IR LECTURE NO.

BY SUSHANT VERMA

INDIA-WEST ASIA RELATION

• Being at the intersection of major continents and civilizations, West Asia holds a critical centrality
in global geopolitical affairs. For quite some time, geostrategic disruptions emerging from the region
have deeply impacted the global peace and security. The West Asian region is witnessing a tectonic
shift, new regional alliances are taking shape and situation has further been compounded with the
humanitarian crisis in Syria and Yemen.

• India has ties to West Asia since millennia. The Indus Valley civilization had trade links with Dilmun
(modern Bahrain). In the 6th century BCE, Punjab was part of the Persian empire. In the 3rd century
BCE, Egypt’s Ptolemy II and the Mauryan emperors Chandragupta Maurya and Asoka exchanged
ambassadors. Persian was the language of the Mughal court, and India’s official language until 1835.
This connection continues.

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 • Historically, India’s West Asia policy has been bi-directional. During the Cold War years, India
maintained close economic cooperation with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, the regional rivals.
• The bi-directional approach has been expanded to a tri-directional foreign policy to accommodate the
four key pillars of West Asia — Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel and United Arab Emirates (UAE).
Ties with Iran, however, took a beating during the sanctions years when New Delhi cut its energy
cooperation significantly despite its vitality and huge energy potential. It was during the same time
that India deepened cooperation with the Saudis.
• India has traditionally followed a low key and non-intrusive policy and consequently enjoyed good
relations with the countries in the region. It has also consistently opposed any military actions to
solve the political problems. Despite being the largest democracy in the world, India has refrained
from promoting any particular form of government in the region.

IMPORTANCE OF WEST ASIA

• Adoption of ‘Look West Policy’ in 2005 reflects India’s increased desire for engagement with its
‘extended neighbourhood’. The Gulf region is important for India due to a combination of several
factors –
(a) Energy security- Securing long term energy supply for its burgeoning economy is of vital
importance for India. West Asian region accounts for 2/3rd of Indian energy supply. As such,
ensuring energy security has undoubtedly dictated India’s initiative of building up a strategic
energy partnership with this region.
(b) Protecting Interests of Diaspora- There is a huge Indian Diaspora of more than 6 million working
and living in this region. India receives valuable remittances in excess of $70 billion annually
from the region. Also, India has to engage Gulf countries to secure a safe and exploitation free
working conditions for these people.
(c) Trade and Investment- The Gulf Region remains the largest trading partner for India with top
trading partner in the region being UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Besides, the region is also a
potential source of sizeable investment in different sectors of Indian economy especially
infrastructure. Investments have included a $44 billion oil refinery in India by Saudi Aramco and
the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company in partnership with an Indian consortium.
(d) Internal Security- India’s internal security is more linked to West Asia than ever before. The rise
of religious extremism and its use for political and terrorist purposes in West Asia as well as India
has acted as force multiplier for cross border terrorism. Extremist and terrorist groups tend to get
support, funding and ideological legitimacy from states and organisations in West Asia. The rise
of ISIS and its attempts at radicalising Indian youths presents a serious challenge to Indian Security
establishment.

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 Consequently, the region is an important partner for India in counter-terrorism, intelligence
sharing, homeland security, combating money laundering, small arms trafficking and
smuggling.
(e) Maritime Security- The increase in piracy activities off the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean has
affected both India and the Gulf countries. So maritime security is one of India’s primary concerns
and cooperation with these countries is vital for strengthening Indian presence in the strategic
waters of the Indian Ocean Region. The demand for increased involvement in the region is ever
growing and given the USA’s reluctance and withdrawal from the region, it provides an opening
for greater Indian role.
(f) Forging strategic ties- India looks forward for enhanced strategic ties with the region. The ensuing
geopolitics and regional and great power rivalry in the region as reflected in chaos in Iraq, Syria,
Yemen, Egypt, Turkey and Palestine-Israel along with the rise of ISIS has intensely complicated
the geopolitical landscape. If India needs a sustained high growth, a peaceful extended territory
from Suez to South Asia is an imperative.
(g) Access to Central Asia and Beyond- For India, West Asia represents an access to Central Asia,
Russia and potentially, overland to Europe. In order to secure these vital communication links,
India needs to expedite Chabahar, Ashgabat Agreement, INSTC and other connectivity projects
along with help of these countries.

The Ashgabat Agreement

• On April 25, 2011, in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan’s capital, an agreement was signed between
Turkmenistan, Iran, Uzbekistan, Oman, and Qatar to build a new international trade and transit
corridor. The ‘Ashgabat Agreement,’ as it is called, laid the groundwork for the development of the
shortest commercial route which connects the CARs with Iranian and Omani ports. A Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) on various components such as the legal, procedural, and infrastructural
of the agreement, was signed on August 6, 2014, in Muscat. Kazakhstan applied for membership in
the same year that Qatar withdrew from the pact.

• The Ashgabat Agreement, which envisions the development of an International Transport and
Transit Corridor between Central Asia and the Persian Gulf, was signed by India in the year 2018.
The Gulf countries and Central Asian Republics (CARs) will be benefited from this corridor, which
is said to improve communication, cargo, trade, and transit. India has taken a step further in its
efforts to improve connectivity with Eurasia by joining the Agreement.

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 • The Ashgabat Agreement aims to establish a commerce and transportation corridor connecting the
CARs and the Persian Gulf. The corridor will be multi-modal, with road, rail, and sea transit options.

• India’s participation in the Ashgabat Agreement will allow it to take advantage of the existing
transportation and transit corridor to facilitate trade and commercial relations with the Eurasian
region. This will also be in line with India’s efforts to build the International North-South Transport
Corridor (INSTC), a multi-modal trade transportation network that runs from Mumbai, India,
through Bandar Abbas, Iran to Moscow, Russia.

MAJOR RIVALRIES IN THE REGION

1. SAUDI ARABIA -IRAN RIVALRY

• Saudi Arabia and Iran have often behaved as serious rivals for influence in the Middle East, especially
the Gulf area, since at least Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In most
respects, Saudi Arabia is a regional status quo power, while Iran often seeks revolutionary change
throughout the Gulf area and the wider Middle East with varying degrees of intensity.
• Saudi Arabia also has strong ties with Western nations, while Iran views the United States as its most
dangerous enemy. Perhaps the most important difference between the two nations is that Saudi
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 Arabia is a conservative Sunni Muslim Arab state, while Iran is a Shi’ite state with senior
politicians who often view their country as the defender and natural leader of Shi’ites throughout the
region. The rivalry between Riyadh and Tehran has been reflected in the politics of a number of
regional states where these two powers exercise influence. Both sides have stood on opposing sides
and engaged in proxy wars in many conflict zones in the Middle East for decades, affecting Syria,
Iraq Lebanon and Yemen.
• Iran seeks to expand its power in the Gulf, which is a key area of competition between the two states.
Saudi Arabia and to varying extents other Gulf Arab states often seek to contain Iran’s quest for
dominance. In the struggle for Gulf influence, Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained a vastly higher
level of political clout with local states than Iran.

2.ISRAEL- PALESTINE DISPUTE: A BRIEF TIME LINE

1917- The Balfour Declaration was a public pledge by Britain in 1917 declaring its aim to establish “a
national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. The statement came in the form of a letter from Britain’s
then-foreign secretary, Arthur Balfour, addressed to Lionel Walter Rothschild, a figurehead of the British
Jewish community.

