Ego Depletion and Auditors’ JDM Quality

Patrick J. Hurley
Assistant Professor
Northeastern University

⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯
D’Amore-McKim School of Business, Northeastern University, 360 Huntington Ave., 404G
Hayden Hall, Boston, MA 02115
p.hurley@northeastern.edu

This paper represents a portion of my dissertation and was funded by the University of
Wisconsin Behavioral Research Insights Through Experiments (BRITE) Lab and Andersen
Center. I thank my dissertation committee chair, Brian Mayhew, as well as my dissertation
committee members Karla M. Zehms, Yuri Miyamoto, Justin Sydnor, and Terry Warfield for
helpful guidance, discussions, and comments. I also thank anonymous accounting firms for
providing professional auditors to participate in my experiments. Finally, I thank Jeff Cohen,
Eric Condie, Emily Griffith, Jackie Hammersley, Kathryn Kadous, Matt Kaufman, Kara
Obermire, Tim Rupert, Jason Smith (discussant), Amy Tegeler, Andrew Trotman, Ken Trotman
(editor), anonymous reviewers, and participants at the University of Wisconsin – Madison,
DePaul University, University of Texas at Austin, George Mason University, Northeastern
University, and the 2017 AAA Auditing Midyear Meeting for helpful comments, assistance, and
suggestions.
 Ego Depletion and Auditors’ JDM Quality

Abstract: I report two experiments with senior-associate auditors that investigate whether self-
control requirements in auditing tasks cause ego depletion, and whether depleting tasks impact
auditors' judgment and decision-making (JDM). In Experiment 1, I find that using self-control to
maintain vigilance/focus leads to greater levels of depletion than does using self-control to
engage in cognitive processing in an audit planning task or inhibit impulses in a task from the
psychology literature. However, I do not find that task-specific experience significantly reduces
self-control resources required for task performance. In Experiment 2, I find evidence that
depleting tasks – compared to a non-depleted control group –significantly reduce auditors’
cognitive processing in the form of auditors’ ability to generate plausible alternative hypotheses
for client-provided explanations for trends. Finally, I find that depleting tasks reduce auditors’
confidence in task performance, when compared to a non-depleted control group.

Keywords: ego depletion; self-control, audit quality; judgment and decision-making; hypothesis
generation; cognitive processing

Data Availability: The laboratory data used in this study are available from the author upon
request.

1
1. Introduction

Recent research has stressed individual auditors’ JDM as a significant factor for

improving overall audit quality (Knechel, Krishnan, Pevzner, Shefchik, & Velury 2013). Ego

depletion (hereafter also “depletion”) represents a causal mechanism that can potentially impact

individual auditors’ JDM quality and thereby audit quality. Ego depletion is defined as a

temporary state in which prior self-control use reduces an individual’s self-control resources.

This reduction decreases willingness to engage in subsequent self-control acts (Baumeister,

Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice 1998; Baumeister & Vohs 2016a). This paper reports the results

of two experiments that investigate whether auditing tasks lead to ego depletion and the impact

of these depleting tasks on auditors’ judgment and decision-making (JDM) quality. The

experiments answer calls to study potential causal mechanisms that impact JDM quality through

psychological theory (Griffith, Kadous, & Young 2016) and determine whether depletion is only

caused by impulse inhibition or whether other self-control requirements cause depletion

(Baumeister & Vohs 2016a).

Self-control, the ability to control one’s own behavior to conform to standards or pursue

long-term goals (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice 2007), is crucial in many of auditors’ JDM processes.

For example, reasoning, cognitive processing, maintaining focus, and being vigilant all require

self-control. As a result, self-control can be a determinant of auditors’ JDM quality (Hurley

2015) and it is important to study whether depleting tasks significantly impact auditors’ JDM

quality.

The current study addresses two main questions. First, does the type, rather than simply

the presence, of a task’s self-control requirements impact the amount of depletion from task

performance, and does depletion result from applications of self-control other than simply

1
inhibiting automatic responses (Baumeister & Vohs 2016a)? Second, do depleting tasks impact

auditors’ cognitive processing? Experiment 1 addresses the former question, while Experiment 2

addresses the latter. It is unclear whether the causes and consequences of depletion and depleting

tasks will extend to professional tasks because much of prior depletion research ignores

important ecological features of the task environment by using mundane tasks that center on

impulse inhibition. Indeed, updates to depletion theory suggest that inhibiting impulses, rather

than other applications of self-control, drives the depletion effect (Baumeister & Vohs 2016a).

As a result, it is important to study whether tasks that go beyond simple inhibition lead to ego

depletion. Further, prior research has largely ignored that task-specific experience can mitigate

depletion by using tasks that are not familiar or meaningful to participants.

In Experiment 1, I investigate the causes of depletion using a 1 x 3 (self-control

requirement: cognitive processing versus impulse inhibition versus maintaining vigilance/focus)

between-subjects experiments using senior-associate auditors. Auditors in Experiment 1 perform

a task manipulated as primarily requiring one of these three types of self-control where the

inhibition task serves as a benchmark because it leads to significant depletion in the psychology

literature (e.g., Baumeister et al. 1998). I then measure participants’ depletion via their reaction

time on an attention-control task (Stroop 1935). This allows me to determine whether depletion

varies based upon the type of self-control used on the initial task. Further, I am also able to

examine whether task-specific experience reduces self-control resources required to perform a

task.

I find that a task requiring auditors to maintain vigilance/focus leads to significantly

greater levels of observed depletion than does the impulse inhibition task. An audit planning task,

which requires cognitive processing, leads to depletion levels similar to those in the inhibition

2
task. Further, I find that auditors’ task-specific experience does not significantly reduce the

amount of self-control resources required for task performance. That is, greater task-specific

experience does not significantly reduce the amount of depletion resulting from task performance.

In Experiment 2, I investigate the consequences of my depleting tasks using a 1 x 4 (self-

control requirements from Experiment 1 and a control treatment) between-subjects experiment

using senior-associate auditors. Auditors in Experiment 2 complete the same manipulated task as

in Experiment 1 and then complete a task in which they are required to provide as many

plausible alternative explanations as possible for troubling financial trends and rate the

reasonableness of a CFO’s explanations for those trends. Alternative hypotheses allow me to

examine the impact of depleting tasks on auditors’ cognitive processing ability, and

reasonableness ratings allow me to examine the impact of depleting tasks on auditors’ resistance

to persuasion. These trends and CFO explanations are adapted from an actual case of fraud at

Koss Corporation.

I find that auditors who complete depleting tasks, when compared to a non-depleted

control group, exhibit significantly poorer complex cognitive processing. Specifically, these

auditors are less able to generate plausible alternative hypotheses for a CFO’s explanations for

financial trends. However, auditors’ JDM quality on this task does not significantly differ among

the depleting tasks themselves.1 In additional analysis, I also find that auditors performing

depleting tasks exhibit lower confidence in task performance compared to the non-depleted

1
Complex cognitive processing and JDM quality are related, yet distinct, concepts. For example, an
auditor can verify that information matches and arrive at an appropriate conclusion in a three-way match,
which would produce high-quality JDM but would not require complex cognitive processing. By contrast,
JDM quality in an accounting estimates task (e.g., Griffith, Hammersley, Kadous, & Young 2015) would
be highly dependent upon complex cognitive processing to simultaneously evaluate model assumptions
and their reasonableness, integrate disparate evidence, and determine the appropriateness of the model as
a whole.
3
control group. However, I do not find evidence that my depleting tasks significantly influence

auditors’ reasonableness assessments of fraudulent explanations.

