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Arroyo v. de Venecia (G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997)
Arroyo v. de Venecia (G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997)
Azcuna, Yorac, Sarmiento, Arroyo & Chua and Rene A.V. Saguisag for
petitioners.
Cesar A. Sevilla & Associates for De Venecia.
SYNOPSIS
In its decision, the Supreme Court finds no ground for holding that
congress committed grave abuse of discretion in enacting Republic Act
8240. It is clear from the facts of the case that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure
of the House rather than the constitutional requirement for the enactment of
a law, that is, Article VI, Section 26-27 of the 1987 Constitution, pertaining to
the existence of the quorum. The established rule is that courts cannot
declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance
with rules of procedure made by itself. Verily, it follows that the case at hand
does not present a situation in which a branch of the government has gone
beyond the constitutional limit of its jurisdiction so as to call for the exercise
of Article VIII, Section I.
Moreover, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of House No.
7198 by speaker of the House and President of the Senate and certification
by secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November
21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. In view of the foregoing, the
petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed.
SYLLABUS
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT;
PARLIAMENTARY RULES ARE MERELY PROCEDURAL AND COURTS HAVE NO
CONCERN WITH THEIR OBSERVANCE; FAILURE TO CONFORM THEREWITH
WILL NOT INVALIDATE ACTION WHEN THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF MEMBERS
HAVE AGREED THERETO. — Cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that,
in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in
the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun , it was
held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conform to parliamentary
usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.'"
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULES MUST NOT IGNORE CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTRAINTS OR VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. — In United States v.
Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers
each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules
ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But
within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination
of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other
way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to
the validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for
a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once exercised is
exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the
House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the
challenge of any other body or tribunal."CIHAED
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In this case no rights of
private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We
have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no
violation of constitutional provisions is shown. Petitioners must realize that
each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere
which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on
which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our
system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our
part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the
House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; CANNOT DECLARE AN ACT OF
LEGISLATURE VOID FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS OWN RULES OF
PROCEDURE. — If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an
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act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a
situation in which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our
Art. VIII, §1 power.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES; THERE IS NO RULE REQUIRING THAT THE CHAIR MUST
RESTATE THE MOTION AND CONDUCT A VIVA VOCE OR NOMINAL VOTING. —
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which specifically
requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva
voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General has
pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No.
7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in legislative
practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills which
became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee
report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were approved.
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate and even more just. The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter
for judicial consideration. In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
"this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be
allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a
diagnosis of the problem."
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; NO CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING THAT
THE YEAS AND NAYS OF THE MEMBERS BE TAKEN EVERYTIME A HOUSE HAS
TO VOTE; EXCEPTIONS. — Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas
and the nays of the Members be taken every time a House has to vote,
except only in the following instances: upon the last and third readings of a
bill, at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, and in repassing a
bill over the veto of the President. Indeed, considering the fact that in the
approval of the original bill the votes of the Members by yeas and nays had
already been taken, it would have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARLIAMENTARY RULES; QUESTION REGARDING
MOTION TO APPROVE AND RATIFY CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT, NOT A
QUESTION OF PRIVILEGE ENTITLED TO PRECEDENCE. — Petitioners claim
that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result
of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session. It
would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties
to settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day
Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority
Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following
week, Rep. Arroyo could at least have objected if there was anything he
wanted to say. It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely
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of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House
to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question
as an obstacle to the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not,
in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to
precedence. And even if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an end to any
further consideration of the question.
8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, DEFINED. — The phrase "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to
amount to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in
explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII, §1
extends to cases where "a branch of the government or any of its officials
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously
as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction."
9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES; CONTINUED INTERPELLATION OF SPONSOR, AN
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF PRESENCE OF QUORUM. — Here, the matter
complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with
which the Court should not be concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that
there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be
raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum is obviously present — for
the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in
effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.
10. ID.; ID.; ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE; SIGNING OF HOUSE BILL BY
THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE AND PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND
CERTIFICATION BY THE SECRETARIES OF BOTH HOUSES, CONCLUSIVE OF ITS
DUE ENACTMENT. — Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No.
