LETTERS

Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been India’s premier journal for ‘My Tax, My Money?’ finance would be flouted. In fact, this is
comment on current affairs
and research in the social sciences.
what is done in aristocracies and oligar-
It succeeded Economic Weekly (1949–1965),
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
T his letter is with reference to the
protest staged by Congress leaders
from Karnataka at Jantar Mantar in New
chies, and even in formal democracies
wedded to extreme neo-liberalism, but
not in democracies which are genuine
As editor for 35 years (1969–2004)
Krishna Raj Delhi on 7 February 2024, led by the welfare states.
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. Karnataka chief minister against the What holds between persons, should
Editor alleged injustice to the state in the devolu- hold between regions and states within
S Mahendra Dev tion of tax revenues. Congress legislators a country too. There is nothing morally
Deputy Editor took part in the protest. They clarified wrong or unjust, if the resources raised
Pyaralal Raghavan
that there was no intention of creating a in rich or economically more developed
SENIOR Assistant editors north–south divide in the country, but states are in part used to develop the
INDU K
Nachiket kulkarni stressed that there should be no discrimi- poorer or less advanced states. In fact,
Assistant editor
nation against the southern states. Of the this principle should operate even
Sahba Fatima placards displayed on the occasion, a larger between countries at the international
editorIAL Assistant number asserted: “My Tax, My Money!” level. But since there is no world gov-
Ankit Kawade There seems to be a strong feeling ernment as such, it is up to individual
Editorial Coordinator among the Congress leaders of the state nations to voluntarily transfer resources
Shilpa Sawant to needy countries.
that a substantial portion of the tax reve-
copy editor nues raised from Karnataka should be As such, a progressive resource transfer
jyoti shetty
devolved back to the state. There is one is never adequate and satisfactory. But
production
suneethi nair more presumption, which is that the “in- this need not be the case within a country,
justice” caused by not following this prin- where there is a national government
Chief Administrative and Finance Officer
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR ciple is particularly against the southern which is responsible for the welfare and
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Economic & Political Weekly
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4 february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

to attain this balance. The question is
whether the recommendations of the
Finance Commission are accepted or
flouted. This can be objectively ascer-
tained by experts, and need not be left
to mutual recriminations.
M V Nadkarni
Bengaluru
On Regulating AI
T he article titled “India’s Approach
towards Regulation of Artificial
Intelligence: Utilising the International
Experience” by Jawahar Bhagwat and
S Y Boldyreva (EPW, 30 December 2023)
identifies three primary concerns regard-
ing the adoption of artificial intelligence
(AI) in India: job displacement, prolifer-
ation of misinformation, and preserva-
tion of research integrity. While legiti-
mate, these are not necessarily the top
concerns with respect to AI. The article
lacks comprehensiveness and portrays AI
in a predominantly negative light. The
proposed recommendations are likely to
substantially impede India’s contributions
to the development of AI and severely
restrict its ability to use AI for its benefit.
AI is capable of improving worker pro-
ductivity. However, there is no certainty
about its impact on labour. Erik Brynjolf-
sson et al, in a paper titled, “What Can
Machines Learn, and What Does It Mean
for Occupations and the Economy?” sug-
gest that machine-learning technologies
will grow more pervasive over time and
that rather than completely automated
processes, jobs will be re-engineered to
incorporate AI alongside humans.
A 2024 publication by Mauro Cazzaniga
et al titled, “Gen-AI: Artificial Intelli-
gence and the Future of Work,” finds
that while advanced economies may
witness around 60% of jobs being
affected by AI, the corresponding figure
for India stands at 26%. Caution on the
jobs front is appropriate, but let fear
not dictate our recommendations, lest we
should fail to recognise the transformative
opportunities arising from AI.
The policy imperative is to create em-
ployment opportunities across various
skill levels. The stringent regulations
advocated by Bhagwat and Boldyreva
are impractical and are likely to drive
Economic & Political Weekly EPW june 17, 2023
february 17, 2024
vol lViii
capital and jobs to countries with more
favourable regulatory climates. They
will hinder Indians from participating in
new categories of jobs that will inevita-
bly be created by adopting AI.
The recommendations by Bhagwat
and Boldyreva to minimise harm are
misguided; they fail to describe a mech-
anism that links data storage localisation
with curtailing misinformation. For
example, they fail to recognise alternative
approaches to the regulation of online
content and feed algorithms such as sep-
aration of content moderation function
from content monetisation, algorithmic
audits, algorithmically curtailing the
virality of suspicious content, stringent
enforcement of privacy laws, etc. On the
contrary, restricting cross-border data
flows will likely stifle innovation and
limit operational efficiency for India-
based technology companies that form
a significant proportion of formal
sector employment.
Likewise, there are many legitimate
uses of AI in information creation, in-
cluding text and graphics creation, ani-
mation, video and voice tools, and lan-
guage tools, among others. The use of AI
in content creation can range from mini-
mal, automated fixes to speed up human
creation of content to entirely AI-gener-
ated content. A warning caption man-
date proposed by Bhagwat and Boldyreva
for the entire broadcast duration that uses
AI-produced content is unenforceable.
Bhagwat and Boldyreva’s myopic focus
on plagiarism neglects AI’s various posi-
tive contributions to research, including in
literature review, data analysis, drug dis-
covery, and even peer review. Mandating
researcher declarations about not using
AI assistance ignores the many positive
uses of AI and risks Indian researchers
falling behind. Other recommendations,
such as central repositories of PhD the-
ses and the creation of anti-plagiarism
software, while noble ideas, bear little
relationship with the problem at hand
EPW Engage
The following articles have been published in the past week in the EPW Engage section (www.epw.in/engage).
(1) Pandemic, Protests, and Workers: India and Sri Lanka Considered — Aardra Surendran, Kanchana N
Ruwanpura, Papia Sengupta
(2) Sustainable Agriculture in Maharashtra: Can the State Budget Offset Climate Vulnerability?
— Gurpreet Singh, Poorvi Kulkarni
vol lix
no 24
no 7
LETTERS
(and, in fact, have been proposed in the
pre-AI era as well). Solutions to research
integrity problems lie in not restricting
AI, but in the larger context of education
and science policy that incentivises re-
search publications while, at best, pro-
viding inadequate and delayed funding.
Bhagwat and Boldyreva’s piecemeal
approach to stringent regulation based
on perceived harms will stifle AI adoption
and innovation in India. Their portrayal
of foreign companies as solely driven by
profit motives is also misguided; adopting
AI tools while providing sufficient guard-
rails can provide substantial benefits.
The recommendation to involve gov-
ernment agencies like the Telecom Reg-
ulatory Authority of India, Ministry of
Labour and Employment, Ministry of Sci-
ence and Technology, along with autono-
mous organisations to evaluate the likely
impact of AI appears well-intentioned
but is ignorant of the lack of government
capacity in the domain of AI and excludes
organisations that possess the technical
and policy understanding to guide such
research. Strict consent norms have re-
peatedly proven unenforceable in the face
of citizen ignorance and government apa-
thy/active encouragement, as seen in
cases ranging from Aadhaar to DigiYatra.
While Bhagwat and Boldyreva recog-
nise major problems with AI, such as
bias, military applications, etc, they fail
to address these in their recommenda-
tions. In the Indian context, the lack of
sufficient localisation of AI—whether
in medical diagnosis, cultural context,
or other domains—can cause harms
that are unaddressed by Bhagwat and
Boldyreva’s proposals. Given the perva-
siveness of AI across domains, a better
policy solution is to ensure competition
across the different layers of AI systems
and to frame principles for regulation
that recognise the legitimate uses of AI
while protecting from its harms.
Bharath Reddy, Mihir Mahajan
Bengaluru
5
LETTERS

6 february
june 17, 17,
2023
2024volvol
lViii
lixno
no247 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EDITORIALS
Castes, Old and New
The rhetoric of “four castes” masks the ongoing violence of caste and struggles against it.
I
n what appears to be a serious statement of intent and com-
mitment, the union minister of finance emphasised the gov-
ernment’s aim to prioritise the welfare of four major “castes”
in the 2024–25 interim budget speech. The four “castes” named
were the garib (poor), mahilayen (women), yuva (youth), and
annadata (farmers). The minister further said that “All four
require and receive government support in their quest to
better their lives,” claiming that “the country progresses,
when they progress.”
In her last budget speech before the upcoming Lok Sabha
elections, the union minister of finance also cited the govern-
ment’s achievements in terms of improving the living standards
of these four “castes.” For the poor, the minister cited pro-
grammes like direct benefit transfers and credit assistance
through the Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana and the Pradhan
Mantri SVANidhi Yojana, respectively. For women, the minister
cited programmes like the MUDRA loan scheme for women en-
trepreneurs, higher female enrolment in higher education, pro-
hibition of triple talaq, enactment of the law reserving 33%
seats for women in the Lok Sabha and state legislative assem-
blies, etc. For the youth, programmes like Skill India and the
establishment of new institutions of higher learning were men-
tioned, while for the farmers, programmes like the Pradhan
Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi, which guarantees minimum income
support for farmers, and the Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana,
a crop insurance scheme, were mentioned.
The Prime Minister’s speeches have been claimed as the inspi-
ration behind these four “castes” being at the centre of the union
government’s welfare and developmental agenda. The Prime
Minister’s coinage of these new “castes” has been primarily
framed in response to the alleged “caste politics” of opposition
parties, an implicit reference to the demand for a nationwide
caste census. Decrying that such demands of opposition parties
seek to divide the people on caste and communal lines, the union
government—claiming that only the “four castes” of the poor,
women, youth, and farmers motivate their politics—has cer-
tainly sought to upend the opposition’s anticipated electoral
dividends arising out of the promise of a nationwide caste census.
It is notable that a state like Bihar has already conducted a
caste survey and published its results, with stark findings about
wealth and income distribution, educational status, demographic
details, and other sociopolitically consequential information.
8 FEBRuary 17, 2024
The results of the caste-based survey in Bihar are likely to affect
the political rhetoric and policy promises of contending parties
in the upcoming general elections. Andhra Pradesh has also ini-
tiated the process of a similar caste survey beginning in January
2024, aimed at assessing the socio-economic and educational
disparities among different caste groups. Karnataka was slated
to release the figures of the caste survey that was conducted
back in 2015. One set of leaders favour the release of these fig-
ures ahead of the Lok Sabha elections; however, other leaders
have resisted it, reportedly due to the fear of a negative backlash
amid the anticipation of the less-than-expected numerical
strength of Lingayat and Vokkaliga caste groups in Karnataka.
It is in this context of political claims and counterclaims sur-
rounding the caste census that the rhetoric of “four castes” in-
voked by the union government becomes intelligible. This lan-
guage of “four castes” can, however, be seen from another point
of view as well. This concerns the moral hurt and insensitivity
mobilised through the rhetoric of these “new” castes when India
is already facing the scourge of an existing caste system. To un-
derstand this dimension, the emphasis on exactly “four” castes
needs to be decoded.
The rhetoric of four new castes actually sanitises the violent
nature of the caste system. When the term “caste” is used for an
income group like the poor, a gender group like women, an age
group like the youth, and an occupational group like the farmers,
one is effectively distorting the meaning of caste by presenting
it as non-hierarchical in nature. While the “timeless” and “un-
changing” portrayal of the caste system has often been chal-
lenged by scholars, the fact of a social hierarchy existing bet-
ween and among castes is something that is noted to be a fairly
common feature of most regions in the Indian subcontinent.
Years of anti-caste struggles and movements led to a certain
hesitation in openly justifying the caste system in the public
sphere. Even among the spokespersons of various ruling par-
ties, one could hear loud, even if tokenistic, slogans about caste
as a form of pernicious inequality that ought to be removed
from Indian society. Development, once hailed as the antidote
to caste and caste politics in India, was envisioned to bridge social
disparities, uplift marginalised communities, and foster inclu-
sive growth. The rhetoric that the poor, women, youth, and
farmers constitute “four castes” entails a regression from this
anti-caste developmental consensus in giving the impression
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

that castes are benign social formations, whose intra- and inter-
group relations can be cordial, harmonious, and equal.
Another aspect of how this rhetoric rehabilitates the violence
of caste is how it excludes the “fifth caste” of human beings
whose status was essentially “outcaste” in character. In line
with the ideological representation of the varna system consist-
ing of Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras, the lan-
guage of the four “new” castes similarly fails to recognise the
sea of human beings who could not be classified into a simplistic
“fourfold” structure, and who were stigmatised on account of
being “unclassifiable.” These “outcaste” human beings were
stigmatised as “untouchables” for centuries altogether, and the
source of such stigma was nothing but the hierarchical imagina-
tion that lay at the root of the varna–jati system.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7
EDITORIALS
Why invoke the painful memories of exclusion and discrimi-
nation that arise at the hint of even the most “well-intentioned”
justifications of caste by this new-found rhetoric? When the
pernicious effects of caste can still be felt in multiple parts of
India on an everyday basis, it is unfortunate that the union
government has felt the necessity of invoking the language of
caste in outlining its welfare agenda. Whether such language
is accepted or countered among the people depends upon con-
scious and critical popular mobilisation around the historically
progressive language of anti-caste movements, whose essen-
tial warning about the caste system continues to be relevant to
this day: there will be outcastes as long as there are castes in
India. Hence, any justification of castes, old or new, is inimical
to democracy.
9

From 25 Years Ago
Vol XXXIV, No 7 FEBRUARY 13, 1999
Maharashtra: Literary
Contretemps
A correspondent writes:
Many debates have crystallised around the
Akhil Bharatiya Marathi Sahitya Sammelan
(All-India Marathi Literary Conference) during
its 122-year history. The only organisation of its
kind among the Indian languages, the sam-
melan has had little tangible to offer writers as
it lacks any executive power. It has remained in
the limelight as a platform for voicing the posi-
tion of the Marathi literary community on cul-
tural and political issues. Though Marathi littera-
teurs have occasionally in the past mobilised
this platform or floated temporary alternative
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
ones to put up a fight against particularly bla-
tant instances of political interference in cul-
tural matters, the consistently large financial
support extended by successive governments in
Maharashtra has transformed the sammelan
over the years into a lavish social gathering on
the one hand and enabled it to claim to repre-
sent the literary mainstream on the other.
It is the hollowness of this claim that was
sought to be exposed by the ‘vidrohi’ sahitya
sammelan organised parallelly to the 72nd
official literary conference in Mumbai this
year. […]
The ‘vidrohi’ sahitya sammelan, which drew
more response than was expected, interrogat-
ed the legitimacy of the official conference
from a different standpoint. Instead of oppos-
ing the official conference for allowing politi-
cians of a particular hue on the dais, the vid-
rohis, claiming to take inspiration from Joti-
rao Phule’s exhortation that the toiling masses
should form their own literary organisations,
vol lix no 7
EDITORIALS
pointed out that the official platform operat-
ing within brahmanical parameters had delib-
erately denied recognition to writers of the
lower castes throughout its history. In a sense,
the vidrohis were reflecting the shift that has
taken place in the social base of literary pro-
duction with the lower castes now in the fore-
front of literary innovation in style and con-
tent. Given that till now almost all the presi-
dents of the all-India conference have been
brahmins and have been elected by less than
300 persons in charge of different literary
bodies spread across the state, it is clearly mis-
leading to attribute to the conference a repre-
sentative status. Nevertheless, the challenge
before the vidrohis remains that of drawing
writers of the constituency they seek to repre-
sent on their platform. This involves gaining
prestige and status for the ‘vidrohi’ platform
which at present it clearly lacks, as was evi-
dent from the minuscule presence of creative
writers at the ‘vidrohi’ sammelan.
9

From 50 Years Ago
Vol IX, No 7 FEBRUARY 9, 1974
Arabs: The Crisis Within
Mohammed Ayoob
For the Egyptian and some other Arab govern-
ments, the existence of the Palestinian prob-
lem complicates the possibility of working out
a peace settlement with Israel. As public opin-
ion in no Arab country is yet prepared to ac-
cept a partial settlement with Israel which
would freeze the Palestine issue, the govern-
ments in these countries have willy nilly to pay
lip service to the cause of Palestine. Neverthe-
less, the fact remains that when Egypt and
Syria went to war last October they did so not
for the sake of Palestinian rights but in order to
defreeze the post-1967 situation regarding the
Egyptian and Syrian territories that had been
occupied by Israel in the June war. And this
was clear from statements made by Cairo and
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
Damascus. This is also why Cairo — though
not Damascus — jumped at the opportunity to
negotiate with Israel in Geneva and then to use
Kissinger’s good offices for bringing about a
military disengagement in the Sinai.
Although the government of Syria has been
trying to portray itself as a very reluctant par-
ty to such an agreement, a similar military
disengagement is very much on the cards
there too. The Syrians’ emotional commit-
ment to their Palestinian brethren does, how-
ever, seem to be qualitatively different from
that of the Egyptians, for historical and ethnic
reasons. After all, Palestine like Lebanon had
been a part of greater Syria; and the Syrian
attitude is determined by the fact that Syria is
situated in the heart of the Arab East and has
been the birthplace of modern Arab national-
ism and renaissance. Moreover, the Baath
which rules Syria has pretensions to being an
all-Arab movement, unlike its counterpart —
the Arab Socialist Union — in Egypt. There
are, moreover, a significant number of Pales-
tinians in Syria, some of them in relatively im-
portant political positions; in fact, Syria is
vol lix no 7
EDITORIALS
probably the only Arab country where the
Palestinians have been given civil and politi-
cal rights on par with its own citizens.
The Syrian attitude also seems to be shaped
by the Syrian resentment of the way in which
the Egyptians treated them in the closing stag-
es of the war and after the cessation of hostili-
ties. While the war had been started on Octo-
ber 6, 1973, in co-ordination by the two coun-
tries, Egypt had accepted the ceasefire unilat-
erally on October 22, without any prior consul-
tations with Syria. I was told by very authorita-
tive Arab sources that the ceasefire on the
Egyptian front came as a great shock to the
political and military leaderships of Syria. […]
West Asia, therefore, is still in ferment. One
cannot rule out the possibility that it may keep
on exploding periodically. One can be reason-
ably sure of one thing, however, — viz, that
the Palestinians will be the catalysts for most,
if not all, of the future explosions and that
these explosions may not always directly re-
late to the Israeli issue. Some of these explo-
sions may well take place within the various
Arab societies.
9
 FEBRUARY 17, 2024
Higher Education Scenario
The laggard states need to more than double their enrolments to meet the new education policy targets.
T
he All India Survey on Higher Education (AISHE) 2021–22
highlights some important aspects of the progress of ter-
tiary education at the national level and in the states. As
per the report, there were 1,168 universities, 45,473 colleges and
12,002 stand-alone higher education institutions registered
with the AISHE, of which a substantial majority participated in
the survey. Together, these institutions hosted as many as 15.97
lakh teachers and 4.3 crore students, a number which is larger
than the entire population of countries like Australia, Venezuela,
Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, and Canada.
The 2021–22 survey, which is the 11th in the series, indicates a
sudden slowdown in the growth of the student population to
4.6% for the first time in four years. A major reason for this is
the slower growth of undergraduate students, especially female
students, who account for around four-fifths of the student pop-
ulation in higher education. Similarly, the number of students
doing MPhil has almost halved, while the number of PhD stu-
dents has remained almost stagnant. However, the number of
students doing post-graduation accelerated to double digits.
Surprisingly, the deceleration in the growth of the higher edu-
cation student population is not uniform across social groups. A
gender breakdown shows that it is the female students who are
most affected, with their growth rate reducing to 2.7% com-
pared to male students, whose growth rate only dipped to 6.3%.
It is also seen that the 2.2 crore male students marginally out-
numbered the 2.1 crore female students. Trends indicate that
the share of female students has dipped by more than 1 per-
centage point to 47.8% from their peak levels two years back.
Despite this setback, the growth of students from almost all the
other disadvantaged social groups shows impressive buoyancy.
While the number of both Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled
Tribe (ST) students increased by 12.4% each to 66 lakh and
27 lakh, respectively, that of Other Backward Classes (OBC) rose
by 10.2% to 1.6 crore. Similarly, the number of students from
the Muslim community increased by 9.7% to 21 lakh. This is es-
pecially gratifying since the number of Muslim students had
fallen by 8.5% during the pandemic.
Trends over the last five years show that while the share of SC
and ST students has increased by around a percentage point to
15.3% and 6.3%, respectively, that of the OBCs has gone up by
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7
2.3 percentage points to 37.8%. However, despite such gains, it
is also noted that the share of female students in all these three
social groups has decelerated in recent years to 47.9%, 49.7%
and 47.9%, respectively.
Another setback is that the share of students from the Muslim
community has fluctuated and even dipped marginally by a few
decimal points to 4.9% from their peak levels two years back.
The only positive trend in this case is that the share of female
Muslim students has gone up by over half in two of the last
three years. In fact, the Muslim and ST groups are the only two
communities where the share of female students had exceeded
that of males at least in some years.
Coming to enrolment ratios in higher education, the numbers
indicate that the overall gross enrolment ratio (GER) of 28.4% in
2021–22 is still far short of the 50% targeted in the new education
policy by 2035. However, the numbers also show that some states,
which are concentrated in the north and the south regions, are
already close to achieving the 2035 GER targets. They include Delhi
(49%), Tamil Nadu (47%), Himachal Pradesh (43%), Uttarakhand
(41.8%), and Kerala (41.3%). The states with the lowest enrolment
rate, with less than half of the top-ranking states, are generally
those with large tribal populations and include Chhattisgarh
(19.6%), Jharkhand (18.6%), Bihar (17.15%), and Assam (16.9%).
On the positive side, the numbers show that the national-level
GER is similar across genders with the female ratio even mar-
ginally higher at 28.5% as compared to 28.3% in the case of
males. It is also seen that the GER has improved by 3.8 percent-
age points over the last five years, with the numbers for both
the male and female ratio increasing by 3.8 and 3.9 percentage
points, respectively.
An equally heartening development is that the GER in higher
education is higher for females in more than 15 major states,
mainly concentrated across the north and the south. They in-
clude Kerala (14.9 percentage points higher), Himachal Pradesh
(12.4), Haryana (6.7), Punjab (4.9), Jammu and Kashmir (4.6),
Chhattisgarh (4.0), Uttarakhand (3.6), and Telangana (3.1). In
contrast, the states where the GER of females are lower than
that of males are geographically scattered and includes Madhya
Pradesh (lower by 1.7 percentage points), Andhra Pradesh (2.5),
Gujarat (2.5), Odisha (2.9), and Maharashtra (3.8).
7
EDITORIALS

But what is more distressing is that the disparities between
the general GER and that of SC and ST communities are rather
substantial. While the overall GER is 28.4% at the national level,
that of the SC is 25.9% and the ST, just 21.2%. It is also seen that
while the female GER of SC is higher than that of males, in the
case of ST, the reverse is true. However, the GER is not available
for the OBC and minority groups.
There are also significant interstate disparities in the GER of
ST and SC groups. The states with the highest GER rate among
ST communities are Goa (39.5%), Tamil Nadu (39.4%), Telangana
(39.2%), Maharashtra (36.3%), and Delhi (36.1%). In the case of
ST, the states with the highest enrolment include Tamil Nadu
(43.9%), Uttarakhand (42.1%), Uttar Pradesh (39.4%), Telangana
(38%), and Bihar (34.6%).

8 FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Tracing Algorithmic and
AI-biased Data
Ashish Makanadar, Samit Shahane, Uttam Patil
Algorithmic bias in machine
learning algorithms has potential
consequences for perpetuating
discrimination, reinforcing
stereotypes, and violating
individual privacy.
Ashish Makanadar (ashishecstasy@gmail.com)
is with the Center of Excellence in Logistics and
Supply Chain Management, Indian Institute
of Management Mumbai. Samit Shahane
(shahanesamit97@gmail.com) is an architect
and project manager. Uttam Patil (uttampatil@
jainbgm.in) teaches computer science at the
Jain College of Engineering, Belagavi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
A
s machine learning (ML) algo-
rithms become more prevalent in
society, the need to ensure that
these algorithms are free from bias
becomes increasingly important. The po-
tential consequences of biased algorithms
are numerous and can lead to unfair and
unjust outcomes for individuals and com-
munities. The documentary “Coded Bias”
highlights the dangers of biased data and
the importance of creating transparent
and accountable ML algorithms.
As researchers and engineers in the fields
of computer science and electrical engi-
neering, we have a responsibility to ad-
dress the issue of algorithmic bias. In this
article, we explore the challenges posed
by algorithmic bias and discuss strategies
for mitigating this issue. Drawing on in-
sights from “Coded Bias” and other sourc-
es, we provide an overview of algorithmic
biases and the technical approaches that
can be used to detect and address bias.
Algorithmic bias is a complex issue
that arises from various sources, including
vol lix no 7
COMMENTARY
biased data, flawed algorithms, and
human biases. To address this challenge,
we discuss the technical approaches that
can be used to identify and mitigate bias,
including techniques for auditing data
and algorithms. We also explore the impact
of algorithmic bias in different domains,
such as criminal justice, hiring practices,
and healthcare, and discuss the potential
consequences of these biases.
By increasing awareness of algorithmic
bias and promoting the development of
ethical and accountable ML algorithms,
we can help to ensure that these tech-
nologies are used in ways that are fair,
just, and beneficial for all.
Background
Algorithmic bias is an all-pervasive and
growing problem in the field of ML and
artificial intelligence (AI). As we increas-
ingly rely on these technologies to make
important decisions, such as who gets a
loan or who is granted parole, the poten-
tial for these systems to perpetuate and
even exacerbate existing social biases
becomes a pressing concern. At its core,
algorithmic bias is a manifestation of
broader social and economic inequalities,
and addressing this issue requires not
only technical solutions but also a deep
understanding of the social and histori-
cal factors that contribute to bias.
17
COMMENTARY

Historically, algorithmic bias has its
roots in long-standing patterns of dis-
crimination and prejudice. From redlin-
ing in housing to racially biased lending
practices, these forms of discrimination
have created lasting disparities in
wealth and opportunities that persist to
this day. In the context of ML and AI,
these patterns of bias can be amplified
and perpetuated by algorithms that rely
on historical data to make predictions
about the future.
One key challenge in addressing algo-
rithmic bias is that it can be difficult to
detect and quantify. Unlike human deci-
sion-makers, algorithms do not have the
capacity for self-reflection and intro-
spection. As a result, it can be difficult to
identify instances of bias or to under-
stand the mechanisms by which bias is
introduced into these systems. However,
recent advances in the field of algorithmic
fairness are providing new tools and
techniques for detecting and mitigating
bias in ML algorithms.
Algorithmic bias does not exist in iso-
lation. Rather, it emerges from and
perpetuates existing social, political, and
economic inequalities (Benjamin 2019;
Noble 2018). Factors like racial discrimi-
nation, lack of diversity in technology,
and historical injustices provide a fer-
tile field in which algorithmic bias can
take root and thrive (Broussard 2018;
Eubanks 2018). Power dynamics that
privilege certain groups also enable the
development and deployment of biased
algorithms that can further marginalise
under-represented communities (O’Neil
2016; Buolamwini and Gebru 2018). As
Benjamin (2019) said, “biased data pro-
duces biased automated decisions” in
ways that “exacerbate existing inequali-
ties.” Ultimately, a complex matrix of
societal biases provides the context in
which algorithmic bias flourishes, shap-
ing the creation and application of algo-
rithms towards discriminatory ends.
Mitigating algorithmic bias, thus, requires
addressing difficult questions about
enduring structural injustice.
Societal Context of
Algorithmic Bias
Several scholars have explained the
complex relationships between algo-
rithmic bias and systemic injustice. For
instance, Benjamin (2019) sees biased
data and algorithms as part of the “new
Jim Code,” reinventing existing inequi-
ties using the veneer of technical neu-
trality. Noble (2018) argues how search
engines reinforce racism through algo-
rithmic bias.
Equally important are the power dy-
namics that allow algorithmic bias to
proliferate. Eubanks (2018) shows how
high-tech tools entrench discrimination
against marginalised groups in areas
like criminal justice and public services.
O’Neil (2016) highlights how “weapons
of math destruction” exacerbate ine-
quality through biased algorithms. Such
analysis reveals how existing hierar-
chies shape the creation and deployment
of algorithms in ways that further disad-
vantage vulnerable populations.
Critically examining the societal
context of algorithmic bias also clarifies
its impacts on identity, citizenship, and
lived experiences. As Hoffmann (2019)
describes, algorithmic categorisations
can directly alter how certain groups
are perceived and treated. Members of
communities affected by algorithmic
bias describe a sense of dehumanisation
and loss of agency (Eubanks 2018). Such
personal accounts underscore how algo-
rithmic bias infringes on civil liberties
and shapes life opportunities.
However, affected groups are not just
passive victims. Scholars have docu-
mented how marginalised communities

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18 FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

are actively resisting and finding solu-
tions to algorithmic bias. For instance,
Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) describe
techniques for auditing facial analysis
technology for bias. Benjamin (2019)
outlines the ways in which “communi-
ties are using the master’s tools to dis-
mantle his house.” Understanding re-
sistance and abolitionist practices is key
to situating algorithmic bias in its full
societal context.
Causes of Algorithmic Bias
Algorithmic bias is a multifaceted prob-
lem that arises from a range of different
factors. The various causes of algorith-
mic bias, including biased data, flawed
algorithms, and human biases are dis-
cussed below.
Biased data: Algorithms are only as
good as the data they are trained on,
and if that data is biased, the resulting
algorithms will be biased as well. For
example, if a facial recognition algorithm
is trained on a data set that primarily
includes lighter-skinned individuals, it
is likely to perform poorly on images
of darker-skinned individuals. This is
because the algorithm is not exposed to
sufficient diversity in its training data.
Similarly, a predictive policing algo-
rithm that is trained on data that reflects
historical over-policing in certain com-
munities is likely to perpetuate these
patterns of discrimination, even if the
algorithm is intended to be unbiased.
Flawed algorithms: Algorithms that rely
on oversimplified or inaccurate models
of the world are more likely to produce
biased outcomes. For example, an algo-
rithm that is designed to predict recidi-
vism based on historical data may inad-
vertently include factors that are corre-
lated with race or socio-economic status,
leading to biased predictions. Similarly,
algorithms that rely on stereotypical
assumptions about different groups of
people, such as assumptions about the
relative intelligence or criminality of
different racial or ethnic groups, are
likely to produce biased outcomes.
Human and societal biases: Even if
the algorithms themselves are designed
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
to be unbiased, the humans who de-
sign, train, and deploy these systems
may introduce biases into the process.
For example, a human programmer
who is biased against a particular
group of people may inadvertently in-
troduce this bias into the algorithm.
Similarly, human decision-makers who
rely on algorithmic predictions may be
more likely to accept or reject certain
predictions based on their own biases
or prejudices.
In order to address the problem of
algorithmic bias, it is critical to under-
stand these different causes and to de-
velop effective strategies for mitigating
their effects. This may involve develop-
ing more diverse and representative
training data sets, designing more accu-
rate and robust algorithms, and pro-
moting greater awareness and account-
ability around the social and ethical
implications of ML and AI.
Moreover, factors like historic dis-
crimination, lack of diversity in tech-
nology, and inequitable social systems
enable the proliferation of algorithmic
bias. For instance, predictive policing
algorithms that rely on data from
racially biased over-policing practices
will further perpetuate discrimination
(Lum and Isaac 2016). Without carefully
considering the societal contexts from
which data emerges, algorithms risk
exacerbating and amplifying embedded
biases. As scholars emphasise, mitigating
algorithmic bias requires examining
and transforming the broader social
conditions that spawn it (Hoffmann
2019). While technical interventions
are important, solutions must also en-
gage with eliminating the root societal
inequities that allow algorithmic bias
to thrive.
ML Algorithms and Bias
Data collection: The first step in ML
is often data collection. Bias can be in-
troduced into the data set during this
process if the data is not representative
of the population it is intended to model.
For example, if a hiring algorithm is
trained on data that primarily includes
male job applicants, it may unfairly dis-
criminate against female applicants.
vol lix no 7
COMMENTARY
Data preprocessing: Before feeding
data into an ML algorithm, it often needs
to be preprocessed. This may include
tasks such as removing outliers, nor-
malising data, or imputing missing val-
ues. If preprocessing is not done properly,
it can introduce bias into the data. For
example, if the algorithm imputes miss-
ing values for a particular demographic
group using the mean of another group,
this can introduce bias.
Algorithm design: The ML algorithm
itself can also be a source of bias. For
example, if a criminal justice algorithm
is designed to optimise for low crime
rates, it may unfairly target certain
demographics or neighbourhoods that
have historically had higher crime rates.
Model training: During model training,
the algorithm is adjusted to better fit the
data. If the training data is biased, the
model will learn and reinforce that bias.
For example, if a healthcare algorithm is
trained on data that primarily includes
White patients, it may unfairly discrimi-
nate against patients of other races.
Consequences of Algorithmic Bias
The consequences of algorithmic bias
can be severe and far-reaching. The
potential consequences of algorithmic
bias are discussed below with examples
of how it has affected different commu-
nities and individuals.
Perpetuating discrimination: One of
the most significant consequences of
algorithmic bias is the perpetuation of
discrimination. When algorithms are
biased against certain groups of people,
they can reinforce patterns of discrimi-
nation and marginalisation that have
historically disadvantaged those groups.
For example, studies have shown that
facial recognition systems are less accu-
rate when identifying individuals with
darker skin tones, leading to a higher
rate of false positives and false arrests
of people of colour (Buolamwini and
Gebru 2018). Similarly, predictive polic-
ing algorithms that are biased against
certain communities can lead to over-
policing and increased surveillance in
those communities, exacerbating existing
19
COMMENTARY
patterns of discrimination and racial
profiling (Angwin et al 2016).
Reinforcing stereotypes: When algo-
rithms rely on oversimplified or inaccu-
rate models of the world, they may per-
petuate existing biases and stereotypes.
For example, a study found that Google’s
advertising system was more likely to
display advertisements for high-paying
jobs to men than to women, perpetuat-
ing the stereotype that men are more
qualified or suitable for these positions
(Datta et al 2015). Similarly, a study of
language models found that they were
more likely to associate certain words
with specific gender or race, reinforc-
ing stereotypes and biases (Bolukbasi
et al 2016).
Violating individual privacy: When
algorithms make decisions based on
personal data, such as credit scores or
medical histories, they can reveal sensi-
tive information about individuals with-
out their consent. This can be particu-
larly problematic when the algorithms
are biased against certain groups, as it
can result in further stigmatisation and
discrimination. For example, a study
found that a health prediction algorithm
was more likely to predict that Black
patients would need extra medical care
compared to White patients, even when
the patients had similar medical histo-
ries (Obermeyer et al 2019).
Subjectivity and Citizenship
Algorithmic bias profoundly impacts
individual subjectivity and citizenship
in pernicious ways (Hoffmann 2019;
Gangadharan and Niklas 2019). Biased
algorithms categorise and classify peo-
ple based on reductive and discrimina-
tory logic, infringing on civil liberties
(Eubanks 2018). This alters how margin-
alised groups are perceived and treated,
shaping lived experiences (Benjamin
2019). For instance, predictive policing
algorithms reinforce racialised notions
of criminality, further dehumanising
communities of colour (Brayne 2020).
Such algorithmic labelling limits life
chances and erodes agency (Angwin et
al 2016). Additionally, the denial of re-
course and accountability in automated
20
decisions contravenes norms of due
process (Citron and Pasquale 2014). As
scholars emphasise, mitigating algorith-
mic bias requires centring its impacts on
personhood and democratic participa-
tion (Hoffmann 2019; Gangadharan and
Niklas 2019). Only by tracing these com-
plex harms can we develop solutions
that restore human dignity and civil rights.
Case Studies
Criminal justice: In 2016, a ProPublica
investigation found that a popular soft-
ware used by courts to assess the risk of
reoffending was biased against Black
defendants. The algorithm classified
Black defendants into a “high-risk” cate-
gory, which was different from White
defendants, even when they had similar
backgrounds and criminal histories.
This bias had real-world consequences,
as it led to more Black defendants being
denied bail and receiving longer prison
sentences. One potential solution to this
problem is to use more transparent algo-
rithms that take into account the factors
that are actually relevant to risk assess-
ment, rather than relying on proxies for
race or other factors.
Hiring practices: In 2018, Amazon
scrapped an ML tool that was designed
to automate the process of résumé
screening, after it was found to be bi-
ased against women. The tool had been
trained on résumés submitted to Ama-
zon over a 10-year period and had
learned to give lower scores to résumés
that contained words like “women” or
the names of all-female colleges. This
bias was likely the result of the fact that
the résumés used to train the tool were
themselves biased against women, as
they had been submitted primarily by men.
One potential solution to this problem
is to use more diverse training data and
to carefully audit algorithms for bias
before deploying them.
Healthcare: In 2019, a study by re-
searchers at the University of Chicago
found that a widely used algorithm for
predicting which patients would benefit
from extra care was biased against
Black patients. The algorithm used a
FEBRuary 17, 2024
“risk score” to determine which patients
were most likely to benefit from extra
care, but this score was systematically
lower for Black patients, even when
they had similar health needs as White
patients. This bias had real-world conse-
quences, as it led to fewer Black patients
receiving extra care and more Black
patients dying as a result. One potential
solution to this problem is to use more
diverse training data and to carefully
audit algorithms for bias before deploy-
ing them.
AI bias in India: There have been sev-
eral reported cases of AI bias in India.
One notable example is the use of facial
recognition technology by law enforce-
ment agencies, which has been shown to
be biased against certain groups, par-
ticularly women and people with darker
skin tones. A study of the union govern-
ment’s National Crime Records Bureau
found that facial recognition technology
had an extremely low accuracy rate
when attempting to match faces from a
database of 1.3 billion people, raising
concerns about the potential for false
identifications and wrongful arrests.
Moreover, there have been cases of
bias in hiring practices, with some com-
panies using automated systems that
may discriminate against certain groups,
such as women or people from lower
socio-economic backgrounds. For exam-
ple, a study posits that some hiring algo-
rithms used in India were biased against
candidates who attended non-English-
speaking schools or who had gaps in
their employment history.
Another notable case study of AI bias
in India is the controversy surrounding
the Aadhaar system, which is a biomet-
ric identification system used by the
government to provide citizens with a
unique identification number. Aadhaar
has been criticised for its potential to
perpetuate discrimination and exclu-
sion, particularly for marginalised com-
munities (Panigrahi 2021). Several cases
arose in India and found that the Aad-
haar system has led to exclusion and
denial of social services for many indi-
viduals due to errors in the biometric
data collection process, such as misiden-
tification of fingerprints or iris scans.
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

