Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

DECISION

MMDA, et. al. vs. Concerned Citizens of Manila Bay

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of late gained the
attention of the international community. Media have finally trained their sights on the ill effects of
pollution, the destruction of forests and other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper
disposal of garbage. And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale
few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.2 But amidst hard evidence and clear
signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators
can still be heard.

This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of their respective offices
or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and preserve, at the first instance, our internal
waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted by human activities. To most of these agencies and their
official complement, the pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves,
if their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not mitigating, the
environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.

At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with marine
life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but now a
dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official indifference of people and
institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.

This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay.
Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that
the water quality of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code. This environmental
aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:

x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or commission [of
the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public health and in the depletion
and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for which reason] ALL defendants must
be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and
to restore its water quality to class B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of
contact recreation.3

In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:

(1) Respondents’ constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;

(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);

(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);

(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);

(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);

(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);

(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);

(8) Executive Order No. 192;

(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
 (10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;

(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and

(12) International Law

Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay
and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed by an ocular inspection
of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water Quality Management Section, Environmental
Management Bureau, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for
petitioners, stated that water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed
that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable number
(MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90 prescribed as a safe level for bathing and
other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.4

Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and in behalf of other
petitioners, testified about the MWSS’ efforts to reduce pollution along the Manila Bay through the
Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part
of its evidence, its memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated waste
treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the cleaning of wastes
accumulated or washed to shore.

The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay

On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision5 in favor of respondents. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean up and
rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it fit for swimming,
skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this, defendant-agencies, with
defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within six (6) months from receipt hereof,
to act and perform their respective duties by devising a consolidated, coordinated and
concerted scheme of action for the rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.

In particular:

Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage] treatment
facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their capacities.

Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide, construct and
operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.

Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install, operate and
maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous substances.

Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-generated wastes
but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels that contribute to the pollution
of the bay.

Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage
disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.

Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize the
marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other aquatic animals.

Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the purpose of
cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.

Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that obstruct the
free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and liquid wastes which
eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and engineering arm of the government,
DPWH is ordered to actively participate in removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels,
and other non-biodegradable garbage in the bay.
 Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and sludge
companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal
sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.

Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through education the
importance of preserving and protecting the environment.

Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all costs the
Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.

No pronouncement as to damages and costs.

SO ORDERED.

The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the Court of Appeals
(CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528.

On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), Philippine National Police
(PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive departments and agencies filed directly with this Court
a petition for review under Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said
petition to the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.

Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent provisions of the
Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific pollution incidents and do not cover
cleaning in general. And apart from raising concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning
purposes, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which
can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA Sustained the RTC

By a Decision6 of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of
the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial court’s decision did not require petitioners to do tasks outside
of their usual basic functions under existing laws.7

Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45 petition on the following
ground and supporting arguments:

THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON

BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S DECISION
DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND DISCHARGED IN THE WATER
SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.

ARGUMENTS

[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC

POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL

II

THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT

OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.

The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the
headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are
they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And second, can petitioners be
compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.

Our Ruling

We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus

Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.8 A ministerial duty
is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."9 It connotes an act in
which nothing is left to the discretion of the person executing it. It is a "simple, definite duty arising
under conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law."10 Mandamus is available to compel
action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion one way or the other.

Petitioners maintain that the MMDA’s duty to take measures and maintain adequate solid waste and
liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part
of the agency concerned. They argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make
decisions, including choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and
cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.

Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and that petitioners’ duty
to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the law does not require the exercise of
discretion. According to respondents, petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for
example, to choose which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to
contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of discretion on whether
or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste disposal; in other words, it is the MMDA’s
ministerial duty to attend to such services.

We agree with respondents.

First off, we wish to state that petitioners’ obligation to perform their duties as defined by law, on one
hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the other, are two different concepts. While the
implementation of the MMDA’s mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the
enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature
and may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v. Atienza11 in which the
Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027
directing the three big local oil players to cease and desist from operating their business in the so-
called "Pandacan Terminals" within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate
with respect to the instant case, the MMDA’s duty to put up an adequate and appropriate sanitary
landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems is
ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The MMDA’s duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec.
3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope
of the MMDA’s waste disposal services to include:

Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of
policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall
likewise include the establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related
facilities and the implementation of other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and
recycle solid waste. (Emphasis added.)

