'Frigid but Unprovocative': British Policy towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the

Winter War, 1939

Author(s): Paul W. Doerr
Source: Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), pp. 423-439
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/261005
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Journalof ContemporaryHistoryCopyright? 2001 SAGEPublications,London,Thousand Oaks, CA and
New Delhi,Vol 36(3), 423-439.
[0022-0094(200107)36:3;423-439;0 18079]

PaulW. Doerr
'Frigid but Unprovocative': British Policy
towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet
Pact to the Winter War, 1939

Relations between Great Britain and the USSR, from the founding of the
Soviet state until 1939, were marred by mutual mistrust and suspicion. The
British undertook armed interventions against the Bolsheviks during the
Russian Civil War, and accused the Soviets of attempting to subvert both
British workers and the British Empire. Periodic spy scandals erupted in both
countries in the late 1920s and early 1930s. British mistrust of the Soviets cul-
minated in the British 'cold-shouldering' the Soviets during the Munich crisis
of September 1938. The British were also horrified by the Stalinist purges of
the late 1930s. Stalin's purge of the Red Army in June 1937 left many British
experts convinced that Soviet offensive military capability had been crippled.
Public pressure, and the need to solidify the British guarantee to Poland, led to
political and military negotiations between the British, French and Soviets in
summer 1939, but these talks ended in bitter failure when the Soviets signed
with Hitler in August.
Historians of British policy towards the USSR have generally fallen into two
dominant perspectives. Some clearly believe that British leaders were blinded
by ideological hatred of the USSR, and for that reason failed to secure an
alliance in 1939 that might have averted war. Others insist that British esti-
mates of Soviet intentions, strengths and weaknesses were entirely accurate
and justified, and largely free of ideological prejudice. The middle ground is
occupied by historians who, while finding fault with the conduct of British
diplomacy, especially in 1939, still seem convinced that Soviet behaviour was
ultimately duplicitous.'
This article will undertake a close study of British policy towards the USSR
during the period from the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the beginning of
the Winter War. It will show that British policy was much more complex than
previously thought. British policy-makers were driven by a profound ambiva-
lence. On the one hand, a deep and abiding mistrust of the Soviets is easy to
find. On the other, the British remained acutely aware of the grave strategic

1 For an example of the first perspective, see F. Northedge and A. Wells, Britain and Soviet
Communism: The Impact of a Revolution (London 1982). For the second, see J. Herndon, 'British
Perceptions of Soviet Military Capability, 1935-39' in W. Mommsen and L. Kettenacker, The
Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement (London 1983), 297-319. For the middle
ground, see relevant sections of D.C. Watt, How War Came (London 1989).
424 Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 36 No 3

situation they faced, and of the overriding need to retain a connection to

Moscow. Such ambivalence can be found at the heart of all aspects of British-
Soviet relations during this period.
When war broke out in September 1939 the British Cabinet was, of course,
unaware of the secret terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact relating to the partition of
Poland. Consequently, Foreign Secretary Halifax could assure his colleagues
on 12 September that Soviet mobilization on the Polish border was of a
'precautionary nature', although he did concede that 'there was a possibility
that later the Soviet might desire to secure a portion of Polish territory'.2
Others, such as John Colville, private secretary to Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain, were quite convinced that Stalin was about to pounce.3
Accordingly, the Soviet invasion of eastern Poland on the morning of 17
September did not come as a major surprise.4 A representative from the
Foreign Office, Lancelot Oliphant, was on hand at the Cabinet meeting that
day to assure all that 'the provisions of the Anglo-Polish agreement would
not come into operation as a result of Soviet aggression against Poland'. The
guarantee applied only in the event of a German attack. Britain was not legally
bound to declare war on the USSR, a judgment that must have served as a
considerable relief.
Lieutenant-General Ronald Adam, Deputy Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, then reported on the military implications of the Soviet attack.
Following established British thinking on Soviet offensive capabilities, Adam
believed that the Soviet advance would 'certainly be slow . ..'. Adam's report
also evinced the British hope, at this early stage, that a contiguous border
between Germany and the USSR would somehow lead to a quick breach in
Nazi-Soviet relations.5 The Soviets would undoubtedly try to spread propa-
ganda among German troops, Adam speculated, and Hitler could hardly
tolerate that. Adam was even inclined to see a positive side to the Soviet
invasion, as Soviet possession of south-east Poland would head off an
immediate German invasion of Romania.6 On the other hand, it was pretty

2 CAB 65/1 13(39) 7, 12 September 1939 and T. Lane, 'The Soviet Occupation of Poland
through British Eyes' in T. Lane and J. Hiden (eds), The Baltic and the Outbreak of the Second
World War (Cambridge 1992), 142-64. Also K. Sword, 'British Reactions to the Soviet
Occupation of Eastern Poland in September 1939', Slavonic and East European Review, 69, 1
(January 1991), 81-101.
3 J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: Downing Street Diaries, 1939-1955 (London 1985), 21.
4 See Alexander Cadogan's matter-of-fact diary entry for 17 September in D. Dilks (ed.), The
Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan (London 1971), 217. Similarly, J. Harvey (ed.), The Diplomatic
Diaries of Oliver Harvey (London 1970), 320. Cadogan was Permanent Under-Secretary of the
Foreign Office, while Harvey was Private Secretary to Halifax.
5 Similar views were expressed by The Times's military correspondent, Basil Liddell-Hart. See
R. Cockett, The Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press
(London 1989), 145. Also Sword, op. cit., 86.
6 This remark found a receptive audience. See Oliver Harvey's diary entry for 22 September.
Also, Simon Papers, 11, diary entries for 18 and 21 September and B. Pimlott (ed.), The Political
Diary of Hugh Dalton (London 1986), 301.
Doerr BritishPolicytowardsthe USSR,1939 425