This has disproportionately affected
individuals who are illiterate, elderly, or
from lower socio-economic backgrounds.
The Aadhaar system had significant
technical flaws that could potentially
lead to data breaches and privacy viola-
tions too. These include poor security
measures for protecting sensitive biome-
tric data and a lack of transparency in
the system’s operation and decision-
making processes.
Overall, the case of the Aadhaar sys-
tem in India highlights the potential
risks and challenges of implementing AI
systems in complex social contexts and
the need for careful consideration of its
ethical and societal implications.
Mitigating Algorithmic Bias
Mitigating algorithmic bias is a critical
step in promoting fairness and transpar-
ency in ML. Several strategies have been
proposed and studied to mitigate algo-
rithmic bias. One such strategy is to im-
prove data collection methods to ensure
that the data used to train algorithms is
diverse, inclusive, and representative of
the real-world population.
Another strategy is to increase trans-
parency in ML algorithms. This can be
achieved through methods such as ex-
plainable AI (XAI), which provides insight
in the decision-making process of
algorithms. By providing transparency
into the decision-making process, XAI
can help to identify potential biases and
promote accountability in algorithmic
decision-making (Lipton 2018; Ribeiro
et al 2016).
Regulatory frameworks can also play
a vital role in mitigating algorithmic
bias. For instance, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in the
European Union (EU) provides a frame-
work for ensuring that individuals have
control over their personal data and
that automated decision-making does
not lead to unfair or discriminatory
outcomes. Similarly, the Algorithmic
Accountability Act, 2023 introduced in
the Senate of the United States (US)
aims to address the issue of algorithmic
bias by ensuring transparency and ac-
countability in the use of AI systems
(Citron and Pasquale 2014; Mittelstadt
et al 2016).
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
COMMENTARY
Governments worldwide are increas- sources used to train ML algorithms.
ingly implementing regulatory frame- This can involve outreach efforts to
works to address algorithmic bias, under-represented groups, as well as
though the impact has been limited collaborations with diverse communi-
(Mittelstadt et al 2016). The EU’s general ties and organisations to gather more
data protection regulation mandates representative data. In addition, there is
algorithmic impact assessments, which a need for greater transparency and ac-
some scholars critique as insufficiently countability in the development and de-
robust (Veale and Binns 2017). In the ployment of ML algorithms, including
Indian context, NITI Aayog has pro- the use of ethical guidelines and regula-
posed guiding principles for accounta- tory frameworks that promote fairness
ble AI, including transparency and fair- and mitigate harm.
ness provisions. However, detectable Another key challenge is the need for
progress remains lacking. Civil society more robust and comprehensive evalua-
advocates argue for a much bolder regula- tion methods for detecting and mitigating
tory action to redress algorithmic bias bias in ML algorithms. This can involve
in India, given its unique systemic and the development of new metrics and
historical inequities. Legislation addres- standards for assessing algorithmic fair-
sing algorithmic accountability was ness, as well as the use of diverse testing
tabled in 2019, but it remains stalled. data sets to identify and address poten-
Scholars also emphasise that impactful tial sources of bias.
solutions necessitate sustained political Looking forward, there are several
will and public participation (Kumari promising areas for future research and
2021). While nascent progress has innovation in the field of algorithmic
occurred, addressing India’s algorithmic bias. Crucially, there is a need for more
divide will require regulators to centre interdisciplinary collaborations between
those most marginalised by decades of computer scientists, social scientists, and
embedded data injustice. domain experts to develop more con-
text-specific solutions to algorithmic bias.
Future Directions The case studies in criminal justice,
Algorithmic bias is a pressing issue that hiring practices, and healthcare show
has garnered significant attention in the pervasive and concerning effects of
recent years. While progress has been algorithmic bias. While there has been
made in identifying and mitigating bias some progress in addressing these issues,
in ML algorithms, there are still chal- much work remains to be done, and the
lenges that need to be addressed to future of algorithmic bias requires ongo-
ensure fair and just outcomes. One of ing research and innovation.
the key challenges is the lack of diversity As AI experts and researchers, we
in the field of AI, with a significant un- have a responsibility to create and
der-representation of women and people implement ML algorithms that are free
of colour. from bias and promote social justice.
To address this challenge, it is important Addressing algorithmic bias will not be
to increase the diversity of AI researchers easy, but it is necessary to ensure that
and practitioners, as well as the data these powerful tools serve the greater
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A soft/hard copy of the author(s)’s approval should be sent to EPW.
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vol lix no 7 21
COMMENTARY
good and do not perpetuate discrimination
and inequality. By recognising the im-
portance of this issue and working towards
solutions, we can create a more equitable
and just society that benefits all.
[The authors would like to extend their heartfelt
gratitude to the anonymous reviewers for their in-
valuable contributions and insightful feedback.
Their meticulous review and thoughtful comments
significantly enhanced the quality and rigour of
this work. Their dedication to the peer review pro-
cess is sincerely appreciated and has been instru-
mental in shaping this article.]
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of Any Classifier,” Proceedings of the 22nd ACM
SIGKDD International Conference on Know-
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vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

ESG Investments
Overcoming Policy, Market, and
Institutional Shortcomings
Asi Guha
T
Environmental, social, and he concept of environmental,
governance investments have social, and governance (ESG) in-
vestment has gained significant
gradually become an important
traction in the investment sphere in re-
framework for investment cent times. In 2019, the market capitali-
managers to gauge corporate sation of ESG-focused portfolios was
sustainability and therefore more than $30 trillion (Broadstock et al
2021). The increased relevance of mate-
provide a scientific basis
rial risk exposures of a publicly listed
for responsible investment company based on the E, S, and G factors
decisions. Globally, there has have emerged from several events like
been considerable growth in Deepwater Horizon oil spill, the 2008
economic downturn, labour conditions
ESG investments. However, the
in the supply chain, and the COVID-19
concept is yet to become a widely pandemic (Billio et al 2022). The basic
accepted mainstream tool for the idea of ESG refers to companies that do
global financial market. Potential well in terms of reporting and managing
environmental-, social-, and governance-
shortcomings are identified
related issues in their operations and
in this article in the domain of their supply chain gives better returns
ESG from policy, market, and on investments in the long run than
institutional perspectives. their peers. For example, during the
COVID-19 pandemic-led financial shock,
the high-ESG portfolios have outper-
formed low-ESG portfolios in China’s
mainland CSI 300 firms traded on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges
(Broadstock et al 2021). Similarly, it was
found that the correlation between fi-
nancial and social performance of some of
the ESG strategies is curvilinear in na-
ture. That means, with increased efforts
in sustainability, the financial perfor-
mance initially decreases, then levels
out, and eventually increases.
This article picked socially responsible
investment (SRI) funds from 1972–2000
and used a maximum of 12 ethical
screens to identify correlation between
The author is thankful to his wife Kathakali the sustainability and financial perfor-
who extended her support to him while writing mance. However, it was also found that
this article. the performance of the funds is better
Asi Guha (asi.guha@gmail.com) is a graduate when either stringent ethical screening
of the Indian Institute of Forest Management, (that is, 12 ethical screens) or a certain
Bhopal, and is currently working in the single screen was applied (Barnett and
sustainability domain.
Solomon 2006). This indicates that fund
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7
COMMENTARY
managers should either fully integrate
ESG or diversify their portfolio without
applying exclusionary lenses for better
returns. In addition to the basic idea of
ESG in terms of fiduciary principles, the
domain of ESG has intersected with the
regulatory and policy arena as well.
For example, the European Union has
implemented the sustainable finance
disclosure regulation (SFDR) that man-
dates companies and their investors to
consider integrating 50 sustainability
measures, out of which 30 are mandated
in their non-financial reporting and invest-
ment decisions (Billio et al 2022). Like-
wise, the Indian stock market regulator,
the Securities and Exchange Board of
India (SEBI) has come up with a strategy
to integrate ESG through the business re-
sponsibility and sustainability report
(BRSR) for the first 1,000 publicly listed
companies in the Bombay Stock Exchange
(SEBI 2023a). In this article, the chal-
lenges of ESG investments are analysed
through the lens of policy, market, and
institutions to identify the potential gaps
and propose rectifying measures in order
to facilitate incremental positive changes
to the sustainable finance domain.
ESG in Financial Decision-making
The concept of ESG is oriented towards
financial markets that aim to achieve
sustainable development through invest-
ment decision-making and corporate
stewardship. Therefore, it is pertinent to
discuss how ESG data is perceived and
used in financial decision-making. Several
studies have found that at the portfolio
level, investors use a screening process
to determine their investments. In most
cases, negative screening or an exclu-
sionary principle is applied to reject
firms with the lowest ESG performance
(Amel-Zadeh and Serafeim 2017; Jaki et
al 2022). However, according to a survey
done on financial investors with assets
under management (AUM) of $31 tril-
lion, the majority of the investors think
that positive screening and active own-
ership methods can perform better than
negative screening in terms of ESG data-
oriented financial decision-making. The
majority of the investors who participat-
ed in the survey ranked positive screen-
ing as first, active ownership as second,
27
COMMENTARY
negative screening as third, and full in-
tegration as fourth in terms of adoption
of methods in the future. Moreover, all
four strategies were considered impor-
tant in the next five years (Amel-Zadeh
and Serafeim 2017).
In addition to performance, a firm’s
ESG efforts can be gauged by two more
factors—ESG momentum and ESG inten-
tionality. The former tracks firms that
have improved ESG performance over a
recent period, whereas the latter evalu-
ates companies based on their intention
to do good through their products and
solutions along with how they operate in
society (Bos 2017; Lydenberg et al 2017).
Intentionality looks at long-term value
creation and can be a key factor in deter-
mining a firm’s future ESG performance
and momentum. Although, there is no
one-fit-for-all solution to measure ESG
intentionality, ESG capacity building
through research, training, investments,
planning, and designing ESG strategy
with strong control procedures can be
taken as proxies. This is a good measure
to go beyond what the firm discloses in
their reports, as ESG policies and proce-
dures show how far they are successfully
executing them in their operations. Ac-
cording to Cappucci (2018),
Intentionality is perhaps the best indicator of
a firm’s commitment to a long-term, sustain-
able business model. Some firms are great
at producing glossy brochures and colorful
sustainability reports, but fall short when it
comes to the hard work of integrating ESG
considerations in their business processes.
Conundrum of ESG Integration
In that context, according to Eccles and
Kastrapeli (2017), can “full ESG integra-
tion” be defined as investing with a sys-
tematic and explicit inclusion of ESG
risks and opportunities in investment
analysis? The ESG risks may come from
aspects such as climate, human capital
management, litigation, reputation, reg-
ulation, corruption, etc (Sautner and
Starks 2021). Similarly, a firm’s business
model and strategy can provide it with
growth opportunities in terms of ESG
perspectives. For example, a company
involved in renewable energy genera-
tion can broadly expect conducive regu-
latory and policy support in the long
term. However, a full ESG integration
28
should not stop at that to determine the
ESG performance of the specific firm.
The potential gap in the ESG integration
from the perspective of policies, institu-
tions, and markets is explored here:
Policy: In this context, prescriptive reg-
ulatory guidelines like Europe’s SFDR
and India’s SEBI can provide details to a
varying degree on ESG integration aspects.
The SFDR categorises the ESG aspects
into two major areas—climate and other
environment-related indicators, and in-
dicators for social and employees, respect
for human rights, anti-corruption, and
anti-bribery matters. The former covers
aspects like greenhouse gas emissions,
energy consumption, pollutants, waste,
water, land use, biodiversity, forests, etc,
whereas the latter tackles social and em-
ployees’ matters covering supplier code of
conduct, health and safety issues, em-
ployment contract type, etc, along with
other major topics like human rights,
anti-corruption, and governance. The
document also provides guidelines on
how to integrate the ESG raw data from
these aspects into the financial product
portfolio. For example, the lack of an
anti-corruption and bribery policy can
be calculated as the summation of the
current value of investments in investee
companies without an anti-corruption
and anti-bribery policy divided by the
current value of all investments. Similar
methods are proposed for supplier stand-
ards, human rights, etc (EIOPA et al 2023).
Although the proposed SEBI guidelines
are not as detailed as the SFDR indica-
tors, the guidelines mandate a stricter
external verification rule with a reason-
able assurance for the nine core indica-
tors (SEBI 2023a, 2023b).
While regulatory steps taken by SFDR
and SEBI on the ESG domain are encour-
aging for the overall sustainable finance
domain, let us examine the issues that
are presenting hurdles in mainstreaming
this concept. To begin with, the methods
of capturing the raw data of ESG invest-
ments which are essentially qualitative
in nature with regard to anti-corruption,
anti-bribery, supplier standards, human
rights policy, etc, are not entirely appro-
priate. This may leave scope for green-
washing by namesake disclosures with
FEBRuary 17, 2024
compromised quality and content. The
quality and language of the policies and
procedures are crucial in determining
the firm’s ESG performance and inten-
tionality regarding these aspects. Accord-
ing to an Asian Development Bank Insti-
tute (ADBI) report on ESG investments,
ESG factors are traditionally nonfinancial
and, therefore, difficult to measure quantita-
tively. Depending on the industry, the scope
of ESG investment can vary greatly. Even
within the same industry, ESG investment
can be broad-based as it includes multiple
aspects, such as cost reduction, supply chain
management, and technology development;
and several stakeholders, such as consum-
ers, communities, and regulators. Therefore,
there is no one-size-fits-all solution for firms
to fully integrate ESG investment. The lack
of a standardized and objective method for
implementing ESG investment and measur-
ing its results poses a daunting prospect to
many firms. However, this challenge also
offers an opportunity to implement ESG ini-
tiatives and incorporate them into core busi-
ness strategies by allowing firms to become
creative, innovative, and flexible. (Nemoto
and Morgan 2020)
In this case, we can identify ambiguity
remaining in the prescriptive ESG policy
structure that can potentially under-
mine the ESG integration process. It is,
therefore, important to highlight that if
innovation, creativity, and flexibility re-
main an integral part of a firm’s ESG
strategy, then assessment of that strategy
should also reflect the same attributes
for a successful “full ESG integration.”
Institution: The premise of a firm’s ESG
and financial performance is based on
the overall quality of the reported data
that includes aspects of materiality, relia-
bility, and accuracy. A study conducted
on this topic by interviewing nine indi-
viduals working in different industries
listed on the Nasdaq Nordic–Iceland Stock
Exchange, a rating agency and institu-
tional shareholders (commercial banks
and pension funds) provides valuable
available at
Gyan Deep
Near Firayalal Chowk,
Ranchi 834 001, Jharkhand
Ph: 09470564686
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

insights. The study found a few short-
comings in ESG reporting from the aspects
of quality. On the one hand, the inter-
viewees from the companies are of the
opinion that the data disclosed by the
companies are usable by the institution-
al investors and sufficient to compare
companies based on their ESG factors as
the data are gathered and disclosed
based on the global reporting initiative
and Nasdaq ESG guidelines.
However, from an investor’s point of
view, institutional investor respondents
pointed out the drawbacks of reported
ESG data in terms of its materiality, ac-
curacy, and reliability. For example,
companies often disclose all kinds of
data without corresponding to the as-
pect of relevance in terms of investment
decision-making when it comes to ESG
reporting. According to commercial bank
interviewees, ESG data generated and
disclosed for the company’s own opera-
tion is just a “drop in the ocean,” where-
in the main environmental and social
impacts lie in their asset portfolios and
supply chains. Despite that, the ESG data
reported remain lopsided towards com-
panies’ own operations and not their re-
spective supply chains. This shows the
issues with regard to the materiality of
ESG data or reporting. Similarly, re-
spondents from the companies stated
that reporting consistent, accurate, and
comparable data year on year is a chal-
lenge on its own.
In that context, according to investor
respondents, government authorities that
aggregate the data should make it acces-
sible to ESG actors in order to improve the
data quality and reduce the data collection
cost. As this is not the case, the data con-
sidered for ESG decision-making mostly
comes from what the companies report.
The risk of greenwashing remains high,
thus impacting the accuracy and relia-
bility of ESG data (Jonsdottir et al 2022).
Similarly, a global survey done on 582
institutional investors across three re-
gions of the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe,
West Asia, and Africa reports a lack of
high-quality data on material ESG factors
as the biggest barrier to ESG integration
(Eccles et al 2017). These studies give
important insights into some of the key
areas of ESG in financial decision-making
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
where the scope for improvement re-
mains evident. As financial decision-
making is dependent on the quality of
data reported, any gap in the latter limits
the capacity of ESG integration.
In relation to that, the data quality is-
sue primarily points towards the lack of
synergy between public and private in-
stitutions along with the absence of
standardised policy support. Therefore,
the issue can be categorised into a combi-
nation of policy and institutional short-
comings. However, as implementing au-
thority regarding maintaining the quality
of reported data remains with different
organisations, the topic can be categorised
primarily as an institutional shortcoming.
Market: Another important aspect of this
discourse is the time period for measur-
ing investment performance. The mar-
ket typically recognises one-, three-, and
five-year time horizons for determining
Table 1: Mapping Potential Barriers of ESG Investments with Their Corresponding Proposed
Mitigative Measures
Categories Potential Shortcomings
Policy Not recognising the qualitative nature of Constitute an interdisciplinary approach that
data points while evaluating ESG aspects evaluates qualitative information on a case-by-
Lack of flexibility in prescriptive
regulatory guidelines for reporting and
evaluating qualitative aspects
Institution Potential gaps in materiality, reliability, Maintaining the quality of ESG data requires
and accuracy of ESG data
Market Limitation in recognising long-term
dividends of ESG integration
Incentivising short-term performance by The variable remuneration of portfolio managers
linking that with employee remuneration can be linked with their ESG investment strategy.
of the financial portfolio managers
Source: Author’s compilation.
vol lix no 7
COMMENTARY
financial performance (Cappucci 2018),
wherein the ESG themes to impact
financial performance may take more
than five years (Eccles and Kastrapeli
2017; High Meadows Institute 2015). As
it is more prevalent to evaluate an em-
ployee’s remuneration or benefits based
on annual performance, investment
managers are less incentivised to fully
integrate ESG aspects in their portfolio
generation. In 2006, Barnett and Salo-
mon acknowledged that the market fails
to accurately price long-term initiatives
with extended payoffs (Barnett and
Salomon 2006).
When it comes to mainstream invest-
ment portfolio making, we see little
change in how the market evaluates the
financial performance of investment de-
cisions with regard to time frames. In
order to tackle this, significant progress
has been made in incorporating ESG as-
pects into pension funds. This is a prudent
Proposed Mitigative Measures
case basis. There is a need to acknowledge the
limitations of quantitative analysis devoid of
relevant qualitative aspects. A more detailed and
stricter guideline is required to restrict the scope
of greenwashing in this case.
Regulatory guidelines can adopt an approach
where best practices are presented as cases. The
industrial variations of ESG aspects in the case of
reporting qualitative information and evaluating
the same should be captured in detail.
more active participation from governmental
authorities like central banks and financial market
regulators. There is immense scope for industry-
wise standardisation of relevant ESG data.
Mainstreaming of ESG investments can witness
progress through a mix of sociological and
financial means. The former attempts to build a
positive perception of ESG investments, whereas
the latter can provide economic incentives in
the form of tax rebates. Perception-building can
be done in the form of scientific research and
popular mediums to propagate the concept of
value creation through ESG investments. When
it comes to tax incentives, the market regulators
may design the necessary legal framework to
determine the eligibility of ESG funds.
This essentially means incentivising ESG
investments by associating it with a certain portion
of variable remuneration of portfolio managers
and thus putting an emphasis on long-term
sustainable value creation. It can be designed as
a case for remuneration of positive externalities
(RPE) that discounts sustainable investments.
29
COMMENTARY
measure, as pension funds are typically
portfolios that are subject to maturity in
the long term with a time horizon of 15
years or more. However, there is no
doubt that the dominant market practice
of measuring financial performance
with a time horizon of one–five years is
causing a hindrance towards the idea of
mainstreaming ESG integration.
Proposed Mitigative Measures
and Conclusions
The potential gaps in the ESG investment
horizon identified in this article require
mitigative measures that entail a judi-
cious utilisation of an interdisciplinary
approach, market principles, and eco-
nomic instruments (Table 1, p 29).
As financial markets cannot be seen in
isolation and several factors that go be-
yond a company’s balance sheets are en-
twined with the performance of the firm
in the equity market, the approach
adopted in proposing measures in this
section is holistic in nature. There is fur-
ther space for research in industry-wise
standardisation of qualitative and quan-
titative ESG data. However, it remains
outside the scope of this article.
The corporate sustainability sphere is
ever-evolving with clean energy transi-
tion targets of countries, including the
major economies of the world. There-
fore, there will always be certain varia-
bilities in the ESG strategies of the firms
on the basis of the industries in which
they operate. It is important to take this
into account while integrating ESG as-
pects into financial decision-making. For
example, a renewable power generating
company may have a well-placed strategy
for contributing towards climate action;
however, its performance on corporate
governance and social aspects should
not be overlooked on this basis. On the
contrary, an oil and gas company should
not be unjustifiably befitted for its good
corporate governance and social perfor-
mances if it has a lacklustre climate ac-
tion strategy. This is important in safe-
guarding the interests of the investors.
The challenge will remain in inte-
grating the different aspects of ESG in a
scientific manner. However, this gives
significant scope for human ingenuity
to keep refining the methodologies
30
regarding the integration of ESG in fi-
nancial decision-making. In line with
that discourse, this article attempted to
make a novel contribution by identifying
potential gaps and proposing associated
rectifying measures in the domain of
ESG investing from policy, market, and
institutional angles.
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vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Employment, Output, and
Degree of Monopoly in India
Romar Correa
The employment rate in India is
falling. Profit inflation is rising.
A solution is shown to lie in public
investment and public works,
and a reduction in the degree of
monopoly and/or profits.
The intervention of an anonymous referee is
gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer
applies.
Romar Correa (romarcorrea10@gmail.com) is
an independent researcher based in Mumbai.
14
and the number of people employed (N)
already introduced. Denoting profits by
Π, we get
PY = WN + PΠ. … (1)
Two theoretical interventions follow.
In the first one, firm-level production
functions connecting flows of output with
flows of labour services are aggregated
S
urjit S Bhalla is indefatigable in over the entire economy to arrive at an
his search for and defence of truth aggregate production function, Y = N.
via facts and in that quest, he has, Second, and similar to the first, micro-
on occasion, taken on the likes of Jean economics teaches us that the represent-
Drèze and others. In this instance, Bhal- ative firm faces a demand curve for its
la (2023b) has gone further and faulted product that depends on the income of
the logic of Ashoka Mody (2023) and all households, Y. The demand curve will
Raghuram Rajan (referring to a com- shift away from the origin when the total
ment made by him in 2018). In our re- output expands and moves to the origin
sponse, therefore, we confine ourselves when Y contracts. An aggregative as-
to the accounting arithmetic of introduc- sumption that is made here is that the
tory economics. Definitions of unem- demand for the typical firm’s output has
ployment and so on emerge from prima- a constant elasticity over all changes in
ry break-ups of national income. prices and output over the relevant range.
Before conducting such a tutorial, In that case, the markup principle of
Bhalla would caution about the limita- pricing over marginal costs can be derived
tions, sometimes dangers, of simply re- (Michl 2002, Appendix A, p 243). The
cording the time path of a variable. Econ- markup, m, is approximately the recipro-
omists use the growth rates of variables. cal of the elasticity of demand. Thus, a
Thus, not the price level but the inflation low elasticity of demand suggests that
rate. Accordingly, our focus of attention consumers are less sensitive to changes
is the unemployment rate, u. If L is the in the price of the product and monopo-
available workforce and N the number of lists will be able to fix prices above mar-
workers employed, u = (L – N)/L. In ginal costs. Under perfect competition,
Bhalla’s (2023b) chart, we can take L to price equals marginal cost, which is the
be a: working-age population, or b: la- wage here. Consequently, the markup
bour force, and N to be b or c: workforce used to be called the “degree of monopo-
(employment). Thereby, we generate ly.” Adding up the individual price equa-
three measures, (i) (a – b)/a, (ii) (a – c)/a, tions over all firms in the economy gives
and (iii) (b – c)/b. The unemployment the aggregate price level.
rate in the three cases is calculated in P = (1 + m)W ... (2)
Table 1 after reproducing the relevant Starting with the observation that prof-
portions of data from Bhalla (2023b). it per unit sold must be the difference bet-
The conclusion is inescapable. The rate ween the price set (P) and the cost in-
of unemployment in India is not falling. curred (W), a step or two is required to
(For the conclusion in terms of worker derive the share of profits in the total
participation rates, see Goswami 2023.) output as m/(1+m). Suppose W = `2 and
m = 50%. Plugging the numbers into
National Income Table 1: Changing Pattern of Population and Employment
Accounting (India), 2001 to 2031
In the interest of student-friendly For Age 15–64 2001 2011 2021 2031
(Unless Otherwise Stated) (Estimates)
access, the following notations Working-age population 656 800 950 1,052
and discussions are taken from Labour force 400.0 449.0 522.6 578.4
Thomas R Michl (2002). One Workforce (employment) 382.3 432.8 487.4 539.5
The unemployment rate in India
break-up of GDP (Y) is into wag-
(i) (a – b)/a .39 .444 .449 .45
es and profits. A price index (P) is
(ii) (a – c)/a .41 .46 .486 .487
used. Wages are the product of (iii) (b – c)/b .044 .036 .0673 .0672
the rupee wage per worker (W) Source: Author’s calculation based on Bhalla (2023b).
FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