This research makes a number of contributions to auditing practice, regulators, and

theories of auditor JDM and ego depletion. First, Experiment 1 provides evidence that different

types of self-control cause depletion and do so at different levels. Further, self-control from a

realistic, professional task can cause greater depletion than does a depleting task used in the

psychology literature. These findings contribute to auditor JDM theories as well as ego depletion

theory, especially given recent theorizing that depletion results from impulse inhibition, but not

deliberate applications of self-control (Baumeister & Vohs 2016a, 76). Given that depletion can

occur from a short period of task performance, these findings underscore PCAOB concerns with

auditors’ workloads (PCAOB 2012; Hanson 2013a, 2013b), and emphasize the importance of

considering both the amount and type of auditors’ work in audit quality indicators (PCAOB

2015; CAQ 2014).

Second, Experiment 2 contributes to our understanding of auditor JDM and ego depletion.

Specifically, I find that performing depleting tasks for just 15 minutes significantly reduces

auditors’ complex cognitive processing, which hinders their hypothesis generation ability, and

reduces their confidence in their task performance. This provides an understanding of the impact

of depleting tasks on auditors’ JDM quality (Hurley 2015) and contributes to a growing body of

research that examines the effects of depleting tasks on auditors’ JDM quality (e.g., Mullis &

Hatfield 2018; Bhaskar, Majors, & Vitalis 2016). Importantly, while Mullis & Hatfield (2018)

report results consistent with depletion hindering auditors’ vigilance in finding seeded errors, I

provide evidence regarding auditors’ cognitive processing, which is distinct and can have far-

reaching implications for auditors’ JDM quality. Finally, this research contributes to ego

4
depletion theory and auditing practice by finding that task-specific experience does not

significantly reduce depletion incurred by a task. This suggests that while self-control stamina

can be increased with practice, as suggested in prior research, task-specific experience does not

significantly reduce self-control demands from task performance.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I discuss ego depletion

theory and related literature, and develop my hypotheses. In Sections 3 and 4 I discuss the

participants, design and procedures, and results of Experiments 1 and 2, respectively. Section 5

offers conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research.

2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development

2.1 Ego Depletion Theory

Ego depletion theory is based upon the strength model of self-control (hereafter “the

strength model”). The strength model analogizes using self-control, or willpower, to using a

muscle in one’s body (Baumeister et al. 1998; Muraven & Baumeister 2000).2 Specifically,

Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister (1998) and others find that the willingness to exercise self-control

becomes temporarily fatigued with use, requires a period of rest to recover and restore

performance, and improves with long-term practice or training.3 The strength model therefore

predicts that an individual’s subsequent self-control performance will suffer after performing an
2
Despite moderate effect sizes reported in Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis (2010), some
researchers have conducted additional meta-analyses that call into question the size of the ego depletion
effect (Carter & McCullough 2014; Carter, Kofler, Forster, & McCullough 2015). However, limitations
in sampling procedures, methodological choices, and statistical analyses call into question the validity of
these meta-analyses (cf. Cunningham & Baumeister 2016). Various laboratories recently conducted a
preregistered replication and had difficulties replicating the depletion effect (Hagger et al. 2016); however,
the standardized task implemented in this replication did not appropriately capture ego depletion (cf.
Baumeister & Vohs 2016b) and had significant differences in design from the study it intended to
replicate (cf. Spirada, Kessler, & Ionides 2016). On these bases, these challenges to the efficacy of the
strength model of depletion should be interpreted with caution.
3
Baumeister & Vohs (2016a) emphasize, in an update to ego depletion theory, that the effects of
depletion stem from an unwillingness, and not an inability, to exercise self-control. This unwillingness
results from individuals’ desire to conserve a limited cognitive resource. In their updated theory,
Baumeister & Vohs (2016a) also address and incorporate aspects of various challenges to the original
formulation of ego depletion theory.
5
initial self-control act. Because most of the prior depletion literature supports the strength model

(see Hagger et al. 2010 for a meta-analysis), I use the strength model as the theoretical basis for

my testable hypotheses later in this section.

The strength model of ego depletion is predicated on five assumptions (Muraven &

Baumeister 2000). First, self-control is required to make decisions and initiate or interrupt

various types of behavior. Second, self-control relies upon a finite set of cognitive resources that

can become depleted. Third, individuals likely differ in their overall amount of self-control

resources. Fourth, an individual’s current level of self-control resources dictates their success in

performing acts of self-control. Fifth, using self-control expends these resources, which reduces

the set of resources available for future self-control acts. Of specific interest are assumptions two,

four, and five. The second assumption highlights the occurrence of ego depletion. The fourth

assumption indicates that the timing of task performance matters, if a self-control task is

performed before, rather than after, other self-control acts. The fifth and final assumption

underlies the findings that self-control efforts degrade with increased depletion.

I focus my discussion on causes and consequences of ego depletion that apply to the
4
current research. Prior psychology research finds that complex cognitive processing

(Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister 2003), maintaining vigilance/focus (Vohs, Baumeister,

Schmeichel, Twenge, Nelson, & Tice 2008; Gailliot & Baumeister 2005), and impulse inhibition

(e.g., Baumeister et al. 1998) all potentially cause ego depletion. However, researchers have

recently theorized that only impulse inhibition, as opposed to other applications of self-control,

results in depletion (Baumeister & Vohs 2016a). As a result, I center each of my manipulations

on these three separate factors, which I discuss in greater detail in Section 3. Increased cognitive

4
Hurley (2015) provides a more comprehensive discussion of the causes and consequences of ego
depletion in an auditing environment.

6
load (Schmeichel 2007), as auditors encounter in multi-tasking settings (Mullis & Hatfield 2018),

and general decision-making (Bruyneel, Dewitte, Vohs, & Warlop 2006; Vohs et al. 2008;

Gailliot & Baumeister 2005) also can potentially cause depletion and are inherent in many

accounting tasks that auditors perform on a daily basis.

Prior research has also discovered a number of consequences stemming from ego

depletion. Baumeister et al. (1998) find that depletion increases passivity and acceptance of the

status quo. Importantly, the status quo in auditing is accepting the client’s explanations or

financial statement presentation without obtaining appropriate supporting evidence, given

management’s status as “first mover” on financial information (Earley, Hoffman, & Joe 2008).

Depletion has also been found to decrease logical reasoning and complex cognitive processing

(Schmeichel et al. 2003), decrease resistance to persuasion (Burkley 2008), and decrease

vigilance/focus (Vohs et al. 2008; Gailliot & Baumeister 2005). All of these consequences can

potentially hinder auditors’ JDM quality, hypothesis generation, and fraud detection. However,

ego depletion research has not explored the impact of depletion when individuals are familiar

with the tasks, as they would be in a realistic, professional task setting. As a result, in

Experiment 2, I focus my main dependent variable measures of auditors’ JDM quality on

cognitive processing (generation of plausible alternative explanations for financial trends) and

resistance to persuasion (reasonableness ratings for the CFO’s fraudulent explanations of trends).

2.2 Causes of Ego Depletion and Accounting Tasks (Experiment 1)

The two hypotheses for Experiment 1 focus on reasons why prior depletion findings

might not generalize to an auditing setting. Prior psychology researchers rely on a general

subject base (e.g., undergraduate psychology students) and general impulse inhibition tasks (e.g.,

keeping one’s hand in a bucket of ice water or willingness to consume unpleasant beverages) to

7
study depletion. However, it is unclear whether these findings generalize to a professional

auditing setting and tasks that require different types of self-control.

