Case digest (Due Process and Equal Protection)

Summary Dismissal v Torcita, 330 SCRA 153

Facts:

 Twelve administrative complaints were filed against respondent against C/Insp. Lazaro Torcita
“for conduct of unbecoming of a police officer.”
Republic Act 6975 as implemented by Memorandum Circular 92-006 of the National
Police Commission under Rule II Section 3, Paragraph C, committed thru a series of
illegal acts consisting of Grave Threats, Illegal Search, Abuse of Authority, violation of
Domicile and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban
 The petitioners of the said case alleged that after attending the birthday party of Miss Jessie
Vasquez Alex Edwin del Rosario, together with Rosita Bistal, Carmen Braganza and Cristita Dawa
boarded Mazda pick up driven by Reynaldo Consejo, proceeded towards the direction of Cadiz
City.
 While nearing Crossing Cadiz in the vicinity of Sitio Puting Tubig, the aforementioned Mazda
pick-up driven by Consejo overtook a red Cortina Ford driven by Major Lazaro Torcita;
 That Major Lazaro Torcita signaled the passengers of the Mazda pick-up to stop, however, the
driver of the Mazda pick-up refused to abide by the signal and instead accelerated and
proceeded to Hda. Aimee (sugar can plantation in Cadiz City) without stopping.
 The complainants alleged that Major Torcita approached and entered the compound of Hda.
Aimee, very drunk, with back-up vehicle full of armed policemen, confronted Jesus H. Puey and
Alex Edwin del Rosario as who stopped him at the gate, shouting in a very, very loud voice,
invectives and remarks. That such act of Major Lazaro Torcita constitute Conduct Unbecoming of
an Officer not worth of respect;
 In his answer, the respondent, Lazaro R. Torcita, while admitting that he entered the premises of
the complainants, the same was done on a regular, lawful and proper way for he was in the
performance of his official duties in pursuing the suspect who committed a crime in his
presence; According to Torcita, a vehicular collision almost took place due to reckless driving of
the driver of the mazda pick-up; that it was the duty inherent to the position as Chief of Police of
Cadiz City and as deputy of the Land Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulation
to prevent chaos and accidents in roads and highways of the country.
 This observation is further bolstered by the testimony of Reynaldo Consejo, the driver of the
mazda pick-up, that he was able to overtake the red Cortina Ford only after the latter car hit the
shoulder of the road and after overtaking he increased his speed.
 Further, Alex Edwin del Rosario testified that upon reaching Hda. Aimee, he instructed the guard
to be on look-out for a car might be following them and might enter the compound .This
conduct would show that witness is anticipating that red Cortina Ford would follow them
because of the incident in Sitio Puting Tubig which could have ended in a vehicular collision.
Further, no proof was presented to show that no other reason exist as to why C/Insp. Torcita
would pursue the Mazda pick up other than near occurrence of a vehicular collision;
 in the Joint-Affidavit of Rosita Bistal and Reynaldo Consejo, Bistal attempted to establish the fact
that C/Insp. Torcita and PO2 Java illegally entered the gate of the compound but were stopped
 by the guards armed with cane stick or batuta, however in her testimony given during the
hearing she stated that she did not know what transpired between the two men approaching
and the guards near the gate because she, together with her companions, were busy unloading
kitchen utensil from the pick-up to the kitchen and Consejo categorically stated that this portion
of their affidavit, is NOT TRUE; Alex Edwin del Rosario, in his testimony given in the hearing,
corroborated this fact that he also did not see or hear what happened for he was in some
distance away and he cannot see them clearly .
 The only piece of evidence presented in connection with the incident which happened near the
gate of the compound is the affidavit of C/Insp. Torcita and his testimony given in the hearing of
the case that when he was walking towards the compound together with his aide, PO2 Nehru
Java, two armed civilian guards stopped and threatened him; He identified himself however, the
same had no effect, and PO2 Java whispered that there are armed men around them and that it
is dangerous for them to continue. That at this point, they radioed for back-up; Since no proof to
the contrary was presented by the Complainant nor was there any witness or witnesses
presented to rebut this allegations, the Board had no other choice except to consider these
allegations as proof. The Board also resolve to take note that a metropolitan newspaper with
nationwide circulation and with unquestionable credential, had published a news item about
the presence of armed security personnel of Congressman Manuel Puey. This evidence give
more credence to the fact that there were really armed men in the premises where the
aforementioned incident happened; That this is corroborated further by the affidavit of PO2
Nehru Java.
 Chief Insp. Lazaro Torcita does not deny having taken alcoholic drink; However, not to the point
of drunkness; The Board is more inclined to believe this allegation for no sane person will risks
the life of a member of his family by deliberately driving when he is mentally and physically
incapable; Further, C/Insp. Torcita was able to drive from Victorias to Cadiz City, a distance of
forty kilometers, on a dark night and raining and was able to avoid collision of the vehicles.
 Further, at the time Chief Inspector Torcita entered the compound he was fully aware of the
presence of armed men and reacted to this by exercising prudence while approaching the
compound of Hda. Aimee; The foregoing facts would show that C/Insp. Torcita was in full
command of his senses and was not affected by the numbing effect of alcohol for a drunk
person does not show any caution and behaves irrationaly."
 The Board did not find sufficient evidence to establish that Torcita threatened anybody with a
gun, nor that a serious confrontation took place between the parties. The Board also found that
there was no sufficient evidence that the urinating incident took place, and held that the
charges of violation of domicile and illegal search were not proven. The Board found that Lazaro
Torcita was "in the performance of his official duties when the incident happened; however, he
committed a breach of internal discipline by taking alcoholic drinks while in the performance of
same. The Complaint for CONDUCT UNBECOMING OF A POLICE OFFICER was dismissed.
However, the board found C/Insp. Lazaro to have committed SIMPLE IRREGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF DUTY and is hereby ordered suspended for 20 days and forfeiture of salary
for the same period.
 C/Insp. Torcita filed a petition for certiorari in the regional trial court of Iloilo City, Branch 31,
questioning the legality of the conviction of an offense for which he was not charged, "which
conviction is a nullity because of the lack of procedural due process of law."
Issue: Whether or not the conviction of C/Insp. Toricita for Simple Irregularity in the performance of
duty is null because of the lack of procedural due process of law.

