1NC

1NC—OFF
Interpretation: The affirmative must defend the reduction of bases and troops and
non-covert operations
Department of Defense ’17 – DOD INSTRUCTION 3000.12 MANAGEMENT OF U.S. GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE (GDP), May 8,
2017. https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/300012p.pdf. TDI

GDP. The U.S. forces and capabilities forward stationed and rotationally deployed for
defense activities in U.S. foreign and overseas locations, as well as the network of
bases and infrastructure and international agreements and arrangements that
underwrite and support the stationing, deployment, and employment of these forces.
It is the network of HN relationships and agreements, activities, footprint, and forces

that comprise forward U.S. military presence and capabilities to address current and
future security challenges
Violation: They defend the removal of contractors which are not legally sanctioned
institutions nor are they military presence. Horton and Gregg in the 1AC just justifies
the violation – they defend not bases and military presence. It’s embarrassing how
egregious this violation is.

Vote neg:
1. Predictable Limits. Broad definitions lack interpretive integrity. At
best they’re Extra T
Merelli ’14 [Annalisa; reporter at Quartz. M.A. and a B.A. in communication from the University of Bologna. April 2, 2015; “These are all
the countries where the US has a military presence”; Quartz; http://qz.com/374138/these-are-all-the-countries-where-the-us-has-a-military-
presence/] TDI

The information about troops abroad, too, isn’t completely clear, which makes it difficult to know the true extent of the American military
footprint. IHS Jane’s armed forces analyst Dylan Lehrke told Quartz that it’s hard to even settle on the definition of military
presence — for the government, that means bases or deployed troops , although it would seem
acceptable to include other forms of presence :

Surely one could say that the US has a military presence in Syria at the moment. They may not have
bases and troops on the ground but we should include the warplanes in the sky . The US military
arguably has more presence in Syria than it does in Germany […]. To take this idea further, it would also be rational to say the US has a

military presence wherever it uses u nmanned a erial v ehicles to strike targets.

All the countries that have some sort of American military presence — from one military
attaché to the troops involved in Iraq and Afghanistan — essentially results in highlighting pretty much
the entire world (Russia included, where the DoD reports having 24 military personnel ).

2. Ground –Disads and core topic lit are about military discuss US
overseas presence in the context of permanent basing. Covert/non-
official troops skirts the links to alliances and deterrences because it’s
not actually part of U.S. grand strategy or posturing.
Meernik ’94 [James; University of North Texas. 1994; “Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force”;
International Studies Quarterly, Volume 38] TDI

American Military Presence. The first, and perhaps most important indicator of U.S. involvement, is
the establishment of a permanent American military base . Not only does such a military
presence signify an especially close relationship between the host country and the
United States, it also demonstrates that the U nited S tates is necessarily involved should any
aggression against the host country take place. This trip-wire function ensures that U.S. credibility
and interests are always and obviously at stake in any matters that threaten the stability of the host country or
the U.S. presence. Military bases are defined to include all permanent U.S. facilities that are home to army, navy, or air force combat-oriented
units according to either the Department of Defense Annual Reports (various years) or Harkavy (1989). This leads to the following proposition:
H1: Situations occurring where there is an established U.S. military presence increase the level of the military response.

Excludes covert and classified missions

DeWaard 6 [Chad DeWaard, President of Department of Political Science in the Graduate School Southern Illinois University Carbondale,
May 2006,http://www.scribd.com/doc/6570993/Official-Development-Assistance-Unmasked-Theoretical-Models-of-International-Relations-
and-the-Determinants-of-American-German-And-Swedish-Aid] TDI

Military presence is defined by at least one hundred active-duty military personnel who are permanently stationed in host countries . Forces that are

temporarily deployed for covert or classified operations or forces deployed for humanitarian
relief do not constitute a "presence" in the sense employed here. Also excluded from consideration are those forces not under direct control of the
United States or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Accordingly. UN sponsored forces that may or may not include contingents from the U.S. or NATO
member-countries are disqualified. This definition also avoids the tricky business of quantifying the approximately 12,000 American overseas military bases or
installations from 1945 to 1988 that have housed (sometimes on a regular basis) U.S. forces. As such, the United States enjoys access to hundreds of military
installations in allied or friendly countries and territorial possessions that are occupied by only a handful of military personnel. While most of these
installations are owned and maintained by the U.S. government and generally indicate security agreements between the U.S. and host nations, they alone do not
constitute a military presence. Many overseas facilities that are frequently utilized by American air. land, and naval forces are in fact owned by foreign
governments (Blaker 1990). Unquestionably, access to these facilities contributes significantly to U.S. military capabilities in the area, but military capability is not
within the purview of this study. Admittedly, access to these foreign-owned installations also suggests some degree of American presence." Yet "access," per se, is
not the central component of this variable in the distribution of ODA. Moreover, this presence is discretionary, in that the extent of any American presence is
contingent upon the approval of host governments. Finally, the United States maintains military offices in most countries which serve diplomatic or liaison functions
between the U.S. and the host governments. For example, throughout the 1980s, the U.S. maintained a greater military "presence1' in the former Soviet Union
(e.g., 43 in 1980, 51 in 1984) than in most of the former's Latin American allies who were and are obligated to mutual defense under the Rio Treaty of the

Organization of American States (OAS). U.S. military personnel in Soviet Russia thus can hardly be viewed as a military presence. Only when a
substantial number of military personnel regularly occupy facilities owned by the
deploying government or the host government can we speak of a visible military
presence in any real sense.

PMCs aren’t even the U.S. military and include international organizations and
substate actors. At best they’re egregiously extra topical – like come on
Britannica n.d. [(encyclopedia Britannica) “Private Military Company” Encyclopedia Britannica. No Date] AW

Private military company (PMC), independent corporation that

offers military services to national governments, international organizations, and
substate actors . Private military companies (PMCs) constitute an important and deeply controversial element of the privatized
military industry. PMCs specialize in providing combat and protection forces. Their work ranges from running small-scale training missions to
providing combat units composed of up to several hundred highly trained soldiers equipped with powerful weapons platforms,
including tanks and attack helicopters.

And their duties are covert and include:

IDT 22 [(Indeed Editorial Team writing on PMCs for wage and job clarification) “Private Military Company Pay vs. Army Pay: What’s the
Difference?” Indeed. 2022] AW

These
Private military company pay is the compensation given to service members who work as private military contractors (PMCs).

contractors are individuals who perform specific military-related tasks, such as

gathering intelligence, patrolling government grounds, protecting persons of interest
and creating security plans. Many PMCs work for the CIA and may receive
compensation bonuses for combat involvement. They may also work for private
organizations outside of the military exclusively, such as large agencies or entities.

Because private military companies are discrete by nature , there's little available data about payroll or related
information. Public information shows that these companies typically offer compensation for

performing missions that involve security, search and destroy, combat initiatives and
other covert operations. Some examples of private contractor pay for various positions include:
Paradigm issues:
1. Drop the debater – their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start
2. Competing interps – reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention and a race to
the bottom of questionable argumentation
3. Fairness is a voter – necessary to determine the better debater
4. Education is a voter – why schools fund debate
5. No RVIs – you shouldn’t win for being fair
 1NC–OFF
Ally-ship is strong now – the U.S. has moved past Trump’s shortcomings, but still has
much to prove
Grossman 12/8 [(Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation, an adjunct professor at the University of
Southern California, and a former daily intelligence briefer to the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs.)
“America’s Indo-Pacific Alliances are Astonishingly Strong” RAND Corporation. December 8 th, 2023] AW

A widespread criticism of the Trump administration's foreign policy is that it wrecked

—or at least severely undermined—the United States' power and standing in the
world, particularly by alienating longstanding allies and partners . Besides his public disdain for NATO, then–
U.S. President Donald Trump questioned aloud why the United States maintained a security alliance with Japan, pressed South Korea to pay
five-fold more to house U.S. troops, and approved of then–Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's plan to terminate a visiting forces agreement
with the U.S. military. He also picked fights with India and Vietnam—two emerging strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific that could be key to
countering China—over alleged unfair trade practices. To top it off, Trump apparently didn't share the same commitment to defending Taiwan
against Chinese military aggression as other U.S. leaders, including his successor, current U.S. President Joe Biden.