The depletion literature extensively explores the impact of the presence, not the type, of

self-control requirements on depletion.5 Most studies manipulate depletion by using tasks that

are centered entirely on impulse inhibition (e.g., resisting the temptation to eat chocolate cookies;

stifling emotions during funny or sad videos; suppressing thoughts; and retyping a paper without

using the letter “e” or the space bar). By focusing on strong impulse inhibition tasks, prior

literature has not systematically investigated the impact of other deliberate self-control acts on

depletion. In this vein, Baumeister & Vohs (2016a, 76) indicate that “it would be useful to know

whether conscious, deliberate processes that do not require blocking a response…deplete or not.”

While professional auditors’ work may involve resisting temptation at times (e.g., resisting the

temptation to use the internet instead of working; Bhaskar et al. 2016), professional auditing

tasks require many different types of self-control other than impulse inhibition. Therefore, it is

important to determine whether types of self-control inherent in auditing tasks, such as using

complex cognitive processing or maintaining vigilance and focus, cause depletion. I am unaware

of any depletion studies that use the same task materials and manipulate the type of self-control

requirement to investigate differences in depletion stemming from different self-control acts. As

a result, I do not have an ex ante prediction as to whether different types of self-control

5
Hagger et al. (2010) explore different types and spheres of self-control in their meta-analysis. However,
I am referring to a lack of studies that purposefully manipulate the type of self-control within a single
experiment. In short, I do not believe that a single meta-analysis provides the internal validity to
rigorously investigate this issue and therefore do not believe the depletion literature sufficiently considers
this issue.
8
requirements will cause different amounts of ego depletion, and posit the following hypothesis

(in null form):6

H1: Different types of self-control use do not cause different levels of ego depletion.

Most depletion studies also use tasks that are not familiar or meaningful to task

performers, thus largely ignoring the potential impact of task-specific experience on depletion.

By contrast, auditors likely have experience with performing auditing tasks. This task-specific

experience can potentially reduce the extent to which self-control resources are depleted by task

performance by converting controlled and effortful processing into automatic and heuristic-based

processing that is unaffected by depletion (Neal, Wood, & Drolet 2013; Schmeichel et al. 2003).

It is important to note that this effect is distinct from prior findings that practicing self-control

exertion can increase self-control capacity (Muraven, Baumeister, & Tice 1999; Oaten & Cheng

2006a, 2006b, 2007; Muraven 2010). Based on this discussion, it is possible that auditors are less

susceptible to depletion from auditing tasks, compared to prior psychology studies’ participants

who are unlikely to have task-specific experience. To examine the effect of task-specific

experience on depletion incurred from task performance, I posit the following hypothesis (in

directional form):

H2: Task-specific experience reduces the extent to which self-control resources are
depleted by task performance.

2.3 Consequences of Ego Depletion and Accounting Tasks (Experiment 2)

After investigating the causes of depletion, Experiment 2 examines whether depleting

tasks affect auditors’ subsequent task performance. Prior research finds that depletion decreases

controlled, effortful processing; decreases in controlled processing force individuals to rely more

on automatic, heuristic processing (Schmeichel et al. 2003; Masicampo & Baumeister 2008;
6
I am specifically referring to the type of self-control exertion and not the intensity/magnitude of the
exertion. I hold magnitude or length of self-control exertion constant by standardizing the time available
to perform the self-control (manipulated) task.
9
Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, & Baumeister 2009). Decreased controlled processing can potentially

hinder overall evidence evaluation and pattern recognition (e.g., Hammersley 2006) and the

ability to generate alternative hypotheses for trends. Auditors’ hypothesis generation

significantly impacts their subsequent performance in identifying actual errors (Heiman-

Hoffman, Moser, & Joseph 1995). Accordingly, depletion can reduce JDM quality through

reduced hypothesis generation ability due to decreased controlled effortful processing. As a

result, I posit the following hypothesis (in alternative form):

H3a: Depleting tasks will reduce auditors’ hypothesis generation ability.

Prior research also finds that depletion increases individuals’ passivity and the likelihood

that they will accept the status quo (Baumeister et al. 1998). Further, prior literature finds that

depletion increases confirmatory information processing and susceptibility to persuasion (Fischer,

Greitemeyer, & Frey 2008; Burkley 2008). As a result, depletion can hinder auditors’ JDM

quality by causing differences in attention to evidence (e.g., Hoffman, Joe, & Moser 2003) or by

relying on management’s assertions as the status quo (e.g., Earley et al. 2008). These findings

indicate that depletion will make auditors judge client-provided, fraudulent explanations as more

reasonable. Accordingly, I posit the following hypothesis (in alternative form):

H3b: Depleting tasks will increase auditors’ reasonableness ratings for client-provided
explanations.

Finally, I explore whether depleting tasks affect individuals’ confidence because

confidence in current task performance serves as an input into an individual’s decision to

continue to perform that task. DeBono & Muraven (2013) find that depletion reduces individuals’

confidence in their predictions of future performance; however, prior research has not explored

the impact of depleting tasks on individuals’ retrospective confidence subsequent to task

10
completion. I therefore do not have an ex ante prediction regarding the impact of depleting tasks

on retrospective confidence, and pose the following research question:

RQ1: Do depleting tasks significantly impact auditors’ retrospective confidence in their

task performance?

3. Experiment 1

I design Experiment 1 to investigate whether different types of self-control requirements

in an initial task lead to significantly different levels of ego depletion (H1). I also examine

whether task-specific experience or expertise (H2) mitigates the incidence of depletion.

3.1 Design and Procedures

Prior depletion research relies upon laboratory experiments to investigate the causes and

consequences of depletion. This research uses a two-task paradigm, where participants perform

an initial task manipulated as depleting or non-depleting and subsequently perform a task that

measures depletion levels, typically through task persistence or the ability to suppress habitual

responses. These methods provide valid measures of depletion because they require self-control

to override a habitual response or urge to quit a task. Lower persistence or an inability to

suppress habitual responses indicates greater depletion.

Before discussing the design and procedures for Experiment 1, it is useful to discuss my

general experimental approach. I use two separate experiments in a two-task paradigm.

Experiment 1 is designed to determine whether auditing tasks can lead to depletion using an

established measure of depletion. Experiment 2 is designed to examine whether these exact same

auditing tasks that cause depletion in Experiment 1 impact auditors’ JDM quality. I use this

approach rather than conducting one experiment using a three-task paradigm, where I would

deplete auditors, measure depletion, and subsequently assess depletion’s impact on JDM. 7
7
This design choice is not without its drawbacks. I address these issues and alternative explanations for
my reported results in subsection 4.4.1.1 and in the conclusion section.
11
 I made the design choice to run two separate experiments as opposed to one experiment

using a three-task paradigm based upon theoretical concerns.8 Prior literature provides evidence

that two separate effects can influence the dependent variable in a depletion study using a three-

task paradigm: conservation of self-control resources; and learned industriousness and adaptation.

