Chapter 8

Scope of Liability (Proximate Case)

§1. The Principle: Scope of Risk
Thompson v. Kaczinski
Facts: Iowa Supreme Court
 James Kaczinski and Michelle Lockwood resided on property abutting a gravel road
 They disassembled a trampoline and placed its parts on their yard approximately thirty-eight feet from the road
 A few weeks later a severe thunderstorm moved through the area and displaced the top of the trampoline from the
yard to the road
 Charles Thompson approached the defendant’s property and when he swerved to avoid the obstruction on the road,
he lost control of his vehicle then entered the ditch and rolled several times
 Thompson and his wife filed suit
Issue:
 Whether Kaczinski breached statutory and common law duties by negligently allowing the trampoline to obstruct
the roadway
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o An actor’s liability is limited to those physical harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s conduct
tortious
o The scope of liability issue is fact intensive as it requires consideration of the risks that made the actor’s conduct
tortious and a determination of whether the harm at issue is a result of any of those risks
 Analysis
o Thompson and his wife filed suit
o Kaczinski moved for summary judgment, contending they owed no duty under the circumstances because the risk
of the trampoline’s displacement from their yard to the surface of the road was not foreseeable
o The district court granted the motion, concluding Kaczinski breached no duty
o The Thompsons appealed
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o Accordingly, the district erred in deciding the scope-of-liability question as a matter of law in this case … we
reverse the district court’s dismissal of this claim and remand this case for trial
 Reasoning:
o On this record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Thompsons, we conclude a reasonable fact finder could
find the harm suffered by the Thompsons resulted from the risks that made the defendants’ conduct negligent.
Accordingly, the district erred in deciding the scope-of-liability question as a matter of law in this case …
Abrams v. City of Chicago
Facts:
 The plaintiff sued for herself and her deceased child for negligence in failing to send an ambulance to her when her
contractions were 10 min apart. Her friend was driving her to the hospital when she ran a red light and was struck
by another car- the person driving at 75 mph was intoxicated and high on cocaine. The accident left the plaintiff in a
coma for 2 weeks and her baby died. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the ground
that the defendant’s failure to send an ambulance was not the proximate cause of the injuries. The intermediate
court reversed.
Issue:
 Was the City liable to the Plaintiff for failing to send an ambulance because such failure was the proximate cause of
the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o The term "proximate cause" describes two distinct requirements: cause in fact and legal cause. A defendant's
conduct is a "cause in fact" of a plaintiff's injury only if that conduct is a material element and a substantial factor
in bringing about the injury. A defendant's conduct is a material element and substantial factor in bringing about
the injury if, absent that conduct, the injury would not have occurred. "Legal cause," by contrast, is largely a
question of foreseeability. The relevant inquiry is whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would
see as a likely result of his or her conduct.
 Analysis
o The Plaintiff negligence action against the city failed because of her inability to establish proximate causation.
Although the failure to send an ambulance was a cause of the accident, the far more immediate causes of the
injuries and death were the traffic violations by both the friend and the reckless driver.The plaintiffs injury and
the child’s death would not be within the scope of the risk when saying that the defendant was negligent.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o No- The high court held that the intermediate court erred, and the trial courts grant of summary judgment is
affirmed.
 Reasoning:
o The city could not have reasonably anticipated that the refusal to send an ambulance would likely result in
plaintiff’s driver running a red light while a substance impaired driver was speeding through the intersection on a
suspended license. This is not the kind of harm that was sufficiently foreseeable.
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
Facts: Court of Appeals of New York
 The Plaintiff was standing on a railroad platform purchasing a ticket, when a train stopped, and two men ran
forward to catch it. One of the men nearly fell, and two railroad employees attempted to help him. In the process, a
package containing fireworks fell and the contents exploded. As a result of the explosion some scales at the other
end of the platform fell and struck the Plaintiff. Plaintiff sued and a jury found in her favor. The Appellate Division
affirmed this decision, but the Court of Appeals of New York reversed.
Issue:
 Does a defendant owe a duty of care to a plaintiff if the plaintiff is not in the zone of reasonably foreseeable harm
resulting from the defendant's actions? Did the train workers’ duties of care extend to the plaintiff?
