THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 233520, March 06, 2019

ROICE ANNE F. FOX, PETITIONER, v. THE PHILIPPINE STATISTICS AUTHORITY AND THE OFFICE OF THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry; Venue; A petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in
the civil register may be filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.—To be clear, the petition filed before the RTC was a petition for
correction of entry which, under Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, must be filed in the RTC
where the corresponding civil registry is located. The Rule provides: Section 1. Who may file petition.—
Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the [Regional Trial Court] of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.—Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriage;
(c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name. Based on the
abovementioned rule, a petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register may be filed with the RTC of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Given that Rule 108 pertains to a special proceeding, the specific provisions
stated thereunder, particularly on venue, must be observed in order to vest the court with
jurisdiction.—It bears stressing that Rule 108 is a special proceeding for which specific rules apply. In
Fujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013), the Court noted, thus: Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court
provides that “[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or
a particular fact.” Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as
birth, death or marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. Given that Rule 108 pertains to a
special proceeding, the specific provisions stated thereunder, particularly on venue, must be observed in
order to vest the court with jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Local Civil Registrar; The inescapable consequence of the failure to implead the civil
registrar is that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) will not acquire jurisdiction over the case or, if
proceedings were conducted, to render the same a nullity.—The petition likewise failed to comply with
other jurisdictional requirements such as impleading the civil registrar and all persons who may have a
claim or interest in the correction sought. The local civil registrar is an indispensable party for which no
final determination of the case can be reached. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 99 (1996), the
Court reiterated the importance of impleading the civil registrar on petitions filed under Rule 108, viz.:
The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable
party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this
case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the
prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. The
inescapable consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar is that the RTC will not acquire
jurisdiction over the case or, if proceedings were conducted, to render the same a nullity.4 Fox vs.
Philippine Statistics Authority, 895 SCRA 436, G.R. No. 233520 March 6, 2019

A. REYES, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Roice Anne F. Fox
(petitioner), assailing the Orders dated March 24, 2017 1 and July 24, 20172 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 54 of Davao City, which dismissed outright her petition for correction of entry on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS:

On October 29, 2012, petitioner married Thomas Kenneth K. Fox (Thomas), a Canadian citizen, in a
ceremony held at the Grand Regal Hotel in Lanang, Davao City. Right after their union, they flew to
Thomas's hometown in Weyburn, Saskatchewan, Canada where they have decided to settle and raise a
family. Not long thereafter, the petitioner conceived and gave birth to a baby girl, whom they named
Zion Pearl Fox (Zion), on June 27, 2015. The fact of birth of the petitioner's daughter was duly registered
at the Registrar's Office in Regina Saskatchewan, Canada, which issued the corresponding birth
certificate. In the said certificate, the petitioner's minor daughter's birthdate was correctly stated as
June 27, 2015. Thereafter, in October 2015, her daughter was issued a Canadian passport which also
properly reflected the exact date of birth of the child.3

On June 7, 2016, considering that the petitioner's daughter was born outside of the Philippines, the
Philippine Consulate Office (PCO) in Calgary, Alberta submitted a Report of Birth 4 of the child to the
national office of the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA) in Manila. Unfortunately, through oversight or
mistake, the PCO erroneously indicated the child's birthdate as June 27, 2016, instead of June 27, 2015,
in the said Report of Birth. The petitioner brought the said discrepancy to the attention of the concerned
officials of the PCO which, instead of taking immediate action, advised her to file a petition before the
proper court in the Philippines for the correction of entry in the Report of Birth of her daughter. 5

Ruling of the RTC

On January 17, 2017, the petitioner filed before the RTC of Davao City, where she was a resident,
however, the RTC motu proprio dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The
pertinent portions of the order read, thus:

Acting on the petition, this court cites Section 1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides for the Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, as follows:

Section 1, Rule 108 "Any person interested in any act, event, order, or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation
or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [Regional Trial Court] of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located."
xxxx

Evidently, the Regional Trial Court in Davao City has no jurisdiction over the instant petition which seeks
to direct the Philippine Statistics Authority in Manila to make the correction of entry in the report of
birth of Zion Pearl F. Fox made by the Philippine Consulate Office of Calgary, Alberta, Canada to the said
office in Manila.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.

SO ORDERED.

On April 10, 2017, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied.