clear that the partition of Poland had been arranged in August in Moscow,
and it was 'disturbing to think' that a similar deal might apply to Romania.7
The question then arose concerning the most appropriate form of protest.
Chamberlain favoured a strongly-worded protest expressing 'indignation and
horror'. Such a statement should also indicate that an independent Polish state
would be restored at the end of the war. Chamberlain noted that both the
Polish and French ambassadors in London wanted a stronger, formal protest
to be made directly by the British ambassador in Moscow, William Seeds, to
the Soviet authorities. The Cabinet, especially Halifax, successfully opposed
this action, relying instead on a communique issued in London. Such a course
of action, according to Alexander Cadogan, head of the Foreign Office, was
much less dangerous.8
There was an additional, compelling reason for moderation. The War
Cabinet was clearly aware, at this point, 'that it was essential to endeavour to
obtain supplies of softwood in view of the acute shortage, and that Russia
appeared to be the only practicable source for an immediate supply of any
considerable quantity'. On 18 September, the Cabinet decided to approach the
Soviets with an offer to exchange machinery for timber.'
It was clear, therefore, only a few weeks into the war, that British policy
towards the USSR rested on a fundamental ambivalence. The failure of the
British-French-Soviet negotiations in August, followed by the Nazi-Soviet
Pact, had left a bitter taste and a sense, in some quarters, that the USSR was
now an ally of Germany. The events of August 1939 capped many years of
mistrust and suspicion between Britain and the USSR. However, all this had to
be set against the fact that any further breaches in relations with the USSR
might well draw that country even closer into the German embrace. Against
that salient fact everything else had to be measured. The Soviet invasion of
Finland at the end of November threw British ambivalence into stark relief.10
As Polish resistance crumbled and Soviet and German armies met in central
Poland, the Cabinet tried to put the best face on matters. Field Marshal

7 CAB 65/1 18(39) 3, 8, 17 September 1939.

8 Dilks, op. cit., 217. Also A. Roberts, The Holy Fox: A Biography of Lord Halifax (London
1991), 176.
9 CAB 65/1 19(39) 8, 14, 18 September 1939. The softwood was needed for RAF airframes.
Relevant studies of Anglo-Soviet relations during this period include: M. Kitchen, British Policy
Towards the Soviet Union During the Second World War (New York 1986); S.M. Miner,
Between Churchill and Stalin: The Soviet Union, Great Britain and the Origins of the Grand
Alliance (Chapel Hill, NC 1988); G. Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps' Mission to Moscow,
1940-42 (Cambridge 1984); T. Munch-Peterson, The Strategy of the Phoney War: Britain,
Sweden and the Iron Ore Question, 1939-40 (Stockholm 1981); M. Gilbert, Winston S.
Churchill, vol. 6 (London 1983) and J. Bayer, 'British Policy Towards the Russo-Finnish Winter
War, 1939-40', Canadian Journal of History, 16, 1 (April 1981), 27-65.
10 'A combination of German and Russian men and resources might take time to be effective.
But its menace to civilisation and the Empire is so real and great that any future developments in
British policy should be judged in the light of a risk of first class magnitude.' FO 371 23103
C14452/13953/18 21 September 1939.
426 Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 36 No 3

Edmund Ironside, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, optimistically told the
Cabinet on 23 September that 'the presence of large Russian forces on the
German borders might compel the Germans to maintain a very considerable
garrison on the Eastern frontier'.11 In early October, Adam reported that
General Gamelin, Commander-in-Chief of Allied Land Forces, estimated that
the Germans would have to maintain 30 divisions of front-line troops in the
east. Landwehr reservists could not be trusted, Gamelin thought, 'owing to
fears of their becoming Bolshevized'.12On 24 September, Halifax brought the
Cabinet's attention to a telegram from the British embassy in Washington.
According to State Department sources, the Soviets had invaded Poland much
sooner than desired by Germany.13
At the same time, the British government worried that Soviet ambitions
might be turned elsewhere once Poland had been digested. A memorandum by
Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India, dated 21 September, noted that 'the
Afghan government are becoming increasingly apprehensive of Russian
aggression'. Zetland recommended a strengthening of 'our intelligence organi-
zation in the countries bordering on Russian Turkestan ...'.14 On 6 October,
Halifax asked the Chiefs of Staff to report on 'the possibilities of Russian
action in the Balkans, acting either alone or together with Germany'.15For its
part, MI2 submitted an appreciation on possible Soviet action in Iraq, Iran,
Afghanistan and India.16 Most important, a memorandum by Laurence
Collier, head of the Foreign Office Northern Department, warning of the
imminence of Soviet pressure on Finland, was making the rounds.
Collier noted that success in Poland had encouraged the Soviets to begin
exerting pressure on Helsinki 'to secure the cession of the islands in the gulf of
Finland, which they have long coveted ...'. Collier noted that public opinion in
Finland favoured resistance to Soviet demands, and that the Scandinavian
states were drawing together for protection against the Soviet Union and
Germany. Collier also noted that Britain could supply Finland with only
minimal material support, and that 'the consequences of their accepting
encouragement from us to maintain a firm front to Russia and Germany might
well be unfortunate to themselves; but in present circumstances we can only
consider our own interests'. Collier then pointed out that Finland had a com-
paratively large, high quality army and a defensible frontier, although the air
force lacked modern equipment. In closing, Collier noted that 'the Finns, at
least, are one of the few small nations in Europe who have some spirit left and
are really ready to defend their independence and neutrality ..'.17 Collier's