 Must the plaintiff be within the range of foreseeability for a duty to be owed?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o To recover for negligence, the plaintiff must establish each of the following elements: duty, standard of care,
breach of duty, cause-in-fact, proximate cause (scope of liability) and damages. A defendant owes a duty of care
to a plaintiff only if the plaintiff is in the zone of reasonably foreseeable harm resulting from the defendant's
actions.
o There is a reasonable limit on the extension of duty in negligent acts - if the harm is not willful, then the plaintiff
must prove that the resulting injury resulted from an apparent danger inherent in the act.
 Analysis
o Negligence liability is predicated on the breach of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. The scope of a
defendant's duty is defined by the scope of the reasonably foreseeable harm resulting from the defendant's actions.
If someone is outside of the range of the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the defendant's actions, the
defendant generally does not owe that person a duty, and the person therefore may not bring a negligence action
against the defendant. The range of reasonably foreseeable harm may be a question either for the court or for a
jury to decide.
o Moreover, with regard to identifying the appropriate scope of negligence liability, a plaintiff may not sue on
behalf of the risk of injury or bodily harm perpetrated against another; rather, the plaintiff may only recover for
harm committed against the plaintiff's own person or property.
o Here, the railroad employees were attempting to help the man with the package safely board the train. The man
suffered no bodily injury in the process, and to the extent he suffered any harm at all, it was only the damage to
the package. If anyone could potentially bring a negligence action against the railroad, it would be the man, but he
is not doing so. Rather, Palsgraf is bringing an action for her own bodily harm based on the events set in motion
when the package dropped. However, this harm to Palsgraf was not reasonably foreseeable. From the outside, the
package gave no indication that it contained fireworks; it looked harmless. Given the package's appearance, even
if a railroad employee had knowingly and deliberately thrown the package down, this could not be seen as an
unlawful act that would put Palsgraf in danger.The consequences should not be more severe for the employee's
unintentional conduct. Because the harm to Palsgraf was outside the realm of reasonably foreseeable
consequences from the railroad employees' actions, there is no basis for negligence liability in this matter.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding: Cardozo, C.J.
o The court reversed the appellate court judgment and dismissed the complaint
 Reasoning:
o Plaintiff must show that some wrong was done to herself, i.e., that there was a violation of her own rights, not
merely a wrong done to someone else. In this case, there was nothing to indicate that the package contained
fireworks, and if dropped, would cause an explosion. The guards, who were assisting the passenger on the train,
were negligent in doing so, and caused the package to be dislodged, which fell causing an explosion. The
explosion caused some scales at the other end of the platform to fall, striking Plaintiff. The guards were not
negligent in relation to the Plaintiff, who was standing far away when the package was dropped. If the court had
decided that Defendant was negligent in respect to the Plaintiff, then the majority concludes that a defendant
would be liable for any and all consequences of its negligence, “however novel or extraordinary.”
 Dissent: Andrews, J.
o Proximate cause, defining it as the arbitrary line that public policy draws to prevent tracing a series of events from
a cause beyond a certain point. He the act was negligent, and the defendant is liable for the proximate causes, and
the result was a proximate cause because it resulted as a direct consequence of the negligence.
o The dissent takes the view that, as a matter of law, it could not be determined that the Defendant’s actions were
not the proximate cause of the Plaintiff’s injuries. Justice Andrews concluded that the judgment should have been
affirmed. Justice Andrews in Palsgraf expresses what has become the matrix for measuring the scope of one’s
duty and its relationship to causation in connection with negligence claims. Essentially, Justice Andrews’
formulation is a consideration of the appropriate tests for proximate (or legal) cause – the third element in the
formula for tort law (duty, breach, causation and harm).
o Concerning negligence, Andrews first asks “is it a relative concept – the breach of some duty owing to a
particular person or to particular persons? Or where there is an act which unreasonably threatens the safety of
others, is the doer liable for all its proximate consequences, even where they result in injury to one who would
generally be thought to be outside the radius of danger?” The latter is often characterized as the “zone of danger”
or “zone of impact” i.e., the area in which the plaintiff is at risk of physical impact resulting from the alleged
wrongdoer’s negligent behavior. As Justice Andrews notes, “negligence may be defined roughly as an act or
omission which unreasonably does or may affect the rights of others, or which unreasonably fails to protect
oneself from the dangers resulting from such acts.” He offers the brief maxim, “everyone owes to the world at
large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others,” “when injuries
do result from our unlawful act we are liable for the consequences. It does not matter that they are unusual,
unexpected, unforeseen, and unforeseeable. But there is one limitation. The damages must be so connected with
the negligence that the latter may be said to be the proximate cause of the former.”