But as 2023 draws to a close, it is remarkable to observe that U.S. alliances and
partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are just about the deepest and most robust they have been in all
their history. Some of this is a testament to the exceptional durability of the United States' alliances and partnerships, given that they survived
—and, in the case of India and Japan, even thrived—in spite of Trump's bullying and destructiveness. Indeed, Washington has been cultivating
and institutionalizing these friendship networks for decades. Credit is also due to the Biden administration: Not only has it returned these
important relationships to their normal status quo following four years of disruption under Trump, but it has also bolstered them to enhance
deterrence against China and North Korea, the two main threats in the region.

The Biden team is also receiving a huge assist from Beijing itself, whose relentless assertiveness is
heightening anxiety among its neighbors. This has convinced more and more countries in the region to ditch their hedging—the old but
increasingly unworkable mantra of not wanting to choose sides—and engage in a balancing strategy against China, just as any student of
international relations would predict.

Although it is theoretically possible that Chinese President Xi Jinping will look to dial down China's assertiveness in the aftermath of his
Beijing's growing economic and
productive meeting with Biden in mid-November, this looks unlikely for several reasons.

military strength is boosting its confidence to push ahead, on its own terms, with
longstanding sovereignty and territorial claims in the region . And Beijing has certainly not shied away
from fiercely waging strategic competition against Washington in the region and beyond. North Korea is similarly pushing U.S. allies in
northeast Asia closer together by constantly threatening additional ballistic missile and nuclear tests.

it is
It is unclear whether this new geostrategic balancing is good or bad for prospects of maintaining global peace and stability. Regardless,

clearly good news for the United States, which is bolstering and expanding its already
robust alliance and partnership network.
In Northeast Asia, the United States is in a historically powerful position. The U.S.-
Japan security alliance has always been the cornerstone of Washington's strategy in
the region, but today the two allies cooperate and coordinate on nearly every aspect of their foreign policy and defense strategy. As a like-minded democratic power that seeks a free and open Indo-Pacific, Tokyo is part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad (alongside Australia, India, and the United States). In recent years, Japan has

carved out some wiggle room from Article 9 of its constitution to allow it to conduct military operations farther away from Japanese shores, including joint patrols with the U.S. Navy and other partners in the South China Sea. Japan consistently raises not only concerns over North Korea, but also the need to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, which has greatly irked
China as it considers Taiwan's status an internal matter. Washington and Tokyo are further deepening their intelligence sharing against these threats, and Japan is enhancing security cooperation with other U.S. allies and partners, such as the Philippines, South Korea, India, and Vietnam.

It is hard to imagine relations with the United States' other security ally in Northeast Asia, South Korea, being much better than they are now. Since the election of South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol last year, Seoul has staunchly supported U.S. initiatives not only concerning the peninsula, but also in the general region and beyond. In most respects, Yoon is mirroring the Biden
administration's approach toward North Korea, which is essentially one of strategic patience—a policy first adopted by the Obama administration that seeks to ignore Pyongyang until sanctions bite hard enough for it to come to the negotiating table on denuclearization. Under Yoon, South Korea has also deepened its alliance with the United States by expanding information sharing
and coordination into the nuclear domain—a new milestone for the two countries.

Yoon also took the unprecedented step of meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in March, the first such visit of a South Korean leader to Japan in over a decade. Relations have been perpetually frustrated by South Korean grievances over Japan's World War II–era atrocities on the peninsula. And in August, Biden met with Yoon and Kishida simultaneously at Camp
David, marking the first-ever such tripartite summit. Like Japan, South Korea has been outspoken against China's aggressive behavior toward Taiwan. Yoon also took the unprecedented step of attending an annual NATO summit—not just once, but twice—to criticize both China's assertiveness and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, underscoring his view that South Korea must become
what he called “a global pivotal state” that looks beyond its own peninsula.

The U.S.-Taiwan partnership is the strongest it has been since 1979, the year Washington revoked diplomatic recognition of Taipei in favor of Beijing. Taiwan has consistently welcomed high-level U.S. engagement, most recently when then–House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited the island in August 2022. Taipei has also embraced U.S. legislation dating back to the Trump era—namely
the Taiwan Travel Act and TAIPEI Act—that has sought to entrench Taiwan's de facto sovereignty and independence from China, widening Taiwan's diplomatic breathing room for higher-level relationships with the United States and other countries around the world.
Under Biden, the U.S. Navy continues to sail warships through the Taiwan Strait on a near-monthly basis to demonstrate the strait's international status and deter Beijing. Washington also remains committed to regular arms sales. On four separate occasions, Biden has publicly stated that if China ever attacked Taiwan, the United States would intervene militarily, regardless of the
fact that Washington has no security alliance with Taipei—nor even recognizes it as a country. Although Biden's statements have created jitters among some in Taiwan (reportedly including Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen herself) that Washington may be unnecessarily provoking Beijing, this is an unprecedented level of commitment to the island that Taipei has
certainly welcomed. Regardless of who wins Taiwan's presidential election in January 2024, the new government is almost certain to implement a U.S.-friendly policy. Even China-friendly opposition nominees would be hard-pressed to do otherwise, given the Taiwanese public's desire to elevate U.S. support.

Key Southeast Asian nations are shifting toward alignment with the United States, too. The U.S.-Philippines alliance, for example, has fully recovered from Duterte's flirt with Beijing. Since entering office in 2022, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has met with Biden twice, and Washington continues to underscore its “ironclad” commitment to the Philippine government in
Manila as the latter faces increasingly aggressive and coercive gray-zone tactics within its exclusive economic zone, including at Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Shoal, and Pag-asa Island. Notably, after a particularly aggressive incident on Oct. 22, during which two Chinese ships rammed a Philippine resupply mission to Second Thomas Shoal and its Philippine Coast Guard escort,
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and Biden himself all reiterated that the U.S.-Philippines mutual defense treaty could be triggered if China attacks Philippine government and military assets.

Although bothersome and worrying, Beijing's tactics have remained beneath this threshold, suggesting that deterrence has been
effective . But not leaving anything to chance, Manila earlier this year expanded the number of military bases covered by its Enhanced
Defense Cooperation Arrangement with Washington from five to nine, allowing U.S. forces to predeploy weapons and rotational troops to
assist in a future China-related contingency. Marcos has further expressed concerns over the Taiwan Strait and has welcomed stepped-up
patrols in the South China Sea by the U.S., Australian, and Japanese navies. In late November, Marcos visited U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
headquarters in Hawaii, subsequently welcoming joint U.S.-Philippines air and sea patrols not far from Taiwan, the first joint patrols since
Duterte suspended them in 2016.
In September, Biden visited Vietnam to raise the two countries' partnership from “comprehensive” to “comprehensive strategic”—the highest level in Hanoi's hierarchy of external relations, putting the United States on par with China, India, Japan, Russia, and South Korea. (Vietnam only elevated South Korea's and Japan's statuses in December 2022 and last month, respectively.)
Vietnam boosted the United States to the top category in part to deepen security cooperation against China in the South China Sea, where Hanoi also has serious sovereignty and territorial disputes with Beijing.

Since Indonesian President Joko Widodo's visit to the White House last month, the United States and Indonesia have their own upgraded “comprehensive strategic partnership.” When U.S. Defense Secretary Austin was at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations defense ministers' meeting in Jakarta in November, the two nations also signed a defense cooperation agreement.
Although details have yet to be released, it is clear that the United States and Indonesia are pursuing closer security cooperation on a variety of fronts, including in maritime domain awareness, that could be leveraged against China.

