive strategies: questioning, summarizing, clarifying, and predicting.
The dialogue leader (at first the teacher, later a student) begins by asking questions about
the content of the text passage. Students offer ans\vers, raise additional questions, and, in case
of disagreement, reread the original text. Next, the leader sumn1arizes the passage, and chil-
dren discuss the summary and clarify unfamiliar ideas. Finally, the leader encourages students @Reciprocal teaching is a
to predict upcoming content based on clues in the passage (Palincsar & Klenk, 1992 ). Vygotsky-inspired educa-
Elementary and junior high school students exposed to reciprocal teaching sho\v impres- tional innovation in which a
sive gains in reading comprehension compared with controls taught in other \vays (Lederer, teacher and two to four
pupils form a cooperative
2000; Rosenshine & Meister, 1994). Notice ho\v reciprocal teaching creates a zone of proximal
!earning group and engage in
development in \vhich children gradually assume more responsibility for comprehending text dialogue about a text pas-
passages. Also, by collaborating \vith others, children forge group expectations for high-level sage. Elemental)' and junior
thinking and acquire skills vital for learning and success in everyday life. high school pupils who par-
ticipate in reciprocal teach-
Cooperative Learning ing show impressive gains
Although reciprocal teaching uses peer collaboration, a teacher is present to guide it, helping to in reading comprehension.
ensure its success. According to Vygotsky, more expert peers can also spur children's develop- © Bob Daemmrich/PhotoEdit
ment, as long as they adjust the help they pro-
vide to fit the less mature child's zone of proxi-
mal development. Recall that Piaget, too, thought
that peer interaction could contribute to cogni-
tive change. In fact, he regarded discussion \Vith
agemates as more valuable than discussion \Vith
adults because a child might superficially accept
an adult authority's perspective \vithout critically
e.xamining it. Piaget also asserted that dashing
vie-..vpoints-arguments jarring the child into
noticing a peer's point of vie\V-1\'ere necessary
for peer interaction to foster logical thought
(Tudge & Winterhoff, 1993).
264 PART Ill • COGNITIVE AND LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT VN/V'J,ablongman.com/berk

Today, peer collaboration is used in many classrooms, but evidence is mounting that it
promotes development only under certain conditions. A crucial factor is cooperative learning,
in \Vhich small groups of classmates \Vork tovvard common goals. Conflict and disagreement
seem less important than the extent t9 v;rhich peers achieve intersubjectivity-by resolving
differences of opinion, sharing responsibility, and providing one another i.vith sufficiently
elaborate explanations to correct misunderstandings (Webb, Troper, & Fall, 1995).And in line
\Vith Vygotsky's theory, children's planning and problem solving improve more \vhe~ their
peer partner is an "experf'-especially capable at the task (Azmitia, 1988).
Cultural variations exist in students' ability to learn cooperatively. VVorking in groups comes
more easily to children reared in collectivist than in individualistic cultures. For example, Navajo
children do so more readily Lhan Caucasian-American children (Ellis & Gauvain, 1992). Japanese
classroom practices, in ··which children solve problems by building on one another's ideas, are sit-
uated in a larger culture that values interdependence (H_atano, 1994). In contrast, North
American cultural-majority children typically consider competition and independent \vork to be
natural-a perspective that interferes \Vith their ability to attain intersubjectivity in groups.
For cooperative learning to succeed, Western children usually require extensive guidance in
ho\v to \Vork together. In several studies, groups of three to four students trained in collabora-
tive processes displayed more cooperative behavior, gave higher-level explanations, and enjoyed
learning more than did untrained groups (Gillies, 2000, 2003; Tenvel et al., 2001). In other
research, the quality of children's collaborative discussions predicted gains in diverse cognitive
skills that persisted for \veeks beyond the cooperative learning e:\.-perience (Fleming & Alexander,
2001). Teaching through cooperative learning broadens Vygotsky's concept of the zone of prox-
imal development, from a single child in collaboration \vith an expert partner (adult or peer) to
multiple partners \\•ith diverse forms of expertise stimulating and encouraging one another.