11 CAB65/1 24(39) 4, 23 September1939.

12 CAB65/1 39(39) 7, 6 October1939.
13 CAB65/1 25(39) 3, 24 September1939.
14 CAB66/2 WP(39)55, 21 September1939.
15 CAB65/1 39(39) 7, 6 October1939.
16 WO 106/1594B,4 October1939.
17 FO 371 23643 N4712/194/56 21 September1939. See also the report from the British
MilitaryAttachein Finland,C.S.Vale, in FO 371 23692 N4235/991/38 5 September1939.
Doerr BritishPolicytowardsthe USSR,1939 427

memorandum was circulated to the War Office, the Air Ministry and the Board
of Trade, along with a long list of orders for industrial and military equipment
that the Finnish government had placed in Britain. For the time being, however,
Halifax was preoccupied with trying to build a bridge to Moscow. Two
approaches suggested themselves: direct trade talks with the Soviets, and a
more indirect approach via the services of the Turkish government.
At this juncture Stafford Cripps, a prominent left-wing politician and
former Labour cabinet minister, made the first of his interventions in the realm
of Anglo-Soviet relations. During summer 1939, Cripps had followed the
British-French-Soviet talks with great interest and in September advocated
closer relations with the USSR as a means of shortening the war. Cripps
excused the Soviet attack on Poland on the grounds that the Soviets were only
seeking to safeguard their own security. This placed him squarely at odds with
the Labour leadership which had condemned the Soviet action.18Ironically,
Cripps's expulsion from the Labour Party only served to elevate his stature in
1939. 'Cripps ceased to be a spokesman of a Labour party faction. He became
the voice of national conscience - the Churchill of the Left.'19This may
explain part of his appeal to Conservative ministers in the coming months;
Cripps was a national figure, above partisan politics, with an interest in
Anglo-Soviet relations (and an impeccable aristocratic background). Churchill
was most intrigued by Cripps's ideas for improved relations with the USSR,
largely on the grounds that Britain would regain important strategic advan-
tages. With Halifax, Cripps found common ground in the fact that both held
deeply-rooted Christian beliefs, left-wing principles notwithstanding.
During the course of September Cripps requested permission from Halifax
to go to Moscow as a private individual 'with a view to investigating the
situation there from my standpoint and from the contacts that I can make'.
Cripps was worried by the prospects of a full-blown German-Soviet alliance
and the possibility that the USSR might enter the war against Britain. In order
to head this off, he proposed an Anglo-Soviet non-aggression treaty. Some in
the Foreign Office saw no value whatsoever in Cripps's proposal, but at least
one staff member, Frank Lascelles, pointed out that 'our relations with the
Soviet Union are now so bad that I doubt whether Sir Stafford Cripps could
make them much worse if he tried'. Lascelles also took the opportunity to ask
if British policy towards the USSR could best be defined as 'frigid but
unprovocative'.20Halifax, for his part, saw no objection to Cripps making the
effort.21
Historian Gabriel Gorodetsky argues that in the coming months opinion

18 H. Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador in Moscow, May 1940-June 1941',
English Historical Review, 94 (1979), 48-70. Also T. Burridge, British Labour and Hitler's War
(London 1976), 26-8.
19 B. Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London 1985), 368.
20 FO 371 23678 N4751/57/38 23 September 1939. Letters from Cripps to Halifax, 16 and 18
September 1939. Minutes by Lascelles and Oliphant, 18 September 1939.
21 Ibid. Halifax to Seeds, 22 September 1939.
428 Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 36 No 3

crystallized between the anti-Soviet hard line, popular in the Foreign Office,
and those in government who were more motivated by considerations of
realpolitik. Halifax vacillated between the two viewpoints, and this made it
possible for an outsider such as Cripps to have an impact.22Cripps was also
incidentally pushing for Chamberlain's resignation and the elevation of
Halifax to Prime Minister.23All that was in the future, however, as Cripps's
initial foray met a dead end when the Soviet government refused his request
for a visa.24Cripps's proposal for a non-aggression treaty with the USSR was
taken up in the Foreign Office by Ivone Kirkpatrick, formerly First Secretary
at the British embassy in Berlin, who thought it might be a good ploy to gain
the support of Labour.25The idea was immediately shot down by Cadogan,
who pointed out that 'the words "Non-aggression Pact" stink somewhat since
August 23 . . .'. He also felt that such a pact would have a negative impact on
opinion in neutral countries such as the USA, Italy and Spain.26
On 24 September Halifax had a meeting with Ivan Maisky, Soviet
ambassador to Britain. Halifax wanted to sound out Maisky on the future of
Anglo-Soviet relations. When asked how Britain was to interpret recent pro-
nouncements on Soviet neutrality, Maisky said only that he would pass
Halifax's questions on to Moscow. Halifax received the same answer when he
asked if the USSR wanted to conclude a general war trade agreement with
Britain. Commented Cadogan: 'Maisky very embarrassed: of course he knows
nothing!'27Maisky returned with the Soviet reply three days later. He said that
the Soviet government intended to follow a path of neutrality, and that the
demarcation line between the USSR and Germany was 'provisional'. There
were simply too many 'imponderables' to declare a final position. Maisky then
said that the Soviets would enter into trade negotiations if these were 'really
desired' by Britain. He also complained that the British government was hold-
ing up export licenses for Soviet orders placed in Britain.28Maisky had thus
dropped the first in a series of hints that the Soviets were deeply distrustful of
the Germans and wanted closer trade links with Britain.29This should have
been very much what the British wanted to hear. However, the bitter events of
the previous months cast a long shadow for Cadogan, who characterized
Maisky's answers as 'evasive and silly .. .'. It was 'quite useless talking to him
- he knows nothing and is told nothing by his Government'.30

22 Gorodetsky, op. cit., 10-11.

23 P. Addison, The Road to 1945 (London 1982), 193.
24 FO 371 23678 N4751/57/38, Cripps to Halifax, 30 September 1939.
25 Ibid. Minute by Kirkpatrick, 22 September 1939.
26 FO 371 23678 N4862/57/38, minute by Cadogan, 23 September 1939.
27 CAB 65/1 25(39) 6, 24 September 1939 and Dilks, op. cit., 219.
28 CAB 65/1 30(39) 6, 28 September 1939. On 10 September Tass had issued a statement
through Pravda complaining about disruptions in Anglo-Soviet trade.
29 See also FO 371 800/328 Halifax to General Lord Gort Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
20 and 23 October 1939. FO 371 23682 N5426/92/38, 13 October 1939; 23697 N5443/
1459/38, 16 October 1939.
30 Dilks, op. cit., 219.
Doerr BritishPolicytowardsthe USSR,1939 429