Importance of Jerusalem

Jerusalem or the Holy City is the sacred site for three religious followers namely Christians, Muslims and
Jews. Temple Mount is said to be the holiest place in Judaism. The Temple Mount is considered to be the
third holiest site in Islam. It contains the shrine of the Dome of Rock and the al-Aqsa Mosque on a plateau
called the Haram al-Sharif, or the Noble Sanctuary. Here is where Muslims believe their Prophet
Muhammad ascended to heaven. The Church of the Holy Sepulchre was constructed in 335 A.D. It is the
site believed by Christians where Jesus was crucified and later had resurrected.

Post-World War-I: In the post-war settlement, Britain was given the mandate for Palestine and Trans-
Jordan (areas including Israel, West Bank and Gaza). Upon the start of the mandate, the British began to
facilitate the immigration of European Jews to Palestine. Between 1922 and 1935, the Jewish population
rose from nine percent to nearly 27 percent of the total population. Defeat of Germany in the war (1914-19)
saw the rise of Adolf Hitler, who blamed Jews for the country’s defeat. He expanded Germany and Jews
were persecuted in areas he controlled. Jewish immigration to Israel gained pace.

Post-World War-II (1939-45): With the support from the US and the UK, Jews created the state of Israel
in 1948. The declaration came after Jews failed to sign a deal with Arabs for carving out a separate state
from Palestine.

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1947- the United Nations adopted Resolution 181, known as the Partition Plan, which sought to divide the
British Mandate of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states. The move is accepted by Jewish leaders but
rejected by the Arab side and never implemented.

1948- Unable to solve the problem, British rulers leave the region. On May 14, 1948, the State of Israel was
created, sparking the first Arab-Israeli War. The war ended in 1949 with Israel’s victory, but 750,000
Palestinians were displaced and the territory was divided into 3 parts: the State of Israel, the West Bank (of
the Jordan River), and the Gaza Strip. This forced expulsion of Palestinian Arabs is referred to as the
“Nakba,” or “catastrophe” in Arabic.

1956: Second Israel-Arab war began after Egypt announced nationalisation of the Suez Canal, an important
trade route. Israel invaded Egypt, got support from Britain and France. The US and erstwhile USSR
brokered a deal to end the war.

1964: Palestinians organised themselves under the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) for struggle
against Israel.

1967: Six-Day War took place in which Israel defeated Egypt, Jordan and Syria. After the war, Israel gained
territorial control over the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt; the West Bank and East
Jerusalem from Jordan; and the Golan Heights from Syria. The Arab League passed 'The Three No's'
resolution (i.e., no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, and no negotiations with Israel) at a summit
in Khartoum.

1973: Arab nations formed a coalition to attack Israel. It suffered losses but recovered after receiving
supplies from the US. The war led to massive oil crisis.

1978: The US brokered a peace deal between Israel and Egypt. Settling the question of Palestine was part
of the deal what came to be known as Camp David Accord. It was a historic peace treaty between Israel
and Egypt terminating the bilateral dispute between them. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime
Minister Menachem Begin were awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in 1978 for their contributions to the
agreements

1987: First Palestinian Intifada was launched. Intifada means uprising or rebellion. Protests and clashes
continued for years in Gaza, the West Bank and inside Israel. Many people died and scores injured during
the Intifada.

1991: Israel begins peace talks with Palestinian leaders, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan in Spain — Madrid
Conference.

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1993: First major breakthrough was achieved. Israel and the PLO signed what is called the Oslo Peace
Accord. It was backed by the United Nations.

1994: A follow-up deal was signed, called the Cairo Agreement between Israel and the PLO. The
agreements created the Palestinian Authority which was given the charge of administrative affairs in
the West Bank and Gaza. Question of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, and status of Jerusalem
remained unresolved. Both Israel and Palestine view Jerusalem as their future capital.

2000: Second Palestinian Intifada was launched. Clashes erupted after Israeli hardliner Ariel Sharon
visited the compound that houses both the Temple Mount and Al-Aqsa, the site of current violence. In
response, the Israeli government approved construction of a barrier wall around the West Bank in 2002,
despite opposition from the International Court of Justice.

2002: Arab Peace Initiative was drawn up by Saudi Arabia, the initiative offered Israel normalized
relations in exchange for a Palestinian statehood agreement and a complete Israeli withdrawal from 1967-
captured territory. Palestinian militant group Hamas launched first major suicide attack killing at least 30
Israelis. Israel later conducted an operation to took control of much of the West Bank.

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2006: Hamas won election in Gaza emerging as a political challenger to Fatah party that was moderate and
had won in the West Bank.

2008: Palestinian militants fired rockets into Israel, which responded by pummelling missiles into the
Palestinian territory. More than 1,100 Palestinians lost their lives, 13 Israeli soldiers were killed.

2014: A seven-week fight ensued after Hamas allegedly kidnapped three Israeli girls from a Jewish
settlement in the West Bank and killed them. More than 2,000 Palestinians lost their lives. Israel reported
73 deaths including civilian casualties.

2015: Seeking re-election, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that there would be no two-
state solution to Israel-Palestine question.

2017: The Donald Trump administration of the US recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and
announced shifting of its embassy from Tel Aviv to this city. The decision saw fresh protests and clashes in
the West Bank and Gaza. Israel considers the “complete and united Jerusalem” its capital, while
Palestinians claims East Jerusalem as the capital of a future Palestinian state.

2021: Israel barricades Damascus Gate Plaza in the East Jerusalem on April 12. It is a popular gathering
place for Palestinians during Ramzan. Protests broke out. On April 16, Israel limits the number of people
who can prayer at Al-Aqsa Mosque — in East Jerusalem to 10,000 people. Clashes erupt and spreads to
Gaza and the West Bank. On May 21, Israel and Hamas agreed to a cease-fire brokered by Egypt, with both
sides claiming victory and no reported violations.

Abraham Accords

The Abraham Accords saw several Arab countries such as the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco
establishing diplomatic ties with Israel in 2020. This normalization process was facilitated by the US. The
accords are named after the patriarch Abraham regards as a prophet in both Judaism and Islam. The rise of
Iran’s clout in the region has played a significant role in signing of the accords. The ending of animosity
between Israel and at least some Arab countries has paved way for greater regional and multilateral
cooperation.

This accord paved way for I2U2 group formed in 2022- India, Israel and USA.

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Ties during Modi Regime

• In recent years, India has taken initiatives to engage with other countries of the region and has opened
multiple fronts of engagement with them. The declaration of strategic partnerships with Saudi
Arabia in 2010 and with Oman in 2008 and the agreement on defence and security cooperation with
Qatar in 2008 are some of the high points in India’s engagement with the region.
• With the coming of the Narendra Modi-led BJP government in 2014, India’s relations with West Asia
have clearly moved towards active diplomatic engagement with all the major players in the region,
with the Prime minister himself leading the initiative. India’s increasing diplomatic activism towards
the region is indicative of the Modi government’s shift in its effort to build stronger economic and
security ties with West Asian countries. Predicting the future course of India’s policy towards the
region, the then Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar observed in early March 2016 that “‘Act East’ would
be matched with ‘Think West’.
• PM Modi’s visits to Riyadh, UAE, Iran, Israel and Qatar should be seen against this background. His
government appears to be following the regional policy set by its predecessor government. This
approach, while not entirely giving up the tri-directional framework, is tilted more towards the Saudi
camp and Israel.
• Expatriates and energy components are the strengths of India’s engagement with the Persian Gulf
Region. But they are also its weaknesses and prevent India from fully exploiting its potential.

