Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Spanish Identity Nation Myth and History
Spanish Identity Nation Myth and History
Volume 33
Issue 2 Identities on the Verge of a Nervous Article 2
Breakdown: The Case of Spain
6-1-2009
Recommended Citation
Torrecilla, Jesús (2009) "Spanish Identity: Nation, Myth, and History," Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature: Vol. 33: Iss. 2, Article
2. https://doi.org/10.4148/2334-4415.1699
This Introductory Material is brought to you for free and open access by New Prairie Press. It has been accepted for inclusion in Studies in 20th & 21st
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Spanish Identity: Nation, Myth, and History
Abstract
In the last two centuries, conservatives and liberals have offered two mutually exclusive visions of Spanish
history, each with distinct myths, symbols, and heroes. The conservative image, formed in the Middle Ages,
was based on the myth of the Reconquest and the need to restore (or keep) the homogeneity of a country
characterized by its Christian religion and Latin culture. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, faced
with Napoleon’s invasion, Spanish liberals understood the danger of associating their modern ideas with
France and invented a progressive and democratic Spanish tradition. According to their interpretation, the
most authentic Spain was not the one identified with the Reconquest and the Empire, but the Spain of all
those who had been excluded from the nation-building process because of their religion or ideas: the tolerant
al-Andalus Muslims, the freedom-fighter comuneros and the defenders of the democratic medieval fueros. The
great success of the transition to democracy and the Constitution of 1978 resided in the ability of all different
tendencies and parties to overcome this division, to build bridges and create a common national project. For
the first time in history, Spaniards managed to build a successful society based on consensus, pluralism and
democracy. However, as a reality based on agreements, its nature is fragile. What is at stake now in Spain is to
strengthen the viability of this model.
This introductory material is available in Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature: http://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol33/iss2/2
Torrecilla: Spanish Identity: Nation, Myth, and History
Jesús Torrecilla
University of California, Los Angeles
(Translated by Margarita Pillado)
Torrecilla 205
show that some of the drafters of the 1978 Constitution had the
earlier text close at hand” (Balfour and Quiroga 45). The success-
ful implementation of a liberal legislative code in Spain was indeed
surprising, not only because it happened with a minimum of social
and political unrest, but also because the document received the
explicit support of the immense majority of parliamentary groups,
particularly, and enthusiastically, of the conservative forces that for
centuries had been hostile to the very same ideas that it proclaims.
Without a doubt, the conciliatory restraint the various political par-
ties exercised in the writing of the Constitution of 1978, giving up
some of their customary demands in favor of a basic consensus,
produced an inclusive Magna Carta that enjoys the support of the
majority of the Spanish population today.
Having said that, it is paradoxical that despite Spain’s consider-
able successes, the image of the country still evokes negative feelings
in a significant part of its population. Let us consider, for instance,
the national symbols. In theory, according to the Constitution of
1978, the flag and the national anthem represent all Spaniards, but
in practice, these symbols are generally identified with conservative,
if not fascist, groups. To explain this fact we must consider the coun-
try’s recent history. Even though the Constitution is informed by a
progressive sensitivity that has inspired an open and tolerant soci-
ety, the symbols that define the Spanish nation are a slightly modi-
fied version of those associated with Franco’s regime, and clearly
different from those in use during the Second Republic. Therefore,
although in the last three decades Spain has managed to disassociate
itself from tyranny and intolerance, its symbols (rather paradoxi-
cally) still have negative connotations of repression and fanaticism.
Consequently, a Catalan socialist or a Basque communist, even if
they feel Spanish, would rather attend a political rally with the flag
of Catalonia or Euskadi instead of the national flag. The senyera or
the ikurriña still evoke in them relatively recent memories of re-
sistance against Franco, whereas the national emblem continues to
bear the stigma of its association with the dictator’s regime. To those
familiar with the importance symbols have in the formation of a
collective identity, the persistent identification of the Spanish flag
with repression and authoritarianism represents an undoubtedly
serious concern.
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at war with the French, given the behavior of the Spanish masses
shortly thereafter. Only two years after the enactment of the Cadiz
Constitution, Ferdinand VII managed to revoke it without any seri-
ous popular opposition. To a significant extent, this was due to the
effectiveness with which the most reactionary forces mobilized the
masses against the liberals after the defeat of the French army, a fact
that seems to contradict the understanding of Spanish identity as
essentially liberal.7 References to liberal Spanish traditions in the
Constitutional Preamble only prove the drafters were aware of the
need to “nationalize” their ideas to avoid the pro-French label.