Ruling:

It is glaringly apparent from a reading of the titles of the twelve administrative cases filed against C/Insp.
Torcita, earlier quoted, that none of the charges or offenses mentioned or made reference to the
specific act of being drunk while in the performance of official duty. The records do not bear out the
specific acts or conduct constituting the charge/offense in the twelve cases which were consolidated at
the pre-hearing conference into a single case of "Conduct Unbecoming of a Police Officer." Notably,
there is no indication or warning at all in the summary dismissal proceedings that C/Insp. Torcita was
also being charged with breach of internal discipline consisting of taking alcoholic drinks while in the
performance of his duties

The omission is fatal to the validity of the judgment finding him guilty of the offense for which he was
not notified nor charged. Summary dismissal proceedings are governed by specific requirements of
notification of the charges together with copies of affidavits and other attachments supporting the
complaints, and the filing of an answer, together with supporting documents. It is true that consistent
with its summary nature, the duration of the hearing is limited, and the manner of conducting the
hearing is summary, in that sworn statements may take the place of oral testimonies of witnesses, cross-
examination is confined only to material and relevant matters, and prolonged arguments and dilatory
proceedings shall not be entertained. However, notification of the charges contemplates that
respondent be informed of the specific charges against him. Torcita was entitled to know that he was
being charged with being drunk while in the performance of duty, so that he could traverse the
accusation squarely and adduce evidence in his defense. Although he was given an opportunity to be
heard on the multiple and broad charges initially filed against him, the absence of specification of the
offense for which he was eventually found guilty is not a proper observance of due process. There can
be no short-cut to the legal process

It is a requirement of due process that the parties be informed of how the litigation was decided with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the Court. The cursory
conclusion of the Dismissal Board that Torcita "committed breach of internal discipline by taking drinks
while in the performance of same" should have been substantiated by factual findings referring to this
particular offense. As it turned out, the dismissal Board believed his allegation that he was not drunk
and found that he was in full command of his senses where he tried to apprehend the driver of the
maroon Mazda pick-up. Although Torcita did not deny that he had taken a shot of alcoholic drink at the
party which he attended before the incident, the records show that he was then off-duty and the party
was at the Municipality of Victorias, which was outside of his area of police jurisdiction. On the other
hand, the hot pursuit incident occurred while he was on in his way home to Cadiz City with the
members of his family. As observed by the Dismissal Board itself, the hot pursuit was motivated by
the duty "inherent to the position as Chief of Police of Cadiz City and as Deputy of the Land
Transportation Office to enforce traffic rules and regulations, to prevent chaos and accidents in roads
and highway
ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA 644: Hazing case. Academic freedom

Facts

 As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School,
held its initiation rites for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation
rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H. Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious
physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital. He was not the lone victim, though, for another
freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized for acute renal failure.
 In a notice, Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours
on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa.
 Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within
twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the
written notice, they failed to file a reply.
 In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. Through their respective
counsels, they requested copies of the charges and pertinent documents or affidavits.
 The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against
respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline."
 Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or
before February 18, 1991; otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to
present their defenses
 Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan,
Justice Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to
hear the charges against respondent students.
 In a letter, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on
Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. It also ordered respondent students to file
their written answers to the above charge on or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would
be deemed to have waived their defenses.
 Respondent students, through counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held in
abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence against them.
 Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on
February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer with regard to the charges filed by the investigating
committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to a petitioners dated February 27,
1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991
to March 1, 1991.
 Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory
questions. They were also informed that:
a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down in the
case of Guzman vs. National University;
b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;
c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in accordance with
the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina, Senate Bill No. 3815;
 d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the petitioners in
the alleged hazing incident in imposing the penalty;
e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the University, i. e.,
Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.
 In a resolution, the Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo
Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
 The Board found that respondent students acted as master auxiliaries or "auxies" during the
initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to
participate in the physical hazing.
 Their guilt was heightened by the fact that they made no effort to prevent the infliction of
further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The Board considered
respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board
pronounced respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through
acquiescence.
 However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of
dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration.
Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left
to the President of the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not.
 Consequently, in a resolution, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de
Manila University, accepted the factual findings of the Board. Accordingly, he imposed the
penalty of dismissal on all respondent students.
 In a resolution and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, the Board excluded respondent
students Abas and Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch
as at the time the latter resolution was promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case
to the Board.
 On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction alleging that they were currently enrolled as students for the second
semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would
be prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged
lack of due process in their dismissal. On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary
restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent students and stopping
the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident.
 Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then held. On
April 7, 1991, the temporary restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed.
Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo
created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon
Ereñeta to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.
 Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional respondents
to the original petition.
 Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the Special
Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process in the
 conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent students; that a
supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the
supplemental petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend
the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day lifetime.
 Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order, Judge Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge Capulong, granted
respondent students' prayer. Respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent
students. Simultaneously, the court ordered petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu
of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take.On the same
date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed
the dropping of their names from its roll of student
 The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary
injunction upon posting by respondents of a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of
P50,000.00.
 Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of
respondent judge

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that
respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of the charges against them.

Ruling:
We are constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the
contrary, respondent students' rights in a school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of
Guzman v. National University,22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C. Branch23 and Non v. Dames II24 have been
meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held before they were
expelled.

Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang Tibay case and not
the Guzman case which is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the
requirements of due process, the Guzman case is more apropos to the instant case, since the latter
deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary
sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance
of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall
have the right to adduce(bring forward) evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence
must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school
authorities to hear and decide the case.

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death
of Leonardo Villa, petitioner Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and
required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to submit within twenty-four hours their written
statement on the incident, the records show that instead of filing a reply, respondent students
requested through their counsel, copies of the charges.While of the students mentioned in the
February 11, 1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter
were granted an extension of up to February 18, 1991 to file their statements

Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices
dated February 14 and 20, 1991.30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule
No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed
individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11, February 14 and 20
clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their
behalf and to answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the
Joint Administration Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and
Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to
see and examine the written statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991
order, they were denied procedural due process.31 Granting that they were denied such opportunity, the
same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary cases involving
students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding
conducted to investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the
attributes of a judicial proceeding

Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is
far from the truth because the February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after
receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witnesses. Similarly, the
Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2, 1991
wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions

With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining the
word "hazing" and allege that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo
Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who
aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be overemphasized that the charge filed before the
Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a
criminal case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. As
such, it is not subject to the rigorous requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to
the specification of the charge involved. As we have had occasion to declare in previous cases a similar
nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and hearings
identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice.34 Accordingly, disciplinary
charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint.
Having given prior notice to the students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School
Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill No. 3815, the proposed bill on the subject of
Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said.
Domingo v Sheer 421 SCRA 468: Deportation

Facts:

 Respondent Herbert Scheer, a native of Germany, was a frequent visitor of the Philippines. On
1986, his application for permanent resident status was granted.
 During his sojourn in the Philippines, the respondent married widowed Edith delos Reyes with
whom he had two daughters. They had a son, Herbert Scheer, Jr., but he passed away. They
resided in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, where the respondent established and managed the
Bavaria Restaurant. He was even appointed Confidential Agent by the NBI.
 In a Letter, Vice Consul Jutta Hippelein informed the Philippine Ambassador to Bonn, Germany,
that the respondent had police records and financial liabilities in Germany
 The Department of Foreign Affairs received from the German Embassy in Manila that the
respondent was wanted by the German Federal Police; that a warrant of arrest had been
issued against him; and that the respondent will be served with an official document
requesting him to turn over his German passport to the Embassy which was invalidated on July
2, 1995
 The BOC (Board of Commissioners) of BID thereafter issued a Summary Deportation Order
dated September 27, 1997.
 In issuing the said order, the BOC relied on the correspondence from the German Vice Consul on
its speculation that it was unlikely that the German Embassy will issue a new passport to the
respondent; on the warrant of arrest issued by the District Court of Germany against the
respondent for insurance fraud; and on the alleged illegal activities of the respondent in
Palawan.The BOC concluded that the respondent was not only an undocumented but an
undesirable alien as well.
 When the respondent was apprised of the deportation order, he forthwith aired his side to then
BID Commissioner Leandro T. Verceles. The Commissioner allowed the respondent to remain in
the Philippines, giving the latter time to secure a clearance and a new passport from the German
Embassy. Nonetheless, the respondent, through counsel, filed on December 5, 1995 an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC.
 In his motion, the respondent alleged, inter alia, that:
1. The elementary rules of due process require notice and opportunity to be heard
before a person can be lawfully deprived of his right. In the instant case, although it is
acknowledged that the Honorable Office may conduct summary deportation
proceedings, respondent was not given notice and opportunity to be heard before said
Summary Deportation Order was issued. Respondent’s right to procedural due process
was therefore violated. Consequently, the Summary Deportation Order is invalid.
 However, the BOC did not resolve the respondent’s motion. The respondent was neither
arrested nor deported.
 Meanwhile, on February 15, 1996, the District Court of Straubing rendered a Decision
dismissing the criminal case against the respondent for physical injuries.The German Embassy
in Manila, thereafter, issued a temporary passport to the respondent.
 In a Letter dated March 1, 1996, the respondent informed Commissioner Verceles that his
passport had been renewed following the dismissal of the said criminal case. He reiterated his
request for the cancellation of the Summary Deportation Order dated September 27, 1995 and
 the restoration of his permanent resident status.Subsequently, on March 12, 1996, the German
Embassy issued to the respondent a regular passport, to expire on March 11, 2006.
 The BOC still failed to resolve the respondent’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.
Commissioner Verceles did not respond to the respondent’s March 1, 1996 Letter. The
respondent remained in the Philippines and maintained his business in Palawan. On March 20,
1997, the Department of Labor and Employment approved his application for Alien Employment
Registration Certificate as manager of the Bavaria Restaurant in Puerto Princesa City.
 In the meantime, petitioner Immigration Commissioner Andrea T. Domingo assumed office. She
wrote the German Embassy and inquired if the respondent was wanted by the German police.
On April 12, 2002, the German Embassy replied that the respondent was not so wanted. At
about midnight on June 6, 2002, Marine operatives and BID agents apprehended the
respondent in his residence on orders of the petitioner.
 Shocked at the sudden turn of events, the respondent promptly communicated with his lawyer.
The latter filed with the BID a motion for bail to secure the respondent’s temporary liberty.
 The respondent (petitioner therein) alleged, inter alia, that his arrest and detention were
premature, unjust, wrongful, illegal and unconstitutional, effected without sufficient cause and
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. He asserted that there was no speedy
remedy open to him in the ordinary course of law24 and that his Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the Summary Deportation Order of the BOC had not yet been resolved
despite the lapse of more than six years
 The BOC ruled that its September 27, 1995 Order had become final and executory after the
lapse of one year.
 The Puerto Princesa City Philippine National Police (PNP) also issued a certification that the
respondent had no pending criminal or derogatory records in the said office
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that the State had no opposition to the
respondent’s re-entry and stay in the Philippines, provided that he leave the country first and
re-apply for admission and residency status with the assurance that he would be re-admitted.

Issue: Did the petitioner violate the respondent’s right to due process when she arrested the
respondent in his house and his subsequent detention?

Ruling:

The arrest of the respondent in his house, at near midnight, and his subsequent detention was
premature, unwarranted and arbitrary. Like a thunderbolt in the sky, the BID agents and marines
arrested the respondent on June 6, 2002, on orders of the petitioner based on the September 27,
1995 Summary Deportation Order. Under the basic rudiments of fair play and due process, the
petitioner was required to first resolve the respondent’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the
said Order, which was filed more than six years before or on December 5, 1995.

The BOC should have set the respondent’s motion for hearing to afford him a chance to be heard
and adduce evidence in support thereon. It was bad enough that the BOC issued its Summary
Deportation Order without a hearing; the BOC dealt the respondent a more severe blow when it
refused to resolve his motion for reconsideration before causing his arrest on June 6, 2002.
 The BOC issued its Summary Deportation Order without affording the respondent the right to be
heard on his motion and adduce evidence thereon. It merely concluded that the respondent was
involved in "illegal activities in Palawan." What made matters worse was that the BOC indulged in
sheer speculation, that the German Embassy is unlikely to issue a new passport to the respondent.
The deportation of aliens should not be based on mere speculation or a mere product of
procrastinations as in this case. As it turned out, the German Embassy re-issued the respondent’s
passport; he was issued a temporary passport, and, thereafter, a regular passport, yet to expire on
March 12, 2006.

Barroso v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 253253, April 27, 2021

What is the act being complained?

Victor M. Barroso was held solidarily liable with Ms. Mag-Abo for their negligence in providing
security escort and service vehicle during the time when the cash for the payment of salaries of BSU
employees was stolen.

The ruling surprised petitioner, considering he was never a party to the case and was never even
furnished copy of Torres' affidavit. In the affidavit for motion for reconsideration filed by Mag-Abo
before the COA, it was stated that that Mag-abo requested for a security escort and vehicle from her
supervisor, but none were provided. The COA Proper found that petitioner failed to exercise the
diligence expected of a good father since he did not adopt precautionary measures to safeguard
the funds of BSU.

Thus, petitioner filed his own motion for reconsideration, invoking his right to due process and
questioning the basis of his supposed liability.

The COA Proper denied petitioner's motion. It ruled that petitioner was not deprived of his right to
due process. For although he was not impleaded in the proceedings below, he was able to file a
motion for reconsideration anyway right after he was found solidarily liable with Mag-abo and
Gregory

Issue: Petitioner now argues that the COA Proper acted with grave abuse of discretion when it found
him solidarily liable to return the stolen amount without observing his right to due process of law, and
despite the insufficiency of evidence to establish negligence on his part.

What was being challenged concerning the due process of law?

The proceedings before the COA was against Mag-abo. He was never made a party thereto
until it reached the COA Proper and only on reconsideration.

The basis of the COA Proper for finding him liable was the Affidavit dated March 2014 of Torres
which he was never furnished a copy of. Thus, although he was able to file a motion for
reconsideration before the COA Proper, he cannot be deemed to have exercised it in a
meaningful way as he had no opportunity to scrutinize the evidence against him

Ruling

Petitioner's right to administrative due process was violated. Here, petitioner claims that he was
denied the opportunity to be heard since he was only included as a party towards the end of the
 proceedings before the COA, after the COA Proper denied Mag-abo's motion for
reconsideration. More, he was never furnished a copy of Torres' Affidavit dated March 2014
which was allegedly the basis of the adverse ruling against him

On the other hand, the OSG invokes Ledesma v. Court of Appeals33 wherein the Court
pronounced that the essence of due process is simply to be heard or an opportunity to explain
one's side, including the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of an action or ruling.

However, the court ruled that while they have ruled in the past that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration cures the defect in procedural due process because the process of
reconsideration is itself an opportunity to be heard, this ruling does not embody an absolute
rule that applies in all circumstances. The mere filing of a motion for reconsideration cannot
cure the due process defect, especially if the motion was filed precisely to raise the issue of
violation of the right to due process and the lack of opportunity to be heard on the merits
remained.

