THE SELF AND NARCISSISM ELIE HUMBERT, Paris How vo you recognise yourself as a subject? In trying to come to terms with this question the various schools of psychoanalysis have followed divergent and conflicting paths, while an increasing number of philo- sophers and psychologists even refuse to consider the question, which they denounce as a snare. The self which, for Jung, was the central reality of man’s existence, was ignored by Freud. Jung on the other hand, took little account of natci sism and alludes to it only a few times in his writings. English Freudians who favour an analysis of the ‘self” are not mentioned in the Language of psychoanalysis (LAPLANCHE & PONTALIS to), and Jungians who study autism ‘and narcissism are sometimes suspected of Freudian tendencies. Over against both those groups, who retain something of the organic model in their concept of the subject, the ego, Lacan sees it as a product of image- making, mirrored into existence and given form in words (LacaN 9). Ought we not, once and for all, to tid ourselves of this illusory subjec- tivity, and make ourselves really available to the spontaneity of life—if we listen to the message of the East—or, if we are politically minded, commit ourselves fully to the task of freeing mankind from conflict and ignor- ance? Without claiming to offer an answer, but with the aim of tackling the problem in its most immediate aspect—which does not mean its simplest— the Société Francaise de Psychologie Analytique celebrated its tenth anniversary by devoting its summer seminar of 24/25 June 1979 to con- sidering the self and narcissism. French-speaking Jungian analysts from Europe and Canada were invited; the lectures and discussions showed not only the value of a common language, but also the diversity of views and the cultural differences, The recognition of an unconscious, organising principle that colla~ borates with consciousness to form and develop the ego, either of an individual or a community, is a major premise of Jungian theory. Jung calls this principle the ‘self”. The course of an analysis, and of life, is modified by the self, depending on whether one recognises it or not, and whether onc is able to discern its fanctioning by one means or another. There is nothing mystical or esoteric about it, and it is not altered either by denigration or veneration. Jung speaks of an experimental totality playing a decisive réle in everyday life. It is in this area that we have to reflect and to undertake, if necessary, further research. 0021-8774/80/030237 + 10 $02.00/0 237 © 1980 The Society of Analytical Psychology238 E. Humbert If you were to ask what the self signifies for me, I should reply that it is, above all, the inner voice which tells me frequently and precisely how I am to live. A definition as simple as that calls for comment. To begin with, it is not a matter of specific words, but of a ‘thought’, though not a reasoned one, offerin; itsel like evidence, with a quite particular intensity, and a call to do what it proposes. It is the revealing of an unconscious source of knowledge and an important dimension of consciousness. That in itself is nothing extraordinary. What is extraordinary is the widespread ignorance of what I am describing and the considerable impairment of mental life resulting from that ignorance. Those analysts who categorise meticulously every nuance of life know personally nothing of what we are speaking beyond, perhaps, what Jung has written about it. There is perhaps a reason for that. It has been observed how some who follow this inner voice lose their sense of responsibility, subjecting their actions, and their relations to others, to this unconscious determinant, and succumbing progressively to more or less damaging ways of living. That so-called unconscious insight then, naturally, becomes suspect and ex- planations are sought within the framework of classical pathology with the unfortunate result of further reducing any approach to the unconscious. Errors such as those are perpetrated through false interpretation. The unconscious is understood in terms of parental complexes and truth is sought that way. But the inner voice docs not talk about the truth; it simply tells the time. It does not point to what is good or right in terms of a general plan of psychological development but to something which will get us going on condition, though, that we obey the inner voice, watch the results and respond accordingly. It can be the voice of the super-ego, of defences, of complexes, or desires: when these serve to confront, to call for a sense of reality, and for an increase of consciousness, they are powered with a major psychic intentionality. That has to be understood. If unconscious inspiration is followed blindly, one becomes its victim; but, opening one’s eyes to it, one comes to realise that things have got going, instinctive forces, changes occurring in one’s life, dreams too—and all that movement invites consciousness to take up a position. In this way one engages in the process and dynamics of transformation. Jungian analysts are aware of this process but, for the most part, they wrap it up in metaphors and little has been done so far to explore its clinical application and develop a theory. Yet it is a vital factor in the science of man. One has to ask what all this means in psychological terms. Is the psyche structured to produce a balance of satisfactions—pleasure and un- pleasure—or does it contain an unconscious creativity which can be actualised if it gets the support of collective or individual consciousness?The