Saudi Iranian Rapprochement

-Shristi Sharma

The announcement of a deal to reestablish diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia came
on March 10 after representatives of both nations had been meeting covertly for five days in
Beijing, China. The two nations have been at odds for more than four decades, with tensions
first emerging at a low level during a previous détente in the 1990s and then rising in the last
two decades. Seven years ago, Riyadh publicly cut its ties with Tehran. Although the nations’
efforts to heal ties were well known—Iraq and Oman having previously held rounds of
negotiations between Iranian and Saudi officials—China’s participation in mediating the
agreement as well as how quickly the thaw has developed were unexpected. The Joint Trilateral
Statement released by the three nations portends a geopolitical shift that will see China play a
bigger role in a region where the United States has traditionally held sway.

Prospects for Regional Peace:

An issue that is as crucial is whether and how much the Beijing accord will help in controlling or
even ending tensions in other parts of the Middle East. Devastating battles in Yemen and Syria
have been exacerbated by Riyadh and Tehran’s rival regional agendas, which have also been
feeding instability in Lebanon and Iraq. Many Gulfs Arab governments have long been
concerned about direct threats from Iranian proxies, or even assaults by them, as well as about
claims that Iran supports opposition activities. Israel, on the other hand, considers Iran’s nuclear
programme to be an existential danger.
A timeline for resuming diplomatic relations within two months is provided under the Saudi
Iranian accord. If all goes as planned, it may lessen the bitter animosity that has existed
between the two nations for many years. The implementation of the deal now seems to be
moving forward quickly: King Salman of Saudi Arabia welcomed Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi to
Riyadh, and on April 6, the foreign ministers of the two nations met in Beijing.
The accord may help ease tensions in the larger Gulf area while simultaneously enhancing
bilateral relations. The agreement was praised by officials in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait,
and Oman as a step towards peace and prosperity that will benefit all parties. Although the
agreement is a “positive first step,” it will take some time for Saudi Arabia to start to trust Iran
again after years of hostility. Even Bahrain, which is famously reluctant to interact with Iran,
released a statement praising the deal and expressing hope for the peaceful resolution of
disputes.
In coming to an accord, Riyadh and Tehran each have their own special reasons and goals in
mind. This mismatch presents both an opportunity and a danger; on the one hand, it raises the
possibility of a situational and transactional agreement and, as a result, of a tenuous
reconciliation since any side may alter direction if goals are attained. The difficulties of making
reconciliation a longer-lasting process are highlighted by conflicting agendas and doubts about
the deal’s sincerity.
From a strategic standpoint, the agreement moves the conflict away from political and security
competition and towards economic competition, which is less expensive for both parties.
Saudi Arabia’s assessment of the United States’ shifting objectives over the past ten years has
altered the Kingdom’s security calculations. President Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran in
2015 and his stated policy that Iran and Saudi Arabia “need to find an effective way to share the
neighbourhood and institute some sort of cold peace”, has now been overtaken by the United
States’ desire to withdraw from the MENA region and move its military and diplomatic
resources to better serve its competition with China. The Kingdom’s options in reaction to these
shifting security calculations are to either defuse tensions with Iran or strengthen the current
security assurances it receives from the US by utilizing great power rivalry to its advantage and
diversifying its security fulfilment. Riyadh appears to have selected a multifaceted approach. On
the one hand, there is diplomatic interaction with Iran to add diplomacy to deterrence. On the
other hand, Saudi Arabia is attempting to take advantage of chances for multilateral diplomacy
to enlist a new political guarantor with more clout over Tehran, in this instance China. These
changes do not aim to displace the United States but rather to work with China in areas where
U.S. policy has shown to be weak or inefficient.
Saudi Arabia has no desire to see conflict break out in the Gulf. The area is dangerously close to
war as a result of the failure of the United States’ policy of applying maximum pressure to Iran,
Tehran’s policy of accelerating uranium enrichment, and Israel’s threats to destroy Iran’s nuclear
facilities. Saudi Arabia does not want to take part in this escalated situation because it will
jeopardize its security and stall its social and economic change. A breakthrough with Iran makes
it very plain to Israel, the United States, and Iran that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is unwilling
to risk going to war directly with its neighbour.
Saudi Arabia and China have mutual strategic economic, political, and security interests. China
mediated the accord with Iran, which strengthens their bilateral ties. More importantly, because
China has both political and economic sway over Iran, the latter will be more motivated to
uphold its end of the bargain in order to avoid harming the reputation of its ally and running the
risk of retaliation — a factor that was overlooked in earlier attempts to reach an agreement with
Iran. To put it another way, Saudi Arabia is hoping that China’s involvement would ensure a
more robust accord.
Since rivalry is expensive, Saudi Arabia places utmost importance on the stability of the area.
Saudi Arabia is not signing the pact out of altruistic motives; rather, it recognizes that removing
the zero-sum dynamic from the area would have significant economic benefits for the Kingdom,
including but not limited to access to Iran’s sizable market as bilateral ties improve.
More importantly, Saudi Arabia will want to maintain close ties with the United States due to
historical and security considerations (the United States continues to be the Kingdom’s primary
military supplier), which could cause Iran to continue to question the effects of these relations
as it works to drive the United States out of the region. Finally, Saudi Arabia has a stake in
sustaining the pressure on Iran to comply to the nuclear agreement since Iran is a nuclear
threshold state that could readily build nuclear weapons if it so chooses. Iran has none the less
always stated that it has no nuclear weapons ambitions.
Over the past 10 years, ties between Riyadh and Teheran have developed beyond the usual
political and religious disputes. The militarization and securitization of relationships is the
prevailing trend in our period. Despite the chance it provides to resolve regional disputes
between the two countries, the agreement will still be subject to their own security policies.