As a de facto security ally short of formal treaty status, Singapore quietly continues to provide the United States with access to the Changi Naval Base on the strategically critical Strait of Malacca that connects the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Singapore also continues its longstanding participation in various military exercises with U.S. and allied forces. Although the country has not
joined Washington's mini-lateral security initiatives in the region, such as the Quad and the Australia–United Kingdom–United States security pact (known as AUKUS), it nevertheless supports them.

Meanwhile, in South Asia, Washington's burgeoning strategic partnership with New Delhi keeps reaching new heights. In June, Biden welcomed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the White House for an official state visit. The two leaders touted their shared democratic values, even if India is arguably becoming a less liberal democracy on Modi's watch, and pledged to expand
security cooperation in areas such as the coproduction of jet engines, the U.S. Navy's use of Indian port facilities, and the joint procurement of armed drones. Washington is hopeful that New Delhi, as a member of the Quad, might be willing to play a substantive role in countering China. Although India eschews formal alliances and is unlikely to support the United States in a military
conflict that does not directly impact itself, Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh notably called China out during talks last month with Blinken and Austin, stating: “We increasingly find ourselves in agreement [with the United States] on strategic issues, including countering China's aggression.”

Finally, the United States is playing a strong hand in Oceania. As evidenced during Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's official visit to the White House in October, Australia and the United States are increasingly marching in lockstep on the need to counter China in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries are not only cooperating in AUKUS, but also working on joint basing,
weapons production, enhanced air operations, and other measures. Australia is also forging military partnerships with other U.S. allies, including Japan and the Philippines.

Across the Tasman Sea, formerly skeptical New Zealand is starting to see eye-to-eye with the United States on China. The New Zealander government in Wellington has begun a massive rethink of its national security and defense strategy within the context of rising Chinese threats to the regional and global order. In a significant turn, Wellington published a series of reports over the
summer that observed China directly causing new challenges in New Zealand's neighborhood—a clear reference to the China–Solomon Islands security agreement inked last year. But following New Zealand's election last month, the new National Party government may take a more pro-business approach to China and try to insulate economic engagement from political and security
considerations.

Many Pacific Island countries have also expressed concerns about China and a preference for the United States. Palau and the Federated States of Micronesia both invited the United States to build military facilities within their territories. Both countries plus the Marshall Islands have renewed their Compacts of Free Association—unique international agreements that allow the U.S.
military virtually uninhibited access to their territories, airspaces, and surrounding waters. Since May, Washington also has a defense cooperation agreement with Papua New Guinea that authorizes U.S. forces to operate at six Papua New Guinean sites and establishes the country's participation in the U.S. Coast Guard's Shiprider program to help it patrol its 200-mile exclusive
economic zone. Meanwhile, Fiji seems poised to cancel a longstanding police training agreement with China because of a lack of shared values. Samoan Prime Minister Fiame Naomi Mataafa has expressed concerns over Beijing's Common Development Vision for the region—a policy former Micronesian President David Panuelo said (PDF) would entail giving China full control over
the lives of Pacific Islanders.

Even if U.S. alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific are exceedingly robust,
there is always room for improvement . Most glaringly, Thailand—a longstanding U.S. treaty ally—simply does not
see China as significant enough of a threat to address. This has resulted in some strain in the bilateral alliance,

including the question of what the two nations should be working on together. U.S. sanctions against Thailand following the

2014 Thai military coup frustrated Bangkok, which briefly turned to Beijing for security cooperation, particularly on submarine procurement. Washington relieved sanctions in 2019, and the alliance is slowly returning to normal. Another wrinkle is that Thailand has a new prime minister, Srettha Thavisin, whose foreign policy priorities are largely unknown. Another blind spot in
Southeast Asia is Washington's virtual lack of any engagement of Cambodia and Laos—a missed opportunity to challenge China in its own backyard. The United States could, for example, leverage its upgraded partnership with Vietnam to engage the two nations, with whom Hanoi has exceptionally close relationships.

The aff reverses allied confidence – that decks legitimacy and alliance structures
Weschler 21 [(William F. Wechsler is director of the Rafik Hariri Center and Middle East programs at the Atlantic Council.) “ No,
the U.S. Shouldn’t Withdraw From the Middle East ” Atlantic Council. June 24 th
, 2021] AW

Proposed policy changes

Rather than argue for a return to pre-2003 policies, which often involved restraint but also typically required consistent US presence and
leadership, the authors advocate instead for a radical military withdrawal that would inevitably have much wider implications. They state that
their proposals “might strike some as dramatic.” In this case, it can be argued, “some” would include all long-standing US regional partners and
the vast majority of US national security professionals, both Democratic and Republican, who have worked on the region for decades.

My colleagues’ specific recommendations include the following (I have bolded some parts for emphasis):

“substantially reduce the number of US forces permanently stationed in the region,” including a call to “end or reduce the permanent
deployment of forces to Kuwait . . . as well as in other major bases in Iraq, Bahrain, and Oman”

“scale down or eliminate routine US Navy deployments” including the “anachronistic requirement to maintain a US carrier battle group”

“terminate routine overflights in the region” and “close many of the associated bases that support these operations”

call to repeal the Carter Doctrine, shut down the US Fifth Fleet
Make no mistake: this is a

(headquartered in Bahrain), and eliminate much of the infrastructure, built over more
than half a century, that allows the United States the placement and access required
to protect US national security interests. This would be no mere redeployment or
retrenchment. It’s an argument for ending the routine projection of US power into the
region through the air and over the seas, and removing all US military personnel stationed within key partner nations, regardless of the

preferences of their leaders. No matter how artfully described , such a policy would be
immediately and correctly recognized by all regional leaders as a general US
withdrawal.
At that point, the biggest flaw in this plan would become immediately evident. The authors assert that, in order to protect US interests, the
United States should then make “greater investments in intelligence and early warning,” seek “close coordination with regional states,” and
engage in “robust diplomacy.” While these are worthy goals, in the context of a general withdrawal they are entirely unrealistic.

Mycolleagues assume that our relationships with host country policymakers and
security-sector officials would freeze in place and remain after departure. They assign zero value to the
day-to-day interactions between US forces and intelligence professionals, the influence this allows the United States to wield, and the
They ignore the criticality of military relationship building
atmospherics that can be gathered as a result.

and how the strength of those relationships transfers into improved interoperability
and common strategic perspectives. They ascribe limited agency to US partners, assuming that these partners will not
feel abandoned by the United States and seek out alternative arrangements to meet their security needs. You can surge a lot of things, but as
Admiral William McRaven has said, “you can’t surge trust.”

calls for greater reliance on diplomacy in the region would come as a

Furthermore, the

surprise to almost every modern US president—with Trump, perhaps, the sole exception—and their secretaries
of state, each of whom dedicated disproportionate time to exactly that. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton became the personal action
officers for diplomacy at Camp David between Israel and Egypt and between Israel and the Palestinians, respectively. US Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger first made an art of “shuttle diplomacy” in the region, and Secretaries James Baker and John Kerry proudly boasted of the
number of trips they had taken there. President George H. W. Bush spent countless hours on the personal diplomacy necessary to build a
coalition to liberate Kuwait, and thus restore the status quo, while his son, who upended that status quo, had regular personal calls with the
leaders of Iraq and Afghanistan.

This diplomacy was possible only in the wider context of American military strength , a
self-evident linkage of hard power and diplomatic prowess. Now that Russia has reentered the region militarily, it too has successfully leveraged
its newfound position for its diplomatic ends. At the same time, former regional powers that have long since withdrawn militarily do not tend to
A simple trade-off seeking to replace military power
find themselves at the center of regional diplomacy.

with diplomatic power is wishful thinking, at best.

This approach is particularly infeasible when applied to US counterterrorism

objectives . The authors argue that “adequate counterterrorism capacity can be maintained primarily with more robust access
agreements and cooperation from local partners,” without explaining how access agreements are supposed to improve in the context of US
withdrawal—or how the United States is supposed to maintain cooperation with people who feel it is in the process of deserting them. The
approach assumes, as my colleagues write, that the “threat is mostly local and manageable with only a small, residual US military presence, if
that” (emphasis added). In reality, Salafi jihadists have a near-perfect record of shifting to external attacks once they have attained a local
sanctuary, and successful indirect action requires the United States to take on more risk, not less.

