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Articulo Economia-Sofia Lopez
Articulo Economia-Sofia Lopez
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Table 1
Railroad Directly Compensates Farmer
road should be held liable for the damage Farmer: fields planted
done to the farmer’s crops because, otherwise, 0 1 2
too many resources would be allocated to the
railroad. Pigou suggested that efficiency could 0 150 160
0
be brought about by imposing a tax on the 0 0 0
railroad.
Coase began his analysis with a simple Railroad 0 150 160 Railroad
(Trains per day) 1 liable
point: if the railroad is made liable to the 100 40 – 20
farmer, in a world of zero transaction costs, the
railroad and farmer would reach an agreement 0 150 160
2
themselves. Moreover, even if the railroad were 150 30 – 90
not liable, an agreement would be reached
with substantially the same allocation of re-
sources. As an example, suppose a railroad Table 2
could make $100 running one train per day
Railroad May Start Fire in Farmer’s Field
and $150 running two trains per day. The farmer
can make $150 planting one field or $160 plant- 0 1 2
ing two fields. If the fields are planted next to
0 150 160
the tracks, the railroad destroys $60 worth of 0
crops per train per field. It is assumed that 0 0 0
there is no problem of assessing damages.1
Railroad 0 90 40 Railroad
Tables 1, 2, and 3 describe three situa- 1
tions. Each row describes the consequences of (Trains per day) has rights
100 100 100
the railroad running no trains, one train, or two
0 30 – 80
trains per day. Each column shows the conse- 2
quences of the farmer’s planting no fields, one 150 150 150
field, or two fields. The lower-left-hand corner
of each cell shows the profits to the railroad;
the upper-right-hand corner of each cell shows Table 3
the profits to the farmer; if positive, the lower- Railroad Pays Tax to Government
right-hand corner shows payments to third par-
ties (Table 3 only). In Table 1, the railroad must 0 1 2
directly compensate the farmer for damages to 0 150 160
his crops. In Table 2, the railroad has the right to 0
start fires on the farmer’s fields. Table 3 shows 0 0 0 0 0 0
an ideal Pigovian tax: the railroad is taxed by the 0 90 40
amount of the damage and a third party receives Railroad Pigovian
(Trains per day) 1 tax on
the lump-sum amount of the tax revenues. 100 0 40 60 –20 120 railroad
In any table, the total benefit to society is 0 30 – 80 paid to
the sum of the payoffs shown (ignoring con- 2 third party
sumer surplus). In all three tables, the maximum 150 0 30 120 –90 240
attainable total benefit is $190 and is reached
when one train is run and one field is planted.
In Table 1, the railroad is liable for dam-
ages inflicted and must pay $60 per train per
field to the farmer. When one train is run and to make an agreement with the farmer not to
one field is planted, the railroad receives a pay- plant the second field. The railroad could offer
off of $40 (= $100 – $60) and the farmer receives the farmer, say, $11 not to plant the field, in-
a total payoff of $150 (the same as if there were creasing the railroad’s net profit to $29 and
no railroad). While this is the social optimum, if increasing the farmer’s payoff to $161 (for a total
the railroad is running one train per day, the of $190 still).2
farmer has an incentive to plant two fields be- Coase then considered the alternative or
cause, with the payment of damages, the farmer reciprocal situation in which the railroad has the
can make $160, more than can be made by right to destroy whatever crops are planted near
planting only one field. This would lower the the tracks. In Table 2, if the farmer again plants
railroad’s profit to –$20. Clearly, in a world of one field and the railroad runs one train, the
zero transaction costs, it would pay the railroad railroad earns $100 while the farmer earns only
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mons. According to Commons (1923, 326), judges because, from the point of view of the railroad,
have often ruled that “taxes may not be used for it is a cost of preventing damages. When a
private purposes.” But Commons pointed out lawyer is hired to write a contract, it is done to
that taxes are always used for some type of protect the firm in a legal dispute. Whether the
private purpose. The question is whether that railroad is liable or not, a firewall will be built
private purpose is tinged with enough public by profit-minded agents. But now we get a
interest to make the taxes worthwhile. For ex- different allocation of resources. If railroad is
ample, property taxes in many localities are liable, it will run two trains a day and the
used to support “public education.” Teachers’ farmer will plant two fields. But if the farmer
unions consistently lobby to increase their share must build the firewall, the farmer will only
of the public purse, and the educational bureau- plant one field because of the exorbitant cost of
cracies expand at the cost of sacrificing the very protecting two fields and diminishing returns.