: Evaluation of Vygotsky's Theory

In granting social experience a fundamental role in cognitive development, Vygotsky's theory helps
us understand the "\vide cultural variation in cognitive skills. Unlike Piaget, "\vho emphasized uni-
versal cognitive change, Vygotsky's theory leads us to expect highly diverse paths of development.
For example, the reading, \Vriting, and mathematical activities of children \vho go to school in lit-
erate societies generate cognitive capacities that differ from those in tribal and village cultures,
"\vhere children receive little formal sch,ooling. But the elaborate spatial skills of Australian
Aborigines, whose food-gathering missions require that they find their 'vay through barren desert
regions, and the proportional reasoning of Brazilian fishermen, promoted by their navigational
e>..-periences, are just as advanced (Carraher, Schliemann, & Carraher, 1988; Kearins, 1981). Each is
a unique form of symbolic thinking required by activities that n1ake up that culture's "\Vay of life.
At the same, Vygotsky's theory underscores the vital role of teaching in cognitive develop-
ment. According to Vygotsky {1934/1986), from communicating \vith more expert partners,
children engage in "verbalized self-observation"; they start to reflect on, revise, and control
their O\Vn thought processes. In this \vay, parents' and teachers' engagement \Vith children
prompts profound advances in the complexity of children's thinking.
Vygotsky's theory has not gone unchallenged. Although he ackno,vledged the role of diverse
symbol systems (such as pictures, maps, and mathematical expressions) in the development of
higher cognitive processes, he elevated language to highest importance. In some cultures, ho,v-
ever, verbal dialogues are not the only means, or even the most important means, through
\Vhich children learn. When Western parents help children \\'ith challenging tasks, they assume
a great deal of responsibility for children's motivation by frequently giving verbal instructions
and conversing with the child. Their communication resembles the teaching that takes place in
school, "\vhere their children \Vill spend years preparing for adult life. In cultures that place less
emphasis on schooling and literacy, parents often expect children to take greater responsibility
for acquiring ne\v skills through keen observation and participation in community activities
(Rogoff, 2003). Turn to the Cultural Influences box on the following page for research that
illustrates this difference.
Finally, in focusing on social and cultural influences, Vygotsl7 said little about biological
contributions to children's cognition. For example, his theory does not address how elementary
CHAPTER 6 • COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT: PIAGETIAN, CORE KNOWLEDGE, AND VYGOTSKIAN PERSPECTIVES
Children in Village and Tribal
Cultures Observe and Participate in Adult Work
In Western societies, ch!ldren ore largely
excluded from partlc!patlng In adult work,
wh!ch generally takes place In settings
beyond the home. The role of equipping
chlldren with the skills they need to become
competent workers Is assigned to school. ln
early chl!dhood, middle-class parents' Inter-
actions With chlldren dwell on preparing the
chl!dren to succeed Jn school through ch!ld·
focused actrvlt!es-espec!ally odult-chl!d
conversations and play that enhance lan-
guage, Hteracy, and other school-related
knov'lledge. In vlHage and tribal cultures,
chlldren receive little or no schoollng. spend
their days ln contod with or partlclpatlng Jn
adult work. and start to assume mature
responslb!IJtles In early childhood (Rogoff
·et al,, 2003). Consequently, parents hove
little need to rely on conversation and play
to teach chlldren.
A study comporlnq 2- and 3-uear-olds'
dolly lives In four cultures-two U.S. middle-
closs suburbs, the Efe hunters and gatherers
of the Repub!Jc of Congo, and a Mayan agrt-
culturot town Jn Guatemala-documented
these differences (MoreJ!J. RQ<Joff. & AngeUUo,
2003). ln the U.S. communities. young chil-
dren had !lttle access to adult work and spent
much time Involved In odu!t-chlld conversa-
tions and play that catered to children's Inter-
ests and provided academic lessons. In con-
trast. the Efe and Mayan children rarely
engaged In these chlld-focused act1v1tles.
Instead, they spent the!r day In close prox-
imity to adult work, which often took place
Jn or near the Efe campsite or the Mcyan
family home. Compared to their American
counterparts. Mayan and Efe chl!dren spent
for more time observing adult work.
An ethnography of o remote Mayan
vlllage In Yucatan, Mexico, shows that
265
when young chl!dren are
leglt!mate onlookers and
participants Jn a dolly
Ufe structured around
adult work, their compe-
tencies differ sharply
from those of Western
preschoolers (Gaskins.
1999). Yucatec Mayon
adults ore subsistence
formers. Men tend corn-
f!e!ds, aided by sons age
8 and older. Women
oversee the household
and yard: they prepare
A In Yucatec Mayan culture, adults rarely
meals. wash clothes, and care for the live- converse with children or scaffold their
stock and garden, assisted by daughters learning. And rather than engaging in
and by sons not yet old enough to work In make-believe, children join in the work of
the fle!ds. To the extent they can, ch!ldren
their community from an early age, spend-
ing many hours observing adults. This
Jo!n Jn these actlv!tles from the second Mayan preschooler watches intently ·as her
year on. When not partlc!potlng with grandmother washes dishes. When the
adults, they are expected to be self-suffi- child begins to Imitate adult tasks, she will
cient. Young ch!ldren make many nonwork be given additional responsibilities.
© Beryl Goldberg
decisions for themselves-how much to
s!eep and eat, what to wear, when to
bathe (as long as they do so every after-
noon). and even when to start school. As a odu!t tokes over and the child observes.
resu!t. Yucotec Mayan preschoolers ore reengaging when able to contribute.
h!ghly competent at self-core. ln contrast. Expected to be autonomous and helpful,
their make-believe ploy Is limited: when lt Yucatec Mayan chl!dren seldom dJsp!oy
occurs, they usually enact adult work. attention-getting behaviors or ask others for
Otherwise. they watch othe1s-for hours S-Ometh!ng Interesting to do. From on early
each day. age, they con sit quietly for !ong periods With
Yucotec Mayon parents rarely converse little fussing-through a lengthy rel!g!ous
or play with preschoolers or scaffold their service or a 3-hour truck ride. And when on
!earning. Rather, when chlldren Imitate odu!t Interrupts their octMty and directs them
adult tasks, parents conclude that they ore to do a chore, they respond eagerly to the
ready for more responslb!lity. Then they tlJpe of command that Western ch!ldren fre-
assign chores. selectfng tasks the ch!ld con quently avoid or resent By age 5, Yucotec
do with Httle help so that adult work Is not Mayon children spontaneously take respons!-
disturbed. 1f a chlld cannot do a task. the bll!ty for tasks beyond those assigned.
266 PART Ill • COGNITIVE AND LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT w\vw.ablongman.com/berk

motor, perceptual, memory, and problem-solving capacities spark changes in children's social
experiences, from \Vhich more advanced cognition springs. Nor does it tell us just ho\v chil-
dren internalize social experiences to advance their mental functioning (Berk & Winsler, 1995;
Moll, 1994). Consequently, like the other perspectives addressed in this chapter, Vygotsky's
theory is vague in its explanation of cognitive change. It is intriguing to speculate about the
broader theory that might exist today had Piaget and Vygotsky-the twu nventieth-century
giants of <;ognitive development-had a chance to meet and \Veave together their extr~ordi­
nary accomplishments.

ctitfo~'/1~~\~
REVIEW
.• > > .. ·.••··•·· .··• •··•·· ·.·• •··.· \@}
f:,D_~i~r! ~_i(~ha:_r_a_~~~~i~tif ~:_o_f:~-~~ial-int_~ractio_n th~t s_~p_poit ~hild~eil'~ ~q~n_i_tiy_ed_~y~l~p~ent~ _How':do~s
0
·..•. · ... ·. . • . .····•.·•····

tc;.~uff)}~fer?~_fil:)-Jl:C_[_ef~~-e_;_Cl ~-?ne_:cif'B~~xima_t_d_evelop_~~~t_? · --- - · - · ·

~f;6w;~~ft6~(di_J~~-t6:;fj~~d'tt~~~i ~~(;~b;_1J;~~~l~Y-\h~-id;~~~~ocial~6-~teXtJoi'co·g~iti~e_devefapfne~i-i~:·
0

REVIEW
~~"''l~~ill~?()dli,~.oe~t'. =jf~"c-~i_ . r~ .; ·. ··~··~··· .. o.C·.~···· ~ c "
APPLY ,fa,hi_Sha:_ se_e_~-hef _~~ye_~~~PI~ :S9_~~:-:J?bY~ -~al~i_fig·_~_l_O_u~,tµ-hlni.4elf WhHe he p1aY~'.-s~_e;-Y,_On(ler~· wh~:th~r, -_,
-~he;sh~-_lii,~_---~ist-Oufa_g_e-th!s_:b_~h~vip·~:-_~sin9 Vy_go_ts!<Y'S theory and i-e_lated research>~xplain _why Toby
talks_ lg ~imS,elf;-}l_~W WoUld yo_-~ ~dv_ise Tanish_a?_ · - -- - - -
. . ·.c cccoc
CONNECT -:_E~~l-~i_n-hOW -P,_i~~·et's .:!_~:~ -~YQOts_kyiSlheOi-ieS
cClmplemerit ·ane.another.-_HOW Would_claSsroo_m
·µfaCtl~e-S-inspire_(IbY th-eS~_theori_eS_b_e similar?_How_ would_they be differen~? ·
;-_-_c~'.___c_Sc_,-----'-~_:_:__:~