7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate and the
certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was
passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusive of its due enactment. The
enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with
approval by text writers here and abroad. The enrolled bill rule rests on the
following considerations: . . . As the President has no authority to approve a
bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary
of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the
United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the
duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress.
The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
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judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so
authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution. To overrule the doctrine
now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases
and overthrow an established rule of evidence.
11. ID.; ID.; JOURNAL; CONCLUSIVE WITH RESPECT TO MATTERS
THAT ARE REQUIRED BY THE CONSTI TUTION TO BE RECORDED THEREIN. —
The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are
required by the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other
matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also
been accorded conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons , this Court
spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public
memorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public,
because all are required to conform to them; they should be permanent, that
rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law
shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts
resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill which
became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has
been duly proven.
12. ID.; SUPREME COURT; WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO SET ASIDE
LEGISLATIVE ACTION AS VOID BECAUSE THE COURT THINKS THE HOUSE
DISREGARDED ITS OWN RULES. — It would be an unwarranted invasion of
the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has
disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can
find their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested
with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of
legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and would
itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case may instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or
amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the
Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good
faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather
than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
1. POLITICAL LAW; LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT; ENROLLED BILL
DOCTRINE; APPLICATION MUST BE LIMITED TO MINOR MATTERS RELATING
TO FORM AND FACTUAL ISSUES WHICH DO NOT MATERIALLY ALTER THE
ESSENCE AND SUBSTANCE OF THE LAW. — Reliance on the enrolled bill
theory is not to be discontinued but its application must be limited to minor
matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially
alter the essence and substance of the law itself.
2. ID.; ID.; BILL; INTRODUCTION OF SEVERAL PROVISIONS IN THE
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BICAMERAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE REPORT VIOLATED THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROSCRIPTION AGAINST ANY AMENDMENT UPON THE LAST
READING. — The introduction of several provisions in the Bicameral
Conference Committee Report did not only violate the pertinent House and
Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but
that the Constitutional proscription against any amendment upon the last
reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view of these lapses, I
thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the
Constitution. This the majority, however, disregarded invoking the same
principle which should have justified the Court in questioning the actuations
of the legislative branch.
PUNO; J.; concurring and dissenting opinion:
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
OF CONGRESSIONAL RULES; BOUNDARIES. — In the 1891 case of US. v.
Ballin, (144 US 1 [1891]) the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries
of the power of the judiciary to review congressional rules. Ballin clearly
confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of congressional
rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Ballin was followed in 1932 by the
case of US v. Smith (286 US 6 [1932]). The Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
Brandeis, assumed jurisdiction over the dispute relying on Ballin. It exercised
jurisdiction although "the question primarily at issue relates to the
construction of the applicable rules, not to their constitutionality." Smith, of
course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within the test
spelled out in Ballin. Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v.
United States (338 US 89 [1948]). A majority of the Court, with Mr. Justice
Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the House had
established and whether they have been followed." The US Supreme Court
pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of Yellin v. United States
(374 US 109 [1963]). In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, (369 US 186
[1962]), the US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
appointment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question
doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government order, will not be so applied
as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law
suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
'political' exceeds constitutional authority." THEDCA
DECISION
MENDOZA, J : p
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I
want to know what is the question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There was a motion by the
Majority Leader for approval of the report, and the Chair called for the
motion.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
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Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally
passed by the House of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21,
1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on
November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually four different versions of the
transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of
audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately
after the session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996, which
petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from the operators of the sound
system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of
November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on
November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the
proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified
by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also
obtained by Rep. Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted.
According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in
the audio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in
the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in the transcript certified on
November 21, 1996 the word "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the
other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published version does
not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will
raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents.
However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitioners have
announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they
admit, without conceding, the correctness of the transcripts relied upon by
the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the
word "approved" appears in the transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners'
principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was
passed in violation of the rules of the House; that these rules embody the
"constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may determine
the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House
rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false
and spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII,
§35 and Rule XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting
the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas or
nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation
of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question,
"What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albano's motion to
approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97, 4 the Chair refused to
recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's motion
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and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX,
§§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair suspended the
session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a
point of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query
should have been resolved upon the resumption of the session on November
28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the
adjournment remained upon the resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40
p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia
to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of
a quorum and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the
Speaker of the House that the law had been properly passed, considering
the Court's power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of
discretion by the other departments of the government, and they ask for a
reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , 6 which affirmed the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the
Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In
addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment.
Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers
and the enrolled bill doctrine. They argue that the Court is not the proper
forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no
justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the
Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House of its
rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the
courts except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as
that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed.
At all events, respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents
for approval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were
faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his
certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the
journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of Representatives, covering the
sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano,
there being no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee
Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was approved on December 2,
1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no
ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in
enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have
been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
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enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there
was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the
rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning
the presence of a quorum. cdrep
Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To
begin with, this contention stands the principle on its head. In the decided
cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully,
precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to conduct
its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all
deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a
law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence
of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v. Pendatun , 11 it was held: "At any
rate, courts have declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action
(taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have
agreed to a particular measure.'"
I n United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co. , 12 the rule was stated thus:
"The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate
fundamental rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which
is sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method
are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted . It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House , and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House
shall determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given
to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in
ordinary legislative matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints,
and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority
extends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise of any power , in the
transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred
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upon it by the Constitution ."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court
of Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the
Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to
regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry. It has been decided by
the courts of last resort of many states, and also by the United States
Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for
noncompliance with rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut
declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall
determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers
necessary for a branch of the Legislature of a free and independent state.
Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its
authority. This authority may be abused, but when the House has acted in a
matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of the
independence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such
action as void because it may think that the House has misconstrued or
departed from its own rules of procedure."
I n McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it
appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain
whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own
rules in their procedure upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final
passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no
court has ever declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance
with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respective branches
thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any
such adjudications, we decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The
1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days
before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the
proviso that in case of an emergency the house concerned may, by two-
thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the
district court of violation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed
contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by the
legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not
been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention,
the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature
should read a bill in any particular manner. It may, then, read or
deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit, either in accordance with its own
rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules. The provision
of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the
direction of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It
receives its entire force from legislative sanction, and it exists only at
legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and
consider an act, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner,
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might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature thereto;
but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which
the legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no
reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed
by the governor. The courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by
itself to govern its deliberations . McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50
N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C.
151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those
of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our
government has its separate sphere which the others may not invade
without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order
rests. Due regard for the working of our system of government, more than
mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into
an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline
the invitation to exercise our power.
Second . Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's
sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII,
§1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is
an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case
and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, §5 and, therefore, to the
requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign
relations. For while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry
into areas normally left to the political departments to decide, such as those
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relating to national security, 20 it has not altogether done away with political
questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we
have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's function is merely [to]
check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond
the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different
view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to
exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks
is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the
legislature void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in
which a branch of the government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits
of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII, §1 power.
prcd
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was
"railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the
Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.
What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor
of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair
called out for objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being
none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the
conference committee report had by then already been declared by the
Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the conference committee report should
have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the Members
should have been taken. They say that the method used in this case is a
legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was that
one or some legislators opposed the report.
No rule of the House of Representatives has been cited which
specifically requires that in cases such as this involving approval of a
conference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct
a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hand, as the Solicitor General
has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198 was approved was by no means a unique one. It has basis in
legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the
bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference
committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code were
approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of
the House. The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino
and his answer became the ruling of the Chair. Mr. Tolentino said:
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Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is
concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years
ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if somebody
objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will
respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill
has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine
claims that the three-fourths vote needed to pass a proposed amendment to
the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts." 39 This Court
quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following excerpt which embodies
good, if old-fashioned democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous
desire to check at any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have
set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost
made them a second and higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong
direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an inefficient
Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary
to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution;
but to represent ourselves with competent, careful, and honest
legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may come to
reflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled
bill sent to the President contained provisions which had been
"surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been observed have no more basis than
another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously"
inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline
the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect
due the other two departments of our government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI, §26(2) of the Constitution that
"upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42
Separate Opinions
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I
am not backtracking from the dissent which I expressed in Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance . 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate,
the vote which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied
abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firm stance in Tolentino.