equation (2), P = 3. With employment
and output equal to 100 units, Π = 33.33
units from equation (1). Examining
equation (1), in what we call situation A,
rupee GDP is approximately 300 where
3×(100) = 2×(100) + 3×(33.33). The
share of profits in the national income is
one-third. Now, consider a rise in the
markup to m = 66.66%. In that case, the
share of profits in the national income
rises to two-fifths. Imagine also that the
wage rate has increased to `3. Hence, from
equation (2), P = 5. For comparison with
situation A with a nominal income of
`300, in situation B, output and employ-
ment must fall to 60 units and real profits
to 24 units. Confirming via equation (1),
5×(60) = 3×(60) + 5×(24). The money
wage deflated by the price index is the real
wage and what matters—the purchasing
power of the money wage. The real wage
falls from two-thirds to three-fifths.
In the second part of a scholarly study,
Drèze (2023) documents the stagnation
of real wages in the informal sector,
“Distress Is There to See,” Indian Express,
24 May 2023, p 13. En passant, he flicks
Bhalla’s (2023a) opposite claim made in
the same newspaper on 25 April as a re-
sponse to the first part of his study on 13
April 2023. All in all, social welfare in
situation B is less than that in situation A.
The Degree of Monopoly
Mody and Rajan have been castigating the
level of m, the degree of monopoly, in
the Indian economy. We have no infor-
mation about the countervailing power
exercised by the Competition Commis-
sion of India (CCI). Viral Acharya (2023)
has repeatedly warned about the price-
setting power of the “Big Five,” albeit in
the particular case of inflation (his the-
sis has been contested; see Balakrishnan
and Parameswaran 2023).
The other break-up of the social prod-
uct is into consumption spending (C),
investment spending (I), and govern-
ment consumption (G). Investment ex-
penditure can be divided into private and
public investments. Thus, Y = C + I + G.
Further, C can be broken up into con-
sumption by the working class and con-
sumption by the capitalist class, corre-
sponding to the earlier break-up of nation-
al income. The former goods are called
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
“basics” because they are inputs into the
production process, and the latter “non-
basics” because they are inessential to
the production process. This distinction
between commodities is slippery and any
application could be challenged. How-
ever, our point for output and employ-
ment even for the same commodities is
made by A Sasi in the headlines of Indian
Express on 2 May 2023: “From Phones to
Cars, Premium Segment Rakes in the
Numbers—Lower-end Segment across
Product Categories Records Tepid
Demand.” Coming to the division of I,
private investment depends positively
on the rate of profit and rosy prospects.
According to one proposition, the rate of
profit is falling. The definition of the rate
of profit requires the stock of capital (K)
and is Π/K. Capital is not a part of our
discussion. However, the drop in the
mass of real profits, the numerator in the
definition, from A to B in the examples
can be regarded as a proxy.
The flagging of enthusiasm in invest-
ment demand is indicated by the finance
minister never ceasing to flag capex by
the private sector. Two examples of the
state lying prostrate before the capitalist
class for this purpose can be provided.
First, the Lok Sabha passed a bill to allow
the private sector to mine six atomic
minerals, including lithium (essential
for the production of batteries in electric
vehicles), beryllium, niobium, titanium,
tantalum and zirconium, and deep-seated
minerals like gold and silver. Under the
principal act, only government corpora-
tions could explore and mine all 12
atomic minerals. Second, the Lok Sabha
passed the Biological Diversity (Amend-
ment) Bill, 2021, which sought to amend
the Biological Diversity Act, 2002 (Hin-
dustan Times, 26 July 2023). The legisla-
tion promotes ease of doing business in
the sector and decriminalises all offences
under the conservation law. The bill also
encourages foreign entry into AYUSH
(ayurveda, yoga, naturopathy, unani,
siddha, and homoeopathy) sector and
aligns the definition of a foreign company
with the Companies Act, 2013. The legisla-
tion exempts users of codified traditional
knowledge and AYUSH practitioners from
sharing the benefits of using biological
resources with local communities that
vol lix no 7
COMMENTARY
have historically been repositories of
the knowledge.
What are the results so far? As per the
index of industrial production (IIP), in-
dustrial growth shows an “alarming regres-
sion over a longer period” (Nagaraj 2023).
During the upsurge of 2005–06 to 2013–
14, manufacturing grew at an average
annual growth rate of 5.7%, which fell to
3.1% from 2014–15 to 2022–23. Nagaraj
continues, “The fall is acute in capital
goods, plummeting from 9.7% to 1%.”
The gross fixed capital formation to GDP
ratio at current prices dropped steadily
from 34.3% to 28.9% from 2011–12 to
2021–22. According to the national ac-
counts, the public sector commitment has
remained constant at 8%. Excluding dis-
investment and outward foreign direct
investment (FDI), the World Development
Indicators show that the net FDI to current
GDP ratio fell from 3.6% to 2.4% during
2008–22. Public investment comprises the
union government, state governments, and
central public sector undertakings (PSUs).
The publicised bloat in the head central
investment is the result of the merging
of extra-budgetary borrowing by central
PSUs and the union’s own budget.
What about housing? The market in
housing for the working class does not
exist and the bubble in the price of land
is kept afloat by the propertied class and
the wealthy (those with substantial
holdings of financial assets). In the event
of the rejuvenation of animal spirits, in-
vestment would likely be capital-inten-
sive by way of drones, robots, and cloud
computing. Returns on public invest-
ment need not be marked to market and
profits can be ploughed back in the ac-
cumulation of capital. Particularly in the
case of the uncompleted manufacturing
revolution in India, projects that are la-
bour-intensive can be picked.
We must deduct income taxes (T)
from aggregate income to get disposable
income, Y – T. Private saving, S, there-
fore, is Y – T – C. This relationship, when
combined with the last break-up of GDP,
gives the so-called investment–saving
identity, G – T = S – I. The left-hand side
is the budget deficit. The number is a
source of anxiety to governments the
world over. What are the freedoms avail-
able? In an epoch defined by shocks, G is
15
COMMENTARY
likely to be subjected to jolts upwards.
The upward rigidity of T reflects a dis-
credited belief that progressive taxes are
a disincentive to work. S in a skewed sys-
tem is entirely the privilege of the rich.
The income of the poor is taken up with
food, milk, transportation, education of
children, and medicines. Consequently,
the lauding of the World Bank president
of the “domestic consumption orienta-
tion,” in India’s GDP is fatuous and insen-
sitive (Indian Express, 20 July 2023,
p 17). That leaves I, and public invest-
ment therein, we have seen, to close the
gap in the equation.
Aggregate savings in India have finan-
cial and non-financial outlets. The latter
is mostly real estate and gold. As the fi-
nancial sector gets more sophisticated,
the menu of options gets wider moving
beyond mutual funds to bonds, pension
funds, and insurance. Net financial sav-
ings of households are net of financial
liabilities which are loans. The net finan-
cial savings of households dropped to
5.1% of GDP in 2022–23, the lowest in 50
years (Ranade 2023). Financial liabili-
ties have risen sharply. The surge in bor-
rowing is not from banks that have been
hamstrung by prudential norms but
from non-banking financial companies
(NBFCs). The numbers reported by Ranade
(2023) stun. The financial liabilities of
households rose from `36 lakh crore to
`47 lakh crore from July 2022 to July 2023.
The net credit of NBFCs to households in-
creased from `21,000 crore to `2.4 lakh
crore in one year, 2021–22 to 2022–23; in
other words, to 15.2% in 2023 from 2.4%
in 2022. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
is caught in a familiar dilemma. On the
one hand, it inhales and exhales the air
of competition. As a result, banks are
caught in the vice of narrowing margins.
There are few takers of funds that pass
due diligence tests and rates of return in
financial markets dominate deposit rates.
Consequently, lending to NBFCs and re-
tail lending has increased sharply. On
the other hand, the RBI is forced to in-
stall speed breakers like additional capi-
tal adequacy norms in banks.
The causation from savings, S, to
investment, I, has been debunked by
economists and central bankers. There-
fore, the fierce competition in deposit
16
pricing, also an element of the discredited
monetary policy transmission process, is
truly unfortunate. Typically, small- and
mid-sized banks suffer the most. Com-
pelled to arrest the fall in current and
savings accounts (CASA), they offer rates
ranging from 7% to 8%, which exceed
the deposit rates of one- to three-year
buckets offered by large banks.
Inflation
Expressing PΠ in terms of rate of change,
the resulting expression is “profit infla-
tion.” Thanks to a recent fraternal de-
bate, the two components of the defini-
tion of profits must be separated to get
“price inflation” and “real profit inflation.”
One body of opinion is that price infla-
tion is the driver in the composite as
markups are steadily rising in the United
States (US), Canada, and the European
Union (Nikiforos and Grothe 2023; Storm
2023). The wage rate, the remaining
variable in the pricing formula, is found
not to be statistically significant. In-
stead, the prices of imported inputs is
shown to be an important explanatory
variable. Intermediates wash out, how-
ever, in our aggregative framework.
Supporters of this charge within the es-
tablishment include Christine Lagarde of
the European Central Bank, and, candidly,
chief executive officers of companies
hiking m. Marc Lavoie (2023a, 2023b),
on the other hand, suggests that profit
inflation is rising but markups are not.
We are not unsympathetic in theory be-
cause, even if we ignore a profit maximi-
sation condition that is never specified,
an arbitrary trail of m upwards with
hand waves in the direction of demand
and supply forces is intellectually unsat-
isfying. Besides, we know that the
markup is roughly the reciprocal of the
elasticity of demand and the number,
consequently, is a constraint. Of course,
the empirical studies distinguish be-
tween luxury goods consumed by the
rich with their high elasticity of demand
and items of mass consumption con-
sumed by everybody else with their low
elasticity of demand.
The non-standard policy regime for
the above scenario is incomes policy, a
proposal that arises once a century or so.
It was recently whispered in the US in
FEBRuary 17, 2024
the situation of tight labour markets and
workers militantly exercising their choices
to stick or quit. Dollar wages are rising but
with monopoly capital in the US, the accu-
sation, we have noted, is that the prices are
being hiked more than proportionately.
Markups are allegedly being raised. The
political economy of so-called wage–price
guidelines is capital and labour sitting
across the table with the government at
the head (and the CCI by its side in India)
negotiating on “low” prices and wages.
Low wages lower the cost of production
and prices (equation [2]). Low prices in-
crease the demand for essentials. Output
(Y) and employment (N) go up (equa-
tion [1]). Yet, the experience of both India
and the Institute for New Economic Think-
ing (INET) countries suggests that the
struggle is not symmetric. “Conflict infla-
tion” does not apply when one party to
the conflict is chained and vulnerable.
To illustrate the policy, suppose the
wage rate of `2 in situation A is a social
wage, enabling the worker’s access to
consumer goods and housing, education,
medical attention, etc. Take the markup
to be 1%. Marginal cost is covered and
firms are not loss-making and equation (2)
gives P = `2.02. Before the policy was re-
duced to inflation targeting, the text-
books entertained income targeting. With
our target GDP of `300, now with a price
level of `2.02, the required output and
employment must be 148.51 units, apply-
ing equation (1). From the same equation,
scenario C turns out to be 2.02×(148.51)
= 2×(148.51) +2.02×(1.47). The only
casualty is a sharp drop in real profits as
well as the share of profits in the nation-
al income. On the other hand, output
and employment increase markedly,
and the real wage is higher than in the
other two situations.
In Conclusion
In sum, we offer nothing but whole truths
in arithmetical examples with different
logical implications. Income (Y) per cap-
ita in India is among the lowest in the
G20 countries because consumption (C)
per capita is low; private investment (I)
per capita is low; government expendi-
ture (G) per capita in primary education
and basic health, for instance, is low. An
economy driven by the consumption of
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

the rich cannot endure for long. The task
before the government is clear. An urban
employment guarantee scheme has been
framed by the NITI Aayog and must be im-
plemented with the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act on a war footing. The treatment of in-
flation in India is confined to the repo
rate–inflation rate seesaw. The discus-
sion would be elevated by a structural ac-
count along the lines suggested here. As
protests against price rises gather mo-
mentum, the appropriate authorities
must initiate a constructive dialogue with
people’s associations and prominent price-
setting capitalists. In a two-sector econo-
my, bargaining with farmer groups is cen-
tral. Farmers remain net consumers of
food and the tension in administered
pricing has to be confronted. Since our
statistical systems nursed and nurtured
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
over decades have begun to unravel, we
will need to pay greater heed to hand-
collected data and narratives.
References
Acharya, Viral (2023): “Former RBI Dy Governor
Says Pricing Power of ‘Big 5’ Driving Core Infla-
tion,” Business Standard, 15 March.
Balakrishnan, Pulapre and M Parameswaran (2023):
“Corporate Power and Indian Inflation,” Hindu,
13 April.
Bhalla, Surjit S (2023a): “Wages Are Rising,” Indian
Express, 25 April, https://indianexpress.com/
article/opinion/columns/surjit-bhalla-writes-
contrary-to-claims-rural-wages-have-risen-
rapidly-8573897/.
— (2023b): “Broken India or Broken Logic,” Times
of India, 1 May, p 16.
Drèze, J (2023): “Distress Is There to See,” Indian
Express, 24 May, p 13, https://indianexpress.
com/article/opinion/columns/since-2014-the-
poorest-communities-are-earning-less-8625367/.
Goswami, Omkar (2023): “India Has Its Work Cut
Out,” Economic Times, 22 May.
Lavoie, Marc (2023a): “Profit-led Inflation Rede-
fi ned: Response to Nikiforos and Grothe,”
Institute for New Economic Thinking, 6 June.
vol lix no 7
COMMENTARY
— (2023b): “Profit Inflation and Markups Once
Again,” Institute for New Economic Thinking,
15 June.
Michl, Thomas R (2002): Macroeconomic Theory,
New Delhi: PHI Learning.
Mody, Ashoka (2023): “India’s Boom Is a Danger-
ous Myth,” Project Syndicate, 23 March.
Nagaraj, R (2023): “State of the Economy—Temper
the Euphoria,” Hindu, 18 November, p 6.
Nikiforos, Michael and Simon Grothe (2023):
“Markups, Profit Shares, and Cost-Push-Profit-
Led Inflation,” Institute for New Economic
Thinking, 6 June.
Ranade, Ajit (2023): “Sustaining Growth Calls for
High Savings,” Free Press Journal, 3 October.
Sasi, A (2023): “From Phones to Cars, Premium
Segment Rakes in the Numbers—Lower-end
Segment across Product Categories Records
Tepid Demand,” Indian Express, 2 May, p 3.
Scroll (2018): “Raghuram Rajan to NDTV: ‘India
Must Protect Its Institutions; Investors Need
Faith in Rule of Law,’” 16 December, https://
scroll.in/latest/905938/raghuram-rajan-to-
ndtv-india-must-protect-its-institutions-inves-
tors-need-faith-in-rule-of-law.
Storm, Servaas (2023): “Profit Inflation Is Real,”
Institute for New Economic Thinking, 15 June.
17
COMMENTARY
Are We Measuring Son
Preference Correctly?
Srinivas Goli, Shreya Singh
Despite the reduction in son
preference by half since the early
1990s, it has failed to exert a
concomitant influence on the sex
ratio at birth. This contradiction
forms the premise of our attempts
to validate the parallels between
stated son preference and
revealed son preference. This
article divulges several lacunae
associated with the questions
designed to measure son
preference in the National Family
Health Survey questionnaire
and suggests alternate ways
to study the prevalence of son
preference in India.
The authors thank Jean Drèze, Mary E John,
Monica Das Gupta, P M Kulkarni, and
Christopher Guilmoto for their insights and
suggestions on the earlier draft of this article.
Usual disclaimer applies.
Srinivas Goli (srinivasgoli@iipsindia.ac.in) and
Shreya Singh (111.shreyasingh191059@gmail.
com) are with the International Institute for
Population Sciences, Mumbai.
10
P
reference for sons over daughters
before and after birth is an anti-
quated sociocultural practice that
pervades a majority of patrilineal socie-
ties—it can lower the chances of daugh-
ters being born and precipitate grave
imbalances in sex ratios (Das Gupta 2010;
Guilmoto 2015). This caught the attention
of social scientists only in the post-late
1980s, especially after the emergence of
small family norms coupled with medical
technologies that can help couples realise
their desire for sons. Since then, son prefer-
ence has been used as a key measure for
capturing gender discrimination or gender
bias in populations (Pande and Astone
2007; Craigie and Dasgupta 2017; Jaya-
chandran and Pande 2017).
Bhatnagar (2023) termed the decline
in son preference as a rise in gender-
equitable fertility preferences in India.
However, these endeavours shall be ren-
dered futile if the son preference meas-
ure withers away in the face of unexplain-
ed skewed gender outcomes. Further,
the decline in son preference alongside
the decline in fertility also discards the
earlier manifestation of an increase in
sex bias with a decline in birth rates
(Das Gupta and Bhat 1997). Thus, what
follows is an attempt to evaluate the ex-
tent to which son preference explains
gender imbalances in the country.
The Demographic and Health Surveys
(DHS) Program, which collects, analyses,
and disseminates reliable and national-
level representative data on population,
family health, and nutrition indicators
across over 90 countries, also collects in-
formation on son preference and allows
computation of the sex ratio of children
at birth and under age five (DHS 2020).
In the last two decades, using the DHS
information, hundreds of research articles
have been published for understanding
imbalances in the sex ratio at birth and
FEBRuary 17, 2024
under-five children (Arokiasamy and
Goli 2012; Kulkarni 2020; Kumari and
Goli 2022).
A careful examination of trends in son
preference over the period (1992 to 2021)
using the Indian DHS, also called the Na-
tional Family Health Survey (NFHS) data,
suggests that by the existing method of
measurement, preference for sons has
declined to 15% in 2019–21 from 41% in
1992–93, accounting for a 63% drop
compared to its initial period (Figure 1).
Despite this huge fall in son preference
levels, a corresponding improvement in
sex ratio at birth and gender equalities is
markedly absent. In this context, it be-
comes important to question whether
we are measuring son preference cor-
rectly. Or are gender inequalities and
sex ratio at birth swimming against
their root cause, that is, son preference?
This article thus forays into examining
the reliability and validity of the meth-
odology that is used to capture son pref-
erence in NFHS.
NFHS Son Preference Measure
Son preference is currently measured
based on three questions asked of all
women and men in the NFHS:
(i) For women and men with living chil-
dren: If you could go back in time when
you did not have children and could
choose exactly the number of children to
have in your whole life, how many
would that be?
(ii) For women and men with no living
children: If you could choose exactly the
number of children to have in your
whole life, how many would that be?
(iii) Women and men: How many of
these children would you like to be boys,
Figure 1: Trends in Son Preference Levels in
India, 1992–2021
45
40
35
Son Qreference (in %)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1992o93 1998o99 2004o05 2015o16 2019o21
Source: Authors’ estimation based on successive rounds
of NFHS.
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

Figure 2: Trends in Son Preference as against Childhood Sex Ratios in India, 1992 to 2021
(A) (B)
45 950 45 950
945 (C)
40 40 945
940 45 880
940 940 40
Son Qreference (in %)

Son Qreference (in %)

Son Qreference (in

35 35 935 860

Sex Satio at Mast Cirth

935

Sex Satio at Cirth

930 930 35

Child Tex Satios

30 30 930
920 25 925 30 840
25 925
920 25
20 910 20 920 820
915
915 20
15 15 910 15 800
900 1 910
10 905
905 10
5 890 5 900
900 780
5
0 880 0 895
895 0 760
1992o93
1998o99
2004o05
2015o16
2019o21 1992o93
1998o99
2004o05
2015o16
2019o21 1992o93
1998o99
2004o05
2015o16
2019o21
Child Tex Satio Son Qreference Sex Satio at Cirth Son Qreference Sex Satio at Mast Cirth Son Qreference
Source: Authors’ estimation based on successive rounds of NFHS.

Figure 3: Trends in Percentage of Families with One or Two Daughters Only as against Child Sex Ratios in India, 1992 to 2021
(A) (B) (C)
7 880
with 1 or 2 daughters only

7 950

with only 1 or 2 daughters

7 950
Number of families with 860
only 1 or 2 daughters

Sex ratio at last birth

6 940 6
NVmber of Families

Number of families
840

Sex Satio at Cirth

940 820
5 930
Child Tex Satio

5 930 5 800
4 920 4 4 780
3 910 3 920 760
2 900 910 3 740
2 720
1 890 1 900 2 700
0 880 0 890 1 680
660
1992o93

1998o99

2004o05

2015o16

2019o21 1992o93

1998o9

2004o05

2015o16

2019o21
0 640
Year Year 1992o93

1998o99

2004o05

2015o16

2019o21
:FBS
Child Tex Satio 1 daughter only Sex Satio at Cirth 1 daughter only Sex Satio at Mast Cirth































1 daughter only
2 daughters only 2 daughters only 2 daughters only
Source: Authors’ estimation based on successive rounds of NFHS.

how many would you like to be girls,
and for how many would it not matter if
it is a boy or a girl?
Son preference is derived precisely
based on the answers to Question No (iii)
where women were asked to tell the ideal
number of boys and girls out of the ideal
number of children they report. A wom-
an is considered to be preferring a son
when her ideal number of sons is greater
than the ideal number of daughters.
Before commenting on the exact prob-
lem with this measure and proposing
remedial options, we have validated this
measure using childhood sex ratios,
which are often treated as outcomes of
son preference.
Validating the Measure
We used three measures of childhood
sex ratios, that is, child sex ratios of un-
der-five children,1 sex ratio at birth2 and
sex ratio at the last birth.3 Figure 2 pre-
sents trends in son preference as against
three childhood sex ratio indicators
from 1992 to 2021. We can observe from
the figure that while son preference con-
tinues to experience a steep fall, it does
not result in a corresponding improve-
ment in childhood sex ratios, sex ratio at
birth or last birth. Surprisingly, when the
rate of fall in son preference is slowing
down for the recent period, we observe
an improvement in child sex ratios.
While the improvement is recognisable
Economic & Political Weekly
in the sex ratio of under-five children, it daughters-only families have continued
is very small for the sex ratio at birth and to increase while the sex ratio has dete-
there is no improvement in the sex ratio riorated. A possible explanation of this
at the last birth. The sex ratio of under- incongruence could be the fact that
five children is improving because of the daughter-only families are a growing niche
disappearance of excess female child that constitutes a very small share of
mortality and convergence in male child Indian households which cannot make an
and female child survival. However, such impact on child sex ratios. As of 2019–21,
convergence can be due to a decrease in only 6% of Indian households had
postnatal discrimination in child health- achieved a completed family size with
care either because of the overall im- one daughter only (Figure 3).
provement in healthcare or because The inability of the above two indica-
more wanted children are being born. tors to explain the worsening trend of
Additionally, a completed family size the sex ratio at birth stems from a variety
with only daughters as offspring should of reasons. In the case of son preference,
ideally serve as a congruent reflection of several complications become apparent.
the trends observed in childhood sex First, the questions are largely ex post
ratios. When the preference for children facto in nature which renders them inef-
in Indian families is rooted in the male fective in capturing the earlier presence
firmament, daughters are viewed as an of son preference among the respond-
affliction of the inability to conceive a son. ents. For women, who are at the end of
Growing daughters-only families signify their reproductive span, preference for
a shift from this warped lens of familial sons may have diminished over time as a
dynamics (John 2014). The emergence of result of changing attitudes of society.
daughter-only families, therefore, could Moreover, it is pertinent to note that the
also serve to explain prevailing gender inferences are drawn from stated prefer-
imbalances, especially in the era of nuclear ences. In such a scenario, respondents
families (John and Guilmoto 2023). How- have to manoeuvre their responses to
ever, as is evident from Figure 2, trends conform to the prevailing societal norms.
in daughter-only families have been un- Son preference, although it persists
able to explain the trajectory of child- hitherto, is largely looked down upon in
hood sex ratios in India between 1992 social circles. Therefore, although stated
and 2021. Similar to the case of stated son preference is improving, it is largely
son preference where the sex ratio wors- a result of superfluous attempts to keep
ened despite a decline in son preference, up with societal ideals.
EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 11
COMMENTARY
Figure 4: Son Preference and the Nature of the Ideal Number of Children for Indian Women over the years. This increasing ratio ex-
90 3.5 plains the disproportionate inflation in
80 3 son preference decline.
Women with son preference

70 To counter this conspicuous function-

2.5
60 ing of stated preferences, one must turn
50 2
towards studying the revealed prefer-

40
30
20
10
0 0
1992o93 1998o99
Even Oumber of CEB
Even number of Jdeal Dhildren

Ratio
(I)
Ratio (I): The ratio of the percent of women with an even number of ideal children to an odd number of ideal children;
Ratio (A): The ratio of the percent of women with an even number of actual children to an odd number of actual children.
Source: Authors’ estimation based on successive rounds of NFHS.
To better understand this convoluted
phenomenon, we turn towards Sen’s
theory of isolation paradox (Sen 1967).
The isolation paradox is an extension of
the prisoner’s dilemma model (Table 1).
Table 1 depicts a classic game-theoret-
ic model with two players, an individual
couple and the society. It lists the pay-
offs of an individual couple when both
the players are presented with the strat-
egies of preferring sons and not prefer-
ring sons. B signifies the expected bene-
fits that a couple hopes to receive from
the birth of a son whereas L signifies the
loss that would accrue to society and
therefore indirectly affect the couple as
a result of prevailing son preference
among other couples in the society. S
represents the stigma associated with a
couple harbouring son preference in a
society where the sentiment is largely
absent. Additionally, p is the probability
of the society gauging whether or not the
couple prefers sons over daughters.
Against this backdrop, the optimal strat-
egy for the individual couple would be to
operate at son preference because their
payoffs will always be higher than those
received while operating at no son pref-
erence. Moreover, the couple can maxim-
ise their pay-offs by conforming their
stated preference to prevailing norms to
Table 1: Individual Couple’s Pay-off Matrix of Son
Preference
Individual Couple’s Pay-off Matrix Society
Son Preference No Son Preference
Individual Son preference B-L
couples No son preference -B
Source: Authors’ construction.
12
Ratio
1.5
1
0.5
2005o06 2015o16 2019o21
Year
Odd Oumber of CEB
Odd number of Jdeal children

Ratio (A)
minimise the value of p. Therefore, an
individual couple would prefer to oper-
ate at son preference while the larger so-
ciety practises no son preference.
However, if we were to extend this
analysis to n-person game, each couple
would prefer to have sons, thereby ensur-
ing that the society at large prefers sons
to daughters resulting in a skewed sex
ratio. This result is largely a consequence
of asymmetrical information that in turn
arises from falsely stated preferences.
As Jayachandran (2017) writes, parents
would prefer to have sons, but would
simultaneously want to ensure some
amount of balance in terms of the sex
composition of their children. There-
fore, son preference becomes more ap-
parent among women who would ideal-
ly prefer to have an odd number of chil-
dren. Building on this, Figure 4 explains
the incongruence of declining son pref-
erence against worsening sex ratios.
There exists a huge gap between son
preference among women who want an
odd number of children and women who
would ideally prefer an even number of
children. This trend is in stark contrast
to the actual number of children born to
a woman and their share in son prefer-
ence. Trends in the actual number of
children disprove the idea that son pref-
erence has largely declined over
the years. The ratio of women who
would ideally prefer to have an
even number of children to those
B-p(S)
0 who would prefer an odd number
has been increasing consistently
FEBRuary 17, 2024
ences of individuals (Jayachandran 2017).
A fitting indicator of revealed preferences
regarding the choice of the offspring’s sex
is to ask who would the parents prefer to
live with during old age. Son preference
largely arises from miscalculated bene-
fits associated with the birth of a son.
Prevailing patrilocal norms contribute to
this contorted idea of security. Patrilo-
cality forms the primary basis of female
migration, thereby divorcing them from
the role of able caregivers to their par-
ents during old age (Goli et al 2022).
Therefore, one of these perceived bene-
fits of birthing a son is old age security. If
parents prefer to live with their sons
during their old age, it indirectly reveals
their tendency to prefer sons over
daughters even in terms of family build-
ing. Guilmoto (2015) offers co-residence
and prevalence of patrilocal arrange-
ments as an alternative reflection of son
preference in Indonesia.
Data from the second wave of the
India Human Development Survey (2011–
12) reveals that 82.49% of Indian women
would prefer to live with their sons dur-
ing old age, which is a far cry from the
18% level of son preference that pre-
vailed during that time (Desai and
Vanneman 2015). The correlation between
the percentage of women who would
prefer to live with their sons during old
age and the sex ratio at last birth stands
at -0.52. This negative correlation implies
that with an increasing preference to
live with sons during old age, the sex ratio
worsens. Figure 5 (p 13) depicts this neg-
ative relationship between living arrange-
ment preferences during old age and sex
ratio at last birth across Indian states.
Figure 5 shows that the majority of
states are clustered towards the lower
end of the spectrum, where the prefer-
ence to live with sons during old age is
very high and is accompanied by a highly
skewed sex ratio.
Current son preference estimates pre-
sent a scenario that is starkly different
from the ground reality. The decline in
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Figure 5: Association between Preference for Living with Son in Old Age and Sex Ratio at Last Birth
in Women
1,080
1,030
Meghalaya
980
930
Sex Satio at last birth
Nagaland
880
830
Arunachal Pradesh
780
730
680
0 10 20 30
Prefer to live with sons in old age
Source: Authors’ estimation using IHDS-II (2011–12) and NFHS-4 (2015–16) data.
sex ratio at birth alongside a decline in
son preference suggests that the spread
of sex-selective abortions is independent
of stated son preference. This gap gravely
impacts our understanding of gender and
natality inequality. With faltering con-
ventional methodologies, there arises a
need to look for newer avenues of meas-
uring son preference. Our analysis reveals
the need to reorient the questions used
to gauge son preference in a manner
that allows for greater insight into the
underlying preferences of prospective
parents. Therefore, questions on son pre-
ference should only be posed to women
who are planning to have children in the
future. Ameliorating the extant method-
ologies of estimating son preference will
help shrink the gap between a perpetrated
mirage that conforms to societal ideals
and the ground reality.
notes
1 Child sex ratios are computed as: number of
under age-five male children/number of under
age-five female children*1000.
2 Sex ratio at birth is computed as: number of
male children at birth/number of female chil-
dren at birth *1000.
3 Sex ratio at last birth is computed as: number
of male children at last birth/number of
female children at last birth*1000.
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Desai, S and R Vanneman (2015): “India Human
Development Survey-II,” ICPSR36151-v2, Ann
Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for
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and Child Sex Ratios in India,” Social Science
Mizoram Kerala
Research Network, 10 February.
Guilmoto, C Z (2015): “Mapping the Diversity of
Gender Preferences and Sex Imbalances in
Indonesia in 2010,” Population Studies, Vol 69,
No 3, pp 299–315.
Tamil Nadu Manipur
Tripura Goa Jayachandran, S (2017): “Odds Are You’re Measuring
West Bengal Son Preference Incorrectly,” World Bank Blogs,
Karnataka 19 June, https://blogs.worldbank.org/impacte-
Assam Andhra PradeshMaharashtra valuations/odds-are-you-re-measuring-son-
preference-incorrectly.
Chhattisgarh J&K
Odisha Jayachandran, S and R Pande (2017): “Why Are
Bihar
Sikkim Indian Children So Short? The Role of Birth
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John, M (2014): “Sex Ratio and Gender Biased Sex
Himachal Pradesh
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SS.pdf.
John, M E and C Z Guilmoto (2024): “Girl-Only
Families in India,” Atlas of Gender and Health
Inequalities in India, C Z Guilmoto (ed), Cham:
Bhatnagar, I (2023): “A Girl and a Boy, Are a Bundle Springer Nature Switzerland, pp 97–105.
of Joy: A Rise in Gender-Equitable Fertility
Kulkarni, P M (2020): “Sex Ratio at Birth in India:
Preferences in India,” Studies in Family Planning,
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Population Fund (UNFPA), New Delhi.
Craigie, T A and S Dasgupta (2017): “The Gender
Pay Gap and Son Preference: Evidence from Kumari, A and S Goli (2022): “Skewed Child Sex
India,” Oxford Development Studies, Vol 45, Ratios in India: A Revisit to Geographical Pat-
No 4, pp 479–98. terns and Socio-economic Correlates,” Journal
of Population Research, Vol 39, No 1, pp 45–72.
Das Gupta, M (2010): “Family Systems, Political
Systems and Asia’s ‘Missing Girls’: The Construc- Pande, R P and N M Astone (2007): “Explaining
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EPWRF India Time Series
(www.epwrfits.in)
Monthly Accounts of the Union Government
High frequency data sets in the form of Monthly Accounts of the Union Government
prepared by the Controller General of Accounts (CGA) have been added to the Finances
of Government of India module of the EPWRF India Time Series (ITS) online database,
that is, in addition to the regular annual budget series. This new sub-module facilitates
the scrutiny of the evolving intra-year progress made in the budgetary heads of receipts,
expenditures and deficits on a monthly basis, as given below:
● Total Receipts–broadly classified under Revenue Receipts (various components
of Tax Revenue and Non-tax Revenue) and Non-debt Capital Receipts (Recoveries
of Loans and Advances, Disinvestment, etc).
● Total Expenditure–comprising Revenue and Capital Expenditures, and as per the
erstwhile classification of Plan and Non-plan Expenditures.
● Deficit Indicators–Primary Deficit, Revenue Deficit and Fiscal Deficit.
● Sources of Financing Deficit–External Financing and different sources of Domestic
Financing, such as Market Borrowing, borrowing from Small Savings Fund, etc.
This monthly series is available from April 1997 onwards, as provided by the CGA.
Finances of Government of India module is one out of 33 modules of EPWRF ITS, which
covers a wide range of macroeconomic, financial and social sector indicators
for India.
For more details, visit www.epwrfits.in or e-mail to: its@epwrf.in
vol lix no 7 13
COMMENTARY
A Respectable Honorarium
for Municipal Corporators
Tanya Jakimow, Josphin Singh, Rekha Pundir, Pushpa Bisht
Not having a respectable
honorarium has implications in
executing municipal councillors’
duties towards citizens, and
causes considerable hardship.
The research was supported by an
Australian Research Council Future Fellowship
[FT190100247]. The authors thank the
anonymous reviewer for significantly
improving the article. The authors express
their gratitude to the parshads of Dehradun for
participating in the study, and for their service
to the community.
Tanya Jakimow (tanya.jakimow@anu.edu.au)
is Australian Research Council Future Fellow
at the Australian National University,
Canberra. Josphin Singh (josphinsingh89@
gmail.com), Rekha Pundir (rekha.pundir11@
gmail.com), and Pushpa Bisht are social
workers and activists based in Dehradun.
22
T
he passing of the Women’s Reser-
vation Bill in the Lok Sabha in
September 2023 marks another
step in India’s commitment to gender
equality in politics. The 128th Constitu-
tional Amendment reserves 33% of seats
in the Lok Sabha and legislative assem-
blies for women. The long-delayed bill
comes three decades after the 74th Con-
stitutional Amendment (1994) came into
force mandating at least a third of the
seats in urban local bodies be reserved
for women. In theory, these local-level
reservations should have produced a
pipeline of experienced women political
leaders at all levels.
There are multiple and complex rea-
sons that local body reservations have
not translated into better representation
of women at the national and state levels.
Some underappreciated factors are the
conditions that enable or prevent women
from thriving in their role as local elected
FEBRuary 17, 2024
representatives. A recent study of women
municipal corporators (known locally as
parshads) in Dehradun, Uttarakhand,
has shown the challenges they face per-
forming a demanding role without any
form of financial support. In the present
study, we assessed these challenges for
women and men, through an in-person
survey of all 100 parshads (89 responses,
56 men, and 33 women) between July
and September 2023. The article exam-
ines the consequences of a lack of salary
for municipal corporators, with a par-
ticular focus on its gendered impacts.
An appropriate salary for local elected
representatives is a matter of policy con-
sideration and scholarly debate. While
researchers have developed models to
examine the extent of professionalisa-
tion of elected representatives (Squire
2007), or surveyed the methods to arrive
at remuneration levels across jurisdictions
(Schobel 2014), there have been few or no
attempts to arrive at an objective stand-
ard either within or across countries.
Instead, questions are posed as to
whether posts should be remunerated as
per time commitment or are essentially
voluntary (Copus 2015). Some recent
studies have also interrogated the rela-
tionship between pay and the quality of
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