~Summary
Piaget's Cognitive·
Developmental Theory
According to Piaget, how does cog11itio11
develop?
@ Influenced by his background in biol-
ogy, Piaget viewed cognitive development
as an adaptive process in which thinking
gradually achieves a better fit with external
reality. Piaget's constructivist approach
assumes that by acting on the environment,
children move through four invariant and
universal stages, in which all aspects of cog-
nition undergo similar changes. According
to Piaget, infants begin life with little in the
way of built-in structures; only at the end
of the second year are they capable of a
cognith•e approach to the world through
mental representations.
@ In Piaget's theory, psychological struc-
tures, or schemes, change in hvo ways. The
first is through adaptation, which consists
of two complementary activities: assimila-
tion and accommodation. The second is
through organization, the internal
rearrangement of schemes to form a
strongly interconnected cognitive system.
Equilibration sums up the changing balance
of assin1ilation and accommodation that
gradually leads to more effective schemes.
The Sensorlmotor Stage:
Birth to 2 Years
Describe the nwjor cognitive attainments of
tlte sensorimotor stage.
@ Piaget's sensorimotor stage is divided
into sb:: substages. Through the circular
reaction, the newborn baby's reflexes
gradually transform into the more flexible
action patterns of the older infant. During
Substage 4, infants develop intentional, or
goal-directed, behavior and begin to
understand object permanence. Substage 5
brings a more flexible, exploratory approach,
and infants no longer make the A-not-B
search error. In Substage 6, sensorimotor
development culn1inates with mental repre-
sentation, as shown by sudden solutions to
sensorimotor problems, mastery of object
permanence problems involving invisible
displacement, deferred imitation, and
make-believe play.
lV1111tdoes follow-up research say about tl1e
accuracy of Piaget's sensorimotor stage?
.@ Many studies suggest that infants display
a variety of understandings earlier than
Piaget believed. Some awareness of object
permanence, as revealed by the violation-
of-expectation method, may be evident in
the first few n1onths. In addition, young
infants display deferred imitation, catego-
rization, and analogical problem solving,
suggesting that mental representation
develops concurrently with sensorimotor
schemes during the first 2 years.
@ Today, investigators believe that new-
borns have more built-in equipment for
making sense of their world than Piaget
assumed, although they disagree on hovv
much initial understanding infants have.
Furthermore, the cognitive attainments of
infancy do not develop in the neat, stepwise
fashion "predicted by Piaget's substages.
CHAPTER 12 • MORAL DEVELOPMENT 485

that the refrigerator \vas nearly empty, leaving no alternative. In this instance, many parents
\vould value the morality of the boy's claims along \Vith his reasoning and negotiation skills.
Cognitive-developmental theorists believe that neither identification \Vith parents nor
teaching, modeling, and reinforcement are the major means through v.;hich children become
moral. The cognitive-developmental approach assumes that individuals, instead of internaliz-
ing existing rules and expectations, develop morally through construction-actively attend-
ing to and interrelating multiple perspectives on situations in which social conflicts arise and
thereby deriving ne\v moral understandings. In other 'vords, children make moral judgments
on the basis of concepts they construct about justice and fairness. As these concepts becoine
increasingly adequate 'vith age, children experience them as having a rational basis and arrive
at a deeper understanding of morality-as something that n1ust be true in the social 'vorld,
just as conservation tnust be true in the physical 'vorld (Gibbs, 1991, 2003).
In sum, the cognitive-developmental position on morality is unique in its vie'v of the child
as a thinking moral being \vho wonders about right and \Vrong and searches for moral truth.
These theorists regard changes in-children's reasoning as the heart of moral development.

- - --
?IIK YouriefA
REVIEW Desc_rihe ~Videiice_ ifldicatitig--thal'many m-Orai1Y re!eV:a-nt.beh~Viors: hav_e _rpois .!n qii~ ·evohitipnaiY histoty:
REVIEW Summarize the TTI.3in features Of the ps.Ychoanalytic "_and social learniri·g perspective's on:nJ:ora-1_:-_ ._
"
";
deV~lopf!ienfWhy ha_s·eac~ b~en criticized? - -
APPLY Alice and Wayne want their two young chiid~~to be-cofne rriofa11;~~~f<l~~~-z~~~-i-~g-i~~-i_vtdua1s>USt
parenting practices that wo_uld foster the.Se goals, and eXplain why each is effective~ -
REFLECT Did yolt display a strong, irlternaiized conscii:nce as a_ child? How do-you thirl_k temPerameflt; _paferltlng --
practices, family livin_g conditions, and cultural background affected your childhood moral maturity?

~ Morality as Social Understanding

According to the cognitive-developmental perspective, cognitive maturity and social experience
lead to advances in moral understanding, from a superficial orientation to physical po\-ver and
external consequences to,vard a more profound appreciation of interpersonal relationships, soci-
etal institutions, and la\vmaking systems (Gibbs, 1995, 2003). ks their grasp of social cooperation
expands, children's ideas about 'vhat ought to be done when the needs and desires of people con-
flict also change, to\vard increasingly just, fair, and balanced solutions to moral problems.

Piaget's Theory of Moral Development

Piaget's (1932/1965) early\vork on children's moral judgments \Vas the original inspiration for
the cognitive-developmental perspective. To study children's ideas about morality, Piaget
relied on open-ended clinical intervie,vs: He questioned 5- to 13-year-old s,viss children
about their understanding of rules in the game of marbles. In addition, he gave children sto-
ries in \vhich characters' intentions to engage in right or 'vrong action and the consequences
of their behavior varied. In the best kna\vn of these stories, children 'vere asked vvhich of hvo
boys-,\•ell-intentioned John, \vho breaks 15 cups 'vhile on his \Vay to dinner, or ill-inten-
tioned Henry, 'vho breaks 1 cup v-:hile stealing some jam-is naughtier, and vvhy. From chil-
dren's responses, Piaget identified hvo broad stages of moral understanding.

