Aliping, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

221823, June 21, 2022

Facts:

On 8 July 1940, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclamation No. 581[4] creating the Santo
Tomas Forest Reserve[5] in Tuba, Benguet. The reserve, which was constituted for purposes of
forest protection, timber production and aesthetic preservation, consists of around 3,114
hectares.

The Santo Tomas Forest Reserve hosts several natural springs that are critical sources of water,
not only of the residents of Tuba and of the nearby Baguio City, but also of the inhabitants of
the distant province of Pangasinan.

The natural springs of the Santo Tomas Forest Reserve sustain three reservoir dams of the
Baguio Water District (BWD). These dams—named the Amliang Dam 1, Amliang Dam 2A/2B[8]
and Amliang Dam 3—hold the supply of potable water for some 4,176 households[9] in Tuba
and Baguio City. Apart from sustaining the dams of the BWD, however, the springs of the Santo
Tomas Forest Reserve also comprise the headwaters of the Bued River.

On 15 April 2014, mountain trekkers Francis S. Likigan, Jr., Eric S. Tanglib and Christian T.
Labascan wrote a letter to then Benguet Governor Nestor B. Fongwan (Gov. Fongwan)
informing the latter of tree-cutting and excavation activities at Mount Santo Tomas. Gov.
Fongwan forwarded this information to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) - Cordillera Administrative Region which, in turn, relayed the same to the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of La Trinidad. The CENRO then conducted
an ocular inspection of Mount Santo Tomas and yielded the following findings:

1. There had been tree-cutting and earth moving activities within Mount Santo Tomas.

2. Such tree-cutting and earth moving activities were made pursuant to the construction of two
new roads in Barangay Poblacion, Tuba. One road spans 1.5 kilometers from Sitio Amliang to
Sitio Pongayan, while another covers 1.14 kilometers from Sitio Pongayan to Sitio Bekel.

3. Per plotting of the CENRO, the area covered by the roads falls within the Santo Tomas Forest
Reserve.

4. Per the records of the Environment Management Bureau (EMB) and the CENRO, the
construction of the new roads is not supported by any Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC), Tree Cutting Permit/Special Land Use Permit, or Road Right of Way/Excavation Permit.

5. An estimated 306 trees (293 Benguet pine trees and 13 Alnus trees) and 455 saplings (415
Benguet pine saplings and 40 Alnus saplings) were cut in connection with the construction of the
new roads.[20] This translates to a total damage in the amount of P10,314,531.40.

6. The earth moving activities associated with the construction of the new roads also led to heavy
soil erosion that, in turn, silted tributaries that supply water to Amliang Dam 3. It was
observed that one of the roads ends only 50 meters away from Amliang Creek—a water source
of Amliang Dam 3.
7. Present along the road constructions were three backhoes that were respectively marked as
"Goldrich Construction," "RUA Construction," and "BLC Construction & Aggregates."

Significantly, the CENRO investigation tagged petitioner Nicasio M. Aliping, Jr. (petitioner)—
then a member of the House of Representatives for the lone legislative district of Baguio City
—

In view of the foregoing findings, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of Benguet filed before the provincial prosecutor a criminal complaint against
petitioner, Goldrich Construction, RUA Construction, and BLC Construction & Aggregates for
violations of Section 77 and 78 of Presidential Decree No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as
amended.

On the other hand, on 2 June 2014, the EMB issued a Notice of Violation cum Cease and Desist
Order against petitioner, Goldrich Construction, RUA Construction, and BLC Construction &
Aggregates for their failure to secure an ECC in relation to the earth moving activities within the
reserve.[23] The EMB thus conducted a technical conference on 14 July 2014 that was
participated in by petitioner and the representatives of the construction companies.[24] During
such conference, petitioner admitted responsibility for an excavation project within his claim
and for undertaking the same without the necessary environmental permit.[25] In view of such
admission, the EMB imposed a penalty of P50,000.00 against petitioner for violation of Section 4
of PD No. 1586.[26]

Meanwhile, on 28 April 2014, the BWD conducted its own inspection of the Amliang Dam 3 and
its surroundings amid observing turbidity in the dam's water supply. In essence, the BWD
attributed the turbid waters of the Amliang Dam 3 to two principal reasons,[27] viz:

1. The road construction within and around the property claimed by petitioner which
caused massive volumes of excavated earth and other debris which were dumped along the
creeks and tributaries leading to the dam, and

2. The presence of small-scale mining activities above the Amliang Dam 3 which led to
massive soil erosions.

The BWD submitted its findings to then Tuba Mayor Florencio V. Bentrez (Mayor Bentrez) who
then relayed the same to petitioner. In a letter[30] dated 21 May 2014 to Mayor Bentrez,
petitioner stated that he would be "undertaking and instituting measures to avoid further

damage to plants, trees and the [Amliang Dam 5] of the [BWD]" and assured that any "damage
will be minimized if not avoided."