Similarly, as recent events clearly demonstrate, a requirement for “over the horizon” counterterrorism
and “offshore balancing” requires more regional naval presence rather than less . With no
shortage of irony, the US departure from Afghanistan has recently necessitated the deployment of the only aircraft carrier based in Asia toward
the Middle East. Moreover, since the new policy is to support Afghan national security forces
from afar—exactly as my colleagues prefer—it will require the United States to keep more ships
and aircraft in the Gulf region , operating out of many of the same bases that the
authors want to close.
there is no win-win scenario when it comes to withdrawal: no way to protect US interests
In the end,

without taking on the necessary costs or risks, and certainly no way to do so and still
maintain (or improve!) regional partnerships and US diplomacy.
U.S. military presence deters conflict, affirms alliances, and solves existential risk
Wormuth 20 [(Christine Elizabeth Wormuth is an American defense official and career civil servant who serves as the United States
Secretary of the Army since 2021. Wormuth previously served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2014 to 2016) “The Role of
Allies and Partners in U.S. Military Strategy and Operations” September 23 rd, 2020] AW

Particularly in an era of great-power competition with China and Russia, the network
of alliances and partnerships the United States has developed over the past 75 years
provides it with a unique comparative advantage . These networks , particularly in Europe and Asia,
are the backbone of the international order that has ensured relative peace and
security since the end of World War II and created the space for so much economic growth, not just in the
United States but around the world. Allies and friends help share the burden of common defense in

tangible and intangible ways. Day in and day out, the United States and its allies share intelligence, train and exercise
together, and operate compatible weapon systems —coming together to create combined capabilities that far exceed what the United States
could bring to bear on its own.

One doesn’t have to look far back into history to find examples of the importance of allies and partners to U.S. national security strategy and
military operations. Allies and partners from around the world joined U.S. forces in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks and fought
alongside them in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many joined U.S. forces again to fight the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria beginning in 2014. Without the
basing and access agreements granted by U.S. allies and partners, without allied and partner trainers and special forces on the ground, and
without the equipment these allies and friends provided to partner forces in Iraq and Syria, defeating the Islamic State and eliminating its
the United States is
physical caliphate would have been far more costly, and the fight would have taken much longer. In Europe,

working closely with NATO allies to deter Russia while, at the same time, guarding
against internal threats to freedom driven by ethno-nationalism and illiberalism. The
United States is also working with its European allies and partners to find ways to address
challenges posed by an increasingly powerful and assertive China. In Asia, U.S. allies and
partners play an essential role in deterring aggression , maintaining stability , and
ensuring free access to the global commons . U.S. alliances with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea
and partnerships with many other countries in the region strengthen the United States’ ability to confront a variety of security threats, such as
North Korea’s growing nuclear weapon and long-range missile programs, China’s military build-up and sweeping territorial claims in the South
China Sea, and the continuing threat of violent extremism.

Changes Are Coming and More Change Is Needed

It has become almost a cliché to say that the United States is at a strategic inflection point, standing at
a crossroads, or perhaps is even facing the end of the international world order as we know it. Whatever you call it, the period when the United States was the sole superpower is ending, and the country now faces significant challenges ahead—most prominently, competing successfully against a rising China while reducing the risks of

war with Beijing. This is going to require the United States to change its national security approach—a challenging assignment under normal circumstances but one that will be even more difficult because national security institutions will almost inevitably face pressure to trim budgets and because many other important domestic problems will compete for policymakers’ time and

attention. Allies and partners will remain critically important in this changing landscape , but the United States

needs to adapt and strengthen its network of alliances and partnerships to better position itself for this era of great-power competition. The zero-based reviews of the regional combatant commands that Secretary of Defense Mark Esper commissioned a year ago and that are wrapping up at the end of this month will inform DoD’s effort to adjust its overseas footprint and activities.
To meet future challenges successfully in an era of finite resources, the United States needs to shore up deterrence in both Europe and Asia while carefully reducing its military footprint in the Middle East without creating more insecurity in that region. The Indo-Pacific Reassurance Initiative concept, included in both the House and Senate versions of the yet-to-be-finalized Fiscal Year
2021 National Defense Authorization Act, would be a valuable tool for DoD to shore up deterrence in Asia.

The United States also needs its allies and partners to do more for themselves and their
own security, as well as more with the United States, in some cases, if all are to meet
future challenges successfully. For instance, NATO allies need to continue to spend more on defense and make good on
their pledges to do so by 2024, without the United States becoming myopically focused on percentage of gross domestic product as the sole
U.S. allies and partners also need to continue working with the
metric of the health of the Alliance.

United States to share the burdens of providing peace and security around the world
—for example, in the Middle East, where France and Australia participate in the
maritime coalition interdicting weapon shipments to the Houthis, and in the South
China Sea, where Australia and Japan have joined the United States to conduct
freedom of navigation operations and hold naval exercises this year. Developing a comprehensive plan to adapt and revitalize the U.S. network of

alliances and rebalance the U.S. military footprint overseas is both an essential component of a broader strategy for great-power competition and a homework assignment that will take years to complete. Palau’s recent offer to host U.S. military bases and airfields and the Philippines’ decision to freeze its withdrawal from the Visiting Forces Agreements are positive developments
but there is much more work to be done. This is also an area in which DoD needs help from Congress. To compete successfully against China, deter Russian aggression, and recalibrate the U.S. military footprint in an era of finite resources, DoD will need to make difficult decisions about the kinds of systems in which it invests, how it is postured in key regions around the world, and
what kinds of capabilities it is willing to sell (or not sell) to its allies and friends. Congress is involved in all these decisions, and without support from Congress for the many tough calls that lie ahead, it will be much harder for DoD to make the strategic adjustments that are so clearly needed.

The Perils of a Neglected Garden

The United States’ network of alliances and partnerships has served the country well for decades and remains a unique comparative advantage for it strategically, but it cannot take these relationships for granted. Any military officer stationed overseas or fighting in a coalition likely would say that working with allies can be the hardest and most painstaking politico-military work
there is, but ultimately it pays critical dividends. Alliances and partnerships are like gardens: They don’t grow overnight, they must be tended carefully to flourish, and they can wither if they are neglected. Maintaining a network of alliances and partnerships takes sustained effort and reliable and consistent communications, and it rests on a foundation of shared objectives and trust.
Both the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy emphasize the importance of allies and partners for the security of the United States, but I am concerned that a widening gap has emerged between the rhetoric in these documents and the actions that U.S. leaders have taken involving many of the United States’ closest allies and friends. The U.S.

U.S. leaders have accused our European allies publicly and

commitment to NATO’s Article V security guarantee has repeatedly been called into question.

privately of taking the United States for granted and have even appeared to
contemplate withdrawing from the NATO alliance altogether. The decision to
withdraw as many as 12,000 U.S. military personnel from Germany without any
apparent advance consultation with Berlin has been publicly messaged as punishment
and makes little strategic sense given Russia’s continuing aggressive actions in Europe
and in the United States. Furthermore, the abrupt decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria
cleared the way for Turkey’s ensuing incursion into Syria, took U.S. allies and friends
by surprise, and left them wondering when the United States could be counted on . Deriding

Seoul as a free rider, the United States demanded that South Korea pay $5 billion to host U.S. troops on the peninsula, a 400-percent increase over the previous year’s bill, and has threatened multiple times to pull U.S. troops out of Korea entirely. Japan has also been threatened with a four-fold increase in payments to host U.S. bases. Growing threats from China and Russia mean
that the United States and its allies and friends need each other now more than ever. But growing points of friction and uncertainty in those alliance relationships can result in negative consequences. A 13-nation Pew Research Center survey released on September 15 showed that the share of the public with a favorable view of the United States was as low in several democratic
countries as it has been since Pew began polling almost 20 years ago.4 Ultimately, shared concerns over common threats and shared security interests lie at the heart of strong alliances and are what binds them together. But nations and their leaders must balance many competing demands and pressures to govern; hence, it is rare that the United States and its allies will see each
problem the same way or agree fully on how best to solve it. Building and sustaining alliances requires persuasion, persistence, consultation, an ability to listen, and a willingness to compromise. The chances are small that the United States’ closest friends would leave their alliances outright, but if the United States does not do a better job tending its gardens around the world, it may
find itself with friends who are far less willing to provide the support that is required to take on all of the hard work that lies ahead.