A visit by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Moscow on 27 Sept-

ember resulted in the conclusion of a 'Soviet-German Friendship and Frontier
Treaty', demarcating the line between the USSR and Germany. The treaty also
pledged closer ties and issued a statement that placed the blame for continua-
tion of the war on Britain and France, should those countries turn down
German peace offers. The British Cabinet remained remarkably sanguine. The
Cabinet recorded 'general agreement that it would be unfortunate if we were
to allow our proposed trade negotiations with the USSR to lapse, in view espe-
cially of the need for obtaining (if possible) supplies of timber from the Soviet
Union'.31At the next day's meeting the Cabinet made an important decision.
John Simon, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Leslie Burgin, Minister of
Supply, argued that the need for Soviet timber 'was so urgent that we should
be justified in releasing rubber and tin ... in order to obtain it.' Oliver Stanley,
President of the Board of Trade, reported that the Soviets were willing to
exchange cereals for machine tools and copper. Halifax cautioned that 'in
existing circumstances exports to the USSR were probably tantamount to
exports to Germany'. Despite his views, the Cabinet agreed to go ahead with
both deals.32
Churchill made the first of his famous wartime speeches on 1 October. This
was the occasion where he referred to Russia as 'a riddle wrapped in a mystery
inside an enigma'. He spoke of the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland as the
result of 'a cold policy of self-interest'. He pointed out that it was in the
USSR's interest to ensure that Germany did not overrun the Balkans.
Chamberlain agreed. 'I believe Russia will always act as she thinks her own
interests demand, and I cannot believe she would think her interests served by
a German victory followed by a German domination of Europe.'33
The reasons behind this sudden wave of optimism may be found in the
minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 2 October. Burgin reported on the progress
reached in negotiations with the Soviet embassy. Burgin said that he had inter-
viewed M. Filin, the Soviet Trade Commissar, and that 'considerable progress
had been made . ..'. Stanley then reported that he had proposed to Filin that
Britain exchange machine tools and copper for cereals. An unnamed minister
raised the possibility that the Soviets might be acting in 'bad faith', and that
the vessels carrying timber might be sunk by German submarines. The Soviets
would then demand their rubber and tin. Burgin replied that the Admiralty
was organizing a convoy as far as Narvik.34However, the possibility of sub-
marine attack, presumably without Soviet connivance, aroused considerable

31 CAB 65/1 31(39) 9, 10, 29 September 1939.

32 CAB 65/1 32(39) 15, 15 September 1939. Simon also felt that 'Russia was as much interest-
ed as Turkey in stopping the Drang-Nach-Osten . . .'. Simon Papers, 11, diary entry for 21
September 1939.
33 Gilbert, op. cit., 49-51. Maisky was so encouraged by Churchill's speech that he paid a visit
to Churchill at the Admiralty. Cripps also had a meeting with Maisky. See I. Maisky, Memoirs of
a Soviet Ambassador (New York 1967), 30-4.
34 CAB 65/1 34(39) 7, 2 October 1939.
430 Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 36 No 3

anxiety on both sides. At one point the Soviets came up with the idea of
exchanging cargoes at sea outside Murmansk. How this would minimize the
submarine danger was not explained. Characteristically, Churchill favoured
the plan.35 Burgin signed the rubber and tin for timber agreement on the
morning of 10 October and the convoys were under way by 24 October. The
deal advanced by Stanley was concluded in mid-October.36
During October the British also hoped to use their Turkish connection to
win over the Soviets. The British and Turks were close to signing a treaty of
mutual assistance by this point in time. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Sukru
Saracoglu, was due to travel to Moscow in October for talks with his Soviet
counterparts. Ivone Kirkpatrick first raised the idea in his 22 September
memorandum. He was still trying to find a means to implement Cripps's idea
for a non-aggression treaty. Kirkpatrick suggested that Saracoglu be given a
message to pass on to the Soviets, hinting at British interest in a non-
aggression pact. Despite Foreign Office opposition, Halifax took up the pro-
posal. He instructed Seeds to get in touch with Saracoglu while the latter was
in Moscow and tell him 'that our efforts are solely directed towards removing
from Europe menace of German aggression'.37
Saracoglu left for Moscow on 27 September. The fact that he was there at
the same time as Ribbentrop aroused great unease in Cadogan's mind.38The
talks went slowly and Saracoglu was kept cooling his heels while the Finnish
envoy underwent 'his ordeal' on 13 October.39Finally, on 18 October Halifax
reported that the Turkish-Soviet talks had broken down, largely over what the
Turks regarded as extreme Soviet demands for control in the Bosphorous. The
Soviets also requested revisions of the impending mutual assistance treaty
between France, Britain and Turkey. Halifax was pleased that the Turks had
stood up to the Soviets, but the 'fact that they had had to break with the USSR
put an end, at present at least, to our hopes of building, through Turkey, a
bridge between the Government of the USSR and ourselves'. Halifax was
worried by the fact that Stalin apparently felt he could dispense with Turkish
friendship. This suggested a German-Soviet arrangement for the Balkans,
highly favourable to the USSR.40
The crisis between Finland and the USSR now shifted into top gear.41On 5
October the Finns received an invitation to send a delegation to Moscow to
discuss 'concrete political questions'.42The next day the Finnish government

35 CAB 65/1 38(39) 10, 5 October 1939.

36 CAB 65/1 43(39) 9, 10 October 1939; CAB 65/1 58(39)9, 24 October 1939; FO 371 23682
N5342/92/38, 16 October 1939 and N5465/92/38, 19 October 1939.
37 FO 371 23678 N4862/57/38, 22 September 1939.
38 Dilks, op. cit., 220.
39 CAB 65/1 46(39) 11, 11 October 1939. The Soviets had just presented the Finns with a list
of territorial demands.
40 CAB 65/1 51 (39) 8, 18 October 1939. The mutual assistance treaty was signed the next day.
41 D. Spring, 'The Soviet Decision for War Against Finland, 30 November 1939', Soviet
Studies, 38, 2 (April 1986), 207-26.
42 G. Gripenberg, Finland and the Great Powers (Lincoln 1965), 75-7.
Doerr BritishPolicytowardsthe USSR,1939 431