On 26 June 2014, the BWD filed before the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) a Complaint for
violation of Republic Act (RA) No. 9275 or the Clean Water Act of 2004 against petitioner,
Goldrich Construction, RUA Construction, and BLC Construction & Aggregates. The PAB
instructed the EMB to investigate the complaint.
On 18 July 2014, the EMB (Environmental Management Bureau)conducted yet another
inspection of the reserve. After such inspection, the EMB arrived at the conclusion that the
pollution of the Amliang Creek was contributed by different sources and that it would be
difficult to determine the exact percentage by which each source contributed to the creek's
pollution

Moved by the foregoing events and findings, herein respondents Bishop Carlito J. Cenzon,
Archbishop Socrates B. Villegas, Sheree M. Nolasco, Marie A. Balangue, Nonnette C. Bennett, Dr.
Teresita F. De Venecia, Antonio J. Supremido, Jr. and Pastor Gener Tandoc (Bishop Cenzon et al.)
[33] filed before the Court a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan and a Writ of
Continuing Mandamus (Kalikasan petition).

In the Kalikasan petition, Bishop Cenzon et al. complained of four ongoing anthropogenic
activities that had allegedly degraded the sustainability of the natural springs indigenous to the
Santo Tomas Forest Reserve. These activities[38] are:

First. Illegal tree-cutting and massive earth moving in Mount Santo Tomas caused by a road
construction project of petitioner.

Second. Illegal small-scale mining activities.

Third. Expansion of vegetable gardens and residential areas due to the unwarranted issuance of
tax declarations over lands within the Santo Tomas Forest Reserve.

Fourth. Use of Mount Santo Tomas and of the nearby Mount Cabuyao as sites of relay towers
and radars by different television and communication companies.

Bishop Cenzon et al. claimed that the foregoing activities caused soil erosions and generated
pollutants which, in turn, significantly reduced the volume and quality of water flowing into
the Amliang Dam 3 and the Bued River. Hence, it was argued that such activities had violated
and, unless abated, will continue to violate the constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology of the people who rely on water from such river and dam—namely, the inhabitants of
Tuba in Benguet, of Baguio City and of San Fabian in Pangasinan.

Bishop Cenzon et al. prayed for the immediate issuance of an ex parte Temporary
Environmental Protection Order (TEPO) and for the rendition of judgment granting the privilege
of the Writs of Kalikasan and Continuing Mandamus (SHORT TERM and LONG TERM measures to
conserve whatever remains of Santo Tomas Reserve: Deploying personnel guards to prevent
further cutting of trees, a comprehensive plan to mitigate the pollution/contamination of the
springs and the river system resulting from the erosion caused by such activities, come up with
the necessary ordinance outlawing the issuance of tax declarations over portions of the [Santo
Tomas Forest Reserve], and prohibiting the alienation of portions of the same; rehabilitate the
portions of the [Santo Tomas Forest Reserve
 Petitioner filed with the CA his return. In his return, petitioner admitted responsibility for the
excavation activities within his claim, but denied any involvement in the construction of roads
and the cutting of trees outside of the said claim. He alleged that he only engaged in excavation
activities to improve an existing access road to his claim. Petitioner also averred that the roads
found to be emanating from his claim are not actually newly constructed but are rather old
logging roads already established.

After due proceedings, the CA issued its Decision granting the Kalikasan petition and rendering
permanent the TEPO it earlier issued.

After being denied by the CA of Motion for Reconsideration, hence this petition.

He argued that the permanent cease and desist from performing acts to develop and enhance
the property he is claiming located at the [Santo Tomas Forest Reserve], which acts include
bulldozing, levelling or any earth-moving activity, improving the old building standing on the
land, building any structure thereon, continuing with road opening activities and concreting
any part of the road; deprives him of the right to use his property without due process of law.
(Item 4(a) of the Dispositive Portion of the Assailed Decision)

Ruling:

Item 4(a) of the Dispositive Portion of the Assailed Decision Does Not Violate Petitioner's Right
to Due Process. Verily, petitioner had been given ample opportunity to be heard before the
verdict against him was handed down. Moreover, We find that item 4(a) of the dispositive
portion of the assailed decision cannot be considered as arbitrary or oppressive. The directive
only permanently enjoins petitioner from performing acts to develop or enhance his claim—
such as bulldozing, levelling or any earth-moving activity, and continuing with the road
construction project—which are the same acts identified in the assailed decision to have
contributed to the siltation, and continuing degradation, of the streams and tributaries leading
to the Amliang Dam 3 and the Bued River. The directive, in other words, is a necessary
restriction to prevent further damage to the waterways indigenous to the Santo Tomas Forest
Reserve.