 §2. Assessing the Scope of the Risk
A. Is Harm Outside the Scope of the Risk Because of the Manner in Which it Occurs?
Ruiz v. Victory Properties LLC
Facts:
 Olga (Plaintiff) commenced a negligent action, in her individual capacity and as a next friend and parent of Adriana
Ruiz (Plaintiff) – against their landlord Victory Properties (defendant).
 The defendant owned and managed a six-family apartment building. The apartment building’s backyard was used
as a playground, but it contained discarded home furnishings and appliances, and abandoned motor vehicle, piles of
construction materials, trash and rocks. The defendant was aware of the condition of the area and made no effort to
remove or cordon off the debris so that the children playing in the area would not have access to it.
 One day, Luis Cruz (10-year-old) grabbed a piece of concrete (he wanted to break a piece of it- it weighed 18
pounds) carried it up to his family’s third floor apartment and dropped it from the window to the ground below.
Luis saw Adriana and yelled at her to move but the rock struck her on the head and caused her serious injuries. She
had two surgeries and was hospitalized for nearly 2 months.
 The plaintiffs filed suit against defendant claiming that defendant was negligent in failing to remove the loose
concrete and other debris from the backyard and this negligence was a cause of Adriana’s injuries bc it was a
substantial factor in producing the injuries.
 The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment.
 The trial court granted defendants motion concluding that defendant did not owe Adriana a duty of care bc a
reasonable landlord in the defendant’s position, would not have foreseen that a child would injure another child by
grabbing a piece of concrete and throwing it from the 3rd floor.
 The trial court did not permit a jury to find liability bc the facts of the case would have discouraged landlords from
renting apartments to families with young children.
 The appellate court reversed the trial courts judgment- concluding that the TC failed to consider whether the harm
that plaintiff suffered was within the general scope of the risk created by the defendant’s failure to remove
potentially dangerous debris and improperly focused on the specific way the injuries occurred. – framed the nature
of the risk in too narrow of terms.
 Defendant appealed to the Supreme court of Connecticut.
Issue:
 Did the Appellate court err in reversing the trial courts judgment.
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o Comment (i) to §29 of the Restatement (3): courts often respond to efforts by advocates to employ excessive
detail in characterizing the type of harm in order to make it appear more unforeseeable with the dictum that the
manner of harm is irrelevant. Factfinders, no doubt, respond to these efforts with their own judgment and
common sense to decide the appropriate specificity in which to assess the scope of liability.
 Analysis
o The defendant does not dispute that the risk of harm created by its failure to remove the debris, broken concrete,
trash, and buckets from the backyard in which children play- might trip on them or throw them at other children.
The types of injuries one would except to result from these types of behaviors run from cuts and bruises to broken
bones, concussions and even fractures skulls. Adriana’s injuries fall squarely along this continuum of harm. They
occurred in an unusual manner but that does not alter the fundamental fact. Adriana’s injuries were sufficiently
foreseeable that it was inappropriate for the trial court to foreclose the foreseeability question as a matter of law.
Conclusions of proximate cause are to be drawn by the jury and not by the court.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The judgment of the Appellate court is affirmed.
 Reasoning:
o The legal construct of proximate cause serves to establish how far down the causal continuum tortfeasors will be
held liable for the consequences of their actions.
 o The inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause questions is whether the harm that occurred was of the same
general nature as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant’s negligence.
o If harm of the general nature as that which occurred is foreseeable, there is a basis for liability even though the
way the accident happens is unusual, bizarre, or unforeseeable.
o Foreseeability does not mean that one charged with negligence must be found actually to have foreseen the
probability of harm or that the particular injury which resulted was foreseeable, but the test is- would the ordinary
many in the defendant’s position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of the
general nature of that suffered was likely to result.