INDIA’S BILATERAL TIES WITH MAJOR REGIONAL PLAYERS

INDIA – UAE TIES

• India-UAE relations has become a pivot of India’s Extended Neighborhood and Look West
Policy in the region. UAE is one of India’s important partners in the Gulf region. The India-UAE
relationship has continued to grow with a number of crucial connections such as trade, energy,
Diaspora and culture.
• In the contemporary era, changing geopolitics and growing security challenges in the region have
drawn the two countries even closer. When PM Modi visited UAE in 2015, it was the first visit by an
Indian Prime Minister in 34 years. Both countries decided to take the bilateral relationship to the
level of a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’. The strategic partnership of India-UAE is a
multidimensional strategic partnership including different areas such as defense, security,
environment, education, health, commerce, and investment. UAE has supported India in her bid for a
permanent seat for the UN Security Council.
• The two sides were able to establish the UAE-India Infrastructure Investment Fund, with the aim
of reaching a target of USD 75 billion to support investment in India’s plans.
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 • UAE was the guest country at G-20, being held under India’s presidency. UAE is the only nation
from the region which has offered to store strategic oil reserves in India. The inauguration of the first
Hindu temple in Dubai on October 5, 2022, is a special gift to the Indian community by UAE.

Imperatives for Better ties

• The Indian community in the UAE is 35 percent of the UAE’s 10 million population, making it the
largest expatriate community in the country. They remit more than $13 billion annually, accounting
for 20 percent of India’s total remittances.
• Economic and commercial cooperation is a key aspect of overall bilateral relationship between the
two countries. The traditionally close and friendly India-UAE ties have evolved into a significant
partnership in the economic and commercial sphere.
• For India, the UAE’s most critical importance lies in the field of trade and business. India-UAE trade
rose to USD 85 billion in 2022, making the UAE India’s third-largest trading partner for 2022-
23 and India’s second-largest export destination. India is the UAE’s second largest trading
partner. Both the countries are expecting to achieve the target of USD 100 billion in trade before the
G-20 meeting in Delhi in September 2023.
• It is the sixth largest supplier of crude oil to India.
• Security is another potential area of cooperation between India and UAE, which have treaties and
agreements on extradition, mutual legal assistance in criminal and civil matters, combating piracy and
trafficking in narcotics, and information cooperation apart from maritime interaction.
• India and UAE have a common issue in countering terrorism and radicalization. Cooperation in
this regard will further enhance bilateral ties. The rise of ISIS and its efforts at promoting radicalisation
among youths is a common threat to their peace and stability. In fact, Cooperation in this regard will
further enhance bilateral ties.
• In addition to the strong bilateral ties, it is UAE’s role and importance in the West Asian region which
is of significance and makes UAE a key pillar of India’s West Asia strategy. UAE is among the key
economic power and political heavyweights in the region. It is a key voice in the region and is an
integral part of all-important regional forums like the GCC, Arab League, BRICS etc.

PM Modi’s visit to UAE, July 2023

• PM Narendra Modi visited the United Arab Emirates on 15th July 2023 after visiting France. It was
Modi’s fifth visit to the country since assuming office in 2014.
• Modi’s latest visit to UAE needs to be seen in the larger context of strengthening ties and further
widening the scope of India’s engagement with the Gulf region. Besides boosting bilateral relations
with the UAE, it would provide further impetus to India’s engagement with the Gulf region.

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Key highlights of the visit

Trade settlement in local currencies

• India and the United Arab Emirates have agreed to start trade settlement in local currencies. In this
regard, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between RBI and UAE Central Bank for the
establishment of a framework to promote the use of local currencies (INR - AED) for cross-border
transactions was signed. The MoU aims to put in place a Local Currency Settlement System (LCSS)
to promote the use of INR and AED bilaterally. Creation of the LCSS would enable exporters and
importers to invoice and pay in their respective domestic currencies. This in turn would enable the
development of an INR-AED foreign exchange market. The use of local currencies would optimise
transaction costs and settlement time for transactions, including for remittances from Indians residing
in UAE.

Linking of Fast Payment Systems of both the countries

• India and the UAE agreed to link the Indian Unified Payments Interface with the Gulf country's Instant
Payment Platform (IPP). In this regard, RBI and the Central Bank of the UAE signed MoU for
cooperation for interlinking their payment and messaging systems.

IIT Delhi to open campus in Abu Dhabi

• India signs MoU with Education and Knowledge dept of Abu Dhabi for setting up IIT Delhi campus
there.

India’s full support for UAE’s COP-28 presidency

• PM Modi assured India’s full support for UAE’s COP-28 presidency. The 2023 United Nations
Climate Change Conference or Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC, more commonly referred
to as COP28, will be held from November 30 until December 12 at the Expo City, Dubai.

CEPA with UAE

• India and the United Arab Emirates have signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) on 18th February 2022, during the India-UAE virtual Summit. It provides
for an institutional mechanism to encourage and improve trade between the two countries.
• The CEPA was the first of its kind signed by India in the Middle East and North Africa region,
and the first by the UAE with any country of the world. It is remarkable that negotiations for this
historic agreement took a mere 88 days, and that they were made possible only through mutual trust
and commitment.

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 • As per the CEPA signed between India and the UAE, 90% of India’s exports will have duty-free
access to the Emirates. It covers goods, services and digital trade. The bilateral trade pact is India’s
first in the region and the first comprehensive trade agreement with any country in a decade.
• India will benefit from preferential market access provided by the UAE, especially for all labour-
intensive sectors such as Gems and Jewellery, Textiles, leather, footwear, sports goods, plastics etc.
• The CEPA is likely to benefit about $26 billion worth of Indian products that are currently subjected
to 5% import duty by the UAE. The deal will open up to 10 lakh jobs for the young people in the
country.
• It is expected that the CEPA will lead to an increase in bilateral trade from the current $60 bn to
$100 bn in the next 5 years. Through the pact, Indian exporters will also get access to the much
larger Arab and African markets.
• Given that the UAE is keen on transforming itself from an oil-dependent economy to a knowledge-
based economy, the India-UAE relationship has the potential to expand to critical areas in the
science, technology, innovation (STI) domain. With India’s strong science and technology base
including in STEM education, space and nuclear fields, the two countries have the potential to
transform the nature and scale of their engagement. The Indian decision to establish the first foreign
branch of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in the UAE fits well with this goal. The decision
on the IIT’s UAE branch in Dubai is part of the CEPA agreement.
• India and the UAE are also becoming more comfortable with the changing geopolitics of the region.
Their partnership in ‘Middle East Quad’ U2I2 is a case in point.
• With Modi wooing the UAE’s investors for the infrastructure projects and opportunities upto a
trillion-dollar potential, for rapid expansion of next generation infrastructure, especially in railways,
ports, roads, airports and industrial corridors and parks.
• Since the signing of CEPA, UAE has emerged as the fourth largest investor in India during
2022-23. It was seventh largest investor in 2021-22. In the last fiscal, FDI from the UAE to India
jumped over three-fold to $3.35 billion from $1.03 billion in 2021-22.

Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, paid an official visit to
Gujarat, India from 9-10 January 2024 as the Chief Guest of the 10th edition of Vibrant Gujarat Global
Summit 2024. This was the fourth visit of Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed to India, in the last eight years and his
second official visit to India as the President of the UAE. The Indian side also congratulated the UAE for
joining the BRICS group on January 1, 2024. The UAE side expressed appreciation to India for supporting
the country’s application to join the Group. Recognizing the importance of food security, the leaders
emphasized that the India-UAE Food Park project will promote the reliability and resilience of food supply
chains and expand food and agriculture trade between the UAE and India.