The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA
9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42
which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the
operation of a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, 12 enjoining
the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the effectivity of the law on February 15,
2001, from using and operating open dumps for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such
effectivity, the use of controlled dumps.

The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of putting up a proper
waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion
presupposes the power or right given by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their
judgment or conscience.13 A discretionary duty is one that "allows a person to exercise judgment and
choose to perform or not to perform."14 Any suggestion that the MMDA has the option whether or not
to perform its solid waste disposal-related duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters or like enabling statutes and pertinent laws would
yield this conclusion: these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and
preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,15 is the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates
the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation,
more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water pollution, the DENR, under
the Act’s Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction "over all aspects of water pollution, determine[s] its location,
magnitude, extent, severity, causes and effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and
[takes] measures, using available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution."

The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status Report, an
Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water Quality Management Area
Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA
9275 provides:

Sec. 19 Lead Agency.––The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency responsible for
the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless otherwise provided herein. As
such, it shall have the following functions, powers and responsibilities:

a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24) months from the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall thereafter review or revise and
publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;

b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve (12) months
following the completion of the status report;

c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within 12 months
following the completion of the framework for each designated water management area. Such
action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality management area governing board every
five (5) years or as need arises.

The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the process of
completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality Management Framework.16 Within twelve
(12) months thereafter, it has to submit a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan. 17 Again,
like the MMDA, the DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.

Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the DENR, with the
assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies and non-government
organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final draft of a comprehensive action plan
with estimated budget and time frame, denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal
Strategy, for the rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.

The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should
more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws.

(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,18 is vested with jurisdiction, supervision, and control over all
waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising what is now the cities of Metro Manila
and several towns of the provinces of Rizal and Cavite, and charged with the duty:

(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be necessary for the
proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns comprising the System; x x x

(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local water districts. It can
prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the operations of these districts and shall monitor
and evaluate local water standards. The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and
furnish facilities and services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm
water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is tasked with
providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up of efficient and safe collection,
treatment, and sewage disposal system in the different parts of the country.19 In relation to the instant
petition, the LWUA is mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.

(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292),20 is
designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce all laws and issuances respecting the
conservation and proper utilization of agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring, control, and surveillance
system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and
managed on a sustainable basis.21 Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with
the PCG and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine waters.22 More
specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall
primarily be responsible for the prevention and control of water pollution for the development,
management, and conservation of the fisheries and aquatic resources.

(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national government, is tasked under
EO 29223 to provide integrated planning, design, and construction services for, among others, flood
control and water resource development systems in accordance with national development objectives
and approved government plans and specifications.

In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to perform metro-wide
services relating to "flood control and sewerage management which include the formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage
and sewerage system."

On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the DPWH and MMDA,
whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible for flood control in Metro Manila. For the
rest of the country, DPWH shall remain as the implementing agency for flood control services. The
mandate of the MMDA and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of
structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways, and esteros (drainages)
in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.

(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard Law of 1974, and
Sec. 6 of PD 979,24 or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall have the primary responsibility of
enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of the
Philippines. It shall promulgate its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and
policies set by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for the
effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of the law, apprehend
violators who:

a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge, or any
other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method, means or manner,
into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the Philippines;

b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown, discharged, or

deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating craft or vessel of any kind, or
from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment, or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of
any kind or description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing
therefrom in a liquid state into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float
or be washed into such navigable water; and

c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water or on the
bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be liable to be washed into
such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or by storms or floods, or otherwise,
whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or obstructed or increase the level of pollution of
such water.

(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990 was
signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group was tasked to "perform all police
functions over the Philippine territorial waters and rivers." Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions
of the PCG shall be taken over by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such
functions. Since the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform
the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime Group shall coordinate
with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and regulations governing marine pollution within the
territorial waters of the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to enforce
said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.25

(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated "to establish, develop, regulate,
manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of trade and national
development."26 Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the PPA has police authority within the ports
administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes
and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other
law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:

xxxx

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles,
as well as movement within the port of watercraft.27
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as amended by MARPOL 73/78,28 the
Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and
terminals for the reception of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is
tasked to adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and
liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at
ports and apprehend the violators. When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine
territorial waters, it is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.