announced that J.K. Paasikivi, the Finnish ambassador to Sweden, would be

going to Moscow to conduct negotiations. Collier noted, however, that 'the
Finnish MFA seems, up to the very last moment, to have displayed an almost
fatuous optimism - presumably because he thought that the German interest
in Finland would be sufficient to keep the Russians quiet. . .'. The Germans
quickly disabused the Finns of this notion.43Nonetheless, as Lascelles noted, 'it
looks as though the Finns will at least put up a better fight than the Estonians
and the Latvians'.4 (Latvia had signed a mutual-assistance treaty with the
USSR on 7 October, whereas Finland had ordered a partial mobilization.)
Meanwhile, Collier pressed the War Office and Air Ministry for the release of
war material to Finland.45
On 8 October the Foreign Office received a despatch reviewing the state of
Finnish-Soviet relations from Thomas Snow, Britain's ambassador to Finland.
He was deeply pessimistic. The Military Attache, Vale, had come to some
discouraging conclusions. The Finnish army was small in numbers, lacked
modern equipment and laboured under a 'poor' high command. Finnish cities
were vulnerable to air attack. Water obstacles in the interior of the country
were already freezing over. Snow noted that no help could be expected from
Sweden, which had always been prepared to sacrifice Finland. He could see no
way in which the British government could send practical assistance. Snow
assessed the Finnish attitude as 'purely fatalistic. They have been under
Russian domination geographically and sooner than temporise with unwel-
come proposals they will fight and go under again.' The conclusion, wrote
Snow, 'would seem to be that this country, if left to its own devices, is headed
for catastrophe'.46
Collier took sharp issue with Vale's assessment of the Finnish army. While
the numbers of the peacetime regular army were small, 'with the aid of con-
scription and of the "Schwartzcorps" system, (the army) can put a compara-
tively large number of men into the field in wartime; and the men are of very
good quality'. Collier also noted that information from Swedish sources indi-
cated that the Finns would 'stand firm - partly, no doubt, from the belief (for
which there is some evidence) that the Russians were "bluffing"'.47
The Finnish ambassador to Britain, G.A. Gripenberg, met Halifax at the
Foreign Office on 10 October amidst reports of heightening tension along the
Finnish-Soviet border.48According to Gripenberg, Halifax expressed sympathy
for Finland's plight, but seemed doubtful that the Finnish government would
fight. Gripenberg assured him otherwise.9 Halifax said that he found it hard
to see exactly what assistance Britain could extend to Finland. This gave

43 See A. Upton, Finland 1939-40 (London 1974), 25-6.

44 FO 371 23692 N5026/991/38, 7 October 1939.
45 FO 371 23692 N5080/991/38, 3 October 1939.
46 FO 371 23692 N5093/991/38, 8 October 1939.
47 Ibid. Minute from Collier, 10 October 1939.
48 FO 371 23692 N5151/991/38, 10 October 1939.
49 Gripenberg, op. cit., 74.
432 Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 36 No 3

Gripenberg the opportunity to complain about the delay in processing export

licenses. Halifax said that he would see what could be done. Indeed, within
one week Halifax had written to Chatfield, Minister for Co-ordination of
Defence, pointing out that Finland had placed orders in Britain for Vosper
Motor Torpedo Boats, aeroplane engines and 'artillery tractors'. Many of
these orders had been placed before the war. 'You will know all the political
and strategic reasons that make it urgently desirable to us to do what we can
to strengthen the position of Finland at this time.'
Meanwhile, Halifax continued to receive advice from Cripps. On 13
October, Cripps wrote to Halifax urging that a high-level trade delegation be
sent to Moscow. 'The fact that the Germans are busy trying to get all the
supplies that they can makes it essential that we should act without any delay
whatsoever.'50
On the same day Anthony Eden, Dominions Secretary (and former Foreign
Secretary), held a one-and-a-half hour lunch with Maisky, at which the latter
did all the talking, according to Eden's record. Eden must have got a few
words in since he managed to raise the possibility of Cripps succeeding Seeds.
Maisky was not keen on the idea, pointing out that a left-wing politician
would not enjoy the confidence of a Conservative government. Maisky went
on to inform Eden that the USSR was pursuing a policy of isolationism, and
needed to bring strategic borders under Soviet control, including 'certain
islands' in the Gulf of Finland. While relations with Germany were good for
now, nobody knew what the future might hold. Eden's general impression was
that 'Maisky was poorly informed on the details of Soviet policy'.51
While Maisky and Eden were chatting, Gripenberg held an interview with
Richard Butler, Foreign Office Under-Secretary. Gripenberg warned that the
USSR and Germany were in collusion and would declare war on the west
together. According to the British record, Gripenberg charged that the Foreign
Office was not interested in Finland, and was corrected by Butler.s2According
to Gripenberg's memoirs, Butler on his own initiative assured Gripenberg of
Britain's interest in Finnish relations with the USSR.53Finally, a minute by
Collier on a separate document, also dated 13 October, noted that the Foreign
Office intended to ask the Chiefs of Staff if it was in Britain's interests to
defend Norway against Soviet invasion, although that 'was not the same thing
as supporting Norway and Sweden if they intervene against Russia in favour
of Finland'. In that event, Collier urged an assurance to Sweden and Norway
that their flank would be protected from Germany while they supported
Finland. While it is difficult to sort out any coherent British policy towards the

50 FO 371 23692 N5190/99/38, 10 October 1939. Letter from Halifax to Chatfield, 17

October 1939.
51 FO 371 23682 N5426/92/38, 13 October 1939. See also A. Eden, The Reckoning
(Cambridge 1965), 86-8. The suggestion for appointing Cripps originated with Churchill. See C.
Cooke, The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps (London 1957), 251.
52 FO 371 23692 N5260/991/38, 13 October 1939.
53 Gripenberg, op. cit., 80.
Doerr BritishPolicytowardsthe USSR,1939 433