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 INDIA-ISRAEL RELATION

• On January 30 2022, India and Israel marked 30 years of full diplomatic relations.
• India-Israel relations have been sensitive and controversial in much of their relationship history. India
had recognised Israel as far back as 1950 but normalisation took another four decades. India was
reticent about its ties with Israel as it balanced this with its historical support for the Palestinian cause,
its dependence on the Arab world for oil, and the pro-Palestinian sentiments of the country’s Muslim
citizens.

Imperatives for closer cooperation

• Israel can be described as India’s natural ally.

• The common threat to national security emanating from their neighbourhood in form of cross-border
terrorism especially in the era of globalisation of jihadi politics necessitates a closer cooperation
between them. Both countries have been victims of terrorist violence for decades and have fostered
closer cooperation to counter this threat.
• Israel is a reliable ally of India especially as seen in regional dynamics of South Asian geopolitics.
Unlike major powers’ ties with Pakistan (like USA, China and even Russia), Indo-Israel ties will never
be hyphenated with Indo-Pakistan relations. India is assured of strong Israeli support in this region
including vis-à-vis China.
• As a rising power with a growing economy, India offers immense opportunities for mutually
beneficial ties for Israel ranging from a huge market, innovation, science and technology, agriculture
and attractive investment destination. Conversely, Israel’s technical expertise in defence, dual use
high technology, dry land agriculture, water management, technical education etc. make it an
indispensible partner for accelerating India’s economic development and security. Israel is thus also
important for food security.
• India offers crucial diplomatic support to Israel in international arena where it is often isolated over
many issues. Also, India’s geopolitical position makes it a gateway for Israel to South Asia, South-
East Asia and East Asia where India’s standing as a responsible power is of great benefit for Israel.

Growth of ties

• Since then, India-Israel relations have blossomed in the short period of three decades into close
military, economic and strategic ties. Both countries took a fresh look at each other and found
substantial interaction in various fields ranging from economic, agricultural, scientific to defence.
• The first high-level bilateral visits took place only when the NDA tenure under Prime Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee took office. In 2000, L K Advani became the first Indian minister to visit Israel. The

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 same year, Jaswant Singh visited as Foreign Minister. That year, the two countries set up a joint anti-
terror commission. And in 2003, Ariel Sharon became the first Israeli Prime Minister to visit
India.

India & the Palestinian cause

• Keeping India’s wider strategic interests in perspective, successive Indian governments since the early
1990s have walked nuanced line between expressing genuine concern for the Palestinian cause
and expanding its commercial and defense ties with Israel.
• Over the years, the Indian government has toned down its reactions to Israel’s treatment of
Palestinians. India has also begun denouncing Palestinian suicide bombings and other terrorist acts in
Israel, something that was seen earlier as rather justified in light of the Israeli policies against the
Palestinians. India is no longer initiating anti-Israel resolutions at the United Nations.
• During the UPA’s 10 years in office, Mahmoud Abbas, head of the Palestinian Authority that
administers the West Bank, visited four times — in 2005, 2008, 2010 and 2012. India voted for
Palestine to become a full member of UNESCO in 2011, and a year later, co-sponsored the UN General
Assembly resolution that enabled Palestine to become a “non-member” observer state at the UN
without voting rights. India also supported the installation of the Palestinian flag on the UN premises
in September 2015, a year after Modi was voted to power.
• The first big shift in India’s policy came during the visit of Mahmoud Abbas in 2017 when India in a
statement dropped the customary line in support of East Jerusalem as the capital of a Palestinian state.
• But the balancing act continued. Modi made a separate visit to Ramallah in February 2018, and
called for an independent Palestinian state. Even as it abstained at UNESCO in December 2017, India
voted in favour of a resolution in the General Assembly opposing the Trump administration’s
recognition of Jerusalem as the Israeli capital.
• At the UNHRC’s 46th session in Geneva earlier in 2021, India voted against Israel in three resolutions
✓ on the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people;
✓ on Israeli settlement policy; and
✓ on the human rights situation in the Golan Heights.
It abstained on a fourth, which asked for an UNHRC report on the human rights situation in Palestine,
including East Jerusalem.
• India believes that the peaceful resolution of the Israel-Palestine conflict would bring lasting peace
and stability to the region and reiterated the need for an early resumption of the political course by
launching credible direct negotiations on all final status issues. India has consistently called for
direct peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine taking into account the legitimate aspirations
of the Palestinian people for statehood and Israel’s legitimate security concerns.

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Ties during Modi regime

Political ties

• During Modi Regime, high level bilateral visits have been a remarkable feature of bilateral ties.
• PM Modi’s meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 28, 2014, at the side lines
of the 69th UNGA sessions was the first interaction between the Indian and Israeli Prime
Ministers since the September 2003 visit of Ariel Sharon to India. PM Netanyahu had remarked that
“sky is the limit” that can be achieved between the two sides with “limitless” potential.
• For long, India had avoided a bilateral visit at the highest level. So, it has successfully come out of
the hyphenation between Israel and Palestine in its relationship with the two nations.
• Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Israel from July 4-6 2017 was a significant milestone.
It was the first-ever historic visit of an Indian Prime Minister after Israeli PM Ariel Sharon came to
India during Vajpayee regime in 2003, and takes place as the two countries marked 25 years of
establishment of diplomatic relations.
• PM Modi had already undertaken visits to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran
before embarking on his trip to Israel. Receiving Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Delhi in
May eased the politics of skipping a visit to Ramallah while visiting Israel.
• India has finally de-hyphenated its relationship with Israel and Palestine, engaging with the two
arch-rivals separately and on mutually beneficial terms.PM Modi had already made a political
statement by choosing to stay in Jerusalem, on which Palestine has claims, for all the three days and
only going to Tel Aviv for the Indian community event. The political message of the trip was clear
– New Delhi is no longer uneasy in dealing with Israel as was the case in the past.
• The outcome of the visit was an impressive joint statement which elevated the relationship to a
‘strategic partnership’. Indian and Israeli companies entered into agreements to bid jointly for
defence contracts for the Indian military and locally build the systems under “Make in India”.
• This was followed by PM Netanyahu’s visit to India in January 2018, the second such visit by an
Israeli PM.
• Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Israel Lt Gen (Res) Benjamin Gantz, visited India on
June 2, 2022. Both countries reviewed the rapid growth in defence cooperation between India and
Israel over the past few years. They acknowledged mutual security challenges and their convergences
on a number of strategic and defence issues, and expressed their commitment to work together to
enhance cooperation in all forums.

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Defence ties

• Defence continues to be a “central pillar” of the bilateral relationship. Next to Russia and the
United States, Israel is one of the largest arms suppliers to India with annual sales worth over $1 billion.
India is the largest buyer of military equipment from Israel.
• Indeed, under the Modi government, India and Israel have ramped up their cooperation on security and
defense matters. The Indian armed forces have inducted a wide array of Israeli weapon systems
over the years, which range from
✓ Phalcon AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control Systems) and
✓ Heron, Searcher-II and Harop drones
✓ Barak anti-missile defence systems and
✓ Spyder quick-reaction anti-aircraft missile systems.
✓ a host of Israeli missiles and precision-guided munitions, from Python and Derby air-to-air
missiles to Crystal Maze and Spice- 2000 bombs.
• At the 15th Joint Working Group (JWG 2021) meeting on Bilateral Defence Cooperation, countries
agreed to form a Task Force to formulate a comprehensive Ten-Year Roadmap to identify new areas
of cooperation.
• Israel has sold radar and surveillance systems as well as electronic components for military aircraft
and India has already deployed Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) along the rugged mountains
of Kashmir for surveillance, as well as on the disputed border with China.
• Israel also wants to be a key player in the “Make in India” initiative, especially in defence
manufacturing through technology transfers and joint research, technology start-ups and cyber-
security. Indian and Israeli warships successfully tested the jointly developed Barak 8 long-range
surface-to-air missile system during November-December 2015, which will now serve as a missile
defence shield for warships and key facilities such as offshore oil platforms. It was joint venture of
DRDO and Israeli aerospace Industry (IAI).

