Article

India Quarterly
India in the Emergent 76(1) 8–23, 2020
© 2020 Indian Council
Multipolar World Order: of World Affairs (ICWA)
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DOI: 10.1177/0974928419901187
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Veena Kukreja

Abstract
India has a middle power status and a rising power mindset. The emerging multipolar
world manifests opportunities as well as challenges to India’s foreign policy. The
newness quotient is Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘economy first’ approach
rooted in his desire to create external conditions necessary to ensure domestic
economic progress. He has displayed dynamism while engaging all major powers,
promoting and reintegrating India with the global economy, promoting greater
cooperation with South Asian neighbours and renewing strategic connections in
the Indian Ocean, the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa. Pragmatism in India’s
foreign policy is seen in Indo–US relations reaching a new level or in cooperation
with China on climate change while opposing its territorial claims in the South
China Sea and One Belt One Road Project. To counter China, India has sought
close strategic partnerships with the USA and its allies and main partners in Asia-
Pacific while retaining its strategic autonomy. A major challenge to India’s foreign
policy is the downward spiral of relations with Pakistan.

Keywords
Rising power, strategic challenges, multipolar world, economic diplomacy, act-East
policy, multilateralism, soft power

By all reckoning, India has arrived on the world stage. In the last three decades,
India’s large and rapidly expanding economy coupled with its huge population
and its nuclear powers captured international attention and enhanced the image of
India with a profound change (Pant, 2009, p. 1).
India’s foreign policy, out of the structural confines of the Cold War strategic
framework, has become more expansive in dealing with its priorities over the
years. With the rise of its economic and military capabilities and strategic interests,

Corresponding author:
Veena Kukreja.
E-mail: kukreja_veena@rediffmail.com
Kukreja 9

India has shaped a diplomacy that is much more aggressive in the pursuit of those
interests. Since the early 1990s, India’s foreign policy manifested visible changes.
In the wake of changing political and security dynamics in the post-Cold War era,
India took the path of economic liberalisation, shed its anti-West, Third-World
outlook and repositioned itself in the world as an important global actor (Ganguly,
2018, p. 20; Mohan, 2004).
Yet India punched below its weight. India’s influence in its backyard including
Nepal, Sri Lanka and the Maldives had shrunk. An analysis of India’s feeble foreign
policy suggests that within India itself, the foreign policy makers shied away from
any talks of country’s rising power. The absence of grand strategic thinking in
India’s foreign policy in terms of long-term goals prevented it from spelling out the
roles that it aims to play in global affairs (Miller, 2013; Varma, 2013, p. 16).
Since coming into power in May 2014, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
government headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made very conscious
and deliberate efforts to give priority to foreign policy and the Prime Minister
himself acted as the roving ambassador of India deciding the contours and
direction of country’s foreign policy1 (Ganguly, 2019, p. 34).
This paper seeks to explain India’s middle power status and rising power
aspirations taking into consideration the changing international scenario. Besides,
the paper analyses the different aspects of India’s foreign policy by focusing on
the dynamics of change and continuity. Finally, it also looks into the debate that
Modi has fundamentally altered the foreign policy or has only tinkered with the
long-held foreign and security assumptions of India.

India:   A Middle Power with Rising Power Mindset

India’s relative weight and influence have been increasing over the past three
decades. However, India has definitely not attained a Great Power status. Although
it is in possession of nuclear weapons and intermediate range ballistic missiles, it
still lacks a global strike capability as well as serious extra-regional power
capabilities. It does not decisively dominate its own region, and it is not a system
shaping power in terms of either economic or military balance. ‘India is neither
one of the Great Powers nor minor power; but it is one that cannot be ignored and
in this sense fits the most general definition of the middle power2 … Hence, India
is a rising power – a middle power moving up in the global power hierarchy’
(Sridharan, 2017, pp. 51–68).
Moreover, India’s status as a regional power is contested. India can be labelled
a regional power in South Asia by taking into account its size, area, population,
GDP and armed forces vis-à-vis its neighbours. However, measured by the
yardstick of being able to dominate and impose its will on its neighbour, India
does not qualify as a regional power. India is not considered as a natural leader of
South Asia with the exception of Bhutan.
India is constrained as a regional power by ‘geo strategic factors specifically,
the possession of nuclear weapon by its neighbour Pakistan, a de-facto ally of
China. Geo-strategically speaking then, India is blocked along its entire continental
10 India Quarterly 76(1)

north by nuclear Pakistan and China …. To the south, the vast expanses of the
Indian ocean hamper the development of power projection capabilities of a kind
that would count in the global strategic calculation of the major powers’ (Sridharan,
2017, pp. 51–52).
In summary, India can be identified as a middle power with rising power
mindset manifesting increasing level of ambition, growing military and material
capabilities and expanding economy and consolidated democracy. India had
forged ahead and sought pathways to acquiring military and material power that
promise to bring it closer to its goal of transforming India into a ‘leading power’
(Gupta & Mullen, 2019; Subrahmanyam, 2015).