Now, if the concept of nation understood as the expression of
popular sovereignty does not particularly help explain Spain as a
historical reality, why has it been so widespread in recent years? Not
because it represents more accurately the historical facts, but be-
cause it reflects the dynamics and tensions of current Spanish so-
ciety. For instance, liberal historians may use the concept in order
to disconnect Spain from its traditional reactionary connotations
(authoritarianism, intransigence, religious fanaticism) and to asso-
ciate it with tolerance, democracy, and the fight for freedom.8 The
tactic is part of a larger political project of the Left whose objective
is to reinvent Spanish identity, an effort that has been extremely suc-
cessful, according to Balfour and Quiroga (96-7). What is at stake is
not a desire to better understand the past, but to solve the problems
of the present and, if possible, to shape a better future. In a society
in which the image of Spain has suffered and is still suffering the
consequences of its association with the Franco regime, the Left has
strived to highlight the country’s open and progressive tradition in
order to strengthen the foundation of the new reality. Additionally,
this liberal revisionist effort owes its success to the support it has
received from the regional nationalist movements, which see it as
an opportunity to diminish the historical importance of Spain, and,
therefore, to justify their own political agenda.
Another major issue in the historical revisionism of recent
years, equally related to the concept of nation, concerns the role that
myths have played in the configuration of Spain. Numerous publi-
cations have shown that the writing of canonical Spanish history
(as any national history) is not only the result of objective scientific
investigation, but also the product of partisan biases. These stud-
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Torrecilla: Spanish Identity: Nation, Myth, and History
cess that would culminate in the expulsion of the Muslims from the
peninsula is highly debatable, if not plainly false.9 The same can be
said about the myth that connected the kings of León with their
Visigothic peers as if united by an uninterrupted continuum, or
about the reductionist interpretation of the tensions and confronta-
tions in the peninsula during the Middle Ages as a single conflict
between native Christians and foreign Muslims. We all know that
these myths are false in historical terms. However, we have to ac-
knowledge as a truth that the Christians responsible for elaborating
those myths, fictitious as they may be, managed to impose them
effectively as a reality, contributing to fashion the character of an
entity that in time came to be known as Spain.10 This is a fact, not
a myth. Consequently, if we accept that Spain is a historical real-
ity, whose identity has been shaped in a particular fashion through
time, it seems problematic to speak of the “Spanish Muslims” of the
Middle Ages. First, it is highly debatable that Spain existed at that
time. However, even if we agree that Spain indeed existed in the
Middle Ages as the idealized memory of a past to be recovered, or,
in other words, as the myth, fashioned by clerics and jurists of a
Visigothic Hispania united under one monarch and one religion
and used by the Christian kingdoms “para cimentar su legitimidad”
‘to cement their legitimacy’ (Álvarez Junco 40), is it justified to say
that this myth included the Muslims? Positively not.11 Hence, if we
speak of Muslim Spain, which concept of Spain are we using? That
of a country shaped (as it was) by exclusionary myths that incited to
expel the Muslim invaders, or rather that of a tolerant and inclusive
society that seems to reflect, not the past, but our current desires
and sensitivity? In any case, it is clear that we should not confuse
the historical concept of Spain with the geographical concept of the
Iberian Peninsula.12
Evidently, I am not implying hereby that Spanish history devel-
oped the way it did because of teleological determinism. Spain could
have constituted itself as a nation in many different ways: as a politi-
cal entity encompassing the entire Iberian Peninsula; as the product
of the union between Castile and Portugal; as a nation with three
religions and two languages, or five languages and three religions;
as a centralized, federal, authoritarian, tolerant, fanatic, or demo-
cratic country…. However, among the many possible outcomes, the
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Notes
1 None of these changes would have occurred so rapidly had it not been for
the social dynamics in existence during Franco’s dictatorship. In “Examen de
conciencia,” an essay published in El furgón de cola, Juan Goytisolo points out
that in the 1960s, for the first time in history, thanks to the double flow of for-
eign tourists and Spanish migrant workers, Spaniards learned to assimilate the
economic values of industrial nations, “y todo ello … bajo un sistema originari-
amente creado para impedirlo” ‘and all this … under a system originally created
to prevent it’ (261).
2 This reaction reveals a strong nationalistic component. Bruce King considers
that nationalism “aims at group solidarity, cultural purity, and dignity, a typical-
ity in the lower orders (worker or peasant) and rejection of cosmopolitan upper
classes, intellectuals and others likely to be influenced by foreign ideas” (42).
3 I provide a full account of this phenomenon in España exótica: la formación
de la imagen española moderna.