• HETEROMOMOUS MORALITY (ABOUT 5 TO 10 YEARS)• Heteronomous means

under the authority of another. As the term heteronomous morality suggests, children in this
first stage vie'v rules as handed dotvn by authorities (God, parents, and teachers), as having a
permanent existence, as unchangeable, and as requiring strict obedience. For example, young
children state that the rules of the game of marbles cannot be changed, explaining that "God
486 PART IV • PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT vNNJ.ablongman.com/berk

didn't teach [the ne\v rules];' «you couldn't play any other \Vay;' or "it \Vould be cheating ....
A fair rule is one that is in the game" (Piaget, 1932/1965, pp. 58, 59, 63).
According to Piaget, hvo factors limit children's moral understanding: (1) the po\\'er of
adults to insist that children comply, \Vhich promotes unquestioning respect for rules and those
\vho enforce them; and (2) cognitive immaturity, especially children's limited capacity to imag-
ine other perspectives. Because young children think that all people vie\V rules the same \Vay,
their moral understanding is characterized by realism-that is, children regard rules as .exter-
nal features of reality rather than as cooperative principles that can be modified at ,vill.
Together, adult po,ver, egocentrism, and realism result in superficial moral understand-
ings. In judging an act's 'vrongness, younger children focus on outcomes rather than on intent
to do hanu. For exan1ple, in the story about John and Henry mentioned earlier, they regard
John as naughtier, despite his innocent intentions, because he broke more cups.
• AUTONOMOUS MORALITY, OR THE MORALITY OF COOPERATION (ABOUT 10
YEARS AND OLDER) • Cognitive development, gradual release from adult control, and
peer interaction lead children to make the transition to the second stage, autono1nous moral-
ity, in which they no longer vie\v rules as fixed but see them as flexible, socially agreed-on
principles that can be revised to suit the \vill of the majority. Piaget regarded peer disagree-
ments as especially facilitating (see Chapter 6). Through them, children realize that people's
perspectives on moral action can differ and that intentions, not concrete consequences,
should serve as the basis for judging behavior.
Furthermore, as children interact as equals \Vi th peers, they learn to settle conflicts in mutu-
ally beneficial \vays. Gradually, they start to use a standard of fairness called reciprocity, in \Vhich
they express the same concern for the \Velfare of others as they do for themselves. Piaget found
that at first, children's grasp of reciprocity is a "crude;' tit-for-tat understanding: "You scratch
my back and I'll scratch yours." This defines the beginning of the morality of cooperation.
Older children and adolescents move beyond this payback morality to an advanced under-
standing of reciprocity as mutuality of expectations, called ideal reciprocity. Most of us are
familiar \vith it in the form of the Golden Rule: "Do unto others as you \vould have them do
unto you." Ideal reciprocity helps young people realize that rules can be reinterpreted and
revised to take into account individual circumstances, thereby ensuring just outcomes for all.

Evaluation of Piaget's Theory

Follo\v-up research indicates that Piaget's theory accurately describes the general direction of
change in moral judgment. In many studies, as children get older, outer features, such as phys-
ical damage or getting punished, give \vay to subtler considerations, such as the actor's inten-
tions or the needs and desires of others. Also, much evidence confirms Piaget's conclusion that
moral understanding is supported by cognitive maturity, gradual release from adult control,
and peer interaction. YVe 1vill consider these findings \Vhen 've turn to extensions of Piaget's
\\'ork by La,vrence Kohlberg and his follo\vers. Nevertheless, several aspects of Piaget's theory
have been questioned because they underestimate the moral capacities of young children.
• INTENTIONS AND MORAL JUDGMENTS • Look again at the story about John and
Henry on page 485. Because bad intentions are paired with little damage and good intentions
'vith a great deal of damage, Piaget's method yields a conservative picture ofyoung children's abil-
ity to appreciate intentions. \.Yhen questioned about moral issues in a \Vay that makes a person's
intent stand out as strongly as the harm that person does, preschool and early school-age children
are quite capable of judging ill-intentioned people as naughtier and more deserving of punish-
ment than \Veil-intentioned ones (Helwig, Zelazo, & \.Vilson, 2001; Jones &Thomson, 2001).
As further evidence, by age 4, children clearly recognize the difference bet\veen t\vo morally
relevant intentional behaviors: truthfulness and lying. They approve of telling the truth and
disapprove of lying, even when a lie remains undetected (Bussey, 1992). And by age 7 to 8-
earlier than one might expect from Piaget's findings-children integrate their judgments of
lying ~nd truth telling \Vith prosocial and antisocial intentions. For example, they give a very
negative rating to telling the truth in certain social situations-for example, bluntly saying to a
friend that you don't like her drawing (Bussey, 1999). Influenc~d by collectivist values of social
harmony and self-effacement, Chinese children are more likely than Canadian children to rate
lying favorably 'vhen an intention involves modesty, as vvhen a student \vho has thoughtfully
CHAPTER 12 • MORAL DEVELOPMENT 487
picked up the garbage in the school yard says, ~'I didn't do it." In contrast, both Chinese and
Canadian children rate lying about antisocial acts as "very naughty" (Lee et al., 1997).
Nevertheless, an advanced und~rstanding of the morality of intentions does a\vait
autonomous morality. Younger children are more likely to center, or focus on, salient features
and consequences in their judgments, \vhile neglecting other important information. For
example, preschoolers more often than older children evaluate lies as ahvays \Vrong (Peterson,
Peterson, & Seeto, 1983). And although they disapprove of undetected lies, they also judge lies
that lead to punishment more negatively than lies that do not (Bussey, 1992).
Furthermore, through the early school years, children generally interpret statements of
intention in a rigid, heteronomous fashion. They believe that once you say you \vill do some-
thing, you are obligated to follo\v through, even if uncontrollable circumstances (such as an
accident) make it difficult or impossible to do so. By age 9 or 10, children realize that not keep-
ing your 1vord 'is much \Vorse in some situations than in others-namely, \Vhen you are able
to do so and have permitted another person to count on your actions (1vfant & Perner, 1988).
In sum, Piaget \Vas partly right and partly \Vrong about this aspect of moral reasoning.
o REASONING ABOUT AUTHORITY •Research on young children's· understanding of
authority reveals that they do not regard adults wilh the unquestioning respect Piaget assumed.
Even preschoolers judge certain acts, such as hitting and stealing, to be wrong regardless of the
opinions of authorities. VVhen asked to explain, 3- and 4-year-
olds express concerns 8.bout harming other people rather than
obeying adult dictates (Smetana, 1981, 1985).
By.age 4, children have differentiated notions about the legit-
imacY" of authority figures that they refine during the school
years. In several studies, kindergartners through sixth graders
\Vere asked questions designed to assess their vie\v of ho\V broad
an adult's authority should be. Almost all denied that adults have
general authority. For example, they rejected a principal's right
to ~et rules and issue directives in settings other than his o\vn
school (laupa, 1995).
VVith respect to nonmoral concerns, such as the rules to be
follo,ved in a game, children usually base the legitimacy of
authority on a person's kno,vledge of the situation, not on social
position. And \vhen a directive is fair and caring (for example,
telling children to stop fighting or to share candy), children vie\v
it as right, regardless of \Vho states it-a principal, a teacher, a
class president, or another child. This is even true for Korean
@These Korean first graders
children, whose culture places a high value on respect for and deference to adults. Korean 7-
have been reared in a culture
to 11-year-olds evaluate negatively a teacher's or principal's order to keep fighting, to steal, or
that places a high value on
to refuse to share-a response that strengthens \Vith age (Kim, 1998; Kim & Turiel, 1996).
deference to adults. Still, if
As these findings reveal, adult status is not required for preschool and school-age children their teacher directed them to
to vie\v someone as an authority. Peers \vho are kno\vledgeable or \vho act to protect others' cheat or steal, they would say
rights are regarded as just as legitimate. But in reasoning about authority, preschool and that her immoral order should
young elementary school children do tend to center on the superficial: They place some\vhat not be obeyed.
greater 1veight than older children on po\ver, status, and impressive consequences for not ©Jack Stein Grove/PhotoEdit
obeying the authority. Nevertheless, younger children can coordinate several factors-the
attributes of the individual, the type of behavior to be controlled, and the context in \Vhich it
occurs-at a much earlier age than Piaget anticipated.
• STAGEWISE PROGRESSION •An additional point about Piaget's theory is that many chil-
dren display both heteronomous and autonomous reasoning, \vhich raises doubts about 'vhether
each stage represents a general, unifying organization of moral judgment responses. But in fair-
ness, Piaget (1932/1965) also observed this mi.xture in children and, therefore, regarded the hvo
moralities as fluid, overlapping phases rather than tightly knit stages.
Finally, moral development is currently vie,ved as a more extended process than Piaget
believed. In fact, Kohlberg's si.x-stage sequence, to "\vhich \Ve turn next, identifies three stages
beyond the first appearance of autonomous morality. Nevertheless, Kohlberg's theory is a
direct continuation of the research that Piaget began.
488 PART IV • PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT www.ablongman.com/berk