Mulleno v. TV5 Network, Inc., G.R. No. 247445, June 13, 2022

Mulleno had been a news assistant in the News and Public Affairs Department of respondent
TV5 Network, Inc. (TV5). Concurrently, Mulleno was also the Press Relations Officer of ABC 5
Employee's Union.

As news assistant, Mulleno was in charge of the news team's vehicle. Both Mulleno and TV5
affirmed that to be able to use or take out the team's vehicle, it was necessary for Mulleno to
accomplish a Vehicle Trip Ticket (VTT). A VTT should indicate vehicle details, driver details, trip
approval, trip details, and fuel lever, among others.

On August 30, 2014, Mulleno used a VTT allegedly signed by a certain Rey Visquera (Visquera),
a TV5 supervisor and dispatcher, enabling Mulleno to use and take out a Toyota Hi-Lux pickup
from the TV5 Media Center in Mandaluyong City. Mulleno was also able to take out a number
of camera equipment through a Custodian Checklist in the name of "D. Suing" referring to
Dennis Suing (Suing), a camera operator in TV5. Notably, company policies dictate that only
camera operators are authorized to withdraw from and return to the News Custodian all the
equipment assigned to them. Afterwards, Mulleno submitted an "Overtime Claim Form"
showing that he had worked on his day off on August 30, 2014.

The Human Resources Department (HRD) of TV5 later received reports that Mulleno allegedly
violated company policies due to his activities on August 30, 2014, and thereafter conducted an
investigation.

During the investigation, it was discovered that Visquera was off duty on the said date. Visquera
also denied that he issued a VTT to Mulleno on said date. Moreover, the investigating team
found that Suing, whose name appeared at the "Custodian" portion of the Custodian Checklist,
did not report for work on August 30, 2014.

TV5 issued a Notice to Explain to Mulleno, directing him to answer the allegations against him.

It is the policy of the Company to dispatch news crews composed of Asst. Cameraman and
Cameraman (with or without the addition of a Reporter), but it is never allowed to dispatch an
Asst. Cameraman alone. To this effect, procedures on equipment accountability and news team
scheduling were established and made known to all concerned. There being no established
requirement for you to render overtime work or any authorized or valid work product, your
whereabouts, while in the possession of valuable company properties, on the said date is being
questioned and therefore your claim for Overtime Pay is without basis.

The above acts/omissions may constitute three separate acts of falsification and, therefore, may
be a violation of the TV5 Code of Conduct provision on falsification, to wit:

OFFENSES AGAINST INTEGRITY, OFFICE CONDUCT & DECORUM No. 14 Falsifying, assisting in
falsifying or destroying Company records and documents.

This, in relation to the Labor Code, Art. 282. Under the provisions of a Serious misconduct or
willful disobedience

Mulleno submitted his written explanation. It stated that August 30, 2014 was indeed his day
off, but he still proceeded to the office thinking that there would be a prospective shoot. Since
he was already there, Mulleno sought permission from the immediate supervisor, Roland
Balito (Balito) to roam around and look for news worthy stories. Mulleno was allowed to do so
and admitted that he was the one who obtained the camera being used by Suing. Mulleno also
declared that in the past, he and other employees of TV5 practiced such actions which were
never questioned by the management. Furthermore, Mulleno proposed that the charge against
him was driven by politics because he was a member of the ABC 5 Employer's Union which was
involved in a conflict with the Union President and TV5's counsel.

TV5 issued a Notice of Termination, which adopted the recommendation of the investigating
committee to dismiss Mulleno. Consequently, Mulleno, assisted by counsel, filed a Complaint
before the Labor Arbiter against respondents TV5, Emmanuel Lorenzana, Luchi Cruz Valdez,
David Jude Sta. Ana, and Leonarda Julita Francisco (TV5, et al.) for unfair labor practices (ULP)
and illegal dismissal.
 The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision finding that Mulleno was illegally dismissed, the
dispositive portion of which reads

This decision was elevated by TV5, et al., on appeal. Notably, Mulleno did not appeal the LA's
dismissal of his claim of ULP.

After a denial of his Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution, Mulleno filed a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.

The CA rendered the assailed Decision denying the Petition. It held that Mulleno's dismissal
from employment was warranted and that there was no grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC when it issued the assailed Decision and
Resolution.

Ruling:

There is just cause behind petitioner's dismissal.