4 According to Pérez Garzón, the Statute of Bayonne strongly influenced the
Cadiz Constitution and all subsequent Spanish liberal constitutions of the
nineteenth century. This affinity, however, was not acknowledged “porque le
quedó la marca de ser un texto ‘afrancesado’ y eso pasó a significar tanto como
traidor a la patria” ‘because the text’s characterization as pro-French implied
that it was a traitor to the country’ (130).
5 See for example Cristóbal de Villalón, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, Diego de
Saavedra y Fajardo, Francisco de Quevedo, Félix Lope de Vega, Benito Jeróni-
mo Feijóo, José Cadalso, and Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos. Miguel Antonio de
Gándara claims in 1759 that “no tengo más patria, más partido, más paysanage
ni más sangre que España, España y España” ‘I have no other fatherland, no
other allegiance, no other country, and no other blood than Spain, Spain, and
Spain’ (2).
6 Santiago Muñoz also affirms that the Bayonne Statute left a decisive mark on
the Cadiz Constitution: not only did the former mobilize the constitutional-
ist impulse among liberals, but more importantly—and similarly to what hap-
pened to the Cadiz text—its supporters considered that the document should
respect Spanish traditions and institutions (32).
7 Examples abound in accounts by liberal writers like José Somoza (461) and
León López y Espila (20-3). In El risco de la Pesqueruela, for instance, Somo-
za reports that as soon as Ferdinand VII returned to Spain in 1814, he heard
turmoil in the streets and saw a procession, directed by the clergy, carrying a
portrait of the king and shouting “Viva la religión y mueran los impíos” ‘Long
live our religion and death to the impious’ (461). The author recounts how the
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mob attempted to storm his house and how he escaped to safety thanks to the
intervention of some of his servants.
8 Álvarez Junco begins Mater Dolorosa by stating that his book tries to un-
derstand the problems confronted by Spanish identity, “una cultura y un sen-
timiento de los que se sienten distanciados una parte—mayor o menor, según
las estimaciones, pero innegablemente suficiente como para generar conflic-
tos—de los ciudadanos del Estado español” ‘a culture and a feeling with which
a segment of the citizens of the Spanish State—a greater or smaller percentage,
depending on the estimates, but without a doubt significant enough to cause
friction—are unable to identify’ (18). Although the author speaks of “under-
standing,” he tries to solve what he perceives as a problem. His study seeks to
configure an idea of Spain that is less conflictive, more appealing to all Span-
iards, and more attuned to the country’s new reality.
9 According to traditional Spanish historiography, Pelayo was a Visigothic no-
bleman who commanded the first Christian military victory against the Mus-
lim invaders in the battle of Covadonga. He is considered to be the initiator of
the Christian “Reconquest” of the Iberian Peninsula.
10 In España y las Españas, Luis González Antón offers a detailed presentation
of the origin and evolution of this myth.
11 In the foreword to the second edition of La realidad histórica de España
(1962), Américo Castro points out that, when speaking of Spaniards, we have
to understand a group of people from northern Hispania who, back in the
eighth and ninth centuries, “comenzó por dotar de dimensión político-social
su condición de creyentes cristianos, y por eso se llamaron a sí mismos ‘cris-
tianos,’ un hecho nuevo y sin igual en la vida de Occidente” ‘began to provide
a socio-political dimension to their being Christian believers, which is why they
began to call themselves ‘Christians,’ a new and unprecedented event in the
West’ (xx).
12 The lack of coherence that characterizes any discussion on the subject is
worrisome. It is present even in authors who are quite perceptive otherwise. For
instance, Balfour and Quiroga declare that one cannot speak of a differentiated
idea of Spain and Spanish identity until the sixteenth century (104), but they
lament the exclusion of Medieval Islamic and Jewish Spain from “the canon of
national culture” by conservative historians (101). If Spain did not exist as such
in the Middle Ages, how can we speak of “Islamic Spain”? Should we not rather
refer to the Muslims of al-Andalus or of the Iberian Peninsula? Discussions on
the subject elude any logic: to question that medieval Muslims were Spanish is
perceived not as an argument that can be logically proven or refuted, but as a
political position that needs to be condemned.
13 Anthony Marx affirms that nationalism in the core countries of Western Eu-
Torrecilla 223
rope “was built, more or less purposely or successfully, not only in the context
of, but also on the back of, fanatical religious passion and conflict” (193). Ac-
cording to Marx, Spain’s “early efforts at exclusionary nation-building perhaps
provided a template for others later but proved premature for Spain herself, and
it failed to take hold” (195).