 Dissent: Zarella and McDonald.
o The trial court correctly concluded that the defendant did not have a legal duty to prevent Cruz from taking the
piece of rock and throwing it off the balcony. Such conduct was not reasonably foreseeable consequence of the
defendant leaving the cinder block in the yard.
o Public policy dictates that it would be imprudent to allow a jury to hold the defendant responsible for Cruz
conduct. The intentional nature of Cruz conduct makes the plaintiff’s injuries not reasonably foreseeable. The
harm that the plaintiff suffered was not reasonably foreseeable bc there is no evidence that the defendant knew or
should have known that either Cruz or other tenants had a propensity for throwing objects from their balconies.
o It is incorrect to suggest that the circumstances giving rise to plaintiff’s injuries are never relevant. We often have
considered the way a plaintiff’s injuries occurred to be highly relevant to the foreseeability inquiry.
 Section 20 of Restatement (3) supports that the way a plaintiff is injured is relevant to the foreseeability
analysis.
 Some aspects of the way the harm occurs are relevant to a determination of the scope of an actor’s liability. The
manner of harm can be of critical importance in determining whether the harm is within the scope of liability.
o As a matter of law, protecting the plaintiff from Cruz was outside the scope of the defendant’s legal duty.
 B. Is Harm Outside the Scope of the Risk Because its Extent is Unforeseeable?
Hammerstein v. Jean Development West
Facts: Nevada Supreme Court
 George W. Hammerstein (plaintiff) was the invited guest of a hotel owned by Jean Development West (the firm)
(defendant). For months, the hotel's fire alarm system sounded unusually often, due to malfunctioning or prankster
tampering. Hammerstein had a room on the hotel's fourth floor, which was serviced by an elevator.
 Hammerstein's age and poor health made it inadvisable for him to use stairs, but one night the fire alarm sounded,
and Hammerstein was forced to evacuate his room by descending the hotel's emergency stairs.
 Hammerstein slipped on the stairs and injured his foot. Hammerstein did not report his injury to resort staff and
sought medical attention only a week later, after the injury started turning gangrenous.
 Hammerstein sued the firm for negligence, alleging that the hotel's many false alarms made frequent emergency
evacuations likely, thereby imposing a duty on the firm to take special precautions to ensure guest safety during
evacuations.
 A Nevada district court found no negligence and granted the firm's motion for summary judgment.
 Hammerstein appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada.
Issue:
 Whether the district court erred in finding no negligence and granting the firm’s motion for summary judgment.
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o To recover under a negligence theory, the complainant must prove four elements: (1) that defendant owed him a
duty of care; (2) that defendant breached this duty of care; (3) that the breach was the legal cause of plaintiff's
injury; and (4) that the complainant suffered damages.
o A tortfeasor is liable even if the extent of the harm was not foreseeable, but the underlying injury was
 Analysis
o The hotel owed Hammerstein, its invitee, a duty to use reasonable care to keep the property in a reasonably safe
condition for Hammerstein's use.
o Hotel may have breached that duty by maintaining a faulty and tamper-prone fire alarm system.
o It is clear that the Hotel should have foreseen that Hammerstein, due to his age and poor health, might injure
himself during an evacuation caused by a false alarm, even if the exact nature of Hammerstein's injury was not
foreseeable.
o It is less clear that Hammerstein's injury was caused by the false alarm and unnecessary evacuation, or by his own
carelessness. It is also unclear whether the serious damage Hammerstein suffered as a result of that injury should
be attributed to the firm or to Hammerstein's own failure to seek prompt medical treatment.
o These are all issues that the district court should have submitted to a jury for consideration
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The district court improperly granted the firm's motion for summary judgment.
o That judgment is reversed.
 Reasoning:
o The court held that the invitee adequately alleged the hotel's negligence as: (1) the hotel owed the invitee a duty
of care; (2) the hotel could be found to have breached that duty by not acting reasonably to remedy the faulty
alarm as it was reasonably foreseeable that someone would be injured trying to escape; and (3) a question of fact
remained as to whether the hotel's breach of duty might have been the proximate cause of the invitee's injuries.