The petitioner turns to this Court for relief in a petition for review on certiorari raising a pure question of
law, particularly whether the RTC was correct in motu proprio dismissing her petition for correction of
entry on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

In the assailed Order dated March 24, 2017, the RTC motu proprio dismissed the petition on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the proper court is the RTC of Manila, where the PSA Office, in which
the Report of Birth of the petitioner's daughter was registered, is situated.

To be clear, the petition filed before the RTC was a petition for correction of entry which, under Section
1 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, must be filed in the RTC where the corresponding civil registry is
located. The Rule provides:

Section 1. Who may file petition. - Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [Regional Trial Court] of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

Section 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. — Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriage; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; U) naturalization; (k)
election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (1) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n)
voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.

Based on the above-mentioned rule, a petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register may be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

It bears stressing that Rule 108 is a special proceeding for which specific rules apply.
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person's life which are recorded by the State pursuant to
the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or
marriage, which the State has an interest in recording. Given that Rule 108 pertains to a special
proceeding, the specific provisions stated thereunder, particularly on venue, must be observed in order
to vest the court with jurisdiction.

Apart from the foregoing, the petition likewise failed to comply with other jurisdictional requirements
such as impleading the civil registrar and all persons who may have a claim or interest in the correction
sought. The local civil registrar is an indispensable party for which no final determination of the case can
be reached. In Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 the Court reiterated the importance of impleading the civil
registrar on petitions filed under Rule 108, viz.:

The local civil registrar is thus required to be made a party to the proceeding. He is an indispensable
party, without whom no final determination of the case can be had. As he was not impleaded in this
case much less given notice of the proceeding, the decision of the trial court, insofar as it granted the
prayer for the correction of entry, is void. The absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. 15

The inescapable consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar is that the RTC will not acquire
jurisdiction over the case or, if proceedings were conducted, to render the same a nullity. In Republic,
the Court emphasized, thus:

The necessary consequence of the failure to implead the civil registrar as an indispensable party and to
give notice by publication of the petition for correction of entry was concerned, null and void for lack of
jurisdiction both as to party and as to the subject matter.16

In view of the defects in the filing of the petition, the RTC of Davao City cannot be faulted in dismissing
the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Nonetheless, the dismissal is without prejudice to the
refilling of the petition in the proper court, with full compliance to the specific requirements of Rule 108.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Orders dated March 24, 2017 and July 24, 2017 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 54 of Davao City are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 239011. June 17, 2019.*

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. PACOL DISUMIMBA RASUMAN, respondent.

Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry; The essential requirement
for allowing substantial correction of entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an
appropriate adversarial proceeding.—The essential requirement for allowing substantial correction of
entries in the civil registry is that the true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding.
Section 3 requires that all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 provide for two sets of notices to two
different potential oppositors, i.e., (1) notice to the persons named in the petition; and (2) notice to
other persons who are not named in the petition, but, nonetheless, may be considered interested or
affected parties. The two sets of notices are mandated under the above quoted Section 4 and are
validated by Section 5, also above quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of
“potential oppositors”) within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of
publication). Summons must, therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with
jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person
concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.

Same; Same; Same; Section 3 of Rule 108 mandatorily requires that the civil registrar and the interested
parties who would be affected by the grant of a petition for correction should be made parties.—In this
case, respondent sought from the RTC the correction of his birthdate from February 12, 1952 to
February 12, 1956. He impleaded in his petition for correction the BOC, the agency where he was
working at so as to update his service records, but did not implead the CSC. It bears stressing that one of
the CSC’s mandated functions under Executive Order No. 292 is to keep and maintain personnel records
of all officials and employees in the civil service. Therefore, the CSC has an interest in the petition for
correction of respondent’s birth certificate since the correction entails a substantial change in its public
record, i.e., he would have an additional four years before reaching his compulsory retirement age. To
reiterate, Section 3 of Rule 108 mandatorily requires that the civil registrar and the interested parties
who would be affected by the grant of a petition for correction should be made parties. Considering that
the CSC is an indispensable party, it should have been impleaded in respondent’s petition, and sent a
personal notice to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process, before it could be
affected by the decision granting the correction of his date of birth. The CSC should have been afforded
due process before its interest be affected, no matter how the proceeding was classified. Thus, the CSC
correctly denied respondent’s request for correction of his date of birth on the basis of the RTC’s
decision granting the correction.