Opportunities and Challenges in the Multipolar World

The Cold War which marked much of the second half of the 20th century was an
era of bipolarity. Its end was followed by a ‘unipolar moment’ dominated by the
USA. Now the unipolar moment is rapidly fading; many scholars see the emer-
gence of a multipolar/multicentre world, and Amitav Acharya (2014) prefers to
call it a ‘multiplex’ world.
The emerging multipolar world offers opportunities as well as poses challenges
to India’s foreign policy. In the context of rising powers in the emerging world
order, Barry Buzan talks about the increasing diffusion of power as a ‘rise of the
rest’ leading towards an international system in which there will be no super powers,
several great powers and a lot of regional powers (Acharya & Buzan, 2019).
Multicentre/multipolar world is shaped not just by a handful of great powers and
their alliances but also by newer and regional powers, global organisations, cor-
porations, social movements and terrorist networks. Economic interdependence in
the multipolar world is multifaceted and complex. A multicentre world has multiple
layers of governance; regional powers and institutions enjoy a much greater
significance than a bipolar or unipolar world (Acharya, 2014).
A multipolar world presents many opportunities for India. Both the bipolar
Cold War and the unipolar moment or American world order constrained India’s
ability to shape world order. The waning of Western dominance opens space for
emerging powers like India to play active role in global affairs.
Increasingly, a multipolar world defined by geopolitics provides India more
choices to pursue its national interest and leadership ambitions by providing
global interdependence, pursuing proactive shared leadership of global governance
and building a positive regional environment in South Asia and the Asia-Pacific.

India’s Foreign Policy under Modi

Modi’s foreign policy builds on the foundation laid by his recent predecessors,
Atal Bihari Vajpayee and former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, and sets more
ambitious international goals of his own for India. According to Mohan, a leading
commentator on strategic diplomacy, India’s new initiative under Modi is to put
Kukreja 11

diplomacy at the service of economic development, deepen the ties with the
diaspora, attempt to end Delhi’s defensiveness on the world stage, inject greater
flexibility into India’s positions on trade and climate change, construct a new
framework of pragmatic internationalism and develop a new vocabulary for
Indian foreign policy. However, the Prime Minister seems to have been far less
prepared in his dealings with Pakistan and China (Mohan, 2015, p. 203).

Economic Diplomacy
Whether it is dealing with major powers or neighbours, negotiating trade agree-
ments or promoting India’s spiritual heritage, Modi has insisted that diplomacy
must be the handmaiden of India’s economic interests and serve the objectives of
accelerating national development.
Modi has prioritised three objectives: attracting foreign direct investment
(FDI) into the country, engaging with the 20 million strong Indian diaspora around
the world and raising the profile of India’s participation in multilateral and
regional forums. A strong underlying purpose of Modi’s active overseas promo-
tion of India as an ideal investment destination aimed to complement his foreign
investment for an infrastructure build out and to jumpstart his flagship pro-
grammes such as Make in India, Digital India, Skill India and Startup India.
FDI inflows have hit a new high of US$61.9 billion in 2017–2018. India’s
economic diplomacy has attracted over US$209 billion investment from May
2014 to February 2018. New opportunities have been unearthed which led India
to engage in a large number of international–bilateral agreements with European
Union (EU), Association for South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Sri Lanka,
Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. India has been negotiating for greater market
access for our products under the Doha Development Round in World Trade
Organisation (WTO) with a view to protecting our trade interests.
An analysis of Modi government’s trade negotiating positions reveals continu-
ity while changes are visible in both policy making and the stated orientation of
the policy. The trade policy under Modi has taken an explicitly nationalist turn
and trade policy is articulated in mercantilist language than in previous regimes.
Finally, under Modi, decision and policy making has become more centralised in
the Prime Minister’s Office (Mullen, 2019, p. 19).
Moreover, critics contend that India’s big failure is the government’s inability
to make trade, technology and investment as an integral part of its foreign policy.
In fact, the Modi government has repeatedly shown its ineptness and myopia in
trade negotiations. India has not been able to get a trade deal with either the EU or
Asia or even trade understanding with USA, not to speak of any bilateral invest-
ment deal which means India is fast losing any hope of leveraging the current
US–China trade confrontation to its advantage (Bagchi, 2018, p. 14).
There is no doubt that China wants to contain India’s rise as an economic and
military power. It often troubles India by aiding and abetting Pakistan and has
been reluctant to resolve border and trade issues. Yet, New Delhi cannot close its
doors on the world’s largest economy, especially when the EU is struggling with
12 India Quarterly 76(1)