The conservation hypothesis within ego depletion theory posits that the more an individual is

depleted, the more they are motivated to conserve self-control resources (e.g., Muraven, Shmueli,

& Burkley 2006; Tyler & Burns 2009). As a result, if individuals know that they must perform

an additional task that requires self-control beyond the current task, they will conserve self-

control resources for the future task at the expense of the current task. This results in improved

performance on the third task, based upon conservation of resources. However, Converse &

DeShon (2009) provide evidence that a three-task paradigm leads to participants exhibiting

learned industriousness and adaptation, which also increases performance on the third task.9

Learned industriousness and adaptation therefore can confound depletion and self-control

conservation in a three-task paradigm, making it difficult or impossible to disentangle which of

these factors accounted for the observed results.10 Further, attempting to isolate or control for

conservation of self-control resources by explicitly discussing self-control requirements of tasks

(as in Muraven et al. 2006) could potentially lead to demand or other uncontrolled effects (e.g.,
8
There are also statistical concerns with this approach. Specifically, I would need to conduct a multilevel
mediation model, as simple mediation analysis cannot handle clustered data from repeated measures (e.g.,
the Stroop task trials) and would yield biased standard errors of estimates (Krull & MacKinnon 2001).
However, multilevel mediation models and multilevel structural equation modeling cannot accommodate
models with a dependent variable at the individual, as opposed to the trial, level (Krull & MacKinnon
2001; Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang 2010, 211).
9
Converse & DeShon (2009, 1319) explicitly note that this phenomenon, learning tasks’ effort demands
and transferring this knowledge and corresponding effort across similar tasks, is especially strong in
situations involving more than two tasks. Further, because the task measuring depletion in my setting is
dissimilar from the other two tasks, learned industriousness could lead to the same decreased performance
on this task as would conservation of self-control resources.
10
For example, would high levels of performance on the second and third tasks indicate learned
industriousness and adaptation, indicate that the participant was not depleted by the initial task, or
indicate that the individual conserved self-control resources to improve performance on the third task?
Using two separate experiments grounded in the two-task paradigm avoids this confound.
12
activation of beliefs in implicit theories of self-control; Job, Dweck, & Walton 2010), which

would weaken and/or confound my inferences and potentially introduce a significant amount of

noise into my measures. As a result of these concerns, I determined that using two experiments

was a more appropriate approach to test my hypotheses.

In Experiment 1, I use a 1 x 3 between-subjects design and randomly assign participants

to one of three separate depletion treatments. I base my treatments upon an audit risk assessment

task and label them as Processing, Inhibition, and Vigilance based upon the type of self-control

required for task performance, which I describe in greater detail below. The Inhibition treatment

has been used in prior literature and shown to induce depletion (Baumeister et al. 1998). As a

result, the Inhibition treatment serves as a valid benchmark against which to compare the other

treatments, and I use it as a quasi-control treatment rather than use a traditional control group.

Not using a traditional control treatment biases against finding significant differences in

depletion from my treatments, thus providing a stronger test. Subsequent to completing the

manipulated risk assessment task, participants complete a Stroop color-word interference task

(hereafter “Stroop task). The Stroop task is designed to measure depletion levels through reaction

times while inhibiting a habitual response. Finally, participants complete a post-experimental

questionnaire.

Senior-associate auditors participate in Experiment 1 following training sessions.

Auditors read a consent form, then begin the experimental procedures as outlined above. The risk

assessment task is manipulated based upon the primary type of self-control required for task

performance. Participants all work on this task for 15 minutes to ensure that the length of the

depleting task is controlled across treatments. 11 The Processing manipulation requires

participants to use cognitive processing to complete risk assessment procedures from the
11
Pilot testing indicated that 15 minutes was not sufficient to complete the manipulated task.
13
planning phase of an audit. Specifically, participants perform a portion of the audit planning case

used in Hammersley, Johnstone, & Kadous (2011), whereby they read information about a

hypothetical client in order to identify risk factors and assess inherent, control, and fraud risk

levels.12 I elect to use a risk assessment task because this task involves self-control through

cognitive processing, which is present in many auditing tasks.13 Further, risk assessment tasks

are common within audits, which increases the likelihood that auditors will have experience with

this task.

The Inhibition manipulation requires participants to read the case and cross out all

instances of the letter “e”. Auditors complete the first page of the case by crossing out all

instances of the letter “e,” with no additional rules. This first page is designed to create a habitual

behavior, which must be inhibited later in the task. Upon completing the first page, participants

read updated instructions, which inform them that they must continue to cross out instances of

the letter “e” according to several specific rules (e.g., do not cross out the letter “e” if it is

immediately preceded or followed by a vowel). This task causes depletion because participants

must override their habitual impulse of crossing out all instances of the letter “e” in order to

apply these specific rules (Baumeister et al. 1998).

12
A realistic professional task enhances the experimental realism of my study, as participants are more
likely to attend to a familiar and meaningful task (Swieringa & Weick 1982). Therefore, using a realistic
professional task will more accurately capture benefits that accrue with task-specific experience. Using a
professional task also allows me to hold task materials constant while varying the type of self-control
required by the task. Further, a realistic professional task will help to probe the robustness of ego
depletion theory by examining whether depletion stems solely from impulse inhibition, which is used
almost exclusively in prior psychology studies, or also from other types of self-control inherent in many
auditing tasks such as cognitive processing or maintaining vigilance/focus (Baumeister & Vohs 2016a).
13
Although the initial task in each treatment requires participants to perform different actions, the
underlying self-control requirement is the only difference between the tasks that could plausibly affect the
amount of depletion resulting from task performance. I hold time constant across tasks to ensure that
different groups do not perform the depleting task for longer than others. Further, differences such as the
Processing treatment requiring more accounting knowledge than other treatments will not plausibly
impact self-control requirements, as accessing general knowledge does not require self-control (e.g.,
Baumeister & Vohs 2016a).
14
 The Vigilance task requires participants to read case information and respond to a number

of simple questions about the case. Participants are informed that the answers to these questions

can be found chronologically throughout the case materials. This task therefore requires self-

control in the form of maintaining vigilance/focus to scan through the case for the answers.

Further, this task is similar to familiarizing oneself with a client prior to joining an audit team.

Upon completing the manipulated task, participants in Experiment 1 complete the Stroop

task (Stroop 1935) electronically via computer to measure depletion. The Stroop task is a

psychological test of attention control, which requires participants to quickly identify the color of

font in which words are displayed, rather than the actual meaning of the word. The Stroop task

contains both congruent and incongruent trials. In congruent trials, the font color and meaning of

the word are the same (e.g., “orange” presented in orange ink; orange is the correct response and

is indicated by pressing the “o” key); in incongruent trials, the font color and meaning of the

word differ (e.g., “orange” presented in green ink; green is the correct response and is indicated

by pressing the “g” key). Incongruent trials require self-control in order to override the habitual

impulse to respond to the meaning of the word, rather than the font color. Participants complete

40 trials of the Stroop task, balanced equally between congruent and incongruent trials. Trial

order is randomly pre-drawn and held constant between participants to ensure greater

experimental control.14 After completing the Stroop task, auditors complete a post-experimental

questionnaire. Specifically, auditors provide demographic information, a self-reported measure

of experience with tasks similar to the manipulated task (a 7-point Likert scale anchored on 1 =

“No prior experience”; 4 = “Dealt with on a number of occasions”; and 7 = “Dealt with very

14
Though some prior literature has allowed participants to perform as many trials as possible within an
allotted time (e.g., Gailliot et al. 2007), I fix the number of trials to achieve greater experimental control.
15
often”), and a mood assessment.15 Auditors also complete trait measures of self-control (Brief

Self-Control Measure; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone 2004) and professional skepticism (Hurtt

2010).

3.2 Participants

Professional participants include 95 senior-associate auditors, who participated in

Experiment 1 at the conclusion of training sessions. I removed seven auditors who did not

complete the experimental materials, seven who did not appropriately complete the Stroop task,

and four who used their phones to complete the Stroop task. 16 Subsequent analyses and

demographics are based upon the remaining 77 auditors. Overall, 55.8 percent of auditors are

male, and auditors’ mean (median) mood was 0.7 (0) on an 11-point Likert scale (anchored by: -

5 = “Very unpleasant”; 5 = Very pleasant”), indicating neutral mood on average. The mean

(median) score on the Brief Self-Control Measure was 42.9 (44), and 126.9 (127.8) for trait

Professional Skepticism.17 The number of auditors who completed the Processing, Inhibition,

and Vigilance treatments was 23, 28, and 26 respectively.