Counter-Terrorism

• Israel has helped India defense itself through training in counterterrorism methods. Israel has
been cooperating with India in the areas of border management, internal security and public safety,
police modernization and capacity building for combating crime, crime prevention and
cybercrime.
• The two countries have signed an Extradition Treaty and a pact on Transfer of Sentenced Prisoners.
Both countries signed an intelligence-sharing agreement in July 2014, hoping to fight radical Islamic
extremism in the region together.
• Joint working Group on counter-terrorism meets periodically

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 • India eyes advanced Israeli foliage penetrating radar capable of detecting human, and vehicular activity
in dense forests. In the Indian use case, the radar would be a handy monitoring tool for the porous Line
of Control with Pakistan, the de facto boundary in the disputed territory of Kashmir. Israeli radars
could considerably improve intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of the difficult terrain.
• This would help India plug leakages in LOC to prevent infiltration and incidents like Pathankot and
Uri attack. There is thus immense scope for collaboration on border security sphere.

Trade & Investment

• The trade and investment relationship has grown impressively in the last few years. Total India-Israel
trade in merchandise and services sectors in 2022-23 is estimated to be $12 billion, as per a PTI report.
• India's merchandise exports and imports from Israel during 2022-23 were $8.4 billion and $2.3 billion,
respectively, leading to a merchandise trade surplus of $6.1 billion. India's key exports to Israel are
diesel ($5.5 billion) and cut and polished diamonds ($1.2 billion). Key imports are rough diamonds
($519 million) and cut and polished diamonds ($220 million); electronics and telecom components
like ICs, parts of photovoltaic cells ($411 million); potassium chloride ($105 million) and herbicide
($6 million).
• India is Israel’s second-largest trading partner in Asia and the ninth largest globally. Though bilateral
trade is dominated mainly by diamonds and chemicals, recent years have witnessed an increase in trade
in areas such as electronic machinery and high-tech products; communications systems; medical
equipment etc.
• India continues to be a 'focus' country for the Israeli Government’s increased trade efforts. India and
Israel have restarted negotiations for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with an aim to conclude
it in 2022.The success of Indian and Israeli information technology companies has particularly led to
interest in collaboration in that sector.
• Indian Investments in Israel: Cumulative ODI from India as on June 2022 was US $ 131.85 million.
Indian companies are marking their presence in Israel through mergers and acquisitions and by opening
branch offices.
• During April 2000 – - March 2022, Israel’s direct FDI into India was US $270.91 million. There are
over 300 investments from Israel in India mainly in the high-tech domain and in agriculture. These
investments are varied in nature - manufacturing plants; R&D centers; subsidiaries etc. There is a
growing preference for Israeli companies in sectors such as renewable energy, water technologies,
homeland security and real estate in addition to traditional areas such as agriculture, chemicals etc.
• India-Israel Industrial R&D and Technological Innovation Fund (I4F) setup for affordable
technological innovations in focus areas of mutual interest such as water, agriculture, energy and
digital technologies. I4F is a cooperation between the two countries to promote, facilitate and support
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 joint industrial R&D projects between companies from India and Israel to address the challenges in
the agreed Focus Sectors.

Agriculture and Water Management

• An Indo-Israel agriculture action plan has developed 30 centres of excellence in agriculture

in India with Israel's help to showcase the latest technology to Indian farmers.
• India has benefited from Israeli technologies in horticulture mechanisation, protected
cultivation, orchard and canopy management, nursery management, micro-irrigation and post-
harvest management, particularly in Haryana and Maharashtra.
• Undoubtedly, agriculture is at least one of the two main pillars in India-Israel relations –
definitely the main pillar from the civilian angle.” The contribution of Israel to the agricultural
growth in different parts of our country over the last two decades is immense- From the blossoming
mango orchards of Haryana to the drip-irrigated vegetable nurseries of Gujarat state, Israeli
agricultural know-how has become a staple resource of farms across the Indian subcontinent.
• Cooperation in water conservation, waste-water treatment and its reuse for agriculture,
desalination, water utility reforms, and the cleaning of the Ganges and other rivers using
advanced water technologies. Israel ‘s expertise in drip irrigation will help India meet its target
of doubling farmer ‘s income.
• A Plan of Cooperation between Israel and the Government of Uttar Pradesh for addressing water
issues in Bundelkhand region was signed in August 2020 following which an Israeli company is
working on a feasibility study in water management in Bundelkhand region. In June 2022 Israel
signed a joint declaration with Haryana government in the field of integrated water resource
management and capacity building. Israeli company IDE has built several desalination plants in
India.

People to People Contact

• There are approximately 80,000 Jews of Indian origin in Israel. The majority is from Maharashtra
(Bene Israelis) and relatively small numbers from Kerala (Cochini Jews), Kolkata (Baghadadi Jews)
and North East (Bnei Menache).
• The Indian Embassy in Israel facilitated the first ever National Convention of Indian Jews in Israel
held on September 2013 in Ramla. Besides, there are about 10,000 Indian citizens of whom about
8000 are care givers while others are diamond graders, IT professionals, students and unskilled
workers.
• India is a popular tourist destination of Israelis. Every year, over 40,000 Israelis visit India for
tourism and business.

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 • Both governments also encourage collaboration among Universities and Educational institutions
involving faculty and student exchange programmes, joint academic research, fellowships,
Industrial R & D in IT and electronics, promoting innovation etc.

ISRAEL-HAMAS CONFLICT (2023-24)

➢ The ruling Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement) militant group in the Gaza Strip carried out an
unprecedented attack "Operation Toofan Al-Aqsa “(Operation Al-Aqsa Storm.) on Israel at on
October 7, 2023, firing thousands of rockets as dozens of fighters infiltrated the heavily fortified
border in several locations by air, land and sea. It caught Israel off guard on a major holiday- Sabbath
which is the Jewish day of worship and rest.
➢ The attack by Hamas on Israel coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of Yom Kippur War the
fourth Arab-Israel war (1973). In this attack at least 1,200 Israelis were killed and many Israelis were
captured by Hamas as hostages. In response Israel launched its war on Gaza.
➢ Hamas may have had several objectives, but the most important ones were to shake off the
Palestinian fatigue that had become so prevalent in the Arab world. This was evident in the Abraham
Accords driven by Donald Trump’s administration. Biden nearly got Saudi Arabia to sign up too. This
would have been the biggest loss for the Palestinian support and cause. Hamas also made the Arab
streets wake up to the plight of Muslims and Palestinians. Besides, Hamas also busted the myth of
the invincibility of Israel by piercing through the impregnable defences at 22 points.
➢ In response, Israel has launched 'Operation Iron Swords’ against Hamas militants in the Gaza Strip.
India launched Operation Ajay to evacuate its citizens stranded in Israel.
➢ Israel has maintained a blockade over Gaza since Hamas seized control of the territory in 2007.
The bitter enemies have fought four wars since then. There have also been numerous rounds of smaller
fighting between Israel and Hamas and other smaller militant groups based in Gaza.
➢ The blockade, which restricts the movement of people and goods in and out of Gaza, has devastated
the territory’s economy. Israel says the blockade is needed to keep militant groups from building up
their arsenals. The Palestinians say the closure amounts to collective punishment.
➢ Over the past year Israel’s far-right government has ramped up settlement construction in the occupied
West Bank, Israeli settler violence has displaced hundreds of Palestinians there, and tensions have
flared around a flashpoint Jerusalem holy site.
Peace Efforts