Brexit and the USA is increasingly turning protectionist. India needs newer
markets to help its business achieve economies of scale and grow faster. China
could be the new export market if India plays.
Similarly, making India more attractive for foreign investors by addressing
their major concerns on contract enforcement, tax uncertainties and investment
protection treaties will boost FDI inflows and further support India’s economic
growth. India should give more importance to prudent economic management. On
the other hand, India is levelling towards a confused approach to technology—the
new world order will be determined by rival technological ecosystem in civilian
and military sectors.

Managing the Great Powers with Pragmatism

Modi’s efforts to engage with the USA have been proven to be quite successful.
In this context, Modi’s government has benefited from the legacy of the UPA I and
UPA II regimes. Manmohan Singh’s two terms had brought significant improve-
ments in Indo–US relations, despite some differences on global issues such as
trade and climate change. The landmark Indo–US Civil Nuclear Deal (2005) was
the result of shared perception of long-term strategic convergence between the
two countries. Modi has utilised his decisive mandate to carve a new partnership
with the USA to harness its capital and technology for his domestic development
agenda.
The Indo–US deal has transformed the terms of bilateral engagement. Earlier
India was the main target of the US nuclear sanctions, but today it is increasingly
seen as a natural US partner though not a natural ally. Despite major military
exercises, India will never ally with the USA in the South China Sea or West Asia.
One strand of Modi government’s foreign policy has been vigorous drive to
acquire advanced nuclear, military and dual-purpose technologies. It has sought
admission to major dual-purpose technology export control regimes. The govern-
ment amended its civil nuclear liability law to make investment in civil nuclear
power generation attractive to US companies, enabling it to take full advantage of
Indo–US Nuclear deal (Sridharan, 2017, pp. 61–62).
Modi got the bilateral Logistical Exchange Memorandum Agreement (LEMOA)
signed with the USA in 2016 for facilitating logistical support, supplies and
services between the USA and the Indian militaries on a reimbursable basis and
providing a framework to govern such exchanges (Pant, 2019; Roy, 2016). He
followed it up with the signing of communications compatibility and security
agreement (COMCASA) in 2018 to facilitate access to advanced defence system
and enable India to optimally utilise its existing US-origin platform.
Besides, India and the USA have to work harder to manage differences on
other issues such as the architecture of the emerging global regimes in trade and
investment and climate change.
Apart from pursuing good relations with the USA, Modi has developed
excellent relations with most European states. However, he has manifested a
particular interest in France owing to a defence deal for 126 Medium Multirole
Combat Aircraft that had initiated under the UPA II. Modi has moved forward on
Kukreja 13

his own with the purchase of 36 Dassault Rafale Aircraft. Given the fact that the
Indian Air Force remains in dire need of multiple squadrons to replace an ageing
fleet of MIG-21s, defence relationship with France is likely to be sustained
(Ganguly, 2019, p. 36).
So far Indo–Russian relations are concerned, given the common politico-
strategic interests in South, South-West and Central Asia, Modi government has
continued to strengthen cooperation between the two countries. Modi’s continued
reliance on Russia for defence stems from the fact that Soviet Union had provided
unstinting support for India’s economic development and security since India’s
independence. Indo–Russian relations have witnessed profound upheavals since
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, ranging from steep decline in the early
1990s through new political and strategic understanding in the mid-1990s to
mutually productive and enduring partnership between New Delhi and Moscow
during the Putin administration (Harshe, 1998). India’s cooperation with Russia is
imperative for its defence security. Besides, there is largely untapped but high
potential market for pushing exports. Furthermore, even today Russia does not
place end-user limits on the weaponry it sells to India and is often willing to
pursue co-production arrangements.
However, in current global power play, Russia is increasingly seen as needing
China more than the other way round. In summary, Russia has entered in China’s
orbit, presenting a challenge to Indian diplomacy.