self and narcissism 239 And if that is so, can one possibly understand those processes in order to work with them? This is exactly what the theory of the self tries to do; and Jung stated that it was his principal task. He became aware of this dynamic when, after several years of crisis, he began to draw mandalas without understanding what he was doing, but observing, at the same time, that his psychic life was taking on a greater coherence. For a long time he was unable to give his observations any value or meaning beyond the personal. Only when he read Taoist writings, and in particular The secret of the golden flower, did he discover that others had had the same experiences. He was then able to formulate, as a general concept, the idea of the self. From that time onwards, he writes, he gave up painting mandalas and occupied himself with what he perceived about reality with the help of the idea of the self (June 8, p. 190). That was nothing less that the action of totality on the one hand, and the image of God, on the other. At this stage, as a consequence of his discoveries, Jung stressed the fact that the ego needed above everything clse to sacrifice its egoistic and subjective claims in order to submit to the active and unconscious principle which directs our being. Before long, however, Jung was drawn to the writings of the al- chemists in whose texts he discovered all the details of the process of transformation, projected, in this instance, into matter. In contrast with the major religions in which psychic events are projected far away, alchemy operated in the here and now, and so expressed in concrete symbols the elements and processes of a work which, as Jung understood it, was a representation of the aim of life itself. Thus the concept of the self gained in substantiality and precision, and could be related to clinical experience. It led to the hypothesis of the conitinctio oppositorum, or, if taken by way of feeling rather than of thinking, to Mercurius. Around the idea of the union of opposites, which is connected with the philosophical theory of correspondentia, Jung assembled a number of obser vations which not only extended beyond the boundary of that idea, but which could also be described as contraries. So coniunctio should not be understood to mean a suppression of differences. On this level the concept of the self can be understood and verified. It has made possible the formulation of several laws which, from my ex- perience, are as reliable as any law of the psyche can be, and three of which can relate to the concept of narcissism. Development proceeds by way of compensation, Thus we mect with the practical application of the self concept, for example, in typology. The development of the four functions is essential to individuation even at the cost of some loss of differentiation of one or more of the superior ones (Meter 11). It is to be understood, likewise, that no inner voice, no re-240 E. Humbert presentation, no feeling of the centre is to be counted as definitive. An idea, a theory, a feeling, a dream, is not to be taken merely for what it represents, but also for what it compensates (VON FRaNz 3). Consciousness must be available to the opposites. He who gets fixed into an attitude, a philosophy, or a set method of analysis condemns himself. The dynamic of the self collaborates with everything that breaks up narcissistic fixation. It stands opposed to all that the great mother secks to preserve in a static ikon. Does that mean that one is totally exposed to every wind that blows? Yes, if the unconscious does not encounter the continuity of consciousness, supported by integrated body-feeling, the irreversibility of time and the certainty of death. Totality is the relationship of conscious to unconscious. For a way of analysing, which understands relating to the unconscious only in the direction of becoming more conscious, that is a new idea. Now the other way, that of listening to, and making oneself available to, the unconscious is equally important, so much so that the aim of therapy can be defined as the setting up and preserving of a living relationship between conscious and unconscious. On the theoretical level to define totality in terms of relationship, and not perfection or the attainment of a goal, brings up the issue of the ego, and of its status. Everything we say about it will depend on temporal circumstances, since psychic factors undergo change and transformation. The effort to understand it, and to define the guidelines leads us to a law of ‘differentia- tion’. Thus the recognition of an unconscious organising force gives the analysand a feeling of having found a support. This allows him to restore a deficient early ‘holding’ (Devine 1), and a part of the therapeutic effi- cacy of Jungian analysis consists precisely in that. But in the long run, and for other patients, to relate to unconsciousness as to a mother can mean being held in a regressive state. Such a one needs to experience frustration, isolation, separation. Numerous compensatory signs will intimate when the time is ripe, and it will be observed that the dynamic of the self, ob- scured until then by the primitive relationship with the mother, begins to differentiate—not emerging as a feature from the depths of the personality or as a hidden potential, but as an opposing and integrating power which works on the materia prima of our conditionings and identifications in the same way that the serpent churned up the milky sea in order to give birth to the earth, in the Vedic myth of creation. Thus the