➢ Israel and Hamas had agreed to a temperoray humanitarian pause in fighting in Gaza. A "humanitarian
pause" is a temporary stop to fighting for the sole purpose of humanitarian aid. This was agreed upon
to allow for the release of over 100 hostages held by the militant group in exchange for many

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 Palestinians held in Israeli prisons and also to allow for more aid to enter the enclave. It was facilitated
by Qatar, Egypt and the United States.
Widening of Conflict

➢ The recent conflict has reaffirmed that addressing the Palestinian cause vital for ensuring peace
and stability in the region.
➢ West Asia is in flux. What started as a direct military confrontation between Israel and Hamas has
snowballed into a regional security crisis. Hezbollah (Lebanon), Kataib Hezbollah (Iraqi Shia
militant group) Hashad al-Shabi (Iraq and Syria), Houthis (Yemen), Iran, Pakistan and the
United States are all now part of an expanding conflict theatre. While multiple players are present in
the crisis, there are three major operational centres — Israel, Iran and the U.S.
➢ This is now a classic case of regional anarchy where countries are taking unilateral military measures
to address their perceived security challenges, throwing international laws and the idea of sovereignty,
the bedrock of the international system, to the wind, thereby risking a wider all-out war.
➢ Israel says it has the right to attack Gaza until it meets its objectives — dismantling Hamas and
releasing hostages. Isreal’s attack has killed more than 25,000 people in 120 days, a vast majority of
them women and children, wounded over 50,000 and displaced almost 90% of the Gaza enclave’s
population. While Israel has managed to turn Gaza into what the United Nations called a “graveyard
for children and a living hell for everyone else”, it also faces questions on whether it is meeting its
objectives after two and a half months of bombing and invasion.
➢ In the case of Israel-Palestine, the fundamental issue is Israel’s continuing occupation of the
Palestinian territories. Hamas might be a terrorist outfit for Israel and its western allies, but for a vast
majority of other regional actors, it is fighting Israel’s violent occupation. Hamas has a social
and political cause — the liberation of Palestine — and is deeply entrenched in Palestinian
society. This makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to dismantle Hamas through military
means, at least as long as Israel continues the occupation of Palestinian territories.
➢ The high civilian casualties and the sheer brutality of Israel’s offensive in Gaza have isolated
Israel globally.
SOUTH AFRICA TAKING ISRAEL TO ICJ FOR GENOCIDE IN GAZA

South Africa had in December 2023 moved the ICJ, invoking the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948, against Israel, accusing it of committing genocide during its
ongoing military campaign in Gaza. South Africa had sought the indication of provisional measures to stop
the genocide

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The Genocide Convention, 1948, was the first human rights treaty to be adopted by the UN General
Assembly. It primarily arose form a commitment to ‘never again’ allow mass killing of people such as
the Holocaust. The Genocide Convention 1948 under Article IX provides that disputes between states
relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention shall be submitted to the
ICJ at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. Both South Africa and Israel are signatories to the
Genocide Convention of 1948, which has now been invoked by South Africa.
Genocide is treated as the most serious of international crimes. For this reason, every state has an obligation
(known as an “erga omnes obligation”) to take steps to prevent the occurrence of genocide, wherever it may
occur. This is the basis on which South Africa, a party that is technically unrelated to the conflict in Gaza,
claims standing to bring this case to the ICJ. In recent times, The Gambia instituted proceedings against
Myanmar in 2019 with respect to the genocide of the Rohingya, and successfully obtained provisional
measures.
South Africa’s case is based upon Article II which says genocide means acts such as
✓ killing members of a national, racial, ethnic or religious group;
✓ causing serious bodily and mental harm to the members of the group; and
✓ deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part.
✓ measures to prevent births, and forcibly transferring children.
It has also accused Israel of causing hunger, dehydration, and starvation in Gaza by impeding sufficient
humanitarian assistance, cutting off water, food, fuel, and electricity, and failing to provide shelter or
sanitation to Palestinians in Gaza, including its 1.9 million internally displaced people. South Africa drew
heavily upon statements and remarks attributed to Israeli officials and military leaders, to contend that one
could infer genocidal intent from their words and deeds.
Israel dismissed the case as a “grossly distorted story” and said that if any genocidal acts had been carried
out, they had been executed against Israel during the October 7 Hamas attacks.
It anchored its presentation on its right to self-defence. It claimed that its operations in Gaza were not aimed
at destroying its people, but to protect them and that it was directed solely against Hamas and its allied
groups and were aimed at removing Hamas’ capacity to threaten Israel. It also accused South Africa of
relying on statistics provided by Hamas on casualties.
On 26 January 2024 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ordered that Israel must “take all
measures within its power” to prevent all acts within the scope of the Genocide Convention. While the
court did not agree to South Africa’s request for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, it directed Israel to allow
the entry of basic services and humanitarian assistance into the Palestinian enclave. The top U.N. Court

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court decided not to throw out genocide charges against Israel for its military offensive in Gaza, as part of
a preliminary decision in the case.
Whether Israel will choose to abide by the ruling is debatable since the court does not have any enforcement
powers. However, ICJ’s ruling could significantly sway international public opinion. It makes it much
harder for other states to continue to support Israel in the face of a neutral third party finding there is a risk
of genocide. States may withdraw military or other support for Israel in order to avoid this

➢ Iran is the main backer of all anti-Israel non-state actors in West Asia, be it Hamas, the Islamic Jihad,
Hezbollah, Houthis or the Shia militias of Iraq and Syria. Iran-backed proxies are directly attacking
both Israeli and American positions, while Iran is flexing its military muscle through cross-border
attacks. The U.S., which has a widespread military presence in the region, has three objectives — to
ensure the security of Israel, the security of America’s troops and assets deployed in the region and
the perseverance of the U.S.-led order in the region

➢ While Arab countries, upset with Israel’s indiscriminate bombing, stuck to the path of diplomacy to
turn up pressure on the Jewish state, Iran-backed militias elsewhere opened new fronts. Houthis, the
Shia militias of Yemen, started attacking commercial vessels in the Red Sea from mid-
November, again in “solidarity with the Palestinians”. Houthis, who control much of Yemen,
including its Red Sea coast, has used sea denial tactics to target dozens of ships ever since, forcing
several shipping giants to suspend operations in the Red Sea, which connects the Mediterranean Sea
with the Arabian Sea (and the Indian Ocean) through the Suez Canal and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.
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 The Houthis have challenged the U.S.’s ability to provide security to one of the world’s busiest
shipping routes. The Houthis, a militia that survived seven years of Saudi bombing, are unlikely
to be deterred by America’s strikes.
➢ Israel has carried out multiple strikes inside Syria and Lebanon, killing Hamas, Hezbollah and Iranian
commanders. As instability spread, the Islamic State terror group attacked a memorial event in
Kerman, southeastern Iran. When Houthi attacks imperilled the Red Sea traffic, the U.S., which
continues to support Israel’s war on Gaza, started carrying out airstrikes in Yemen, targeting Houthi
positions under ‘Operation Prosperity Guardian’.
➢ As it was coming under growing regional and domestic pressure, Iran carried out strikes on
January 16 ,2024 in Iraq’s Kurdistan, Syria and Pakistan, claiming to have hit a Mossad
operational centre and Sunni Islamist militants. In retaliation, Pakistan carried out air strikes in Iran
on January 18, 2024.
Impact

➢ The current conflict may strengthen Hamas and weaken Palestinian Authority’s position in the West
Bank. This could negatively impact peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestine.
➢ It has strained Israel's ties with Egypt and Jordan and Arab countries with whom Israel had
normalized its relations. This could impact the prospects of ending the war early, the release of
hostages and prisoners of war. The war has reportedly resulted in life-threatening shortages, impacting
water, electricity, fuel, food, and medical supplies in Gaza while also causing unprecedented human
causalities, (nearly 25 thousand so far).

