1AR---Octas---Wake

Africa
Central Asia
NAC CP
 1AR---Deficits
Ratification is key to cooperation over peaceful nuclear energy---that’s Ogunbanwo.
<<FOR REFERENCE>>

Pelindaba Treaty will provide a framework to accelerate cooperation . For

In other aspects of international nuclear trade, the
example, Africa possesses large reserves of uranium—the essential raw material for nuclear energy. AFCONE could be the vehicle for
promoting intra-African cooperation in the peaceful uses of uranium . Effective cooperation and monitoring of nuclear
commerce is especially important under the current international circumstances, when charges have been made about
attempts to illegally procure uranium in an African state. Although these particular charges now appear to have been false,1 they
underline the benefits of establishing mechanisms to monitor and coordinate uranium mining in Africa, so that the
benefits of peaceful nuclear commerce can be obtained without risking proliferation . Along these same lines, once the
Pelindaba Treaty enters into force, AFCONE will be able to serve as a clearing-house for African expertise, which could become a valuable
source for developing peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

Making them binding is key---that’s Hamel Green.

<<FOR REFERENCE>>

Firstly, while some countries remain in possession of nuclear weapons, there is an important incentive for states that agree to forego
nuclear weapon acquisition to seek compensatory negative security guarantees from nuclear possessor states. In contrast
to the conventions that have universally prohibited chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty
creates, indeed perpetuates, a divide between nuclear-weapon-states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS). The five permanent
members of the UN S ecurity C ouncil, China, France, Russia, the UK and the United States, are permitted to retain nuc lear
weapon s without having to abide by a specific time-bound requirement to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, although under the NPT Article VI,
they are obligated to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms raced at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament’. 11 The n on- n uclear- w eapon s tates party to the NPT are, in return, offered access to civilian nuclear
activities and infrastructure but are not necessarily offered legally binding negative security assurances assuring
them against the use or threat of use of nuc lear weapon s against them. Under the NWFZ concept elaborated in the
Tlatelolco Treaty, this NPT lacuna is addressed through additional protocols that require the P5 nuclear weapon
states to provide guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against zone members. In the case of the Tlatelolco Treaty,
all five P5 nuclear states have signed and ratified the negative security protocols, albeit with some reservations.12 In the case of the other
existing NWFZs, the P5 states have signed the relevant negative security protocols but have not as yet all consistently ratified the protocols.
The South Pacific, African , and Central Asian NWFZ treaty protocols have been ratified by four P5 NWS but only signed
by the U nited S tates, while the Southeast Asia NWFZ protocol is yet to be either signed or ratified by any of the P5 NWS.13

A binding commitment is key to Central Asia---that’s Tuya.

<<FOR REFERENCE>>
Nuclear-weapon-free zones were established out of the shared conviction of their states’ parties that their national security was enhanced, not
reduced, if they banned nuclear weapons instead of introducing them. By establishing such zones they have turned entire regions in Southern
and Northern hemispheres into lands where no nuclear weapon is allowed, thus making an important contribution to the global non-
proliferation regime and towards the objectives of the elimination of nuclear weapons. The protocols to the treaties establishing
NWFZs envisage a legally-binding commitment by NWS, albeit with attached reservations, not to use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against states parties. In the absence of a universal instrument providing such a commitment, this has been a
welcome development. In Asia, unfortunately, not a single treaty on a NWFZ has its protocols ratified by all NWS.
Ratification of the security assurance protocol is key to get other states on board---
that’s Du Preez.
<<FOR REFERENCE>>

DU PREEZ: I’ll wrap up. And then the final problem is the unwillingness of the U nited S tates and Russia to ratify the
security-assurance protocol. And this message suggests that, despite being completely free of nuclear weapons,
and not presenting any threat to any of the nuclear-weapons states, African states may still be targeted by nuclear
weapons. It is a complete illogical idea.

And so African states may very well question why they should make the effort to ratify this treaty if these two states
with the most nuclear weapons potentially could use their nuclear weapons against African states . And so while a little
bit disappointed that, in President Obama’s statement two days ago, there was not a clear indication that his administration would immediately
seek ratification of the Pelindaba Protocol, I think it’s implied that a lot of changes will occur. And I look forward to one of those changes being
ratification of the protocol.

Only ratification can overcome membership barriers---that’s Musto.

<<FOR REFERENCE>>

Not all of the nations in Africa have ratified the Treaty of Pelindaba . While the continent’s only former nuclear weapon state (South
Africa) is a full member, some notable omissions include Egypt and the D emocratic R epublic of the C ongo. But
incomplete membership has not stopped the U nited S tates from joining a NWFZ in the past. In the early 1980s, the
United States became a full adherent to Latin America’s NWFZ while the region’s two most advanced nuclear states (Argentina and Brazil), and
the state in part responsible for the most dangerous nuclear showdown in history (Cuba), remained non-members. US ratification of the
Treaty of Pelindaba would not have to overcome nearly such ominous holes in regional membership .

Issues in the South Pacific and Central Asia. In the South Pacific, tensions over the transit rights of oceangoing vessels climaxed in the mid
1980s, when New Zealand refused to allow US nuclear-powered ships and US ships carrying nuclear weapons to enter its ports. That was a
bilateral dispute with an ally, though, and Washington and Wellington finally put the issue to rest last year. Guam, which functions as a key
military outpost for the United States, is not included in the territory covered by the Treaty of Rarotonga, and the denuclearization of American
Samoa and Jarvis Island would hardly constitute a setback to the US strategic posture. Nor would the denuclearization of US territory be
unprecedented. Under Latin America’s NWFZ, the United States denuclearized the far more contentious territories of Puerto Rico, the Virgin
Islands, and the naval base at Guantanamo Bay. Central Asia’s Treaty of Semipalatinsk does not cover Afghanistan, so the United States could
forego the denuclearization of its military bases stationed there.

Reasons to ratify. Aside from highlighting how full adherence to these three treaties will do little to hamper US strategic capabilities, it is
important to recognize the benefits of ratification. There are reasons specific to the treaties themselves. For example, all three treaties prohibit
the dumping of radioactive waste, a measure not even covered by Latin America’s NWFZ. The Treaty of Semipalatinsk also has an
environmental security clause that calls for cooperation in securing loose nuclear materials. This clause looks to keep nuclear materials out of
the hands of terrorists and to mitigate the environmental effects of the Soviet nuclear legacy in the region, critical goals deserving of US
support. Meanwhile, US adherence to the Treaty of Pelindaba could help spur comprehensive membership across
Africa .
Chada CP