representation and government efficiency
(Benito et al 2021), councillor well-being
and motivation (Jakimow and Henaway
2023), and patterns of under or over-rep-
resentation (Gulzar 2021). The evidence
is mixed for each of these relationships.
More crucially, these lines of enquiry are
framed from Euro-American contexts.
The features of local government in
India present challenges to providing
adequate pay as well as arguably make
it more important. Several studies on
women councillors identify inadequate
salary as one challenge among many,
preventing them from fulfilling their role
(Raheena 2016), meeting constituent ex-
pectations (Nazneen et al 2014) and ex-
acerbating a heavy workload with com-
peting responsibilities (Banerjee 2017).
In this article, we focus on inadequate sal-
ary as an issue in itself, highlight its neg-
ative impacts for men and woman, and
point to the gendered implications in-
hibiting female political advancement.
Councillor Remuneration:
A Politicised Issue
Corporators (elected representatives in
municipal corporations) and councillors
(of other urban local bodies) are the
most accessible level of government, and
hence “one of the key building blocks on
which democracy is based” (McGarvey
and Stewart 2019: 65). Their formal role
includes participating in meetings and
evaluating policy for the welfare of the
people. These dual roles of scrutiny and
representation are expanded in the Indian
context, where they are also an important
bridge for citizens to access the personal-
ised or mediated state (Berenschot 2010).
Similar to other countries, there is a
large difference between their de jure
and de facto responsibilities, with citizen
expectations expanding their scope of
work considerably, as seen below.
The majority of Indian states provide
an allowance to municipal councillors
and corporators (Table 1). In July 2023,
the Tamil Nadu government implemented
an honorarium of `10,000 a month for
corporation councillors to “strengthen
administrative efficiency of urban local
bodies.” The mayor of Chennai, R Priya,
added that the move will particularly help
councillors from economically weaker
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
COMMENTARY
sections and women, “as most of them working to improve urban governance,
do not have a paying job” (Express News lists councillor salary as an indicator in
Service 2023). On 31 August 2023, the their urban governance index (Praja un-
Aam Aadmi Party-led Delhi Municipal dated). It is not enough to provide a
Corporation increased the allowance for small allowance; it needs to be sufficient
meeting attendance from `300 to `25,000 to provide incentives for performance and
(with a cap of `1,00,000 per month). The enable councillors to take on their role
outrage expressed by the Bharatiya Janata full time. In the 2019 national consulta-
Party (BJP) in response to this increase tion on urban governance, the Praja
shows how councillor allowances can (2020) study found low or no remunera-
become a politicised issue (Singh 2023). tion to be a problem across the country.
Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand are
among the states that do not provide any Out-of-pocket Expenses
allowance to corporators or councillors. India differs from many countries where
Despite gaining statehood in 2000, Utta- the remuneration of municipal repre-
rakhand is still under the Uttar Pradesh sentatives is debated due to the extent of
Municipal Corporation Act, 1959. While out-of-pocket expenses. In Dehradun, it
the act is often cited as a barrier to re- is not so much a question of how much a
ceiving an allowance, nothing explicitly corporator should be paid, but how
excludes such a provision. Indeed, provi- much the role costs them. In the field
sion 30-A states that corporators “may be survey, 65 parshads provided an esti-
paid … conveyance allowance, or be giv- mate of their monthly expenditure,1 with
en such facilities in lieu of conveyance an average of `20,831, and a median of
allowance, for attendance at meetings of `17,500. Of the remainder, two stated
the Corporation and its committees.” No they bore no, or minimal expense, while
such allowance is paid. In contrast, 22 respondents incurred considerable
pradhans in Uttarakhand receive a small expenses, but did not track the amount
honorarium as well as have authority (Figure 1, p 24). While self-reporting of
over a small budget for village works. expenses (and time) can be unreliable,
Tellingly, the term parshads use to re- at the least these findings indicate that
fer to financial payment is maandey, or most parshads bear considerable ex-
honorarium. This term avoids the nega- pense to fulfil their ward duties.
tive connotation of professionalisation Parshads indicated three categories of
and retains the voluntary orientation of expenses. First is the money spent in the
the role. Praja, a non-partisan organisation execution of their responsibilities such
Table 1: Monthly Allowance for Corporators in Municipal as stationary, phone, petrol, office
Corporations in Selected States rent, and maintenance costs. At a
State City Amount (in `) bare minimum, parshads must pay
Arunachal Pradesh Itanagar 10,000
for transport to and from meetings.
Assam Guwahati 25,000
Bihar Patna 1,500
Citizens’ access to state schemes
Chhattisgarh Raipur 15,000 and entitlements requires printing
Goa Panaji 10,800 forms, photocopying documents,
Gujarat Gandhinagar 14,500 and transport. While parshads may
Himachal Pradesh Shimla 7,000 be able to recoup these expenses
Jharkhand Ranchi 11,000
from citizens, many cover it them-
Karnataka Bengaluru 7,000
Kerala Thiruvananthapuram 9,200 selves, especially for citizens with
Madhya Pradesh Bhopal 6,000 lower incomes.
Maharashtra Mumbai 25,000 Some also pay for the expenses
Odisha Bhubaneswar Sitting fee 700 related to infrastructure and ser-
Punjab Chandigarh 17,500
vices out of their own pockets. The
Rajasthan Jaipur 10,000
Tamil Nadu Coimbatore 10,000
budget for services, such as fogging
Telangana Hyderabad 7,800 for mosquitoes, is sometimes insuf-
Uttar Pradesh Lucknow None ficient for large wards, and hence,
West Bengal Kolkata 10,000 parshads cover the shortfall. Some
Source: Compiled through direct communication with municipal
corporations, media reports and Praja (2020): accurate as of
parshads reported having to pay
October 2023. sanitation workers when salaries
vol lix no 7 23
COMMENTARY
Figure 1: Monthly Expenses by Gender
35
30
25
Percentage of respondents
20
Men %
15
Total %
10.7
Women %
10
7.8
5 3.8
0 not having an honorarium caused them
<10,000
are delayed, providing cleaning products,
and repairing government equipment.
Disasters, such as floods, result in damage
to infrastructure, which often requires
immediate action to ensure the safety
and convenience of citizens. Such emer-
gency works need timely access to funds,
which in most cases is not available.
The lack of honorarium is related to
the problem that parshads in Dehradun
do not have signatory authority over a
discretionary budget for their ward. As a
result, for necessary works, they must
submit a proposal to the Nagar Nigam in
order to release funds: a process that can
take two to three months. Members of
the legislative assembly’s (MLAs) dis-
cretionary budgets are an alternative
source, yet these too take time and are
often denied if the parshad belongs to a
different party. Further, the MLA who
uses their discretionary budget then re-
ceives the recognition for the project,
rather than the parshad who undertook
the work. To avoid these delays and to
ensure emergency works are completed
quickly, some parshads cover the expen-
ses, to a manageable extent, from their
personal budget.
A third category of expenditure is pro-
viding financial support to needy citi-
zens. Most commonly, parshads help
with medical and marriage expenses,
school fees, uniforms and so on. They
are regularly invited to social events,
such as weddings and community func-
tions, with expectations that they will
provide a monetary gift or donation.
24
32.3
22.2
20.5
16.7 17.8 16.7
11.7
10.7 11.1
8.9
6.7
5.3
4.4
2.9 2.9 2.9
1.7
10o14,000 15o19,000 20o24,000 o,000 0o,000 > 1 lakh
Lakh
These expectations arise from the rela-
tional morality between elected repre-
sentatives and constituents in which citi-
zen demands for support are often seen
as a “return” for their past or future vote
(Piliavsky 2014). Some parshads are also,
however, moved by the plight of people
in their constituencies. While there are
differences in how individual parshads
will respond to supplicants based on the
dynamics of caste, class, religion and
gender, many will do all they can to
alleviate struggles (Jakimow 2018).
Public Welfare and
Personal Hardship
Parshads’ expenses reveal the extent of
cost-shifting from state and federal gov-
ernment to the personal finances of local
elected representatives. This cost-shifting
is very clear in expenses directly related to
the role, and in covering shortfalls in in-
frastructure and services that should be
provided by the state. Even the third
case of catering to citizen demands en-
tails parshads bearing the financial cost
of government failure. Berenschot (2010:
200) notes that political intermediaries,
such as parshads, arise due to the “limit-
ed capacity [of the state] to meet the de-
mand it generates.” Many demands for
financial support arise from the lack of
safety nets and inadequate provisions to
ensure basic rights such as health and
education. Arguably, parshads are bear-
ing the costs of state scarcity.
As a consequence, citizens’ access to
government services and infrastructure
(in `) is, in part, dependent upon the financial
resources of their elected parshad. The
32.1 result is uneven provision, disadvantag-
ing areas represented by parshads with
limited financial means. A logical response
24.4 is to elect those leaders who can meet
these demands—that is, electorally pun-
ish those who cannot—exasperating the
under-representation of people from poor-
er socio-economic backgrounds. These
11.8 individuals also bear a disproportionate
burden for covering state expenses out
of limited household budgets.
The majority of parshads face difficul-
ties meeting these expenses. Out of 89
2.2
parshads, 77 (or 86.52%) indicated that
Do not count
hardship, nine indicated it did not, with
three unsure. The inability to meet citizen
demands, including turning away people
who need help or the inability to com-
plete work in a timely manner, was most
frequently mentioned as a hardship.
When people’s expectations are not met,
they can get angry, issue threats, and,
most significantly, redirect their vote in
the next election. Some women parshads
complain that greater demands and a lack
of respect are directed more so at wom-
en, compared to men (Jakimow 2019).
Impacts of No Honorarium
Both male and female parshads com-
monly noted the impact expenses had
on their household budget. The monthly
expenses by gender are presented in
Figure 1. There is a small difference in
the average monthly spend: `16,600 for
women compared to `18,132 for men
when outliers are removed. Men are
more likely to spend less than `10,000 a
month compared to women, but also
more likely to spend `25,000 a month or
more. Of greater significance is that only
four of the 22 parshads who did not keep
track of their spending were women;
that is, 32% of male respondents but only
11.8% of female respondents indicated
that they could spend money without
concern for their overall budget.
These differences arise from women’s
dependence on family members to finan-
cially sustain their work. A minority of
women parshads, 12 (35.2%) of them,
indicated they had their own source of
income (such as business or pension),
FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

while 22 (64.7%) indicated that they
took familial support usually from their
husbands. Only three indicated they have
no financial resources.2 In contrast, only
eight male parshads (14.3% of male
respondents) indicated that they took
financial support from their families,
mostly parents or through a family busi-
ness. The majority of men relied on their
own, independent income stream.
The implications for women to not
have an honorarium are therefore pro-
found. Over a third of women (12 out of
34) indicated that dependency on their
husbands was a significant hardship. The
negative consequences of financial depen-
dence for intra-familial relations are well
known for women more generally, includ-
ing reduced bargaining power, increased
gender-based violence, and constrained
agency. In this way, the lack of honorari-
um exacerbates unequal power relations
within households. Women parshads re-
ported being embarrassed to continue to
ask family members for help, while some
family members extended only limited,
and insufficient, financial support.
As a consequence, women’s political
aspirations are often determined by
their husband’s willingness to fund
their activities. Many women parshads
are concerned that a lack of independent
income means that they are unable to
meet citizen expectations, and will
therefore face challenges being re-elect-
ed. This possibility was seemingly real-
ised during the 2018 Dehradun elec-
tions, with both major parties denying
tickets to sitting female parshads on the
basis of “voter surveys” that showed
lack of popular support.3 While there is
much hand-wringing at the tendency
for women elected in reserved seats to
contest on behalf of male family mem-
bers (Rawal and Sengupta 2023), the
current lack of honorarium increases
the likelihood of this scenario. In order
to ensure that politically ambitious
women can become parshads on their
own behalf, they need the confidence
that they have the financial capacity to
perform the role.
Gendered Challenges
Women are further financially disadvan-
taged relative to male parshads in many
Economic & Political Weekly EPW FEBRuary 17, 2024
ways. Many men reduce expenses by
aligning parshad work with income-gen-
erating activities. A business or place of
employment doubles as an office to meet
constituents, with some able to call on
employees to undertake minor tasks.
The majority of female parshads must
rent an office or dedicate space in the
home for these activities (as do many
men). In the previous term, an office in
the Nagar Nigam provided space for all
parshads to meet with constituents, with
computer and printing facilities. This
facility no longer exists.
Another problem related to the lack of
provisions for parshads is security. Sad-
ly, it is not safe for women in Dehradun
to step out at night unaccompanied by
male members. As many emergencies
occur at night, women parshads depend
on male family members to attend to
their work. If family members are una-
vailable, important works are delayed
until morning. Currently, women par-
shads must make arrangements for their
own safety, with the state bearing no re-
sponsibility to ensure that all elected
representatives can perform their role
without harm.
There are also gendered impacts to
the absence of a discretionary budget for
parshads, although both men and wom-
en find this aspect of their work chal-
lenging. Some parshads overcome this
problem by mobilising funds from their
networks, and through connections to
officers in relevant departments. While
many women are adept at doing so, it is
also the case that both routes are more
available to men. Social networks built
through business and work can connect
parshads to relatively affluent people in
the locality. Requests from men also tend
to be taken more seriously than from
women, who often face questions about
their capacity to deliver. This homo-
social capital extends to relations be-
tween parshads and officials in govern-
ment departments for roads, sewerage
and so on. Women are disadvantaged in
this way relative to men in their capacity
to “get things done” without a discre-
tionary budget.
Such disadvantages matter in a con-
text where voter expectations are rising.
Signatory authority to expend funds for
vol lix no 7
COMMENTARY
wards would somewhat level the elec-
toral playing field, enabling women an
equal opportunity to demonstrate their
ability to deliver. Gender equity in local
governments also means providing the
facilities and security so that both men
and women can perform their roles
without gendered disadvantages. The
re-election of women at the local level
(including in unreserved seats) so that
they build a record of political perfor-
mance is crucial to their advancement to
higher levels of government.
In Conclusion
Strategies to increase the representation
of women in politics often start, and
end, with getting them elected (descrip-
tive representation), with reservations
as an obvious example. Less attention is
placed on which women are elected and
their political advancement. Reservations
are necessary, and we advocate for 50%
reservations in urban local bodies in
Uttarakhand. Yet we also argue for the
need to properly support women who are
elected, ensuring that their conditions
enable them to perform their role effec-
tively, and overcome any gendered dis-
advantages. Providing an honorarium,
discretionary budget, and adequate fa-
cilities or security are crucial to achieve
the objectives of the 74th Constitutional
Amendment (1994), and a pipeline of
women for the elections to the Lok Sabha
and Vidhan Sabha (Legislative Assembly).
However, the case for adequate allow-
ance goes beyond gender. The overwhel-
ming support for an honorarium indicates
that it is a cross-partisan issue, with 96.7%
of our respondents strongly agreeing that
it is necessary. Speaking to parshads, it
is clear that reducing hardships is only
one aspect of their grievance. They want a
“respectable” amount (sammaanjanak),
one that reflects the status and impor-
tance of the position. Despite the chal-
lenges they face, only one parshad said
that they would not contest the next
election (if selected by the party) and it
is clear that they receive non-financial
benefits (such as satisfaction, status) from
performing the role.4 Yet there is a ques-
tion of fairness. Can local elected repre-
sentatives be expected to bear expenses
that are the responsibility of the state?
25
COMMENTARY

There is currently a proposal before
the Uttarakhand State Cabinet to imple-
ment an honorarium of `1,000 a month
for corporators in the Nagar Nigam (`750
for nagar palika and `500 for nagar
panchayat). Dehradun parshads previ-
ously rejected a proposal for an honorar-
ium of `2,000 a month as disrespectful,
and we are of the opinion that `1,000 is
insulting. If governments are serious
about urban efficiency, local representa-
tion, and gender equity, they need to de-
velop a budget to financially support the
work of these important actors for de-
mocracy. Scholars and researchers have
a role in developing objective criteria
that can guide policymakers to arrive at
a fair and equitable compensation for
elected representatives.
Notes
1 Most parshads gave a range, with calculations
made from the middle of this range.
2 Some women noted multiple sources of finan-
cial support, such as business and family,
hence the overall number is greater than 34.
3 Parshads questioned the veracity of these “voter
surveys,” and claimed they were an excuse for
party elites to select male supporters.
4 We do not deny that some parshads obtain finan-
cial benefits through unsanctioned practices, yet
neither do we assume all, or even the majority
do. Few in our observations earn money by
being a parshad.
References
Banerjee, Riya (2017): “Does Time Matter?—A
Study of Participation of Women in Urban Gov-
ernance,” Space and Culture, India, Vol 4, No 3,
pp 62–76.
Benito, Bernardino, Pedro-José Martinex-Córdoba
and María-Dolores Guillamón (2021): “Impact
of Politicians’ Salaries and Their Dedication
Regime on the Efficiency of Municipal Public
Services,” Local Government Studies, Vol 47,
No 5, pp 784–807.
Berenschot, Ward (2010): “Everyday Mediation: The
Politics of Public Service Delivery in Gujarat,
India,” Development and Change, Vol 41, No 5,
pp 883–905.
Copus, Colin (2015): In Defence of Councillors, Man-
chester: Manchester University Press.
Express News Service (2023): “Monthly Pay for Urban
Local Body Representatives in TN; `30,000 for
Mayors,” New Indian Express, July, viewed on 14
October 2023, https://www.newindianexpress.
com/states/tamil-nadu/2023/jul/14/monthly-
pay-for-urban-local-body-representatives-in-tn-
rs-30000for-mayors-2594595.html.
Gulzar, Saad (2021): “Who Enters Politics and Why?”
Annual Review of Political Science, Vol 24,
pp 253–75.
Jakimow, Tanya (2018): “The Familiar Face of the
State: Affect, Emotion and Citizen Entitle-
ments in Dehradun, India,” International Jour-
nal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol 44,
No 3, pp 429–46.
— (2019): “The ‘Servants’ of Dehradun: A Chang-
ing Relationship between Municipal Council-
lors and Voters in India,” Journal of Contempo-
rary Asia, Vol 49, No 3, pp 389–409.
Jakimow, Tanya and Kat Henaway (2023): “Repre-
sentation as Privilege or Burden: Centring Pay
to Achieve Gender Parity and ‘Diversity’ in Local
Government,” European Journal of Politics and
Gender, online first, DOI: 10.1332/25151088Y202
3D000000004.
McGarvey, Neil and Fraser Stewart (2019): “The Role
of the Councillor,” The Routledge Handbook of
International Local Government, R Kerley, J Lid-
dle and P T Dunning (eds), London: Routledge,
pp 54–69.
Nazneen, Sohela, Iqbal Ehsan and Bayazid Hasan
(2014): “Exceptional Women: Reserved
Councillors in Municipal Corporations in
Bangladesh,” Women in Politics: Gender, Power
and Development, M Tadros (ed), London: Zed
Books, pp 74–100.
Piliavsky, Anatasia (ed) (2014): Patronage as Politics in
South Asia, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Praja (2020): “National Consultation on Urban Gov-
ernance: Key Findings from 21 States,” https://
www.praja.org/praja_docs/praja_downloads/
UGI2020.pdf, viewed on 14 Oct 2023.
— (undated): https://www.praja.org/ugi, viewed
on 14 October 2023.
Raheena, P A (2016): “Women Representatives in Lo-
cal Government: Issues and Challenges,” KILA
Journal of Local Governance, Vol 3, No 1, pp 37–43.
Rawal and Sengupta (2023): “Behind Women’s
Reservation in Local Body Polls, Tales of Patri-
archy, Proxy Candidates,” Hindustan Times,
10 October, https://www.hindustantimes.com/
india-news/behind-women-s-reservation-in-
local-body-polls-tales-of-patriarchy-proxy-
candidates-101696876918809.html, viewed on
14 October 2023.
Schobel, Kurt (2014): “How Much Is Enough? A
Study of Municipal Councillor Remuneration,”
Canadian Public Administration, Vol 57, No 1,
pp 138–53.
Singh, Paras (2023): “Delhi: MCD Councillors’
Allowance Revised from `300–`25,000,” Hindu-
stan Times, 1 September, https://www.hindusta-
ntimes.com/cities/delhi-news/delhi-mcd-cou-
ncillors-allowance-revised-from-30025000-101-
693505385803.html, viewed on 14 October 2023.
Squire, Peverill (2007): “Measuring State Legisla-
tive Professionalism: The Squire Index, Revis-
ited,” State, Politics & Policy Quarterly, Vol 7,
No 2, pp 211–27.

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26 FEBRuary 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

A Companion to Rāmcaritmānas
Imre Bangha
R
eading the Rāmcaritmānas: A
Companion to the Awadhi Rama-
yana of Tulsidas is a book that the
reader may find unusual to be reviewed
in the Economic & Political Weekly since
the authors silently avoid politicisation
of this masterpiece. As its subtitle indi-
cates, this book is a companion to the
Ramćaritmānas through a detailed in-
troduction, selected passages and their
glossaries. Both the introduction and
the passages can be a joy to read for be-
ing inspired or written by one of the
most outstanding poets of India, Tulsidas.
If a modern, anglicised reader wonders
why Tulsidas is considered to be a great
poet, this book might be the right one to
turn to.
A Masterpiece of World Literature
Although hardly known in the Western
world, and less and less in India, those
who can still access the works of classical
Hindi probably agree that the Mānas,
just like the short poems of Kabir and
Surdas and Jayasi’s great narrative, the
Padmāvat, belong to the highlights of
world literature. The general failure to
recognise this may be explained by
Macaulian orientalism and by the fact
that even the best translations can only
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
Reading the Rāmcaritmānas: A Companion to
the Awadhi Ramayana of Tulsidas by Rupert Snell
and Neha Tiwari, Delhi: Primus Books, 2023; pp xxiii + 503,
`1,995.
partially give back the beauty of the
originals. Although we read a lot of
world literature, readers having access
to both originals and translations would
concur with the authors that great
works are best experienced in their
own language. This is especially true of
poetry that has not been part of the
build-up of our contemporary sensibili-
ties in English and whose language and
style are greatly distanced from the
modern Western languages.
Rupert Snell and Neha Tiwari’s book
is an excellent gateway to the Mānas
primarily for a modern Indian reader
and for a student of Indian languages.
Although the authors state that the
readings are meant for people who
know the modern standard version of
Hindi, the first part of the introduction,
“Tulsi’s Artistry: The Text and its Re-
wards,” can be read without knowledge
of the language. This part is written so
brilliantly that there is a great chance
that even those who have never heard
of the Mānas will be attracted to read it
vol lIX no 7
BOOK REVIEW
and start to share the enthusiasm of the
authors. It is full of succinct observa-
tions and brilliant formulations about
the literary merits of the epic. Let me
just quote a few,
The muscle and sinew of vibrant narrative
runs throughout the whole, yielding a text of
great organic and aesthetic sophistication;
Seasoned readers would agree that Tulsi’s
language is razor-sharp, vigorous and precise,
while also being allusive, playful and lush;
The hagiographical depiction of the poet as
a devout superman sits ill with a deeply hu-
man achievement of a literary text;
or
A close reading … reveals Tulsi’s character
as an individual with a great capacity of
joy, an alertness to majesty and epiphany,
a boundless creativity and a subtly knowing
understanding of human aspirations and
behaviour.
The latter two observations are the key
to Snell and Tiwari’s approach to the
epic. They treat the Mānas not so much
as one of the most influential works of
Hinduism but rather as an outstanding
literary piece by a deeply human poet
that reveals various aspects of the human
condition regardless of time and space.
The second part of the chapter locates 10
factors that give the Mānas its depth and
appeal, such as being permeated by the
devotional and the recognition of the
sacred. These aspects pervade the text
through and through. For example, the
term maṅgala, “bliss, auspiciousness,
etc,” linking the worldly to the divine,
33
BOOK REVIEW
figures over a hundred times in it. Re-
ducing the text to the religious would,
however, be missing the layered nature
of the epic. The layering of meaning is
exemplified by the multiple reasons for
Vishnu’s incarnation, where only Rama
and the readers are aware of the divine
plot behind the unfolding of the events.
Further aspects include the psychological,
such as the “perception of order that
helps the reader to make sense of their
experiences in and of a disordered world”
and the “vision of remediation and com-
fort through divine grace,” to start with.
This latter aspect may have been rela-
tively new in Varanasi at Tulsi’s time.
David Lorenzen (2012: 48), putting the
dates of Kabir into the early 16th century,
argues that the early date is confirmed
by the relative absence of the concept of
divine grace, so important to later poets
across sectarian lines.
A further aspect is giving the familiar
an aestheticised shape. The authors talk
about the “landscape of the text” con-
sisting of recognisable and familiar plac-
es and scenes. Concerning the spatial
aspect, one cannot help thinking of a
link between Tulsi’s claimed early pere-
grinations to Prayag and Chitrakut and
the vivid descriptions of their landscape.
One may have given birth to the other. A
strong support to aestheticisation is the
text’s formal structure and rhythm—
saved from monotony by introducing
occasional changes to established patterns.
The wide lexical range of the poem relies
heavily on Sanskrit words called tatsamas,
or more exactly ardhatatsamas, that is
Sanskrit words adapted to the north
Indian popular pronunciation, such as
bikala, bighana, sāvaka, sikhara, karama,
etc, some of which we may still hear from
speakers of modern Hindi. Beyond these,
the literary and narrative wit and the
deployment of a wide range of rasas are
features of the epic that keep its readers
and listeners engaged. A feature percep-
tible throughout the introduction is the
authors’ great respect for the language
of the epic pointing at Tulsi’s precise cal-
culation of the deployment of words and
eventually stating that “a close reading
of his text shows that Tulsi is utterly in
love with language.” The authors of this
book also appear to be so.
34
As has already been indicated, this
book brings us close not only to the text
but also to the personality of the author
Tulsidas. No other study has been so
successful in it. The authors locate Tulsi’s
genius not in attributing great poetic
imagination to him but rather praising
“the individual genius with which he
uses established rhetoric.”
Grammar and Style Interlinked
There is, however, more in the introduc-
tion than the general statements about the
epic and praise for the poet. Sometimes
the authors go into details of grammar
and style that readers assuming that
they automatically understand the text
may miss. Particularly interesting is the
discussion of how verbal tenses are de-
ployed as stylistic features. For example,
the “aberrant past tense” implies a sug-
gestion of disapproval like in the modern
Hindi karbaiṭhnā. In this epic, the “aber-
rant” forms extend the usual perfect
with -si. Interestingly, this stylistic shade
seems to be peculiar to Tulsi since Da’ud
(1379) and Jayasi (1540) used these forms
as a litany to describe God’s creation of
the world, each in the first stanza of
their Indo-Sufi romances. Da’ud writes,
“He created (sirajasi) the earth and the
sky, he created (sirajasi) the circles of
mount Meru and Kailash.” and goes on
for three more ardhālīs (look up Snell’s
glossary if you do not know this word).
Jayasi imitates these lines with a syno-
nym “He first made (kīnhesi) the shining
light; and for its love he made (kīnhesi)
heaven.” And again, five more lines with
the verb kīnhesi twice in each. This solemn
linguistic form, a few decades later in
the Mānas, became a form of disapprov-
al. Sic transit gloria mundi (“Thus passes
the worldly glory”).
How grammar blends into the style can
be perceived with specific Indic features,
such as the location of feeling, where
“the grammatical focus is on the feeling
itself,” such as kopunamohi, “there is no
anger for me,” that is “I am not angry.”
Such structures acknowledge the fact
that humans are not always strictly agents
of their own feelings. Similar observa-
tions include ellipsis versus explicitness (a
nightmare for language learners). The
rhetorical devices of parataxis, chiasmus
february 17, 2024
and zeugma may sound alien to most of
us, but after their explanation we real-
ise that they are important stylistic fea-
tures in Tulsidas. It would have been
helpful to have the Indian term, wherever
possible, such as in the case of zeugma
which in Hindi is nothing else but
dehrīdīpak, “lamp on the threshold,” a
figure of speech when a word placed
between two clauses “brightens” by its
meaning both clauses of a sentence,
such as sevakasukhaćahamānabhikhārī,
“a servant [who] desires comfort or a
beggar respect.” The Hindi word for
“[she/he] desires,” ćaha, should be ap-
plied in both directions.
A Poet Experimenting with
Rhyming and Versing
It should be mentioned that what the
authors sometimes perceive as weakness
in the text can, in fact, be signs that the
poet Tulsi is taking advantage of the pos-
sibilities of vernacular or experimenting
with new rhythmical features. For exam-
ple, rhyming sītā with ćiṁtā is exploiting
the scribal feature that the anusvāra can
also be used in manuscripts to express
the lengthening of a vowel or lengthen-
ing can be used instead of marking na-
salisation. For example, siṁha some-
times is written as sīha in classical Hindi
poetry. Similarly, rhyming nainī with
śrenī makes use of the fact that apart
from tatsamas, Hindi scribes often free-
ly interchanged e with ai, indicating that
there may not have been much differ-
ence in the pronunciation of the two—
just as modern Hindi hardly differenti-
ates between o and au.
Chapter 3 is about Tulsī’s prosody, the
knowledge of metre in poetry. In the
world of today, where especially in India
free verse is more the rule than the ex-
ception, the authors present this chapter
in defence of prosody. It is not a coinci-
dence that humankind in all nooks and
available at
Alter Media
Brhamswom Madom Bldg,
M G Road, Trissur 680 001
Kerala
vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

corners of the world produced poetry in
metre. The rhythm of verses has some-
thing magical, like hidden mantras that
get repeated over and over again with
the involvement of a deeper than ordi-
nary consciousness. Metrical poetry was
also a “democratic” form of Hindi. The
low-caste Kabīr used dohās, ćaupāīs and
their combination, just like Tulsīdās. In
fact, this combination in the Kabīr
verses was—probably after the success
of the Mānas—called ramainī, that is
Rāmāyanī metre. Even illiterate readers
and listeners in the past centuries were
able to internalise a feel for the most
widespread Hindi metres probably from
childhood as they heard them being
recited at home, in temples or in public
places. Contrasts with English (for
example, night train versus night rain;
or the ćhands being like operatic arias) of-
ten help in explaining a subject from
which many people nowadays feel alien-
ated. Tulsīdās was an experimenting
poet. Charlotte Vaudeville (1955) has
shown that in the second phase of com-
posing the Mānas, Tulsi used the metre
more irregularly. It was not because he
was becoming a weaker poet but rather
he was experimenting with poetic li-
cences and innovations. One interesting
innovation is his special soraṭhā that apart
from the usual pre-cesura rhyme also
used end-rhymes.
There are further aspects of prosody
that could have been touched upon, such
as the rich volume of Hiroko Nagasaki
(2012) on Indo-Persian Prosody and Rec-
itation. It might have been worth men-
tioning that apart from mātric length,
stress is also a constituting element of
Tulsī’s ćaupāīs (Fairbanks 1992). In fact,
the 16-mātrā ćaupāī can be divided into
four units of four mātrās and the first
syllable of each unit carries the poetic
stress, the ictus giving an energetic feel
for the recitation. Ken Bryant has shown
in the example of Sūrdās that the mo-
notony of the four-mātrā units can be
broken by syncopation, producing a 3+5
distribution (Bryant 1992). This is also
applicable to Tulsī’s ćaupāīs.
Chapter 4 of the introduction gives an
overview of the poem with beautiful exam-
ples and subtle analysis of selected lines. I
wonder why the charming and important
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
Bhushundi episode in the Uttarakāṇḍa is
omitted from this? The overview of the
poem is followed by a close-up in the
next chapter, which presents a close
reading of the boatman episode with the
usual subtle observations that we got
used to in the previous chapters.
Using the Gita Press Edition
The main body of the book contains
selections from the text with facing
translations and notes. The notes are or-
ganic, important parts of the translation
that guide the reader through apparent
difficulties and occasionally cite other
translators for comparison. The transla-
tion is as close as possible to the facing
text, or in the translators’ words, they
are “hugging as closely to its contours as
English syntax and idiom allow.” While
the notes and the translations on the right
side of the book are brilliant, there are
problems with the left side, the text. The
authors state that the left-hand page is
“the strict preserve of the poet.” While this
book is an introduction to the epic and not
a philological study, it should have stated
that the Gita Press text may not strictly
be that of Tulsidas but a reconstructed and
standardised text, which cannot be found
in manuscripts that were the most impor-
tant medium of transmission before
print modernity. The popular edition of
the text (Gita Press 2010) is attributed to
Hanuman Prasad Poddar (p xxii).
The translators also observe that “the
[grammatical] patterns are fairly regu-
lar.” However, it should be mentioned
that this regularity may well be a feature
imposed by the later Gita Press editors.
The earliest version of the Gita Press text
was edited primarily by Nand Dulare
Vajpeyi (Bajpai) (Lal 1992: 4473; Mishra
1962: 17; Gupta 1996: 7; Singh 1974: 49).
Vajpeyi, the editor of the Nāgarī Praćāriṇī
Sabhā’s Sūrsāgar, worked in Gorakhpur
on the Mānas project for two years. His
name, however, does not appear on the
editions where the owner of Gita Press,
Hanuman Prasad Poddar is presented as
the editor. The published Gita Press text
has been criticised for its imposed ar-
chaisms, such as using “-u” as masculine
singular nominal/accusative ending, so
much so that a critique sarcastically
referred to the “editor” as “Hanumānu
vol lIX no 7
BOOK REVIEW
Prasādujī Poddaru” (Singh 1974: 53).
However, these archaisms were defended
by Vishvanath Prasad Mishra (1962: 20–
22; Singh 1974: 53–54). Another target of
criticism is that the standardisation of
the text was done to a high level (Pandey
1989: 142–43; Mishra 1996: 25).
A shortcoming for philology is, even-
tually, help for the student. Snell and
Tiwari produce a clear, accessible gram-
mar. As for the unfamiliar vocabulary,
the reader is helped by two excellent
glossaries, one of the technical terms
and the other of Avadhi words.
In Conclusion
Every chapter contains both familiar
and new information and the book is
a delight to read. Different ages have
accessed Tulsi’s masterpiece differently
pointing to and sometimes exaggerating
its merits and demerits. Reading the
Rāmcaritmānas is a successful attempt
to bring the literary merits of this classic
close to the modern reader.
Imre Bangha (imre.bangha@ames.ox.ac.uk)
teaches Hindi at the University of Oxford.
References
Bryant, K (1992): Poems To The God–child: Struc-
tures and Strategies in the Poetry of Surdas,
University of California Press.
Fairbanks, Constance E (1992): “Hindi Stress from
the Poet’s Perspective,” Dimensions of Sociolin-
guistics in South Asia: Papers in Memory of Gerald
B Kelley, Edward C Dimock, Braj B Kachru and
BhKrishnamurti (eds), New Delhi: Oxford &
IBH Pub, pp 297–314.
Gupta, Mata Prasad, ed (1996): “SrīRāmćaritmānas:
PrāćīnPratiyoṁ Kī Sahāytā Se NirdhāritPāṭh
Aur PāṭhāntarYukt Allahabad: Hindustānī
Ekeḍemī.”
Lal, Mohan (ed) (1992): Encyclopaedia of Indian Lit-
erature, New Delhi: Sahitya Akademi.
Lorenzen, David N (2012): “Religious Identity of
Gorakhnath and Kabir, Hindus, Muslims, Yogis
and Sants,” Yogi Heroes and Poets: Histories and
Legends of the Naths, David N Lorenzen and
Adrian Munoz (eds), Dev Publishers, pp 19–49.
Mishra, Vishvanath Prasad (ed) (1962): Rāmćarit-
mānas, Varanasi: Kāśīrāj.
Nagasaki, Hiroko (ed) (2012): Indian and Persian
Prosody and Recitation, Delhi: Saujanya
Publications.
Pandey, Sudhakar (1989): “Pariśiṣṭ,” Mānas
Anuśīlan (by Shambhu Narayan Chaube), edited
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Singh, Kanhaiya (1974): “Rāmćaritmānas Kī
PāṭhSamasyā,” Tulsī: Sandarbh Aur Dr̥ Ṣṭi,
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Maisonneuve.
35
The Humanisation of Hazards
New Configurations and Rethinking
Disaster Studies
Lavanya Shanbhogue Arvind
D
isaster Studies: Exploring Intersec-
tionalities in Disaster Discourse
edited by Janki Andharia is an
important collection of scholarly contem-
plations and theorisations that posits
humanitarian questions about various
hazards that place human life in danger.
The book is thematically divided into
three large areas of inquiry. In “Disaster
Studies: Concepts, Contestations and
Research,” the focus is on how, over the
years, the disciplinary boundaries of
disaster management have undergone
changes. This, the authors argue, has a
profound impact on both research and
praxis. The papers collated under “Dis-
aster Studies: Intersectionality between
Policy and Practice” critically urge
disaster practitioners to bridge the
gaps between theory and praxis in such
a way that they inform policy and
ensure accountability to at-risk popula-
tions. The “Making of a Disaster” is a
diverse set of articulations on a range of
issues—cascading vulnerabilities, dis-
aster justice, questions of mining and
development as well as armed confl ict
in fragile geographies.
The book traverses the conceptual ter-
rains of disaster research through a deep
analysis of systems to classify disasters.
Andharia’s introductory papers suggest
that disciplinary boundaries may be
porous and permeable. How and in what
ways can we include more and more
conceptualisations of disasters? What is
hoped to be achieved by referring to
certain situations as a “disaster”? These
are some of the questions the book criti-
cally engages with, early on. Shubhda
Arora’s chapter makes a case for being
cognisant of subjective and experiential
aspects of disasters. Through her ethno-
graphic study of Leh’s flash floods, she
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
book reviewS
Disaster Studies: Exploring Intersectionalities
in Disaster Discourse edited by Janki Andharia,
Springer Nature, 2020; pp 462, €139.
argues that post-disaster experiences are
influenced by sociocultural processes and
that “certain memories allow for hope.”
Contrasted against this humanistic
approach to disasters is the conventional
idea of “management” of disasters that
represents the notion of enhancing effi-
ciency through control. Keeping in mind
critical scholarship on both managerialism
and neo-liberalism, the book critically
reflects on the differences between dis-
aster studies and disaster management
while engaging with the disciplinary
intersections between humanitarianism,
disaster management and conflict stud-
ies. As disasters around the world dev-
astate human societies and ecosystems,
debilitating lives, livelihoods, economy,
and bio-environments, sentient life
looks to external and dynamic systems
of institutional governance to restore
the elusive, yet coveted, normality. What
then are the challenges and dilemmas
that riddle humanitarianism in the
contemporary era?
The book reminds us that over the
years, disasters bring about social and
political disintegration, even the collapse
of civilisations. In the aftermath, the
human experience is plagued by trauma,
injury and pain, and the book rightly
reiterates that hazards cannot be inter-
rogated in isolation without “the life-
worlds of all manner of people who exist
in a chaotic relationship of loving, sup-
porting, managing, restoring, surviving,
coping, resisting and tolerating” (p v).
That disasters are embedded in social
vol lIX no 7
order is a strong thrust area of the book.
To broaden the theoretical base for disas-
ter studies, the chapter by Daniel P Aldrich
recommends comparative work to draw
from “strong parallels across space and
time” to analyse disasters, and there-
fore arrive upon newer configurations
for response. To narrow the divide
between academic engagement and
praxis, Krishna S Vatsa endorses active
research support using a multidiscipli-
nary approach. He argues that institution-
alising research in higher educational
spaces would facilitate knowledge-shar-
ing across disciplines.
Intersectionality is a key theme of
inquiry. The book critically engages
with the hierarchical dominant social
order in various human societies; it rec-
ognises that power structures amplify
vulnerabilities while contributing to
newer forms of social marginalisation.
The contexts of conflict and ethnic strife
are a pronounced area of inquiry. The
thematic focus on intersectionalities in
disaster discourse reconfigures disaster
studies through the lens of multidimen-
sional vulnerability. That the question
of race, ethnicity, indigeneity, gender,
class, sexuality, geography, age, disabil-
ity/ability, migration status, religion
must be posed alongside hazard consid-
erations is an important conceptualisa-
tion. Such lines of interrogation remain
woefully inadequate if not viewed with-
in the discourse of power, for social
marginalisation is concerned with dis-
enfranchisement and dispossession—a
situation of powerlessness.
Conflicts and Disasters:
Issues and Challenges
True to its commitment to humanising
hazards, the book ventures into the
murky terrains of conflict and its distress-
ing impacts on human life. The authors
argue that conflicts drive 80% of all
humanitarian needs as they cause dis-
placement, migration, trauma and large-
scale loss across several social and eco-
nomic dimensions. Several chapters are
dedicated to violence and the resulting
skirmishes on account of conflict in frag-
ile sociopolitical geographies.
31
BOOK REVIEW
Sanjeevini Badigar Lokhande’s chapter
argues that often political parlance places
communal violence on par with natural
disasters. The author analyses how, dur-
ing the 2002 Godhra riots in Gujarat,
the then chief minister Narendra Modi
“appealed to the victimisation of Gujarat
citing cases of natural calamities along-
side the instances of communal violence
implying that the violence, like the earth-
quake, were outside of state control.”
Lokhande contends that such comparisons
depoliticise communal violence and that
the state seeks to be absolved of its
responsibility to law and order. Such
thoughts require resistance.
In the chapter linking mining-led deve-
lopment in mineral-rich Chhattisgarh,
author Goldy M George scrutinises how
Maoist militancy and governmental crack-
downs of such belligerency exploit the
indigenous Adivasi communities and bring
about displacement and political turmoil
in the region. George traces the origins
of the conflict to the planned mining
activities undertaken by the state in
independent India, and analyses social-
ecological and social impact. He states that
it is difficult to accept the hypothesis
that mining benefited the local commu-
nities; instead, he argues that it created
a context for resistance by Dalit and Adi-
vasi communities in the region bringing
about their fragility.
Other conflict-ridden regions and state
strategies in areas such as Nagaland and
Kashmir lend insights into the grievous
nature of geographies that have a long
history of insurgency and militarisation
of civil society. Nishit Dholabai’s contri-
bution on Nagaland in the context of the
conflict between Bodos and Bengali-
speaking Muslims in Assam and be-
tween Bodos and Adivasis raises perti-
nent questions about the development
and political strategies of the centre.
The author argues that a flawed devel-
opment strategy that places a premium
on security conditions rather than people’s
welfare results in amplified vulnerabil-
ities such as increases in HIV preva-
lence and conflict-inflicted psychological
trauma. The operation of the Armed
Forces (Special Powers) Act in both
Nagaland and Kashmir and people’s
resistance to state power raise the
32
question of “authority of the authority,”
as argued by Tim O’ Riordan in the
foreword of the book.
Saima Farhad’s paper on Kashmir is a
powerful scholarly probe into how the
Kashmiris experience decades of militari-
sation as a disaster and the intractability
of the conflict emerges as a greater dis-
aster. Going beyond the Indian context,
the chapter by P Jayaprakash provides
an insight into the military colonisation
of 70% of the Northern Province of Sri
Lanka, raising important questions on
conflict and disaster justice.
The book’s thematic turn into conflict
experience and its theoretical reconfigu-
ration of civil society’s encounters with
conflict as a valid disaster experience
contribute evocatively to the disaster
discourse.
Gender as a Critical Area of Inquiry
Jamie Weare demonstrates how the
pre-existing and gendered nature of
vulnerabilities is exacerbated in disaster
contexts owing to pre-established sys-
tems of oppression. Drawing from dis-
aster experiences of women from the
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004), Hurricane
Katrina (2005), and Haiti earthquake
(2010), Weare determines that women
encountered poor reproductive health out-
comes, had limited access to resources,
and that gender-based violence increased
during such disasters. The chapter
provides an insightful commentary on
how these findings can meaningfully
inform policy.
There are other chapters that scrutinise
vulnerabilities on account of gender.
Fernandez, Das and Andharia’s chapter
uncovers important linkages between
food security and gender inequality in
disaster-prone areas. The tribal area of
Attapady in Kerala and the ecologically
sensitive Sundarbans in West Bengal
have been studied as food-insecure geog-
raphies in disaster contexts. Environ-
mental and anthropogenic stressors
have been identified. The chapter suggests
that local capacities, resources and in-
stitutional mechanisms must work to-
gether to combat food insecurity.
Thiruppugazh’s inquiry into post-dis-
aster reconstruction examines the chal-
lenges of realising normative goals of
february 17, 2024
including women and girls to participate
in such reconstruction programmes.
Floods, cyclones and earthquakes ex-
tensively impact not only the built envi-
ronment but also developmental mile-
stones. Objectives of such reconstruction
may differ from resumption of normalcy
to dramatic changes in developmental
transformation. The chapter argues that
gender-inclusive and participatory poli-
cymaking will promote gender-sensitive
disaster risk reduction.
Policy Implications and
Other Unexplored Issues
Papers in the volume also engage with
governance mechanisms, policy responses
to disasters as well as the role of the
armed forces in humanitarian action.
Pradeep Chauhan’s paper on maritime
logistics in national and regional disaster
situations chalks out how naval forces
have responded to disasters such as the
Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). He, how-
ever, cautions that political and cultural
sensitivities of the region have to be fac-
tored in while responding to disasters.
Kalyan Rudra’s chapter on combating
flood erosion in the lower Gangetic plain
contends that human–ecology relations
have to be secure and linkages between
institutional and ecological issues require
delicate hydrological balance. However,
this cannot be achieved without question-
ing larger sociopolitical and socio-eco-
nomic progressions in the fragile region.
As disaster discourse navigates several
theoretical and conceptual terrains, the
idea of the resilience of people and com-
munities becomes stronger. That a sus-
tainable housing initiative in Meghalaya
builds disaster resilience is an important
input by author Harsha Sridhar. The
volume also engrosses on the subject of
resilience in low-income settlements in a
large metropolis such as Mumbai. Vikas
Lakhani and Andharia’s paper suggests
a methodology to measure and assess re-
silience across different dimensions while
taking into account different kinds of
severities, shocks, stresses and risks that
plague the community. Andharia’s chapter
on post-disaster redevelopment in Nicobar
Islands is a polemic commentary on the
one-size-fits-all approach to management
of disasters. The ethnic diversity and
vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