Responding to China’s Rise

The rise of Chinese influence all across the world, including in India’s neighbour-
hood, is an inevitable consequence of country’s increasing might in the global
economy and polity. China’s cherished—but now increasingly controversial—
Belt and Road strategy aims for expanding its global reach. China has been asser-
tive in recent years, building islands in South China Sea and constructing an
international architecture that provides a potential alternative to the Bretton
Woods Institutions (Gupta and Mullen, 2019, p. 4). China had clearly emerged as
a new long-term challenge, threatening the US dense web of interests in Asia
(Saran, 2014). In the recent years, there has been a growing concern in the country
about China’s efforts to establish closer political and economic ties with India’s
neighbours aimed at encircling India. Sino–Pakistan nexus and Chinese nuclear
and missile technology transfer to Pakistan, and development of Gwadar Port and
China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)3 have serious multiple implications
for India. China, through its economic corridor with Pakistan, has proposed a
dramatic redrawing of demographic and geographical boundaries, threatening
India’s territorial integrity.
On the Line of Actual Control between India and China, minor incursions
without causalities take place frequently. Despite the rapid growth of trade––with
a huge surplus on the Chinese side––over the past decade and a half, security
relations with China remain fraught.
14 India Quarterly 76(1)

Moreover, a serious longer-term threat lies in plans by China to divert part of

water of Brahmaputra, a river flowing eastwards and northwards in Tibet, a
development that would have serious downstream effect on India’s north-east
and yet about which India would be unable to do anything significant (Sridharan,
2017, p. 59).
China has its eye on Doklam as it would add strategic depth to its narrow
Chumbi valley, which juts in like a dagger between Sikkim and Bhutan. The
launch of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and BRICS New Development
Bank exemplify China’s new diplomatic and economic muscles.
China remains India’s biggest challenge and opportunity. The challenge is
understanding the nature of Chinese power and hence the importance of Indo-
Pacific strategy. The opportunity is to be able to find openings to create interde-
pendence rather than the current skewed relationship. New Delhi should leverage
a future of militarised Quad for better behaviour by China, say in Doklam. India
should fast-track security trilateral with Japan and the USA. India should also
consider inviting the current ASEAN chair as observer to Quad meetings which
makes it more inclusive, puts ASEAN at the heart of Asia-Pacific and keeps China
under pressure.
In the wake of China’s economic slowdown, US President Donald John
Trump’s arm-twisting on trade, India would do well not to lose such an opportunity
for rebalancing its relations, especially bilateral trade imbalance with its northern
neighbour. The Parliamentary Committee of India has recommended adopting
a ‘flexible approach’ using all options, including its relations with Taiwan, but
avoiding ‘adversarial posturing’.

New Initiatives in the Neighbourhood

Given the fact that India is situated in one of the most troubled neighbourhoods
of the world, imperative of structuring a comprehensive engagement strategy
towards its neighbours poses a complex challenge. The issues of identity, asym-
metry and the nature of domestic politics of these countries are the ones that
bedevil the relationship between India and its smaller neighbour countries. India
has largely adopted an ad hoc bilateral approach vis-à-vis its neighbours. As a
result, India has focused on ‘managing (its) relationship with (its) neighbours
rather than shaping it with a long-term objective and vision in mind’ (Behuria
et al., 2012, p. 23).
In recent years, India’s approach has transformed considerably. India has been
experimenting more often with asymmetric diplomacy, offering more than it
would have in the past in an effort to lay to rest its reputation as a regional bully
or hegemon. This will necessitate a clear and unambiguous articulation of its
security and national interest. Simultaneously, it must find ways of enabling its
neighbours to participate profitably in India’s economy.
Given the present government’s unambiguously stated priority of improving
relations with the neighbours, Modi’s initiative of inviting all South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) heads of governments to his
Kukreja 15