➢ The war has impacted the Suez Canal trade, which is a key maritime route between Asia and
Europe and accounts for 12% of global trade by value. Further escalation in the entire Middle East
could jeopardize trade through the Strait of Hormuz, responsible for 20% of global oil trade passage.
Involvement of Iran in the conflict may disrupt trade with landlocked Central Asia, a significant
producer of agriculture, raw materials, and minerals.
➢ Owing to the heightening conflict, exports to crucial markets in Europe, US east coast and parts of
Africa and West Asia, earlier using the Red Sea, are now being re-routed through the Cape of
Good Hope in South Africa, resulting in steep increase in shipping and insurance charges.
➢

Why does the U.S. always back Israel?

One explanation is that Israel’s strategic value in a volatile yet critical region makes it appealing for
Washington. During the Cold War, the U.S. saw Israel as a powerful bulwark against possible Soviet
expansion in the Arab world.

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 After the Cold War, when the U.S. started becoming more and more involved in West Asia, it continued to
see Israel as a force of stability, along with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Strategic value explains a close
partnership or alliance, like America’s relationships with Japan, South Korea or Germany. A host of other
factors, including America’s public opinion, electoral politics and the powerful Israel lobby in the
U.S., play a role in shaping the country’s Israel policy. Besides, there are strong ties between the
military industrial complexes of both countries.
The powerful Israel lobby helps amplify pro-Israel voices, backs pro-Israel politicians and works toward
playing down or neutralising voices critical of Israel. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee
(AIPAC), a powerful pro-Israel lobbying group, hosts top leaders from both countries, including Presidents,
Senators and Prime Ministers, for its annual gatherings. Pro-Israel groups also support both parties in the
U.S. financially.
India’s stand

➢ India’s position has been multi-layered.

➢ Within hours of the massacre of Israeli citizens by Hamas fighters last Saturday, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi tweeted India’s solidarity with Israel. The Modi government has condemned terrorism
in the strongest language and stood with Israel over the attack, although it hasn’t thus far designated
Hamas as a terror group. The government called on Israel for restraint, dialogue and diplomacy and
condemned the death of civilians.
➢ India’s second big concern has been the safety of its citizens, especially as Israel began retaliatory
strikes on Gaza. It launched ‘Operation Ajay’ to bring its citizens from this conflict zone. Around
18,000 Indians work or study in Israel.
➢ Meanwhile, at the United Nations, India abstained at a UNGA vote on October 26 2023 that called
on Israel for a ceasefire. India abstained on the October 26 vote because it said there was no explicit
reference to the October 7 terror attacks by Hamas. The country’s decision was in line with the one
that it has maintained in the other ongoing — and deeply polarising conflict — in the world: the Russia-
Ukraine war.
➢ On December 12 2023, India voted in favour of a United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
resolution that called on Israel for an immediate ceasefire, the protection of civilians in
accordance with international law and the unconditional release of all hostages. India was among
153 countries that made up a massive 4/5th majority in the Assembly who voted in favour of the
resolution.
➢ There could be several reasons:
✓ First, casualty figures have risen relentlessly, with more than 25,000 dead and the highest such
toll of nearly 90 journalists. More than 80% of the entire population is homeless.

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 ✓ Second, Israeli Defence Forces have gone far beyond their original mandate of eliminating
Hamas capacity and freeing the hostages to a large-scale flattening of Gaza and forced
occupation of more territory.
✓ Third, global opinion, including Indian public opinion, has moved decidedly from sympathy
with Israel, to horror at the unfolding aftermath. New Delhi could not have been immune to
appeals by Palestine and the Gulf States to take a relook at its vote, even as India stood isolated
in South Asia and the Global South for its previous abstention.

➢ PM Modi, however, skipped the BRICS plus summit attended by all other leaders of the 11-nation
grouping, indicating a discomfort with the tough line taken by South Africa that has taken Israel to
International Criminal Court over allegation of genocide in Gaza.
➢ On 17 January 2024, India said it was “deeply concerned” at the current Israel-Palestinian crisis,
highlighting the spillover effect of the violence for the West Asian region. The ongoing conflict
between Israel and Hamas is impacting the safety of maritime commercial traffic in the Indian
Ocean, including in the vicinity of India, directly impacting the country's energy and economic
interests,
➢ The message that India has conveyed since the start of this conflict is clear and consistent – it is
important to prevent escalation, to ensure continued delivery of humanitarian aid. The unfolding
humanitarian crisis needs to be addressed in earnest. India welcomed the efforts of the international
community for de-escalation and delivery of humanitarian goods to the people of Gaza. We have also
called for continued humanitarian aid for the affected population.
➢ India has delivered shipments of relief material to the Palestinian people in Gaza. India has also
provided $5 million, including the $2.5 million we provided at the end of December, to the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).
➢ India reiterated the Indian support for “negotiated Two-State solution to the Israel-Palestine issue,
leading to the establishment of a sovereign, independent and viable State of Palestine living within
secure and recognised borders, side-by-side in peace with Israel along with due regard to the security
needs of Israel. India also emphasises the importance of “immediate resumption of credible direct
negotiations” between Israel and the Palestinians in this regard. It will deliver an enduring peace that
the people of Israel and Palestine desire and deserve.
➢ Thus, the balaning Act continued. The diplomatic tool of hedging and balancing between the warring
sides has been a consistent feature of New Delhi’s approach.

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Red Sea Events

➢ The heightening of the West Asia crisis has impacted global trade and threatens about $235-240
billion worth of India’s annual trade through the Red Sea. The Houthis say they are acting in
solidarity with Palestinians and have threatened to expand attacks to include U.S. ships in response to
American and British strikes on their sites in Yemen.
➢ As the crisis in the Red Sea spurred by the Israel-Hamas war escalates, India has begun a diplomatic
outreach to crucial players to secure the country’s trade and strategic interests. The outreach
treads a line of neutrality in the conflict between the Western powers and the Islamic world wherein
India has not joined the US-led multinational naval coalition in the Red Sea while it remains critical
of the Houthis’ violence. The Indian Navy was trying its best to secure the sea lanes.
➢ An important element of India’s diplomatic outreach was Minister of External Affair S Jaishankar’s
recent visit in January 2023 to Tehran, where he shared with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein
Amirabdollahian the country’s concerns on the havoc caused by the Iran-backed Houthis in the Red
Sea. India is also engaging diplomatically with other countries connected with the crisis, including
Western powers.
➢ On the question of Iran’s air strikes inside Pakistan, New Delhi clubbed its understanding of Iran’s
action with “zero tolerance on terrorism” and an exercise in “self-defence” – something India has
maintained as part of its policy against the Pakistan-backed terror network in India. This is significant
because New Delhi realises that the tightrope walk in its response to the latest episode of the Gaza
conflict meant that it had to assuage some misgivings in Tehran.
➢ In his recent visit to Iran, India’s external affairs minister gave high priority to discussions with Iran’s
roads and urban development minister. This signals that India is eyeing to invest with renewed vigour
in geostrategically important Chabahar Port, opening a key access point to Central Asia for India, an
alternative that does away with the Pakistan route barrier for India’s trade.
➢ Along with the task of building a terminal in Chabahar port, India will also be keen on developing the
International North-South Transport Corridor. Such projects also form the core of a mutuality of
interests, as Tehran would see them as effective guarantees against the sanctions imposed by the West.