15
For example, in the Processing treatment, participants responded to the question: “How much
experience do you have with audit planning tasks, such as Task 1 in this study?”
16
The seven individuals who did not appropriately complete the Stroop task only responded correctly to
congruent trials, thus ignoring the instructions. Further, as depletion can only be measured by correct
responses to incongruent trials, these individuals’ observations would also be removed due to being
incorrect. I discarded four individuals who used their phones because the Stroop task requires using a
computer and keyboard; reaction times for phone responses are severely inflated and thus do not
accurately measure reaction time in a way that is consistent with other participants. Finally, I discarded
seven individuals who opened the Stroop task but did not complete it; these individuals responded to less
than three trials. Any analysis including these groups would not be meaningful due to the
inappropriateness of the data. As a result, I do not explore whether my results hold when including these
observations.
17
The Brief Self-Control Measure (Professional Skepticism Measure) has a maximum score of 65 (180).
These measures do not significantly differ across treatments, indicating successful randomization.
16
3.3 Variables of Interest

The dependent variable for the current analysis is participants’ reaction time, in seconds,

on correctly answered incongruent Stroop task trials.18 I focus my analyses on incongruent

Stroop trials only because of their self-control requirement that is not present in congruent trials.

The main independent variable of interest for H1 is Treatment (Processing and Vigilance) in my

repeated measures ANOVA (mixed-effects regression) below. I test H2 using a self-reported

task-experience measure (T1Exp).

3.4 Results and Discussion

3.4.1 Causes of Ego Depletion (H1 and H2)

In untabulated analyses, I find that auditors’ average reaction time for the Processing

(1.57 seconds) and Inhibition (1.53 seconds) treatments are similar; however, average reaction

time for the Vigilance treatment is 2.01 seconds. This initial comparison suggests that the

Processing treatment causes similar levels of depletion as the Inhibition treatment found to cause

significant depletion in prior psychology studies. However, the Vigilance treatment causes higher

levels of depletion than did the other two treatments. This initial evidence contradicts the null

hypothesis H1, which predicts that different types of self-control will not cause different levels

of ego depletion. It is also important to note that these simple means do not account for other

factors, like task-specific experience and learning.

18
I follow prior research (e.g., Diestel, Cosmar, & Schmidt 2013; Osinsky et al. 2009) by removing
incorrect responses, as incorrect responses do not reflect successful self-control exertion. Only 55
observations of 1,470 incongruent trials (3.74 percent) were incorrect, leaving me with 1,415 observations.
I also follow prior literature by winsorizing outlier values, as long reaction times are likely to be
influenced by other factors, and short reaction times are unlikely due to controlled processing reaction
times (Diestel et al. 2013). I identify outliers as less than 200 milliseconds or greater than the 99th
percentile (5.808 seconds). There are no outliers below 200 milliseconds; I winsorize right-skewed
outliers to 5.808 seconds (14 observations). Whelan (2008) and Ratcliff (1993) indicate that trimming
outliers in this manner is an acceptable approach for reaction-time tests, due to their right-skewness. My
results are not qualitatively affected by inclusion of incorrect responses or by winsorizing outliers,
including using more conservative definitions of outliers.
17
 To investigate H1, I first conduct a repeated-measures ANOVA with Time as the

dependent variable and Treatment as the independent variable to assess whether my treatments

significantly impact depletion. I include Question, which is the overall number of the Stroop trial

and controls for learning effects. I also include Participant as a control variable, as individuals

may have different inherent reaction-time ability. Table 1, Panel A presents the results of this

analysis. Treatment represents my test of H1, and is significant (F(2,1317) = 111.16, p < .001); this

leads me to reject the null hypothesis H1 and indicates that my treatments cause different levels

of depletion. Question (F(19,1317) = 14.08, p < .001) and Participant (F(76,1317) = 32.37, p < .001)

are also significant, consistent with expectations.

To more fully investigate H1, and to explore H2, I use a mixed-effects linear regression. I

use mixed-effects linear regression because, in addition to controlling for repeated measures, this

model allows for easier interpretation of task experience and its directional relationship with the

dependent variable that I use to test H2. Table 1, Panel B presents the following model and

variables’ corresponding to H1 and H2:

Time = β0 + β1Processing+ β2Vigilance + β3Question + β4T1Exp + β5ProfSkep + ε

Time is the reaction time for correct incongruent Stroop trials. Processing and Vigilance

are binary variables that are set to 1 if the observation relates to a participant in the Processing or

Vigilance treatment, respectively. Question is the overall question number of the Stroop trial to

control for learning effects as the trials progress.19 T1Exp is the participant’s experience with

tasks similar to the manipulated task and tests H2. Average experience with the manipulated task

(T1Exp) is 3.54 / 1.37 / 3.96 for the Processing / Inhibition / Vigilance treatments, respectively.

19
In untabulated analyses, I verify that using ln(Question) or Question(1/2), to capture decreasing marginal
returns of learning, does not qualitatively change my results.
18
ProfSkep is the individual’s score on the professional skepticism measure.20 I specifically include

ProfSkep due to the findings of Bhaskar et al. (2016), who find that professional skepticism can

potentially exacerbate the effects of depletion.

[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]

Similar to my ANOVA analysis, and contrary to the null hypothesis H1, Vigilance is

positive and significant (z = 2.47, two-tailed p = .013). Processing is positive but not significant

at conventional levels (z = 0.90, two-tailed p > .35). This result expands our understanding of

ego depletion theory by indicating that different types of self-control cause differences in

depletion and that depletion is not only caused by impulse inhibition (Baumeister & Vohs 2016a).

Specifically, cognitive processing leads to similar levels of depletion as does an impulse

inhibition task and maintaining vigilance/focus causes significantly greater depletion than either

of these other forms of self-control. This finding also expands our understanding of factors

affecting auditors’ JDM, given that realistic auditing tasks cause depletion and depletion can

have significant consequences for auditors’ JDM (Hurley 2015). H2 predicts that task-specific

experience mitigates depletion. Inconsistent with H2, T1Exp is negative but is not significant at

conventional levels (z = -1.00, one-tailed p > .15). This result indicates that task-specific

experience does not reduce the self-control resources required to perform a task, which

contradicts the findings of Neal et al. (2013).

Consistent with expectations, I find a significant learning effect as participants complete

additional Stroop trials, as Question is negative and significant (z = -13.55, two-tailed p < .001).

20
All other collected variables (e.g., mood, trait self-control) are not significant when included in the
model; therefore, I omit them for brevity and a lack of ex ante predictions regarding their effects on
depletion. In untabulated analyses, I also control for each participant’s average time on congruent trials;
this measure provides a baseline for reaction time ability and guards against any differences in ability
across treatments, despite random assignment. I find that my results are robust to adding this control
variable.
19
Trait professional skepticism (ProfSkep), however, is not significantly associated with depletion,

either as a main effect or, in untabulated analyses, as an interaction with my treatments.

4. Experiment 2

I designed Experiment 2 to determine whether depleting tasks significantly affect JDM

quality through hypothesis generation ability (H3a), susceptibility to fraudulent explanations

(H3b), and confidence in task performance (RQ1). As discussed in section 3.1, a three-task

design would introduce potential theoretical confounds. Based upon these concerns, I hold the

initial tasks constant between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 and use senior-associate auditors

as participants in both experiments to ensure that auditors are similarly depleted when

performing a subsequent auditing JDM task. As a result, Experiment 2 links the manipulated

depleting tasks into more meaningful measures of auditors’ JDM quality and compares these

tasks to each other and to a Control treatment.