14 Fueros is the Spanish designation of a compilation of laws, especially at a
local or regional level. Comuneros are Spaniards who revolted against King
Charles V, to defend local interests.
15 A similar historical revisionism occurred in other European countries at
the beginning of the nineteenth century. According to Leersen, to counter the
claim that some French aristocratic families made about being descendants of
the Franks, some post-revolutionary historians interpreted French history “as
a long and radically ethnic conflict translated in terms of social classes—the
conquered Gauls passing on the ideal of liberty and tribal democracy to the
communes, the roturiers, the cities and Tiers état; the Franks imposing feu-
dalism and the aristocratic values of the ancien régime” (46). This caused an
identification of the French people “with nos ancêtres les Gaulois (as opposed to
Montesquieu’s earlier ‘nos pères, les anciens Germains’)” (46).
16 The majos were people from the lower classes of Spanish society who were
recognized by their distinctive clothing and behavior, as seen in the paintings
of Francisco de Goya.
17 Susan Martin-Márquez calls this double “invention” of Spain “First-Wave”
and “Second-Wave Nation Building” (12-27).
18 On 27 April 1814, La abeja madrileña claimed that it was in Covadonga and
in Sobrarbe where the social pact of Spaniards began, “pues las leyes de Castilla
y Vizcaya, con los fueros de Navarra y Aragón, componían una constitución tan
sabia y perfecta, qual vemos y admiramos en la promulgada en Cádiz” ‘since
the laws of Castile and Biscay, together with the fueros of Navarra and Aragon,
made up such a wise and perfect Constitution as the one we see and admire
now enacted in Cadiz” (383). Similar statements abound in liberal newspapers
of the time; see for instance Semanario patriótico (6 Jul. 1809): 153-4; Redactor
General de España (16 Nov. 1813): 61; La colmena (25 Apr. 1820): 90; Barto-
lomé Gallardo’s Alocución patriótica (1820): 19; Minerva Nacional (213-5); El
eco de Padilla (17 Aug. 1821): 51; El Zurriago 6 (1822): 2; and El Espectador (28
Mar. 1823): 352.
19 Some members of Masonic lodges decided to break away from them in or-
der to establish a new association heir to the comuneros. According to Antonio
Alcalá Galiano, liberal Bartolomé Gallardo claimed to have found proof in an-
cient documents that the comuneros had formed a kind of secret society with
symbols resembling those of the Masons and on that ground he designed a
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project whereby the Spanish masons would have new grades alluding to those
who fought in the War of the Comunidades (170).
20 Other articles included in Ocios reveal how early nineteenth-century liberals
identified themselves with medieval Muslims of the Iberian Peninsula. Like-
wise, during his exile, José Joaquín de Mora published a Cuadros de la historia
de los árabes (1826), characterizing them as wise and tolerant and declaring
he considered them “parte de nuestra familia” ‘part of our family’ (VI). The
identification with the Arabs of Medieval Iberia is documented as early as the
eighteenth century, but it was not as unanimously upheld among the liberals as
the identification with the comuneros. I provide a more detailed account of the
positive image of the Arabs among Enlightened Spaniards in Guerras literarias
del XVIII español.
21 Eric Hobswam points out that when confronted with a new situation, mem-
bers of a society may resort to the past “to construct invented traditions of a
novel type for quite novel purposes” (6).
22 Different from the traditional and liberal image, identified with their respec-
tive groups, the exotic image has been accepted as authentic by Spaniards of all
ideologies, although, of course, each group interprets it differently. See chapter
II of Torrecilla´s España exótica.
23 The Second Republic myths, which the Left embraced for decades, recall
a time of radical confrontation that cannot adequately reflect the conciliatory
and inclusive climate of the new Spain.
Works Cited
La Abeja madrileña. 96 (27 Apr. 1814).
Alcalá Galiano, Antonio. Memorias. Obras escogidas. Ed. and Foreword Jorge
Campos. Vol. 1 Madrid: Atlas, 1955. 248-475.
Álvarez Junco, José. Mater Dolorosa: La idea de España en el Siglo XIX. Madrid:
Taurus, 2001.
Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London & New York: Verso,
1991.
Balfour, Sebastian, and Alejandro Quiroga. The Reinvention of Spain. Nation
and Identity since Democracy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.
Capmany, Antonio de. Centinela contra franceses. Françoise Etienvre, ed. Lon-
don: Tamesis, 1988.
—. Teatro histórico-crítico de la eloquencia española. Vol. 1. Madrid, 1786.
Torrecilla 225
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