The landmark case of Tolentino, just like the one under consideration,
involved a similar challenge to the constitutionality of a significant tax
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measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive
and procedural, were posed by petitioners, each of which was discussed by
the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who, incidentally, is
also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did
not entirely disagree with each and every argument of the opinion, most
especially those touching upon substantive issues. My main objection in
Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a
substantial breach and disregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional
requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in the passage of a bill
which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by
hiding under the cloak of the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the
Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative rules
allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited
blind adherence to otherwise sound principles of law which did not, however,
fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence, I objected, not so much
because I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they
were applied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for their
application. cdtai
When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled
bill theory, I was very careful to emphasize that reliance thereon is not to be
discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor matters
relating more to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the
essence and substance of the law itself. Thus:
"As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or
not the procedural irregularities that attended the passage of House
Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading and
printing requirements which were exempted by the Presidential
certification, may no longer be impugned, having been 'saved' by the
conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why
we cannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with
respect to matters pertaining to the procedure followed in the
enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment,
printing errors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively
minor matters relating more to form and factual issues which do not
materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself .
Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural
legitimacy, since constitutional rules on legislative procedure are easily
mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts — whether or not the bill
had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever — not over the
meaning of the constitution. Legislators, as eyewitnesses, are in a
better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also
made that legislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative
procedure.
Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to
substantive changes in a bill introduced towards the end of its tortuous
trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public
unawares and altering the same beyond recognition even by its
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sponsors.
This issue I wish to address forthwith." 4
As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of internal legislative rules, both the majority and I were
actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's
review power in respect of internal procedures in this wise:
"I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the
Constitution which provides that '(j)udicial power includes the duty of
the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.' We are
also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal
procedures of its coordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution." 5
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining
the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may
of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages
or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any
matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the question is only
one of power. The Constitution empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should be a
reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceedings
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the
determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the rule to say
that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more
just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make
rules is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous
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power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other
body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity of
congressional rules, i.e., whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was
examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental
right; and (3) its method has a reasonable relationship with the result sought
to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction
to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers.
Ballin was followed in 1932 by the case of US v. Smith. 3 I n Smith, the
meaning of sections 3 and 4 of Rule XXXVIII of the US Senate was in issue,
viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
Smith, of course, involves the right of a third person and its ruling falls within
the test spelled out in Ballin.
Smith was followed by the 1948 case of Christoffel v. United States. 4
Christoffel testified before the Committee on Education and Labor of the
House of Representatives. He denied he was a communist and was charged
with perjury in the regular court. He adduced evidence during the trial that
the committee had no quorum when the perjurious statement was given.
Nonetheless, he was convicted in view of the judge's charge to the members
of the jury that to find Christoffel guilty, they had to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that —
"xxx xxx xxx
Christoffel objected to the charge on the ground that it allowed the jury
to assume there was a continuous quorum simply because it was present at
the start of the meeting of the Committee. Under the House rules, a quorum
once established is presumed to continue until the lack of quorum is raised.
Again, the court assumed jurisdiction over the case. A majority of the Court,
with Mr. Justice Murphy, as ponente, defined the issue as "what rules the
House had established and whether they have been followed." It held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Congressional practice in the transaction of ordinary legislative
business is of course none of our concern, and by the same token the
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considerations which may lead Congress as a matter of legislative
practice to treat as valid the conduct of its committees do not control
the issue before us. The question is neither what rules Congress may
establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of
continuity may protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The
question is rather what rules the House has established and whether
they have been followed. It of course has the power to define what
tribunal is competent to exact testimony and the conditions that
establish its competency to do so. The heart of this case is that by the
charge that was given it the jury was allowed to assume that the
conditions of competency were satisfied even though the basis in fact
was not established and in face of a possible finding that the facts
contradicted the assumption. llcd
The minority complained that the "House has adopted the rule and
practice that a quorum once established is presumed to continue unless and
until a point of no quorum is raised. By this decision, the Court, in effect,
invalidates that rule . . ." The minority view commanded only the vote of
three (3) justices.