Constitutional Commissions; Civil Service Commission; Jurisdiction; The Civil Service Commission (CSC) is
the central personnel agency of the government and, as such, keeps and maintains the personal records
of all officials and employees in the civil service.—In this case, while respondent impleaded the BOC
when he amended his petition for correction of entry, he did not implead the CSC. To stress, the CSC is
the central personnel agency of the government and, as such, keeps and maintains the personal records
of all officials and employees in the civil service. Notwithstanding that respondent knew that the
correction of his date of birth would have an effect on the condition of his employment, he still did not
exert earnest efforts in bringing to court the CSC, and there is no showing that the CSC was only
inadvertently left out. We, therefore, find no basis for the CA’s ruling that respondent’s case falls under
the exceptional circumstances where the failure to implead indispensable parties was excused.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS: On April 16, 2014, respondent Pacol Disumimba Rasuman, a Senior Executive Assistant in the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanao del Sur, Branch 9, Marawi
City, a verified petition for correction of his date of birth from February 12, 1952 to February 12, 1956,
docketed as SPL. PROC. No. 2191-14, impleading as respondent the Local Civil Registrar of Marantao,
Lanao del Sur. The RTC issued an Order5 setting the case for hearing and directing the publication of the
Order in a newspaper of general circulation in Marawi City and Iligan City for three consecutive weeks at
the expense of respondent, and that the Order and the petition, as well as its annexes, be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Marantao, Lanao del Sur, the Office of the Solicitor General, and the Civil
Registrar General which respondent complied with. Respondent later filed an Amended Petition 6 to
implead the BOC.

In a Decision7 dated July 23, 2015, the RTC granted the petition for correction. The decision became final
and executory on October 8, 2015.

On January 21, 2016, respondent filed with the Civil Service Commission-National Capital Region (CSC-
NCR) a request9 for correction of his date of birth in his service records. In a letter, the CSC-NCR required
respondent to submit certain documents. Respondent submitted the following documents: the original
copy of his Certificate of Live Birth issued by the Philippine Statistics Authority with remarks that his
date of birth was corrected from February 12, 1952 to February 12, 1956 pursuant to the July 23, 2015
RTC Decision; his affidavits explaining the discrepancy in his date of birth and the fact that he was not
baptized as it is not a Muslim practice; affidavits of two witnesses attesting to the truthfulness of his
claim that his date of birth was February 12, 1956; and the certified true copies of his service records
card and the Personal Data Sheet issued by the CSC Field Office, Department of Public Works and
Highways, indicating his birthdate as February 12, 1952.

The CSC-NCR issued Resolution denying respondent's request for correction. It held that while
respondent's Certificate of Live Birth (belatedly registered) supported his claim that his date of birth was
February 12, 1956, however, his employment and school records showed otherwise; that his personal
data sheet on file with the CSC Field Office showed that he attended elementary school from 1957 to
1962; thus, if his birthday was February 12, 1956, he was only one year old at the time he first attended
elementary school.

Respondent filed a petition for review with the CSC Proper.

The CSC issued Decision dismissing the petition for review. It held that it is not bound by the July 23,
2015 RTC decision in the correction of respondent's birthdate because it was not impleaded therein,
although it was an indispensable party; that the RTC decision would have no effect insofar as the CSC is
concerned.

Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied by the CSC. Respondent filed a petition for review
with the CA. The parties filed their respective pleadings, and the case was submitted for decision.

The CA issued its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. Accordingly, the January 13, 2017 Decision No.
170058 and May 8, 2017 Resolution No. 1700847 of the Civil Service Commission in NDC-2016-07025
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Civil Service Commission is DIRECTED to comply with the July
23, 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Branch 9, Marawi City in SPL. PROC. No.
2191-14.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA.

Petitioner filed the instant petition for review on the ground that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT PETITIONER ERRED WHEN
IT DENIED RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR THE CORRECTION OF HIS SERVICE RECORD. 17

RULING: We find merit in the petition.

Petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry is governed by Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court which provides, among others:

SEC. 3. Parties. - When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time
and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. - The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry
whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or
from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

The essential requirement for allowing substantial correction of entries in the civil registry is that the
true facts be established in an appropriate adversarial proceeding. 18 Section 3 requires that all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the
proceeding. Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 provide for two sets of notices to two different potential
oppositors, i.e., (1) notice to the persons named in the petition; and (2) notice to other persons who are
not named in the petition, but, nonetheless, may be considered interested or affected parties. 19 The two
sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 and are validated by Section 5, also
above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which
to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). 20 Summons must,
therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the
requirements of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his
interest if he so chooses.21

Due process requires that those with interest to the thing in litigation be notified and given an
opportunity to defend those interests. Courts, as guardians of constitutional rights, cannot be expected
to deny persons their due process rights while at the same time be considered as acting within their
jurisdiction.

In Police Senior Superintendent Macawadib v. The Philippine National Police Directorate for Personnel
and Records Management,24 we already held that there is a necessity to implead the CSC in petitions for
correction of entries that would affect a government employee's service records. In that case, petitioner
therein, Police Senior Superintendent Dimapinto Macawadib, filed with the RTC of Marawi City a
Petition for Correction of Entry in his birth certificate which the RTC granted; and the Philippine National
Police (PNP), the National Police Commission, and the CSC were ordered to make the necessary
correction in their records of Macawadib's date of birth. The RTC decision had become final and
executory. The PNP filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA on the ground that the RTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over it, an unimpleaded indispensable party. The CA nullified and set aside
the RTC decision and barred Macawadib from continuing and prolonging his tenure with the PNP
beyond the mandatory retirement age of fifty-six (56) years.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, "parties in interest without whom no final determination
can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants." If there is a failure to implead an
indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. It is "precisely 'when an
indispensable party is not before the court (that) an action should be dismissed.' The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present." The purpose of the rules on joinder of
indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves,
but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face
cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.

In this case, respondent sought from the RTC the correction of his birthdate from February 12, 1952 to
February 12, 1956. He impleaded in his petition for correction the BOC, the agency where he was
working at so as to update his service records, but did not implead the CSC. It bears stressing that one of
the CSC's mandated functions under Executive Order No. 292 is to keep and maintain personnel records
of all officials and employees in the civil service. Therefore, the CSC has an interest in the petition for
correction of respondent's birth certificate since the correction entails a substantial change in its public
record, i.e., he would have an additional four years before reaching his compulsory retirement age. To
reiterate, Section 3 of Rule 108 mandatorily requires that the civil registrar and the interested parties
who would be affected by the grant of a petition for correction should be made parties. Considering that
the CSC is an indispensable party, it should have been impleaded in respondent's petition, and sent a
personal notice to comply with the requirements of fair play and due process, before it could be
affected by the decision granting the correction of his date of birth. The CSC should have been afforded
due process before its interest be affected, no matter how the proceeding was classified. Thus, the CSC
correctly denied respondent's request for correction of his date of birth on the basis of the RTC decision
granting the correction.

In this case, the CSC was not impleaded at all in respondent's petition for correction of his date of birth
filed with the RTC, and it was never specifically ordered to make the correction in respondent's records,
as his amended petition only prayed for the BOC to effect correction on his employment records to
reflect his true and correct date of birth. The CSC was not at all apprised of the proceedings in the RTC
and not bound by such decision.

While there may be cases where the Court held that the failure to implead and notify the affected or
interested parties may be cured by the publication of the notice of hearing, such as earnest efforts were
made by petitioners in bringing to court all possible interested parties, the interested parties themselves
initiated the correction proceedings, there is no actual or presumptive awareness of the existence of the
interested parties, or when a party is inadvertently left out, none of them applies in respondent's case.

In this case, while respondent impleaded the BOC when he amended his petition for correction of entry,
he did not implead the CSC. To stress, the CSC is the central personnel agency of the government and, as
such, keeps and maintains the personal records of all officials and employees in the civil service.
Notwithstanding that respondent knew that the correction of his date of birth would have an effect on
the condition of his employment, he still did not exert earnest efforts in bringing to court the CSC, and
there is no showing that the CSC was only inadvertently left out. We, therefore, find no basis for the
CA's ruling that respondent's case falls under the exceptional circumstances where the failure to
implead indispensable parties was excused.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 25, 2017
and the Resolution dated April 26, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 151017 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 13, 2017 Decision No. 170058 and May 8, 2017 Resolution No.
1700847 of the Civil Service Commission in NDC-2016-07025 are hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 209527 February 14, 2018 SECOND DIVISION

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L. TIPAY, Respondent

Facts:

In a petition dated February 13, 2009, Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his birth certificate.
Attached to the petition are two (2) copies of his birth certificate, respectively issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Govemor Generoso, Davao Oriental and the National Statistics Office5 (NSO). Both copies
reflect his gender as "FEMALE' and his first name as "Virgie." It further appears that the month and day of
birth in the local civil registrar's copy was blank, while the NSO-issued birth certificate indicates that he
was born on May 12, 1976. Virgel alleged that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of
his birth certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from "FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name, from "VIRGIE"
to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY 25, 1976."