Jungian theory of the self developed on three levels: the phenomenology of the mandala; the concept of the self; the hypothesis of the union of opposites (Humsert 6). It is on this third level that Jung exposed and presented quite clearly, the formulation of ego and self in terms of a polarity. Consciousness has organised the separation from the mother and has become ego, that is‘ ego-image. This ego, produced by a process it neither understands norThe self and narcissism 241 desires, henceforward fights a long battle against confusion. It needs courage and vigilance to attain a differentiation beyond those habitual responses on which it depends. By refusing to identify with the self and avoiding being possessed by it, the ego enables these impulses to emerge from archaism and negation. In this state of tension, during which the self is becoming differentiated, the risk of annihilation is diminished by a movement from the unconscious, an inner tendency, which increasingly and steadily guides the subject. In all the many studies devoted to the self, Job represents, in Jung’s writings, the image of the ego. I shall not recapitulate the literature of narcissism. It is the common heritage of all forms of psychoanalysis. Nor shall I discuss here the relation between the self and narcissism. But I should like to ask a question: why did Jung not deal with narcissism, nor even make use of the concept, and content himself with only a few allusions to it in the whole of his published writings? My view is that he spoke so little about it because he never encountered it. Narcissism is a phenomenon which strikes the observer who takes the outside viewpoint, and that Jung rarely did except in certain studies; typology, for example. It has to be remembered that it is not Narcissus who tells the story, but a third party. If anyone speaks of his own narcissism he is compelled to take an outside point of view, make himself an observer of himself and of his relations with his own image. In doing this he turns his gaze upon himself and treats himself as a psychic object whose organisation and functioning are being described. For this reason, in narcissism, you are always threefold. If, on the other hand, Narcissus were to speak directly, within his experience, instead of speaking of, or about, what he lives, he would express his psycho-physical attachment to a world with which he is completely identified. He would speak about the threats arising out of the darkness, and of the tremendous effort he is making to see and to under- stand in order to re-establish a state of harmony. In his threefold aspect, Narcissus speaks about his narcissism; when speaking directly his ego- nature (Ichhaftigkeit) is in action—in its dual versions of active and passive —that is, the efforts of his ego to maintain its ego world. Jung does not speak about narcissism but about ego-nature (Ichhaftig- keit). This he analyses with the help of two adjectives. Both the world and the ego can be ichhaft, which can be translated as endued with ego, that is, with a connotation of clinging or adhesion; and ichsucht, self-secking, with its fecling of greed and want. The difference between narcissism and Jungian ego-nature then be- comes a question of perspective in Nietzsche’s sense, and is essentially epistemological. We have already had occasion to show how the greater number of242, E. Humbert Jungian concepts are arrived at not from the standpoint of an observer, but are generated out of, and illuminated by, the confrontation with the unconscious, In that sense they are rightly analytical. I we compare, for example, the concepts of the ‘shadow’ and ‘repres- sion’ we can see that we are concerned with two different interpretations of objectivity. The idea of repression belongs to an analysis of the psyche in accordance with a causal scheme. It is the outcome of a positivist approach which tends to limit and analyse all phenomena as objective, seeking instances, abstracting structures and defining mechanisms. This procedure, which was Freud’s, remains the same even when the model is no longer that of eighteenth-century physics but of the linguistics of the first half of the twentieth century. In Jungian theory objectivity lies within experience. The shadow is a metaphor by means of which we may apprehend and explain certain re~ lationships to, or with, the unconscious, personal or collective: derived from the past, evolving by different stages, and engaging the whole psychic disposition in a pre-determined dynamic. Objectivity, in this sense, obtains in both formal and temporal constancy. Is it possible—and is it desirable—to work out the relations between the self and narcissism, two concepts developed from very different epistemologies? With regard to this, Bernard Sartorius describes the myth of Nar- cissus from the Jungian point of view (SarTortus 12), and Rosemary Gordon discusses work done on the concept of the self which has the merit of setting in relief those points on which analysts of different schools are today in agreement (Gordon 4). One would like to think that psycho- analysis as a whole discipline gains from a comparison of different theo- retical approaches. But in bringing together the concepts of the self and narcissism, there is something specific at stake, which I should like to emphasise To begin with, the epistemological dividing line crosses another which separates those who consider the self as a complex from those who con- sider it as a product of image-making. Here the two points of view are differently disposed. It is not clear, for