ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

I. INTRODUCTION

ARTICLE IX

Constitutional Commissions

A. COMMON PROVISIONS

Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any
other office or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or
in the active management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected
by the functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly,
in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

Section. 3. The salary of the Chairman and the Commissioners shall be fixed by law and
shall not be decreased during their tenure.

Section 4. The Constitutional Commissions shall appoint their officials and employees in
accordance with law.

Section 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.

Section 6. Each Commission en banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings
and practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules, however, shall not diminish,
increase, or modify substantive rights.

Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members, any case
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the Commission
or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.

Section 8. Each Commission shall perform such other functions as may be provided by
law.
B. THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Section 1. (1) The civil service shall be administered by the Civil Service Commission
composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, with
proven capacity for public administration, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, a
Commissioner for five years, and another Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or
acting capacity.

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charters.

(2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to
be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination.

(3) No officer or employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law.

(4) No officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any
electioneering or partisan political campaign.

(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

(6) Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be
provided by law.

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the
Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. It
shall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources
development programs for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management
climate conducive to public accountability. It shall submit to the President and the
Congress an annual report on its personnel programs.

Section 4. All public officers and employees shall take an oath or affirmation to uphold
and defend this Constitution.
Section 5. The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of
government officials and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities
pertaining to, and the qualifications required for, their positions.

Section 6. No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or
controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries.

Section 7. No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any

capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.

Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.

Section 8. No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional,

double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept
without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind
from any foreign government.

Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect

compensation.

C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and

six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time
of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective positions in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the
Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years,
two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In
no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and
appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by
trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving

elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for
the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions

which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of
government; and accredit citizens’ arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals
through violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution,
or which are supported by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections, constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion
or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations
of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending,

including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent
and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
candidates.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized,
or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to, its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress, a comprehensive report on the conduct of
each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.

Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.

Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special
privileges, or concessions granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its
subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time,
and space ,and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective
of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election

laws, rules, and regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission.

Section 6. A free and open party system shall be allowed to evolve according to the free
choice of the people, subject to the provisions of this Article.

Section 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be

valid, except for those registered under the party-list system as provided in this
Constitution.

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list

system, shall not be represented in the voters’ registration boards, boards of election
inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled
to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

Section 9. Unless otherwise fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period
shall commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days thereafter.

Section 10. Bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.

Section 11. Funds certified by the Commission as necessary to defray the expenses for
holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall
be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released
automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the Commission.
D. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT

Section 1. (1) There shall be a Commission on Audit composed of a Chairman and two
Commissioners, who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of
their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, Certified Public Accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing experience, or members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their
appointment. At no time shall all Members of the Commission belong to the same
profession.

(2) The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the
consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without
reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years,
one Commissioner for five years, and the other Commissioner for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the
term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Section 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the
Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit
basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal
autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and universities; (c)
other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d) such
non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or
through the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit
to such audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control
system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such
measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are necessary and appropriate to
correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of the Government and, for
such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting
papers pertaining thereto.

(2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article,
to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods
required therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations,
including those for the prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.

Section 3. No law shall be passed exempting any entity of the Government or its
subsidiaries in any guise whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
Section 4. The Commission shall submit to the President and the Congress, within the
time fixed by law, an annual report covering the financial condition and operation of the
Government, its subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, and non-governmental entities subject to its audit, and
recommend measures necessary to improve their effectiveness and efficiency. It shall
submit such other reports as may be required by law.

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987 (E.O. 292)

E.O. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 and other enabling laws provide for the
general qualifications and limitations in the appointment of the members of the Cabinet.
The purpose of such requirements is to ensure that the appointees possess the
necessary skills, expertise and integrity essential to the job.

OPLE V. TORRES, G.R. NO. 127685, JULY 23, 1998

Facts:

Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant
the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers
against further erosion.

Petitioner contends that the establishment of a national computerized

identification reference system requires a legislative act. The issuance of A.O. No. 308
by the president of the republic of the Philippines is, therefore, an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the Republic of the Philippines.