Only U.S. primacy prevents great-power conflict — multipolar revisionism fragments

the global order and causes nuclear war
Brands & Edel, 19 — Hal Brands; PhD, Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of
Advanced International Studies. Charles Edel; PhD, Senior Fellow and Visiting Scholar at the United States Studies Centre at the University of
Sydney. (“The Lessons of Tragedy: Statecraft and World Order;” Ch. 6: Darkening Horizon; Published by Yale University Press; //GrRv)
Each of these geopolitical challenges is different, and each reflects the distinctive interests, ambitions, and history of the country undertaking it.
Yet there is growing cooperation between the countries that are challenging the regional pillars of the U.S.-led order. Russia and China have
collaborated on issues such as energy, sales and development of military technology, opposition to additional U.S. military deployments on the
Korean peninsula, and naval exercises from the South China Sea to the Baltic. In Syria, Iran provided the shock troops that helped keep Russia’s
ally, Bashar al-Assad, in power, as Moscow provided the air power and the diplomatic cover. “Our cooperation can isolate America,” supreme
leader Ali Khamenei told Putin in 2017. More broadly, what links these challenges together is their opposition to the constellation of power,
norms, and relationships that the U.S.-led order entails, and in their propensity to use violence, coercion, and intimidation as means of making
that opposition effective. Taken collectively, these challenges constitute a geopolitical sea change from the post-Cold War era.
The revival of great-power competition entails higher international tensions than the world has known for decades, and
the revival of arms races, security dilemmas , and other artifacts of a more dangerous past. It entails sharper
conflicts over the international rules of the road on issues ranging from freedom of navigation to the illegitimacy of altering borders by force, and

intensifying competitions over states that reside at the intersection of rival powers’ areas of interest. It requires confronting the prospect that rival
powers could overturn the favorable regional balances that have underpinned the U.S.-
led order for decades, and that they might construct rival spheres of influence from which
America and the liberal ideas it has long promoted would be excluded. Finally, it necessitates recognizing that great-power rivalry could

lead to great-power war , a prospect that seemed to have followed the Soviet empire onto the ash heap of history.

Both Beijing and Moscow are, after all, optimizing their forces and exercising aggressively in preparation for
potential conflicts with the United States and its allies; Russian doctrine explicitly emphasizes the limited use of
nuclear weapons

to achieve escalation dominance in a war with Washington. In Syria, U.S. and Russian forces even came into deadly contact in early 2018. American airpower
decimated a contingent of government-sponsored Russian mercenaries that was attacking a base at which U.S. troops were present, an incident demonstrating the

increasing boldness of Russian operations and the corresponding potential for escalation. The world has not yet returned to the epic clashes for global
dominance that characterized the twentieth century, but it has returned to the historical norm of great-power struggle , with all
the associated dangers.

Those dangers may be even greater than most observers appreciate, because if today’s great-power competitions are still most intense at the regional level, who is

to say where these competitions will end? By all appearances, Russia does not simply want to be a “ regional
power ” (as Obama cuttingly described it) that dominates South Ossetia and Crimea.37 It aspires to the deep Europe an and
extra-regional impact that previous incarnations of the Russian state enjoyed. Why else would Putin boast about how far his troops can drive

into Eastern Europe? Why else would Moscow be deploy ing military power into the Midd le East? Why else
would it be continuing to cultivate intelligence and military relationships in regions as remote as Latin America?

Likewise, China is today focused primarily on securing its own geopolitical neighborhood, but its ambitions for tomorrow are clearly much
bolder.

Beijing probably does not envision itself fully overthrowing the international order, simply because it has profited far too much from the U.S.-anchored global

economy. Yet China has nonetheless positioned itself for a global challenge to U.S. influence . Chinese military forces are deploying
 ever farther from China’s immediate periphery; Beijing has projected power into the Arctic and
established bases and logistical points in the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa . Popular Chinese movies depict Beijing replacing
Washington as the dominant actor in sub-Saharan Africa—a fictional representation of a real-life effort long under way. The Belt and Road Initiative bespeaks an aspiration to link China to

countries throughout Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe; BRI, AIIB, and RCEP look like the beginning of an alternative institutional architecture to rival Washington’s. In 2017, Xi
Jinping told the Nineteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party that Beijing could now “ take center stage in the
world” and act as an alternative to U.S. leadership .38

These ambitions may or may not be realistic. But they demonstrate just how significantly the world’s leading authoritarian powers desire to shift the global environment over time. The

revisionism we are seeing today may therefore be only the beginning . As China’s power continues to grow, or if it is successful in dominating
the Western Pacific, it will surely move on to grander endeavors . If Russia reconsolidates control over the former Soviet space, it may seek to
bring parts of the former Warsaw Pact to heel. Historically, this has been a recurring pattern of great-power behavior—interests expand with power, the appetite grows with the eating, risk-

taking increases as early gambles are seen to pay off.39 This pattern is precisely why the revival of great-power competition is so concerning—because geopolitical
revisionism by unsatisfied major powers has so often presaged intensifying international conflict , confrontation,
and even war . The great-power behavior occurring today represents the warning light flashing on the dashboard. It tells us there may be still-greater traumas to come.
The threats today are compelling and urgent, and there may someday come a time when the balance of power has shifted so markedly that the postwar international system cannot be
sustained. Yet that moment of failure has not yet arrived, and so the goal of U.S. strategy should be not to hasten it by giving up prematurely, but to push it off as far into the future as possible.

Rather than simply acquiescing in the decline of a world it spent generations building, America should aggressively bolster its defenses , with an
eye to preserving and perhaps even selectively advancing its remarkable achievements.

Nuke war causes extinction

Pappas 23 [(Stephanie Pappas is a writer and contributor for Scientific American, a news organization that covers the most important
and exciting research, ideas and knowledge in science, health, technology, the environment and society. It is committed to sharing trustworthy
knowledge, enhancing our understanding of the world, and advancing social justice. Citing Francois Diaz-Maurin, associate editor for nuclear
affairs at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Previously, Diaz-Maurin was a MacArthur Foundation Nuclear Security Visiting Scholar at the
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, and a European Commission’s Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellow.
He has been a scientific advisor to members of the European Parliament on nuclear issues, and he is a founding member of the Emerging
Leaders in Environmental and Energy Policy network (ELEEP) of the Atlantic Council, Washington D.C. and the Ecologic Institute, Berlin. Prior to
joining academia, Diaz-Maurin spent four years as a research engineer in the nuclear industry in Paris, France and Boston, MA. There, he
worked on the safety design of new reactors and of a treatment plant to vitrify Hanford’s tank waste from WWII and Cold War nuclear weapons
production.) “Will Humans Ever Go Extinct?” Science American. March 21, 2023. www.scientificamerican.com/article/will-humans-ever-go-
extinct/] AW

The species Homo sapiens evolved some 300,000 years ago and has come to dominate Earth unlike any species that came before. But how long
can humans last?

Eventually humans will go extinct. At the most wildly optimistic estimate, our species will last perhaps another billion years but end when the expanding envelope of the sun swells outward and heats the
planet to a Venus-like state.

But a billion years is a long time. One billion years ago life on Earth consisted of microbes. Multicellular life didn’t make its debut until about 600 million years ago, when sponges proliferated. What life will look like in another billion years is anyone’s guess, though one modeling study
published in 2021 in Nature Geoscience suggests that Earth’s atmosphere will contain very little oxygen by then, making it likely that anaerobic microbes, rather than humans, will be the last living Earthlings.