(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate sanitary landfill
and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other alternative garbage disposal systems. It is
primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which
would necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.29

Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently violated are
dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals or esteros, open burning of solid
waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills, open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non-
biodegradable materials in flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined
in RA 9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental compliance
certificate.

Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279), eviction or demolition
may be allowed "when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks,
garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads,
parks and playgrounds." The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs, and
concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other
encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along the rivers, waterways,
and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers, waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan,
Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay,
the DILG shall direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such structures,
constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279 and other applicable laws in
coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.

(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water Code), is tasked to
promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste disposal areas that affect the source
of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH,
in coordination with the DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and
standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the establishment and operation
of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage
or a mix sewerage-septage management system shall be employed.

In accordance with Sec. 7230 of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines, and Sec. 5.1.131 of
Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered to ensure the regulation and
monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private sludge companies through the strict
enforcement of the requirement to obtain an environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection
treatment and disposal before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.

(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), is
mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its school curricula at all levels.32 Under
Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and
Philippine Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign to promote
the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the environment. Under the
Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the other hand, it is directed to strengthen the
integration of environmental concerns in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste
management principles.33

(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2, Title XVII of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound utilization of government funds and
revenues so as to effectively achieve the country’s development objectives.34

One of the country’s development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the Philippine Clean Water
Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a policy of economic growth in a manner
consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine
waters. It also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline processes
and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution mechanisms for the protection
of water resources; to promote environmental strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments
and of control mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national
program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this management cannot
be separated from concerns about water sources and ecological protection, water supply, public
health, and quality of life; and to provide a comprehensive management program for water pollution
focusing on pollution prevention.

Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the noble objectives of
RA 9275 in line with the country’s development objectives.

All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We
need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code encompass the
cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution incidents?

Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code

Include Cleaning in General

The disputed sections are quoted as follows:

Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.––Where the quality of water has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the government agencies concerned
shall take such measures as may be necessary to upgrade the quality of such water to meet
the prescribed water quality standards.

Section 20. Clean-up Operations.––It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to contain,
remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case of his failure to do
so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake containment, removal and clean-up
operations and expenses incurred in said operations shall be charged against the persons
and/or entities responsible for such pollution.

When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, o, amended the
counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code (PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues,
however, to be operational.

The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:

SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.––Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26 hereof,

any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of the applicable and
prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove and clean up any pollution
incident at his own expense to the extent that the same water bodies have been rendered unfit
for utilization and beneficial use: Provided, That in the event emergency cleanup operations
are necessary and the polluter fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in
coordination with other government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment,
removal and cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by
the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative determination x
x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the Water Quality Management
Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements were sourced.

As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more apparent than real
since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely consists in the designation of the
DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.

Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves
only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general.
They aver that the twin provisions would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and
(h), which defines the terms "cleanup operations" and "accidental spills," as follows:

g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants discharged or

spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.

h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances in water that result
from accidents such as collisions and groundings.

Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific polluted
portion or portions of the body of water concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20
is limited only to "water pollution incidents," which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of
specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment, removal, and cleaning
operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires "cleanup
operations" to restore the body of water to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been
a specific incident of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as
mentioned in Sec. 62(h).

As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the
application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only.
Contrary to petitioners’ posture, respondents assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the
coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed
covered only pollution accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around the Manila
Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay. Respondents, however,
emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting provision, in fact even enlarged the operational
scope of Sec. 20, by including accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated
in Sec. 17 in relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.

To respondents, petitioners’ parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with their narrow reading
of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the worsening water quality of the Manila Bay.
Assuming, respondents assert, that petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec.
20 of PD 1152 is constricted by the definition of the phrase "cleanup operations" embodied in Sec.
62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases "cleanup
operations" and "accidental spills" do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in the chapter where said
section is found.

Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that the government
agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning
operations when a specific pollution incident occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act
even in the absence of a specific pollution incident, as long as water quality "has deteriorated to a
degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage." This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, "to take such measures as may be necessary to
meet the prescribed water quality standards." In fine, the underlying duty to upgrade the quality of
water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates that it is properly
applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused by polluters who fail to clean up the
mess they left behind. In such instance, the concerned government agencies shall undertake the
cleanup work for the polluters’ account. Petitioners’ assertion, that they have to perform cleanup
operations in the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring polluters do
not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is quite off mark. As earlier
discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment Code comes into play and the specific
duties of the agencies to clean up come in even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them.
Petitioners, thus, cannot plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275
on the pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific pollution incident.
In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at
once valid as it is practical. The appellate court wrote: "PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive
program of environmental protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20
of general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents."35

Granting arguendo that petitioners’ position thus described vis-à-vis the implementation of Sec. 20 is
correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude
and scope that it is well-nigh impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution
incident. And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the polluters are.
We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions "water pollution incidents" which may be caused by
polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or
waterways that empty into the bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to "any
person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies," which may refer to an individual or an
establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways, such that the
contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water pollution incidents are so
numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters that they can validly be categorized as beyond
the specific pollution incident level.

Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned are so undermanned
that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may
perhaps not be amiss to say that the apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few
and far between. Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a given
water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government to step in and undertake
cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents
and purposes a general cleanup situation.

The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial stage of the long-
term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay after the rehabilitation process is as
important as the cleaning phase. It is imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the
rivers, inland bays, and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise,
any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all, the Manila Bay water
quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and
other relevant laws. It thus behooves the Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies
and the bureaus and offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform,
their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the quality of its water
to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes as "continuing mandamus,"36 the Court
may, under extraordinary circumstances, issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its
decision would not be set to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of
continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the length of the Ganges
River from industrial and municipal pollution.37

The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other unauthorized structures which
do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region
(NCR) (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the
Meycuayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks, and esteros which
discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and garbage, into the major rivers and
eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor responsible for the pollution of the major river systems
and the Manila Bay, these unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal
or unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then practically all efforts
to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.38

Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art. 51 of PD 1067 or
the Water Code,39 which prohibits the building of structures within a given length along banks of rivers
and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:

The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in
agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the
easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and
salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for
recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
(Emphasis added.)

Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial establishments standing along
or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they
may not be treated as unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly
contribute to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned LGUs,
have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial establishments set up, within a
reasonable period, the necessary waste water treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their
industrial discharge, including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major
rivers, and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall be shut
down or asked to transfer their operations.

At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-agencies to comply
with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-commissioned study on the garbage
problem in Metro Manila, the results of which are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there
reported, the garbage crisis in the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights
of the report:

1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas, Catmon and
Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and leachate or liquid run-off.
Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and seep into the earth and poison the
surface and groundwater that are used for drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.

2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of human waste in
the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably generated by households that lack
alternatives to sanitation. To say that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.

3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and possibly strains
of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into the Marikina and Pasig River
systems and Manila Bay.40

Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever be established as
prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003). Particular note should be taken
of the blatant violations by some LGUs and possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:

Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.––No open dumps shall
be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid waste by any person,
 including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for solid waste, be allowed after the
effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years
following the effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis added.)

RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5) years which ended
on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary landfill which strictly complies with
the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has yet been set up.

In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like littering, dumping of
waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public places, operation of open dumps, open
burning of solid waste, and the like. Some sludge companies which do not have proper disposal
facilities simply discharge sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in the Manila
Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which enjoins the pollution of water
bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport
or dumping into sea waters of sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which
proscribes the introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment including
"dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of petroleum or residual products of
petroleum of carbonaceous materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid,
gaseous or solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made structure."

In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to emphasize the extreme
necessity for all concerned executive departments and agencies to immediately act and discharge
their respective official duties and obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need
to set timetables for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for them
by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.