ISSUE

WON the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the
Philippines is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of
the Republic of the Philippines?

RULING

Yes, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the Philippines
is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the Republic
of the Philippines.
 The Court held that the Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the
Philippines. The grant of legislative power to Congress is broad, general and
comprehensive. The legislative body possesses plenary power for all purposes of civil
government. Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily
possessed by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere. In fine, except
as limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces
all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the
laws. The executive power is vested in the Presidents. It is generally defined as the power
to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance. The President has the duty of supervising
the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and public order. Thus, he
is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him
to discharge his duties effectively.

In this case, A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered
by an administrative order. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest
against dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Regulations are not
supposed to be a substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the
form of a public law. Although administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the
authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power to
make laws.

Hence, the issuance of A.O. No. 308 by the president of the republic of the
Philippines is an unconstitutional usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of
the Republic of the Philippines.

CALALANG VS. WILLIAMS

70 PHIL 726

FACTS

In pursuance of Commonwealth Act 548 which mandates the Director of Public

Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the use of and
traffic on such roads and streets to promote safe transit upon, and avoid constructions
on, roads and streets designated as national roads, the Director of Public Works adopted
the resolution of the National Traffic Commission, prohibiting the passing of animal
drawn vehicles in certain streets in Manila. Petitioner questioned this as it constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power.

ISSUES

Whether or not there is a undue delegation of legislative power.

RULING

There is no undue delegation of legislative power. Commonwealth Act 548 does

not confer legislative powers to the Director of Public Works. The authority conferred
upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained
of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative
policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, “to promote safe transit
upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts
of the National Assembly or by the executive orders of the President of the Philippines
and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic “whenever the condition of
the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest.”

The delegated power, if at all, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but
merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the application of
said law is to be predicated.

To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine
when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of
the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience and interest,
is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly.

It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is

confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the
law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
II. SEPARATION OF POWERS

PLANAS V. GIL, G.R. NO. L-46440, JANUARY 18, 1939

FACTS

Planas was a member of the municipal board of the City of Manila. This case arose
because of the publication of a statement made by the Petitioner criticizing the acts of
certain government officials in connection with the general election for Assemblymen. It
was published in La Vanguardia. The day after the publication of Planas’ statement, she
received a letter from the President, through Secretary Vargas, ordering her to appear and
explain herself to the Commissioner of Civil Service regarding the statement she made.
Planas then contends that the respondent has no jurisdiction to investigate her
since it violates Article VII, Sec. 11 of the 1935 Constitution. She also said that the
President cannot delegate his power to any other person.
ISSUE
(1) Whether or not the respondent has jurisdiction to investigate her.
(a) Whether or not the President can delegate his power to Sec. Vargas, to the
Commissioner of Civil Service, or any other person.

(2) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to review the order of the Chief Executive
RULING
(1) Yes. The statement she made tend to create a general discontent, and hatred among
the people against their government. The interest of the public service requires that these
charges be investigated, so that, if found untrue and made without justifiable motives, the
party making them may be proceeded against in accordance with section 2440, in
connection with section 2078, of the Revised Administrative Code. This is essential to
render effective the authority vested in the President by the Constitution to “take care the
laws be faithfully executed” (Sec 11, par 1, Art. VII).

(a) Yes. The president can delegate his power. Article VII of the Constitution begins
in its section 1 with the declaration of that “The Executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines.” All executive authority is thus vested in him. The
Constitution grant him the power to exercise general supervision over all local
governments and take care the laws to be faithfully executed, and authorizes him to order
an investigation of the act or conduct of any public servants.

(2) No. The Court has no jurisdiction to review the order of the Chief Executive under the
doctrine of separation of powers. However, the Court may inquire or question the validity
or constitutionality of the acts of the Chief Executive when his acts are properly challenged
in an appropriate legal proceeding. In other words, the Constitution made the Court to
allocate constitutional boundaries.

SAMUEL C. OCCENA, petitioner,

vs.

THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE NATIONAL

TREASURER, THE DIRECTOR OF PRINTING, respondents.

G.R. NO. L-56350

APRIL 2, 1981

FACTS:

The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings is against the validity of three
Batasang Pambansa Resolutions proposing constitutional amendments. Petitioners
urged that the amendments proposed are so extensive in character that they go far
beyond the limits of the authority conferred on the Interim Batasang Pambansa as
successor of the Interim National Assembly. For them, what was done was to revise and
not to amend.

Petitioners Samuel Occena and Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the

Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed
the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these
petitions is the assertion that the 1973 Constitution is not the fundamental law. The suits
for prohibition were filed respectively on March 6 and March 12, 1981.

ISSUE(S):

1. WON the 1973 Constitution is already in effect.

2. WON the Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose amendments.
3. WON the three resolutions are valid.
HELD:

1. Yes. It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973
Constitution. In the dispositive portion of Javellana v. The Executive Secretary,
dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification,
this Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: “This being
the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution
being considered in force and effect.”

With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but
must also be obeyed, a factor for instability was removed. The Supreme Court can
check as well as legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts
of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In the latter case, there is
an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient.
The mere dismissal of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the
concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has invariably applied the
present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two
weeks ago. During the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at
least ten cases may be cited.

2. Yes. The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The
applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it
reads thus: “The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National Assembly
and the Members thereof.” One of such powers is precisely that of proposing
amendments. Article XVII, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution in its Transitory
Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with the power to propose
amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote of the majority of its
members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on Amendments. When,
therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the President and Prime
Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted by virtue Of such
impotence its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could and did propose the
amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.
3. Yes. The question of whether the proposed resolutions constitute amendments or
revision is of no relevance. It suffices to quote from the opinion of Justice Makasiar,
speaking for the Court, in Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections to dispose of this
contention. Whether the Constitutional Convention will only propose amendments to
the Constitution or entirely overhaul the present Constitution and propose an entirely
new Constitution based on an Ideology foreign to the democratic system, is of no
moment; because the same will be submitted to the people for ratification. Once
ratified by the sovereign people, there can be no debate about the validity of the new
Constitution. The fact that the present Constitution may be revised and replaced with
a new one … is no argument against the validity of the law because ‘amendment’
includes the ‘revision’ or total overhaul of the entire Constitution. At any rate, whether
the Constitution is merely amended in part or revised or totally changed would become
immaterial the moment the same is ratified by the sovereign people.”

WHEREFORE, the petitions are dismissed for lack of merit.

BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. NO. 208566, NOVEMBER 19, 2013

FACTS

Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For
The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s
lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting
grave abuse of discretion. Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents.

ISSUE

Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws
similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of
constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative
powers.

RULING – Partly Granted.

Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which

govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not
related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to
intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.
This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to
mere oversight that must be confined to: (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and
monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will
undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, the court
declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation
or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the
separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.
III. CREATION, REORGANIZATION AND ABOLITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

ARTICLE XI, 1987 CONSTITUTION, SECTION 5. OMBUDSMAN

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at
least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the
military establishment may likewise be appointed.

ARTICLE XIII, 1987 CONSTITUTION, SECTION 17

HUMAN RIGHTS
Section 17.
(1) There is hereby created an independent office called the Commission on Human
Rights.
(2) The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four Members who must
be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and a majority of whom shall be members
of the Bar. The term of office and other qualifications and disabilities of the Members
of the Commission shall be provided by law.
(3) Until this Commission is constituted, the existing Presidential Committee on
Human Rights shall continue to exercise its present functions and powers.
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission shall be automatically
and regularly released.

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 292, S. 1987 | OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES

SECTION 31, BOOK III, EO 292 (RELATE TO SECTIONS 21-23)

SECTION 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. — The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take
any of the following actions:
 (1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper,
including the immediate Offices, the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers
System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department
or Agency as well as transfer functions to the Office of the President from other
Departments and Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or
agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office of the President from other
departments or agencies.