The remainder of the invitee's claims had no merit.
 §3. Intervening Causes
A. Intentional or Criminal Intervening Acts
Marcus v. Staubs
Facts: West Virginia Supreme Court
 Jonathan Marcus (defendant), age 18, and his 26-year-old friend Steven Woodward drove 14-year-old Samantha
Staubs and her 13-year-old sister Jessica across the West Virginia state line into Virginia to purchase alcohol. After
Woodward purchased the alcohol, the group traveled to a house in West Virginia where they began drinking.
Marcus left the party shortly thereafter. When the party was over, Samantha telephoned Marcus for a ride home,
which he declined to provide. Samantha and Misty Johnson left the home and stole a neighbor’s truck. Misty, who
was intoxicated, got behind the wheel and proceeded to drive Samantha and Jessica home. Minutes later, the
vehicle hit an embankment, killing Samantha and injuring Jessica. Samantha and Jessica’s mother, Lori Ann Staubs
(plaintiff), filed suit against Marcus and others for negligently providing alcohol to the minor females.
 The trial court granted Staubs’ motion for summary judgment and Marcus appealed.
 The West Virginia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review.
Issue:
 Whether summary judgment was proper.
 is a negligent defendant relieved from liability by the intervening acts of third persons?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o A defendant whose negligence is a substantial factor in an injury is not relieved from liability by the intervening
acts of third persons if those acts were reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of the negligent
conduct. Negligence is the violation of the duty of taking care under the given circumstances. It is not absolute;
but is always relative to some circumstances of time, place, manner, or person. The ultimate test of the existence
of a duty to use care is found in the foreseeability that harm may result if it is not exercised. The test is, would the
ordinary man in the defendant's position, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of
the general nature of that suffered was likely to result? When the facts about foreseeability as an element of duty
are disputed and reasonable persons may draw different conclusions from them, two questions arise-one of law
for the judge and one of fact for the jury.
 Analysis
o A negligent defendant is not relieved from liability by the intervening acts of a third party, if those acts were
reasonably foreseeable by the defendant at the time of the negligent conduct.
o When the trial court awarded Staubs summary judgment, it made the following findings: (1) that Marcus had a
duty to Samantha and Jessica to “obey the law,” and that he had violated two state statutes by obtaining the
alcohol; (2) that by virtue of his violation of the statutes, Marcus was prima facie negligent; (3) that by refusing to
pick up the females later in the evening at their request, Marcus was guilty of common law negligence; (4) that
Marcus’ negligence was a proximate cause of the accident; (5) that Misty’s actions in stealing the vehicle, driving
without a license, and driving while intoxicated were not intervening causes; and, as a result, that Marcus was
liable to Staubs.
o Marcus argues that the illegal consumption of alcohol by the female minors and Misty’s driving of the vehicle
without a license while intoxicated are illegal acts amounting to intervening causes.
o In support of his claim, Marcus cites Yourtee v. Hubbard, 474 S.E.2d 613 (W.V.1996). In Yourtee, the court
noted that “a willful, malicious, or criminal act breaks the chain of causation.” Id. at 620. However, the Yourtee
court also stated that an individual is not relieved of liability by the intervening acts of third persons if those acts
were reasonably foreseeable by the original tortfeasor at the time of his negligent conduct.
o Here, it is well within the province of the jury to determine the extent of Marcus’ knowledge of, and his
participation in, the procurement of the alcohol for the minor females as well as the subsequent events that led to
the death of Samantha and injury to Jessica.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
 o The state's highest court held that the trial court’s award of summary judgment in favor of Staubs was improper. The
judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.
 Reasoning:
o The common-law negligence finding depended on whether the driver engaged in affirmative actions or omissions
that created an unreasonable risk of harm, and whether such harm was reasonably foreseeable, which were jury
issues and depended on the driver's awareness of the party, his intent to share the alcohol with others at the party,
and the minors' desire to leave the party and attempt to procure a ride.
o Whether the illegal consumption of alcohol by the minors, the theft of the vehicle, and the friend's reckless
operation of the vehicle without a license and while intoxicated constituted intervening or concurrent causes were
jury issues. Social host liability did not apply.