If surviving to see the sun fry Earth is a long shot, when is humanity likely to meet its doom ? Paleontologically, mammalian species usually persist for about a million years, says Henry Gee, a
paleontologist and senior editor at the journal Nature, who is working on a book on the extinction of humans. That would put the human species in its youth. But Gee doesn’t think these rules necessarily apply for H. sapiens.

“Humans are rather an exceptional species,” he says. “We could last for millions of years, or we could all drop down next week.”

Opportunities for doomsday abound. Humans could be wiped out by a catastrophic asteroid strike, commit self-destruction with worldwide nuclear war or succumb to the ravages caused by the climate emergency. But humans are a hardy bunch, so the most likely scenario involves a
combination of catastrophes that could wipe us out completely.

Pick Your Poison

Some species killers are out of our control. In a 2021 paper in the journal Icarus, for example, researchers describe how asteroids comparable to the one spanning 10 to 15 kilometers in diameter that killed off the nonavian dinosaurs hit Earth approximately every 250 million to 500
million years. In a preprint paper posted on the server arXiv.org, physicists Philip Lubin and Alexander Cohen calculate that humanity would have the ability to save itself from a dino-killer-sized asteroid, given six months’ warning and an arsenal of nuclear penetrators to blow the space
rock into a cloud of harmless pebbles. With less warning or a larger asteroid, Lubin and Cohen suggest that humanity should give up and “party” or “move to Mars or the Moon to party.” Currently, the biggest asteroid that scientists know of with the potential of striking Earth is called
(29075) 1950 DA. It is a mere 1,300 meters across and has a one-in-50,000 chance of hitting our world in March 2880, according to a 2022 risk analysis by the European Space Agency.

Incoming space rocks aside, many threats to humanity are of our own making: nuclear war, the climate emergency, ecological collapse. Our own tech might do us in in the form of sentient artificial intelligence that decides to snuff out its creators, as some AI critics have suggested.

An all-out nuclear war could easily destroy humanity , says François Diaz-Maurin,
associate editor for nuclear affairs at the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists . The last time
humans dropped nuclear bombs on one another, only one country, the U.S., had nuclear
warheads , so there was no risk of nuclear retaliation. That’s not the case today—and the bombs are a
lot bigger. Those bombs, which struck the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, packed the equivalent of 15 and 21

A single modern-day, 300-

kilotons of TNT, respectively. Together they killed an estimated 110,000 to 210,000 people.

kiloton nuclear weapon dropped on New York City, for example, would kill a million
people in 24 hours, Diaz-Maurin says. A regional nuclear war, such as one between India and
Pakistan, could kill 27 million people in the short term, whereas a full-scale nuclear
war between the U.S. and Russia could cause an estimated 360 million direct deaths, he
adds.

The threat to humanity’s very existence would come after the war, when soot from
massive fires ignited by the bombings would rapidly alter the climate in a scenario
known as nuclear winter. Fears of nuclear winter may have receded since the end of the cold war, Diaz-Maurin says,
research shows that the environmental consequences would be severe . Even a
but

regional nuclear war would damage the ozone layer, block out sunlight and reduce
precipitation globally. The result would be a global famine that might kill more than five
billion people in just two years , depending on the size and number of detonations.

“ That possibility of destroying humanity is still here and real ,

” Diaz-Maurin says.

Death by ecological contamination or the climate emergency would be slower but still
within the realm of possibility. Already humans are facing health stressors from chronic pollution that have been exacerbated by the additional heat brought by climate change, says Maureen Lichtveld, dean of the

School of Public Health at the University of Pittsburgh. Hotter temperatures force people to breathe more rapidly to dispel warmth, which draws more pollution into their lungs . The climate emergency
also deepens existing problems around food security —for instance, persistent drought can
devastate cropland—and infectious disease. “The interconnectedness of climate
change and health inequities and inequities in general is what is impacting our global
population,” Lichtveld says.
 1NC—OFF
CP Text: The United States should substantially reduce military presence in the West
Asia/North Africa region with the exception of Turkey.
Russia and China are expanding capabilities now—continued presence is key to
maintaining America’s edge
Lopez 23 [(C. Todd, DOD News), “Allies, Partners Central to U.S. Integrated Deterrence Effort”, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-
Stories/Article/Article/3315827/allies-partners-central-to-us-integrated-deterrence-effort/, March 1, 2023] SS

Both Russia and China figure heavily into the content of the 2022 National Defense
Strategy, which was released in October. Within the strategy, integrated deterrence — including
increased partnerships with American allies and partners — plays a central role to
defending against both the acute and strategic threats posed by those two nations.
Mara Karlin, who performs the duties of the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy and who also serves as the assistant secretary of defense for strategy,
plans and capabilities, spoke today at the Center for a New American Security to discuss how the department is enabling integrated deterrence regarding both
China and Russia.

China , Karlin said, has both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to challenge the
United States militarily, economically, technologically and diplomatically. While Russia
doesn't pose the same long-term strategic threat, it does pose a more urgent short-
term threat . Because of this, and as evidenced by the now yearlong Russian invasion of Ukraine, the department has identified Russia
as an "acute threat."
"We very much see Russian aggression threatening our interests and values and those of our allies and our partners," Karlin said. "Russia's reckless war of choice
against Ukraine has made that very clear and very real for the entire world. And we can't help but watch the Russian alignment with the People's Republic of China.
Both [nations] seem to favor a world in which they can trample over the sovereignty of their smaller neighbors and have a free hand in their self-declared spheres of
influence."

One example of how the U.S. has operationalized integrated deterrence as it relates
to Russia, Karlin said, includes the U.S. response following the Feb. 24, 2022, Russian
invasion of Ukraine.
"We did a lot to surge U.S. forces to Europe as the conflict was kicking off and surge
from 80,000 to 100,000 troops in Europe to reinforce our posture and frankly, that
was doable because of our very close relationship with so many of those countries,
because of preposition equipment," she said.
the U.S. and American allies and partners worked to
As Russia continued to wage war against Ukraine, Karlin said,

defend their own interests in Eastern Europe by strengthening Ukraine's ability to

defend itself.
" We've been able to build Ukraine's military and asymmetric capabilities through
robust security assistance ," she said.
NATO allies, Karlin said, have stepped up to enhance their presence in Eastern Europe, and as part of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group — led by Secretary of
Defense Lloyd J. Austin III — some 50 nations have banded together to help meet Ukraine's current and future defense needs.

"I would also just note that ... the United States has worked really hard to ensure we can maintain our bedrock commitment to NATO's collective defense and we do
that working hand-in-hand with our allies," she said.

When it comes to China, Karlin said, the department is investing in a combat credible force
and investing in critical capabilities across domains such as cyber and space.

" You've seen this in terms of our construction of new ships, our modernization of the
Army and the Marine Corps and the advancement of air power and key investment s
and in various aircraft," she said.
In space, she said, the department is investing in the fielding of resilient satellite constellations and in boosting U.S. resilience in cyber.

When it comes to partnerships, Karlin said the U.S. is working with key allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific region to build and deepen security cooperation efforts.

"We're forming new geometries for cooperation, such as AUKUS ... Australia, the U.K. and the United States," she said. "It's really a strategic partnership that's
focused on enhancing regional stability and safeguarding a free and open Indo-Pacific, and it's going to provide Australia with a conventionally armed nuclear
powered submarine capability."

As part of AUKUS, she said, the three partnered nations develop and exercise joint, advanced military capabilities.

accelerating the advancement of a bunch of different capabilities across areas as

"We're

wide-ranging as artificial intelligence and autonomy and cyber ... to ensure that our
warfighters can retain and expand their competitive edge," she said.
Also in the Pacific, Karlin said, the U.S. has worked to optimize its force posture there, including a more capable Marine Corps presence in Japan, increased
rotational presence in Australia and better access in the Philippines.

"That's all really meaningful when you look at our ability to project power," she said.

The U.S. military is also expanding the number of exercises it holds with partners in the Indo-Pacific, Karlin said.