In relation to the Labor Code, Mr. Mulleno's violations of the TV5 Code of Conduct fall under
Just Causes under Art. 282, to wit: "(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work and
(b) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative."

Petitioner bewails the alleged lack of due process in the proceedings due to the "variance
between the charge of falsification of document as against in the judgment of the NLRC and
Court of Appeals that there is unauthorized use of documents."

This grievance is misplaced.

Jurisprudence provides us with a discussion on substantial and procedural due process in the
context of labor cases. The case of Brown Madonna Press, Inc. v. Casas provides thus:

In determining whether an employee's dismissal had been legal, the inquiry focuses on whether
the dismissal violated his right to substantial and procedural due process. An employee's right
not to be dismissed without just or authorized cause as provided by law, is covered by his right
to substantial due process. Compliance with procedure provided in the Labor Code, on the other
hand, constitutes the procedural due process right of an employee.

The violation of either the substantial due process right or the procedural due process right of
an employee produces different results. Termination without a just or authorized cause
renders the dismissal invalid, and entitles the employee to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid
up to the time of actual reinstatement.

The above discussion shows that substantial due process in the context of labor cases pertains
specifically to the existence of a just or authorized cause as a ground for dismissal. As provided
in the factual findings of the NLRC and CA, petitioner's activities on August 30, 2014 were
contrary to their company policies and is considered serious misconduct under the Labor Code.
Substantial due process, therefore, was accorded to petitioner.

As to procedural due process, the guidelines have been summarized in the case of Distribution &
Control Products, Inc. v. Santos:

The settled rule is that in termination proceedings of employees, procedural due process
consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must furnish the
employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1)
the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
sought; and (2) the second informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him.
The requirement of a hearing is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to be heard,
and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.

In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioner was given a Notice to Explain, followed by a
conference where he was assisted by counsel, and lastly, a Notice of Termination which
provided the grounds for dismissal. Following these premises, the NLRC and the CA found that
procedural due process was afforded to petitioner. We adopt the NLRC's discussion:

Anent the issue of due process, Complainant-Appellee was fully accorded procedural due
process by respondents. On 12 September 2014, complainant was served a Notice to Explain
directing him to explain in writing within five (5) days why he should not merit any disciplinary
action relative to the incident on 30 August 2014. Complainant-Appellee then submitted a
written explanation and a conference was conducted on 19 September 2014. Complainant-
Appellee then submitted a written explanation and a conference was conducted on 19
September 2014 wherein he was not only given the opportunity to fully air his side, but even
assisted by his counsel and supported by union officers during this conference. It was only after
due deliberation and evaluation of the evidence on record that Respondent TV5 decided that
Complainant-Appellee's actions warranted the punitive action of dismissal thus it issued him a
Notice of Termination dated 14 October 2014.

In addition, we note the extensive nature of the investigation conducted by TV5's team,
consisting of the HRD and the Legal Services Department. Their ascertainment of the facts in
petitioner's case shows that he was indeed accorded a fair and fact-based proceeding. A
portion of the investigating committee's report states that they even verified the police blotters
of the police stations allegedly visited by petitioner on August 30, 2014 and found that he was
not truthful in his statements, thus:

During the Conference, Mr. Mulleno alleged that after withdrawing the equipment he went to
Commonwealth, Elliptical Road (Circle), and areas in Quezon City . . . When asked if he ever
experienced getting any news while on roving, he responded in the negative claiming that "eh
 wala pa po Ma'am, kung talagang walang makukunan, kahit nung may kasama ako, wala kaming
nakunan.

However, based on the findings of the Investigating Committee, Mr. Mulleno's alibi is not
credible. A review of the Police Station Blotters of Batasan and Quirino Police Stations for the
questioned date of August 30, 2014, reveals that the following news worthy events were
reported to the stations 1 1:30 PM: a shooting incident involving policemen manning a
checkpoint and a lone gunman happened at 9:10 AM, along Tatlong Hari in Brgy. Sta. Monica,
Novaliches; 2 8:00 AM: Mauling incident happened around 5:00 AM in Brgy. Holy Spirit; 3 8:30
AM: Stabbing incident happened at 1:30 AM in Brgy. Commonwealth; 4 9:00 AM: Shooting
incident, 1 man killed, incident happened 4:30 AM, Brgy. Payatas.

Given the respondents' observance of the twin notice requirement and the generous
opportunities for petitioner to be heard, petitioner cannot be said to have been deprived of
procedural due process.

Hence, based on the foregoing, it is all too clear that petitioner was not illegally dismissed
because his employment termination was grounded on a just cause and was mindful of
procedural due process. Accordingly, he is not entitled to back wages, or his claims for actual,
moral, and exemplary damages.