cultural pluralism in the region necessi-
tate culturally sensitive interventions.
Can contamination of a waterbody be
viewed as a disaster? Pushing the bounda-
ries of the study of slow on-set disasters
beyond drought, authors Ganesh, Yadav
and Seshan contextualise arsenic contami-
nation and the inadequate state response
in Assam and West Bengal as a slow
on-set disaster.
A notable articulation in the volume is
the interrogation of the Ebola epidemic
that author Alex Tsakiridis argues
“fractured the social fabric resulting in
violence and stigmatization.” The stig-
matisation of Ebola survivors in Sierra
Leone and Liberia raises germane queries
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
about whether disaster managers under-
stand epidemics—a question that is still
relevant in the COVID-19 era.
There are a few issues that do require
attention. It would have been rewarding
to see an analysis of other social vulner-
abilities and their encounters with disas-
ters. The question of disaster impacts on
caste-stratified communities, for instance,
would complete the humanising of haz-
ards, considering that intersectionality is
a key theme. One is also curious about
technological innovations in disaster
response and whether they mitigated
disaster impacts on vulnerable commu-
nities. A paper dedicated to such an ex-
ploration would have been worthwhile.
vol lIX no 7
BOOK REVIEW
This volume thus departs from the
regular hazard-vulnerability-risk-resilience
approaches of the normative disaster
discourse and critically interrogates the
nomenclatural dilemmas as well as the
disciplinary boundaries of disaster studies.
In doing so, it enhances the under-
standing and grounds conceptual articu-
lations of hazards, vulnerabilities and
risks. The volume contributes to critical
scholarship on multi-hazard environ-
ments and complex emergencies.
Lavanya Shanbhogue Arvind (lavanya.
arvind@tiss.edu) teaches at the Centre for
Disasters and Development, Jamsetji Tata
School of Disaster Studies, Tata Institute of
Social Sciences, Mumbai.
33
INSIGHT
On the Student Movement in
Barak Valley
The Role of the ACKHSA, 1983–94
Joyati Bhattacharya
Understanding the development
of a society and delving into
student activism at a particular
period requires an understanding
of the concept of student power.
But student activism is a complex
phenomenon, and there is no
single theoretical model that
describes it fully. Nevertheless,
the historical context may provide
an appropriate framework for
analysing a student movement.
Hence, this article will put forward
some general perspectives on
student activism in Barak Valley
in Assam and will try to
comprehend the role of the
ACKHSA in its initial decade
against the historical backdrop of
the origin of the movement.
The author acknowledges with gratitude the
contribution of the reviewer whose insightful
comments significantly helped in the process
of revising the article.
Joyati Bhattacharya (joyati09@gmail.com)
is with the Department of Political Science,
School of Social Sciences, Assam University,
Silchar.
36
S
tudent movements are always drivers
of societal change. Literature sug-
gests that there are numerous com-
plex attitudes and factors that motivate
students to engage in activism. The pri-
mary factor that incites student activism
with significant social impact is a crucial
political event or issue. The birth of the All
Cachar, Karimganj, Hailakandi Students
Association (ACKHSA) was also influenced
by political developments that preceded
in Assam. However, a non-political issue
served as the immediate catalyst for the
formation of this student organisation.
The ACKHSA was born to address the
challenges faced by students in Barak
Valley while pursuing higher education in
the Brahmaputra Valley during that time.
The organisation remained dedicated to
its objective until it was achieved.
Student Movement in Barak Valley
The historical context for the rise of the
student movement in Barak Valley dates
back to the colonial period when Barak
Valley was a part of Surma Valley. In 1874,
Assam was separated from the Bengal
Presidency and made a chief commis-
sioner’s province. Subsequently, Bengali-
dominated Sylhet and two other Bengali-
speaking districts, namely Cachar and
Goalpara, were also separated from
Bengal and attached to the new province
of Assam. The arrangement was made
to fill the revenue deficit of the newly
created province of Assam. “In Septem-
ber 1874, the authorities decided to in-
corporate the populous Bengali-speaking
district of Sylhet, which historically as
well as ethnically was an integral part of
Bengal” (Guha 1977: 22), with Assam to
make the province financially viable.
With Sylhet and Cachar, the Surma Valley
administrative division was created in
february 17, 2024
southern Assam in the late 19th century.
Cachar district was part of Surma Valley
until Sylhet separated from East Pakistan
in 1947. Later, Cachar district with the
remnants of the erstwhile Sylhet district
came to be known as Barak Valley in
south Assam.
At the time when Cachar and later
Sylhet district were separated from Bengal,
there was as such no school in Cachar
district.
In 1860–61, there was one unaided school,
which was attended by only 13 pupils.
Matters began improve slowly but progress
was made at a snail pace till the reforms initi-
ated by Sir George Campbell … Progress was
made since 1874–75. (Allen 1905: 145–46)
In Sylhet, on the contrary, education
was spreading at a fast pace.
Campbell’s reforms resulted in Sylhet doing
a lot better than the rest of Assam in terms
of primary education and between 1872
and 1874, there was a stark increase in the
number of primary schools and students.
(Chakraborty 1921)
Besides, a number of reputed higher edu-
cation institutions were established dur-
ing the period. It may be in order here to
mention the Sylhet Government Pilot
School (1836), Raja Jimi High School
(1886), MC College (1889), Sylhet Sanskrit
College (1902) and Agragami Government
Girls’ High School (1903).
In 1925, an English medium school was also
established in a village in Sylhet, although the
number of English medium school was very
few in number in Assam … There was only
one such school in Sunamganj subdivision of
Sylhet. (Chowdhury 1960: 151)
A number of newspapers like Shrihatta
Prakash (1875), Paridarshak (1875–80),
Srihattamihir (1889), and Shrihattabasi
(1895) were also published during the
time from Sylhet (Banglapedia 2021).
Thus, an intellectual awakening was in
the making to galvanise students to larger
social issues of concern in Surma Valley.
However, students have been mobi-
lised to the movement mainly during the
Swadeshi Movement. The Swadeshi and
boycott movements of Bengal and Sylhet
sent ripples across the Brahmaputra Valley.
As an offshoot of the boycott movement,
national schools sprang up all over Bengal
vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and the Surma Valley. The first Surma Valley
Political Conference, held on 11–12 August 1906
at Sylhet under the presidency of K K Chanda
was addressed by Bipin Chandra Pal. At a
students’ rally at Sylhet addressed by him on
16 August 1906, about forty school boys
declared their intention to quit government
school. (Guha 1977: 58)
In October 1907, the Sylhet National
School was established on voluntary do-
nations. A few more similar schools were
set up during this time at Habiganj,
Srimangal, Baniachung and Lakhai.
These institutions which were looked upon
by the official circles as the “hot bed of
seditions” … Teachers and students openly
took part in organising meetings, processions
and in picketing shops selling foreign goods.
Political leaflets and pamphlets like Swadin
Bharat and Bande Mataram were widely
and regularly circulated among the students
who were also required to commit to memory
the patriotic songs of Bankim Chandra’s
Anandamath. (Barpujari 1977: 188)
Thus, colonial rule did not precisely
witness student agitation in Surma Valley
as the number of schools and colleges
had been nominal till the end of the
colonial rule. Nonetheless, students had
been an important force in any agitation in
Surma Valley, be it the Non-cooperation,
Civil Disobedience Movement or move-
ment to reunite Sylhet and Cachar with
Bengal. There had also been a remark-
able expansion of education in Cachar
district during the period of British rule.
Between 1874 and 1882, a number of
government-aided primary, middle and
high schools were established in Silchar.
Few schools were established in rural
areas of Cachar district. In 1882, the
first girls’ school, known as Hindu Balika
Vidyalaya was established in Cachar
district. A retired Sanskrit teacher of
High Grammar School, Bharat Chandra
Bhattacharjee, made this maiden initia-
tive to popularise female education in
this part of Assam (Datta 1982: 7).
Rationale of the Study
An agitation that acquires the character of
an enduring struggle generally cannot be
discussed independently of the historical
context that preceded it. The politics of
the Surma Valley before independence
was focused on all-India issues and sep-
arating Sylhet and Cachar from Assam.
It may thus be presumed that student’s
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
participation in Surma Valley during the
colonial period was motivated by a sense
of patriotism and tied to nationalism.
The literature suggests that there was no
separate student organisation to galvanise
the youth to the agitation. After the parti-
tion, Surma Valley experienced a sudden
disruption of history. Sylhet joined East
Pakistan and Cachar district, later known
as Barak Valley, lost its brethren and was
marginalised overnight in Assam. Sub-
sequent decisions of the ruling govern-
ment in Assam and recurring attacks on
Bengali language and culture led to
repeated protests in Barak Valley, involv-
ing people from various backgrounds,
including students.
The first manifestation of the student unrest
in Barak Valley could be traced back to
1949–50 over the creation of Purbachal. The
youths of Barak Valley were divided primarily
into two groups on this issue. One group
identified itself as the protector of rights and
privileges of indigenous people against the
so-called aggression of the people coming
from East Pakistan. The second group stood
for establishing the constitutional rights of
the victims of partition. (Datta and Pradhan
1998: 180)
Later, students played an important role
in opposing the imposition of Assamese
as the official language in Barak Valley
leading to the death of 11 participants in
the Language Movement in 1961. By 21
May 1961, the death toll of the infamous
Silchar Railway Station firing rose to 11.
Of these 11 persons, two, namely Kamala
Bhattacharjee and Sachindra Paul were
students. Of the approximately 30 injured
persons admitted to Silchar Civil Hospital,
nine were students and they were minors.
(Bhattacharjee 1987: 134)
The students and teachers played a more
important role in 1972 when Assamese
language was made the medium of in-
struction at the college level.
The role of the Chatra Yuva Sangram Pari-
shad is worth mentioning in making the pro-
longed picketing (August 1972–February
1973) successful. (Bhattacharjee 1987: 184)
However, the issue of ongoing attacks on
the language and culture of the people
of Barak Valley was not addressed for-
mally until the founding of the ACKHSA.
The ACKHSA in the early 1980s emerged
as a powerful force and played a signifi-
cant role in bargaining a fair deal for
vol lIX no 7
INSIGHT
Barak Valley that led to the establish-
ment of a central university in Silchar.
Unfortunately, the role of ACKHSA in
ensuring the future of higher education
for the youth of Barak Valley is not fully
acknowledged. There is not enough liter-
ature apart from newspaper reports of the
time. The article aims to provide some
chronological details so that the readers
can comprehend the role of this student
body in the establishment of the central
university in Barak Valley in an appro-
priate historical context. In the absence
of sufficient literature available in the
public domain, only major incidents will
be focused upon.
For the article, newspaper archives
were visited and primary documents like
academic council proceedings, photo-
graphs and insights from people affiliated
with the movement were also taken into
account. Besides books, articles and
ACKHSA bulletins were consulted.
Historical Context
As discussed, the historical context for
the birth of the ACKHSA was quite propi-
tious in Barak Valley. This region had
been struggling to preserve its existence
and cultural identity since its amalga-
mation with Assam in 1874. With Sylhet’s
accession to East Pakistan, the yearning
for identity has strengthened.
Soon the people of Cachar/Barak Valley
realised that reunion with Bengal was not
a realistic option as geography becoming
the major obstacle after the partition of
Sylhet. Reconciling to live in Assam was
also not a practical proposition. This might
jeopardise the cultural identity of Bengalis.
(Bhattacharya 2023)
In the very first session of Assam Legisla-
tive Council on 5 November 1947, the
governor of Assam underlined the deep-
rooted division in the demography and
aversion to the Bengalis.
The natives of Assam are now masters of
their own house ... the Bengalee has no
longer the power, even if he (sic) had the will
to impose anything on the people of these
Hills and Valleys which constitute Assam.
The basis of such feelings against him as exist
is fear, but now there is no cause for fear.
(Chaudhuri 2007: 56)
Thus, the ground for the Assamese–
Bengali divide was set on the very eve of
independence, leading to anti-Bengali
riots in 1948, 1950, 1960, 1972, and 1980.
37
INSIGHT
The worst manifestation of the increas-
ing Assamese–Bengali divide was seen
during the language movement of 1961.
In less than a decade, the resolution of
the Academic Council of Gauhati Uni-
versity came as an outright attack on
Bengalis once again in 1972.
In partial modification of its earlier decision,
the Academic Council resolves: (i) Assamese
shall be the medium of instruction in all col-
leges under the jurisdiction of Gauhati Univer-
sity. (ii) English shall continue as a alterna-
tive medium of instruction till such time, not
exceeding ten years ... (iii) Students shall have
the option to answer either in Assamese
or English in the University Examination.
(iv) The above decision shall come into force
with effect from the session 1972–73 in
respect of two-year Pre-university Course
and from the session 1974–75 in respect of
two-year Degree Course. (Academic Counci
Proceedings 1972)
With the commencement of the anti-
foreigners’ agitation, commonly referred
to as the Bongal Kheda Andolan (Expel
Bengalis), the prospect of pursuing higher
education for the students of Barak Valley
in Gauhati and Dibrugarh Universities
has become a difficult choice and has
amounted to a matter of serious concern.
The atmosphere in both the existing univer-
sities of Assam, in Guwahati and Dibrugarh,
is so charged with anti-minority sentiment
that it is only a very brave minority community
student who dares to enrol for a post-gradu-
ate course in either of them. (Week 1984: 32)
Needless to say, the minority here were
referred to linguistic minority communi-
ties of Assam. In some such volatile socio-
political scenarios and against the back-
drop of a contentious historical legacy,
ACKHSA was born in Cachar.
Birth of All Cachar Students’
Association
In a mass convention in Silchar on
14 May 1983, Cachar Siksha Sangrakshan
Samiti opposed the circular (SEBA/AB/CU/
I/76/83/7379 dated 28 December 1982)
of the Secondary Education Board of
Assam (SEBA) and pledged to strengthen
the movement for a university in Cachar.
Spearheading the people’s ire against the
curriculum is Cachar Siksha Sangrakshan
Samity, a forum of the Valley’s teachers,
students and the guardians. It has threat-
ened to launch a “vigorous agitation” if the
controversial SEBA curriculum is not revoked.
(Telegraph 1983)
38
On 15 May 1983, the representatives of
student wings of various schools and
colleges of Cachar district met in a meet-
ing in A K Chand Law College in Silchar.
The meeting was convened jointly by
the leader of the Student Association of
A K Chand Law College, Pradip Dutta Roy,
and the general secretary of the Cachar
College Students’ Association, Partha
Ranjan Chakraborty. In the meeting, a
21-member committee was constituted to
unite students of Barak Valley irrespective
of party affiliations. In this endeavour,
the All Cachar Students Association (ACSA)
was born primarily to realise the long-
standing dream of a central university
in Cachar/Barak Valley. The ACSA so
formed later came to be known as ACKSA
and ACKHSA with the declaration of
Karimganj and Hailakandi as districts
on 1 July 1983 and 29 September 1989,
respectively.
Movement for the University
The emergence of ACSA in Cachar was
not taken quite easily by the members of
the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU).
In a news brief, the leaders of the AASU
negated the need of a university in Cachar
district as they believed that this would
further widen the divide between majority
and minority linguistic groups in Assam. To
counter the move by ACKHSA, AASU demanded
for the establishment of a central university
at the north bank of the river Brahmaputra.
(Sentinel 1983)
On 5 August 1983, the ACKHSA represent-
atives submitted one memorandum to
the then chief minister, Hiteswar Saikia,
underlining the need for the central
university in Barak Valley.
After discussion with student leaders, Saikia
admitted the need of a central university
and assured to take appropriate measures to
fulfil the demand. (Chakraborty 2000: 46)
A delegation of ACKHSA also met Mukut
Sarma, the then education minister of
Assam, on 12 August 1983, to impress
upon him that the students, teachers and
guardians of Barak Valley are deeply
concerned about the repetitive state of
affairs and the recurring directives/
circulars of SEBA and Gauhati University
and the establishment of a university in
Barak Valley is the only way forward to
save the future of students of this region.
ACKHSA delegates illustrated their point
february 17, 2024
by stating that in 1983, the pass percent-
age in the HSLC examination for stu-
dents appearing from Barak Valley was
only 11% as against 51% for the state as a
whole. The scenario was no less different
at the pre-university level. Besides, the
students of Barak Valley were allegedly
subjected to mental/physical harassment
in their pursuit of higher education in the
Brahmaputra Valley.
Against such incidents of reported dis-
crimination, ACKHSA lodged strong pro-
tests and sent separate telegrams to the
then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, the
then union home minister and the then
chief minister of Assam on 2 September
1983, urging them to act immediately to
restore normal academic ambience in
Gauhati and Dibrugarh Universities so
that the students of various linguistic mi-
nority communities, particularly Bengalis,
get enough safeguard to pursue their
studies without fear (ACKHSA Publication
2010: 9). On 22 September 1983, ACKHSA
charted out a long-drawn agitation to
achieve the goal of a university in Barak
Valley. To galvanise support from various
quarters, ACKHSA founder and president,
Pradip Dutta Roy, travelled to Calcutta
(now Kolkata). Around 20 members from
Silchar accompanied him. In a meeting
held at Hardinge Hostel, solidarity was
pledged to the student body’s agitation
by many eminent residents of Calcutta.
On 16 November, a similar resolution
was passed in a students’ meet in Pandu
in Guwahati (Dainik Sonar Cachar 1983).
Waiting for the response of the central
and state leadership, ACKHSA renewed its
movement for the central university on
22 September 1983. A “Demand Week”
was observed from 29 September to
5 October 1983 as per the decision of the
executive committee meeting held on
22 September 1983. Throughout the
week, students wore black badges, dis-
tributed leaflets, wrote their grievances
on the wall, organised meetings and
submitted memorandums to governments.
The “Demand Week” culminated in the
observance of a complete student strike on
5 October 1983. In the following year on
22 August 1984, this student organisation
organised a seminar in Cachar College.
The title of the seminar was, “Why
Central University for Barak Valley.”
vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Many prominent intellectuals of Barak
Valley of that time attended the confer-
ence (ACKHSA Publication 1994: 2–3). It
helped ACKHSA to stir up an intellectual
debate in the civil society on their
demand for the central university. In the
subsequent year, the ACKHSA strength-
ened its demand and met Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi along with a delegation
of All Assam Minority Students’ Union
(AAMSU) on 10 June 1985. The meeting
resulted in substantial success as the
Prime Minister declared in a public meet-
ing in Guwahati on 12 August 1985 that a
campus of North Eastern Hill University
(NEHU) would be set up in Cachar.
But the ACKHSA opposed the idea of
opening up a campus of NEHU mainly on
two grounds. The NEHU campus is no
substitute for the long-standing demand
of a central university. Besides, such a
decision will violate the NEHU Act, 1973,
which delimits the jurisdiction of the
university to Meghalaya, Mizoram, and
Nagaland. “In a bid to oppose the move
tooth and nail, the ACKHSA on 25 Novem-
ber 1985 gave a call to intensify the
agitation and a Jail Bharo (Fill the Jail)
Programme.” As part of the ACKHSA’s
“Jail Bharo” Programme, “over 6,000 stu-
dents courted arrest staging day long pick-
eting before the office of the Deputy
Commissioner yesterday” (Assam Tribune
1985). On 11 January 1986, the ACKHSA
delegation met the then chief minister
of Assam, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta and
submitted a memorandum to the central
government through him. On 9 January
1986, the ACKHSA executive committee
resolved to give an ultimatum to the
Prime Minister with a deadline of 15 days
to take decisive action on their demands.
On the expiry of the deadline of 26 Janu-
ary 1986, the members of the student
body met at Gandhibag on 27 January
1986 and decided to block all means
of transportation, including road, rail
and air. The Press Trust of India (PTI)
reported that
the inter-district and inter-state traffic in
Assam’s Cachar and Karimganj districts
were totally crippled due to Rasta Roko agi-
tation called by the “All Cachar-Karimganj
Student Association” to press its three year-
old demand for establishing a central uni-
versity in either of the three Bengali speaking
districts of Barak Valley. With the ACKSA
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
volunteers forming human barricades on
the vantage road crossing in the districts,
the movement of traffic of the neighbouring
Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya and Manipur
was stalled. Officials said the State Trans-
port buses of Assam, Mizoram, Tripura did
not ply in both the districts. Though the In-
dian Airline operated its flights, the passen-
gers were left stranded at Kumbhirgram
airport … City buses did not ply. (ACKHSA
Publication 2010: 22)
Meanwhile, the ACKHSA’s agitation
entered a crucial phase with the declara-
tion of the controversial SEBA Circular of
28 February 1986. The ACKHSA’s relent-
less agitation for the unconditional with-
drawal of the circular reached its culmi-
nation on 21 July 1986 when police fired
at peaceful agitators, which led to the
death of Jaganmoy Deb and Dibyendu
Das. On 22 July 1986, the ACKHSA gave
a call for people’s curfew. On the same
day, 15 ACKHSA workers were arrested
on charges of planting a bomb around
Kumbhirgram airport. But two days
later, a bomb squad members revealed
that the purported bomb threats were
fake (ACKHSA Publication 1994: 38–39).
The controversial SEBA circular was
withdrawn on 15 August 1986. It was a
partial victory for the ACKHSA, other
student bodies, civil society forums and
the people of Barak Valley per se. But the
road to the central university was still
quite far away. In a letter dated 23 May
1993 addressed to the Prime Minister, an
ultimatum was given that the ACKHSA
would be forced to renew its agitation if
the “foundation stone” was not laid on
the land at Dargakona for the construction
of a building for the university within
one month. On 2 July, the reply to this
letter from the Prime Minister’s Office was
received. Meanwhile, Hiteshwar Saikia
invited ACKHSA delegates to Dispur for
talks to resolve the stand-off centring on
the establishment of the university in
Barak Valley. The ACKHSA accepted the
invitation and met the chief minister in
Dispur on 7 July 1993 where the chief
minister informed the ACKHSA delegation
that the Prime Minister would soon visit
Silchar to lay the “foundation stone” of the
university (ACKHSA Publication 2010: 85).
Within a short time, P V Narasimha Rao,
the then Prime Minister, laid the “foun-
dation stone” of the Assam University at
vol lIX no 7
INSIGHT
Dargakona near Silchar and declared the
university open. The ACKHSA’s protracted
struggle came to a successful conclusion.
In Conclusion
The ACKHSA’s decade-long agitation for a
central university in Barak Valley is a
classic example of a student agitation
that successfully generated support from
every quarter of society from the edu-
cated middle class to the lower rungs
of the people. Unlike the AASU of the
Brahmaputra Valley, the ACKHSA had
been successful in achieving its goal
without aligning itself with the senti-
ment of Bengali nationalism.
The birth of the AASU can also be symbolised
as the cementing factor behind the growth
of the nationalistic movement based on the
identity, that is, the Assamese language, cul-
ture as well as an ethnic community. (Gogoi
and Dutta 2020)
Some such observations are incongruent
with the ACKHSA. The inception of the
ACKHSA was primarily prompted by the
challenges encountered by the students
of Barak Valley in their pursuit of higher
studies in the universities of Brahmaputra
Valley. It remained steadfast in its mission
until the establishment of the Assam
Central University in Silchar. In a con-
versation with the author, the founder
president of ACKHSA, Pradip Dutta Roy,
observed that since the establishment of
ACSA (later ACKHSA), the organisation’s
leaders have been committed to avoid-
ing any demographic division that could
hinder the movement’s prospect. The
initial body of ACSA was formed with
representatives from all communities in
Cachar district to prevent demographic
division, particularly communal polarisa-
tion. This inclusive representation con-
tinued in subsequent bodies within
ACKHSA. To involve people from every
walk of life, the first committee set
membership fees for students at a mere
25 paise. The purpose for fixing such a
meagre membership fee was to engage a
wide array of students and their guardi-
ans irrespective of caste, creed, religion
and community to the cause of the student
movement (Roy 2023). In order to pre-
vent a partisan split among students,
ACKHSA officials made a key decision
not to field candidates for campus
39
INSIGHT
elections immediately after the organi-
sation’s founding.
The organisation’s conveners, Pradip Dutta
Roy and Annisujamman Laskar, claimed in
a written statement that since the cause of
ACKHSA has been adopted by individuals
from all walks of life, they feel it would
be good to avoid power struggles that may
lead to discord among students. (Dainik
Gati 1983)
In fact, the leading student organisa-
tions of the then Barak Valley, such as
the National Students’ Union of India
(NSUI) and Students’ Federation of India
(SFI), pledged solidarity with ACKHSA’s
agitation for a central university (Aajkaal
1983). To avoid any distraction or politi-
cisation of the agitation, ACKHSA leaders
had taken the initiative to unite students
beyond Barak Valley.
A move to forge unity among youths and
student organisations in Assam, Tripura and
Mizoram has been initiated by the newly
formed All Cachar Students’ Association
(ACSA) ... The object is to organise a com-
bined and peaceful agitation to press for the
setting up of the central university in Cachar
... the proposed university would cater to the
needs of students of Tripura and Mizoram
as there was no university there at present.
(Assam Tribune 1983)
This dispassionate approach of ACKHSA
helped it to secure the support of AAMSU,
All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU) and the
people of Tripura in the accomplishment
of its goal amid stringent opposition
from the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP)
government in Assam. In fact, students
from diverse ideological affiliations sup-
ported the agitation and people from
every walk of life identified with the
aspiration of the movement. It would not
be an exaggeration to state that the
ACKHSA succeeded in bridging the social
divide to a certain extent. The leader-
ship of the educated middle class did
not keep the movement limited to the
elite classes. Historical circumstance,
sociopolitical developments and the eco-
nomic backwardness of the Barak Valley
paved the way for the birth of ACKHSA.
The movement was fructified because of
its effective leadership. Student move-
ments, on many occasions, have disrupted
academic life as happened in the case of
AASU’s agitation during the same time.
But the ACKHSA’s agitation yielded its
40
goal without leaving behind any scar or
unveiling any disruptive culture of student
activism in Barak Valley.
But such laurels to ACKHSA do not sug-
gest that there were no failures. The
most notable failure of the ACKHSA
movement was that it failed to sustain
the momentum it generated in the early
1980s and early 1990s. Once the central
university was established, this student
organisation seemed to have lost its
ground. This loss of influence may be
attributed to the fact that the success
of the ACKHSA was not solely its own
accomplishment. It was spearheading
the movement on an issue that had been
a concern for the residents of Barak
Valley much prior to the birth of the
ACKHSA. As a result, ACKHSA’s call for the
central university resonated quite easily
among a cross-section of people against
the backdrop of their long-standing
demand and the prevailing grim situa-
tion in the Brahmaputra Valley caused by
the anti-foreigner agitation. Nevertheless,
the leadership of the ACKHSA exhibited
the acumen to take up the right issue at
the right time.
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thi Debena ACKSHA, ACKSHA Abstains from
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vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Caste’s Quiet Role
Urban Transformation on Patna’s Periphery
Mukesh Kumar, Lalitha Kamath
The transformation of agricultural land in the periphery
of Patna into the high-value settlement of Rajeev Nagar
over 50 years is analysed to show how a coalition of the
four privileged Hindu upper castes acts to leverage
control over state and civic institutions in order to
informally occupy and develop land and achieve its
regularisation. Emerging from the Rajeev Nagar
experience, we argue that the upper castes are
advantaged in urbanisation processes through the
refashioning of caste as networks, relations and
knowledge. Caste and its social relations are crucial
in shaping urban transformation in exclusive and
selective ways.
The authors would like to express sincere appreciation and gratitude to
participants and other supporters in Rajeev Nagar and Patna for their
responses and help during the fieldwork. Special thanks are also due to
Anant Maringanti.
Mukesh Kumar (mukesh.click@gmail.com) and Lalitha Kamath (Lalitha.
kamath@tiss.edu) are with the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7
W
hile the Bihar Caste-based Survey (2023) has brought
discussions on caste to the forefront, these have
largely remained “enclosed” within the confines of
reservations and electoral politics. This paper follows others
(Maringanti and Kamath 2023) in arguing for widening the
study of caste’s influence to include that of urban transforma-
tion. We study the transformation of agricultural land of Digha
village in the periphery of Patna into the high-value settlement
of Rajeev Nagar over a period of 50 years to show how a coali-
tion of the four most privileged Hindu upper castes of Rajput,
Bhumihar, Kayastha, and Brahmin acts to leverage control
over state and civic institutions in order to informally occupy
and develop land and achieve its regularisation. Our inquiry
highlights the diverse mechanisms by which caste privilege is
being renewed and reproduced in processes of urbanisation.
We focus on studying how caste is a source of advantage for
the four upper castes in urban Bihar, rather than examining caste
as a source of discrimination, as is typically done (Deshpande
2013). This helps explain why the four most privileged Hindu
communities in the state comprise only 10.61% of its popula-
tion (Caste Survey 2023) and yet dominate so much of Bihar’s
public life (Dasgupta 2023). Following Mosse (2018), we trace the
persistence of caste in the modern age of the market to its advan-
tages, the opportunities for some castes that are inherent in its
discriminations for others. Sociological and political economy
studies have highlighted how land and the state have been im-
portant locales for the operation of power and the formation of
multiple relations of inequality, exclusion and dominance
(Brass 1992). But in recent decades, land and agriculture have
weakened as a basis for caste power, with upper-caste village
elites increasingly withdrawing from village economies and
politics and seeking/securing non-farm and urban employ-
ment. This has increased the salience of caste to opportunities
beyond village life: access to higher education, jobs or business
(Mosse 2018). However, the literature in urban studies insuffi-
ciently features caste.1 Mosse (2018: 427) suggests that the
deployment of caste as a resource or strategic network is not
easily seen as such because, “with the transition from honour
to opportunity, caste increases its invisibility.” This paper
seeks to contribute to the growing voices on the salience of
caste in urban life.
The paper brings a nuanced understanding of the centrality
of caste networks and relations from studies of sociology and
regional political economy to the recent research on the agrarian-
urban interface in South Asia. We build on Frankel and
41
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Rao’s (1989) and Witsoe’s (2014) approach of dynamically un-
derstanding caste identities as processes of social formation that
also shape state formation. They are constituted not just through
historical processes of (colonial) rule but also the agency of
caste-based networks and relations as they seek to protect/
enhance their interests. We also draw from research on how re-
gionally specific, organised, agrarian elites play an important role
in driving contemporary urbanisation (Gururani and Dasgupta
2018; Gururani 2019; Kennedy 2019; Balakrishnan and Gururani
2021; Upadhya and Rathod 2021) to help us trace the historically
informed modes by which the four Hindu upper castes of Rajput,
Bhumihar, Kayastha, and Brahmin dominate the processes of
urbanisation in a settlement on the periphery of Patna.
We argue in the paper that caste is being refashioned in
ways that offer upper-caste communities disproportionate
opportunities in urbanisation processes. Caste is being reworked
as private connections, networks and knowledge that operate
through seemingly secular, democratic institutions (courts, state
government, police), legitimised state practices (of law, policy)
and civil society actions (of protest, civic associationalism). We
show how the settlement of Rajeev Nagar which is dominated by
the four Hindu upper castes leverages state laws, schemes and
practices, and electoral politics on the one hand, and mobilises
a civic politics on the other, to enable Rajeev Nagar’s regularisa-
tion and valorisation. The new modalities of caste are supported
by caste violence that is also taking on new forms in urbanis-
ing peripheries—for instance, through enacting the threat of
demolitions, filing criminal cases and forcible possession of
land. Overall, caste and its social relations are crucial in shap-
ing urban expansion in exclusive and selective ways.
The paper is structured as follows. We begin by discussing
the nature and methodology on which this study is based. Sub-
sequently, we develop a historical political economy analysis
of Bihar, showing how a coalition of upper castes has formed
with linkages to land and state institutions, and are located in an
advantageous position to dominate contemporary urbanisation
processes. Further, the specific mechanisms by which the upper-
caste alliance drives urbanisation in peripheral Patna are dem-
onstrated through developing the case of one settlement over
50 years. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of such
caste-related, exclusive urbanisation processes.
Methodology
The paper is based on a year-long ethnographic study of
Rajeev Nagar (December 2018 to December 2019) conducted
by the first author who resided in the settlement during this
period. We employed multiple methodological strategies to
uncover different dimensions of urban transformation and
piece together the quiet role of caste in processes of urbanisa-
tion. First, to understand the long developmental trajectory
of Rajeev Nagar, we interviewed key informants such as
residents, landowners, brokers, community leaders, and
government officials. Through the life histories of older
residents, we traced the identity-based networks and rela-
tions that helped them move from rural areas to the capital
city, access educational and livelihood opportunities, and
42
form associations that played a crucial role in Rajeev
Nagar’s development.
Second, a spatial analysis of each lane of the settlement was
developed by detailed observation, noting the differentiation in
services between the better-serviced lanes occupied by upper
castes and later extensions with poorer quality of service occu-
pied by lower castes. Spending time in public spaces like tem-
ples, tea stalls, market areas and road junctions enabled the
study of wider cross-caste interactions and this was contrasted
with the lanes of particular communities that were marked by
particular caste relations and exclusion of certain groups, in-
cluding of the researcher. Third, we examined sites of civic pro-
tests and (shifting) political alignments among different (caste)
communities that marked them. This involved observing the dy-
namics of protests conducted by the upper caste–backward class
alliance (called the Sangharsh Samiti Morcha) as well as those
of only the backward classes once the alliance split, and inter-
viewing morcha members. Fourth, we conducted interviews
with local lawyers and reviewed legal cases, government re-
ports, court judgments and media reportage to understand the
legal history of Rajeev Nagar’s development and how and by
whom it was contested. Fifth, we did an electoral analysis that
involved observing electioneering activities in Rajeev Nagar and
talking to voters at polling booths to develop an understanding
of how and why people voted for the 2019 national elections
and how caste influenced these calculations. Key informants in-
cluded community leaders who were aspirants for municipal
and assembly elections, serving corporators and members of
the legislative assembly (MLAs), and media reporters. This helped
situate local political aspirations for regularisation within the
context of city- and national-level electoral politics.
Formation of an Upper-caste Alliance and Its Linkages to
Land and State
A historical political economy analysis of Bihar offers a com-
pelling explanation as to why a loose coalition of upper castes is
currently in an advantageous position to dominate urbanisa-
tion processes. Both colonial policies and postcolonial democratic
politics have shaped the formation of this alliance.
Bihar’s extremely unequal land relations were fundamentally
shaped by colonial policies and caste was central to colonial
governmentality (Witsoe 2014). Even prior to the advent of the
British, many large landlords among Hindus were from the
upper castes.2 The permanent settlement in Bihar, introduced
by the East India Company in 1793, further consolidated a
large landlord class from the upper castes even as it obliterated
the customary rights to land for tenant farmers (Appu 1996;
Dirks 2001; Pushpendra and Jha 2014).
British social policies also disproportionately benefited upper
caste groups as they were best placed to take advantage of new
opportunities in state institutions that came with migration to
urban centres, English education and new forms of urban em-
ployment. For example, the Kayasthas, a community that had
emerged as scribes for the Mughals, were the first to organise
themselves into a caste-based samaj (community) association
across Bihar, advocate for Bihar’s administrative separation
february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