In other words, if a person has not been given the opportunity to squarely and intelligently
answer the accusations or rebut the evidence presented against him, or raise substantive
defenses through the proper pleadings before a quasi-judicial body (like the COA) where he or
she stands charged, then a due process problem exists

Professional Regulation Commission v. Alo, G.R. No. 214435

What is the act being complained?

Respondent Dayamon Didato Alo (Alo) was formally charged with unprofessional conduct
and/or dishonorable conduct before the Board for Professional Teachers (Board), which
operates under petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), for using fraud or deceit
in obtaining a certificate of registration and professional license

You used a falsified Board Resolution No. 671 dated September 28, 2000 when you
registered as a professional teacher on September 14, 2007. The original Board
Resolution No. 671 dated September 28, 2000 does not contain your name as among
those who will be registered as professional teachers without examination either in the
elementary level or in the secondary level.

Alo allegedly went to the PRC Head Office in Manila to apply for a Professional Teacher's License
based on Section 26 (C) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7836.RA 7836, under certain conditions, grants
a certificate of registration and professional license to qualified applicants without need for
examination.

Alo maintained that there was no iota of proof that she used the alleged falsified Board
Resolution No. 671 in obtaining her certificate of registration and professional license. She
claimed that she never knew of the existence of such board resolution, and that it was the first
time she heard about it.
 Moreover, Alo argued that she already enjoyed security of tenure pursuant to Section 5 of RA
4670,16 otherwise known as "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers," which provided that
"teachers appointed on a provisional status for lack of necessary civil service eligibility shall be
extended permanent appointment for the position he is holding after having rendered at least
ten years of continuous, efficient and faithful service in such position

The board rendered a decision against Alo GUILTY as charged and accordingly REVOKES her
certificate of registration and license as professional teacher.

What was the challenge concerning the due process?

Without elevating the case to the PRC, Alo directly filed a petition for review with the CA under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

ruling for Alo, the CA held that the evidence on record was utterly insufficient to sustain the
Board's finding that Alo committed fraud or falsification in securing her certificate of registration
and professional license.33 The special prosecutor in this case failed to present not only the
alleged falsified Board Resolution No. 671 used by Alo, but also the authentic and original copy
of the said board resolution itself.

The Board argued that Alo's right to apply for a certificate of registration and professional
license had already prescribed, pursuant to the last paragraph of the aforequoted provision and
its own Board Resolution No. 600, Series of 1997 (BPT Resolution 600-1997), which provided
that "those who fail to register by September 2000 shall forfeit their privilege to practice the
teaching profession for abandonment of responsibility."According to the Board, since Alo only
applied in September 2007, way beyond the prescriptive period, she already lost her
entitlement under the law.

However, the CA ruled that this issue was never mentioned in the formal charge against Alo, and
stressed that she was charged with falsification only.

Aggrieved, the Board and the PRC filed a motion for reconsideration.

The court ruled that Alo was never qualified under the law to obtain a professional teaching
license and certificate of registration. Moreover, she applied for registration way beyond the
prescriptive period under the law. Clearly, respondents, in the case at bar, had until September
19, 2000 to comply with the mandatory requirement to register as professional teachers. As
respondents are categorized as those not qualified to register without examination, the law
requires them to register by taking and passing the licensure examination.

She must be deemed to have forfeited her privilege to practice the teaching profession for
failure to register by September 19, 2000. She admitted to have only applied for registration in
September 2007,seven years from the deadline provided under BPT Resolution

Alo's right to due process was not violated when the Board declared that she was not qualified
for registration under Section 26 of RA 7836.
 While the formal charge was for the use of fraud or deceit in obtaining a certificate of
registration and professional license, constituting unprofessional conduct and/or dishonorable
conduct, particularly in using Board Resolution No. 671, the records would show that it was Alo
herself who brought up her qualification under Section 26 of RA 7836. Given this, it makes no
sense to argue that Alo had been denied due process with respect to her qualification under
Section 26 of RA 7836, when she was the one who raised the issue in the first place, and
because of this, the Board had to rule on such issue as the same was tied into Alo's defense.

Ante v. University of the Philippines Student Disciplinary Tribunal, G.R. No. 227911, March 14, 2022

What is the act being complained?

The present case stemmed from seven disciplinary actions filed by UP before the SDT against
Ante and others. The disciplinary actions, in the form of formal charges, were prompted by the
death of Chris Anthony Mendez (Mendez) allegedly due to hazing activities/initiation rites
conducted by the Sigma Rho Fraternity. In particular, the formal charges accused them of
participating in the alleged hazing activities/initiation rites, leaving Mendez in the hospital, and
failing to give information to the authorities, and to comply with the directives of UP's Vice
Chancellor for Student Affairs to give information on the circumstances surrounding Mendez's
death

In his answer, Ante emphasized that under Section 1, Rule III of the UP Revised Rules and
Regulations Governing Fraternities, Sororities, and other Student Organizations (Rules
Governing Fraternities), a valid preliminary inquiry must first be conducted to determine
whether a formal charge against any member or officer of a fraternity, sorority, or other student
organization is warranted. During the proceedings, Ante likewise (a) requested copies of the
documents and pieces of evidence upon which the charges were based on, (b) moved that he be
furnished information with regard to two members of SDT, and (c) requested details on the
selection process of the jurors, and a list of individuals from which said members were chosen.
However, in separate Orders, these requests were denied by SDT.

Ante filed an omnibus motion,[9] which was also adopted by Veloso, Dela Cruz, and Sapitan as
their own, seeking for: (a) the quashal of the formal charges and declaration of all the
proceedings as void due to an invalid preliminary inquiry; and (b) the inhibition of the members
of SDT who conducted the invalid preliminary inquiry on the ground of prejudgment,
considering that SDT has concluded that a prima facie case already existed against Ante and
others. In seeking for the quashal of the formal charges, Ante reasoned that the preliminary
inquiry was invalid for violating Section 1, Rule III of the Rules Governing Fraternities, which
requires that the preliminary inquiry be conducted "by any member of the Tribunal."

SDT denied the omnibus motion. In maintaining that a valid preliminary inquiry was conducted,
SDT declared that under the Rules Governing Fraternities, no member or officer of a fraternity,
sorority, or student organization shall be formally charged in the absence of such inquiry
conducted by the SDT. Citing Black's Law Dictionary, SDT emphasized that the word "by," as
utilized in the Rules Governing Fraternities, meant "through the means, act, agency, or
 instrumentality" of any member of the SDT. SDT further explained that any of its members may
thus be present during the preliminary inquiry called by itself, and if two or more members
attend and exercise the authority, such would be in accordance with the Rules Governing
Fraternities. As to the accusation of prejudgment, SDT explained that there was none, as the
formal charges were drawn precisely to formally summon Ante and the others so their defenses
may be properly heard, and their evidence be properly evaluated.

Ante filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC of Quezon City. In the petition,
Ante primarily assailed the validity of the preliminary inquiry, contending that it was in violation
of Section 1, Rule III of the Rules Governing Fraternities. Ante likewise contended that they have
been denied due process, and that the case has been prejudged against them.

In granting the petition, the RTC agreed with Ante's argument that the preliminary inquiry was
conducted not by SDT, but by the University Prosecutor, in violation of the Rules Governing
Fraternities. Aggrieved, respondents filed a notice of appeal.