Roxas v. Macapagal-Arroyo 630 SCRA 211

FACTS:

Melissa Roxas, an American citizen of Filipino descent, while in the United States, enrolled in an
exposure program to the Philippines with the group Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-United
States of America (BAYAN- USA) of which she is a member.

On 19 May 2009, after doing survey work in Tarlac, Roxas and her companions rested in the
house of Mr. Jesus Paolo in Sitio Bagong Sikat. While Roxas and her companions were resting,
15 heavily armed men in civilian clothes forcibly entered the house and dragged them inside a
van. When they alighted from the van, she was informed that she is being detained for being a
member of Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA). She was then
separated from her companions and was brought to a room, from where she could hear sounds
of gunfire, noise of planes taking off and landing, and some construction bustle.

She was interrogated and tortured for 5 straight days to convince her to abandon her communist
beliefs. She was informed by a person named “RC” that those who tortured her came from the
“Special Operations Group” and that she was abducted because her name is included in the
“Order of Battle.”

On 25 May 2009, Roxas was finally released and was given a cellular phone with a sim card. She
was sternly warned not to report the incident to the group Karapatan or something untoward
will happen to her and her family. After her release, Roxas continued to receive calls from RC
thru the cell phone given to her. Out of apprehension, she threw the phone and the sim card.

Hence, on 01 June 2009, Roxas filed a petition for the issuance of Writs of Amparo and Habeas
Data before the Supreme Court, impleading the high-ranking officials of military and
 Philippine National Police (PNP), on the belief that it was the government agents who were
behind her abduction and torture.

On 09 June 2009, the Supreme Court issued the writs and referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for hearing, reception of evidence and appropriate action. The Court of Appeals granted
the privilege of writs of amparo and habeas data. However, the court a quo absolved the
respondents because it was not convinced that the respondents were responsible for the
abduction and torture of Roxas.

Aggrieved, Roxas filed an appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in an amparo petition.

Whether or not circumstantial evidence with regard to the identity and affiliation of the
perpetrators is enough ground for the issuance of the privilege of the writ of amparo.

Whether or not substantial evidence to prove actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim is necessary before the privilege of the writ may
be extended.

Ruling:

No.

It depends. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence.

Yes.

SUPREME COURT RULINGS:

1. DOCTRINE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND THE WRIT OF AMPARO

Command responsibility as justification in impleading respondents is legally inaccurate – The

use of the doctrine of command responsibility as justification in impleading the respondents in
her amparo petition, is legally inaccurate, if not incorrect. Such doctrine is a rule of substantive
law that establishes liability and, by this account, cannot be a proper legal basis to implead a
party-respondent in an amparo petition. (As then formulated, command responsibility is "an
omission mode of individual criminal liability," whereby the superior is made responsible for
crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators). Since
the application of command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is
more aptly invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary
amparo proceeding.

*Writ of Amparo:

The Writ of Amparo as a protective remedy – As held in the case of Rubrico v. Arroyo, the writ
of amparo is a protective remedy aimed at providing judicial relief consisting of the
appropriate remedial measures and directives that may be crafted by the court, in order to
address specific violations or threats of violation of the constitutional rights to life, liberty or
security. It does not fix liability for such disappearance, killing or threats, whether that may be
criminal, civil or administrative under the applicable substantive law. Since the application of
command responsibility presupposes an imputation of individual liability, it is more aptly
invoked in a full-blown criminal or administrative case rather than in a summary amparo
proceeding. However, the inapplicability of the doctrine of command responsibility does not
preclude impleading military or police commanders on the ground that the complained acts in
the petition were committed with their direct or indirect acquiescence. In which case,
commanders may be impleaded — not actually on the basis of command responsibility—but
rather on the ground of their responsibility, or at least accountability.

2. EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN AMPARO PROCEEDINGS

In amparo proceedings, direct evidence of identity must be preferred over mere circumstantial
evidence – In amparo proceedings, the weight that may be accorded to parallel circumstances as
evidence of military involvement depends largely on the availability or non-availability of
other pieces of evidence that has the potential of directly proving the identity and affiliation
of the perpetrators. Direct evidence of identity, when obtainable, must be preferred over mere
circumstantial evidence based on patterns and similarity, because the former indubitably offers
greater certainty as to the true identity and affiliation of the perpetrators.