from colonial Bengal and then take advantage of enhanced
opportunities in education and public service jobs after 1912
when the separation occurred. By establishing colleges and
hostels, caste-based associations channelled agricultural surplus
into white-collar government jobs (Witsoe 2014: 32).3
After independence, the upper castes further consolidated
their dominance through democratic politics. The core con-
stituency of the Congress party in Bihar was constituted pre-
dominantly by the upper-caste and landed gentry (Pushpendra
and Jha 2014) with 43% of Bihar MLAs coming from the Brahmin,
Bhumihar, Rajput, and Kayastha castes in 1962 (Frankel 1989).
Scholars concur that due to the upper castes dominating the
Congress, it was unsuccessful in abolishing the zamindari system
and transforming social relations.4 The greatest beneficiaries
of land reforms were the larger occupancy tenants—mostly
Bhumihars and Rajputs—as they accrued lands partitioned
and sold by zamindars (Frankel 1989). Additionally, develop-
ment plan outlays in the early decades of independence were
concentrated in power and irrigation and these benefited the
class of rich farmers (Frankel 1989). This revealed the influence
of the upper castes on state functioning and policy.
In the 1960s, the backward classes emerged as a challenge
to upper-caste dominance and Frankel (1989) argues that this
served to consolidate a new upper-caste formation to counter
this threat. The alliance was a multistranded one comprising the
Bhumihars and Rajputs with their landed base and the Kayasthas
and Brahmins with their capture of state bureaucracy, and the
judiciary. Their efforts to control state institutions and policies
assumed utmost importance due to the state’s political and arbi-
trating power that could protect or enhance socio-economic
and caste privileges (Frankel 1989; Balakrishnan 2019). The
backward classes in Bihar that comprised the most numerous
members of the upper caste peasant groups of Yadavs, Kurmis,
and Koeris contested this through agitations for reservations
in government.5 However, they were never able to coordinate
these efforts internally or align across castes or with other
“backward” Muslims (Frankel 1989).6 The Bihar bureaucracy
therefore remained upper-caste dominated.
By the 1970s, as the upper castes could no longer rely on
Brahminical ideology to preserve their position and their in-
fluence through the Congress party waned due to the party’s
inability to secure a majority, they sought new (urban) oppor-
tunities to cement their privilege. It is in this context that we
see the emergence of the settlement of Rajeev Nagar.
Urbanisation as Pathway: The Case of Rajeev Nagar
The making of Rajeev Nagar in Congress-led Bihar—sub-
version of a housing scheme and the cooperative housing
society: In 1974, the Congress-led state government that was
dominated by upper-caste elites issued an ordinance for forming
the Bihar State Housing Board, ostensibly to build housing for the
growing urban population. The board issued public notification
of housing schemes across the state, including in Digha village.
The collector of Patna district7 accordingly notified 1,034.94
acres of land in Digha village, belonging to approximately 1,1008
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7
SPECIAL ARTICLE
farmers of the backward classes of Yadav, Koeri, and Kurmi,
for acquisition and conversion to a public housing scheme in
March 1976. Digha’s acquisition was clearly a strategic choice.
Located in north-west Patna, it was eminently suitable for con-
version to urban land use as this was the only direction in
which the city could expand freely.9
Right from the beginning, caste power seemed central to
the board’s functioning. Frankel (1989) has described the rule
by ordinance that prevailed in the 1970s Bihar as a caste-based
struggle in which both the upper castes and the backward
classes sought to control the administration in order to ad-
vance family and group interests. The Housing Board is an in-
stance of this, we argue, given its power to notify land for
housing schemes. Despite being constituted via an ordinance
(it was only placed before the state legislature and ratified by
the passage of the Bihar State Housing Board Act in 1982), the
board went ahead and started collecting money from appli-
cants for the housing scheme10 but it did not compensate the
owners or actually take physical possession of the land. This
disadvantaged the backward class owners of the land, leaving
them unable to profit from land that no longer legally belonged
to them but for which they were not compensated.
The series of decisions subsequently taken by the state gov-
ernment and high court on this land helped form the settle-
ment that became Rajeev Nagar and through this process re-
vealed a pattern of systematic bias towards upper-caste elites.
In 1980, the state government exempted 4.30 acres of land be-
longing to R S Pandey, the son-in-law of the ex-chief minister
of Bihar and himself a member of the IAS,11 from land acquisi-
tion. The aggrieved farmers who had been dispossessed from
their lands filed civil appeals in 1983 contending that there
was no justification to release this 4.03 acres of land, and de-
manding invalidation of the entire land acquisition proceed-
ings.12 The high court dismissed the farmers’ petitions and
validated both the exemption of Pandey’s land from acquisi-
tion as well as the land acquisition proceedings.
Protesting farmers then took the matter to the Supreme
Court. They refuted the state government’s argument that the
Pandey family had erected a large building with boundary
walls on the premises, making it difficult to demolish the con-
struction by showing photographs that revealed that the Pandey
family’s land had no permanent building but only small huts.
Based on this, the Supreme Court annulled the exemption of
the Pandey family’s land, concluding that it was a violation of
Article 14 of the Constitution. It also ruled that the landowners
should get equitable compensation in the form of interest. The
state government, however, chose not to act on the Supreme
Court’s orders till 1994. This created a long period of state-
produced deregulation (Roy 2009), a purposeful suspension of
what rules applied to this land. It was upper-caste members
that were best placed to take advantage of this deregulation.
A conversation with a local property dealer suggested that
upper-caste elites close to the political regime used the networks,
capital and knowledge they had to informally purchase this
land and construct buildings at low rates, given the uncertainty
surrounding its future. The effective subversion of the public
43
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Map 1: Patna Municipal Corporation Areas and the Study Area (Rajeev Nagar)
Source: Drawn by authors with assistance from Bateswar Das for the GIS map.
housing scheme in Digha was achieved through the instrument
of the civic cooperative housing society (CHS). The dealer says,
See, I won’t tell you the names of who all own cooperative housing so-
cieties in Rajeev Nagar because they are ministers for the Government
of Bihar. A few of them had supported and formed the CHS in secret. ...
Cooperatives had started forming [in Rajeev Nagar] by 1978–79. Since
they [upper caste groups] were in power at that time, therefore, there
were no problems. — 25 May 2019
To promote the idea of CHSs under the existing Bihar Coopera-
tive Societies Act, 1935, the then state government waived the
stamp duty on land transactions for government employees if
they used a cooperative housing society letterhead for land
transactions. The property dealer suggested that upper castes
hit upon the idea of (mis)using the CHS to informally purchase
land with an eye to later seeking regularisation.
Caste practices and community relations were central to the
formation and operation of the CHS. CHS members typically
included family members, fellow villagers, community mem-
bers, and office colleagues belonging to the upper-caste alli-
ance. For instance, the Mithila Cooperative Housing Society
was registered in 1977 and listed 16 of its members as belonging
to the same Maithil Brahmin caste, while the remaining two
members belonged to upper castes from the Mithila region.
Other CHSs reveal a similar associational pattern.
Sitting ministers in the Government of Bihar were crucial in
enabling the upper castes to form and register CHSs. Once formed,
CHSs started buying Digha’s land from its landowners through the
power of attorney at the rate of `3,000 to `5,000 per katta.13 The
power of attorney is a legal document that transfers authority to
an agent (here, the CHS) to manage assets on behalf of an owner.14
Since the status of ownership was in doubt due to the delayed
acquisition by the Housing Board, the CHS and the power of at-
torney provided nominally legal means to enable land transfer.
Key informants mentioned that a total of 90 such CHSs were
formed and more than 600 acres of land were informally pur-
chased, made into plots, and sold to upper-caste members.
A local resident revealed how the office-bearers of the CHS
initially bought land only for its members’ use but later, realising
44
the huge demand for housing, started functioning like a “land
mafia” reaping huge profits from such sales. He shares,
Us samay sab jamin mafia mila aur cooperative banaya aur jamin kauri
ke bhav se liya; 3000, 4000, aur 5000/Rs. Katta ke hisab se jamin liya
cooperative aur usse bad mein bahut paisa kamaya. [At that time, land
settlers came together to form CHSs, and purchased Digha’s land at
a pittance—`3,000, `4,000, and `5,000 per katta. They made huge
profits later by selling them [to new society members.]—Resident,
Road no 16, 16 July 2019
Observation of the settlement during fieldwork revealed the
everyday practices through which the upper-caste CHSs coor-
dinated and cooperated with each other—for instance, swap-
ping land parcels to enable contiguous development and road
access. Within the CHS also, members collaborated to collec-
tively pool their capital and networks to purchase land at
scale, pressure landowners to sell, and plot layouts that closely
resembled formally planned ones. This did not mean that
there were no differences among upper-caste communities but
that they were able to come together and present a united
front to further their property interests.
By the mid-1980s, the settlement was being called Rajeev
Nagar, a strategic choice of name. In the early 1980s, both the
state and the union governments were ruled by the Congress
party, with the Prime Minister being Rajeev Gandhi. The alliance
of upper castes, many of whom were closely associated with
the Congress party, sought protection from demolition and
support for the development of the unauthorised settlement
through this naming process.15
By 1990, Rajeev Nagar had undergone significant develop-
ment (Map 1). Since it was well connected to transport infra-
structure, and not prone to flooding during the rains, it was
poised for tremendous growth in value. But in the early 1990s,
Rajeev Nagar’s expansion was curtailed due to changes in the
political regime in the state. This called for a shift in strategy
by the upper-caste groups.
The formation of a cross-caste civic coalition during the
period of backward class assertion: The Janata Dal led by Lalu
Prasad Yadav came to power in 1990, spurring a backward
february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

class assertion that challenged the upper-caste coalition in with the bhadralok bureaucrats. Such was upper-caste domi-
Rajeev Nagar. To adapt to this shifting political-economic con- nance that even 15 years of the Other Backward Classes (OBC)
text, members of the upper castes strategically formed a civic led RJD regime could not bring about institutional change and
coalition with the former landowners from the backward equalise socio-economic gains for OBCs (Mosse 2018). This is
classes because the latter formed a core part of the Janata Dal seen in Table 1 which reveals the disproportionate representa-
(subsequently Rashtriya Janata Dal [RJD]) vote bank and the tion of the four Hindu upper castes in the Bihar bureaucracy.
morcha needed the support of the ruling government. The
non-registered civic coalition was called the Rajeev Nagar Rajeev Nagar’s exceptional regularisation during the NDA
Sangharsh Samiti Morcha. rule: In 2005, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) consti-
The morcha was positioned as a cross-caste civic coalition tuted by the Janata Dal (United) and the Bharatiya Janata
that worked toward the development and regularisation of Party came to power in Bihar. Fieldwork has revealed that the
Rajeev Nagar.16 A local informant explained the mutual bene- four upper castes in Rajeev Nagar strongly support the BJP and
fits that could arise out of an alliance of uncertain landowners their politicians have reciprocated by using their special funds
and unauthorised residents as, for developmental works in Rajeev Nagar. Caste relations form
Humlog (original landowners and residents) jabardasti ek sath hai, a foundational part of this association, as conveyed in multiple
vaise humlog ek-dusare ke dushmanhai. Lekin koi upay nahi hai, ve ka- conversations such as this one.
henge ki ghar se humko koi matlab nahi hai aur hum kahenge ki jamin Sarkar mein bhi hum hi log hai, public bhi hum hi log hai [We are the
se koi matlab nahi hai? Humlog bant gaye, jo bhi ladte hai bhi khatam government and we are the public]—Office-bearer of the morcha,
ho jayega. Isiliye humlog ek dusre ke sath hai, hamara ghar bach jay aur 6 August 2019
apka jamin bach jay. [We (the original landowners and residents) are
compelled to collaborate. We are enemies in a way, but there is no way The High Court of Patna has also singled out Rajeev Nagar,
out. If they (original landowners) say that we do not care about our out of the many informal settlements in the city, for improve-
houses, and we (residents) say that we do not care about the land, then ment and regularisation after the NDA-led government came
we are divided, whoever fights, will be destroyed. That’s why we are to power. The high court in 2011 (on a petition filed in 1996)
with each other—we can save our homes and they can save save their
ordered state agencies to provide basic services and social
land.] (Chairman, CHS, 3 July 2019)
amenities to the residents of Rajeev Nagar.17
The morcha undertook a number of community rallies and Seeing their (caste) people as constituting the state made
protests, did media advocacy as well as filed PILs and made Rajeev Nagar’s residents confident about their ability to con-
applications in government offices. It thus combined the use of tinue to carry out unauthorised construction and achieve its
“civil” strategies employed by formal, middle-class residents regularisation. As proof of this, the rate of construction has
as well as protest modes associated with those inhabiting accelerated after 2005 and the population in the settlement
political society (Coelho et al 2013). has increased.18 Consequently, Rajeev Nagar’s electoral bar-
Despite a political regime that was unfavourable, the gaining position has strengthened and it has become a signifi-
upper-caste elite’s enduring association with different state cant vote bank for the BJP.
agencies helped to not only protect but also incrementally The upper castes within Rajeev Nagar could make their set-
consolidate Rajeev Nagar. A key informant of the neighbour- tlement’s regularisation a subject of political mobilisation by
hood described how, using their vote collectively and strategically. This was seen
Kucch judges ka aur in sab ke saga-sambandhee ka free hai. Ye log paisa-
when the MLA for Digha constituency, within which Rajeev
usa de ke, chahe jaise bhi ho, free karwaye hue hai. Jab ye log judge Nagar falls, included the regularisation of Rajeev Nagar as
the tbhi ye, ye sab 5-10 sal pahle hi free ho gya. Judge admihai, clear part of his election manifesto for the 2015 assembly elections.
kijayega to pura clear kardega. Kaun rokega inko. [some judges and Additionally, evidence from the parliamentary elections
their relatives regularised their homes by paying money, and using Table 1: Percentage of Caste and Their Representation in the Indian
whatever means necessary when they were judges in the Patna High Administrative Service (Bihar Cadre)
Court five to ten years earlier. They are judges. They took initiative to Caste Number in 2013 % in 2013 From Bihar Other State
“clear” their land (i e get it regularised) and this “cleared” up the land Kayastha 54 22.13 47 7
for regularisation by others. Who will stop them?]—Resident and Sec- Brahmin 60 24.59 38 22
retary, CHS Rajeev Nagar, 19 July 2019 Rajput 22 9.01 17 5
Bhumihar 7 2.86 6 1
During the period of the RJD’s rule, we see that the interests Scheduled Castes 25 10.24 8 17
of the upper-caste coalition were retarded but not substantially Scheduled Tribes 7 2.86 0 7
dented. Favourable judgments on the petitions filed by the Bania 15 6.14 4 11
Muslim 10 4.09 9 1
morcha could only be delayed during the tenure of the RJD.
Yadav 4 1.6 4 0
This was likely because the RJD regime only changed the political Kurmi 3 1.22 3 0
elites in the state while the bureaucracy and judiciary contin- Other backward 9 3.68 4 5
ued to be dominated by upper-caste–class sections of society. Others (Christian, Sikh, Jain) 7 2.86 0 7
Bandyopadhyay (2016) makes this same argument in the case Unidentified 21 8.60 0 0
Total 244 140 83
of West Bengal where even Scheduled Caste (SC) and Muslim Source: Modified from Table 2, p 85, Witsoe (2013). Witsoe obtained these numbers from
ministers could not change much as implementation rested IAS personnel lists followed by personal interviews with senior IAS officers.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 45
SPECIAL ARTICLE
(2009, 2014, and 2019) shows that the Kayastha BJP candidates
that had won had done so by relying on a coalition of Kayastha
and other upper-caste votes.19 Interactions with politicians, media
reporters and residents confirmed that national elections were
won here on (upper)-caste-based arithmetic that pushed par-
ticular upper community interests, such as regularisation.20
Electoral pressure from the upper-caste community combined
with broad support from state agencies for the regularisation
of Rajeev Nagar led to the state government enacting a new law,
the Digha Acquired Land Settlement Act, 2010 that cancelled
all allotments made by the Housing Board. This was followed
by enacting the Digha Land Acquisition Settlement Scheme
2014 to allow for the regularisation of Rajeev Nagar. Even in
this scheme, the state government singled out the upper-caste-
dominated Rajeev Nagar for regularisation. It left out the OBC-
dominated area in Rajeev Nagar’s interior that came under the
adjoining neighbourhood of Nepali Nagar even though this
land was part of the original land acquired from Digha village.
The act and scheme justified this differential treatment on
the grounds that Rajeev Nagar was an already constructed un-
authorised settlement while Nepali Nagar consisted largely of
vacant land with a few constructions. This dictated differen-
tial treatment for the two settlements. The board was to “make
settlement of land” with the 600 acres of land of Rajeev
Nagar21 on payment of specific fees. By contrast, it was to forcibly
take possession of the remaining 400 acres of OBC-dominated
Nepali Nagar.
In late 2018, demolitions had started in Nepali Nagar. Reveal-
ing the caste dynamics at play, the morcha disassociated itself
from the struggles of backward class residents for regularisation
of Nepali Nagar after the passage of the regularisation scheme.
Clearly, once the upper castes’ goal of regularisation for Rajeev
Nagar was achieved, their differences with the backward
classes—temporarily in abeyance—soon resurfaced.
From 2018 to 2019, more than 64 first information reports
(FIRs) have been lodged against unauthorised construction in
Rajeev Nagar by the Housing Board at Rajeev Nagar police sta-
tion. Scrutiny of these reveals that a majority have been filed
against non-upper caste groups, most of which belong to those
parts of the settlement that were developed later. In other
words, they seek to criminalise those backward classes who
sought to emulate upper caste informality.
Upcoming infrastructure projects further contribute to rais-
ing Rajeev Nagar’s development potential. A six-lane north-
south Patna expressway corridor that runs along the eastern
boundary of Rajeev Nagar was inaugurated in January 2021.
Named “Atal Path” in memory of former NDA Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, this connects with the ring road of Patna
called Ganga Driveway. Senior state functionaries (going up to
the chief minister of the state) have been involved in expediting
the project.22 One of the three underpasses along this 6.3 km
expressway is being constructed at Rajeev Nagar to enable ease
of access for its residents. The city’s metro route (Phase I) also
passes close to Rajeev Nagar’s western boundary. The advantage
of its strategic location along with the caste–class clout of its
residents has attracted a concentration of transport infrastructure
46
that has made Rajeev Nagar a prime real estate locality
today. In the last 35 years, its land values have risen from
`3,000– `3,500 to 7–8 million per katta.23
Overall, caste relations with political parties, the state gov-
ernment, the police, administration and judiciary have been vital
in enabling unauthorised construction of upper-caste occupants
but constrained similar actions of the backward classes.
Upper-caste Entrenchment and Its Implications
for Urbanisation
Caste identity and caste alliances have historically structured
the formation and functioning of the state. In Bihar, a multi-
stranded alliance of upper castes has always had an edge over
other caste groups because they had privileged access to state
institutions, public resources and protection through their his-
torically endowed caste networks and relations. This has
helped them to shape contemporary urbanisation in Bihar.
The paper focuses on the development of a particular neigh-
borhood in Patna, Rajeev Nagar, to reveal the mechanisms by
which the four most privileged communities use informal
urbanisation as a pathway to reinforce historical patterns of
dominance. These operate in seemingly secular and democratic
institutions (courts, state government, police) and through
legitimised practices of state (policies and laws) and civil society
(protest and associationalism).
The paper constitutes two important points of departure.
First, it highlights the tacit but enduring networks and relations
among the four most privileged Hindu upper castes in the
state, the Patna High Court and state government institutions.
These are used to suborn legal, developmental mechanisms,
such as housing and infrastructure policies/laws, and harness
electoral politics in their favour using civic associations and
civic activism. Such networks and flexible strategies greatly
enhance the ability of upper caste groups to dominate urbani-
sation processes even when larger political-economic regimes are
unfavourable. Second, the importance of reading caste as a form
of privilege for some, not only for land-based accumulation but
for how caste is being encashed into the modern form of urban
property through the capture of state, judicial and civic insti-
tutions. Overall, caste has been critical in shaping government
policies and their execution in ways that privilege pathways of
agrarian-urban diversification for upper caste groups.
We argue that the case of Rajeev Nagar must not be looked
at as an isolated instance. Rajeev Nagar illustrates the en-
trenching of upper-caste privilege in newer domains of urbani-
sation through the reworking of caste as networks, relations
and knowledge. These have been deployed to transform agrar-
ian land into prime urban real estate assets. Information on
caste-based landholding size and ownership patterns from the
Bihar Caste-based Survey (2023) have not been released as yet
but what little data exists reveals a disturbing picture of deep
caste-based inequality.24 This coupled with the dominance
of the upper castes in important positions within the state
bureaucracy and judiciary, makes the possibility of driving
urbanisation in uneven and exclusive ways, as witnessed in
Rajeev Nagar, extremely high.
february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

notes
1 There remain some significant exceptions to
this. See Maringanti and Kamath (2023) for a
listing of some of these.
2 These included Brahmins, Bhumihars, and
Rajputs and most high-caste households, in-
cluding Kayasthas, were small landlords and
rich peasants (Frankel 1989).
3 Despite constituting less than 2% of population,
Kayasthas and Brahmins made up over one-
third of the student body at Patna College until
the 1940s (Frankel 1989).
4 Bihar was the first state in the country to enact
zamindari abolition in 1950, and impose ceil-
ing limits on individual landholdings in 1961,
but did not implement these and several other
legislative reforms as such programmes were
regarded too radical for its core constituency
(Pushpendra and Jha 2014).
5 Bihar witnessed three important anti-reservation
agitations spanning the late 1970s to the 1990s.
6 This is in contrast to backward class mobilisa-
tion in Madras and Bombay Presidencies.
7 In July 1977, the State Ministry of Revenue and
Industry, after issuing notifications under Sec-
tions 6, 7 and 9 and after considering the
claims and objections, confirmed the acquisi-
tion. The compensation for the acquired land
was to be paid by the Bihar State Housing
Board through its own funds.
8 Interview, resident and CHS chairman, 3 July
2019.
9 Patna is surrounded on three sides by rivers—
the Ganga, Sone and Punpun—which means
that its growth is largely confined to the north-
western direction.
10 For higher income group (HIG) plots, applicants
deposited `3,100 and on receipt of this fee, the
board was supposed to allot plot numbers. Af-
ter allotment, applicants were to mandatorily
deposit 25% of the total cost of the plot size
(`21,063 for a HIG plot).
11 Chandra Bansi Singh and Ors ETC v State of Bihar
and Ors ETC. Date of Judgment 22/08/1984.
12 Civil appeal No 9973 of 1983; Appeals by Special
leave from the Judgment and Order dated 31st
January, 1983 of the Patna High Court in C W J
C Nos 2170, 3435, 3879, 3436 and 3561 of 1982.
13 One katta is equal to 0.0312 acre or 1,359
square feet.
14 Informal sale through power of attorney is a
fairly common process that has been docu-
mented in other regions (Upadhya and Rathod
2021; Kamath and Kotal 2023).
15 Interview with resident cum secretary to CHS,
Rajeev Nagar, 3 July 2019.
16 Interview, office bearer of The Morcha, 6 August
2019.
17 Patna High Court CWJC No 11662 of 1996
dt.22-06-2011.
18 Interview, Resident, Rajeev Nagar, Road No 22.
19 See https://www.newindianexpress.com/na-
tion/2019/may/15/lok-sabha-elections-2019-
kayastha-vs-kayastha-yadav-vs-yadav-in-pat-
na-seats-1977003.html.
20 Interview with resident, 14 April 2019; inter-
view with landowner in Digha, 1 July 2019;
interview with ex-ward councillor, 30 July 2019;
see also https://www.millenniumpost.in/na-
tion/bjps-priority-keep-upper-caste-votes-in-
tact-woo-obcs-dalits-420904?infinitescroll=1;
It is interesting to note that the solidarity
across Rajeev Nagar’s Forward Castes when
voting in national and state elections is in con-
trast to the pattern at the municipal level
where strong differences within the upper
caste alliance emerge as members of different
forward castes promote their own caste candi-
dates against other upper castes (Interview,
ex-ward councillor, 30 July 2019).
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
21 Approximately 600 acres of land were deline-
ated in sectors 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11 and 12 (that is, the
eastern side of Digha-Ashiana Road).
22 https://www.hindustantimes.com/patna/bihar-
work-on-digha-ghat-expressway-likely-to-be-
gin-in-january/story-eNA3JUUldaIcI2X-
tiuxc0N.html.
23 Interview, Rajeev Nagar resident, 4 April 2019.
24 Based on a household caste census in 2010 of
Jitwarpur village in Bihar, supplemented by
observations and discussions with key inform-
ants, Pushpendra (2014) analyses that the average
landholding size of general castes is the highest
(1.71 acres), followed by OBC-ll (1.02 acres),
OBC-l (0.62 acres), with SCs having the smallest
size of landholdings (0.32 acres). Based on an
older sample survey of 2,531 households con-
ducted in 1983, Kumar (2003) argues that
77.4% of upper-caste households owned land-
holdings of more than 10 acres, in contrast to
17.6% backward classes.
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47
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Hospital Network and Healthcare Access
Unequal Opportunity to Use Insurance
Shailender Kumar Hooda
The strategies for eliminating financial barriers to
medical care work well in an equitably distributed
healthcare system. The paper suggests that where
healthcare facilities are equally distributed, the benefits
of insurance are better utilised. But, more importantly, a
good public health system in itself is sufficient to
promote equitable access to healthcare. Further,
insurance does little to encourage and redirect private
healthcare providers to cover the critical gap in the
health facilities. The private hospital care providers are
located more in areas where (public and/or private)
facilities are already concentrated.
[Figure 1 accompanying this paper is available on the EPW website.]
Shailender Kumar Hooda (hoodask@isid.org.in) is with the Institute for
Studies in Industrial Development, New Delhi.
48
G
lobally, around half of the world’s population lacks access
to essential health services, therefore, each year, a large
number of households are being pushed into poverty due
to out-of-pocket expenses towards healthcare (WHO 2017). In
2016, India ranked 145th out of 195 countries in the “healthcare
access and quality” index (Global Burden of Disease Study 2016),
reflecting the vulnerability in accessing care within the country.
Among others, financial constraint is recognised as an important
barrier to access, even if services are available. This calls for a
strategy to reduce the heavy reliance on out-of-pocket expenses.
The World Health Report, 2010 argued that governments need
to strive to provide Universal Health Coverage (UHC) that can
ensure financial protection against the cost of care (WHO 2010).
Several countries have lately developed policy proposals to
pursue this goal (Coovadia and Friedman 2015). India, too,
constituted a High Level Expert Group on UHC in 2010, with
the mandate of developing a framework for providing accessi-
ble and affordable healthcare to all (HLEG 2011).
The debate and framework of UHC brought out some funda-
mental changes in the healthcare delivery system in many
countries. Its foundation is not laid on the mechanisms of health-
care delivery or the nature of the health system (Sengupta
2013), rather it argues how services are to be financed largely
through insurance (Rodin and Ferranti 2012). It argues in favour
of incorporating the private providers in a planned manner
(Kutzin 2012). It says that since the private sector already has a
significant presence in many developing countries, therefore
the key role of any government is to promote strategic purchasing
of services from the private hospitals/players promoted through
a fully or partially subsidised health insurance strategy (WHO
2013). While following this argument, the recent National Health
Policy (2017) of India argued that insurance would play a steward-
ship role in directing private investment in areas and services
in which currently we have no healthcare providers or have
very few (GoI 2017). This model therefore lays the foundation
for the systematic participation of private providers, promoted
through the insurance route in India as well, while ignoring the
importance of geographic distribution of services.
Studies, however, warn that the lack of physical proximity to
health services can pose significant access barriers (Zegeye et al
2014; Krishna and Ananthpur 2013; Kumar et al 2014). A good
health system in itself is sufficient to promote equitable access
to healthcare, while a poor system may make things worse by
imposing costs through out-of-pocket expenses without offer-
ing sufficiently good quality care (O’Donnell 2007). This paper
february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