The word "before" must not be construed to mean that the members of the tribunal merely
served as observers of the University Prosecutor, with themselves physically present thereat
but meaning nothing at all to the Plaintiffs-Appellees. When the preliminary inquiries were
conducted the entire Tribunal was comprised by each and every individual member acting
collectively. An official act made by the Tribunal is an act performed by each of its members.

Issue: 1. Was the preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT valid?

2.Is SDT guilty of prejudging the case against Ante, thereby violating the latter's right to due process?

Ruling:

The preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT was valid. The disagreement as to the validity of the
preliminary inquiry conducted by SDT all boils down to the interpretation of Section 1, Rule III of
the Rules Governing Fraternities. In particular, the parties argue over the correct interpretation
of the phrase "by any member of the SDT." Since it is undisputed that the University Prosecutor
performed the preliminary inquiry, Ante theorizes that this is in violation of the provision, by
making a distinction between the terms "by" and "before"; he argues that the preliminary
inquiry was done by the University Prosecutor, and not by SDT, although before it. On the
other hand, SDT, citing Black's Law Dictionary, contends that the phrase should be construed as
"through the means, act, agency or instrumentality" of "any member of the SDT. Ante
suggests that the terms "by" and "before" are mutually opposed; that one necessarily negates
the other – they are not and do not. As correctly held by the CA, simply because SDT stated in
the formal charges that the preliminary inquiries were conducted "before" them, does not
mean that they themselves did not conduct nor participate in the same. The term "inquiry,"
which means "to request for information" in its ordinary sense, necessarily implies that SDT
took part in the conduct of such. This alone, satisfies the requirement that the preliminary
inquiry be conducted "by a member of the SDT." Thus, contrary to Ante's assertion, to split hairs
between the phrases "by the Student Disciplinary Tribunal" and "before the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal" is actually a trifling (unimportant) matter.
There was no violation of Ante's right to due process. In asserting that his right to due process
was violated, Ante claims that SDT is guilty of prejudice when it found a prima facie case against
him, even though what is required by the school regulations is merely the determination of the
sufficiency of a report or complaint

The rule is clear. In the required preliminary inquiry, only the sufficiency of a complaint or
report to warrant a formal investigation should be determined. The (sic) present case, the UP
Prosecutor went further to find not only the sufficiency of the complaint against Petitioner Ante
but to rule, with the acquiescence of the SDT, that there existed a prima facie case against him.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)

Ante then proceeds to state that the finding of a prima facie case against him amounts to a
prejudgment, since a prima facie case denotes "evidence which, if unexplained or
uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or
to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction."[34] Ante likewise
stresses that this effectively shifts the burden of proof to him, in violation of the presumption of
innocence in his favor.

We do not agree. Initially, We wish to point out that Ante's argument of due process violation is
premature. to repeat, the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural
due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does
not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in
courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross-
examination is not, contrary to petitioners' view, an essential part thereof. There are withal
minimum standards which must be met to satisfy the demands of procedural due process; and
these are, that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with
the assistance of counsel, if desired; (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4)
they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be
duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities
to hear and decide the case.

In the present case, and following Guzman, we fail to see how can there be a violation of Ante's
right to due process when formal proceedings are only yet to begin. SDT is in fact asking Ante to
participate – the very essence of due process – but the latter so stubbornly refuses to do so and
instead resorts to procedural devices meant to avoid the proceedings.

Even if we disregard the prematurity of Ante's claim, the same still fails to persuade. As to the
argument that the finding of a prima facie case against him amounts to prejudgment, we find
the same lacking in merit. Neither does it shift the burden of proof to him, nor violate the
presumption of innocence in his favor.

Burden of proof. – Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in
issue necessary to establish his claim or defenses by the amount of evidence required by law.

Further, it is a basic principle that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.[38]
 Meanwhile, burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular
time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created
against him."[39] Similarly, it is elementary that the burden of evidence shifts from party to
party depending upon the exigencies of the case.[40]

In the present case, and guided by the foregoing, it is clear that the burden of proof is not
shifted to Ante. Contrary to his assertions, only the burden of evidence is shifted, which requires
him to present evidence that weighs in his favor to counteract the findings of SDT. This,
nevertheless, does not require him to prove his innocence; i.e., that he did not do the
infractions charged. The distinction between the two lies in the subtle but important detail that
Ante may successfully overthrow SDT's prima facie case against him, without necessarily proving
his innocence.

Instead, the burden of proof logically lies with SDT, since it is the party alleging a fact – that Ante
participated in the hazing activities which led to the death of Mendez. Thus, in conducting its
preliminary inquiry which resulted to a finding of a prima facie evidence against Ante, SDT
merely found evidence good and sufficient on its face, enough to support the filing of the formal
charges against Ante. However, we emphasize that this prima facie evidence is in no way
conclusive of the truth or falsity of the allegations sought to be established – a determination
which is best attained after an exhaustive trial.

Prime Steel Mill, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 249153, September 12, 2022

What is the act being complained?

Petitioner Prime Steel Mill, Incorporated received a Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) from
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), assessing it with deficiency income tax, value-added tax
(VAT), and expanded withholding tax (EWT) for taxable year. Petitioner received a Final
Assessment Notice (FAN) and Formal Letter of Demand (FLD) dated 14 January 2009 from the
BIR, which reiterated the findings contained in the PAN. Thereafter, petitioner sent another
letter to the BIR to dispute the FAN and FLD

Subsequently, petitioner received the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) dated 14
April 2014, which maintained petitioner's liability for deficiency income tax and VAT in the
aggregate amount of P37,675,379.58, inclusive of interest and compromise penalties.

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Review before the CTA, before which it challenged the
validity of the assessments. Petitioner claimed, inter alia, that the BIR's right to assess had
already prescribed in this case

Respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue countered that the subject assessments were
issued well within the three-year period under Section 203 of the National Internal Revenue
Code
 The case then proceeded to trial.

In the Decision12 dated 23 January 2017, the CTA Third Division partially granted the Petition,
and cancelled the deficiency VAT assessment against petitioner while still upholding its
deficiency income tax assessment

Both parties moved for partial reconsideration but their pleas were denied by the CTA Third
Division. Displeased, both parties filed their respective Petitions for Review before the CTA En
Banc

In its Supplemental Memorandum, petitioner raised, for the first time on appeal, the following
arguments: (1) no Letter of Authority (LOA) was offered in evidence by the respondent, hence,
the entire audit and the resulting assessment were all void; (2) the FAN was issued prior to the
lapse of the fifteen (15)-day period given to a taxpayer to protest the PAN (What was the
challenge concerning the due process), hence petitioner's right to due process was violated;
and (3) the FAN and FLD did not set and fix the tax liability contrary to the requirements of the
Tax Code since the interest and total tax due was still subject to modification.

Ruling:

The issue on the violation of petitioner's right to due process is inextricably linked to the
validity of the assessment. It is primal that the BIR's right to collect deficiency taxes must flow
from a valid assessment. This, in turn, proceeds from the basic truism that a void assessment
bears no valid fruit. Moreover, a resolution on the apparent violation of petitioner's right to
due process is indispensable for an orderly and comprehensive disposition of this case.