4.1 Design and Procedures

In Experiment 2, I use a 1 x 4 between-subjects design and randomly assign professional

auditors to treatments. These treatments mirror those in Experiment 1 with the addition of a

Control treatment. The design and procedures for Experiment 2 are identical to those in

Experiment 1 with the exception of the second task. In Experiment 2, auditors complete an

auditing task instead of the Stroop task. The auditing task involves evaluating explanations that a

CFO has given to explain troubling financial trends of a company, generating plausible

alternative explanations for those trends, and providing reasonableness ratings for the CFO’s

explanations (Johnstone, Gramling, & Rittenberg 2012, 670). The task is based upon the fraud at

Koss Corporation, perpetrated by the CFO. In this case, the CFO-provided explanations are

fraudulent. This task provides evidence of auditors’ cognitive processing measured by plausible

20
alternative explanations and susceptibility to fraudulent explanations captured by reasonableness

ratings. Auditors then rate their retrospective confidence in their performance and complete a

post-experimental questionnaire, identical to that in Experiment 1. Auditors in the Control

treatment complete the auditing task and post-experimental questionnaire.21

4.2 Participants

Professional participants include 127 senior-associate auditors, who participated in

Experiment 2 at the conclusion of training sessions. Senior associates are appropriate participants

for this task as they are well suited to the goals and task of the experiment (Libby, Bloomfield, &

Nelson 2002, 802) and their decisions and documentation can influence decisions by their

superiors (Ricchiute 1999). I removed from analysis one auditor who did not complete the task,

three auditors who did not complete the post-experimental questionnaire, and ten auditors who

spent insufficient time on the tasks (i.e., less than ten minutes combined).22 Subsequent analyses

and demographics are therefore based upon 113 auditors. Overall, 51 percent of auditor

participants were male, and their mean (median) mood was 0.7 (0) on an 11-point Likert scale

(anchored by: -5 = “Very unpleasant”; 5 = Very pleasant”), indicating a neutral mood on average.

The mean (median) score on the Brief Self-Control Measure was 45.3 (46), and 131.2 (130) for

trait Professional Skepticism. The number of auditors who completed the Processing, Inhibition,

Vigilance, and Control treatments was 20, 21, 24, and 48 respectively.
21
I elect not to use a filler task because my theoretical comparison of interest in using a Control treatment
is to compare performance of depleted individuals to that of non-depleted individuals. The most reliable
way to achieve a true no-depletion group is to simply measure performance on the task immediately.
Importantly, Control treatment auditors had 30 minutes to complete their materials, while all depleting
treatments had 45 minutes (15 minutes for the initial task plus the 30 minutes given to the Control group);
this ensured that time to complete the JDM task was held constant across all treatments. Proctors were
asked specifically to watch for herding effects and did not report any herding effects. This design choice
raises the possibility of alternative explanations for my observed results, which I discuss in detail in
subsection 4.4.1.1.
22
In untabulated analysis I added back these 13 auditors (14 exclusions less the auditor who did not
complete the task) and re-ran my ANCOVA model for my test of H3a. My effect of Treatment in my
ANCOVA is stronger with the inclusion of these observations (F(3,614) = 6.01 compared to F(3,551) = 5.23
reported) and all of my reported contrasts hold or improve their significance.
21
4.3 Variables of Interest

The dependent variables for my tests of depleting task consequences are: the number of

valid (i.e., plausible) alternative explanations generated for each trend (H3a); participants’

reasonableness rating of the CFOs explanation for each trend (H3b); and participants’ self-

reported retrospective confidence in task performance (RQ1). Two PhD students assessed and

coded the validity of the provided explanations (H3a test). These individuals are former senior

managers at a Big 4 accounting firm and are blind to experimental treatment during their

coding.23 The coders met and resolved their coding issues. This reconciled coding is used in my

following analyses.

4.4 Results and Discussion

4.4.1 Generation of Alternative Explanations (H3a)

To examine H3a, I conduct analyses over ValidAlternatives. Table 2, Panel A provides

the means for ValidAlternatives and RawAlternatives by treatment. Valid (Raw)Alternatives

averaged .837 (1.204) for Processing, .942 (1.350) for Inhibition, 1.059 (1.395) for Vigilance,

and 1.200 (1.417) for the Control treatment. I conduct an ANCOVA for ValidAlternatives with

Treatment as the independent variable of interest. I also control for Trend and RawAlternatives,

as valid hypotheses may differ depending on the specific trend and are necessarily a subset of the

raw number of hypotheses generated. Table 2, Panel B provides the results of these tests.

[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]

23
In untabulated analyses, I find the inter-rater reliability to be acceptable, based upon a Cohen’s Kappa
of .757 for assessing the validity of alternative explanations (Peterson 1994). For Trend 1 “Cash balances
have declined to their lowest level since FY 2008,” examples of valid responses include: “Increased R&D
expenditures,” “Paid off debt,” and “Net PP&E increased so the company is buying more long-term
assets.” Examples of invalid responses include “Spending more cash on marketing” (inconsistent with
SG&A numbers), “A/R has increased due to decreased collectability” (inconsistent with A/R balance,
which has not increased), and “COGS or other expenses have increased” (inconsistent with these
balances).
22
 H3a predicts that depleting tasks will reduce auditors’ generation of alternative

explanations for the given trends. Consistent with H3a, Treatment is significant (F(3,551) = 5.23, p

= .002); this indicates that differences in treatments led to significant differences in auditors’

ability to generate plausible alternative explanations for troubling financial trends. Trend, as

expected, is significant (F(4,551) = 9.02, p < .001); this indicates that auditors were better able to

generate plausible alternative explanations for certain trends than others. Finally, the number of

RawAlternatives is significant in determining the number of ValidAlternatives (F(1,551) = 1039.76,

p < .001); this is expected, as valid alternatives are a subset of raw alternatives, and controls for

the total number of alternatives generated.24

To further investigate the results of the ANCOVA, I perform a series of planned contrasts,

which are presented in Table 3 Panel C. First, I compare ValidAlternatives for all depletion

treatments to the Control treatment in order to compare the performance of depleted auditors to

non-depleted auditors. I find that ValidAlternatives are significantly lower for depletion

treatments than for the Control treatment (F(1,551) = 14.58, p < .001). Second, I test each

treatment individually against the Control treatment and find that auditors in the Processing

(F(1,551) = 9.24, p < .01), Vigilance (F(1,551) = 4.27, p < .05), and Inhibition (F(1,551) = 10.60, p

< .01) treatments all generate significantly fewer valid alternative explanations for the trends. As

a result, performing a depleting task, when compared to not being in a depleted state,

significantly reduces auditors’ cognitive processing in the form of hypothesis generation.

Third, in order to test whether the statistically significant differences in depletion

observed in Experiment 1 impact auditors’ JDM, I conduct three additional planned contrasts.

Specifically, I compare ValidAlternatives in each depleting treatment to each of the two other

24
All other collected variables (e.g., mood, trait self-control, trait professional skepticism, experience
with tasks similar to the JDM task) are not significant when included in the model; therefore, I omit them
for brevity and a lack of ex ante predictions regarding their effects.
23
depleting treatments. Contrary to expectations, I do not find significant differences in

ValidAlternatives for the Vigilance treatment when compared to the Processing and Inhibition

treatments, despite the Vigilance treatment causing significantly greater depletion in Experiment

1. Performance in the Vigilance treatment does not significantly differ from the Processing

(F(1,551) = 0.96, p > .30) or Inhibition (F(1,551) = 1.28, p > .25) treatments. As expected, the

Processing and Inhibition treatments do not significantly differ (F(1,551) = 0.02, p > .85).