swearing-in ceremony was a new leap in Indian diplomacy and aimed at strength-
ening ties with the neighbourhood.
Now, Modi is taking a leaf from China’s book and trying to share its prosperity
with its neighbours. In this context, there has been a major psychological break-
through with Bangladesh although the land boundary agreement being the most
visible victory of Modi’s visit to Bangladesh on 6–7 June 2015. Other accords
were also equally very significant as nudging the subcontinent towards a common
market. Indian companies will sell electricity and make goods in special eco-
nomic zones across the border, creating jobs while helping reduce Bangladesh
trade deficit. The accord signals to Nepal, Sri Lanka and Pakistan the benefits of
moving from the politics of suspicion to economic prosperity (Das, 2015, p. 10).
This has created a new psychological dynamic with Bangladesh–Bhutan–India–
Nepal (BBIN) pushing for new levels of connectivity, including electricity, trans-
portation and grids.
The Modi’s government initiated its South Asian diplomacy with a positive
note with investing in developmental projects in Bhutan, concluding border
agreement with Bangladesh and addressing the question of the mistrust between
India and Nepal. In this new orchestra of feel-good South Asian music, the only
discordant note relates to Pakistan. Relations with Pakistan have manifested
deadlock on terrorism since the Mumbai attacks of November 2008. Over the
years, India–Pakistan relations have witnessed only incremental improvement or
reversal. All efforts to establish ceasefire at the Line of Control (LoC), or a real
detente, have always been stymied in the end by Pakistan’s ‘Deep State’, that is
the ubiquitous army, which has a pernicious hold over the foreign and security
policies of the country.
Notwithstanding Modi’s neighbourhood first policy, Indo–Pak relations
deteriorated under Modi’s period and the purposed Foreign secretary’s meeting
had to be postponed more than once. In post-Uri Indian surgical strike against the
terrorist launch pad in PoK not only breached decades of self-imposed restraint
but also signalled New Delhi’s new assertive approach dealing with Pakistan-
based terrorism, even if this means crossing the LoC. The fact is that India has
carefully calibrated its actions, deploying diplomacy and coercion at the same
time (Katju, 2016, p. 10).
Recently the Pakistan army and the Inter-Service Intelligence planned the
Kartarpur corridor with the aim of reviving Sikh militancy even before Imran
Khan took office (Chellaney, 2018, p. 20). Modi’s response to terror strikes at
Pulwama (at the very end of his first term in office) targeted terror camps inside
Pakistan’s territory. It shattered the myth of Pakistan’s nuclear capability and
threw open the possibility of India fighting a limited conventional war if needed
(Pant, 2019, p. 1). However, the relationship with Pakistan continues to be perhaps
the biggest challenge.
The role of India and Pakistan during the post-withdrawal period of the US
forces from Afghanistan has also been critical. During the last few years, India has
emerged as a major investor and partner in the post-Taliban Afghanistan. As
Trump plans to withdraw from Afghanistan, the reports of the last round of US–
Taliban talks indicate that the USA has agreed to the key Taliban demand for the
16 India Quarterly 76(1)

withdrawal of foreign forces. On its part, Taliban has accepted the important US
condition that it could neither have any connection with international terrorist
groups such as Al-Qaida nor allow Afghanistan’s territory to be used by such
organisations. The other issues—Intra-Afghanistan Dialogue and ceasefire—are
yet to be discussed. The sequence is important. Intra-Afghan Dialogue which
should have been the priority in an ‘Afghan-owned’ and ‘Afghan-led Dialogue’
has been relegated to future rounds of talks. The US offer of withdrawal is a tan-
gible concession; Taliban’s offer to forsake terrorism is a promissory note. There
is certainly no commitment on terror groups which affect India. Over the past
months Taliban, with Pakistan behind it, has virtually dictated terms to the USA
(Katju, 2019, p. 18). Taliban’s takeover in Kabul will be prelude to further radi-
calisation of Pakistan and unleashing Jihadis in Kashmir (Srivastava, 2019, p. 16).

Integrating the Subcontinent

For all its trappings of a multilateral organisation, SAARC remains largely non-
starter and dysfunctional. Modi has talked ambitiously about trade and connectivity
for the subcontinent and called for deeper integration of South Asia for peace and
prosperity. SAARC needs to be converted into an energetic regional organisation.
In this context, in the view of the negative role played by Pakistan within the
SAARC, India should encourage sub-regional cooperation. In the east, India can
take steps to foster integration with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. In the south,
it can construct deeper links with the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Another strategy is
to build transregional institutions and cooperation. China, Japan and the USA,
three important observer states, seek to actively promote transregional coopera-
tion involving the SAARC and neighbouring regions, such as East Asia and
Central Asia. Building transregional institutions, namely Bay of Bengal Initiative
for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), which
connects the eastern subcontinent with parts of Southeast Asia or joining the
Chinese Silk Road initiatives that hope to connect different parts of subcontinent
with various regions of China, will lead to transregional cooperation (Kukreja,
2015, p. 221).
Besides, a strategy of positive unilateralism would permit Modi to push the
subcontinent a little faster towards long overdue regional integration. For example,
Modi has already proposed, unilaterally, to build a SAARC satellite for use by its
neighbouring countries. Former foreign secretary Shyam Saran has suggested that
Modi could open India’s market for goods produced by neighbouring countries by
reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers and improving trade facilitation. In any
case, if India signs bilateral agreements with its neighbours on connectivity and
offers overland transit to all of them, a large part of the subcontinent will auto-
matically get integrated.
In order to retain its pre-eminence, India has to think seriously in terms of
investing in development projects in the neighbouring countries to convince
others of its intentions to bring peace and prosperity to the entire region.
Kukreja 17