goal of teaching students. This example can be The major implication, then, of the existence of
multiplied many times. Taxes imposed on the transaction costs is that changing the rules of
working population are used to support large liability has an impact on resource allocation.
segments of the nonworking population. Gov- The Coasian hypothesis suggests that it
ernment employees become a central clientele makes a real difference what the law stipulates
to the political party that hires them. about what is legal and not legal. If the law
Coase’s basic insight is really that we can- imposes the rule that companies are responsible
not separate the analysis of externalities from for whatever illnesses are caused by their prod-
the real-world situation we are describing. What ucts and the standard of proof is relatively am-
we have just said simply shows that there is biguous, there will be a strong tendency for the
no a priori role for government policy in con- product to disappear from the marketplace. In-
trolling externalities. It does not say that there is deed, there are many examples of products that
no role. But instead of concocting abstract have disappeared in the United States that can
theories about externalities and what to do be obtained elsewhere.6
about them, the Coasian research agenda re- Whether or not the change in the alloca-
quires the economist to actually study the tion of resources is beneficial requires a detailed
detailed setting in which the alleged externality study of costs and benefits. For example, a
is taking place. We must examine the institu- recent study by Richard Manning (1994) of the
tions, the property rights, and the costs of con- effect of changes in the tort law on the prices of
tracting in each and every instance. As Coase childhood vaccines shows that the price of the
(1993, 97) once put it, “What I object to is DPT vaccine has increased by 2,000 percent
mindless abstraction or the kind of abstraction over the past decade, with 96 percent of the
which does not help us to understand the price increase due to litigation costs.
working of the economic system.”
Public goods
Positive transaction costs and In the classic treatment of public goods
property rights (Samuelson 1955), it is supposed that public
A transaction cost is a cost of using a goods exhibit two characteristics: nonrivalry in
market. “There are negotiations to be under- consumption and the inability of providers to
taken, contracts have to be drawn up, inspec- exclude users. A lighthouse has been used by
tions have to be made, arrangements have to be economists of the stature of John Stuart Mill,
made to settle disputes” (Coase 1992, 715). It is A. C. Pigou, and Paul Samuelson as an example
important to distinguish between what has been of a pure public good (Coase 1974). Apparently,
called the Coase theorem and what I will call the the light from any lighthouse could be used by
Coasian hypothesis. This is the hypothesis that any number of ships and no ship could be
the legal system under a system of positive excluded from using the light. Thus, the prob-
transaction costs “will have a profound effect on lem of free riding would make it difficult to
the working of the economic system and may in privately finance a lighthouse. Coase (1974) used
certain respects be said to control it” (Coase the lighthouse as a real-world illustration of his
1992, 718). method of examining the argument for govern-
To illustrate this at the simplest level, in ment interference into the economy. Coase sur-
the parable of the railroad and the adjacent veyed the history of lighthouses and discovered
farmer, suppose it costs the railroad $10 or the that lighthouses were built by private parties
farmer $20 for each planted field to build a even though everyone within sight of the light-
protective firewall. This is a transaction cost house can use its services without any conges-
28
Huber, Peter V. (1988), Liability (New York: Basic Books). Samuelson, Paul. A. (1955), “Diagrammatic Exposition of
a Theory of Public Expenditures,” Review of Economics
Manning, Richard L. (1994), “Changing Rules in Tort Law and Statistics 32: 350–56.
and the Market for Childhood Vaccines,” Journal of Law
and Economics 37: 247. ——— (1995), “Some Uneasiness with the Coase Theo-
rem,” Japan and the World Economy 7: 1–7.
Pigou, A. C. (1932), The Economics of Welfare, 4th ed.
(London: Macmillan). Tullock, Gordon (1967), “The Welfare Cost of Tariffs,
Monopolies, and Theft,” Western Economic Journal 5:
Ruffin, R. J. (1972), “Pollution in a Crusoe Economy,” The 224 – 32.
Canadian Journal of Economics 5: 110 –18.