3. EVIDENCE REQURED IN HABEAS DATA PROCEEDINGS

Substantial evidence of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty
or security of the victim is an indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be
extended – An indispensable requirement before the privilege of the writ may be extended is the
showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to
privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim. In the case at bar, Roxas failed to show that there
is an actual or threatened violation of such right. Hence, until such time that any of the
respondents were found to be actually responsible for the abduction and torture of Roxas, any
inference regarding the existence of reports being kept in violation of the petitioner’s right to
privacy becomes farfetched, and premature. The Court must, at least in the meantime, strike
down the grant of the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

* The writ of habeas data was conceptualized as a judicial remedy enforcing the right to
privacy, most especially the right to informational privacy of individuals.The writ operates to
protect a person’s right to control information regarding himself, particularly in the instances
where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends.

DISPOSITIVE:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. However, it modified the
directive of the Court of the Appeals for further investigation, as follows:

Appointing the CHR as the lead agency tasked with conducting further investigation regarding
the abduction and torture of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CHR shall, under the norm of
extraordinary diligence, take or continue to take the necessary steps: (a) to identify the persons
 described in the cartographic sketches submitted by the petitioner, as well as their whereabouts;
and (b) to pursue any other leads relevant to petitioner’s abduction and torture.

Directing the incumbent Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), or his successor, and the
incumbent Chief of Staff of the AFP, or his successor, to extend assistance to the ongoing
investigation of the CHR, including but not limited to furnishing the latter a copy of its personnel
records circa the time of the petitioner’s abduction and torture, subject to reasonable regulations
consistent with the Constitution and existing laws.

Further directing the incumbent Chief of the PNP, or his successor, to furnish to this Court, the
Court of Appeals, and the petitioner or her representative, a copy of the reports of its
investigations and their recommendations, other than those that are already part of the records of
this case, within ninety (90) days from receipt of this decision.

Further directing the CHR to (a) furnish to the Court of Appeals within ninety (90) days from
receipt of this decision, a copy of the reports on its investigation and its corresponding
recommendations; and to (b) provide or continue to provide protection to the petitioner during
her stay or visit to the Philippines, until such time as may hereinafter be determined by this
Court.

The Supreme Court likewise referred the case back to the Court of Appeals, for the purposes of
monitoring compliance with the above directives and determining whether, in light of any recent
reports or recommendations, there would already be sufficient evidence to hold any of the public
respondents responsible or, at least, accountable. After making such determination, the Court of
Appeals shall submit its own report with recommendation to the Supreme Court for its
consideration. It was declared that the Court of Appeals will continue to have jurisdiction over
this case in order to accomplish its tasks under this decision.

Topic: Equal Protection of Law

Dela Cruz-Cagampan v. One Network Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 217414

DOCTRINE:

An employer's blanket policy of "no-spouse employment" is discriminatory. To justify its

enforcement, the employer must clearly establish a reasonable necessity.

FACTS:

Catherine was hired by One Network Bank (the Bank) on June 11, 2004 as an Accounting
Specialist. Subsequently, the Bank implemented the "Exogamy Policy" on May 1, 2006. This
policy provided that when two employees of the Bank are subsequently married, one of the
spouses must terminate employment immediately after marriage, except as to employees
who were already married prior to the rule. However, on October 31, 2009 (around 3 years
after the Exogamy Policy tookeffect), Catherine married her co-worker, Angelo, a Loan
Specialist. Aware of the Exogamy Policy, the couple requested for permission from the Bank
President to allow them both to continue working for the Bank, proposing that Angelo be
simply transferred to any other branch of the Bank. However, the request was
denied.Catherine sought reconsideration, arguing the ff:(1) she was employed prior to the
 rule's effectivity;(2) the Exogamy Policy violates Art. 136 of the Labor Code. The request being
unheeded, Catherine file for Illegal Dismissal. The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled in Catherine's favor,
and was affirmed by the NLRC, but the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the NLRC,
holding that the policy was a valid exercise of management prerogative because the bank
presented a "reasonable business necessity" or a "bona fide occupational qualification"
behind the Exogamy Policy, citing the high degree of diligence the law imposes upon banking
institutions.

ISSUE:

Whether the Exogamy Policy is valid.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court (SC) held that the policy was invalid for violating(1) the Full Protection
to Labor clause of the Constitution; and 2) the Magna Carta for Women's provisions to
eliminate discrimination against women and their right to freely choose their spouses; and(3)
Article 136 of the Labor Code.

As correctly held by the NLRC, the Bank's policy was unreasonable considering that the "mere
fear of the possibility that the spouses may divulge to each other information with respect to
clients' accounts" is speculative unfounded, and imaginary. Thus, the Bank failed to prove the
"legitimate business concerns" behind the assailed policy.