The US Supreme Court pursued the same line in 1963 in deciding the case of
Yellin v . United States. 5 Yellin was indicted on five counts of willfully
refusing to answer questions put to him by a sub-committee of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities. He was convicted by the District Court
of contempt of Congress on four counts. The conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit. On certiorari, he assailed his conviction
on the ground that the Committee illegally denied his request to be heard in
executive session . He alleged there was a violation of Committee Rule IV
which provides that "if a majority of the Committee or sub-committee, duly
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appointed as provided by the rules of the House of Representatives, believes
that the interrogation of a witness in a public hearing might endanger
national security or unjustly injure his reputation, or the reputation of other
individuals, the Committee shall interrogate such witness in an executive
session for the purpose of determining the necessity or admissibility of
conducting such interrogation thereafter in a public hearing." In a 5-4
decision, the Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Warren, held:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Yellin should be permitted the same opportunity for judicial
review when he discovers at trial that his rights have been violated.
This is especially so when the Committee's practice leads witnesses to
misplaced reliance upon its rules. When reading a copy of the
Committee's rules, which must be distributed to every witness under
Rule XVII, the witness' reasonable expectation is that the Committee
actually does what it purports to do, adhere to its own rules. To
foreclose a defense based upon those rules, simply because the
witness was deceived by the Committee's appearance of regularity, is
not fair. The Committee prepared the groundwork for prosecution in
Yellin's case meticulously. It is not too exacting to require that the
Committee be equally meticulous in obeying its own rules."
It additionally bears stressing that in the United States, the judiciary has
pruned the "political thicket." In the benchmark case of Baker v. Carr, 6 the
US Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction to hear a petition for re-
apportionment of the Tennessee legislature ruling that "the political question
doctrine, a tool for maintenance of government order, will not be so applied
as to promote only disorder" and that "the courts cannot reject as 'no law
suit,' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
'political' exceeds constitutional authority."
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for courts to
categorically reject the political question defense when its interposition will
cover up abuse of power. For section 1, Article VIII of our Constitution was
intentionally cobbled to empower courts ". . . to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."
This power is new and was not granted to our courts in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions n . It was not also xeroxed from the US Constitution or any
foreign state constitution. The CONCOM granted this enormous power to our
courts in view of our experience under martial law where abusive exercises
of state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse of the
political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and sharpened the checking powers of
the judiciary vis-a-vis the Executive and the Legislative departments of
government. In cases involving the proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus, it is now beyond dubiety that
the government can no longer invoke the political question defense. Section
18 of Article VII completely eliminated this defense when it provided:
"xxx xxx xxx
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"The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding
filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ or the extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
The CONCOM did not only outlaw the use of the political question
defense in national security cases. To a great degree, it diminished its use as
a shield to protect other abuses of government by allowing courts to
penetrate the shield with the new power to review acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government ". . . to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction." In Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance , 7 I posited the following
postulates:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Former Chief Justice Roberto R . Concepcion, the sponsor of this
provision in the Constitutional Commission explained the sense and the
reach of judicial power as follows:
'xxx xxx xxx
VITUG, J ., concurring:
When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of
judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII, of the Constitution, the
determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of government , the Supreme Court,
upon which that great burden has been imposed, could not have been
thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility
of overseeing the entire bureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has
long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and confined to, a capricious
and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of
grave abuse of discretion, like the patent disregard of a Constitutional
proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose
province the specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To
do otherwise would be an unwarranted intrusion into the internal affairs of a
co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it
would seem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental
law to cause a substantial deviation, let alone departure, from the time-
honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the
three branches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between
the old rule and the new Charter on the understanding of the term "judicial
power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, and to
undertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political
questions provided, however, that grave abuse of discretion — the sole test
of justiciability on purely political issues — is shown to have attended the
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contested act.
All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs.
Secretary of Finance and companion cases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA
630) and vote to deny the instant petition. cdtai
Footnotes
1. JOURNAL No. 39, pp. 66, 68; Rollo , pp. 210, 212; Transcript of November 21,
1996 session, pp. 39-52; Rollo , pp. 368-381; Petition, p. 6. par. 10; Rollo , p. 8.
2. Rule VIII. §35. Voting. — Every member present in the session shall vote
on every question put unless he inhibits himself on account of personal
pecuniary interest therein.
