• Valencia v. Cabanting, Antonio, et al.

(196 SCRA 302)

Principle: The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To
that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in
utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to
illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor.

Facts: In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia and his wife allegedly bought a parcel of land, where
they built their house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the original
owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their
names. A conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land dispute
between Serapia and the Valencia spouses. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership if the
Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written
in the Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property.
Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for the recovery
of possession with damages. The Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty.
Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written
in Ilocano. For this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person
who would falsify the signature of the alleged vendor. A "Compraventa Definitiva" as a result
thereof.

The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, rendered a decision in favor of Serapia. Paulino filed a
Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction before the CA. While the petition was pending,
the Trial Court issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case has already
become final and executory".

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the
remaining portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. Paulino
filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly
violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics,
prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel. The appellate court dismissed
the petition of Paulino.

Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, also filed a disbarment proceeding against Atty.
Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery and its subsequent introduction as evidence
for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a
litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil Code; and against the
three lawyers, for allegedly rigging the case against her parents.
Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the
New Civil Code.

Ruling:

Yes, under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code: The following persons cannot acquire by purchase,
even at a public of judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another, Justices,
judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply
to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they make take part by virtue of their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended
to curtail any undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the
sentiments of loyalty and disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute
malpractice and is a ground for suspension. Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel
concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending.

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality
of judgment, there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not
only if there is some contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes
subject to the judicial action of the judge. Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the
appellate court may either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for
purposes under Article 1491 that the litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial
court become final while a certiorari connected therewith is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the
property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in violation of Art. 1491 and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension. The sale in favor
of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship
between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as her counsel.
The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.
Renato Cayetano vs Christian Monsod

201 SCRA 210

G.R. No. 100113
September 3, 1991
Facts:

Christian Monsod was nominated by then President Corazon C. Aquino as chairman of the
COMELEC. Cayetano questioned the appointment for Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately
preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of
the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

It was established that after graduating from the College of Law and hurdling the Bar, respondent
worked in his father’s law office for a short while, then worked as an Operations Officer in the
World Bank Group for about 2 years, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-
countries, negotiating loans, and coordinating legal, economic and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as Chief Executive Officer
of an investment bank and has subsequently worked either as Chief Executive Officer or
Consultant of various companies.

Issue

1. Whether or not Monsod satisfies the requirement of the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in

confirming Monsod’s appointment.

Held

1. YES. In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava: The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court…In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of
mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and
conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice
or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is
whether in or out of court.

A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration
engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights
under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is
engaged in the practice of law.”

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a due paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than 10 years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a
lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement
— that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the
president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the
discretion of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess
the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise
its corrective power since there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
Cobb-Perez v. Latin, 24 SCRA 291(1968)

Principle: Responsibility of Counsel: The duty of counsel to advise their clients on the merits of
their case and to discourage unnecessary litigation. While assertiveness in advocating for a client's
cause is commendable, persistence in pursuing futile positions is unacceptable.

Facts: Over a money judgment that had become final and executory, the petitioners were involved
in a protracted legal battle to delay the execution of this judgment. In its decision dated May 22,
1968, the court noted that the petitioners and their counsel engaged in a series of actions and
petitions aimed at thwarting the execution of the money judgment. These actions were
characterized by the court as deliberate attempts to subvert the ends of justice.

Treble costs were assessed against the petitioners, with the requirement that these costs be paid
by their counsel. This decision was made in response to the perceived misconduct and dilatory
tactics employed by the petitioners and their counsel. Attorneys Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas,
who represented the petitioners, filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the court's decision.
They specifically contested the adverse remarks made against their "professional conduct" and
objected to being held responsible for the treble costs.

Upon reevaluation of the case records, the court reaffirmed its earlier findings that the litigation
had been deliberately prolonged to delay the execution of the judgment. The active involvement
of the petitioners' counsel in these tactics was evident. A pattern of actions taken by the
petitioners and their counsel to delay the execution. This included filing numerous motions and
petitions, some of which were abandoned or withdrawn, in a bid to prolong the legal proceedings.

Moroever, Despite opportunities to expedite the resolution of the case, the petitioners and their
counsel pursued inconsistent legal strategies, causing repeated delays in the execution process.
petitioners and their counsel sought injunctions from courts lacking jurisdiction over the matter,
further contributing to the delay. These actions were characterized by the court as strategic
maneuvers aimed at obstructing the execution of the judgment.

Issues:

Whether the actions taken by the petitioners and their counsel constituted deliberate attempts to
delay the execution of the judgment.

Whether the counsels should be held responsible for the delay and the costs incurred.

Court's Ruling: Yes, the court found that the litigation was prolonged intentionally to delay the
execution of the judgment, with the active participation of the petitioners' counsels. The
petitioners and their counsels engaged in various maneuvers and actions aimed at delaying the
execution of the judgment. Despite having opportunities to end the litigation promptly, they
chose to pursue quixotic maneuvers to delay the process. The counsels' duty is to advise their
clients on the merit of their case and to discourage unnecessary litigation.

Yes, The court held that the counsels' assertiveness in advocating for their clients' cause is
commendable, but they should not persist in pursuing futile positions. Treble costs were upheld
against the petitioners' counsels, as they were found to be responsible for the delay and the costs
incurred. The court modified its previous decision to specify that Attorneys Crispin D. Baizas and
A. N. Bolinao, Jr. shall jointly and severally pay the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
This ruling affirmed the counsels' responsibility for the delays and associated costs incurred in the
case