Note that Art. 136 of the Labor Code was also violated because Catherine was terminated, while
Angelo was retained. The SC cited the Star Paper v Simbol case, where the doctrine of BFOQ
(BonaFide Occupational Qualification) was enunciated, whereby employers are only allowed to
enforce no-spouse employment policies if there exists reasonable demands of the business
which require the enforcement of such a policy. BFOQ has two requisites:(1) that the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved;
(2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the
qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. Further, the case of
Duncan and PT&T held that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established,
and that the employer bears the burned of proof, with substantial evidence. As a final note,
Justice Leonen reminds that Friends, Lovers, and Couples share secrets. Any bank employee may
potentially craft elaborate schemes to embezzle the bank's funds. Thus, the no-spouse
employment policy cannot be justified.

*Magna Carta for Women: to eliminate discrimination against women and ensures their right to freely
choose a spouse

*ARTICLE. 134. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her marriage

De Alban v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 243968, March 22, 2022

Background of the Case

 The case of De Alban v. Commission on Elections involves the constitutionality of the

Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) authority to refuse or cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
(CoC) of a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. (On the ground
that De Alban does not have the financial capability to run a nation-wide campaign. On the
other hand, De Alban contended that he has bona fide intention to run for public office given
his government platforms covering education, agriculture, health and housing program. He
can also wage a nationwide campaign by using social media platform and lastly, his
international travels are sufficient proof of his financial capabilities)

The power of this Commission to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate is clearly

delineated under Section 69 of the Omnibus Elections Code. The Commission is not
duty[-]bound to adduce evidence for any party or for the Respondent in this case. Let
it be understood that the resolution of a case, particularly the instant case, is based on
the law and the evidence on record and not based on a conclusion of fact. It is the
Respondent's burden to convince this Commission that he has the bona fide intention to
run for a Senatorial position which entails significant expenditures.

SECTION 69. Nuisance candidates. — The Commission may, motu proprio or upon a
verified petition of an interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has been filed to put the
election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by
the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or
acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run
for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate.

 The provision allegedly violates the due process clause for lack of comprehensible standards.
Also, the phrase infringes the right of suffrage and the equal protection clause for being
subjective and arbitrary. (Issue concerning equal protection of law)

*Already moot because the comelec already declared the winners of 2019 elections

 Angelo Castro De Alban (Lawyer and teacher) filed his CoC for senator in the May 2019
elections.

 The COMELEC Law Department filed a petition to declare him a nuisance candidate, alleging that
he had no bona fide intention to run for public office and lacked the financial capacity to sustain
a nationwide campaign.

COMELEC's Declaration of De Alban as a Nuisance Candidate

 The COMELEC First Division declared De Alban a nuisance candidate.

 The COMELEC En Banc denied his motion for reconsideration.

De Alban's Petition for Certiorari

  De Alban filed a Petition for Certiorari, arguing that the provision allowing the COMELEC to
declare a candidate a nuisance candidate is unconstitutional for lack of comprehensible
standards and violates the right of suffrage and equal protection clause.

Court's Decision on the Constitutionality of COMELEC's Authority

 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC's authority to refuse or cancel the CoC of
a nuisance candidate.

 The Court found that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring De Alban a
nuisance candidate based on an erroneous interpretation of the law and lack of substantial
evidence.

Ruling

 The authority of the Comelec to refuse to give due course to or cancel the CoC of nuisance
candidates under Section 69 of the OEC applies to elections of all public officers.
The Court then clarified that "[w]hile legislations have been enacted every time an
election for elective officials is scheduled, the Omnibus Election Code remains the
fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of legislations are designed to improve
the law and to achieve the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections."
To be sure, Section 2 of RA No. 6646 is explicit that the OEC shall govern the elections
under the 1987 Constitution. OEC remains the fundamental law on elections despite
the passage of the 1987 Constitution and the enactment of subsequent statutes.23
Hence, contrary to De Alban's theory, the OEC applies to elections of all public officers
including senatorial candidates.
 There is no irreconcilable conflict between Section 69 of the OEC and RA No. 6646 that will bar
the Comelec's power to motu proprio declare candidates as nuisance.
The legislative deliberations reveal that RA No. 6646 was never intended to revoke the
Comelec's motu proprio authority under Section 69 of the OEC. As the proponent
explained, the amendment merely outlined the procedure in declaring a nuisance
candidate if filed by an interested party, to wit
 The last phrase in Section 69 of the OEC does not infringe the equal protection clause and the
right of suffrage.
There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between CoCs filed in good faith and
those falling within the three instances in Section 69 of the OEC that prevent a faithful
determination of the true will of the electorate. The distinction is also aligned to the
policy to ensure rational, objective, and orderly elections. The cancellation of the CoCs
of nuisance candidates is necessary to maintain the purity and fairness of the
elections. The classification is not limited to existing conditions only since it covers every
election. Lastly, Section 69 of the OEC applies indiscriminately to all CoCs filed in bad
faith
Moreover, Section 69 of the OEC does not infringe the right of suffrage. Suffice it to say
that the right to seek public office is not a constitutional right but merely a privilege
that may be subject to the limitations imposed by law
 The Court emphasized that the COMELEC's motu proprio(own’s initiative)authority is subject to
procedural due process. Here, the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in declaring De Alban a
nuisance candidate based on an erroneous interpretation of the law and for lack of supporting
substantial evidence.