Collins v. Scenic Homes, Inc.

Facts:
 Scenic homes constructed an apartment development– they did not use a licensed architect to design the plan and
they did not comply with the applicable fire safety codes. They used inadequate fire-retardant building materials;
the sprinkler system was inadequate, and the windows were too small to provide a viable exit route.
 20 years later, a fire started, and April Collins died.
 The plaintiff sued scenic homes and Russel (building owner) for negligence.
 The trial court granted summary judgment based on the intervening criminal act
Issue:
 Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o A building owner is liable for injuries even after an intervening criminal act if the way the building was
maintained made resulting injuries foreseeable.
 Analysis
o The question is whether the injuries allegedly caused by the inability to escape from the fire were the foreseeable
result of the alleged failure of Scenic home to build and Russell to maintain a reasonably safe building with
regard to safety.
o It is a foreseeable risk that a fire at an apartment complex will cause harm if the premises owner fails to provide
adequate fire suppression safeguards and an adequate means of escape.
o The evidence in this case indicates that an issue of material facts exists (for the jury to decide) as to whether
Scenic homes contracted and Russell maintained. and operated a reasonably safe apartment building with regard
to safety.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o Summary judgment for Scenic homes and Russell is reversed.
Delaney v. Reynolds
Facts: Massachusetts Appeals Court
 Delaney (plaintiff) and Reynolds, a police officer (defendant) lived together at Reynolds’ house. Reynolds knew
that Delaney was depressed and abusing drugs while living with him. Reynolds also kept a loaded and unlocked
gun in the bedroom, a fact that Reynolds knew Delaney was aware of. One day, Delaney was under the influence of
drugs and alcohol and Reynolds demanded that Delaney move out of the house. Upset, Delaney went to the
bedroom and grabbed Reynolds’ gun. Delaney then shot herself in the head, seriously injuring herself.
 Delaney brought a negligence action against Reynolds for her injuries. Reynolds asserted that Delaney’s suicide
attempt was a superseding cause, and that Reynolds could not be held liable.
 Agreeing with Reynolds, the trial court granted his summary judgment motion.
Issue:
 Is a plaintiff’s attempt at suicide following a defendant’s negligence considered unforeseeable as a matter of law?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o When an independent event supersedes a defendant's negligence and causes the plaintiff's injury, the defendant's
original negligence is a proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm if the superseding cause was foreseeable by the
defendant.
o A purposeful act of suicide, rather than any antecedent negligence, will be deemed the legal cause of a decedent’s
injury unless the defendant’s negligence rendered the decedent unable to appreciate the self-destructive nature of
the suicidal act or, even if unable to appreciate the nature of the act, unable to resist the suicidal impulse.
 Analysis
o A superseding cause only excuses the defendant of liability if the superseding cause was unforeseeable by the
defendant. Regardless of how extraordinary the superseding act may be, the proximate cause analysis remains the
same.
o The defendant’s negligence is a proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries if the later independent event was
foreseeable by the defendant. Traditionally, suicide was an exception to this rule, and courts would rule in favor
of a defendant unless the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff to be unable to appreciate the nature of the
act of suicide.
o The rationale behind this rule centered on the immorality, inherent culpability, and un-foreseeability of the act of
suicide. Taking the modern view, however, many courts have rejected the traditional rule and held that suicide is
foreseeable by the defendant under certain circumstances.
o The circumstances here-- a reasonable jury could find that Reynolds should have foreseen that Delaney might use
the gun to cause intentional harm to herself. Reynolds knew that Delaney was depressed, using drugs, and that she
knew where Reynolds kept his gun. These facts would allow a jury to find that Reynolds’ negligence was the
proximate cause of Delaney’s injuries.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The decision of the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Reynolds is reversed.
 Reasoning:
o Most states continue to follow the traditional rule that suicide is a superseding cause of plaintiff’s harm, freeing
the defendant from liability for negligence. Other jurisdictions have recently gone beyond the categorical basis for
treating suicide as an intervening cause of injury and have considered various nontraditional circumstances as
relevant to the issue of foreseeability.
 B. Negligent Intervening Acts
Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp.