Look East to Act East Policy

In the post-Cold War global scenario, the Asia-Pacific region occupies the centre
of economic and strategic concerns. In this context, Modi’s upgrading of ‘Look
East’ policy into ‘Act East’ policy is considered rebranding rather than a new
wholesome new policy (Pardesi, 2019, p. 29). The Modi government is trying to
increase its footprints in East Asia. Modi’s East Asia policy not only aims to
improve partnership and cooperation with the states of East and South-East Asia,
but also designs to address China’s growing assertiveness in the region. It would
not only provide India with strategic leverage in the region but also revive
economic growth at home. India’s effort have been focused on bolstering ties with
Japan and Vietnam, the two countries that are most concerned about Chinese
assertiveness.
In the wake of Asia’s current power disequilibrium triggered by the rapid
economic rise of China seeking to disturb the territorial and maritime status quo,
an enduring entente between India and Japan can help to restore a fair degree of
equilibrium to the power balance (Chellaney, 2014). Besides, Japan is ready to
help India to become an economic power house at par with China.
Japan’s strategic goals can, therefore, partly be realised by assisting in the rise
of India, a benign power that would be a bulwark against unipolar Asia dominated
by China, besides being a place to invest its surplus funds.
Modi’s visit to Japan made a significant strategic shift in India’s policy towards
East Asia. Evident in the personal chemistry between Modi and Japan’s Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe, there is clearly a meeting of minds that both countries can
benefit form. In this regard, Japan’s pledge to invest US$33.5 billion in Indian
infrastructure and Smart Cities over the next 5 years can galvanise the Indian
economy and get its growth engines reviving again. At the heart of the defence
and security partnership was the signing of Memorandum of Cooperation and the
exchanges in the defence, especially the ‘regulation of bilateral maritime exercise’
and Japan’s continued participation in India–Japan special strategic and global
partnership. Meanwhile, enhanced bilateral cooperation in defence and civil
nuclear energy can have significant strategic and geopolitical implications.
India–Japan partnership can transform development paradigm in India and the
region. Juxtaposed to China’s top-down investments comprising its OBOR initia-
tive India–Japan outreach to the continent seeks to connect different growth poles
through local ownership of projects, skill development and transfer of technology.
Modi’s visit to Myanmar, Australia and Fiji sought to entrench India in the
Asia-Pacific architecture. Modi’s first port of call was Myanmar where he attended
the ASEAN—India Summit and East Asia Summit.
Modi has re-ignited what he called ‘natural partnership’ with Canberra. India’s
civilian nuclear deal with Australia signals a new phase in regional diplomacy.
Australia presents huge economic opportunities for India with significant room
for improving ties in areas such as energy, mining, services and education.
Moreover, along with Japan and the USA, Australia and India can become the
fulcrum of the new strategic platform to ensure security and freedom of navigation
in the Asia-Pacific.
18 India Quarterly 76(1)

Engagement with Central Asia

Central Asia is a region critical for India’s energy, trade and security needs. There
are unprecedented concerns in several Central Asian Republics about China’s
increasingly dominant presence. There are also Central Asian Republics’ height-
ened threat perceptions about the resurgence of Islamic militancy in wake of the
US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014. India must deepen strategic partnership
with the Central Asian Republics as well as with other international actors to form
effective counterbalancing alliances that will make India central player in the
emerging Eurasian regional architecture.
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also provides India with the oppor-
tunity to work with the Central Asian Republics and Russia to further its own
strategic interest in the region. Despite India’s historical and cultural links to
Central Asia, former’s ties with them have remained well below the potential.
Hence there is much scope for India to leverage its soft power here. In fact, much
like Modi’s Buddhism diplomacy in East Asia, Sufism in Babur’s original home
could become key component of India’s outreach to Central Asia. Promoting
shared Sufi ideals will also serve as a powerful symbol of unity against the rising
currents of Islamic extremism in the region.