Impact on India

➢ The ongoing Israel-Hamas war is causing concern in India over the conflict’s potential impact on
oil prices. India meets 85% of its oil needs through imports. A price spurt will leave the government
little fiscal space for social welfare spending by inflating the import and fuel/fertiliser subsidy bills,
which will weaken the rupee by impacting the current account deficit. The overall impact can also hurt
the GDP growth.

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 ➢ Ongoing conflict could bring fresh global trouble for the Indian economy, with elevated oil prices
bringing up import costs and increasing prices for commodities and foodstuffs. As per RBI, a 10
per cent jump in oil prices can make inflation soar by about 30 basis points and impact growth by about
15 basis points. Exports can decline further while prices could rise and the Indian Rupee could
weaken with the worsening of the balance of payment situation and decline in foreign exchange
reserves.
➢ It could potentially increase shipping costs and insurance premiums for Indian exporters,
impacting bilateral trade. For India, the Red Sea trade route is the shortest trade route for ships
moving from Asia to Europe. India is heavily reliant on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait for its crude oil,
LNG imports and trade with parts of West Asia, Africa, and Europe. Freight rates for Indian shipments
headed to Europe and Africa could surge as much as 25-30 per cent if there is disruption along this
route.
➢ India is also looking to source more oil from countries like Guyana, Canada, Gabon, Brazil, and
Colombia. It has also heavily increased oil purchases from sanction-hampered Russia.
➢ The Israel-Hamas conflict is threatening to disrupt India’s exports like Gems and Jewellery,
pharmaceuticals etc. to several countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
➢ While Israel launches its counterattack, the question for India will be how much of a template could
this serve to re-energise Pakistan-based terror groups, especially on the Kashmir issue.
Historically, the Pakistan deep state has emulated models and methods from the Israel-Palestine
theatre. Drone attacks by Hamas have raised apprehensions in the Indian establishment about use of
Chinese made drones by non-state actors along the Indo-Pakistan border. Escalating drone sightings
along the India-Pakistan border and Kashmir's Line of Control have raised significant concerns.
➢ India needs to have a framework of crisis management response at the national level for extreme
terrorist scenarios. And two, that the reliance on technology, while very imperative, has to be
complemented by highly skilled personnel who are at the pinnacle of the craft. India needs to
constantly invest in skill upgradation of our personnel who are the ultimate redeemers in a terror
response mechanism.
➢ It has impacted normalisation between Arab countries and Israel and has frozen any such ongoing
efforts especially between Israel and Saudi Arabia. This normalization had opened up great
opportunities for India to strengthen its global and economic position through initiatives like I2U2
and IMEEEC.
➢ A key impact of Israel's war could be on the proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic
Corridor (IMEEC). The war casts a shadow over this ambitious project and has dampened the spirits.
The IMEEC project hinged on normalisation of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

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 ➢ However, many think since the corridor is a long-term project work on which hasn't even started yet,
the conflict is unlikely to impact it. The IMEEC, which is an India initiative, is for the long term, and
its significance is long-term. While short-term glitches can have concerns and occupy our minds, India
will keep engaging with all stakeholders.

INDIA-MIDDLE EAST-EUROPE ECONOMIC CORRIDOR (IMEEC)

➢ Announced on the sidelines of the G20 summit by several participating countries, the IMEEC will
comprise two separate corridors
✓ the east corridor connecting India to the Arabian Gulf and
✓ the northern corridor connecting the Arabian Gulf to Europe.

➢ It will include a railway which will provide a reliable and cost-effective cross-border ship-to-rail
transit network to supplement existing maritime and road transport routes – enabling goods and
services to transit to, from, and between India, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, and Europe.
It will also include an electricity cable, a hydrogen pipeline and a high-speed data cable. It is
an ambitious infrastructure deal to connect India through Saudi Arabia and Israel to Europe, a
corridor that would immensely contribute to global trade.
➢ The IMEC has the potential to reduce trade time between the EU and India by 40%, which will be
a significant boost in reducing energy costs and increasing trade. The IMEC would have acted as a
green and digital bridge, linking key commercial hubs, enabling the production and export of clean
energy, and expanding power grids and telecommunication networks.

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 ➢ USA had earlier said that this initiative extends beyond mere infrastructure development. It
emphasized that the broader goal of this strategy is to reduce tensions in a region that has
traditionally been a major source of instability and insecurity, rather than a contributor to stability.
The route of the plan was slated to be announced around two months after the G20 summit. The
rising geopolitical uncertainty means the hopes of normalisation may have been shortlived, at least
for now.
➢ India has rejected claims that the IMEC was an alternative to China’s Belt & Road Initiative even
as US and the EU have sought sought to counter China’s initiative.

Way out

➢ There is no clear way-out from this polycentric crisis. After more than 100 days of war, Israel has
achieved little in Gaza, given the targets it set for itself. It is unlikely to end the offensive in the near
term. If instability spreads further, the Islamic State and other jihadists would seek to exploit the
situation. The U.S., once a shaper of outcomes in West Asia, watches the region plunge into chaos.
The only silver lining amid this spiral of crisis, as of now, is that the Saudi-Iran detente, and the
associated Saudi-Houthi peace, is holding.
➢ What West Asia needs is a new security equilibrium. There has to be an immediate ceasefire in
Gaza, and peace between Israel and Palestinians could be used as a springboard for further talks aimed
at regional security between the main stakeholders — Israel, Arab nations, Iran, the U.S. and their
respective allies and proxies. Resolving issues such as Palestinian refugees and the status of Jerusalem
is essential. Success depends on both parties' willingness to engage in negotiations and the role of
international actors, along with evolving regional dynamics.
ANALYSIS OF INDIA’S WEST ASIA POLICY

• Perhaps, the key to India’s diplomatic success lies in its de-hyphenation of relations with countries
locked in zero-sum rivalries and its focus on forging bilateral win-win relations with each country
individually. By pursuing a highly balanced, non-partisan policy, India has to a great extent been able
to protect and secure its growing stakes and vital interests in the region that range from energy,
maritime trade, security and the safety of its 8 million strong diasporas.
• According to some experts, New Delhi needs to pay attention to some major trends that are changing
the big picture in the Middle East-
1) The first is about the nature of confrontation between the US and Iran. The sanctions regime
against Iran, according to the US’s official claims, is one of the toughest the world has known.
Even many of Iran’s Arab neighbours, including Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, support

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 the US Administration’s steps against Tehran. For they fear Iran’s growing power and the assertion
is threatening to undermine their national coherence and security.
2) In Israel-Hamas war, amid competing demands from West Asian powers for India to take sides,
India might find it difficult to maintain a “balancing” approach even if it wanted to.
3) Third, India’s engagement with Iran over Chabahar is unlikely to eliminate the
Pakistan/China factor. One reason is the more modest scale of India’s efforts in Central Asia and
the Middle East, especially when compared to China’s Belt and Road and brokering of peace deal
between Saudi Arabia and Iran by China last year.
• In view of some experts, India, being trusted by both sides (Israel and Arab Countries), could play a
more constructive role in easing the crisis and facilitating a long-term solution.
• New Delhi now realises that in a multipolar world, it has to stick to diversifying its options, both
strategic as well as economic. Such strategic autonomy in exercising its choice was evident in how
India identified its interests in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. India now realises the significance of
spreading its interests over the key pillars of West Asian power architecture. Along with such strategic
reasoning for the reset, India also seems to be coming to terms with the need to widen its options to
meet energy needs.

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