Facts: Court of Appeals of New York
 Felix Contracting Corp. (Felix) (defendant) contracted to install a gas main. The worksite Felix excavated for the
project was in the street. Harold Derdiarian (plaintiff), a subcontractor, was sealing a gas main using a kettle of 400-
degree liquid enamel. James Dickens was driving near the worksite when he had an epileptic seizure, which caused
him to lose control of his vehicle and crash into the worksite. Derdiarian was hit, and the kettle of enamel spilled all
over him. Derdiarian burst into flames but survived. Derdiarian sued Felix, alleging that Felix negligently failed to
ensure a safe worksite. At trial, Derdiarian’s expert in traffic safety testified that Felix should have built a barrier
and taken other steps to protect workers from oncoming traffic.
 The trial court found in favor of Derdiarian. The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division affirmed. Felix
appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York.
Issue:
 Were Plaintiff’s injuries a foreseeable result of the employer’s failure to maintain a safe work site?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o If the intervening act is extraordinary under the circumstances, not foreseeable in the normal course of events, or
independent of or far removed from the D's conduct, it may well be a superseding act which breaks the causal
nexus. An intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause and relieve a D of responsibility where the risk of
the intervening act occurring is the very same risk which renders the D negligent.
o Foreseeability is the reasonable anticipation of the possible results of an action. Proximate cause is determined by
whether an intervening act is a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence. If it is not foreseeable,
then it is a superseding act which would sever the causal connection.
 Analysis
o Negligence liability is only proper if the defendant’s act was the proximate, or legal, cause of the plaintiff’s
injury. The intervening act of a third person between the defendant’s negligence and the plaintiff’s harm does not
necessarily break the causal connection. If the intervening act was a natural consequence of the defendant’s
negligent conduct, the defendant will still be liable for the plaintiff’s harm. Highly extraordinary and
unforeseeable intervening acts will break the causal chain. In such cases, the intervening act will be a
“superseding act which breaks the causal nexus.” The defendant will not be liable under those circumstances.
This is generally a question of fact for the trial court to resolve, but some cases may be so clear that no other
conclusion as to causation could be drawn. In that case, proximate causation will be decided as a matter of law.
o Felix claims Dickens’s car careening into the worksite was a superseding cause of Derdiarian’s injuries. However,
this intervening cause is the very risk created by Felix’s negligence in not placing a barrier at the worksite. It is
reasonably foreseeable that a car may veer off the road into a nearby worksite and injure a worker. It is not
necessary that the exact manner of the accident be foreseeable.
o The fact that Dickens may have been negligent or even reckless does not cut off Felix’s liability. Moreover,
nothing is changed by the fact that Dickens’s negligence was in not taking his medication rather than driving
badly. Consequently, Dickens’s crash was not a superseding cause of the accident. A finder of fact could
reasonably conclude that Felix's negligence was the proximate cause of Derdiarian's injuries.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The ruling of the appellate division is affirmed.
o For a plaintiff to carry the burden of proving a prima facie case of negligence, he must generally show that the
defendant’s negligence was a substantial cause of the events that produced the injury. Plaintiff need not
demonstrate that the precise manner in which the accident happened or that the extent of injuries was foreseeable.
Essentially, the foreseeable harm test requires (1) a reasonably foreseeable result or type of harm, and (2) no
superseding intervening force. Further, an intervening act may not serve as a superseding cause, and relieve an
 actor of responsibility, when the risk of the intervening act occurring is the very same risk that renders the actor
negligent.

Torres v. JAI Dining Services (Phoenix) Inc.

Facts: Supreme court of Arizona
 Villanueva drove his truck from the club while intoxicated. He eventually returned home and fell asleep for a short
time before getting up to take a friend home.
 Villanueva was still intoxicated and smashed his truck into a car that was stopped at a red light, killing Suarez and
Torres.
 The trial court declined to enter judgment as a matter of law for JAI.
Issue:
 Does an overserved patron’s decision to drive while intoxicated after safely reaching home constitute an
intervening and superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation as a matter of law, thus reliving the defendant
liquor licensee of liability?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o It is foreseeable to a liquor licensee that an overserved patron will drive while intoxicated and cause an accident
that injures or kills another person.
o Restatement (2) of torts: if the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular manner is the hazard or one of
the hazards which makes the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent, negligent, intentionally tortious, or
criminal does not prevent the actor from being liable for harm cause thereby.