therefore investigates whether inadequacy of health services
poses a barrier even if people are financially well-equipped or
protected through insurance. In India, several attempts have
been made to find the impact of insurance on healthcare access
(Prinja 2017; Hooda 2017). The role of physical proximity of
health facility, in the existing studies, has not been incorpo-
rated with financial protection strategy while examining the
impact on access indicators.
The paper specifically compares the nature of access in
healthcare-deficient areas with those living in highly sufficient
areas in India. It further probes into the pattern of access among
the insured people in those regions and the extra medical cost
burden incurred due to the distance. The study examines the
case of pro-poor government-funded health insurance schemes
(GFHIS) and assesses whether the non-availability of health
facilities leads to unequal benefits of the GFHIS. It begins with
providing evidence on the geographical distribution of public
and private healthcare providers, especially to assess their
role in filling critical gaps in health services and providing
care in deficient services areas.
Pro-poor Health Insurance
India witnessed the launching of national- and state-level pro-
poor GFHIs for achieving UHC over the last decade. Before the
launch of nationally representative Rashtriya Swasthya Bima
Yojana (RSBY 2008), Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh launched
pro-farmer (Yeshavini 2003) and pro-poor (Aarogyasri 2007)
schemes. Many states joined the RSBY with upgraded or own
version of the scheme. The union government launched the
Pradhan Mantri Jan Aarogya Yojana (PMJAY) under the ambit
of Ayushman Bharat in 2018 replacing the existing central
RSBY scheme.
In the recent past, India has witnessed around 33 GFHIs
across states (Hooda 2021). They largely provide financial protec-
tion on a defined category of procedures and treatments, and
beneficiaries are entitled to access medical care in accredited
private and public empanelled hospitals. Several states and
successive union governments have been competing in schemes
with high coverage (of population) and cover amount. The union
government increased per family cover amount from `30,000
under the RSBY to `5 lakh under the PMJAY. The amount varies
between `1 lakh and `3 lakh per family in states like Tamil
Nadu (`1 lakh), Karnataka (`1.5 lakh), Himachal Pradesh (`1.75
lakh), Maharashtra (`1.5– `2.5 lakh), Andhra Pradesh (`2
lakh), and Rajasthan (`3.30 lakh) (Hooda 2021). The competi-
tion in raising the coverage amount must attain its stated ob-
jectives, as it entails fiscal implications. Therefore, while ana-
lysing GFHIs’ impact on regions with deficient or concentrated
health facilities, the role of the insurance amount is assessed.
Data and Method
Due to the paucity of data, capturing the geographical distri-
bution of health services is relatively difficult. Information on
hospitals, hospital beds, doctors, and paramedical and non-
paramedical staff in the public and private sector is inadequate
and not readily available in one place. This compels us to explore
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7
SPECIAL ARTICLE
the data from diverse sources, ranging from hospitals empanelled
under the GFHIS and non-GFHIS networks, annual National
Health Profile (NHP) 2019 published by the Ministry of Health
and Family Welfare (MoHFW), Sixth Economic Census (SEC)
2016, and Census of India (2011).
First, a list of accredited empanelled hospitals, under the
national-level government insurance schemes (old and new)
and a state scheme (Bhamashah Swasthya Bima Yojana [BSBY]
Rajasthan), which had offered the highest cover amount before
the launch of the PMJAY, is compiled. The list, however, does
not provide details on the beds and doctors, which are critical
for service quality. The annual NHP (2019) provides data on:
the number of government hospitals and beds across rural–
urban areas; the number of beds in medical college hospitals,
Employees State Insurance (ESI) hospitals and dispensaries; and
the number of qualified doctors (registered with state or central
Medical Council of India), allopathic doctors in government
hospitals and doctors or specialist at primary health centres
(PHCs) and community health centres (CHCs). The NHP does not
provide information on the availability of doctors or bed strength
in the private sector, the distribution of human resources and
the spread of physical infrastructure across districts.
The unit-level records of SEC 2016 are used to capture
variabilities by extracting data at the three-digit National Indus-
trial Classification (NIC) codes that includes enterprises pursu-
ing hospital activities (NIC-861), medical and dental practice
(NIC-862) and other human health-related activities (NIC-869)
along with ownership pattern (public, private, corporate, for-
profit and not-for-profit) and the number of workers engaged.
Here, enterprises engaging in hospital or medical (NIC-861 and
862) activities are extracted separately and they are classified
based on the number of workers engaged. The large-sized
health enterprises (LSHEs) with the number of health workers 
5 workers are taken for a detailed analysis. Districts are classi-
fied as having low to high availability of LSHEs, to associate it
with access indicators. The SEC, however, captures the number
of workers; whether they are doctors, specialists, medical or
non-medical staff cannot be identified. It still gives a better in-
sight into the distribution of enterprises engaged in hospital
or medical activities at the state and district level.
The latest available Census 2011 has comprehensive data on
almost 21 variables relating to physical and human health in-
frastructure. Using this information for the public and private
sector1, the district-level Health Facility Index (HFI) is constructed
employing the principal component analysis (PCA). The HFI gives
an idea of the regional distribution of health facilities. The medical
practitioners with no degree, traditional practitioners and faith
healers, and facilities that provide only outpatient care and do
not have doctors were excluded from HFI, so as to assess its
relationship with access indicators.
On accessibility, the 72nd Domestic Tourism Expenditure
Survey Round of National Sample Survey (NSS) (GoI 2015) has
data on the purpose of travel from the place of residence, espe-
cially on whether a person seeks health or medical care treat-
ment within or outside the district or the state and also bears
the medical costs. This does not show whether the individual
49
SPECIAL ARTICLE

is covered under the GFHIs. However, the 75th Health Round or more doctors (GoI 2017–18). In addition, there are around
of NSS (GoI 2019a) provides information on whether a person is 0.227 beds per 1,000 population in the hospitals attached to the
hospitalised and has a coverage of GFHIs. This allows us to esti- medical colleges. After adding the ESI beds, the total bed tally
mate medical care access and expenditure among the insured and comes to around 0.79 beds per 1,000 population, which is sig-
uninsured and places from where services were received. The nificantly lower than the WHO recommended ratio of 5:1000.
rate of hospitalisation per lakh population (PLP) is used as a The PMJAY list of 13,055 hospitals in 2019 reveals around
proxy of access. These NSS rounds are used to assess differences 1.01 empanelled hospitals PLP in the country (Table 1). Over
in healthcare access and costs incurred in different regions. 60% of them were private. The hospitals were classified under
24 medical services. While information about these services can
Health Facility Network: Deficiency vs Concentration help people choose the right hospital in reality, only 36.25% of
An important aspect of a healthcare system is human resources them disclosed the details. Chhattisgarh, Gujarat, West Bengal,
and physical infrastructure. India had 11,54,686 qualified Himachal Pradesh and Tamil Nadu had a higher (than average)
allopathic doctors registered under the state and national number of empanelled hospitals PLP (Table 1) with a wide
medical councils in 2018 (GoI 2019a). This comes to around 0.89 variation across districts. Hospitals empanelled under the
doctors per 1,000 population, which is lower than the World RSBY in 2017 (with 4,926 private and 3,771 public) shows a high
Health Organization (WHO) recommended doctor to population concentration in a few districts. Similarly, in 2018, a list of 2,130
ratio of 1:1000. The ratio comes close to the “finishing line” after empanelled hospitals under Aarogyasri in undivided Andhra
including dental surgeons and AYUSH doctors. The availability Pradesh shows their high concentration in a few districts. This
of registered qualified doctors varies across states (Table 1). pattern repeats with the BSBY scheme, with a high concentra-
The average population served by the government allopathic tion of hospitals in Jaipur.
doctors was 10,926 persons (GOI 2019a). There is a high variation The Registry of Hospitals in Network of Insurance (ROHINI)
in the doctor to population ratio in the public health sector with has 21,288 empanelled hospitals, which turns out to be around
higher state averages in Delhi, West Bengal and Himachal 1.64 hospitals PLP with a high variation across states (Table 1).
Pradesh. Around 0.02 hospitals (25,778) and 0.55 hospital beds The number of hospitals PLP is higher than the average in
(7,13,986) per 1,000 population were available in the government Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Haryana, Punjab, Gujarat, Telangana,
sector in 2018–19, with a considerable variation across states. Delhi, West Bengal, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala.
Of the total government hospitals in the country, 17% were More than 59% of these hospitals were located only in 87
located in urban areas, while the share of beds in urban hospitals districts, largely in state capitals, along with one or more urban
was 62.8%. This was largely due to the inclusion of CHCs and districts. Hospitals are in fact concentrated in a few cities. The
PHCs under the hospital category. Many of these centres function existing health infrastructure, such as doctors, beds, and hospi-
without the required number of beds. The CHCs alone have more tals, were found to be positively associated with the per capita
than 80% shortage of all specialists (surgeons, obstetrics and net state domestic product (PCNSDP).
gynaecologists, physicians, and paediatricians) and over 74% The Census (2011) shows that facilities do vary widely across
of PHCs do not have a lady doctor. Only 9% of the CHCs have a districts in both public and private sectors (Figure 1, available
combination of all four specialists and only 4% of PHCs have four on the EPW website). The HFI value (ranges between >0 and 10)
Table 1: Variation in Health Human Resources and Infrastructure across States
No of India/ Mean Std Dev Min Max Coefficient Number of States (N) with Higher Than Average Mean Correlation
States Total (State’s of N of which, States with a Descending Value Coefficient with
(Average) Average) Variation log (PC NSDP)
Number of government hospitals (PTP) 36 0.020 0.034 0.035 0.005 0.163 1.009 13 HP, WB, KR, OD, RJ, AS, KL 0.035
1 Number of government hospital beds (PTP) 36 0.550 1.068 0.774 0.11 3.614 0.724 13 WB, HP, TN, KR, DL 0.450*
Number of beds per government hospital 36 27.70 58.28 80.10 10.17 417.3 1.374 8 DL, AP, MH, MP, TN 0.427*
Share of government hospitals located in 34 16.97 28.44 26.79 4.08 100 0.942 10 DL, MH, TN, MP 0.465*
urban area
Share of government beds located in 34 62.85 61.32 18.84 11.15 100 0.307 17 DL, MH, WB, RJ, AP, KR, MP, PJ, 0.329*
urban area OD, TL, UK
2 Number of beds in attached hospitals of 26 0.227 0.507 0.796 0.067 4.244 1.572 6 KR, KL, TN 0.283*
medical colleges (PTP)
3 Beds in ESI hospitals and dispensaries (PTP) 24 0.017 0.024 0.023 0.002 0.105 0.934 10 WB, DL,KR, KL, HR, TL, TN 0.320*
Total (1+2+3) number of beds (PTP) 36 0.794 1.450 1.186 0.178 6.27 0.817 13 WB, HP, KR, KL, TN, DL 0.428*
Qualified doctors registered with the state and 28 0.890 0.926 0.695 0.048 2.129 0.751 12 WB, TN, KR, AP, KL, PJ, MH, GJ, DL 0.461*
MCI up to 2018 (PTP)
Allopathic doctors in government hospitals (PTP) 36 0.090 0.206 0.157 0.026 0.741 0.761 13 DL, WB, HP 0.378*
Doctors/specialists at PHCs and CHCs (PTP) 35 0.024 0.038 0.024 0.001 0.096 0.630 12 HP, AS,AP, TN, KR, RJ -0.0434
Hospitals empanelled under ROHINI (PLP) 34 1.640 1.412 1.188 0.026 3.732 0.842 14 MH, TN, HR, PJ, GJ, TL, DL, WB, 0.552*
KR, AP, KL
Hospitals empanelled under AB-PMJAY (PLP) 32 1.006 1.673 2.005 0.003 9.585 1.198 8 CG, GJ, WB,HP, TN -0.098
NPC-NSDP 2017–18 at constant price (2011–12). PTP—per thousand population; PLP—per lakh population, CHC—community health centres, PC NSDP —per capita net state domestic product.
Source: Web portal of ROHINI, PMJAY and National Health Profile 2019.

50 february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

was less than two in 352 out of 624 dis- Figure 2: Association between Availability of Health Entities and Pattern of Medical Care
45 14
tricts and between two and four in 239

enterprises per patients visited for health/medical care

Large-size health enterprises (>=5 workers) per 1

Ranking of 560 districts by health workforce in large

districts. Only 33 districts had an index 40
12
value of more than four, reflecting the 35
concentration of health facilities per 10
30
10,000 population in a few districts.

lakh population
25 8
There has been a deficiency in health
facilities in many other districts across 20 6
the states. As per estimates, around 15
33.6% of rural population did not have 4
10
access to any formal health facility in
2
their village and around 22.87% of 5

villages did not have any public health 0 0

facility out of the existing 10 types of 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 320 360 400 440 480 520 560
facilities. The estimates suggest that in Ranking of 560 districts by health workforce in large enterprises per patients visited for health/medical care

places where there were fewer medical health/medical care

Use of health/medical carefrom
fromoutside
outsidestate
stateand
anddistrict
district(rate
(rateinin%)
%)
Large size health
Large-size healthenterprise (>=5
enterprises (>=5workers) perper
workers) 1,00,000
1,00,000population
population
facilities, the majority had to travel Expon. ((Use
Expon Use of health/medical
health/medicalcare
carefrom
fromoutside
outsidestate
stateand
anddistrict
district(rate
[rateinin%))
%])
more than 10 km to access healthcare. Expon. (Large-size
Expon (Large size health
healthenterprise
enterprises(>=5
[>=5workers)
workers]per
per1,00,000
1,00,000 population)
population)
As per the Sixth Economic Census Source: Estimates from SEC 2016 and NSS 72nd (2015); Expon indicates exponential trend lines.
(SEC) (GoI 2016), India had 9,83,018 health (hospitals, medical ownerships, such as corporate, for-profit and not-for-profit—
and dental care, and other health activities) enterprises in are found to be positively associated with the availability of
2013–14, with every third enterprise located in urban areas. public enterprises in a district, with a correlation coefficient
The enterprises in the hospitals and medical and dental practice value ranging from 0.072 to 0.297, with a 5% level of signifi-
categories accounted for around 5,96,928 units (54.54 PLP), of cance. Most of the large-sized charitable trusts or societies reg-
which 87,674 (8.011 PLP) had five or more health workers. They istered as health enterprises were located in 43 districts only
engaged 216.55 workers and 140.41 workers PLP, respectively (Hooda 2021).
(Table 2). These LSHEs can be potential collaborators under the
insurance network, in future. The ownership classification of Travelling for Accessing Care and Facility Network
LSHEs reveals only 25% of were government-owned. Proprie- The NSS 2015 data suggests that around 4,87,92,883 persons
tary enterprises dominate (with a 60% share) under the private (4.37% of the total population) in the country, that is around 14.4
ownership category. A similar picture of distribution emerges with per 100 households, made the overnight trip from their residents
the overall number of health workers and enterprises. Locational to seek health and medical care, in 2014–15 (Table 3, p 52).
analysis at the district level reveals that around half of LSHEs Over two-fifths of these had to travel either outside the domicile
were located in 25% of districts. Corporate entities, partnerships district or of the state. There is a considerable variation across
and NPI (non-profit) enterprises were concentrated in a very few states in the pattern of travel for accessing medical services. In
districts. The estimates suggest that more than two-thirds of some states, a large number of persons were able to get care
the LSHEs were located in less than half of the districts in the within the domicile areas, while it is not the case for others. Five
country. A majority of private enterprises were in districts where Indian states attracted over 50% of patients from states other
public facilities already existed in large numbers, which is similar than their own. Delhi attracted the highest number of patients
to the findings from the Census 2011 data reported earlier. The (14%), followed by Maharashtra (10.3%), Tamil Nadu (9.8%),
number of enterprises in the private sector—across different Gujarat (8.7%) and Uttar Pradesh NCR region (8.5%). Of the total
Table 2: Distribution and Location of Health Enterprises and Workforce patients who visited from other
% % % % LSHE More Than Half of More Than Correlation states, more than three-fourths
Distribution Distribution Distribution Distribution per Lakh LSHE Located in the Two-thirds of LSHE Coefficient
of Total of Workers of Total of LSHE Popula- District (Out of 561 Located in District with Large-
of them received care from two
Number of in LSHE Number tion Districts) (Out of 561 Districts) size (Public) to three neighbouring states
Workers in HE of HE ( %) (No) (%) (No) Enterprises
(Table 3). For the north, Delhi
Percentage Distribution of Health Enterprises and (No) Location of Large-size HE in No and % of Coefficient
Health Workers District (Per Lakh Population) Value
and NCR regions, for the south,
Government/PSU 24.06 30.13 13.86 25.18 2.018 22 125 36 204 1 Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Kerala
Proprietary 54.45 40.44 77.65 60.10 4.814 19 105 30 170 0.0862* and for the northeast, Assam
Partnership 4.14 5.99 0.94 2.83 0.227 9 51 17 94 0.1486* and West Bengal remained major
Company 3.01 4.81 0.38 1.56 0.125 4 23 9 50 0.2974* destinations for treatment. The
SHGs 0.50 0.71 0.14 0.35 0.028 4 22 8 45 0.0720*
NSS 2019 data shows that 25.9%
Cooperative 1.09 1.60 0.18 0.51 0.041 6 36 12 66 0.0973*
of rural patients received medi-
Non-profit institution 2.30 3.29 0.60 1.60 0.128 10 55 18 101 0.2659*
Others 10.45 13.04 6.25 7.86 0.629 23 127 37 207 0.0748*
cal care within their domicile
Total (PLP) 216.6 140.4 54.5 8.011 8.011 25 143 43 244 0.4918* areas, whereas the rest had to
Source: Estimates from SEC (2016). LSHE- Large-scale health enterprise. visit outside. A higher percentage
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 51
SPECIAL ARTICLE

of residents could manage care within the same district in the
states where rural health infrastructure is relatively better. Around
85.2% of urban patients received medical care from urban areas
of the districts they reside, though results vary across states.
The absence or low availability of health facilities in the
vicinity compels the majority of people to travel longer dis-
tances either outside the districts or states (Figure 2). This possi-
bility decreases when the health facilities, especially the LSHEs,
are available in large numbers.
A further quantification by classifying districts in decile (using
total workforce engaged in health enterprises per 1,000 popu-
lation; Q1 to Q10 indicates the level of low to the high available
facility) suggests a positive correlation between the number
of the health workforce and the distance travelled to access
medical facilities. When the total health workforce available in a
Table 3: Hospitalisation by Source of Destination—2014–15 and 2017–18
State
Total Number of
Patients Visited
Within Outside
for Medical Care
the District from District
(in No)
(%) (%)
district was high, the healthcare received within the districts in-
creased (Figure 3, p 53). Consequently, the use of services out-
side one’s districts or states also declines. The compositional
share of the use of healthcare facilities by individuals within
(district) versus outside (district and state) was around 48.8%
and 51.2%, respectively in the first decile, while it turned
70.7% and 29.2% in the tenth decile. The study found that sim-
ilar types of trends in medical care utilisation emerged across
quintile or decile constructed using LSHE and HFI. This indicates
that equitable distribution of health workforce and facility/
enterprises are important for access.
The importance of proximity of health facility holds true
even if the government extends financial benefits to the poor
through insurance. The results suggest that a large proportion
of GFHIS holders in districts where a number of LSHEs was low
Treatment Received Status 2014–15 (in %) 2017–18
Source of Destination of Treatment Received Rural Residents Urban Residents
Received Treatment Received Treatment
Outside If Visited Outside State for Treatment, Which State
from within District from within District
from State Do They Visit
(Rural) (Urban)
(%) (States from Which over Three-fourths Care Received, %)

Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) 5,69,717 52.41 39.14 8.44 PB (54.6), DL (32.5) 15.0 78.7
Himachal Pradesh (HP) 3,74,954 63.69 14.24 22.00 PB (54.9), CH (36.0) 17.6 74.7
Punjab (PB) 11,51,539 56.04 33.96 10.00 CH (39.4), HR (29.4) 11.9 81.6
Chandigarh (CH) 1,865 35.82 36.19 27.99 PB (69.7), UP (28.7) 9.6 82.8
Uttarakhand (UK) 3,54,694 35.71 51.50 12.80 UP(44.7), DL (44.6) 29.3 88.2
Haryana (HR) 10,10,970 59.41 23.88 16.23 RJ (40.4), DL (28.6) 24.5 79.8
Delhi (DL) 98,880 27.17 35.83 37.00 UP (60), TN/RJ/HR (5–7) 52.3 85.3
Rajasthan (RJ) 27,76,439 56.57 30.14 13.28 GJ (77), UP/DL/HR (6–7) 19.8 84.8
Uttar Pradesh (UP) 62,33,010 57.31 31.57 11.06 DL (49), MP/HR (11) 25.6 83.3
Bihar (BR) 42,87,074 47.84 43.77 8.12 UP (40.7), DL (29.1) 35.5 86.2
Sikkim (SK) 17,654 40.63 27.04 30.58 WB (85.8), DL (6.7) 11.1 87.2
Arunachal Pradesh (AR) 60,584 22.10 32.95 44.94 AS (92.6), WB (0.6) 49.8 78.2
Nagaland (NG) 44,534 62.17 26.34 11.50 AS (68.9), MN (19.7) 42.1 88.0
Manipur (MN) 93,381 37.35 54.25 8.40 AS (60.6), JK (17.9) 37.8 73.8
Mizoram (MZ) 38,006 46.89 41.59 11.52 AS (46.7), MG (25.2) 58.3 87.8
Tripura (TR) 2,25,591 44.99 31.01 24.00 AS (67.2), WB (16.8) 54.5 82.6
Meghalaya (MG) 92,671 48.37 30.44 21.20 AS (76.1), WB (8.9) 55.2 91.9
Assam (AS) 8,25,133 43.25 50.58 6.14 TN (61), KR (13), WB (10) 33.6 75.3
West Bengal (WB) 46,56,557 68.43 22.78 8.63 TN (40), KR/OD (15–16) 36.8 83.2
Jharkhand (JK) 14,58,078 51.11 33.85 15.04 BR (34.8), WB (34.0) 26.4 76.8
Odisha (OD) 22,76,563 69.79 25.57 4.64 AP (70.5), CG (10.0) 22.2 77.1
Chhattisgarh (CG) 7,09,932 62.76 32.33 4.91 OD (33), JK (23), AP (13) 37.9 82.8
Madhya Pradesh (MP) 28,81,778 51.13 34.52 14.35 MH (41), UP (23), RJ (14) 23.9 82.7
Gujarat (GJ) 17,23,358 70.36 28.91 0.73 MH (60.5), RJ (36.6) 21.8 92.7
Daman & Diu (DD) 15,438 43.04 3.55 53.40 GJ (70.9), RJ (20.0) 0.4 69.6
D & N Haveli (DN) 21,657 84.70 0.00 15.31 GJ (68.9), MH (31.1) 59.7 94.1
Maharashtra (MH) 39,48,818 72.36 24.50 2.98 UP (32), AP/GJ (13–14) 24.2 89.1
Andhra Pradesh (AP) 21,2,807 72.23 20.21 7.56 TN (60.6), KR (35.3) 13.5 85.1
Karnataka (KR) 25,76,998 55.92 34.21 9.87 MH (64), AP/KL (15–16) 17.2 88.3
Goa (GA) 64,266 76.48 16.11 7.41 KR (80.8), MH (19.2) 38.7 80.6
Lakshadweep (LD) 9,955 28.39 11.28 60.33 KL (98.6), KR (1.4) 60.5 60.8
Kerala (KL) 29,72,306 79.26 17.74 3.00 KR (46.8), TN (44.0) 39.9 86.5
Tamil Nadu (TN) 37,45,293 57.62 36.82 5.56 PY (47), KL (29), KR (18) 13.8 86.4
Puducherry (PY) 62,343 61.26 14.21 24.53 TN (74.8), AP (14.1) 21.2 84.0
A&N Islands (AN) 31,243 61.29 9.57 29.14 TN (64.7), KL (19.4) 68.6 75.5
Telangana (TL) 12,08,798 61.24 37.03 1.73 KR (48), TN/(MH (20) 7.4 84.7
India 4,87,92,883 60.75 30.64 8.53 DL (14), MH (10.3), TN (9.8), GJ (8.7), UP (8.5) 25.9 85.2
Source: Author’s estimates from NSS 72nd (2015) and NSS 75th (2019).

52 february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

travel beyond their residential place (Figure 4). Figure 3: Availability of Health Workforce and Location of Health/Medical Care Access
4 9
Around 23.2% of the poorest and 17.8% of the

medical and dental practice activities per 1,000 population

Utilisation of health/medical care out of total population (%)

Average of total health workforce enganging in hospital,

richest-classified using monthly per capita con- 3.5 8
sumption expenditure (MPCE), in rural areas 7
3
could receive medical care within their district,
6
if the presence of LSHE was lower in numbers 2.5
(Figure 4). The share of medical care accessed 5
2
from the same rural district reached to almost 4
double among the poorest (42.9%) and richest 1.5
3
(30.1%) GFHIs holders, where the availability
1
of LSHEs was high. In the case of urban areas, a 2
majority (over 85%) of urban insured (poor 0.5 1
and rich) were able to receive care within the
0 0
district, if the availability of LSHE was high.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Decile of total health workforce enganging in enterprises doing hospital, medical and dental practice activities
Healthcare Access: Role of Insurance Cover per 1,000 population
Percentage of population using health/medical care from within the district (in %)
Evidences on access, at the aggregate level, Percentage of population using health/medical care outside from the state and district
Average of total health workforce enganging in hospital, medical and dental practice
Average practice activities per 1,000 population
1000 population
suggest that GFHIS holders have a high rate PLP
Source: Designed using data from Figure 2.
of reporting for inpatient care than the hospi-
talisation rate (HR) of their uninsured counterparts. This trend Figure 4: Composition Share of Place of Hospitalisation by Level of
Available Health Entities
holds true across rural–urban residents and socio-economic 90 88.788.6 89.2
81.8 85.3
categories. The HR of insured persons from the general category 80
81.4

was significantly higher than that of the Scheduled Tribes. 70

61.1
Despite the higher need, the HR remained low among the poorest. 60
60.7

The richest have even much higher HR if they get insured. 50

42.9
(%)

Hospitalisation care among the poorest-Q1 GFHIs holders was 40

34.9
31.9
28.4 30.1
higher, about 8% than the poorest uninsured. The difference 30
23.2
28.5

in HR was more than 36% among the richest insured and 20 17.8

uninsured (Figure 5). Whether insurance guarantees equity in 10

access to health, is not clearly visible. The states present a 0

Overall Insured Overall Insured Overall Insured Overall Insured
wide variation in HR among GFHIs holders; it was less than half
Low
LowNo No.of
of LSHE (Q1) High No of LSHE (Q5) Low
LowNoNo.of
of LSHE (Q1) High No of LSHE (Q5)
of the national average in Uttarakhand, Assam and Bihar, LSHE (Q1) High No. of LSHE (Q5) LSHE (Q1) High No. of LSHE (Q5)

while more than double the average in Jammu and Kashmir, Rural residents: place of hospitalisation (same district - Urban residents: place of hospitalisation (same district -
rural) urban)
Tripura, Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Manipur, Maha- Poorest Richest
rashtra, Jharkhand and Sikkim. The classification of states by in- LSHE – availability of large-size health enterprises per lakh population in a district.
Source: Estimates from SEC (2016) and NSS 75th (2019).
surance (coverage) amount suggests that the HR of the in- Figure 5: Hospitalisation Rate by Insurance Status across Socio-economic
sured person living in states with a high coverage amount was Groups and Regions
Hospitalisation rate (HR) per 1 lakh population

7,000
significantly higher, with 5,028 patients PLP, while it was 4,141
6,000
in low coverage amount states. Differences in HR however can-
not be directly attributed to insurance amount, as the HR of high 5,000

insurance amount states at aggregate was also higher (4,702) 4,000

than (3,701) the rate of low coverage amount states (Figure 5). 3,000

2,000
Healthcare Access, Hospital Network and Insurance 1,000
The network of medical facilities plays a significant role in 0
Urban

OBCs

Others
Rural

SCc

NE-states
Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q5

STs

High (>1L)

UTs
Low (<1L)

All state

access to healthcare. The inpatient rate was higher in districts

(4,531 PLP) where the number of LSHEs was high as compared
to districts (3,756 patients) where the LSHE PLP was low. Differ- Sector Economic status Social status Coverage amount status Total
ences in HR between the insured and uninsured were high. It HR of GFHIs HR of uninsured HR (Total)
was about 20.9% in regions with a large number of LSHEs, as HR-Hospitalisation rate; GFHI – Government-funded health insurance.
Source: Estimates from NSS 75th (2019).
compared to 16.9% in regions with low facilities (Figure 6, p 54).
The poorest GFHIs holders received a 7.7% higher hospitalisation availability of LSHE. Such ifferences were higher among urban
rate than the uninsured in districts where the LSHE was high, than rural residents. In low insurance coverage amount states,
while the difference was 3.5% in districts where a low number of the rate of hospitalisation of insured persons was 23.3% higher
such facility existed. The HR among the richest GFHIs recorded than the uninsured in districts where the availability of LSHE
38.3% higher than their uninsured counterparts in high was high, while such difference was 14.2% in high insurance
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 53
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 6: Hospitalisation Rate by Availability of Facility Network and Insurance Status only 18.8% for the private sector (Q5). Similarly,
9,000 in high coverage amount states, such differ-
Rate of hospitalisation per lakh population

8,000 ence was higher (39.15%) if the LSHE was

7,000
available more in the public sector (Q5) as
6,000
against 34.8% difference in the private sector,
5,000
4,000
indicating whatever coverage amount a state/
3,000 country follows, health enterprises in the pub-
2,000 lic sector are always important.
1,000 In addition to the LSHE, the HR of insured
0 and uninsured was found positively associat-
LN of big ent (Pub-Q1)

LN of big ent (Pub-Q1)

LN of big ent (Pub-Q1)

LN of big ent (Pvt-Q1)

LN of big ent (Pvt-Q1)

LN of big ent (Pvt-Q1)

LN of big ent (T-Q1)
HN of big ent (T-Q5)

HN of big ent (Pub-Q5)

LN of big ent (T-Q1)

HN of big ent (Pvt-Q5)

HN of big ent (T-Q5)

HN of big ent (Pub-Q5)

LN of big ent (T-Q1)

HN of big ent (Pvt-Q5)

HN of big ent (T-Q5)

HN of big ent (Pub-Q5)

HN of big ent (Pvt-Q5)

LN of big ent
HN of big ent
LN of big ent
HN of big ent
LN of big ent
HN of big ent
LN of big ent
HN of big ent
LN of big ent
HN of big ent

LN of big ent
HN of big ent

LN of big ent
HN of big ent
ed with different types of available health
facilities (doctors, beds, and hospitals) at the
aggregate level. The share of urban hospitals
in a state turned out to be negative with the
HR of GFHIs, while it turns positive for rural
PoorestRichest Rural Urban Total Low insurance cover High insurance cover GFHIs holders. Unfortunately, the number of
HR of GFHIs HR of Uninsured HR (total) hospitals empanelment under ROHINI and
Due to unmatching district code, 84.4% NSS sample results are presented. LN/HN are low (lower than average
8.4 PLP) and high availability of LSHEs in a district. HR–Hospitalisation rate; GFHI–Government Funded Health PMJAY at the state level turned negative with
Insurance; LN–low number; HN–high number. inpatient rate, which may be because of the
Source: Merged data of NSS 75th (2019) and SEC (2016).
skewed distribution of hospitals PLP in the state.
coverage states, indicating the availability of health facilities is The HR of GFHI holders also turned positive with the HFI and
more important than offering high coverage amount. LSHEs both at the state- and district-level analysis (Table 4).
The classification of districts with lowest (Q1) and highest Scheme (RSBY) level data of 282 districts shows that the
(Q5) LSHEs reveals that the HR of insured (6,693) was 47.7% access to hospital care (hospitalisation ratio) increases with the
higher than the uninsured (4,465) in Q5 districts at the aggregate availability of empanelled hospitals. The hospitalisation ratio was
level (Figure 6). The difference was 65.5% in Q5 districts with almost 9.3 times high in districts where a number of healthcare
public sector LSHEs, while it was 40.8% for the private sector. In providers (per targeted person) were high. The ratio was 1.27% in
states with low insurance coverage amounts, the difference in districts where the average level of hospital empanelment was
the HR between the insured and uninsured was 31.4% in the between 0-5 hospitals, per lakh targeted families, while it
district where the public sector LSHE was high (Q5) and against increased to 11.83% in districts where the average hospital em-
Table 4: Correlation between Facility Network and Hospitalisation Rate of Insured and Uninsured panelment was more than 40 hospitals, per lakh
Correlation Coefficient with log of HR lnHR of lnHR of lnHR of GFHIs lnHR of lnHR of lnHR of targeted families (Figure 7, p 55).
GFHIs (Total) Uninsured (Rural) Uninsured GFHIs Uninsured Experience from the BSBY-Rajasthan also
(Total) (Rural) (Urban) (Urban)
suggests that the rate of hospitalisation in Jaipur
Total hospital (government)–PTP 0.1454* 0.1973* -0.0196 0.2359* 0.2472* 0.1341*
was significantly high, where the majority of
Share of urban hospitals– -0.0192 -0.051 0.2708* -0.2140* -0.1851* -0.0099
government empanelled hospitals are concentrated. A com-
Bed (government)–PTP 0.2494* 0.3339* 0.1706* 0.3066* 0.2411* 0.2510* positional distribution of all hospitalisation cases
Share of urban beds 0.0418 -0.026 0.3076* -0.1202* -0.2566* -0.0911 across the district reveals that Jaipur attracts a
(government) significantly higher (over one-fourth) number of
Beds in medical colleges 0.1253 0.1176 0.2933* 0.1519* 0.1427 0.0645
BSBY patients. The comparison of hospitalisation
attached hospitals–PTP
ESI beds–PTP 0.0495 0.3358* 0.0547 0.2268* 0.1782* 0.2964* cases between the two periods further indicates
Total beds–PTP 0.2316* 0.3128* 0.2127* 0.3085* 0.2325* 0.2361* that Jaipur is increasingly becoming a centre of
Allopathic doctors (regd with 0.3910* 0.4219* 0.1981* 0.4021* 0.4649* 0.4050* attraction for many BSBY patients over time
state/centre MCI–PTP (Figure 8, p 55). The administrative data of BSBY
Allopathic doctor 0.0366 0.027 0.1589* -0.0733 -0.0631 -0.0197 suggest that between the two points (2015–16 and
(government)–PTP
2017–18) share of hospitalisation care declined
Doctors/specialist at PHCs/ 0.1687* 0.1427* 0.0739 0.1791* 0.1435* 0.1156
CHCs–PTP in many districts, while increased significantly
All doctors–PTP 0.3394* 0.2722* 0.2015* 0.2372* 0.2565* 0.2703* in a few other districts, reflecting few districts are
ROHINI hospitals–PLP -0.0118 0.2193* -0.0734 0.1706* 0.1682* 0.2542* becoming the centre of attraction for receiving
AB-PMJAY hospitals–PLP -0.1468* -0.1828* -0.2138* -0.1694* -0.1713* -0.2279* treatment. A closer examination of Part 1 and
HFI (District) HFI (State) HFI Hospital Beds per LSHE (State) LSHE Part 2 of Figure 8 reflects that treatment received
and Beds Hospitals (District)
(District) (State) for hospitalisation care between two points in-
lnHR of GFHIs 0.4439* 0.1025* 0.4571* 0.1103 0.5277* 0.6487* creased more in districts where facilities are con-
lnHR of uninsured 0.1807* 0.0436* 0.2636* 0.2052* 0.1843* 0.4386* centrated. Such trends further indicate the
lnHR–log of Hospitalisation Rate; *–significance at 5 %; PTP–per thousand population; PLP–per lakh population;
GFHI–Government funded health insurance; HFI–Health facility index.
growing concentration of the hospital industry
Source: NSS 5th (2019), SEC (2016) and Table 1. in a few cities/districts rather than serving the
54 february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE
Figure 7: Coverage without Care—Unequal Opportunity to Use Insurance Figure 9: Facility Concentration and Cost of Care by Source of Destination
Relationship between Hospital Network and Access to Medical Care under RSBY 60,000

Mean hospitalisation cost (per visit/case)

>40 (50.99) 11.83 50,000
Empanelled hospitals under RSBY per 1,00,000
targeted families (range and average)

40,000
31–40 (34.58) 9.40
30,000
21–30 (24.75) 8.20
20,000

11–20 (13.87) 4.70 10,000

0
6–10 (7.54) 3.62
Overall LN of HN of LN of HN of LN of HN of LN of HN of low size High
big size big size big size big size big size big size big size big size ent size ent
0–5 (3.39) 1.27 ent ent ent ent ent ent ent ent

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 Total Insured (GFHI): Insured (GFHI) Uninsured Total (Tourism)

Net
Hospitalisation ratio under RSBY: N=282 districts
Source: RSBY raw data at districts level. Same district (from rural) Same district (from urban) Outside district (from rural)
Outside district (from urban) Outside state
Figure 8: Relationship between Hospital Network and Hospitalisation—
For GFHI, LN/HN see note of Figure 6; ent–enterprises
Rajasthan’s BSBY Experience
Source: Estimates from merged data of SEC (2016), NSS-75th (2019) and NSS-72nd (2015).
Hospitalisaiton rate and empanelled hospital—relationship
10 14,000

Rate of hospitalisaiton per 1lakh targeted population-2017–18

Figure 10: Association between Type of Health Facility and Medical Care Cost

Large size (>5 workers) private health enterprises per lakh

25 80,000
Empanelled hospital per 1lakh targeted population

12,000 lntotalmeancost = -0.04268*** large_pub_ent + 0.0221*** large_pvt_ent

8 (-3.58) (4.21)
(*** - significant at 1%, t-value in brackets) 70,000
10,000 20

Healthcare cost per cases (` )

60,000
6
8,000
15
50,000
population

6,000
4
10 40,000
4,000
30,000
2 5
2,000
20,000
0 0 0
10,000
Rajasamand

Jhalawar

Ganganagar
Jaisalmer
Pratapgarh

Sirohi

Hanumangarh
Barmer

Karauli

Bhilwara
Banswara

Chittorgarh

Churu

Rajasthan
Jalore

Baran
Bharatpur

Kota
Jhunjhunu

Sikar
Tonk
Jodhpur
Dholpur
Dungarpur

Udaipur

Ajmer
Bundi

Bikaner

Dausa
Alwar

Pali
Nagaur

Jaipur
Sawai madhopur

-5 0
19
37
55
73
91
109
127
145
163
181
199
217
235
253
271
289
307
325
343
361
379
397
415
433
451
469
487
505
523
541
559
1

Districts:
Districts: sortingsorting based
based on largeonsize
large size enterprises
private pvt ent
Empanel hospital
Empanel hospital Rateof
Rate of hospitalisaiton,
hospitalisaiton: 2017-18
2017–18
Linear (Rate of hospitalisaiton,
hospitalisaiton: 2017-18) larg_pvt_ent_lakhpop largentpubperlakhpop
Large public enterprises
Linear (rate of 2017–18
Linear (larg_pvt_ent_lakhpop) Large
Linearpublic enterprise per lakh population
(largentpubperlakhpop)
Distribution of hospitalisation cases across districts (%) Significant by 1%.
30 Source: Estimates from merged data of NSS 75th (2019) and SEC (2016).