example, how the narcissistic ego of Griinberger differs from the more speculative reflection-born, narcissistic ego of Lacan (Griinsercer 5). In the one view the ego is seen as taking shape in some organic manner out of the primitive relationship with the mother: Narcissus exists already when he sces himself in the water. In the other view Narcissus exists from looking at himself; he is born in the mirror, an image which comes alive ‘when it is cared into language. Lacan’s point of view differs essentially from those of Hartman, Mahler and Kohut: their views come somewhat closer to those of several Jungian analysts, such as Fordham (FORDHAM 2). ‘Where is Jung to be placed? Without developing in this paper theThe self and narcissism 243 Jungian theory of the ego, we should remember that Jung was the first to consider the ego as a complex, though in his later works he stresses the image view of it. I think the thread of continuity here lies in his acute perception of the relative nature of the ego. When he proposed that we view the ego as one complex among others it was already within the context, striking in its day, of the theory of relativity. He deprived ego consciousness of predominance, which was inherited from the old moral psychology, and leaned towards a poly- phonic perception of the individual. He discovered within the individual psyche a plurality of temporary authorities, thus underlining the frag- mentary character of ego-consciousness and introducing the concept of ‘dominants of consciousness’. Relativity was given even greater prominence and was more clearly defined when Jung came to consider the ego from the point of view of the unconscious subject. To illustrate this, Jung made use of the question which occurred to Chuang Tzu after he had dreamed he was a butterfly: ‘Was I then a man dreaming I was a butterfly, or am I now a butterfly dreaming I am a man? Jung returned to this three times in Memories, dreams, reflections, showing, that for him, it was not a mere play on words but a matter of living importance. Is it C.G. sitting on a stone, or a stone on which C.G. sits? Would he not cease to exist if the yogi of which he dreamed ceased to meditate? It is in this light that the ego takes on image quality. Where Jung and Lacan differ is that Lacan conceives of the ego as arising from human dis- course and the desire for the other, whereas Jung sees it ‘in the mirror of the self” (June 7, p. 280). It should be observed how this latter viewpoint allows one to distance oneself from the parental imagos, provides a point d’appui from which differentiation of the ego can take place, and is necessary for the trans- formation recognised by Lacan, by which the enunciating subject becomes the subject of enunciation. Jung linked the origin of the ego with the creativity of the unconscious, and while that is indispensable, it can take place only under certain conditions. The more an analysis liberates unconscious forces the more one ex- periences a sense of creativity and potentiality; it holds the ego dynami- cally, and the ego can own it. Attention is turned towards dreams and other signs, and to understanding the prospective quality of myths and stories. Analogies which begin to unfold in all their richness, relate private phantasy to common humanity, induce a belief that the key to life has been discovered and are taken by the ego as its own, In fact, the ego is caught up in a self-claboration, in a kind of superstructure based on a primitive instinctual condition which lacks any real capacity for relationship. When that inflation becomes conscious an attempt to dissolve it can be made for the wrong reason, that of readjusting the self-image to better advantage.244 E, Humbert Thatis a narcissistic preoccupation that can very well assume an appearance of fidelity to the self: but the regression will have been one in which the dynamic was a self-regarding depression. Here we touch on a sensitive point as regards Jungian analysis. If the collective unconscious is not given the recognition it deserves in analysis, and tends rather to attract the attention of the historian and mythologist, who use it to their own hermeneutic ends, it is because Jungian therapists do not take analysis of the ego sufficiently into account. Inflation, or possession by phantasies, teaches us that to neglect narcissism deprives us of a valid interest in the self, Yet Jung had perceived quite clearly the illusion and the dangers of secking salvation through the mere play of the collective forces of the unconscious. While emphasising with great insistence the need to recognise the potential of the unconscious psyche, he affirmed that that could be realised only within the limitations of the individual, and was conditional on his commitment to reality. Now a number of Jung’s followers are still seduced by the idea of a psyche that regulates itself provided its functioning is understood and hindrances swept away. It would bring order into life without our having to suffer neurosis, castration and sacrifice. At the other extreme are those analysts who base themselves on Jung in order to borrow certain aspects of dream interpretation, typology and symbology, without properly under- standing how analysis is involved in the individuation process. What Lacan terms image-making and what Jung described as inflation, are those excesses, deficiencies and side-trackings which have to do with the living relationship to the collective unconscious. Jung frequently men- tioned inflation but gave scarcely any hint of how to treat it, We are led to