Rule XVII. §103. Manner of Voting. — The Speaker shall rise to put a
question saying "As many as are in favor of (as the question may be), say
Aye" and, after the affirmative vote is counted, "As many as are opposed, say
Nay . . ."
3. Rule XIX. §112. Reading and Withdrawal of Motions . — The Speaker shall
state the motion or, if in writing, shall cause it to be read by the Secretary
General before being debated. A motion may be withdrawn any time before
its approval.
4. Rule XVI. §97. Recognition of Member. — When two or more members
rise at the same time, the Speaker shall recognize the Member who is to
speak first.
5. Rule XX. §121. Definition. — Questions of privilege are those affecting the
duties, conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or reputation of the
House or of its members, collectively or individually.
45. Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672, 36 L.Ed. 294, 303
(1891).
46. The following are required to be entered on the Journal: (1) The yeas and
nays on the third and final reading of a bill (Art. VI, §26(2)); (2) the yeas and
nays on any question, at the request of one-fifth of the members present (Id.,
§16(4)); (3) the yeas and nays upon repassing a bill over the President's veto
(Id., §27(1); and (4) the President's objection to a bill which he has vetoed.
(Id.)
47. 34 Phil. 729, 735 (1916), quoting State ex rel. Herron v. Smith, 44 Ohio 348
(1886).
48. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 529.
49. Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Com'n., 675 F.2d 1282.
ROMERO, J ., concurring:
1. 235 SCRA 630.
2. Id., at p. 672: "Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Republic Act No. 7716 must be resolved in its favor. Our cases
manifest firm adherence to the rule that an enrolled copy of a bill is
conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment. Not even
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claims that a proposed constitutional amendment was invalid because the
requisite votes for its approval had not been obtained or that certain
provisions of a state had been 'smuggled' in the printing of the bill have
moved or persuaded us to look behind the proceedings of a coequal branch
of the government. There is no reason now to depart from this rule.
No claim is here made that the 'enrolled bill' rule is absolute. In fact in one
case we 'went behind' an enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to determine
whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate in
view of the fact that the President of the Senate himself, who had signed the
enrolled bill, admitted a mistake and withdrew his signature, so that in effect
there was no longer an enrolled bill to consider.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of
bills have not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that
the Conference Committee 'surreptitiously' inserted provisions into a bill
which it had prepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the 'enrolled bill' rule in such cases
would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
government."
3. Id., at p. 675: "Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for the
enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary, as we have already
ruled, 'parliamentary rules are merely procedural and with their observance
the courts have no concern.' Our concern is with the procedural requirements
of the Constitution for the enactment of laws. As far as these requirements
are concerned, we are satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in
these cases."
4. Id., pp. 778-779; emphasis supplied.
5. Id., p. 780; emphasis supplied; compare to note 3, supra.
PUNO, J ., concurring and dissenting:
1. 144 US 1 (1891).
2. The case involved the validity of a law which allegedly was passed in
violation of House Rule XV which provided that members present in the
chamber but not voting would be "counted and announced in determining
the presence of a quorum to do business."
3. 286 US 6 (1932).
4. 338 US 89 (1948).
5. 374 US 109 (1963).
6. 369 US 186 (1962); see also Bond vs. Floyd, 385 US 116 (1966).
7. 235 SCRA 630.
8. Supra.
9. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Rev. ed., p. 624.
10. Price v. Moundsville, 64 Am. St. Rep. 878, 879; 43 W. Virginia 523 [1897].
11. Carr v. Coke, 47 Am. St. Rep. 801, 803 [1895]; see also Note on ex rel.
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Reed v. Jones , 23 L.R.A. 211 [1893]. The rule of conclusiveness is similar to
the common law rule of the inviolability of the Sheriff's return. The Sheriff is
considered as an officer of the King just as a parliamentary act is deemed as
a regal act and no official can dispute the King's word. Dallas, Sutherland
Statutes and Statutory Construction, Vol. 1, 4th ed., pp. 408-418 (1972).
16. 50 Am. Jur. Statutes, S. 150 (1938) 4 J. Wigmore Evidence, S. 1350 (3rd ed.
1940)
17. 63 Miss 512 (1886).
18. Op cit, pp. 729-732 (1994).