There is no true disagreement that the FAN was issued well within the 15-day period for
petitioner to reply to the PAN. As recounted above, the PAN was received by petitioner on 7
January 2009 and its reply thereto was filed on 22 January 2009. Without waiting to receive
petitioner's reply, the BIR apparently issued the FAN on 14 January 2009, albeit it was received
by petitioner only on 12 February 2009.

The CTA En Banc noted such discrepancy but brushed this aside by saying that the requirements
of due process were already substantially complied with considering that petitioner was, in any
event, given an opportunity to be heard on its grounds for disputing the assessment.

The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, does not deny that the 15-day
period was not observed; it simply reverberates the declaration of the CTA En Banc that there
was substantial compliance with the requirements of the due process.

This line of reasoning does not stand judicial muster. The Court held that the sending of a PAN
is part and parcel of the due process requirement in the issuance of a deficiency tax
assessment and the BIR must strictly comply with the requirements laid down by the law and
by its own rules.

The importance of the PAN stage of the assessment process cannot be discounted as it presents
an opportunity for both the taxpayer and the BIR to settle the case at the earliest possible
time without need for the issuance of a FAN
 There can be no substantial compliance with the due process requirement when the BIR
completely ignored the 15-day period by issuing the FAN and FLD even before petitioner was
able to submit its Reply to the PAN. Sec. 3.1.2 of RR No. 12-99 explicitly grants the taxpayer
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the PAN to file a response.

Well-settled is the rule that an assessment that fails to strictly comply with the due process
requirements set forth in Section 228 of the Tax Code and Revenue Regulations No. 12-99 is void
and produces no effect

Gov’t of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v Munoz GR 208342, August 16, 2016

What is the act being complained?

Under the rule of specialty in international law, a Requested State shall surrender to a
Requesting State a person to be tried only for a criminal offense specified in their treaty of
extradition. Conformably with the dual criminality rule embodied in the extradition treaty
between the Philippines and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR), however,
the Philippines as the Requested State is not bound to extradite the respondent to the
jurisdiction of the HKSAR as the Requesting State for the offense of accepting an advantage as
an agent considering that the extradition treaty is forthright in providing that surrender shall
only be granted for an offense coming within the descriptions of offenses in its Article 2 insofar
as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other form of detention for more than one
year, or by a more severe penalty according to the laws of both parties.

For consideration and resolution is the petitioner's motion for reconsideration1 to seek the
review and reversal of the decision promulgated on August 16, 2016, 2 whereby the Court
affirmed the amended decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on March 1, 2013 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88610, and accordingly denied the petition for review on certiorari.3We thereby
held that respondent Juan Antonio Muñoz could only be extradited to and tried by the HK.SAR
for seven (7) counts of conspiracy to defraud, but not for the other crime of accepting an
advantage as an agent. This, because conspiracy to defraud was a public sector offense,
but accepting an advantage as an agent dealt with private sector bribery; hence, the dual
criminality rule embodied in the treaty of extradition has not been met.

The Court DENIES the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for its lack of merit considering
that the basic issues being thereby raised were already passed upon and no substantial
arguments were presented to warrant the reversal of the decision promulgated on August 16,
2016.

Article 2 of the RP-Hong Kong treaty provides that surrender of the extraditee by the Requested
State to the Requesting State shall only be for an offense coming within any of the descriptions
of the offenses therein listed insofar as the offenses are punishable by imprisonment or other
form of detention for more than one year, or by a more severe penalty according to the laws
of both parties. The provision expresses the dual criminality rule. The determination of
whether or not the offense concerned complied with the dual criminality rule rests on the
Philippines as the requested party. Hence, the Philippines must carefully ascertain the exact
nature of the offenses involved in the request, and thereby establish that the surrender of
 Muñoz for trial in the HKSAR will be proper. On its part, the HKSAR as the requesting party
should prove that the offense is covered by the RP-Hong Kong Treaty, and punishable in our
jurisdiction.

A perusal of the motion for reconsideration shows that the petitioner has lifted from the
dissenting opinion the arguments it now advances to support its insistence that Munoz must
also be extradited for the crime of accepting an advantage as an agent

In the last paragraph of the motion for reconsideration, the petitioner cites the ruling
supposedly handed down by the Court of Final Appeal of the HKSAR in the case of B v. The
Commissioner of the Independent Commission Against Corruption to the effect that the term
agent in Section 9 of the HK.SAR' s Prevention of Bribery Ordinance (POBO) also covered public
servants in another jurisdiction

Public Prosecutions in the Department of Justice of the HK.SAR. Not surprisingly, said legal
experts shared the opinion that the offense defined in Section 9 of the POBO was a private
sector offense. The CA thus decided against the petitioner's position. To extradite Muñoz also
for the crime for accepting an advantage as an agent would be devoid of justification if the
Philippines did not have an equivalent crime of accepting an advantage as an agent.

Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31L

What is the act being complained?

In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents' right to exercise their profession and their
right to due process of law? (Issue)

Respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots Association, through Capt.
Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the Department of Transportation and
Communication, but they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that "the
matter of reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA's administrative issuances lies exclusively with its
Board of Directors as its governing body."

The PPA issued Memorandum Order No. 08-928 which laid down the criteria or factors to be
considered in the reappointment of harbor pilot, viz.: (1) Qualifying Factors:safety record and
physical/mental medical exam report and (2) Criteria for Evaluation:promptness in servicing
vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average
GRT of vessels serviced as pilot, awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.

Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO No.
04-92, but Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of
the Board of Directors of the PPA

On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited context
of this case. PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let alone a
wrongful deprivation of, the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be noted, the
issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the appointment to harbor
pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after a rigid evaluation of the
appointee's performance.

PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their
profession in PPA's jurisdictional area

Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the
pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural
aspect of the enactment

Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPA-AO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the
pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural
aspect of the enactment. Fortunately, the Court has maintained a clear position in this regard, a
stance it has stressed in the recent case of Lumiqued v. Hon. Exevea,15 where it declared that
"(a)s long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot
be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very
essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."

In the case at bar, respondents questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the
matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to
persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the
licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations," was not consulted,17 the facts
show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard,
was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, petitioners correctly argued
that, there being no matters of naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative
order, the Philippine Coast Guard need not be consulted.

Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the validity
of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative functions,
such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with the
requirements of notice and hearing

Upon the other hand, it is also contended that the sole and exclusive right to the exercise of
harbor pilotage by pilots is a settled issue. Respondents aver that said right has become vested
and can only be "withdrawn or shortened" by observing the constitutional mandate of due
process of law. Their argument has thus shifted from the procedural to one of substance. It is
here where PPA-AO No. 04-92 fails to meet the condition set by the organic law.
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.
Even petitioner Corona recognized this when he stated in his March 17, 1993, decision that
"(t)he exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process."

Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals. Licensure
is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system of granting
licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with establishment standards."21 A license
is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business or do an act
which, without such license, would be illegal.22

Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass
through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed
by actual training and practice.

Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage
until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right. Under the terms of PPA-AO No. 04-92,
"(a)ll existing regular appointments which have been previously issued by the Bureau of
Customs or the PPA shall remain valid up to 31 December 1992 only," and "(a)ll appointments to
harbor pilot positions in all pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year
from date of effectivity subject to renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a
rigid evaluation of performance."

It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy
their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job
training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner
revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to
contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent
depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike
are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is
conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term
"renewal." It is this pre-evaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without
due process of law.

The Court notes that PPA-AO No. 04-92 and PPA-MO No. 08-92 are already covered by PPA-AO
No. 03-85, which is still operational. Respondents are correct in pointing out that PPA-AO No.
04-92 is a "surplusage"23 and, therefore, an unnecessary enactment. PPA-AO 03-85 is a
comprehensive order setting forth the "Rules and Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the
Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine Ports." It provides, inter alia, for the
qualification, appointment, performance evaluation, disciplining and removal of harbor pilots —
matters which are duplicated in PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing memorandum order.
Since it adds nothing new or substantial, PPA-AO No. 04-92 must be struck down.
Phil. Merchants v. CA, G.R. No. 112844, June 2, 1995

What was the act being complained?

FACTS:

Petitioner PHILIPPINE MERCHANT MARINE SCHOOL, INC. (PMMSI), was established in Manila in
1950 to train and produce competent marine officers.

Public respondent Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) has repeatedly
disapproved petitioner’s requests for renewal permit/recognition due to the following recurrent
violations against public respondent’s orders:

1) That Petitioner is ordered to cease operating without a renewal permit/recognition;

2) That Petitioner is deficient in terms of the minimum requirements as provided in DECS Order
No. III, series of 1987, which refers to the policies and standards for Maritime Education Plan.

3) The Petitioner school has not acquired its own school site and building. The present school
campus is not conducive for training and is found to be very limited in space so that there is
difficulty for school development and expansion.

4) That the petitioner is ordered to phase-out its Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation
courses.

Despite these violations, petitioner still continued to enroll students and still offered courses in
Marine Engineering and Marine Transportation. The DECS informed petitioner that it had
received reports that petitioner enrolled freshmen for its maritime programs which were
ordered phased out.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration regarding the non-compliance with the DECS’ minimum
requirements and subsequently moved for reconsideration regarding the phasing out of the two
Marine courses stated above. Both motions were denied by the DECS.

Petitioner appealed to the Office of the President. Pending appeal, the DECS issued a Closure
Order. Thereafter, petitioner sought reconsideration of the Closure Order alleging compliance
with the DECS’ requirements.

The Office of the President dismissed the appeal finding no reason to disturb the DECS’ action.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration praying that the case be remanded to the DECS for
another ocular inspection and evaluation of its alleged improved facilities. Petitioner anchored
its motion on the proposition that since it had made substantial improvements on school
equipment and facilities there existed no valid ground to deny them a permit to offer maritime
courses. After another circumspect review of the case, the Office of the President found no
cogent reason to set aside its previous resolution.
 Petitioner assailed both resolutions of the Office of the President before respondent Court of
Appeals by way of certiorari. It alleged that the resolutions failed to meet the constitutional
requirement of due process because the basis for affirming the DECS phase-out and closure
orders was not sufficiently disclosed.

Respondent CA dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was denied due process of law.

RULING:

Set against the records of the case, the assertion of petitioner that it was deprived of its right to
a hearing and any opportunity whatsoever to correct the alleged deficiencies readily collapses.
The earlier narration of facts clearly demonstrates that before the DECS issued the phase-out
and closure orders, petitioner was duly notified, warned and given several opportunities to
correct its deficiencies and to comply with pertinent orders and regulations.

We agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General that —

As long as the parties were given opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the
demands of due process were sufficiently met (Lindo v. COMELEC, 194 SCRA 25). It should also
be noted that petitioner herein repeatedly sought reconsideration of the various orders of
respondent DECS and its motions were duly considered by respondent DECS to the extent of
allowing and granting its request for re-inspection of its premises. In connection therewith, it
has been ruled that the opportunity to be heard is the essence of procedural due process and
that any defect is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration (Medenilla v. Civil Service
Commission, 194 SCRA 278)

Jaka Food Processing v. Pacot, G.R. No. 151378

FACTS: Respondents Pacot et al were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing
Corporation until the latter terminated their employment because the corporation was “in dire
financial straits”. It is not disputed, however, that the termination was effected without JAKA
complying with the requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a
written notice upon the employees and the DOLE at least 1 month before the intended date of
termination.

In time, respondents separately filed with the regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC
complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and nonpayment of SIL and 13th month
pay against JAKA and its HRD Manager.

ISSUE: is the dismissal valid, because of non-compliance with the notice requirement?

HELD: the dismissal is legal, but employer should pay nominal damages for non-compliance
witht the notice requirement
In the case of Agabon vs. NLRC, the court had the opportunity to resolve a similar question.
Therein, we found that the employees committed a grave offense, i.e., abandonment, which is a
form of a neglect of duty which, in turn, is one of the just causes enumerated under Article 282
of the Labor Code. In said case, we upheld the validity of the dismissal despite non-compliance
with the notice requirement of the Labor Code. However, we required the employer to pay the
dismissed employees nominal damages for non-compliance with statutory due process.

**

The difference between Agabon and the instant case is that in the former, the dismissal was
based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code while in the present case,
respondents were dismissed due to retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes under
Article 283 of the same Code.

A dismissal for just cause under Article 282 implies that the employee concerned has
committed, or is guilty of, some violation against the employer, i.e. the employee has committed
some serious misconduct, is guilty of some fraud against the employer, or, as in Agabon, he has
neglected his duties. Thus, it can be said that the employee himself initiated the dismissal
process.

On another breath, a dismissal for an authorized cause under Article 283 does not necessarily
imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the dismissal process is
initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. when the employer
opts to install labor saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or when, as in
this case, he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program.

Accordingly, it is wise to hold that: (1) if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article
282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction to be
imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was, in effect, initiated
by an act imputable to the employee; and (2) if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause
under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement, the sanction
should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his
management prerogative.

The records before us reveal that, indeed, JAKA was suffering from serious business losses at the
time it terminated respondents’ employment.

**

The clear-cut distinction between a dismissal for just cause under Article 282 and a dismissal for
authorized cause under Article 283 is further reinforced by the fact that in the first, payment of
separation pay, as a rule, is not required, while in the second, the law requires payment of
separation pay.

We find the CA to have been in error when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay
equivalent to 1 month salary for every year of service. This is because in Reahs Corporation vs.
NLRC, we made the following declaration:
 “The rule, therefore, is that in all cases of business closure or cessation of operation or
undertaking of the employer, the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is
consistent with the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic force, affording
full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is when the closure of business
or cessation of operations is due to serious business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in
which case, the right of affected employees to separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.

Aliping, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 221823, June 21, 2022

Facts:

On 8 July 1940, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 581[4] creating the Santo
Tomas Forest Reserve[5] in Tuba, Benguet. The reserve, which was constituted for purposes of
forest protection, timber production and aesthetic preservation, consists of around 3,114
hectares.