understand that this is a question of a heroic and sacrificial act, more or less self-castrating, based on a moral attitude of rejecting both power and humility. To some that demand sounds suspect, to others impossible or marvellous. In fact, it has been insufficiently investigated. Phantasies have taken the place of analysis. Inflation lies in the unconscious having been taken over by the ego. ‘What is required is a study of ego-nature (Ichhaftigheit). A truly Jungian epistemology would bring out aspects complementary to those which throw light on autism, the pre-and part-object relations states and primary narcissism. We ought to direct our attention to an idea to which Jung only alluded, namely, that of the self imago. This idea reminds us that every conception or apprehension of the centre of the personality begins as a projection. The self, like the ego, is stamped with relativity. Analysis has to strive to differentiate the self from the powerful imagos with which it is at first identified, an effort analogous to that which leads to the differen- tiation of our real parents from the parental imagos. This will no doubtThe self and narcissism 245 surprise those who believe they find, in Jung’s writings, a reference to an absolute self. For this kind of work, an acquaintance with the theories of narcissism is indispensable, initially for purposes of comparison and guidance. Clearly, the idea of the self being taken over into the ego-ideal, and the idea of the identification of ego and phallus are, among others, indispens- able adjuncts for a widening of consciousness. On’a deeper level, it is by using the categories of narcissism that one’s viewpoint can change. As we mentioned earlier, it involves a transition to an epistemology involving three persons, which objectifies the ego itself. Itis precisely at this stage that the subject must become conscious of itself. Subjectivity has to forego the help of the unconscious creative impulse, assess the questionable nature of its existence, and thus arrive at the opening point, the void, when its real need can—perhaps—become evident. At this stage of the analysis the necessary transition comes about through a change in understanding and attitude. This evidently carries with it a change in the transference and the constellation of different archetypes. What in classical psychoanalysis tends to reduce the individual to abstract structure here allows him to stand aside from himself. The analysand may then see himself as he appears in the eyes of the third—not very marvellous, without, guidelines, unloving, and struggling with his phantasies. Out of the relation of the object with itself emerges the fact, hitherto obscured, that he has been existing almost solely as the object of observations and of wishes of others. Such a widening of consciousness halts egoism, for it dispels the illusion of believing in himself as only a subject. At the same time, it questions the attachment to the images of the self and helps to extricate the wishes of others from wishes for himself. We learn from analysis that a right and seminal relation to the collective unconscious sub-tends the acquiring of a sexual identity. That is achieved only gradually through confrontation with sexual partners, and with the collective unconscious. A differentiation has to be attained which a one- sided approach could, in one way or another, only hinder. We need to develop Jungian methods by not only making use of theories of narcissism, but even more by changes in our approach, or, to put it more precisely, in our epistemology. Awareness has two aspects: one conscious, the other unconscious. The first is relative to the second, but the second can only be freed from ambi- valence by the efforts of the first. Both are undifferentiated to begin with and they are projected externally; the projections are withdrawn by means of a twofold differentiation. That could be a summary of my views on the matter. In attempting to bring together two concepts as distinct as those of the self and narcissism, what has to be understood is the relativity of the inner246 E. Humbert state of the human being, while recognising, simultaneously, the reality of the dynamic of the self and the nature of subjectivity. REFERENCES 1. Denne, J. (1979). ‘Le “holding” en psychothérapie’. Cahiers de psychologie Jungienne, 22, 3. 2. Forpuam, M. (1976). The self and autism. London, Society of Analy- tical Psychology. 3. Franz, M.-L. von (1975). C. G. Jung, his myth for our time. New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons for C. G. Jung Foundation. 4. Gorvon, R. (1980). ‘Narcissism and the self: who am I that I love?” J. analyt, Psychol., 25, 3 5. GRinBERGER, B. (1971). Le narcissisme—essai de psychanalyse. Paris, Payot. 6. Homoeer, E. G. (1974). ‘Images et réalité du soi’. Cahiers de psychologie Jungienne, 17, t & 2. 7. June, C. G. (1954). “Transformation symbolism in the mass’. Coll. wks., 11. 8. ——(1963). Memories, dreams, reflections. London, Collins and Rout- ledge & Kegan Paul. 9. Lacan, J. (1966). Ecrits. Paris, Editions du Seuil. 10. LAPLANCHE, J., PONTALIS, JB. (1973). The language of psychoanalysis. London, Hogarth Press. 11. Meter, C. A. (1979). Persorilichkeit: der Individuationsprozess im lichten der Typologie C. G. Jung. Olten, Walter Verlag. 12. Sartorius, B. ‘Mythe de Narcisse—necessité et limite de la reflection’. Cahiers de psychologie Jungienne, 22, 3. ‘This paper, published originally in Cahiers de psychologic Jungienne (Vol. 22, No. 3), has been translated from the French by Ruth Hoffman and James Seddon.