 Analysis
o The risk created by overserving alcohol to a patron is that the patron will drive intoxicated and cause an accident
that result in injury or death to member of the traveling public.
o The injury producing conduct by driving a vehicle while intoxicated is one of the very hazards which makes the
tavern owner’s act negligent.
o The foreseeable risk that an intoxicated person might drive and cause an accident does not vanish solely bc the
patron initially return home with the intent to sleep, eat, change or do myriad other things before deciding to leave
home and resume driving.
o The risk created by a liquor licensee overserving someone exists as long as the person drives while intoxicated.
o In all cases the risk of liability ends when the patron sobers up. Thus, the risk of liability correlates to the degree
in which the liquor licensee overserves the patron.
o A reasonable person in the club’s position could have foreseen that Villanueva would drive while intoxicated,
cause an accident, and injure someone, so long as he remained intoxicated.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o Trial Court properly submitted this issue to the jury.
 Reasoning:
o A jury could have reasonably concluded the Villanueva’s act in driving while intoxicated, even after he reached
home, although an intervening cause of the accident, was foreseeable by someone in the club’s position and not
extraordinary in hindsight.
Marshall v. Nugent
Facts: United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
 Walter Harriman and his passenger, Frank Marshall (plaintiff), were driving on a highway to Marshall's business
appointment. A truck owned by Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. (defendant) cut a corner on the highway and forced
Harriman's car off the road. Harriman and Marshall both exited the car and stood on the highway. The Socony truck
driver offered to help Harriman pull his car back onto the highway. The driver suggested that Harriman and
Marshall step around the truck to warn oncoming cars of the obstacle. Marshall attempted to go and warn the
oncoming cars as the driver had suggested. As Marshall did so, a car driven by Robert Nugent (defendant) was
coming over the hill toward the oil truck. Nugent saw the oil truck blocking his path, and he swerved to avoid it.
Nugent crashed into a guard rail and then hit Marshall, severely injuring him.
 Marshall brought suit against both Nugent and Socony.
 After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Marshall against Socony for $25,000, as well as a verdict in
favor of Nugent.
 Socony appealed on the ground that the wrongful conduct of its truck driver was not the proximate cause of
Marshall’s injuries.
Issue:
 May a defendant’s negligent conduct be the proximate cause of injuries occurring to a plaintiff after the actual
negligent conduct?
Rule of Law/ Analysis:
 Rule:
o A defendant's negligent conduct may be the proximate cause of injuries occurring to a plaintiff after the actual
negligent conduct if the risk of those injuries is a foreseeable consequence of the negligent conduct.
 Analysis
o A defendant’s negligent conduct may be the proximate cause of injuries occurring to a plaintiff after the actual
negligent conduct if the risk of those injuries is a foreseeable consequence of the negligent conduct. Even after the
primary risks of harm stemming from negligent conduct are over, a defendant may still be liable for subsequent
harm if the risk of the harm is not too remote given the totality of the circumstances.
o When the Socony truck hit Harriman’s car, it was reasonable that both Harriman and Marshall would step out on
the highway to attempt to pull the car back on the road. It was especially reasonable for Marshall to do so, given
that he had a business appointment later in the day that he wished to keep.
o Harriman and Marshall stepping onto the highway and being exposed to other cars on the highway was a
reasonably foreseeable risk of harm following the Socony driver's negligent collision with their vehicle.
o The injury Marshall sustained when he was struck by Nugent's oncoming car was not too remote in time or place
from the negligent conduct of Socony's driver, and the Nugent-Marshall collision occurred while the traffic issues
caused by the Socony driver's original negligence were still ongoing.
Holding/ Reasoning:
 Holding:
o The trial court did not commit error in leaving the proximate-cause determination to the jury and refusing to
direct a verdict for Socony. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.
 Reasoning:
o Plaintiff’s injury was not too remote in time or place from the negligent conduct of Defendant.
o Defendant put Plaintiff in a dangerous situation. The jury could have rightfully decided if Defendant’s initial
negligence was the legal cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.