Kohlberg's Extension of Piaget's Theory

Like Piaget, Kohlberg used a clinical intervie\ving procedure to study moral development. But
i,vhereas Piaget asked children to judge and explain \Vhich of hvo children in a pair of stories
\vas naughtier, Kohlberg used a more open-ended approach: He presented people \Vith hypo-
thetical moral dilemmas and asked \Vhat the main actor should do and \Vhy.
• THE CLINICAL INTERVIEW • In Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, individuals
resolve dilemmas that present conflicts bet\veen t\vo moral values and justify their decisions.
The best knovvn of these is the «Heinz dilemma;• \Vhich pits the value of obeying the la\v (not
stealing) against the value of human life (saving a dying person):
In Europe, a 'voman 'vas near death from cancer. There 'vas one drug the doctors thought
might save her. A druggist in the same to,vn had discovered it, but he '\Vas charging ten
times 'vhat the drug cost him to make. The sick '\Voman's husband, Heinz, 'vent to every-
one he kne'v to borrovr the money, but he could only get together half of 'vhat it cost. The
druggist refused to sell the drug for less or let Heinz pay later. So Heinz got desperate and
broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his 'vife. Should Heinz have done that? Why
or why not? (paraphrased from Colby et al., 1983, p. 77)
In addition to explaining their ans,ver, participants are asked to evaluate the conflicting moral
values on which the dilemma is based. Scoring of responses is intricate and demanding-per-
haps the most complex of any intervie'v scoring system (Gibbs, Basinger, & Grime, 2003;
Miller, 1998).
N1oral maturity is determined by the ivay an individual reasons about the dilenuna, not the
content of the response ('vhether or not to steal). Individuals 'vho believe that Heinz should
steal the drug and those who think he should not can be found at each of Kohlberg's first four
stages. At the highest nvo stages, moral reasoning and content come together. Individuals do
not just agree on ,vhy certain actions are justified; they also agree on 'vhat people ought to do
'vhen faced 'vith a moral dilemma. Given a choice bet,veen obeying the la'v and preserving
individual rights, the most advanced moral thinkers support individual rights (in the Heinz
dilemma, stealing the drug to save a life). As '\Ve look at development in Kohlberg's scheme, '\Ve
'vill see that moral reasoning and content are independent at first, but eventually they are inte-
grated into a coherent ethical system (Kohlberg 1 Levine, & He\ver, 1983).
• /:.. QUESTIONNAIRE APPROACH• For more efficient gathering and scoring of moral
reasoning, researchers have devised short-ans,ver questionnaires. The most recent is the
Sociomoral Reflection Ivleasure-Short Form (SRM-SF). Like Kohlberg's clinical intervie\V1
the SRM-SF asks individuals to evaluate the importance of moral values and produce moral
reasoning. Here are 4 of its 11 questions:
e Let's say a friend of yours needs help and may even die, and you're the only person 'vho
can save him or her. Ho,v important is it for a person ('vithout losing his or her own life)
to save the life of a friend?
o VVhat about saving the life of anyone? Ho'v important is it for a person ( \Vithout losing his
or her o'vn life) to save the life of a stranger?
o Ho'v important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people?
•How important is it for people to obey the la,v? (Gibbs, Basinger, & Fuller, 1992,
pp. 151-1S2)
After reading each question, participants rate the importance of the value it addresses (as
('very important," "important;' or "not important") and \Vrite a brief explanation of their rat~
ing. The explanations are coded according to a revised rendition of Kohlberg's stages.
The SRlvl-SF is far less time consuming than the Moral Judgment Intervie'\v because it
does not require people to read and think about lengthy descriptions of moral dilemmas.
Instead, participants merely evaluate moral values and justify their evaluations. Nevertheless,
scores on the SRM-SF correlate well with those obtained from the Moral Judgment Intervie'v
and shovr similar age trends (Basinger, Gibbs, &Fuller, 1995; qibbs, Basinger, & Grime, 2003).
Apparently, moral reasoning can be measured 'vithout using dilemmas-a discovery that is
likely to ease the task of conducting moral development research.
CHAPTER 12 o MORAL DEVELOPMENT 489