The petition was found sufficient in form and substance, and the case proceeded to trial. Aside from his
own personal testimony, Virgel's mother, Susan L. Tipay, testified that she gave birth to a son on February
25, 1976, who was baptized as "Virgel." The Certificate of Baptism, including other documentary evidence
such as a medical certificate stating that Virgel is phenotypically male, were also presented to the trial
court.

Issue:

Whether or not Rule 108 proceeding is always a summary proceeding?

Ruling:

No. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary.

The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the
petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be
affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting
the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.

REPUBLIC v. LORENA OMAPAS SALI

G.R. No. 206023, April 03, 2017, Second Division, (Peralta, J.)

Section 1 of RA 9048 now governs the change of first name. It vests the power and authority to
entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general
concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily
lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the
change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction
of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change
of name is first filed and subsequently denied

TOPIC/S:
Special Proceeding; Correction of Entry under Rule 108

FACTS:
Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Petition for Correction of Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
before the RTC. In her petition, she averred that in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the
Local Civil Registrar of Baybay, Leyte, erroneously entered in the records the following: Firstly, the first
name of the petitioner as "DOROTHY" instead of "LORENA" and Secondly, the date of birth of the
petitioner as "June 24, 1968" instead of "April 24, 1968. The petitioner has been using the name "Lorena
A. Omapas” and her date of birth as "April 24, 1968" for as long as she could remember and is known to
the community in general as such.

The trial court ruled in favor of Lorena Sali thereby granting the petition to correct the erroneous
entries in her birth certificate. However, The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
appealed the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court a quo because the title of the
petition and the order setting the petition for hearing did not contain Sali's aliases.

The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication that Sali is known by a
name other than "Lorena," hence, it would be absurd to compel her to indicate any other alias that she
does not have; (2) Sali not only complied with the mandatory requirements for an appropriate adversarial
proceeding under Rule 108 of the Rules but also gave the Republic an opportunity to timely contest the
purported defective petition; and (3) the change in the first name of Sali will certainly avoid further
confusion as to her identity and there is no showing that it was sought for a fraudulent purpose or that it
would prejudice public interest.

Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it applied Rule 108 instead
of Rule 103, thereby dispensing with the requirement of stating the respondent’s aliases in the
title of the petition

Whether or not respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

HELD:

Anent the first issue:

NO. Sali's petition is not for a change of name as contemplated under Rule 103 of the Rules but
for correction of entries under Rule 108. What she seeks is the correction of clerical errors which were
committed in the recording of her name and birth date. This Court has held that not all alterations allowed
in one's name are confined under Rule 103 and that corrections for clerical errors may be set right under
Rule 108. The evidence presented by Sali show that, since birth, she has been using the name "Lorena."
Thus, it is apparent that she never had any intention to change her name. What she seeks is simply the
removal of the clerical fault or error in her first name, and to set aright the same to conform to the name
she grew up with.

Anent the second issue:

YES on the part of Sali’s first name but NO on the part of her birth date. At the time Sali's petition
was filed, R.A. No. 9048 was already in effect. Section 1 of RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.
It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction over applications for
change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned administrative officers. The intent
and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court, until and
unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied. It likewise lays
down the corresponding venue, form and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings regulating
change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.

In Republic v. Cagandahan, we said that under R.A. No. 9048, the correction of clerical or
typographical errors can now be made through administrative proceedings and without the need for a
judicial order. The law removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of clerical
or typographical errors. Thus petitioner can avail of this administrative remedy for the correction of his
and his mother's first name.

In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali's first name, was not within
the RTC's primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the remedy should have been administrative, i.e.,
filing of the petition with the local civil registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies,
the RTC should have dismissed the petition to correct Sali's first name.