"What we're really trying to do is change and enhance the size, scope, scale and
character of these exercises," she said. "A great example would be Garuda Shield, which was an exercise of 14 nations that occurred a
couple of months ago."

Turkey’s bases are key to check back against Russia

TRT 19 [(TRT World, provides worldwide news and current affairs focusing on Turkey, Europe, Africa, and Western and Southern Asia),
“Why are US military bases in Turkey so crucial for Washington?”, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/why-are-us-military-bases-in-turkey-so-
crucial-for-washington-32243, 2019] SS

The US also allied with the YPG, the Syrian wing of the PKK, which is recognised as a terrorist organisation by Turkey, the US and NATO.

Turkey is the second biggest army in NATO . Since the 1950s, its bases have helped the
alliance in protecting its southern wing against perceived threats emerging from the
former Soviet Union and its successor state Russia.

But Washington’s recent moves endanger the relations between the two NATO allies a great deal as the US domestic political turbulence puts
both countries’ regional interests at stake.
Why is Incirlik air base a crucial station for the alliance?
the US has operated strategic reconnaissance missions from Incirlik air base to
Since 1956,

the areas close to the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, mainly to follow the
moves of the former Soviet Union and later Russia and its allies.
base was reportedly one of the centres of Washington’s largest military
In 2004, the

movement concerning Iraq in the US history, providing its troops what they need
during their stops there after their comeback from deployments.
base had also been a principal focal point for
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the

Washington’s Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Since 2014, the base was used to conduct for operations against Daesh in Syria and Iraq.

Beyond regular military missions, the Incirlik base hosts at least 50 B61 nuclear bombs in its
hangars, demonstrating its strategic significance for Washington and NATO.
The base has been one of the unique locations, holding US nuclear weapons alongside with Belgium, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, since
the Cold War.Vital bases in and around the region are necessary for deterring Russia and maintaining Turkey alliance

Jones 19 [(Dorian, reports for VOA from Istanbul), “US Military Base in Turkey Has Uncertain Future,” VOA News,
https://www.voanews.com/a/europe_us-military-base-turkey-has-uncertain-future/6180061.html, 11/26/23] NH

With U.S.-Turkish relations at their lowest ebb in decades, the future of a critical American air base in

Turkey is increasingly in the spotlight.

The vast Incirlik Air Base, located in southern Turkey close to Syria, has been a longstanding symbol of U.S.-
Turkish cooperation. At the height of the Cold War, it underscored America's commitment to its NATO partner against the Soviet Union.

"We have to underline the Incirlik is one of the most important bases in the Middle East with the placement of tactical
nuclear weapons at the base," said professor Mesut Casin, a Turkish presidential foreign policy adviser. "This shows Turkey
continues to support the value of the NATO organization."

It's widely reported that the United States retains around 50 nuclear free-fall bombs at the facility. During the Cold War, the weapons were

relied on to deter vast Soviet ground forces massed on the Turkish border.
However, with Ankara and Washington at loggerheads over a myriad of issues, including Turkey's deepening ties with Russia and the removal of Turkey from a U.S. jet fighter program, the future of Incirlik is increasingly murky.

The Countering Turkish Aggression Act, a bipartisan bill under consideration in the U.S. Senate, would require the Trump administration to consider alternative bases for "personnel and assets" deployed at Incirlik. The bill comes in
response to Ankara's offensive into Syria against a Kurdish militia, which is an ally in Washington's war against Islamic State.

FILE - A service vehicle with a sign reading 'Welcome to Incirlik' is pictured at Incirlik Air Base, near Adana, Turkey, Jan. 21, 2016.

FILE - A service vehicle with a sign reading 'Welcome to Incirlik' is pictured at Incirlik Air Base, near Adana, Turkey, Jan. 21, 2016.

House Armed Services Committee member Representative Kendra Horn tweeted last month that she is "deeply concerned that strategic nuclear weapons remain on an air base within Turkish borders." Horn later removed the
tweet.

"They (Congress) are talking about removing the nuclear arsenal from Incirlik," said former Turkish ambassador Mithat Rende. "If

they (nuclear weapons) are removed, that would be a sign of a huge lack of confidence (by Washington
in Ankara)."
"There would be a trust problem , and relations might unravel if you withdraw the nuclear arsenal from
Turkey," he added. "And you would expect an overreaction from the Turkish

side if the U.S. pulls out its nuclear arsenal."

"Turkey-U.S. relations cannot continue in this climate of threats," warns Casin. "Turkey has a long history of being the United States' best ally in
the region. Who is the winner of this present situation, Russia and China."

Analysts warn Moscow will be eager to take advantage of any U.S. reduction in Incirlik .
"If the Americans take their nuclear weapons, then I can tell you if they do, then the Turks will take Russian missiles
there," said international relations professor Huseyin Bagci of Ankara's Middle East Technical University. "Then the Russians will have
much more free hand to gain Turkey. So the architect of a lost Turkey will be American policy, and the winner will
be (Russian President Vladimir) Putin."

"Turkey is not on the defensive anymore," he added." The more the Americans make pressure, the more
Turkey will work closely with Russia -- this is a historical change in Turkish foreign policy."
Russian President Vladimir Putin has carefully cultivated a relationship with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as relations with Ankara's
traditional western allies deteriorate.

Such efforts are likely to continue, given a continued current downward spiral in U.S.-Turkish relations. However, analysts warn, abandoning
Incirlik will not be without consequences.
"So American has to choose between losing Turkey or not losing Turkey. At the moment, they are more intending to lose Turkey," said Bagci.

Deterrence is key to check adversarial ambitions. The plan unleashes a power struggle
that escalates.
Cropsey & Roughead ’19 [Seth; senior fellow at Hudson Institute and former deputy undersecretary of the U.S. Navy. Gary
Roughead; Robert and Mary Oster distinguished military fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and former U.S. chief of naval
operations. December 17, 2019; “A U.S. Withdrawal Will Cause a Power Struggle in the Middle East”; Foreign Policy;
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/17/us-withdrawal-power-struggle-middle-east-china-russia-iran/] TDI

The Middle East’s central location between Europe, East Asia, and Africa makes it
geographically vital to U.S. interests. The rise of China had not changed that. U.S. lines of
communication and supply between Europe and Asia pass directly through the
Middle East. U.S. maritime strategy requires sailing carrier and expeditionary strike
groups , submarines, and logistic ships between co mbatant com mands, and passing
through the Suez Canal is far more efficient than rounding the Horn of Africa.
Although the United States has decreased its reliance on Middle Eastern oil — a fact motivating some of the isolationist rationale for

disengagement — Washington’s European and Asian allies still require uninterrupted access
to the region’s energy resources . The Levantine Basin and Suez Canal are also
international container shipping hubs. Disruption to that regional maritime trade would have
immediate, far-reaching global implications .
The Ottoman Empire was the last entity to command regional hegemony in the Middle East. No country or group has made a legitimate claim

to the mantle of a regional caliphate since. While a united Middle East under any version of a reconstituted
caliphate could undermine U.S. interests by projecting power globally , a divided Middle
East monopolized by a hostile great power could have the same effect. Either an external power or a regional hegemon could prevent
the U nited S tates from communicating and coordinating among forces and allies in
Europe and Asia and disrupt global economic activity by interrupting U.S. and allied shipping.
Eliminating U.S. naval dominance would upend the current balance of power , with
severe consequences for Europe and Asia.
The pursuit of this mantle in the 21st century has only one true aspirational contender: Iran. But Tehran lacks the resources to conquer the
Middle East, and its Shiite character would inflame old sectarian enmities in an explicit imperial campaign. For that reason, Iran’s strategy
involves expanding its influence through proxies supported by well-placed special operations forces in an attempt to wear down Saudi and
Israeli strength.