• KOHLBERG'S STAGES OF MORAL UNDERSTANDING •In his initial investigation,

Kohlberg (1958) extended the age range Piaget studied, including participants who \Vere •veil
into adolescence by administering the Moral Judgment Intervievv to 10-) 13-, and 16-year-old
boys. Then he follov1ed the participants longitudinally, reintervie\ving them at 3- to 4-year
intervals Over the next 20 years (Colby et al., 1983). Analyzing age-related changes in the boys'
moral judgments, Kohlberg generated his six-stage sequence. As \Vith Piaget's progression of
development, Kohlberg's first three stages characterize children as moving from a morality
focused on outcomes to a morality based on ideal reciprocity. Inclusion of older adolescents
yielded the fourth stage, in which young people expand their notion of ideal reciprocity to
encompass societal rules and la\vs as vital for ensuring that people treat one another justly. On
the basis of the moral judgment responses of a small minority of adolescents, Kohlberg
extended his sequence further, positing the fifth and sixth stages. As \Ve \vill see, these stages
have remained infrequent in subsequent research.
Kohlberg organized his six stages into three general levels and made stronger claims than
Piaget about a fixed order of moral change. In doing so, ho\vever, Kohlberg dre\v on charac-
teristics that Piaget used to describe his cognitive stage sequence:
e Kohlberg regarded his moral stages as invariant and universal-a sequence of steps that
people every.vhere m"ove through in a fi.xed order.
e He vie\ved each ne\V stage as building on reasoning of the preceding stage, resulting in a
more logically consistent and morally adequate concept of justice. ·
0 Kohlberg S3\V each stage as an organized \vhole-a qualitatively distinct structure of moral
tliought that a person applies across a \vide range of situations (Colby & Kohlberg, 1987).
Recall from Chapter 6 that those theorists \vho continue to adhere to a stagewise vie\v of cog-
nitive development accept a flexible notion of stage. Similarly, i,ve \vill see that Kohlberg's
@How does this boy explain
claims about a tightly organized sequence of moral stages have been challenged. his decision to help a class-
Furthermore, Kohlberg believed that moral understanding is promoted by the same factors mate pick up her books and
th!'lt Piaget considered important for cognitive development: (1) disequilibrium, or actively papers? If he expects her to do
grappling \Vith moral issues and noticing v,reaknesses in one's current thinking, and (2) gains a favor for him in return, his
in perspective taking, \vhich permit individuals to resolve moral conflicts in increasingly com- reasoning falls at Kohlberg's
plex and effective ways. As \Ve examine Kohlberg's developmental sequence and illustrate it preconventional level, !f his
\Vith responses to the Heinz dilenuna, look for changes in cognition and perspective taking actions are governed by the
that each stage assumes. Golden Rule, "Do unto others
as you would have others do
> The Preconventional Level. At the preconventional level, morality is externally con- unto you,'' then he has
trolled. As in Piaget's heteronomous stage, children accept the rules Of authority figures, an~ advanced to Kohlberg's con-
actions are judged by their consequences. Behaviors that result in punishment are vie\ved as ventional level.
bad, and those that lead to re\vards are seen as good. © Michael Newman/PhotoEdit

o Stage 1: The punish1nent and obedience orientation. Children at this

stage find it difficult to consider two points of vie\v in a moral
dilemma. As a result, they ignore people's intentions and instead
focus on fear of authority and avoidance of punishment as reasons
for behaving morally.
Prostealing: "If you let your \vife die, you i,vill get in trouble. You'll be
blamed for not spending the money to help her, and there'll be an
investigation of you and the druggist for your \vife's death." (Kohlberg,
1969, p. 381)
Antistealing: "You shouldn't steal the drug because you'll be caught
and sent to jail if you do. If you do get away, [you'd be scared that} the
police would catch up with you any minute." (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 381)
e Stage 2: The instrutnental purpose orientation. Children become
3\vare that people can have different perspectives in a moral
dilemma, but at first this understanding is very concrete. They
vie\v right action as flo\ving from self-interest. Reciprocity is
understood as equal exchange of favors: "You do this for me and
I'll do that for you."
 490
@Rallying against tobacco
use, these young people evalu-
ate the rules and laws of their
society on the basis of how
well they serve the interests
of the majority. They express
a principled level of morality.
© Bob Daemmrich!PhotoEdit
PART IV • PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL OEVELOPMENT vv1N1N.ablongman.com/berk
Prostealing: "The druggist can do \Vhat he \Vants and Heinz can do \vhat he \vants to do....
But if Heinz decides to risk jail to save his \vife, it's his life he's risking; he can do \Vhat he \Van ts
\vith it. And the same goes for the druggist; it's up to him to decide \Vhat he 1vants to do." (Rest,
1979, p. 26)
Antistealing: "[Heinz] is running more risk than it's \Vorth [to save a \vife \Vho is near death]."
(Rest, 1979, p. 27)
I> The Couventional Level. At the conventional level, individuals continue to regard conform-
ity to social rules as important, but not for reasons of self-interest. Rather, they believe that actively
maintaining the current social system ensures positive human relationships and societal order.
t» Stage 3: The ''good bay-good girl" orientation, or the u1orality of interpersonal cooperation.
The desire to obey rules because they promote social harmony first appears in the context
of close personal ties. Stage 3 individuals '\Vant to maintiiin the affection and approval of
friends and relatives by being a "good person"-trusn.vorthy, loyal, respectful, helpful, and
nice. The capacity to view a nvo-person relationship from the vantage point of an impar-
tial, outside observer supports this ne'\v approach to morality. At this stage, the individual
understands ideal reciprocity, as expressed in the Golden Rule.
Prostealing: "No one 'vill think you're bad if you steal the drug, but your fanlily '\vill think
you're an inhuman husband if you don't. If you let your wife die, you'll never be able to look
anyone in the face again:' (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 381)
Antistealing: "It isn't just the druggist '\vho '\vill think you're a criminal, everyone else '\vill too.
After you steal it, you'll feel bad thinking ho,vyou brought dishonor on your family and your-
self' (Kohlberg, 1969, p. 381)
o Stage 4: The social-order-111aintai11i11g orientation. At this stage, the individual takes into
account a larger perspective-that of societal la,vs. ~foral choices no longer depend on
close ties to others. Instead, rules must be enforced in the same evenhanded fashion for
everyone, and each member of society has a personal duty to uphold them. The Stage 4
individual believes that }a,vs cannot be disobeyed under any circumstances because they
are vital for ensuring societal order and cooperative relations behveen individuals.
Prostealing: "He should steal it. Heinz has a duty to protect his '\vife's life; it's a vo'\v he took in
inarriage. But it's \Vrong to steal, so he '\vould have to take the drug with the idea of paying the
druggist for it and accepting the penalty for breaking the la\v later."
Antistealing: "It's a natural thing for Heinz to '\Vant to save his 'vife but.... Even if his \vife is
dying, it's still his duty as a citizen to obey the la\v. No one else is allowed to steal, 'vhy should
he be? If everyone starts breaking the lavv in a jam, there'd be no civilization, just crime and
violence:' (Rest, 1979, p. 30)
> The Postco11ve11tio11al or Principled Level. Individuals at the postconventionallevel move
beyond unquestioning support for the rules and la,vs of their o'\vn society. They define moral-
ity in terms of abstract principles and values that apply to all situations and societies.
•Stage 5: The social-contract orientation. At Stage 5, individuals regard
la,vs and rules as flexible instruments for furthering human purposes.
They can imagine alternatives to their o\vn social order, and they
emphasize fair procedures for interpreting and changing the la\v. When
la\vs are consistent with individual rights and the interests of the
majority, each person follo,vs them because of a social-contract arien-
tation-----free and '\villing participation in the system because it brings
about more good for people than if it did not exist.
Prostealing: "Although there is a Ja,v against stealing, the la'v '\Vasn't
meant to violate a person's right to life. Taking the drug does violate
the law, but Heinz is justified in stealing in this instance. If Heinz is
prosecuted for stealing, the la'\v needs to be reinterpreted to take into
account situations in 'vhich it goes against people's natural right to
keep on living."
CHAPTER 12 • MORAL DEVELOPMENT 491