On the other hand, anent Sali's petition to correct her birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April
24, 1968," R.A. No. 9048 is inapplicable. It was only on August 15, 2012 that R.A. No. 10172 was signed
into law amending R.A. No. 9048. As modified, Section 1 now includes the day and month in the date of
birth and sex of a person.
 Considering that Sali filed her petition in 2008, Rule 108 is the appropriate remedy in seeking to
correct her date of birth in the civil registry. The Republic did not question the petition to correct Sali's
birth date from "June 24, 1968" to "April 24, 1968." In fact, it did not contest the CA ruling that the
requirements for an appropriate adversarial proceeding were satisfactorily complied with.

The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Petition for Correction of Entry in the Certificate of Live Birth of
Dorothy A. Omapas with respect to her first name is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to its filing with the
local civil registrar concerned.

SILVERIO vs. REPUBLIC

22 October 2007

DOCTRINE: Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable
cause or any compelling reason justifying such change and he must show that he will be prejudiced by the
use of his true and official name. If his cause for changing his name doesn’t fall under those given in R.A.
9048 (e.g. because of sex reassignment), his petition must fail and it cannot be granted even on grounds
of equity.

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of CA’s decision

Ponente: Corona

FACTS:

1. Petitioner filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, impleading the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
a. Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses
Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was
registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth
certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
b. He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels,
thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since
childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States.
c. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when
he underwent sex reassignment surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand.
d. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction
surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.
e. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then
sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely,"
and his sex from "male" to "female."
 2. An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal Tonight, a
newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks. 3 Copies of the
order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.
a. On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner, ruling that
granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of justice and
equity and that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community
in granting the petition.
b. On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no law allowing the
change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
3. Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the Republic, holding that the trial court’s
decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the
certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery.
a. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. WON a person’s first name can be changed on the ground of sex reassignment. NO
2. WON there is a law that allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground
of sex reassignment. NO
3. WON the entries may be changed on the ground of equity. NO

HELD:

ISSUE #1

1. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a right.12 Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes.13 In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that “No person
can change his name or surname without judicial authority”.
a. This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular,
Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and

Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or
typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be
corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or
consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

b. RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The

petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of
the following cases:
 (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and
continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

2. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather
than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create
grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
a. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition, he must
show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.20
b. In this case, petitioner failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer
as a result of using his true and official name.
3. In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioner’s first name
was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the
local civil registrar concerned, assuming it could be legally done.
a. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that
provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept.
b. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not
prejudice him at all, hence the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition
in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

ISSUE #2

1. The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court
must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides: No entry in
the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

c. Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
d. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through administrative
proceedings and without the need for a judicial order.
e. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors so that Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.23

2. Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines a "clerical or typographical error" as “a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register
that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like,
which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only
by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must
involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
 a. Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere
clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable
procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
b. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code.
c. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include
even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex
reassignment.
d. Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts, events
and judicial decrees which produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the
laws.
e. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article
407. Neither is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
3. A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a person’s legal
capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides: All other matters
pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
a. But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its
effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
b. Moreover, under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth.29
c. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant.
d. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination
of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is
immutable.
e. For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change
of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

ISSUE #3:

1. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy
consequences.
a. First, even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioner’s first step
towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
i. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman.37
ii. One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.38
iii. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of
a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual).
b. Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions
of the Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised Penal
 Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court,41 among others.
i. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be
substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
2. In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for
legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are
statute-based.
a. The statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or
change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be
invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed.
b. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the
privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact
legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

DISPOSITION: The petition is hereby DENIED.

REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN

FACTS: On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. In her petition, she alleged that
she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while
growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female
characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years
and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age
thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has
no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in
mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected
such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to
Jeff.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of
the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued
a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that
respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the
change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and
the gender change would be advantageous to her. The RTC granted respondents petition. Thus, this
petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her name from Jennifer to Jeff and her sex or gender, from female to male, on the
ground of her medical condition.
HELD: In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term “intersexuality”
which is the condition or a disorder that respondent is undergoing. intersexuality applies to human beings
who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species
whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither
exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics
of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the
compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when
nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render
judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence
points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change
in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at
maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent
as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither
will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one
who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness
and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along
the path of his sexual development and maturation.
In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent” and in the absence of evidence to show
that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondent’s position and
his personal judgment of being a male. As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has
held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of
the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change
of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in
respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.
 39. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v GLADYS LABRADOR