TITLE II

Organization

CHAPTER 8

Organization of the Office of the President

SECTION 21. Organization.—The Office of the President shall consist of the Office of the
President Proper and the agencies under it.

SECTION 22. Office of the President Proper.—(1) The Office of the President Proper shall
consist of the Private Office, the Executive Office, the Common Staff Support System, and
the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System;

(2) The Executive Office refers to the Offices of the Executive Secretary, Deputy Executive
Secretaries and Assistant Executive Secretaries;

(3) The Common Staff Support System embraces the offices or units under the general
categories of development and management, general government administration and
internal administration; and

(4) The Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System includes such special

assistants or advisers as may be needed by the President.

EUGENIO V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 243 SCRA 196, MARCH 31, 1995

FACTS
 In 1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She
was then recommended to be appointed as a Civil Service Officer Rank IV. But her
appointment to said rank was impeded when in the same year, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) abolished the Career Executive Service Board (CESB). CESB is the
office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the selection,
classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive Service.

Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the
CSC does not have the power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D.
1). CSC on the other hand argued that it has the power to do so pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right to reorganize the CSC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive
Service Board.

RULING

No. The CESB is created by law. It can only be abolished by the legislature. The
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function, except for
Constitutional offices. The power to restructure granted to the CSC is limited to offices
under it. The law that created the CESB intended said office to be an autonomous entity
although it is administratively attached to the CSC.

Larin v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 112745, October 16, 1997

 COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, G.R. NO. 155336, NOVEMBER 25, 2004

FACTS
ISSUE

RULING

BIRAOGO V. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010, G.R. NO. 192935,

DECEMBER 7, 2010
FACTS

E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed
by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level
public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during
the previous administration and submit their findings and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of
the E.O. on the grounds that.

a. It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a

public office and appropriate funds for its operation;
b. The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy,
simplicity, and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new
office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;

ISSUE

RULING
TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

SEC. 2, E.O. 292

SECTION 2. General Terms Defined. — Unless the specific words of the text, or the context
as a whole, or a particular statute, shall require a different meaning:

(1) Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate governmental
entity through which the functions of government are exercised throughout the
Philippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the context, the various arms
through which political authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining
to the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or
other forms of local government.

(2) National Government refers to the entire machinery of the central government, as
distinguished from the different forms of local governments.

(3) Local Government refers to the political subdivisions established by or in accordance

with the Constitution.

(4) Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government,
including a department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or
controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.

(5) National Agency refers to a unit of the National Government.

(6) Local Agency refers to a local government or a distinct unit therein.

(7) Department refers to an executive department created by law. For purposes of Book
IV, this shall include any instrumentality, as herein defined, having or assigned the rank of
a department, regardless of its name or designation.

(8) Bureau refers to any principal subdivision or unit of any department. For purposes of
Book IV, this shall include any principal subdivision or unit of any instrumentality given or
assigned the rank of a bureau, regardless of actual name or designation, as in the case
of department-wide regional offices.

(9) Office refers, within the framework of governmental organization, to any major
functional unit of a department or bureau including regional offices. It may also refer to
any position held or occupied by individual persons, whose functions are defined by law
or regulation.
(10) Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated
within the department framework vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law,
endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying
operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions and government-owned or controlled corporations.

(11) Regulatory agency refers to any agency expressly vested with jurisdiction to regulate,
administer or adjudicate matters affecting substantial rights and interest of private
persons, the principal powers of which are exercised by a collective body, such as a
commission, board or council.

(12) Chartered institution refers to any agency organized or operating under a special
charter, and vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or
objectives. This term includes the state universities and colleges and the monetary
authority of the State.

(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized as a

stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly or through
its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: Provided,
That government-owned or controlled corporations may be further categorized by the
Department of the Budget, the Civil Service Commission, and the Commission on Audit
for purposes of the exercise and discharge of their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such corporations.

(14) “Officer” as distinguished from “clerk” or “employee”, refers to a person whose duties,
not being of a clerical or manual nature, involves the exercise of discretion in the
performance of the functions of the government. When used with reference to a person
having authority to do a particular act or perform a particular function in the exercise of
governmental power, “officer” includes any government employee, agent or body having
authority to do the act or exercise that function.