The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical landmark cannot
be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore the Manila Bay to its former splendor
and bring back the plants and sea life that once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting
as they may be, could only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all
civic-minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility. This means that
the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the preservation and protection of the Manila
Bay.

The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must transcend their
limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the problem at hand becomes
unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different government agencies and instrumentalities
cannot shirk from their mandates; they must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and
rehabilitating the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners’ hiding behind two untenable claims: (1)
that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are required to act; and (2) that the
cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.

RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and improve waste
management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, which explicitly provides that the
State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and political rights
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of
transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.41 Even assuming the absence of a
categorical legal provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and
women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the
waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal
of the trust reposed in them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CV
No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No.
1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in view of subsequent developments or
supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC Decision shall now read:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-

government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and restore and
maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water Classification Tables under
DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and
other forms of contact recreation.

In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency responsible for the
conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country’s environment and natural
resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government agency
responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and
conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular coordination
meetings with concerned government departments and agencies to ensure the successful
implementation of the aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the
Local Government Code of 1991,42 the DILG, in exercising the President’s power of general
supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs under
Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal,
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments,
and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective areas of jurisdiction,
such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las
Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando
(Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other
minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting
the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as
prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall
be ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities or septic tanks
within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes, sewage water, and human wastes from flowing
into these rivers, waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines
and other sanctions.

(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,43 the MWSS is directed to provide, install, operate, and
maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite
where needed at the earliest possible time.

(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,44 the LWUA, through the local water districts and in coordination with the
DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the
efficient and safe collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.

(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,45 the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to improve and restore
the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite,
Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and
aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.

(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in accordance with
Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550,
and other existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.

(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 51346 and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters
from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.

(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for flood control projects
and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP
Maritime Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other
agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
established or built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Parañaque-Zapote, Las Piñas) Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-
Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal
implementor of programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the country more
particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG,
affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall
remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in breach of RA
7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay
(Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways,
and esteros that discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.

In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary landfill, as prescribed
by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial
jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills
and like undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal
cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003,47 Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean
Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within one (1) year from
finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities
for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall
give the companies, if found to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the
necessary facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.

(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,48 Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA 9003,49 the DepEd
shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste management, environmental protection, and like
subjects in the school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and,
through them, their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and maintaining
a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General Appropriations Act of
2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and
preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country’s development objective to
attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our
marine waters.

(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP
Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing
mandamus," shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report
of the activities undertaken in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.
OPOSA v FACTORAN

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners
have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and
"arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The
original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary,
the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of
the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for
themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate
that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed
for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to —

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands
has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests
contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial;
scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's
land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-
six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as
the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of
the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion
(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum — approximately the size of the entire island of
Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and
fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance of the
Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of
corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent
spells of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon
winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural
plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening
of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water
for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic
changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation
are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares
of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89
million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as
Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included — the
Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and
to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs —
especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use, benefit
from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural

resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging
permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a
country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna
and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to

the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent
part, states that it is the policy of the State —

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
 (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of

dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is

contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —

a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make
full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section
14, Article XIV, id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural
law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative
or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is
dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In
the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that
the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors
not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf
of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of
the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-
preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners
maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they
may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific
legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see
nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which
supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens patriae."
Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then reiterate the
theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question
which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They
therefore assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by
the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
— usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not
totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein
are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests.
Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such rhythm and
harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal
and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and
other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and
healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right
for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits
of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but
agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest
of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal
right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking
to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the
Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against
the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with
political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of
by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers"
of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
 The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint
is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section
of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill
health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of
rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation — aptly and
fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless
the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a
solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come —
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing
the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all
forms of pollution — air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment

necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same
and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources,
specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources
as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom
for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure
the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including
the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable
access of the different segments of the population to the development and the use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral,
land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent
with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and
enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration,
development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall
be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development,
utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes
already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine
Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in productive and
enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is
conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter
statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O.
No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 — to protect and advance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

 . . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other;
and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the
defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails
to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth
of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may
the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and
circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed
hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there
is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory
affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION,
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof,
they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants,
the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question
doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable
shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of
the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice
to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political
departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and
the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave
abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or contract
according to the disposition of the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before
us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts
clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do
otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental
law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke
in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with
utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to
the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to strictly respect
the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which
provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form
of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber
license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license
or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or
public welfare as in this case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and

is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the
person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create
a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights
(People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end
that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence
a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by
the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and
20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No.
L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not
involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and
purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for
the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute.
The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the
promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional
guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general
welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American
Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:
 Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both
shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract
rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work
them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate
it in the common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with
respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as
of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it
as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
THE DIRECTOR, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and AQUILINO L. CARIÑO, respondents.

PURISIMA, J.:

At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside
the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed
the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC No. B-
467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.

The facts that matter are as follows:

On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cariño, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First
Instance of Laguna, a petition1 for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three
thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of
land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.

Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa
Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,2 and later administered by him in behalf of his five
brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3

In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cariño, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue
of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa
Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of
Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.4

Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands Management),
disclosed:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That the land subject for registration thru judicial confirmation of imperfect title is situated in
the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao, province of Laguna as described on plan Psu-
108952 and is identical to Lot No. 3015, Cad. 455-0, Cabuyao Cadastre; and that the same is
agricultural in nature and the improvements found thereon are sugarcane, bamboo clumps,
chico and mango trees and one house of the tenant made of light materials;

2. That the land subject for registration is outside any civil or military reservation, riverbed, park
and watershed reservation and that same land is free from claim and conflict;

3. That said land is neither inside the relocation site earmarked for Metro Manila squatters nor
any pasture lease; it is not covered by any existing public land application and no patent or
title has been issued therefor;

4. That the herein petitioner has been in continuous, open and exclusive possession of the
land who acquired the same thru inheritance from his deceased mother, Teresa Lauchangco
as mentioned on the Extra-judicial partition dated July 26, 1963 which applicant requested that
said instrument will be presented on the hearing of this case; and that said land is also declared
for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 6359 in the name of the petitioner;

xxx xxx x x x5

With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only
oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record,
the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:

WHEREFORE, the Count hereby orders and declares the registration and confirmation of title
to one (1) parcel of land identified as Lot 6, plan Psu-108952, identical to Cadastral Lot No.
3015, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre, situated in the barrio of Sala, municipality of Cabuyao,
province of Laguna, containing an area of FORTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FOURTEEN (43,614) Square Meters, more or less, in favor of applicant AQUILINO L.
CARINO, married to Francisca Alomia, of legal age, Filipino, with residence and postal address
at Biñan, Laguna.

After this decision shall have become final, let an order for the issuance of decree of
registration be issued.
 SO ORDERED.6

From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on
November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS
NOT SUBMITTED PROOF OF HIS FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR PROOF OF POSSESSION IN
THE MANNER AND FOR THE LENGTH OF TIME REQUIRED BY THE LAW TO JUSTIFY
CONFIRMATION OF AN IMPERFECT TITLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT

HAS NOT OVERTHROWN THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND IS A PORTION OF THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.7

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The petition for land registration8 at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 Pursuant to said Act, he
who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title
since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant,
a composicion con al estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and
"informacion possessoria" or "possessory information title", which would become a "titulo gratuito" or
a gratuitous title.10

In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single
muniment of title substantiate his claim of ownership.11 The Court has therefore no other recourse, but
to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496.

Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA
No. 141), as amended, private respondent's petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of
evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to
prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years
required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.