Soviet Union at this juncture, the bottom line was that Britain could not afford
to drive the Soviets into Germany's arms.54
Halifax took up Cripps's proposals, urging Stanley to go to Moscow with
the objective of driving a wedge between Germany and the USSR.55The
bureaucracy gave the idea a cool reception. At a meeting of representatives of
the Foreign Office, Board of Trade, Ministry of Economic Warfare, and
Ministry of Food and Supply on 17 October, 'it was unanimously agreed that,
in view of the present ambiguous political attitude of the Soviet Government
and their ostentatiously close economic relations with Germany, it was
impossible to contemplate anything more than a specific barter deal . ..
Nevertheless, Halifax placed the proposal before the Cabinet on 20 October.56
The Finnish delegation had spent 12 and 14 October in Moscow receiving
the initial set of Soviet demands. The Soviets wanted territorial concessions
opposite Leningrad and islands in the Gulf of Finland. In exchange the Soviets
would turn over territory in Soviet Karelia. The Finnish government spent
between 16 and 20 October preparing a counter-offer. Halifax interviewed
Maisky again on 13 October with a view to eliciting Soviet intentions.57
Maisky was relatively open. He said that the Soviets wanted
... to secure Finnish consent to such action as would prevent the Gulf of Finland being
blocked against Russia. In reply to an enquiry from me as to the quarter against which this
improved strategical defense was necessary, M. Maisky contented himself by saying that
no friendship was very secure these days and, therefore, they had to be prepared for any
eventuality.58

This failed to clarify the situation for Halifax. In private correspondence he

referred to the USSR as 'the query mark in Europe at the present moment'. He
conceded that Soviet fears of aggression through the Baltic were 'genuine'.
However, 'Stalin will, I think, play a shrewd, suspensive game designed in the
main to encourage continuance of the war in order that he may look for the
appropriate pickings in an enfeebled Europe'.s9
A modest step towards making the situation clearer was provided by a
telegram from Snow that reached the Foreign Office on 21 October. Snow
dealt with the question of what to do should the Soviets attack Finland.
He speculated that 'a complete breach with the Soviet Government would
command nation-wide support'. Snow also suggested that the Soviets would

54 Roberts, op. cit., 178.

55 FO 371 23682 N5296/92/38, 13 October 1939.
56 Ibid. See also CAB 65/1 54(39) 5, 20 October 1939 and FO 371 23683 N5598/92/38, 18
October 1939.
57 Neither Seeds nor Snow had been able to discover the nature of the Soviet demands, although
Collier thought that 'they must be very far-reaching'. FO 371 N5336/991/38, 13 October 1939
and N5364/991/38, 16 October 1939.
58 FO 371 23697 N5343/1459/38, 16 October 1939.
59 FO 800/320. Letters from Halifax to the Viceroy of India and Gort, 17 and 20 October
1939.
434 Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 36 No 3

not be content with a conquest of Finland, and would press on to the

Norwegian seaboard. Snow called for an anti-Soviet 'arrangement' with Japan
and, as Halifax said later in a report to the Cabinet, 'recommended in effect
that, in the event of Soviet aggression against Finland, we should either
formally or informally declare a state of belligerence between ourselves and
the USSR'. Snow's telegram garnered little enthusiasm in the Foreign Office,
largely because his proposals were utterly impractical. Lascelles thought the
idea of a diplomatic breach was academic since 'the Cabinet presumably still
take the line that we cannot afford to break with Russia and thus turn her into
an ally of Germany'. Collier agreed and noted that 'what the Soviet govern-
ment may do in Finland (cannot) be more, from our point of view, than what
they have done in Poland'. For his part, Halifax thought the time had come to
ask the Chiefs of Staff for their views on the advantages and disadvantages of
declaring war on the USSR.60
With the Finnish delegation preparing to return to Moscow on 23 October,
Halifax continued attempts to obtain details of the negotiations. He had only
marginal success. Details of Soviet demands came to the attention of the
Foreign Office only on 24 October, in a despatch from Cecil F. Dormer,
British ambassador to Norway. Dormer noted most of the Soviet demands,
but failed to mention the Soviet offer of compensation in Karelia. On the same
day the Finns ordered general mobilization.61
Halifax obtained Cabinet approval to send Stanley to Moscow in pursuit of
a major trade deal at the Cabinet meeting of 24 October. After reading
Cripps's letter to his colleagues, Halifax said that he 'was influenced by the
apparent result of Herr Hitler's request to M. Stalin for economic assistance. It
seemed that M. Stalin had replied that he wished to reserve his freedom to
trade with the United Kingdom and the United States.'62The proposal was put
to a 'highly gratified' Maisky the next day, with the warning that the outbreak
of hostilities between the USSR and Finland would jeopardize any progress in
this area. Maisky said he was confident that if the Finns were reasonable,
'everything should be capable of adjustment'.63That was as far as the matter
got; the British never received an answer to their proposal. Much later Maisky
confessed that Moscow suspected that it was the British who were secretly
encouraging Finnish intransigence.
Halifax also held an interview with Gripenberg on 25 October. Gripenberg
insisted that Finland would fight and would 'put up a good resistance to
the invasion'. Halifax still doubted that hostilities would result. He seemed
characteristically ambivalent about the prospects of any 'accretion' of Soviet
strength in the Baltic. A build-up of Soviet naval strength, Halifax mused,
would be to the advantage of Britain since it would distract Germany. On the
other hand, one had to keep in mind the dangers involved in any spread of
60 CAB 65/1 57(39) 8, 23 October 1939 and FO 371 23692 N5522/99/38, 21 October 1939.
61 FO 371 23692 N5587/991/38, 24 October 1939 and N5595/991/38, 24 October 1939.
62 CAB 65/1 58(39) 9, 24 October 1939.
63 CAB 65/1 62(39) 13, 27 October 1939.
Doerr BritishPolicytowardsthe USSR, 939 435