e Stage 6: The universal ethical principle orie.ntation. At this highest stage, right action is
defined by self-chosen ethical principles of conscience that are valid for all humanity,
regardless ofla\V and social agreement. These values are abstract, not concrete moral rules
like the Ten Commandments. Stage 6 individuals typically mention such principles as
equal consideration of the claims of all human beings and respect for the \Vorth and dig-
nity of each person.
Prostealing: "If Heinz does not do everything he can to save his \vife, then he is putting some
value higher than the value of life. It doesn't make sense to put respect for property above
respect for life itself. [People] could live together \Vithout private property at all. Respect for
human life and Personality is absolute, and accordingly [people] have a mutual duty to save
one another from dying:' (Rest, 1979, p. 37)

Research on Kohlberg's Stages

Is there support for Kohlberg's developmental sequence? If so, movement through the stages
should be related to age, cognitive development, and gains in perspective taking. Also, moral rea-
soning should conform to the strict stage properties that Kohlberg assumed.·
• AGEwRELATED CHANGE •A \Vealth of research reveals that progress through Kohlberg's
stages is consistently related to age. The most convincing evidence comes from Kohlberg's 20-
year longitudinal Continuation of his first study (Colby et al., 1983). Thf? correlation behveen
age and moral judgment maturity,vas strong, at +.78. In addition, on the basis of responses
to Kol}lberg's hypothetical dileminas, almost all participants moved through the stages in the
prediCted order, 1vithout skipping steps or returning to less mature reasoning once a stage had
been attained. Other longitudinal studies using hypothetical dilemmas confirm these findings
(Rest, 1986; YValker, 1989; \.Valker & Taylor, 1991b). Ho,vever, as \Vill become clear in the next
section, \Vhen researchers use real-life dilemmas, age-related change is less tidy and more
variable.
A striking finding is that development of moral reasoning is slo\v and gradual. Figure 12.3
shO,vs the extent to \Vhich individuals used each stage of moral reasoning behveen ages 10 and 36
in Kohlberg's longitudinal study. Notice ho\v Stages 1and2 decrease in early adolescence, \vhereas
Stage 3 increases through mid-adolescence and then declines. Stage 4 rises over the teenage years
until, by early adulthood, it is the typical response. Feo;vpeople move beyond it to Stage 5.AB noted
earlier, postconventional morality is so rare that no clear evidence exists that Kohlberg's Stage 6
actually follov.rs Stage 5. The highest stage of moral development is a matter of speculation.

•ARE KOHLBERG'S STAGES ORGANIZED WHOLES?• If each of Kohlberg's stages forms

an organized \vhole, then individuals should use the same level of moral reasoning across
many tasks and situations~not just for hypothetical dilem-
mas but for everyday moral problems as \Veil. In focusing on
hypothetical dilemmas, Kohlberg emphasized the rational
\\'eighing of alternatives but neglected other influences on
moral judgment. \Vhen researchers asked adolescents and
adults to recall and discuss a real-life moral dilemma, they
focused most often on relationships-whether to continue
helping a friend \vho is taking advantage of you, \vhether to
live \Vith your mother or \Vith your father after their separa-
tion. Although participants mentioned reasoning as the
most frequent strategy for resolving these dilemmas, they

~s::::~~{%$S"'-**;;4$~€~~~~l~~Yffi~~J
Longitudinal trends in moral reasoning at each stage in
Kohlberg's 20-year study of adolescent boys. Note that as
the lower stages decline, Stage 4 reasoning increases slowly and
gradually with age,. eventually becoming the typical response.
(From A. Colby, L Kohlberg, J. C. Gibbs, & M. Lieberman, 1983, "A Longitudinal 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 .30 32 34 36
Study of Moral Judgment," Monographs of the Society for Research in Child
Development, 48{1-2, Serial No. 2001p.46. ©The Society for Research in Age in Years
Child Development, Inc. Reprinted by permission.)
 492
®Will the 14-year-o!d girls on
the left accept a peer's offer of
a cigarette? Real-life moral
dilemmas, involving on-the-
spot decision making, bring out
the motivational and emotional
sides of moral judgment along
with practical considerations
involved in resolving conflicts.
©Eliza be.th Zucke.rman!PhotoEdit
TABLE 12.1 RELATIONSHIPS AMONG KOHLBERG'S MORAL, PIAGET'S COGNITIVE,
AND SELMAN'S PERSPECTIVE-TAKING STAGES
I I• I - I ....
Punishment and
obedience orientation
·1 Instrumental purpose
orientation
:1
"Good boy-good girl"
orientation
I Social-order-maintaining
orientation
Social contract
orientation
Universal ethical
principle orientation
~To review these stages, return to Table 11.2 on page. 466.
PART IV • PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT wvN1.ablongman.com/berk
also posed other strategies, such as talking through issues \vith others,
relying on intuition that their decision \Vas right, and calling on
notions of religion and spirituality. Especially striking V..'ere expres-
sions of anguish in \\'ork.ing through everyday dilemmas. People men-
tioned feeling drained, confused, and tom by temptation~a motiva-
tional and emotional side of moral judgment not tapped by
hypothetical situations (Walker, 2004; Walker et al., 1995, 1999).
Although everyday moral reasoning corresponds to Kohlberg's
scheme, it typically falls at a lo\\'er stage than responses to hypothet-
ical dilemmas (VValker & Jvforan, 1991). Real-life problems seem to
elicit reasoning below a person's actual capacity because they bring
out many practical considerations. Hypothetical sih1ations, in con-
trast, evoke the upper limits 9f adolescents' and adults' moral
thought because they allo'v reflection 'vithout the interference of
personal risks.As one participant in a study involving both types of dilemmas observed, "It's a lot
easier to be moral when you have nothing to lose" (Walker et al., 1995, pp. 381-382).
The influence of situational factors on moral reasoning indicates that like Piaget's cogni-
tive stages, Kohlberg's moral stages are loosely organized Rather than developing in a neat,
step,vise fashion, people dra'v on a range of moral responses that vary,vith context. VVith age,
this range shifts up,vard as less mature moral reasoning is gradually replaci::d by more
advanced moral thought (Fischer & Bidell, 1998; Siegler, 1996).
• COGNITIVE PREREQUISITES FOR MORAL REASONING •Moral maturity, whether
based on Piaget's theory or that of Kohlberg, is positively correlated 'vith IQ~ performance on
Piagetian cognitive tasks, and perspective-taking skill (Lickona, 1976; \.Valker & Hennig,
1997). Kohlberg (1976) argued that each moral stage requires certain cognitive and perspec-
tive-taking capacities, but that these are not enough to ensure moral advances. In addition,
reorganization of thought unique to the moral domain is necessary. In other \Vords, Kohlberg
hypothesized that cognitive and perspective-taking attainments are necessary but not sufficient
conditions for each moral stage.
Research indicates that, consistent \Vith Kohlberg's predictions, children and adolescents at
each moral stage score at either a higher stage or the matching stage of cognition and perspec-
tive taking, shown in Table 12.1 (Krebs & Gillmore, 1982; Selman, 1976; Walker, 1980). Still, the
domain in \vhich the cognitive ingredients required for more mature moral judgment first
emerge--cognitive, social 1 or moral-remains unclear. In Chapters 6 and 7, ,.,,e encountered a
\Vealth of evidence indicating that children display more advanced reasoning on tasks 'vith
. .. -
Fear of authority and avoidance Preoperational, early Social-informational
of punishment concrete operational
Satisfying personal needs Concrete operational Self-reflective
Maintaining the affection and Early formal operational Third-party
approval of friends and relatives
A duti; to uphold laws and rules Formal operational Societal
for their own sake
Fair procedures for changing
laws to protect individual rights
and the needs of the majority
Abstract unlversa! principles
that are valid for all humanity
CHAPTER 12 • MORAL DEVELOPMENT 493