Sec. 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 as amended R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law
prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claim and the issuance of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant
can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to
constitute a grant from the State.13

Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases
is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director
of Lands vs. Agustin,14 this Court stressed that:

. . . The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land registered under the Torrens
system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of
 his land. He must show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the court,
that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not justified in registering property
under the Torrens system, simply because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in
the absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the Torrens system,
upon the ground that the facts presented did not show that petitioner is the owner, in fee
simple, of the land which he is attempting to have registered.15

There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public
agricultural lands may be granted judicial
recognition.16

The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic
vs. Lee:17

. . . Both under the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the
utilization of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its
command if the judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real
estate. To be granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where,
as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such
claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification
belong to the state. Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its right over the same
as dominus. . . .18

In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit
resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him
(petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive,
and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least (30) thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.19

In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject
parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial
settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has
possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his
petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he
theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral
assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that
his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911. 1âw phi 1.nêt

Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances
evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere
conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20

From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering
Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent
and his brother, Severino Cariño. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969
declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax
Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of
Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21

It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for subject
land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have any
sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of
private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22

The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is
not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts
that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent's predecessor-
in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 the
Court ratiocinated thus:

This case represents an instance where the findings of the lower court overlooked certain facts
of substance and value that if considered would affect the result of the case (People v.
Royeras, 130 SCRA 259) and when it appears that the appellate court based its judgment on
a misapprehension of facts (Carolina Industries, Inc. v. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., 97
SCRA 734; Moran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 88; Director of Lands v. Funtillar, et al.,
G.R. No. 68533, May 3, 1986). This case therefore is an exception to the general rule that the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on
appeal to this Court.'
 and—

. . . in the interest of substantial justice this Court is not prevented from considering such a
pivotal factual matter that had been overlooked by the Courts below. The Supreme Court is
clothed with ample authority to review palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision.24

Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the
original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never
declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations are
not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of ownership.25 In Director
of Lands vs. Santiago.26

. . . if it is true that the original owner and possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in
possession since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation purposes for the first
time only in 1968, and in the names of Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute at least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the property.27

As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in
possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence.
The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, and in concept of owner", by which characteristics
private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law
requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as
applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his
parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not
amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.28

In a case,29 this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the
registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public
Land Law; holding as follows:

Based on the foregoing, it is incumbent upon private respondent to prove that the alleged
twenty year or more possession of the spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan which
supposedly formed part of the thirty (30) year period prior to the filing of the application, was
open, continuous, exclusive, notorious and in concept of owners. This burden, private
respondent failed to discharge to the satisfaction of the Court. The bare assertion that the
spouses Urbano Diaz and Bernarda Vinluan had been in possession of the property for more
than twenty (20) years found in private respondent's declaration is hardly the "well-nigh
incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Private respondent should have
presented specific facts that would have shown the nature of such possession. . . .30

In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied
on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:

We hold that applicants' nebulous evidence does not support their claim of open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 2027-B en concepto de dueño. Although they
claimed that they have possessed the land since 1950, they declared it for tax purposes only
in 1972. It is not clear whether at the time they filed their application in 1973, the lot was still
cogon land or already cultivated land.

They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peñaflor, to testify on his alleged
possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land. Not
a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land
as owners.

xxx xxx xxx

On the basis of applicants' insubstantial evidence, it cannot justifiably be concluded that they
have an imperfect title that should be confirmed or that they had performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant of a portion of the public domain.32

Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,33 amending Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public
land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest occupied
subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only establish his
possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.
The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private
respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property.34 To reiterate, under the
Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.35 Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its
basic rights over the same as dominus.36

Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for
registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of
his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de dueño for at
least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,37 the Court is of the opinion, and so finds,
that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the public domain not registrable in
the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11,
1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional
Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. 8-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more particularly
described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and
power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs. 1âwphi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

Republic vs. Dela Paz, GR. No. 171631 November 15, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and GLICERIO R. DELA
PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No.
84206, which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in
LRC Case No. N-11514, granting respondents’ application for registration and confirmation of title over
a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

The factual milieu of this case is as follows:

On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and
Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz (Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an
application for registration of land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with an area of 25,825
square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-
00-000084, (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration, respondents submitted the
following documents: (1) Special power of attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela
Paz to file the application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-
D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map
No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development,
Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-000084; (4) Geodetic
Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated
June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated
March 10, 1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land patent or any public
land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro
Manila, that the tax on the real property for the year 2003 has been paid.

Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an agricultural land, by virtue
of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob4 dated June 18, 1987, executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and
Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent
Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga
Pag-aari ng Namatay5 dated March 10, 1979. In their application, respondents claimed that they are
co-owners of the subject parcel of land and they have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public,
adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired it in 1987. Respondents
further averred that by way of tacking of possession, they, through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, public, adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the concept
of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than fifty (50) years since the filing of
the application of registration with the trial court. They maintained that the subject property is classified
as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.

The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date, respondents presented
documentary evidence to prove compliance with the jurisdictional requirements of the law.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
opposed the application for registration on the following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; (2)
that the muniments of title, and/or the tax declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any,
attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of bona
fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of public
domain belonging to the Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there
was no other oppositor to the application.

On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default6 against the whole world except as
against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents presented their evidence in support of their application.

In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents' application for registration of
the subject property. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered, judgment is hereby rendered
AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela
Paz and Glicerio R. dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal address at No. 65 Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and bounded under Plan Ccn-00-
000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and 3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping,
containing Twenty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less,
situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the operation of P.D. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.

After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon payment of all taxes and
other charges due on the land, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration shall be
accordingly undertaken.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA, in its Decision dated February
15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents
were able to show that they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the
subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest. The CA found that
respondents acquired the subject land from their predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of an owner since time
immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to
establish that the subject property is part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER GRANTING
RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING
THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN
IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT
IN THE CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE SUBJECT LOT
IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO
PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN.9

In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents and their predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public, and adverse possession in the concept of owners,
for more than fifty years or even before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to
show actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the concept of an
owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject property is within the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. The subject property remained to be owned by the State
under the Regalian Doctrine.

In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present evidence of specific acts of
ownership showing open, notorious, continuous and adverse possession and occupation in the
concept of an owner of the subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of
the subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966, 1974, 1979, 1980, 1985,
1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents
presented a tax clearance issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are
up to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that the annotations
appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as sufficient proof that the land is within the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues
raised by the petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a petition for review
under Rule 45.

The petition is meritorious.

In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited
to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of
support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.10 It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is
a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous
as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.11

In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that the subject land is
part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.

Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier.12 These the
respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive and convincing evidence.13

Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All lands not
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly,
public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land, or alienated
to a private person by the State, remain part of the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in
overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must
be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15

To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable,
respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212
& 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C. Torres
with the following annotation:

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau
of Forest Development, Quezon City on Jan. 03, 1968.

Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.

In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-geodetic engineer on the
blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision plan approved by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area,
Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry," is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the
land remains part of the inalienable public domain.

Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as required by law
is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said properties are alienable
and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject
of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive
act of the government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative
action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable
and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the
Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of
the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of
the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency
to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.

Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,19 the Court held that the applicant bears
the burden of proving the status of the land. In this connection, the Court has held that he must present
a certificate of land classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR.
He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the
land as alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per verification through survey
by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.

Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of proof required by law to
prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit
a certification from the proper government agency to establish that the subject land are part of the
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to
prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the
same as still inalienable public domain.20

Anent respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading of the records failed
to show that the respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and
occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or earlier. 1avvphil

The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and occupation over the subject
property consists of the testimonies of Jose and Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent
lot. However, their testimonies failed to establish respondents’ predecessors-in-interest' possession
and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Jose, who was born on March 19,
1939,21 testified that since he attained the age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this
case belonged to them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the subject
property since 1950,23 and on about the same year, he knew that the respondents were occupying the
subject land.24

Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no specific details as to when
respondents' predecessors-in-interest began actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While
Jose testified that the subject land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who
earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence was presented to show
Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and that he had been in possession of the same on or
before June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements
that are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot
suffice.25 An applicant in a land registration case cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to
embellish the application but must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged
ownership and possession of the land.26

Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best, respondents can only prove possession since
said date. What is required is open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their claim that their predecessors-in interest have
possessed the subject properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only
in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for purposes of taxation. Well
settled is the rule that tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the
right to possess land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed property
may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the applicants for registration or of their
predecessors-in-interest does not necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.28

The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture that respondents by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof under a
bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for confirmation and
registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 15,
2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for
registration and confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz,
Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela Paz, over a parcel of land,
with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at
Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.