Soviet influence, particularly the threat of 'Bolshevization' of the Baltic States

and Scandinavia.64
The Finnish delegation in Moscow concluded a second round of talks and
returned to Helsinki on 26 October. By 30 October Collier was convinced that
the prospects for a peaceful settlement were dim.65Coincidentally, it was also
towards the end of October that serious questions were raised, first by the
Ministry of Economic Warfare, then in Cabinet and in the House of
Commons, concerning the extent to which the USSR constituted a loophole in
the British blockade of Germany.66
On 31 October the Chiefs of Staff completed their report on the relative
advantages and disadvantages of a declaration of war against the USSR. Their
conclusion was unambiguous. 'In our view we and France are at present in no
position to undertake additional burdens and we cannot, therefore, from a
military point of view, recommend that we should declare war on Russia.' The
only possible circumstance under which such a declaration could be justified
would be if it led to the intervention of the USA. This, however, seemed a
remote possibility. The Chiefs also recapitulated the conclusions of a report
drawn up earlier in October on the effects of closer co-operation (to the point
of a joint war effort) between the USSR and Germany. This report concluded
that the Soviets could cause Britain 'serious embarrassment' in the Middle East
and diminish the effects of the economic blockade of Germany.67Presumably
the Chiefs wanted to reinforce the necessity in the ministers' minds of avoiding
anything that would drive the Soviets over to Germany. Despite great pressure,
the Chiefs never wavered from their opposition to open conflict with the USSR
during the course of the Soviet-Finnish war.
The Cabinet adopted the recommendations of the Chiefs' report at its meet-
ing on 1 November, and in the process reviewed the whole scope of Anglo-
Soviet relations. Halifax noted that Snow's report of 21 October enjoyed
support in 'ideological circles', but for his own part he supported the Chiefs of
Staff position. Halifax added that only one issue remained outstanding in the
Soviet-Finnish talks, and that 'the situation was not viewed with undue alarm'
in Helsinki. Stanley noted that Maisky had not yet received authorization to
begin trade talks, but Halifax 'thought that it would be an error of tactics for
HM Government to appear unduly anxious to start negotiations'. Halifax also
reviewed a speech given by Molotov the preceding day, and described it as
'satisfactory'. According to Halifax, Molotov gave moral support to Germany,
but promised no active assistance and had stressed Soviet neutrality.68

64 FO 371 23644 N5631/194/56, 25 October 1939 and CAB 65/1 62(39) 10,27 October 1939.
Halifax's complacency may have been fed by intelligence reports indicating that the Soviet occu-
pation of Estonia had been poorly executed. See CAB 66.2 WP(39) 101, 28 October 1939.
65 FO 371 23693 N5732/991/38, 28 October 1939. Intelligence reports indicated a steady
build-up of Soviet forces on the Finnish frontier. CAB 66/2 WP(39) 101, 28 October 1939.
66 FO 371 23683 N5647/92/38, 27 October 1939 and CAB 65/1 65(39) 9, 30 October 1939.
67 CAB 66/3 WP(39)74, 9 October 1939 and CAB 66/3 WP(39)107, 31 October 1939.
68 CAB 65/2 67(39) 9, 10, 11, 17, 1 November 1939.
436 Journalof ContemporaryHistoryVol 36 No 3

Halifax's interpretation of Molotov's remarks was astounding. Molotov's

speech was widely held to have marked an important turning-point on the
road to war with Finland, 'because now considerations of great power prestige
would not permit Russia to draw back'.69Molotov also dropped a clear hint
that Moscow believed that Britain was the inspiration for Finland's intransi-
gence. He claimed that 'in Finland there is greater evidence of various kinds of
outside influence on the part of third Powers'. Nevertheless, Chamberlain also
drew optimistic conclusions from Molotov's pronouncements while Snow told
the Finnish government 'that he could not believe that the Soviet Government
would incur the odium of attacking Finland and the accompanying risk of
alienating the United States, their best safeguard against Japan'.70
The British probably believed that the Soviets were militarily incapable of
an attack on Finland. On 1 November the British Air Attache in Stockholm,
J.C. Johnson, had a meeting with an official at the Swedish Ministry of
Defence, Colonel Uhr. Uhr said that 'Russia would not fight for Finland now
because the Russians had never held winter manoeuvres and do not possess
troops trained for winter operations in the snow'. If the Soviet did attack, the
Finns would hold out in the woods for many months 'and would strain rather
seriously (the Red Army's) organisation and supply system in Russia'. Soviet
troops, according to Uhr, were poorly disciplined and clothed, and had 'little
spirit or morale for a fight'.71Lost in the shuffle of information was a report
from Colonel Firebrace, the British Military Attache in Moscow. Firebrace
argued that while the Red Army was not the equal of the French, German
or British armies it was still fully capable of imposing its will on smaller
neighbours such as Finland.72
A prolonged lull marked most of November, with the Soviets negotiating in
a desultory fashion with Helsinki. An unreal air of optimism settled over the
scene; as late as 15 November the Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs told
Snow that despite the deadlock in talks he 'did not anticipate anything worse
than a week of angry utterances in Moscow'.73 In the meantime something had
to be done about the trade issue. At the Cabinet meeting of 16 November
Halifax read a letter from Cripps (who had been talking with Maisky), in
which Cripps suggested that the Soviets would not resume trade talks until the
Finnish issue had been settled. Cripps noted that the Soviets had been telling
one and all that their difficulties in negotiations with Finland could be
attributed to British machinations. This led to an interjection from Churchill,
who pointed out that 'no doubt it appeared reasonable to the Soviet Union to
take advantage of the present situation to regain some of the territory which
Russia had lost as a result of the last war . . .'. He then argued that it was in

69 Upton, op. cit., 38.

70 CAB 65/2 69(39) 8, 3 November 1939.
71 FO 371 23708 N6005/2066/42, 1 November 1939.
72 FO 371 23678 N5778/57/38, 20 October 1939.
73 CAB 65/2 84(39) 9, 15 November 1939 and FO 371 23693 N6537/991/38, 14 November
1939.
Doerr BritishPolicytowardsthe USSR,1939 437