FACTS:
Labrador filed with the RTC a Petition for the correction of entries in the record of birth of Sarah
Zita Erasmo, her niece. In her Petition, respondent alleged the following, among others: 1) that she is the
sister of Maria Rosario Cañon who is presently residing in the USA; 2) that sometime in 1986, Cañon, had
a common law relationship with a certain Degoberto Erasmo, and during such cohabitation, Cañon begot
two illegitimate children, one of which is SARAH ZITA B. ERASMO, born on April 27, 1988, as shown in
her birth certificate; 3) that during the registration of the birth of SARAH ZITA, Cañon told the Local Civil
Registrar (LCR) that she was not legally married to the father of SARAH ZITA; 4) that Labrador erroneously
entered the name of Sarah Zita in her birth record as SARAH ZITA C. ERASMO, instead of SARAH ZITA
CAÑON. Not only that, the name of Cañon, being the mother, was also erroneously written by the LCR
as Rosemarie Cañon, instead of Maria Rosario Cañon; 5) that in order to straighten the record of birth of
SARAH ZITA ERASMO and pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code which provides:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of the
mother . . .
[t]here is a need to correct the entry in the record of birth of SARAH ZITA ERASMO to SARAH ZITA CAÑON
and to correct the name of her mother as appearing in her birth certificate from ROSEMARIE CAÑON to
MARIA ROSARIO CAÑON.
Evidence was presented to establish the jurisdiction of the trial court to hear the petition. When
Labrador testified, she repeated the allegations in her Petition. She stated that Sarah Zita Erasmo was
her niece because Maria Rosario Cañon, the mother of the child, was her (respondent's) sister. On cross-
examination, Labrador explained that she was the one who had reported the birth of Sarah to the LCR,
to whom she had erroneously given "Rosemarie" as the first name of the child's mother, instead of the
real one, "Maria Rosario." Labrador explained that her sister was more familiarly known as Rosemarie;
thus, the error. She likewise averred that Rosemarie and Maria Rosario were one and the same person,
and that she had no other sister named Rosemarie. She added that Maria Rosario was abroad where she
lived with her foreigner husband.
Labrador then formally offered her evidence which included Maria Rosario's birth certificate and
a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it had no record of marriage between Maria
Rosario Cañon and Degoberto Erasmo. Prosecutor Labra, who conducted the cross-examination, did not
object to the evidence offered. The trial court granted Respondent Labrador's Petition.
Petitioner contends at the summary proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court and Article
412 of the Civil Code may be used only to correct or change clerical or innocuous errors. It argues that
Rule 108 "cannot be used to modify, alter or increase substantive rights, such as those involving the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, which respondent desires to do. The change sought will result not
only in substantial correction in the child's record of birth but also in the child's rights which cannot be
effected in a summary action."

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in granting Labrador’s petition.

HELD: YES.
The Court has held:
On its face, Rule 108 would appear to authorize the cancellation of any entry regarding
"marriages" in the civil registry for any reason by the mere filing of a verified petition for the purpose.
However, it is not as simple as it looks. Doctrinally, only errors that can be canceled or corrected under
this Rule are typographical or clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the validity of a
marriage. A clerical error is one which is visible to obvious to the understanding; error made by a
transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing (Black vs. Republic, L-10869, Nov. 28, 1958); or some harmless
and innocuous change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a mis-statement of
the occupation of the parent.
Where the effect of a correction in a civil registry will change the civil status of petitioner and her
children from legitimate to illegitimate, the same cannot be granted except only in an adversarial
proceeding.