4.4.1.1 Potential Alternative Explanations for H3a Findings

Due to my experimental design, where I do not explicitly measure ego depletion in

Experiment 2, it is possible that, while my results are theoretically consistent with ego depletion

as an explanation, confounding factors other than ego depletion are driving my observed results.

In this section, I identify potential alternative explanations for my observed results and discuss

the likelihood that these alternative explanations are driving my findings.

I designed the control treatment to move directly to the JDM task, rather than complete a

filler task to mirror the depleting-task treatments. I chose this structure to ensure that my control

treatment was truly a no-depletion treatment. While prior research has used tasks which

ostensibly require little self-control (e.g., Muraven et al. 2006; Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, &

Muraven 2007), self-control requirements exist on a continuum and the most reliable way to

ensure the control group was not depleted was to forego an initial task. This approach raises the

possibility that simple fatigue from completing an initial task led participants in the depleting-

task treatments to generate fewer valid alternative explanations for the observed trends. However,

if fatigue were driving my results the prediction would be that participants in the depleting-task

treatments generated fewer raw and valid explanations than did participants in the Control

treatment. Depletion, by contrast, would not necessarily lead to fewer raw explanations, but

24
would lead to fewer valid explanations through decreased complex cognitive processing.25 An

untabulated ANCOVA indicates that Treatment does not significantly impact raw explanations

(F(3,556) = 1.01, p = .387), but does significantly impact valid explanations, as reported previously.

As a result, it does not appear that fatigue is driving my observed results.

A second possibility is that initial tasks requiring accounting knowledge (e.g., the

Processing treatment) either 1) cause depletion through accessing this knowledge, or 2) prime

accounting knowledge for use in the JDM task. In the former case, prior research finds that

accessing knowledge does not lead to depletion, so it is unlikely that accessing accounting

knowledge would be responsible for my findings (Baumeister & Vohs 2016a). In the latter case,

priming accounting knowledge on the initial task would lead to improved performance on the

JDM task for auditors in the Processing treatment. By contrast, auditors in the Processing

treatment exhibit the poorest performance among all treatments. As a result, it does not appear

likely that accounting knowledge requirements are responsible for my observed results.

A third possibility is that auditors’ reactions to the initial task (e.g., interest in the task,

enjoyability, etc.) influenced their performance on the JDM task in ways that did not occur for

auditors in the Control treatment. While I did not measure auditors’ task interest or enjoyment, I

measure their mood. Due to random assignment, differences in mood can be attributed to

auditors’ affect resulting from the initial task manipulations or lack thereof in the Control

treatment. In an untabulated ANOVA with Mood as the dependent variable and Treatment as the

independent variable, I find that Treatment significantly influences auditors’ mood (F(3,556) =

25
While one could argue that depletion reduces task persistence, which could influence raw alternatives,
this effect seems to be contingent upon the task being unsolvable or impossible for the participants to
complete (e.g., Baumeister et al. 1998), which is not the case in my setting. Indeed, Stillman, Tice,
Fincham, & Lambert (2009) and Wright et al. (2007) do not find any persistence effect of depletion using
a word production task and mental arithmetic task, respectively. As a result, depletion theory would not
necessarily predict a decrease in raw alternatives in my setting with a familiar task that can be completed
but would predict a decrease in valid alternatives through decreased complex cognitive processing.
25
30.46, p < .001, untabulated). However, I re-run my analyses of ValidAlternatives and include

Mood as a direct-effect covariate and an interaction with Treatment and find that neither Mood

nor the interaction term Treatment*Mood are significant (both ps > .75, untabulated). Further,

the effect of Treatment remains significant (F(3,547) = 4.94, p = .002, untabulated). As a result, it

does not appear that auditors’ reactions to the initial manipulated task drive my observed results.

4.4.2 Susceptibility to Persuasion (H3b)

Rating captures auditors’ rating, via seven-point Likert scale, of how likely they believe

the CFO’s explanation accounts for each trend (anchored by: 1 = “Very unlikely”; 7 = “Very

likely). Table 3, Panel A provides the mean ratings by treatment for Experiment 2: 4.16 for

Processing, 4.23 for Inhibition, 4.32 for Vigilance, and 4.55 for Control treatments. To

investigate H3b, I conduct an ANOVA with Treatment as the independent variable of interest,

and control for Trend, as in my test of H3a, and prior experience with tasks similar to the JDM

task TaskExp. Table 3, Panel B provides the results of this analysis.

[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]

H3b predicts that performing depleting tasks will lead to higher reasonableness ratings

for the CFO’s explanations. Inconsistent with H3b, Treatment is not significant at conventional

levels (F(3,551) = 1.20, p > .30). This indicates that performing depleting tasks did not

significantly impact auditors’ susceptibility to the CFO’s fraudulent explanations for trends.

Trend, as expected, is significant (F(4,551) = 18.44, p < .001). TaskExp, as expected, is also

significant (F(1,551) = 6.95, p = .009). I use an untabulated contrast to compare the depleting

treatments to the Control treatment and find that depleting tasks do not significantly impact

auditors’ reasonableness ratings (F(1,551) = 1.92, p > .15). Thus, performing depleting tasks does

not significantly impact auditors’ susceptibility to fraudulent explanations in my setting.

26
4.4.3 Confidence (RQ1)

RQ1 considers whether depletion will significantly impact auditors’ confidence in task

performance following the CFO explanation task. Auditors’ mean confidence by treatment is as

follows: 4.23 for Processing, 4.57 for Inhibition, 4.75 for Vigilance, and 4.85 for the Control

treatment. In an untabulated ANOVA, Treatment is not significant at conventional levels (F(3,108)

= 1.54, p > .20), when controlling for TaskFamiliarity (F(1,108) = 29.56, p < .001). However, in an

untabulated ANOVA comparing the Control treatment to all depletion treatments, auditors in the

Control treatment reported higher mean confidence than depleted auditors (F(1,108) = 9.72, p

< .01), indicating that depleting tasks reduce auditors’ retrospective confidence in task

performance. This result complements that of DeBono & Muraven (2013), who find that

depletion reduces individuals’ prospective confidence on a future task. Given that the depleting

tasks hindered auditors’ ability to generate plausible alternative hypotheses, it is notable that

these auditors then have lower confidence in their work because confidence in task performance

is an input into the decision to continue to persist in performing a task. Indeed, this provides

some indirect evidence that auditors are subconsciously aware of the impact of the depleting

tasks on their performance.

5. Conclusions

I conduct two experiments to explore the causes and consequences of ego depletion with

respect to professional auditing tasks. With respect to causes of depletion, I find that an auditing

task requiring vigilance/focus causes greater levels of depletion than does a depleting psychology

task based upon impulse inhibition. Further, an audit planning task requiring cognitive

processing leads to similar levels of depletion as the depleting psychology task. These findings

provide evidence that realistic, professional tasks can cause depletion at similar or even higher

27
levels than a previously used psychological task of self-control, due to different self-control

requirements. This finding contributes to theories of auditors’ JDM processes and ego depletion

theory, which has recently theorized that depletion may stems solely from inhibiting impulses

(Baumeister & Vohs 2016a). This finding also underscores the PCAOB’s concerns regarding

auditor workload; regulators should not only consider the amount of work, but whether specific

types of auditing tasks have significant self-control requirements. I also find that task-specific

experience did not significantly reduce the self-control resources required to perform a task.