Unravelling West Asia Policy

The articulation of a comprehensive ‘Look West’ Policy is a critical imperative.
Following ‘Act East’ and energetic Central Asia visit, Modi plunged into West
Asia and Gulf—a part of India’s extended neighbourhood that many accused him
of neglecting. India has vital stakes in the security and stability of the Gulf region,
which is source of nearly two-third of India’s crude oil requirements and largest
trading partner and also hosts 7 million diaspora which accounts for a major part
of India’s inward remittance income. Modi has not only continued the policies of
his predecessors but also sought to build upon them.
Modi’s visit to United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia aimed at boost-
ing investment and credit, particularly on infrastructure and energy development.
This balances both India’s closer relations with Israel and Pakistan’s close relation
with Gulf countries. The strategic dimension of Modi’s visit cannot be underplayed
as there is an urgent need for India and UAE to enhance their ties to a strategic level
and step up counterterrorism cooperation to tackle the scourge of extremism
throughout West Asia and South Asia. The worsening internal implosion in Pakistan
and Afghanistan demands a sustained dialogue between India and Saudi Arabia.
Iran could also be a valuable partner of India in stabilising the region.
India’s engagement with Iran is of vital significance in terms of energy, domes-
tic and regional security imperatives. Modi visited Iran and signed agreement to
develop the US$500 million Chabahar port. India has dual objectives: first, it
wants to encircle Pakistan by maintaining cordial relations with Iran and
Afghanistan and second, it seeks to counter weight China. The cooperation with
Iran is imperative to push India’s ambitious logistics project, Chabahar port which
Kukreja 19

marks a pivotal moment in the advancement of India’s strategic interest in Central

Asia and beyond. Chabahar enables overland trade between India and Afghanistan
by passing Pakistan. In that sense, Chabahar diminishes Pakistan’s strategic stran-
glehold over Afghanistan. Chabahar plus International North–South Transport
Corridor (INSTC) could be India’s answer to China’s much vaunted OBOR initia-
tive of transnational connectivity—in fact, Chabahar is just 80 km from China’s
Gwadar Port Project in Pakistan.
Modi is the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel. Modi’s visit to Israel on
July 2017 marks a pragmatic turn in Indian foreign policy manifesting boost in
bilateral ties and strategic partnership with Tel Aviv without diluting its position on
the two-state solution vis-à-vis Palestine. In this context, Blarel (2019) remarks
that despite the initial attempt at a pro-Israel policy Modi has mainly pursued the
traditional policy of engagement with all relevant regional actors in Middle-East.

Africa and the Maritime Security

India has also begun to look further beyond its traditional areas of concerns. There
has been an active attempt to build long-term relationship with Africa, an emerging
continent rich in national resources including oil and gas. Modi’s Africa tour of
Southern and East Africa aimed at strengthening diplomatic, economic ties and
create a stronger presence in Africa, as the country tries to match China. Despite
the fact that India has historically enjoyed excellent cultural and economic
relations with East African nations of Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and South
Africa, it has somewhat failed to project itself as a maritime security provider in
the extended region. There now exists a unique opportunity for India in this
regard, as the structure and economic interests of all regional stakeholders
converge in the Indian Ocean region (Kukreja, 2016, p. 16).
After India–Africa summit in October 2015, India made new long-term
commitments of US$ 10 billion in line of credit on top of existing commitments
of US$ 6.77 billion. The motivation is probably a long-term access to resources,
energy supplies and UN General Assembly votes in supports of India’s global
governance aspirations.
On Africa’s eastern seaboard, India should concentrate on countries such as
Eritrea for a portbase. Even better, India should consider recognising Somaliland
and leverage for a strategic presence. All of these should be on India’s bucket list
for 2019.

Challenge of Recasting Multilateralism

India confronts a challenge of reviewing and reorienting strategic vision of
Indian multilateralism (Mohan, 2010, p. 8). Modi’s government undertook the chal-
lenge of recasting multilateralism by adopting strategic approach in promoting
Indian participation in multilateral forums, including regional groupings for both
economic and security reasons. India has recently become member of SCO founded
initially by China, Russia and Central Asian States. It has joined Chinese promoted
20 India Quarterly 76(1)

Shanghai-headquartered Asian infrastructure investment bank and new develop-

ment bank promoted by the BRICS grouping. It has also played an active role in
neighbourhood regional organisations including the SAARC, BIMSTEC, as well
as in the East Asia summit and other groupings centred on ASEAN. So far, the
Modi’s government has deftly combined politico-strategic concerns with eco-
nomic advantages. It needs to show that it can shape the agenda of institutional
gatherings such as BRICS, WTO and climate change talks.