British interests 'that the USSR should increase their strength in the Baltic,
thereby limiting the risk of German domination in the area. For this reason, it
would be a mistake for us to stiffen the Finns against making any concessions
to the USSR.' Halifax countered that he was not about to press the Finns 'to
make concessions on questions which they themselves regarded as vital to their
national independence'.74When Churchill's remarks came to the attention of
the Northern Department, Collier responded by noting that the USSR was
'benevolently neutral, or even half-allied to Germany . . .'. It was hardly in
Britain's interest to see Soviet power strengthened. Britain should instead work
towards 'a situation in which (the USSR) is involved in difficulties . . . and is
thereby so much the less able to help Germany'.
The next few days saw the British preoccupied with attempts to restart trade
talks. Butler interviewed the Soviet Military Attache in London, General
Czerny, on 22 November. Czerny promised Butler that the Soviet reply would
be forthcoming within the next few days.75The Cabinet also directed Halifax
to interview Maisky and ask him about the cause of the delay. At the same
time, Halifax was told to avoid giving the impression that the British were in
any hurry.76Labour leaders such as Clement Attlee and Arthur Greenwood
were also now pressing Halifax to do something about the delay in opening
trade talks.77
For better or worse Halifax had little choice in the matter. Frontier incidents
between the USSR and Finland began on 26 November. An interview between
Halifax and Maisky on 27 November went badly. Maisky was in a belligerent
mood and blamed everything on the Finns. Helsinki had been completely
unreasonable and the Finns were now shelling Soviet territory. Maisky re-
peated accusations about British meddling in Finnish-Soviet negotiations
and complained 'that it appeared to be British policy to obstruct the Soviet
Government in every part of the world'. Halifax challenged Maisky to 'pro-
duce a single case, in any part of the world, in which we had interfered with
Russia's legitimate interests'. Maisky 'left shaking his head and expressing
foreboding for the future'.78
On 29 November Leslie Hore-Belisha, Secretary of State for War, told the
Cabinet that the Soviets had concentrated 350,000 troops and 750 tanks
on the Finnish border. The Finns had 400,000 men under arms and were in
possession of a strong defensive line. 'They were a plucky people, and it
looked as though they intended to fight.'79 Halifax then gave details on

74 CAB 65/2 85(39) 10, 16 November 1939 and Gilbert, op. cit., 99-100.
75 FO 371 23678 N6477/57/38, 22 November 1939. Butler also noted that 'private reports we
have received from John Rees the book-seller indicate that my friend has recently been ordering
large quantities of maps of the USSR's borders with Iran, Afghanistan and China . .'.
76 FO 371 N6602/92/38, 23 November 1939.
77 CAB 65/2 92(39) 10, 23 November 1939.
78 FO 371 23693 N6717/991/38, 27 November 1939 and CAB 65/2 97(39) 7, 28 November
1939.
79 CAB 65/2 98(39) 8, 29 November 1939.
438 Joural of ContemporaryHistoryVol 36 No 3

German-Soviet relations from 'a highly secret source'. Details were recorded in
the Secretary's Standard File and are presumably still inaccessible, but a hint of
what Halifax reported may be found in a letter he wrote to Gort on 28
November. Halifax began by expressing 'considerable doubt whether the
Soviet really means to get itself into any real fighting' with Finland. He
expressed genuine disappointment over the apparent failure of the British
trade initiative made 'on the advice of those people who profess to know the
workings of the Bolshevik mind . . .'. Halifax noted that the Soviets were, in
fact being as disagreeable as they could be towards Britain in their press. On
the other hand, information indicated that they were doing the same thing to
the Germans, 'and I can't help feeling that there is a good deal of the desire in
their minds to play up their nuisance value as high as possible to both sides'.80
In any event, there was no more time for Halifax to ponder the issue. On 30
November the Soviet Union invaded Finland.81
The reaction of the British public and press to the Soviet invasion of Finland
was overwhelmingly hostile. Sympathy for Finland was strong. The Finns were
seen as a small, embattled liberal state defying a totalitarian power. As the
Finns battled against increasingly long odds, pressure grew on the British
government to do something. Military supplies were sent to Finland along
with some British volunteers. By March 1940 public pressure and pressure
from the French forced the British government to agree to a wild plan to send
British troops to Finland. In fact, the real purpose of this expedition was to
have British and French troops occupy northern Norway and Sweden in order
to deprive Germany of Swedish iron ore supplies. Only one brigade of British
troops would cross the border into northern Finland, where they would have
absolutely no impact on the fighting in the south. In any event, the Finnish
military collapse in mid-March ruled out the necessity of military action. This
was a development greeted with a huge sigh of relief by British leaders, espe-
cially the Chiefs of Staff, who had opposed the venture all along.82 British
diplomats were soon back at work, trying to repair the wire to Moscow, but
Stalin was still too sullen and in no mood to talk. The situation changed only
with the opening salvoes of Barbarossa.
British policy towards the USSR from the beginning of September to the end
of November 1939 rested on a fundamental ambivalence. British leaders had
few fond memories of their dealings with the Soviets in the interwar period,
especially after the Nazi-Soviet Pact, and could easily have given up on the
Soviets. Yet British leaders appreciated the serious strategic weakness that
Britain and France faced. Some form of friendship with the USSR simply had
to be salvaged. The British government tried to open trade talks, listened to the
advice of outsiders such as Stafford Cripps, attempted to use Turkey as an

80 FO 800/328 Halifax to Gort, 28 November 1939.

81 P. Salmon, 'Great Britain, the Soviet Union and Finland at the beginning of the Second World
War' in Hiden and Lane, op. cit., 95-123.
82 B. Bond (ed.), Chief of Staff: The Diaries of Lieutenant General Sir Henry Powell, vol. 1,
1933-1940 (London 1971), 290.
Doerr BrtishPolicytowardsthe USSR,1939 439

intermediary and practically went into denial when faced with the prospect
of a war between the USSR and Finland. Britain was engaged in a fight for
survival, and under such circumstances ideology simply had to take a back
seat to considerations of realpolitik.

PaulW. Doerr
teaches European and diplomatic history at Acadia University, Nova
Scotia, Canada. He is the author of British Foreign Policy
1919-1939: Hope for the Best, Prepare for the Worst (Manchester
1998), and is currently working on a study of war termination in the
twentieth century.