(15) “Employee” when used with reference to a person in the public service, includes any
person in the service of the government or any of its agencies, divisions, subdivisions or
instrumentalities.

CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

Carpio v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992

FACTS

In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed. This law moved the
Philippine police force from the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the DILG.

Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution,

questioned the constitutionality of the law. He averred that it only interferes with the
control power of the president because it diminishes the president’s commander-in-chief
power (war powers).

Carpio also advanced the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to administrative control” over the PNP
thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the
NAPOLCOM and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose
local police heads also undermine the power of the president.

ISSUE

Whether or not the president abdicated its commander-in-chief power over the
PNP and NAPOLCOM by virtue of RA 6975.

RULING

No. the PNP and the NAPOLCOM are not under the Commander-in-Chief Power of
the President. They are under the President’s control power and power of supervision. So
there is no abdication to speak of.

The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as
a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all
at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet
members.

Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him
over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus
and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the executive department.”

Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under
the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a system
of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated
law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the
funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.
BLAQUERA VS. ALCALA G.R. NO. 109406, SEPTEMBER 11, 1998

FACTS

On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and
employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount
equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be
less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be
granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government
boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions, are
strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and
future years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office
of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government

departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan.
19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive
benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the
prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits
without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices
and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992
in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance
therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government concerned
caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to
cover the alleged overpayments.

ISSUE

Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential
control over the executive departments

RULING

The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive
departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by virtue of his power of
control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his subordinate in the
executive departments, bureau or offices under him.
 When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining
heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from
him and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just
exercising his power of control over executive departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive
benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among
government personnel by committing limited resources of government for the equal
payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising his power of control by
modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive
benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres.,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources.

The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his
control of executive departments.

MORAN V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. NO. 192957, SEPTEMBER 29, 2014

RULING
 IV. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES

ACEBEDO OPTICAL V. C.A ET. AL., G.R. NO. 100152, MARCH 31, 2000

FACTS

Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit.
After consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by
local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to
the following conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical
clinic but only a commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and
similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It
cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made
by an independent optometrist or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell
directly to the public, without need of a prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4)
It cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar
glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an
independent optometrist.

On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas

(SOPI lodged a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the
conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or
revocation of such permit. On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of
Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date and giving
petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

ISSUE

Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid
exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits.

RULING

The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is

essentially regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government
units to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police
power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local
Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in

the business of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage
in the practice of optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on
petitioner's business permit could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's
employ to produce a valid certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of
Examiners in Optometry. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of
business and the City Mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the
practice of a profession. Such a function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative
agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, in this case the
Professional Regulations Commission and the Board of Examiners in Optometry.
SENATOR ROBERT S. JAWORKSI V. PAGCOR, G.R. NO. 144463, JANUARY 14, 2004

FACTS

On March 31, 1998, PAGCOR’s board of directors approved an instrument

denominated as "Grant of Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting
and Internet Gaming", which granted Sports and Games and Entertainment Corporation
(SAGE) the authority to operate and maintain Sports Betting station in PAGCOR’s casino
locations, and Internet Gaming facilities to service local and international bettors,
provided that to the satisfaction of PAGCOR, appropriate safeguards and procedures are
established to ensure the integrity and fairness of the games. Petitioner, in his capacity
as member of the Senate and Chairman of the Senate Committee on Games, Amusement
and Sports, files the instant petition, praying that the grant of authority by PAGCOR in
favor of SAGE be nullified.

ISSUE

Whether or not PAGCOR has the right to vest another entity (SAGE), with the authority to
operate internet gambling.

RULING

The court held that PAGCOR has acted beyond the limits of its authority when it
passed on or shared its franchise to SAGE.