Projection of Soft Power in Foreign Policy

In foreign policy, attributes of soft power can play varying roles. C. Raja Mohan
argued as early as 2003 that India could always count itself among the few nations
with strong cards in the arena of soft power. India has been projecting soft power
globally. India has relied on a mix of constitutional, political, economic, cultural
and technology-related assets (Malone, 2011, pp. 35–39). Significant efforts are
made recently by India in displaying the soft power of the Indian Diaspora during
Modi’s recent visits to the USA and Australia. However, India needs to develop
new instrumentalities in leveraging its widely acknowledged soft power strengths
and convert it into ‘smart power’.4

Conclusion
In summary, Modi’s foreign policy mirrors soft nationalism, market-oriented
economics and new Asianism, seeking close ties with Asian democracies to
‘create a web of interlocking strategic partnerships’ (Chellaney, 2014). However,
India’s foreign policy under Modi does not reflect fundamental departure from
previous policies of the predecessor governments. The changes have involved
rebranding/repackaging in most realms. Notwithstanding, Modi has undeniably
put a personal stamp on foreign policy. Despite imparting his personal stamp,
India’s foreign policies towards major powers and in most issues areas remain
substantially similar to those of UPA government, reflecting continuity rather than
change (Gupta, 2019; Mullen, 2019).
India’s foreign policy and strategic orientation towards the world under Modi
suggest a shift from self-righteous idealism to pragmatism. Modi also emphasised
the importance of economic engagement with the rest of the world, encouraging
investments in India from abroad. He focused on strengthening cooperative
relations with South Asian neighbours and regional integration. India is also
moving close to the US’s main strategic partners in the Asia-Pacific region—
Japan and Australia without losing its strategic autonomy to extract gains from
China and the USA.5 The ambit of India’s development partnership continue to
remain a way of gaining support for India’s global ambition, for example, attaining
seat in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). India seeks to become a big
player on the regional and global level, but it lacks the ability to manifest its
aspirations adequately.
Kukreja 21

In the neighbourhood, India requires to deal with Pakistan and China more
rigorously and pragmatically. For example, Pakistan backed increasing violence
in Jammu and Kashmir and China’s OBOR Project have serious ramifications for
Indian sovereignty and security. Besides, in case of Pakistan, Modi’s government
may have employed a stronger rhetoric against Pakistan and terrorism; in practice,
there are limits to what it can do on the ground.
The forgoing decision of India’s foreign policy suggests that India has regional
weight and influence in terms of its size, area, population, military and sustained
economic growth, but not dominance or the capacity to change the policies of its
neighbours. ‘Geostrategic and geographic constraints box India into South Asia in
a way that makes it a contained power. India will find it very difficult to overcome
these constraints, even with sustained high growth and greater missile and naval
reach. To count globally, it will need to make a massive jump in both economic
weight and military reach’ (Sridharan, 2017, p. 59).

Veena Kukreja is a Professor and Head at the Department of Political Science,

University of Delhi. She specializes in South Asia and Pakistan Studies. Her
Published works include: Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of
Pakistan, New Delhi: NBO Publishers, 1985; Civil Military Relations in South
Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991;
Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, New Delhi:
Sage Publications, 2003; Pakistan: Democracy, Development and Security Issues
(Co-edited), New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005; Democracy, Development and
Discontent in South Asia (Co-edited), New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2008;
Federalism in South Asia (Co-authored), New Delhi: Routletdge, 2014. She has
published numerous research papers and articles in scholarly journals.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship
and/or publication of this article.

Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of
this article.

Notes
1. At the diplomatic level, the BJP’s legislative majority afforded him substantial inde-
pendence from coalition partners as well as from bureaucrats.
2. For theoretical discussions of middle powers, see Cooper, Higgot and Nossal (1993)
and Jordaan (2003, pp. 165–181).
3. CPEC is a corridor of highways and railways that will run from Kashgar to China and
to Gwadar in Pakistan on the Arabian Sea near Iran Border. And all the infrastructure
and associated stuff for CPEC will be constructed for Pakistan by China, free of cost or
far negligible loans. With the CPEC, China has sunk close to US$50 billion in Pakistan.
CPEC (the life and sole of One Belt One Road (OBOR)) is likely to reduce Chinese
dependence on sea routes for trade and energy supplies, and China will loom larger
22 India Quarterly 76(1)

as both a security threat and an economic opportunity for all its neighbours, including
India.
4. Nye has stressed in espousing as of 2004, the concept of ‘smart power’, involving
element of both soft and hard power. Soft power alone cannot achieve much in an often-
contentious world.
5. India’s engagement in the so-called Quad enhances its strategic autonomy vis-à-vis
China, whereas when sits together with Russia and China trilateral it enhances its
strategic autonomy vis-à-vis USA.

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