Israel and Saudi Arabia are the two main challengers to Iran’s ambitions. The Israeli Defense Forces are the only military in the region of
Western quality and proficiency. Israel likely operates a secure nuclear second-strike capability, and its foreign intelligence service, Mossad, is
one of the world’s best. While Saudi Arabia’s armed forces are of lesser quality, the kingdom has been remarkably adept at cultivating support
from Sunni radical groups—necessitated by the United States’ strategic neglect of the region after 2008. And despite questions about its
legitimacy, the House of Saud remains custodian of Islam’s two holy cities, Mecca and Medina, a position of great religious and political
importance.

Nevertheless, neither Israel nor Saudi Arabia can contend for the title of regional hegemon. Moreover, despite its military superiority, Israel
does not have the capability or requisite political will. The House of Saud may have considered itself the ruling dynasty of a new caliphate at
some point, but contemporary Saudi Arabia has no such delusions. The government understands that oil revenues determine its survival, and
an imperial campaign would overstretch the Saudi economy, possibly leading to economic collapse and, worse, revolt. Both Israel and Saudi
Arabia operate on the defensive.

Turkey is a spoiler in this strategic balance. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has unmistakably neo-Ottoman objectives, but the Turkish
Armed Forces are unprepared militarily for the potential confrontation with Iran and Russia that their Syrian offensive could prompt. In the
coming years, Ankara will remain a wild card, and the political stance it takes will profoundly influence the strategic landscape. Its position on
Iranian expansion is unclear, and even if its current offensive puts it at odds with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime — and by extension
with Iran — Erdogan may well forego cooperation with the unofficial Saudi-Israeli entente.

U nited S tates must also contend with its two greatest geopolitical threats , Russia and
But the

China — both of which have interests in the Middle East. China, dependent on Middle Eastern energy, seeks to
assure its energy supply, complete the midsection of its B elt and R oad I nitiative, and place at risk the
ports on which the U nited S tates would depend in a continental war . China’s objectives
European

challenge Washington’s interest in its NATO and East Asian allies’ need for energy, along with the
United States’ long-standing relationship with the continent most closely allied to its
political, economic, and security interests. China’s growing control of Mediterranean and European port
infrastructure will complicate logistics associated with a U.S. response in the region.
Russia has made serious progress toward fulfilling its Middle Eastern strategic
objectives of maintaining a decisive hand in the region’s politics, a year-round ice-free
port , and a portal through which to influence events beyond the eastern Mediterranean.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has no desire to imperialize the Middle East in a manner akin to the Russian Empire’s conquest of Central Asia
in the 19th century. Having obtained air and naval bases at Khmeimim and Tartus, both in Syria, Russia can once again turn its focus toward
Europe. Still, the Kremlin likely prefers whatever political arrangement will most quickly secure its position as the Middle East’s predominant
power, even if that puts it at odds with its erstwhile Iranian ally.

Nonstate forces will continue to play a crucial role in the strategic balance. The Kurds are arguably the most
highly disruptive presence in Turkish, Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian
relevant of these, because of their

national politics and, additionally, because their transnational character gives them the ability to
stoke interstate conflict . Iran’s significance will, as a result of its economic woes, likely continue to decline, but the political
vacuum it helped create in Iraq and Syria will persist, giving Russia and especially Iran the diplomatic cover to expand their influence.

The unique mix of political forces in the Middle East suggests three possibilities in the event of U.S. naval
withdrawal from the region, and none favor U.S. interests .
First, Russia may broker a political arrangement among Turkey, Israel, and Iran, or, alternatively, support a coalition pitting some of those states
against another in an effort to manufacture a manageable regional balance of power and allowing it to shift its attention back to Europe. The
final shape of this strategy would depend on several variables: Turkey’s approach to Syria, Israel’s posture against Iran (and its proxies), the
outcome of Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen, the Kurdish question, and the possibility of the Islamic State’s resurgence.

Regardless of these factors, Russia will still bid for control of the Mediterranean Sea , which the U nited
S tates will be hard-pressed to counter, particularly if China can manipulate its European economic partners
into limiting or expelling the U.S. Navy from its Mediterranean bases. If that happens, Washington will have

to fight its way back into the region for the first time since World War II.

In the second scenario, Iran defeats Saudi Arabia in a regional confrontation, thereby taking the top leadership spot in the Islamic world,
making it a great power in its own right. Control of Middle Eastern oil exports would give Iran the
ability to coerce and bully the U nited S tates’ European and Pacific allies, and it would deny the U nited
S tates any peaceful access to the Levantine Basin . The balancing dynamics against this new great power are
difficult to project, but regardless, the United States’ ability to control the strategic environment would be hampered markedly.

Third, a long-term regional war between Tehran and a fluctuating anti-Iran coalition composed of Saudi Arabia, other Sunni

Gulf states, and Israel would cause widespread bloodshed . As the 1980s Iran-Iraq War demonstrated, both Iran and
Saudi Arabia would be likely to attempt nuclear breakout .

With Iran, this would mean closing the small technological gap that now exists between its low-enriched uranium to the higher level of
enrichment needed for a nuclear weapon.
The Saudis could pay scientists from a sympathetic Sunni nuclear state — such as Pakistan — or simply buy nuclear
weapons from Islamabad. An increasingly fractured and war-ravaged Middle East would
spawn more jihadist organizations, and the West would be their primary target . Absent a
reliable U.S. presence, Saudi Arabia and perhaps even Israel would increasingly turn to Russia and
China as great-power guarantors , leaving U.S. officials in the unfortunate position of hoping polar ice will melt quickly
enough to allow unrestricted year-round access over the Arctic, diminishing the importance of the Mediterranean.

But hope can only go so far, and the United States needs a more concrete, long-term approach to the Middle East. Despite modest increases in
U.S. defense spending in recent years, peer and near-peer competition increasingly puts the predominance of the U.S. military at risk. In
testimony before the Senate last year, Adm. Philip S. Davidson, commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, noted that China is “approaching
military parity” with the United States “in a number of critical areas,” and that “there is no guarantee that the United States would win a future
conflict with China.”

The strength of hegemonic powers waxes and wanes, and allies respond accordingly. In 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made the
first visit to China by a Japanese leader in seven years. There, he and Chinese President Xi Jinping agreed to elevate bilateral relations. Although
Benjamin Netanyahu was first elected prime minister of Israel in 1996, he only visited Russia for the first time during his third term, in 2013. (He
did not serve as prime minister during the decade from 1999 to 2009.) Since then he has been to the country 11 times, indicating that staunch
allies that had previously relied on the United States for security now sense the need to open lines of communication with its adversaries.

The United States should reexamine its global commitments, especially those in the eastern Mediterranean, with a view to Russia’s expanding
power. The Trump administration’s foreign and security policies in the region have included several bright spots: the strengthening of U.S.-
Israel relations, an aggressive military campaign against the Islamic State, economic sanctions against Iran, and denial of F-35 fighter jet sales to
Turkey following its purchase of Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles.

But these have yet to be linked in a coherent strategic policy. Questions that need answers include: What is America’s goal in the region? Is
growing Russian military and diplomatic presence consistent with U.S. regional goals? Should Washington leave the blossoming relations
between Moscow and Ankara to run their course, and what is to be done if a true alliance between Russia and Turkey emerges? If regime
change in Iran is not an option for U.S. policy, what should the goal be? Is it sufficient to assist Israel and Saudi Arabia and hope that they will
manage regional tensions that could lead to war with Iran?

An examination of the global commitments recommended here should include the possibility of a comprehensive U.S.-Israel treaty that would
gather together all the existing nontreaty agreements between the two nations on such matters as military aid, intelligence sharing, defense
industrial cooperation, and free trade — to name a few.

The U nited S tates still retains strong interests in the Middle East. These include the
untrammeled flow of oil to allies in Europe and Asia, the defense of democratic Israel, the security
of NATO allies bordering the Mediterranean, and preventing conflict between regional powers.
 1NC–OFF
Interpretation: Debaters must specify a branch of the federal government in the AC
plan text— that's key to fairness and education. Any other interp green lights aff
shiftiness, kills neg strategy and undermines clash. We lose access to process CPs and
politics DAs which are crucial to neg flexibility. C/A paradigm issues from T