While PAGCOR is allowed under its charter to enter into operator's and/or
management contracts, it is not allowed under the same charter to relinquish or share its
franchise, much less grant a veritable franchise to another entity such as SAGE. PAGCOR
cannot delegate its power in view of the legal principle of delegata potestas delegare non
potest, in as much as there is nothing in the charter to show that it has been expressly
authorized to do so. Hence, in this case, SAGE has to obtain a separate legislative
franchise and not "ride on" PAGCOR's franchise if it were to legally operate on-line Internet
gambling. The grant of franchise is a special privilege that constitutes a right and a duty
to be performed by the grantee. The grantee must not perform its activities arbitrarily and
whimsically but must abide by the limits set by its franchise and strictly adhere to its
terms and conditions. Given that PAGCOR has no authority to grant such authority, it has
exercised beyond the limits provided by the legislature.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH V. CAMPOSANO, G.R. NO. 157684. APRIL 27, 2005

Facts:
 The case involves former employees of the Department of Health-National Capital
Region (DOH-NCR) who were charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty in relation
to an alleged anomalous purchase of medicine. The case was initially investigated by the
DOH Resident Ombudsman and later taken over by the Presidential Commission Against
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The PCAGC found the respondents guilty and
recommended their dismissal from government service. The President issued an
administrative order dismissing one of the respondents and remanding the case of the
others to the Secretary of Health for appropriate action. The Secretary of Health
subsequently issued an order dismissing the respondents from service. The respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. They then appealed to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC), but their appeal was denied. They appealed to the Court of
Appeals (CA), which granted their petition and ordered their reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and payment of back salaries.

Issue:

The main issues raised in the case are:

I. Whether the PCAGC had jurisdiction to investigate the charges against the
respondents.
II. Whether the Secretary of Health properly exercised her authority in dismissing
the respondents.
III. Whether the anomalous contract for the purchase of medicine without public
bidding is illegal.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals (CA) ruled in favor of the respondents and ordered their
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of back salaries. The CA held
that the PCAGC did not have jurisdiction to investigate the charges against the
respondents, as its jurisdiction was limited to presidential appointees. The CA also found
that the Secretary of Health failed to comply with administrative due process in
dismissing the respondents, as she merely relied on the findings of the PCAGC without
conducting an independent assessment of the facts and the law. The CA did not discuss
the legality of the anomalous contract for the purchase of medicine without public
bidding.

Ratio:

Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions,

the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law.
The investigation of a case may be delegated to another body or group of officials, but
the disciplining authority must still weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the
applicable law. In this case, the PCAGC did not have jurisdiction to investigate the charges
against the respondents, as its jurisdiction was limited to presidential appointees. The
Secretary of Health failed to comply with administrative due process by simply relying on
the findings of the PCAGC without conducting her own assessment of the case.

EXPRESS AND IMPLIED

VILLEGAS V. SUBIDO, G.R. NO. L-31711, SEPTEMBER 30, 1971

RULING

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION

The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as
that which is expressed.

DISCRETIONARY AND MINISTERIAL

CARIÑO V. CAPULONG, G.R. NO. 97203, MAY 26, 1993
OCAMPO V. ENRIQUEZ, G.R. NO. 225973, NOVEMBER 8, 2016

Facts:

During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate
Rodrigo R. Duterte publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9,
2016 elections.

On August 7, 2016, Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum

to AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libingan ng Mga Bayani.

On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the
Philippine Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos.

Dissatisfied with the foregoing issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition with the Court.

Issues

1) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave
abuse of discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in
compliance with the verbal order of President Duterte to implement his election
campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB?

2) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive
violated the Constitution, and domestic and international laws?

3) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses
and their cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have
nullified his entitlement as a soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB?

4) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of
former President Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by
which his remains shall be brought back to and interred in the Philippines?

Ruling
The Supreme Court denied the petitions.

Procedural issues

Political question

The Court agrees with the OSG that President Duterte's decision to have the
remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy. In the excercise of his powers under the Constitution and the
Administrative Code of 1987 to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a
land of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine
purposes, President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it
shall promote national healing and forgiveness. There being no taint of grave abuse in
the exercise of such discretion, as discussed below, President Duterte's decision on that
political question is outside the ambit of judicial review.