The Santo Tomas Forest Reserve hosts several natural springs that are critical sources of water,
not only of the residents of Tuba and of the nearby Baguio City, but also of the inhabitants of
the distant province of Pangasinan.

The natural springs of the Santo Tomas Forest Reserve sustain three reservoir dams of the
Baguio Water District (BWD). These dams—named the Amliang Dam 1, Amliang Dam 2A/2B[8]
and Amliang Dam 3—hold the supply of potable water for some 4,176 households[9] in Tuba
and Baguio City. Apart from sustaining the dams of the BWD, however, the springs of the Santo
Tomas Forest Reserve also comprise the headwaters of the Bued River.

On 15 April 2014, mountain trekkers Francis S. Likigan, Jr., Eric S. Tanglib and Christian T.
Labascan wrote a letter to then Benguet Governor Nestor B. Fongwan (Gov. Fongwan)
informing the latter of tree-cutting and excavation activities at Mount Santo Tomas. Gov.
Fongwan forwarded this information to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) - Cordillera Administrative Region which, in turn, relayed the same to the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of La Trinidad. The CENRO then conducted
an ocular inspection of Mount Santo Tomas and yielded the following findings:

1. There had been tree-cutting and earth moving activities within Mount Santo Tomas.

2. Such tree-cutting and earth moving activities were made pursuant to the construction of two
new roads in Barangay Poblacion, Tuba. One road spans 1.5 kilometers from Sitio Amliang to
Sitio Pongayan, while another covers 1.14 kilometers from Sitio Pongayan to Sitio Bekel.

3. Per plotting of the CENRO, the area covered by the roads falls within the Santo Tomas Forest
Reserve.

4. Per the records of the Environment Management Bureau (EMB) and the CENRO, the
construction of the new roads is not supported by any Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC), Tree Cutting Permit/Special Land Use Permit, or Road Right of Way/Excavation Permit.
5. An estimated 306 trees (293 Benguet pine trees and 13 Alnus trees) and 455 saplings (415
Benguet pine saplings and 40 Alnus saplings) were cut in connection with the construction of the
new roads.[20] This translates to a total damage in the amount of P10,314,531.40.

6. The earth moving activities associated with the construction of the new roads also led to heavy
soil erosion that, in turn, silted tributaries that supply water to Amliang Dam 3. It was
observed that one of the roads ends only 50 meters away from Amliang Creek—a water source
of Amliang Dam 3.

7. Present along the road constructions were three backhoes that were respectively marked as
"Goldrich Construction," "RUA Construction," and "BLC Construction & Aggregates."

Significantly, the CENRO investigation tagged petitioner Nicasio M. Aliping, Jr. (petitioner)—
then a member of the House of Representatives for the lone legislative district of Baguio City
—

In view of the foregoing findings, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of Benguet filed before the provincial prosecutor a criminal complaint against
petitioner, Goldrich Construction, RUA Construction, and BLC Construction & Aggregates for
violations of Section 77 and 78 of Presidential Decree No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended.

On the other hand, on 2 June 2014, the EMB issued a Notice of Violation cum Cease and Desist
Order against petitioner, Goldrich Construction, RUA Construction, and BLC Construction &
Aggregates for their failure to secure an ECC in relation to the earth moving activities within the
reserve.[23] The EMB thus conducted a technical conference on 14 July 2014 that was
participated in by petitioner and the representatives of the construction companies.[24] During
such conference, petitioner admitted responsibility for an excavation project within his claim
and for undertaking the same without the necessary environmental permit.[25] In view of such
admission, the EMB imposed a penalty of P50,000.00 against petitioner for violation of Section 4
of PD No. 1586.[26]

Meanwhile, on 28 April 2014, the BWD conducted its own inspection of the Amliang Dam 3 and
its surroundings amid observing turbidity in the dam's water supply. In essence, the BWD
attributed the turbid waters of the Amliang Dam 3 to two principal reasons,[27] viz:

1. The road construction within and around the property claimed by petitioner which
caused massive volumes of excavated earth and other debris which were dumped along the
creeks and tributaries leading to the dam, and

2. The presence of small-scale mining activities above the Amliang Dam 3 which led to
massive soil erosions.

The BWD submitted its findings to then Tuba Mayor Florencio V. Bentrez (Mayor Bentrez) who
then relayed the same to petitioner. In a letter[30] dated 21 May 2014 to Mayor Bentrez,
petitioner stated that he would be "undertaking and instituting measures to avoid further
damage to plants, trees and the [Amliang Dam 5] of the [BWD]" and assured that any "damage
will be minimized if not avoided."

On 26 June 2014, the BWD filed before the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) a Complaint for
violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9275 or the Clean Water Act of 2004 against petitioner,
Goldrich Construction, RUA Construction, and BLC Construction & Aggregates. The PAB
instructed the EMB to investigate the complaint.

On 18 July 2014, the EMB (Environmental Management Bureau)conducted yet another

inspection of the reserve. After such inspection, the EMB arrived at the conclusion that the
pollution of the Amliang Creek was contributed by different sources and that it would be
difficult to determine the exact percentage by which each source contributed to the creek's
pollution

Moved by the foregoing events and findings, herein respondents Bishop Carlito J. Cenzon,
Archbishop Socrates B. Villegas, Sheree M. Nolasco, Marie A. Balangue, Nonnette C. Bennett, Dr.
Teresita F. De Venecia, Antonio J. Supremido, Jr. and Pastor Gener Tandoc (Bishop Cenzon et al.)
[33] filed before the Court a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and a Writ of
Continuing Mandamus (Kalikasan petition).

In the Kalikasan petition, Bishop Cenzon et al. complained of four ongoing anthropogenic
activities that had allegedly degraded the sustainability of the natural springs indigenous to the
Santo Tomas Forest Reserve. These activities[38] are:

First. Illegal tree-cutting and massive earth moving in Mount Santo Tomas caused by a road
construction project of petitioner.

Second. Illegal small-scale mining activities.

Third. Expansion of vegetable gardens and residential areas due to the unwarranted issuance of
tax declarations over lands within the Santo Tomas Forest Reserve.

Fourth. Use of Mount Santo Tomas and of the nearby Mount Cabuyao as sites of relay towers
and radars by different television and communication companies.

Bishop Cenzon et al. claimed that the foregoing activities caused soil erosions and generated
pollutants which, in turn, significantly reduced the volume and quality of water flowing into
the Amliang Dam 3 and the Bued River. Hence, it was argued that such activities had violated
and, unless abated, will continue to violate the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the people who rely on water from such river and dam—namely, the inhabitants of
Tuba in Benguet, of Baguio City and of San Fabian in Pangasinan.

Bishop Cenzon et al. prayed for the immediate issuance of an ex parte Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and for the rendition of judgment granting the privilege
of the Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus (SHORT TERM and LONG TERM measures to
conserve whatever remains of Santo Tomas Reserve: Deploying personnel guards to prevent
further cutting of trees, a comprehensive plan to mitigate the pollution/contamination of the
springs and the river system resulting from the erosion caused by such activities, come up with
the necessary ordinance outlawing the issuance of tax declarations over portions of the [Santo
Tomas Forest Reserve], and prohibiting the alienation of portions of the same; rehabilitate the
portions of the [Santo Tomas Forest Reserve