With respect to consequences of ego depletion, I find evidence that performing depleting

tasks, when compared to a non-depleted control group, significantly reduces auditors’ cognitive

processing in the form of inhibiting their ability to generate plausible alternative hypotheses for

troubling financial trends. However, auditors within the different depleting task treatments alone

did not exhibit significantly different levels of JDM quality. This finding can inform workpaper

reviewers, as work performed after auditors have performed depleting tasks may require more

thorough workpaper review. I also find that these depleting tasks reduce auditors’ retrospective

confidence in task performance, which potentially guards against the effects of depletion if

decreased confidence leads to increased effort. However, I do not find that depleting tasks lead to

increased susceptibility to fraudulent explanations for these troubling trends. Importantly,

auditors performed these tasks for less than 15 minutes, which would be considered a less-severe

form of depletion. As a result, it is possible that more severe depletion (e.g., depletion occurring

over multiple tasks, during multi-tasking, or during busy season) or more depleting tasks can

more significantly impact auditors’ JDM processes. These findings also contribute to the

accounting literature on ego depletion (e.g., Hurley 2015, 2017; Bhaskar et al. 2016; Mullis &

Hatfield 2018).

28
 The results of my study need to be interpreted with some caveats. First, for reasons

outlined earlier, I did not use a three-task paradigm in my experimental design and choose to

address my research questions using two separate experiments and to infer the effect of depletion

from Experiment 1 to Experiment 2. I strengthen the tie between these experiments by using

senior associate auditors in both experiments and using the exact same depleting tasks in both

experiments. Second, in order to ensure that auditors in my control treatment were not depleted,

they did not perform an initial task as did the auditors in my depleting-task treatments. While this

design choice affords me greater control over a lack of depletion in the control treatment, it

raises the possibility that confounding factors, rather than depletion, are driving my results. I

discuss fatigue, differences in accounting knowledge requirements, and auditors’ reactions to the

initial task as potential alternative explanations for my results and provide evidence and

theoretical arguments to support that these factors do not drive my results.

Based upon my findings that depleting tasks hinder auditors’ complex cognitive

processing but not their susceptibility to fraudulent explanations, future research should continue

to investigate the consequences of ego depletion within professional accounting and auditing

settings. For example, future research can examine whether more-severe levels of ego depletion,

resulting from tasks that are either more complex or longer in duration, impairs JDM quality in

predictable ways. Further, future research can investigate the impact of depletion on more

complex tasks (e.g., audits of complex estimates), and whether existing mechanisms in the

auditing environment (e.g., workpaper review and decision aids) can guard against the effects of

depletion on auditors’ JDM.

29
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Table 1
Participants’ Reaction Times – Stroop Task

Panel A: Repeated-Measures ANOVA (H1 Test)

Observations: 1,415 R2: 0.689

Root MSE: 0.563 Adj. R2: 0.667

Source Partial SS df MS F p
Model 924.85 95 9.74 30.74 0.000

Treatment 70.40 2 35.20 111.16 0.000

Question 84.69 19 4.46 14.08 0.000
Participant 758.46 74 10.25 32.37 0.000

Residual 417.68 1,319 0.32

Total 1342.53 1,414 0.95

Time is the dependent variable and measures individuals’ response time (in seconds) to each incongruent,
correct trial of the Stroop task. Treatment is a factor variable where 1, 2, and 3 correspond to Processing,
Inhibition, and Vigilance treatments, respectively. Question corresponds to the overall trial number for
that individual for that observation and controls for learning effects. Participant corresponds to the unique
identifier for each experimental participant. All variables are presented with two-tailed p-values.

1
Panel B: Mixed-Effects Linear Regression (H1 – H2 Test)

Auditors
Coeff
Pred. (SE)
Intercept N/A 2.336***
(0.632)
Processing (H1) +/- 0.194
(0.216)
Vigilance (H1) +/- 0.557**
(0.225)
Question - -0.019***
(0.001)
T1Exp (H2) - -0.047
(0.047)
ProfSkep +/- -0.003
(0.005)

Observations: 1,382
By-participant random Intercept: YES
Wald Chi2: 190.60
p < .001
Pseudo R2: 0.109

Time is the dependent variable and measures individuals’ response time (in seconds) to each incongruent,
correct trial of the Stroop task. Processing and Vigilance are binary variables that correspond to
Processing and Vigilance treatments, respectively. Question corresponds to the overall trial number for
that individual for that observation to control for learning effects. T1Exp is the individuals’ self-reported
experience with their depleting task. ProfSkep is the participant’s score on Hurtt’s (2010) trait measure of
professional skepticism. The remaining terms are interaction terms of previously described variables. All
variables are presented with two-tailed p-values. *, **, and *** represent significance at the .10, .05,
and .01 levels, respectively.

2
Table 2
Participants’ Alternative Explanations (H3a Test)

Panel A: Raw Alternatives and Valid Alternatives by Treatment

Mean Raw Alternatives Mean Valid Alternatives
Condition n
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
Processing 20 1.204 0.837
(1.093) (0.992)
Inhibition 21 1.350 0.942
(1.045) (0.978)
Vigilance 24 1.395 1.059
(1.051) (0.985)
Control 48 1.417 1.200
(1.019) (1.048)

Panel B: ANCOVA – Valid Alternative Explanations

Observations: 560 R2: .7181
Root MSE: .545 Adj. R2: .7140

Source Partial SS df MS F p
Model 417.240 8 52.155 175.43 0.000

Treatment (H3a) 4.661 3 1.554 5.23 0.002

Trend 10.727 4 2.682 9.02 0.000
RawAlternatives 39.124 1 309.124 1039.76 0.000

Residual 163.815 551 0.297

Total 581.055 559 1.039

Panel C: Contrasts based on ANCOVA

Source df F p
Processing, Vigilance, and Inhibition < Control 551 14.58 < .001
Processing < Control 551 9.24 < .01
Vigilance < Control 551 4.27 0.039
Inhibition < Control 551 10.60 <.01
Processing vs. Vigilance 551 0.96 0.328
Processing vs. Inhibition 551 0.02 0.898
Vigilance vs. Inhibition 551 1.28 0.259

Note: ValidAlternatives is the dependent variable in Panel B and measures the number of plausible
alternative explanations generated. Treatment is a factor variable where 1, 2, 3, and 4 correspond to
Processing, Inhibition, Vigilance, and Control treatments, respectively. Trend is a factor variable that
controls for each of the five trends that participants evaluate. RawAlternatives is the total number of
alternatives generated. All variables are presented with two-tailed p-values.

3
Table 3
Participants’ Reasonableness Ratings (H3b Test)

Panel A: Reasonableness Ratings by Treatment

Mean Rating
(Std. Dev.)
4.158
Processing
(1.740)
4.233
Inhibition
(2.054)
4.319
Vigilance
(1.850)
4.546
Control
(1.768)

Panel B: ANOVA – Reasonableness Ratings

Observations: 560 R2: 0.135
Root MSE: 1.723 Adj. R2: 0.122

Source Partial SS df MS F p
Model 254.220 8 31.778 10.71 0.000

Treatment (H3b) 10.718 3 3.573 1.20 0.308

Trend 218.936 4 54.734 18.44 0.000
TaskExp 20.614 1 20.614 6.95 0.009

Residual 1,635.401 551 2.968

Total 1,889.621 559 3.380

Note. Rating is the dependent variable, and measures participants’ reasonableness ratings for the CFO’s
explanations of trends. Treatment is a factor variable where 1, 2, 3, and 4 correspond to Processing,
Inhibition, Vigilance, and Control treatments, respectively. Trend is a factor variable that controls for
each of the five specific trends that participants evaluate. TaskExp is participants’ self-reported experience
with tasks similar to the JDM task. All variables are presented with two-tailed p-values.