Section 76 of the OEC provides that the Comelec has the ministerial duty to receive
and acknowledge a CoC submitted within the filing period using the prescribed form.
The candidate's name will be on the ballot unless the CoC is withdrawn or canceled.

The Court has ruled that the Commission has no discretion to give or not to give due
course to petitioner's certificate of candidacy. The duty of the COMELEC to give due
course to certificates of candidacy filed in due form is ministerial in character. While
the Commission may look into patent defects in the certificates, it may not go into
matters not appearing on their face. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate is thus beyond the usual and proper cognizance of said body.

Contrary to the submission of the COMELEC, the denial of due course or cancellation of
one's certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the
Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions.

It should be stressed that it is not sufficient, as the COMELEC claims, that the candidate
be notified of the Commission's inquiry into the veracity of the contents of his
certificate of candidacy, but he must also be allowed to present his own evidence to
prove that he possesses the qualifications for the office he seeks.

The Court held that "financial capacity to sustain the financial rigors of waging a
nationwide campaign" cannot be used, by itself, to declare a candidate nuisance. The
Court clarifies that financial capacity cannot be conflated with the bona fide intention to
run.

Significantly, the Court in Marquez rejected the Comelec's invocation of Section 13 of RA

7166 because the law does not even set by rule any financial requirement for the
candidates, to wit: "Section 13 of RA 7166 merely sets the current allowable limit on
expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaign. It does not (whether
by intention or operation) require a financial requirement for those seeking to run for
public office, such that failure to prove capacity to meet the allowable expense limits
would constitute ground to declare one a nuisance candidat

The COMELEC's invocation of Section 13, without making explicit, by rule, the minimum
amount that meets the financial capacity requirement, is constitutionally anathema
because it violates the equal protection rights of Marquez and all of the other
candidates it disqualified on this ground. Since the COMELEC did not require all
candidates for senator to declare the amount of money they had, and were committed,
to fund their campaign (whether evidenced by bank certification, guarantee or standby-
letter of credit, for instance)

People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12

 FACTS:

Respondent Cayat, native of Baguio, Benguet and a member of the non-Christian tribe
was found guilty of violating sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 for possessing an
intoxicating liquor (one bottle of gin) which is not a native wine.

Section 2 of the said act prohibits any native of the Philippines who is a member of the
non-Christian tribe to buy, receive and possess any intoxicating liquor other than their
so-called native wines. Consequently, Section 3 thereof provides for its punishment.

Cayat challenges the constitutionality of Act No. 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violative of the due process
and it is an improper exercise of police power.

ISSUES: Whether the Act No. 1639 violates the equal protection clause?

RULING:

No, the Act No. 1639 is not violative of the equal protection clause.

Equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable

classifications. The classification to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to
existing conditions only; (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. On the first requisite, the classification rests
on real and substantial distinctions. The non-Christian tribes refer not to the religious
belief, but in a way to the geographical and more directly to the natives of the
Philippines of a low grade of civilization. Second, Act No. 1639 was designed to insure
peace and order among the non-Christian tribes. The experience of the past and the
lower court observed that the use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian
tribes often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, which hamper the efforts of the
Government to raise their standard of life and civilization. Third, the said act is intended
to apply for all times as long as the conditions exist. Legislature understood that
civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures
of protection and security. Fourth, the act applies equally to all members of same class.

Inchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155

Facts:

RA 1180 – An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was enacted to nationalize the retail trade
business in the Philippines. The law prohibits persons not citizens of the Philippines, and against
associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens
of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade and other
prohibitions and regulations.

Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that it denies to alien residents
the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process
of law. SolGen content that the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the
 State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic
survival.

Issue:

Whether or not the Act is unconstitutional because it denies alien residents the equal protection
of the laws.

Held:

No.The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation,
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It
does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons
falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds
exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.

The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and
as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to
declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act
transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

People v Siton, 600 SCRA 476

Facts:

Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant
to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. The above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, Davao City,
without any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.

Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants:

1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work
and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;

2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support;

3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be
found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or
justifiable purpose;

5. Prostitutes.