In the present case, the changes sought by Respondent Labrador were undoubtedly substantial:
first, she sought to have the name appearing on the birth certificate changed from "Sarah Zita Erasmo"
to "Sarah Zita Cañon," thereby transforming the filiation of the child from legitimate to illegitimate.
Second, she likewise sought to have the name of Sarah Zita's mother, which appeared as "Rosemarie" in
the child' birth record, changed to "Maria Rosario." An adversarial proceeding is essential in order to fully
thresh out the allegations in respondent's petition.
Sarah Zita and her purported parents should have been parties to the proceeding. After all, it
would affect her legitimacy, as well as her successional and other rights. In fact, the change may also
embarrass her because of the social stigma that illegitimacy may bring. The rights of her parents over her
and over each other would also be affected. Furthermore, a change of name would affect not only the
mother but possibly creditors, if any. Finally, no sufficient legal explanation has been given why an aunt,
who had no appointment as guardian of the minor, was the party-petitioner.
Even granting that the proceedings held to hear and resolve the petition before the lower court
were "adversarial," it must be noted that the evidence presented by the respondent was not enough to
fully substantiate her claim that Sarah Zita was illegitimate. Her evidence consisted mainly of her
testimony and a certification from the civil registry of Cebu City that such office had no record of a
marriage between Rosemarie/Maria Rosario Cañon and Degoberto Erasmo. Respondent Labrador was
not able to prove the allegations in her petition.
Indeed, respondent correctly cites Article 176 of the Family Code, which states that "illegitimate
children shall use the surname[s] . . . of their mothers." But to enforce such provision, the proper recourse
is an adversarial contest. It must be stressed that Rule 108 does not contemplate an ordinary civil action
but a special proceeding. By its nature, this recourse seeks merely to correct clerical errors, and nor to
grant or deny substantial rights. To hold otherwise is tantamount to a denial of due process to third
parties and the whole world.
Topic: Divorce and Remarriage
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas
628 SCRA 266
August 11, 2010
FACTS:
1. Gerbert Corpuz, who acquired Canadian citizenship, married a Filipina, Daisylyn Sto. Tomas. He
left for Canada soon after the wedding and when he came back to the Philippines after three
months, he discovered that his wife was having an affair with another man.
2. Corpuz returned to Canada and filed for a divorce. His petition was granted and the said divorce
took effect a month after it was granted.
3. Two years after the divorce, he found another Filipina to love. He wanted to marry his new fiancée
so he went to the Pasig City Civil Registry to register the divorce decree on his and Sto. Tomas’
marriage certification.
4. As told by an NSO official, Corpuz filed for a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) denied his petition, citing that he was not the proper party to institute the action
for a judicial recognition and that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
5. Corpuz then filed a petition for review on certionari from the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUES:
1. Is the foreign decree sufficient to declare that there is a divorce?
2. Does the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extend to aliens the right to petition
a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce?
3. Can the Filipino spouse remarry under Philippine law should a divorce be validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse, thereby capacitating him or her to remarry?

RULING:
(1) No. The decree has to be recognized first in a competent Philippine court. Rule 108 of the
Court sets the jurisdictional procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be made and annotated in the civil registry. (2) The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code states that: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law”. The said provision bestows no rights in favour of aliens. However, this does not necessarily
strip Mr. Corpuz his legal interest to petition for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. In fact, he
can be considered as a proper party to the petition because his direct involvement or being the subject of
the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of foreign judgement. Although Corpuz failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce as a supporting document to the validity of the decree, the Court granted to
remand the case and granted the petition for review on certiorari. (3)As to the third question, YES, the
Filipino spouse can remarry under Philippine law should a divorce be validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse (second paragraph, Article 26, Family Code).
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR | G.R. No. 189538 | February 10, 2014

DOCTRINE: Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage. What the respondent
sought is the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which
is the marriage certificate was a forgery. In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage
by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not declare the marriage void as there was no
marriage to speak of.

FACTS:

 Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR).
She then discovered that she was already married to Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24,
2002.
 Olaybar denied having contracted the marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband. Moreover, she averred that she did not appear before the solemnizing officer, that the
signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers.
 She filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the
wife portion. Olaybar impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband,
as parties to the case.
 During trial, Olaybar testified on her own behalf. Further, Olaybar presented Natinga as witness, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated
in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not Olaybar. A document
examiner also testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.
 The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition and directed the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City
to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was
not that of Olaybar, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and
rectify the terrible mistake.
 The petitioner opposed and moved for reconsideration, contending that: (1) there was no clerical
spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the
wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
 The RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity
was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible
for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the
void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.

ISSUE: Is the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding? – NO

RULING:

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.

In Republic v. Valencia, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may
be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties
aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to
demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is undisputed that the
procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was
likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate
in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer
of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several
documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies and other evidence presented, the
trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from
respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards. The court thus
made a categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and,
therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage
was celebrated.

While the Court maintains that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, it held
that it cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the
opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence
of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Olaybar sought, not the nullification of marriage
as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth
as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.