\vhich they have mbre extensive experience. Young peop1ei.vho frequently grap-
ple \Vith social and moral issues may actually construct the cognitive supports
for more development directly--..vhile reasoning about social or moral con-
cerns (Damon, 1977; Gibbs, 2003).
Finally, Kohlberg's stage order makes sense to adolescents and adults \Vho
have not studied his theory. When Russian high school and Dutch university
students -..vere asked to sort statements typical of Kohlberg's stages, they tended
to rank reasoning at each consecutive stage as more sophisticated. Hui;vever,
the higher the stage, the more participants disagreed in their rankings because
they had difficulty ordering statements beyond their O\vn current stage
(Boom, Brugman, & van der Heijden, 2001).

Are There Sex Differences in Moral Reasoning?

As "\Ve have seen, real-life moral dilen1mas highlight the contribution of emo-
tion to moral judgment. Return to leisl's moral reasoning in the opening to @Kristopher Knowles, age 14,
this chapter and notice ho'v her argument focuses on caring and co1nmitment to others. Carol accompanied by supporters,
Gilligan (1982) is the best-known figure among those "\Vho haVe argued that Kohlberg's the- completes his cross-Canada
ory----originaily formulated on the basis of intervie,vs 'vith males--<loes not adequately rep- walk to raise awareness for
resent the morality of girls and women. Gilligan believes that feminine morality emphasizes organ donation, having visited
an "ethic of care" that is devalued in Kohlberg's system. Leisl's reasoning falls at Kohlberg's over 200 cities and towns and
Stage 3 because it iS based on interpersonal obligations. In contrast, Stages 4 to 6 stress jus- generated over 800 media
tice-an abstract, rational commitment to moral ideals. According to Gilligan, a concern for stories. Kristopher has been -
oth~rs is a different, not less valid, basis for moral judgment than a focus on impersonal rights. waiting for a liver since birth.
After surviving twenty opera-
Many studies have tested Gilligan's hypothesis that Kohlberg's approach underestimates the
tions, he decided to take
moral maturity of females, and most do not support it (Turiel, 1998). On hypothetical dilem-
action, not just for himself
mas as 'vell as everyday moral problems, adolescent and adult females display reasoning at the but for thousands of people
same stage as their male counterparts, and sometimes at a higher stage. Also, themes of justice worldwide who also await a
and caring appear in the responses of both sexes, and 'vhen girls do raise interpersonal concerns, life-saving transplant.
they are not downgraded in Kohlberg's system (Jadack et al., 1995; Kahn, 1992; Walker, 1995). Kristopher's feat exemplifies
These findings suggest that although Kohlberg emphasized justice rather than caring as the complex~ care-based moral
highest of moral ideals, his theory includes both sets of values. understanding.
Still, Gilligan makes a po,verful claim that research on moral development has been lim- © CP Photo/Adrian Wyld
ited by too much attention to rights and justice (a "masculine" ideal) and too little attention
to care and responsiveness (a "feminine" ideal). Some evidence shov,rs that although the
morality of males and females taps both orientations, females do tend to stress care, or
empathic perspective taldng, \vhereas males either stress justice or f6cus equally on justice and
care (Jaffe & Hyde, 2000; Wark & Krebs, 1996; Weisz & Black, 2002).
The difference in emphasis appears most often in real-life rather than hypothetical dilem-
mas. Consequently, it may be largely a function of 'vomen's greater involvement in daily activi-
ties involving care and concern for others. In one study, American and Canadian 17- to 26-year-
old females sho\ved more complex reasoning about care issues than their male
counterparts. But as Figure 12.4 sho,vs, Nor\vegian males 1vere just as advanced as
Norv,regian females in care-based understanding (Skoe, 1998). Perhaps Nor\vegian cul-
ture, which endorses gender equality at home, at school, and in the workplace, induces 25
boys and men to think deeply about interpersonal obligations.
Collectivist values of Asian cultures explicitly emphasize care and concern for
others as a societal norm. In one study, Japanese adolescents almost ahvays inte-
grated care and justice reasoning. At the same time, both males and females stressed
caring, "\vhich they regarded as a communal responsibility. As one boy remarked,
yasashii (kindness/gentleness) and ornoiyari (empathy) are "something 'normal' that
everyone sho,vs" (Shimizu, 2001).

> iQt!111ijfJSWt4# g~g¥~*#Fi@:~;i~i~~I~~~11

Complex reasoning about care issues among U.S. and Canadian versus Norwegian males
and females. In this study of 17- to 26-year-olds, North American females scored much 0
U.S. and Norway
higher than males in complex care-based understanding. In contrast, Norwegian males and Canada
females displayed equally advanced care-based understanding. (Adapted from Skoe, 1998.}