25 cost was `22,403 for the services outside the state and `15,938
Composition distribution of hospitalisation cases (%)

for receiving services outside the district, as against the cost of

20 `9,766 within the residential district (from NSS 2015). Thus
moving out from the state doubles the medical expenses. Esti-
15
mates from NSS 2019 also show average per case hospitalisation
10 cost outside the state was `51,929 as against the cost of `13,765
within one’s own district. If rural residents receive care from a
5
rural area of the same district then the cost up to `7,184 is even
0 lower. High medical costs are because people incur indirect
expenses on travelling/transport and food lodging. Rural resi-
Hanumangarh
Chittorgarh
Banswara
Jalore

Rajasamand

Jhunjhunu
Baran

Jhalawar
Jaisalmer

Pratapgarh

Tonk
Sirohi
Bundi

Bikaner

Ajmer

Ganganagar
Alwar
Karauli

Barmer
Pali

Bhilwara
Nagaur
Churu

Jaipur
Sikar
Dungarpur

Bharatpur

Kota

Jodhpur
Dholpur

Sawai madhopur

Dausa

Udaipur

dents have to spend a higher share (14%) on travelling compared

2015–16
2015-16 2017–18
2017-18
Source: Health Department, Administrative raw data of BSBY, Jaipur.
people of the remotest part of the districts and such types of
trends have become quite visible when the amount of coverage
increased substantially under the pro-poor (BSBY) scheme.
Healthcare Cost at Destination and Facility Network
Moving out of one’s own residential district for medical care in
itself is not problematic, as people can avail facility of their
choice in other districts or states. However, it does become a
problem when it costs more. Estimates suggest that healthcare
Economic & Political Weekly
to the urban residents (9%). The transport expenses increased
from `1,575 in the residential district to `4,455 (rural) and
`4,155 (urban) when travelled to other districts and `5,982 for
other states, in per case of hospitalisation. The aggregate as
well as net (after reimbursement) medical care cost per case
were recorded even higher where LSHE exists in good numbers.
The average medical care cost per case was also high, among
the insured as well as uninsured patients (Figure 9), indicat-
ing that the availability of LSHE did not generate any competi-
tion towards reducing medical charges.
Concentration of medical facility in some of the metro cities
attracted a large number of patients from the neighbouring
EPW february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 55
SPECIAL ARTICLE

states as well. However, it resulted in an enormously high cost
of care compared to other districts. The cost of care was high in
districts which have a large number of big size health enterprises
(Figure 10, p 55). A decoding of medical cost, separately for
public and private sectors, shows that with the increase in large-
size enterprises, the average cost in a district rises in the private
sector while it reduces in the public sector (Figure 10). Regression
results show that with the increase in one unit of large-size
public enterprises in a district, the mean medical care cost reduces
by -0.0426%, while the cost increased by 0.0221% with the in-
crease in one unit of large-size enterprises in the private sector.
Conclusions
Debate in the health sector, in the recent past has shifted from
providing comprehensive health “care” to universal health
“coverage,” which emphasises the financial coverage for a defined
category of treatments. This, however, is only one aspect of care.
Coverage restricts care to a limited basket of services to be
hired from different players. It incorporates private players
and market logic in a planned manner to deliver public goods.
The evidence suggests that the private health providers lo-
cate their entities in urban metropolitan areas, where public
healthcare facilities are already available in large numbers.
They do not therefore rather fill the service deficiency gap.
They are more inclined to opportunistic purchasing rather
than strategic purchasing. The private sector has concentrated
further more in a few cities or districts under the insurance-
based regime, as evident from the Rajasthan BSBY scheme.
Insurance does little to encourage and redirect private health
providers to deficient areas.
The private sector has brought inflationary pressure and un-
affordability in care. Over the different health survey rounds
of NSS between 1986–87 and 2017–18, per case average cost of
medical care in private sector increased to almost 9–10 times
as compared to two to three times the rise in the public sector.
The average cost of medical care in the private sector was seven
to nine times higher costs than in the public sector in 2017–18
(Hooda 2021). The cost increased manifold in areas with a
high private facility concentration. The presence of a large
number of (big) hospitals or medical entities in one place
should have generated competition among them and thereby
reduced the costs. However, this does not seem to be the case.
In general, people from deprived socio-economic strata,
low-income groups, and rural residents have less access to
healthcare than their counterparts from better-off castes, classes
and urban regions. Insured persons access more healthcare
than the uninsured across these groups. However, a deficiency
of health facilities compels individuals to seek care in other
districts or states. The impact of adequate and equitable geo-
graphic distribution of health services is even more visible
than insurance. There is a robust empirical and analytical evi-
dence that universal healthcare systems are superior in quali-
ty, efficiency, and equity, where comprehensive primary
healthcare exists, and where financing and service provision is
predominantly public, with effective state regulation of the
private sector (Giovanella et al 2019).

Note
1 Private sector includes medicine shop, medical
colleges, charitable and non-charitable medi-
cal facilities, in-out patient care medical facili-
ties, outpatient facility, traditional practitioner
and faith healer, medical practitioner with no-
degree, medical practitioner with other degree,
medical practitioner with MBBS degree. Public
sector includes family welfare centre, mobile
health clinic, dispensary, alternative medicine,
hospital allopathic, TB clinic, maternity and
child welfare centre, health sub-centre, primary
health centre, community health centre.
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56 february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

Figure 1: Distribution and Concentration of Health Facility at the District Level

30
Availability of health facility per 10,000 population

25

20
District with low District with middle District with high
index value = 2. index value 2-4. index value >4.
15 No. of dist: 352 No of dist: 239 No. of dist: 33

10

0
0 2 4 6 8 10
Index of health infrastructure availability (i.e., Health Facility Index-HFI) constructed using variables
in legend by employing PCA method
Public infrastructure Doctors in position-public
Para Medical Staff In Position Private infrastructure
Doctors in position-private Traditional healer
Health Infrastructure -total Total health workforce
For HFI, see footnote 1; PCA–Principal Component Analysis
Source: Estimates from Census of India, 2011.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024 vol lIX no 7 1
NOTES
Victims and Vehicles of Patronage
The Struggles of Government Schools
in Dewas, MP
Arvind Sardana
Government schoolteachers work
in fairly challenging and complex
conditions, often with contradictory
pressures. Besides reforms, it is
equally important to analyse the
systemic issues in the management
that act as a drag on government
schools. This is also significant in
the contemporary situation where
we are either dismissive of the
role of the teachers or expect
them to uphold high moral
grounds, oblivious to their toxic
working ambience.
This is a revised and expanded version of the
note presented at Manthan, Azim Premji
University, Bengaluru on 6 August 2015. The
author would like to thank the participants for
their warm responses, queries, and questions.
Many of the details have emerged from extended
conversations with teachers. The author would
especially thank Krishna Patel, Prakash Kant and
the late M R Khan for their insightful comments
and generosity. Sadhna Saxena, A R Vasavi and
Rashmi Paliwal read and commented on an
earlier draft. The author would also like to
thank the anonymous reviewer for valuable
suggestions on improving this article.
Arvind Sardana (arvindewas@gmail.com) is a
noted educationalist and former director of
Eklavya Foundation. He was also an integral
part of the curriculum development programmes
of the National Council of Educational Research
and Training and various state governments.
He also played an important role in the
Literacy Mission campaign in Madhya Pradesh.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
E
klavya’s curricular initiative in
science and social science disci-
plines was a collaborative effort
with the Government of Madhya Pradesh
(MP) and the Ministry of Tribal Affairs,
Government of India. In the selected
cluster of middle schools, the interven-
tion was at three levels: alternative text-
books that were used in these schools
had to be developed and revised; three-
week-long teacher workshops were held
each year along with regular monthly
meetings; and separate assessment pat-
terns for the Class 8 board examination
and follow the curricular aims of the
programme. In this regard, Eklavya staff
was expected to do a regular follow-
up of the schools, monthly meetings
with teachers, and review academic
progress. The collaborative programme
required regular liaison with all school
administrative structures at the village,
block and district levels. This could relate
to the supply of textbooks, teacher train-
ing orders, monthly meeting schedules,
school timetables, examination processes,
filling teacher vacancies in the case of
transfers, etc.
These programmes were for a large
number of schools across many districts
in MP. But for Dewas district, we worked
with a few schools along the aforemen-
tioned pattern from 1984 to 2002. Besides
this, we worked with a large number
of government schools across all blocks
in the district as part of youth groups,
libraries and national literacy missions.
Of Patrons and Patronages
In many reports looking at the manage-
ment of government schools the analysis
ends up blaming teachers for all the
troubles. Widespread absenteeism is
often flagged as one of the major crimes
vol lix no 7
of teachers by many studies. Such studies
tend to ignore the systemic issues that
ail the education space. The issues here
are: Why is absenteeism widely preva-
lent and considered “normal” by local
school administration? How could such a
system persist over decades?
One of the factors that leads to teacher
absenteeism is the patronage system. At
the village level, the local political lead-
ers, school administration and teachers
work out patronage arrangements that
could lead them to stay in their postings
for longer periods. These patronage ar-
rangements are arrived at in multiple
ways. It could be through reciprocal
political support or a slice of share in
government schemes such as mid-day
meal (MDM), school construction, etc.
Notably, in all arrangements, kinship
and caste along with bribes play critical
roles. These may appear intricate arrange-
ments to outsiders, but normal to insiders.
The “transfer industry” for teachers has
navigated through these arrangements
for a long time, irrespective of changes
in governments.
Patronage could work in a beneficial
manner but at times can be disruptive.
There are government schools where the
staff could work with some security be-
cause the village elders ensure that the
school team would not be disrupted
through unnecessary transfers. There
are such schools where this beneficial
protection is provided. One of the mid-
dle schools that was part of Eklavya’s
programme in Dewas district enjoyed
this stability for more than 10 years.
This social protection provided the de-
sired stability and a conducive atmos-
phere. Many village school teams that
have worked well were provided social
protection, either by community mem-
bers or by local school administrators.
Contrast this with an example of a pri-
mary school in the Khategoan block of
Dewas (Vasavi 2002). Studies showed
that this single-teacher school in a tribal
hamlet with 62 children recorded 90%
attendance when a particular teacher
was teaching. As soon as he was trans-
ferred, the school became totally dys-
functional and few students attended.
57
NOTES
The villagers tried their best to retain
the earlier teacher but in vain.
At times, patronage arrangements
can be disruptive and everyone refers
to such episodes as the local game of
kho-kho for teachers. Consider the case
of a roadside school, which was part of
our programme. A trained social science
teacher was shunted out to another
school to make room for another teacher
as a stop-gap arrangement. The latter
moved out after his purpose was met.
It should be mentioned here that the
patronage strings are well-knitted and
that rational decisions expected from
the school administration are not taken.
For example, the demand for additional
teachers when the strength of students
for particular schools increases, is never
met. But we have had a similar positive
experience from a rural middle school.
This particular school could not get an
additional teacher from 1988 to 1998.
The demand for an additional teacher
was raised by the school staff and some
village leaders but was ignored by the
administration. The allotted staff was
itself considered as a “favour” by the
education department. As a result, this
middle school could not manage the swell-
ing demand. This school had a reputed
staff and therefore would attract a large
number of students from Class 6 onwards.
Every year, the intake at Class 6 would
swell to more than 80. In a particular
year, the student strength was 110. The
staff and some members of the adminis-
tration did wish for the middle school to
move to two sections for each class. This
could not be done for over a decade,
because many surplus teachers located in
Dewas town were not willing to move to
an interior school. Rational arrangements
expected of school bureaucracy could not
overcome the patronage pattern that
had become the established norm for
all concerned. What we witnessed for
more than a decade was that since the
school could not cope with the student
strength, nearly half of those who were
admitted to Class 6 would leave by Class 8.
A good government school was quietly
pushing out students because it could
not create additional sections. Creating
additional classrooms was not a bottle-
neck compared to the lack of teachers.
58
Patronage arrangements are usually
combined with rent-seeking through
transfers or attachments. The “transfer
industry” has been created and sustained
over decades by all. As per the arrange-
ment, urban and roadside schools that are
desired are oversupplied while interior/
rural schools are understaffed. Condi-
tions of the overall shortage of teachers
make the distribution extremely uneven.
For example, if five primary schools have
two teachers each, the actual distribution
that would evolve later may be 3, 3, 2, 1,
1. This was clearly witnessed in 1986. As
part of the Operation Blackboard Policy,
it was sought to ensure that the additional
teachers for all single-teacher schools
should be women. The appointments were
done in a rational manner but within a
few years, most of them had moved out
and “attached” to a different school.
Temporary attachments are a necessary
administrative process but this was used
as a silent transfer.
Research supports the uneven place-
ment of teachers through arrangements of
patronage and rent-seeking. For example,
Mukhopadhyay et al (2017) quote two
reports to illustrate the point:
The report of PwC observes the following
for the state of Karnataka: Despite have
enough number of teachers, there are 4,508
(10.45%) primary schools in the state which
are single-teacher schools and another
13,463 (31.21%) primary schools have only
two teachers. A similar concern arises from
the NIAS-DQEP field-experiences where it
was noted that a politicization of deputation
process has led to many schools having only
a single teacher though official district-data
reflects the complete absence of such single-
teacher schools.
What is being reproduced year-on-year are
patronage arrangements for schools and
teachers with little space for bureaucratic
rationality to operate. This tension between
catering to patronage arrangements through
local politics on the one hand, and on the
other hand enforcing administrative ration-
ality needs to be examined. All systems will
have some tension between these opposing
objectives but the pendulum has swung in
one direction for MP.
This was known to administrators and
also mentioned by researchers though
they have not addressed the underly-
ing reasons.
It should be mentioned here that all
schools were not equally affected by
february 17, 2024
the practice of patronage. Some school
teams manage to hold their own from
the menace. They were often supported
by local community leaders or people
within the school administration. How-
ever, warding off negotiating pressure and
sometimes giving in was part of the
overall scenario. Headteachers who tried
to enforce rules often faced pressure from
the patrons. The role of headmaster was
eroded. Effective school teams were not
sought to be created. In fact, more often
than not they were disrupted. Over time,
the checks and balances within the sys-
tem were co-opted, resulting in dysfunc-
tionality that lingered and was not ad-
dressed by the concerned department.
Researchers have noted this behaviour
as “political interference” and “corrup-
tion.” Ravi Srivastava after a survey of
schools in Uttar Pradesh (UP) says:
Teachers’ irregularity and indifference are
not only condoned, but probably abetted
by the corrupt educational bureaucracy.
(Srivastava 2001)
Vimla Ramachandran et al (quoted in
PROBE 2006) put this succinctly,
The informal system of patronage, rent
seeking, the everyday dynamics of local pol-
itics and vested interests drive decisions at
different levels of the administration came
out as a sub text in almost all conversations
with teachers. The community of teachers
are both victims and vehicles of a complex
dynamic that plays out on the ground.
Sincere officials were often helpless.
For example, a block education officer
(BEO) at Dewas could not shift one teacher
from a middle school to a primary
school that required additional teachers
in the same village compound because
of political pressure. There are many
such examples.
These political pressures do not just
affect that particular school or individual,
they are discussed all around and they
create a climate and sustain a cynical
atmosphere for everyone. Rules that
cannot be enforced become a norm.
Laxity is accepted or condoned since
blatant violations are not checked. This is
the local moral framework for the bureau-
cracy. Rational, logical administrative
measures are ignored. Hence, practices
such as teachers being causal in teaching,
absenteeism, and leaving early are general
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

norms. The administration becomes in-
effective in enforcing the usual routine.
This inability to provide the basic ad-
ministrative mechanism for public schools
creates a social culture of laxity among
teachers and local school administrators.
For example, Vasavi (2015) points out,
The education department’s failure, both
in terms of process and providing moral
grounding acts as a legitimising narrative
for teachers to ignore its rules and defy it in
multiple ways.
Mukhopadhyay et al (2017) view this
as political co-option where rational
arrangements or issues of delivery were
ignored. “The co-option of these struc-
tures by and for larger political gains
has meant that immediate and specific
issues pertaining to elementary educa-
tion have often been bypassed.” In other
words, schools do not function as they are
supposed to. It is the underlying patron-
age system that holds up this lax social
culture despite changes in governments.
This decay in the administrative man-
agement of government schools gives rise
to systemic weakness that can be observed
in the structure. Some of these are:
(i) They set a trend where classroom
processes are not supervised by the school
administration. What they checked was
usually the completion of records. For
patronage arrangements to be hidden,
it is essential that paperwork is proper
and complete, showing a superficial
functionality.
(ii) The headmaster’s role is ineffective
in ensuring the attendance of teachers,
classroom teaching and following the
timetable. Therefore, we find that for years
the effective teaching time at many schools
was barely two to three hours a day. In the
Probe resurvey after 10 years, 1996–2006,
the percentage of “schools without any
teaching activity when investigators
arrived” remained the same, at 47%–48%
of schools (PROBE 2006).
(iii) Accountability mechanisms within
the department are ineffective, especi-
ally for blatant violations. This leads to
“flexible” rules and a general atmos-
phere of laxity as a norm within the
local school administration.
(iv) Irrational placement of teachers with
some schools remains overstaffed and
others understaffed.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
If one does not address this balance
between local patronage arrangements
and demands of rational bureaucracy
that is required for schools to run in a
decent manner, we fall into the pitfall of
blaming teachers for the dysfunctional
school. This is the explanation on the
surface since systemic causes are ignored.
Political solutions have been avoided;
hence the chance that rational arrange-
ments for government schools become
a part of popular culture has not found
the space.
Identity Crisis of Teachers
For government school teachers, there is an
identity crisis. Are they clerks, lower-level
government functionaries or teachers?
With regular dak to be answered, scholar-
ships and midday meal registers to be
maintained, surveys to be done, and
regular election duties at all levels, the
load of non-teaching tasks is quite high.
Moreover, they disturb the flow of class-
room teaching and routine at school.
One of the middle schools in our pro-
gramme had worked out that nearly half-
person power is required for no teaching
works and they would consciously allot
fewer periods to the teacher who had
opted for and specialised in these tasks.
This is the only school that I have known
which worked out a structural solution
to this regular demand and lived with it
for a number of years. Two other teachers
from a different school, who were active
in the literacy movement, were attached
to the tehsil office for regular work of the
election commission. They were later
much sought after by the administration.
School administration values all such
roles while regular teaching is hardly
given due credit. This has created a situ-
ation where many teachers see them-
selves more as government functionaries
and disregard their classroom duties.
This is also the best survival strategy in
this system. It blends easily with patron-
age arrangements because of the high
priority of this work. We have seen
many teachers who have chosen clerical
roles for themselves. A geography teacher
whom one knew had not taken a single
geography class for two decades. A
sizeable section of teachers actively seeks
such roles and avoids classroom work.
vol lix no 7
NOTES
Leclercq (2002) has documented and
commented on this in some detail:
“Teachers: disgruntled would be civil
servants.”
Unless alternative arrangements are
made, such as part-time employees, super-
vised volunteers, clerical help for a cluster,
accountants, and increasing election com-
mission staff, the importance attached to
these clerical duties by teachers is likely to
continue. This is because, from the signals
that emanate from the administration,
their role as public servants is valued
much more than their work as teachers.
This is what drives the identity crisis.
Blame Game 2.0: 2000–10
A significant factor that has changed the
patronage scenario in the decade since
2000 has been the moving out of upper
castes from government schools. This
was aided by deregulation in MP. The
upper sections that moved out would no
longer voice their support for govern-
ment schools. Alternative voices among
Other Backward Classes (OBCs) and Dalit
sections had not emerged. This social
vacuum was a contributing factor to the
lack of social support for government
schools. The functionality of schools
became worse.
Leclercq (2002) said:
The fact that the government of Madhya
Pradesh chose to expand the state’s primary
school system as much through privatization
as through measures like EGS—though with-
out advertising this essential point—thus
raises many questions as to the nature of the
current extension of village level school sys-
tems: Can universal primary education be
reached this way?
To recall, the Government of MP relaxed
all the norms for opening a private school.
As per the new rules, no permission was
required to open a private school. You
were only required to inform. Later, when
students at a school were to appear for
the board examination at Class 5, an
application addressed to the district edu-
cation officer (DEO) was required. Permis-
sion was easily granted. Deregulation
clearly aided the expansion of low-fee
private schools.
Paradoxically, for the first time in many
years, positive incentives appeared to
bring in marginalised groups. Infrastruc-
ture improvements on a large scale, MDM,
59
NOTES
free textbooks and incentives for students
and appointment of new teachers took
place. Enrolment of the marginalised
groups increased substantially. For in-
stance, at the national level, the gross
enrolment ratio (GER) for Scheduled Caste
(SC) girls increased from 75.5 in 2000–01
to 116.9 in 2010–11. Similarly, the GER
for Scheduled Tribe (ST) girls increased
from 73.5 to 118.7 during the same decade
(Govinda and Sedwal 2017). This had
never happened before. Girls, margin-
alised groups, many of the never-enrolled,
were in school. When we began our
work at the middle school level in the
1980s there would be a small number of
five to seven girls in each class. Around
2,000 girls filled half the classrooms.
The number of Dalit children in middle
schools increased. In the earlier decade,
one would find a large number of chil-
dren from poorer families being pushed
out at Class 3 and Class 4 so that the
Class 5 board result was not embarrass-
ing for the staff. The “Chakmak clubs,”
youth groups run by Eklavya at various
locations in Dewas district, also had a
fairly mixed caste group composition
around this time.
However, the composition of students
at government schools changed, lead-
ing to a new vicious cycle. In the new
setting, students from OBC, SC and ST
categories replaced dominant caste stu-
dents who dropped out of government
schools. There was also a surge in the
enrolment of girl students. However,
teachers, by and large, belonged to the
upper caste groups.
There was a clear divide among the
teachers belonging to the shamvidashiksha,
shikshakarmi and EGS guruji categories.
Wherever school functionality dropped,
both teachers and students blamed each
other. The students would blame the
teachers for not taking classes and
teachers would blame the children for not
coming to school or leaving early. The
onus of fixing accountability shifted to
another round of blame game, reinforc-
ing the myth that marginalised commu-
nities do not desire education or worse
are incapable of learning. This is de-
scribed in detail by Vasavi (2002). One of
the schools close to Khategoan town had
four teachers with enrolment as per
60
books at 173. Usually, two teachers would
be at school with an attendance of around
50 children, but that was not the case.
If you asked the teachers, they would
blame the children for not coming to
school. The school remained dysfunctional
despite adequate staff.
The education department was inactive
and largely oblivious to dysfunctional
issues that were increasing steadily. The
attitude of teachers were an important
factor but administrative factors were
being ignored while the blame game al-
lowed the structure to deteriorate.
This was clearly evident from the
struggle of some schools resisting these
forces. Was a turnaround feasible? The
examples of some schools did indicate
the nature of administrative action re-
quired. A dramatic case was the revival
of the oldest school in Dewas town, a
137-year-old institution. This school is
situated on valuable land in the town
and was being targeted by land grabbers.
The extent of decay was large: hardly any
classes were held with teachers blaming
the students, antisocial elements had a
free run, shopkeepers had encroached
with impunity, and classrooms were
dilapidated. Everyone thought this was
going to become the new supermarket
that was desired by land grabbers. The
enrolled students in this higher second-
ary school for 2006 was 1,200. The
percentage of students attending was
5%. Through an intervention by the
collector, one of the science programme’s
resource teachers, the late M R Khan was
appointed as the principal of this school.
He was known all over the district for
his integrity and boldness in handling
“no copying” campaigns during public ex-
aminations. He had also been active in
the literacy campaign.
He adopted simple yet firm measures
to restore the functionality of the school.
Some of these were: admonishing the
mayor of the city for the delay in provid-
ing adequate drinking water to the school;
requesting and threatening those shop-
keepers who had encroached on the
school land; building a boundary wall
through donations by residents; enforcing
the timetable by taking regular rounds
and admonishing students in a loud
voice that was meant more for teachers;
february 17, 2024
and repairing broken furniture, windows
and doors. As a religious person, he
would often appeal to his staff that there
cannot be a more pious act than teach-
ing these students who were the poorest
of the poor in the city and promising to
intervene with the education department
for any genuine issue of a teacher. All
these worked wonders. Students stayed
back after the recess, the overall attend-
ance increased to 60% and the teachers
were regular for their classes. The pass
percentage after the first year increased
from 0.7 in 2005 to 36 in 2006 (Khan
2007). Even though the new principal
had the support of the collector, he had
to face threats from those associated
with land grabbers. With a marvellous
sense of humour and courage, he would
ask those threatening him to come home
but not disturb the school.
There are other similar stories though
less dramatic. A school in a neighbouring
kasba was able to draw back students
from private schools. This was a girls’
school where the strength increased
from 80 to 400 through the effort of the
staff. Again, the steps they took were ad-
ministrative and trust-building such as
building the boundary wall, ensuring
scholarships, provision for games and
participation in inter-school meets and a
strict timetable. Most importantly, any
undue pressure was taken care of by the
principal through her own strong political
connections in the town.
The general scenario, however, did
not comprise of struggles by individual
schools or teachers. In the usual case, the
teacher groups do not have the strength
to motivate each other and change the
negative environment. For most schools,
the vicious cycle of blame operated. These
examples of lonely struggles show us
the possibility of a reverse flow through
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vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

administrative measures. It also shows
the need for political intervention to over-
come the negative pressures and provide
real support to schools. In the Dewas
example, the push was by the collector
who wished to save the school from land
grabbers around. In the other example,
the principal was motivated by the desire
to improve education for girls and used
her political connections in the town
to warn and ward off any pressure to
derail her efforts. Without such support,
turnarounds were not feasible.
The school administration ignores these
systemic issues, because there is no
political backing for tackling issues of
school functioning. It is clear that without
political backing one cannot address the
patronage arrangements that have been
firmly established. Nor can they take
rational bureaucratic decisions to make
schools function. If this will is lacking,
the local administration would more or
less remain where it is. In such situations,
it becomes easy to blame teachers for
all the ills; hence the “teacher bashing”
scenario, referred to above, takes hold
among people and school bureaucracies.
The administration has convinced
themselves that the fault lies in the moral
make-up of teachers—they are all shirkers.
Without political initiative, what does the
administration do? To make teachers
work, centralised schedules and formats
along with monitoring the data and
vigilance are the preferred management
strategy. It works for a while till the cynics
figure out how to bypass rules. Those
otherwise sincere hate these forms. What
the administrative management strategist
forgets is that the output here is intellectu-
al and social development, deeply subject
to love between teachers and students.
In this process, the exercise of fordism—
directing and monitoring teachers what
should be done at every step—would be
limited. Most importantly, there is no onus
on the system at the school level. There
are few attempts to create school teams
with some bonding and responsibility.
To sum up, during this decade three
things were important. Marginalised sec-
tions came into school in a big way and
the upper caste started leaving govern-
ment schools. This reduced the social
voice and led to teachers blaming students
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
NOTES
and administration blaming teachers. voluntary basis. This data was collected
The state government did not respond with the help of teachers associated
to this exit in a political manner to tackle with our earlier programmes and other
patronage and take administrative meas- voluntary teachers’ groups. The narra-
ures to ensure better functioning by follow- tives are based on extensive conversa-
ing the rational principles of running a tions with them.
school. The policy was focused on con- For several years, the school’s female
trolling and managing teachers from acting head teacher, took the initiative
above in an attempt to correct their in the functioning of the school. She was
perceived “moral failings.” This only in- able to motivate the staff and, most im-
creased the teacher-bashing scenario. portantly, could hold her own among
the local political leaders of the village.
Private vs Government Schools: She is known to be outspoken and honest
Post-2010 Scenario in arranging infrastructural requirements.
In the context of government schools, it The political scenario was negative be-
is important to realise that the nature of cause many children belonging to the
mass education has changed. Apart from upper-caste sections had moved out of
government schools, there is a sizeable the government schools. As Table 1 indi-
section attending the low-fee private cates, there is a remarkable resistance
schools, both in urban and rural areas. and struggle by the middle school staff.
How did government schools face this In one year, they also started an addi-
competition from the private sector? tional section that had never been pos-
Let us examine the lonely struggle of sible earlier.
a government middle school in a vil- The decline started when the new
lage in Dewas district, using their data principal was appointed. He allowed a
on enrolment. lax atmosphere to settle. The poaching
This middle school was also a part by a new private school led to the school
of Eklavya’s social science programme losing students at a rapid pace. The school
till 2002, when Eklavya’s collaborative had adequate staff but its strength to resist
curricular initiatives with the state govern- was undermined since the principal did
ment were abruptly ended. However, for not actively organise a protest. Without an
some years, Eklavya continued to work active campaign by the school adminis-
with interested teacher groups on a tration, it was difficult to withstand the
Table 1: Enrolment at a Rural Government Middle School, 2007–20
Year Enrolment Remarks
2007–08 136
2008–09 130
2009–10 142
2010–11 161 A private school closes the middle school section, and the children shift to the
government school
2011–12 154
2012–13 169
2013–14 186 Another private school closes the middle school section and the children shift to
the government school
2014–15 191 Two sections are created for Class 6 but only for one year
2015–16 156 A large batch of Class 8 students leave; one private school reopens its middle school
section drawing few students; the inflow at Class 6 is less than the outflow at Class 8
2016–17 164
2017–18 144 The principal at the government school is replaced by a new appointee. The
administration is lax again. Another private school opened, started by an upper-caste
community member. It is said that they made conscious attempts to draw students
of the caste group
2018–19 102 Rapid decline. The staff morale has taken a dip. The new private middle school
clearly poached the students
2019–20 70 Some more students started to shift to the nearby semi-urban centre—kasba—
outside of the village. The teachers have given up. One of them says, “with the
current Class 8 moving out and fewer admissions in Class 6, we will be down to
50 next year”
Source: Field data from teachers.
vol lix no 7 61
NOTES
market forces. The morale of the teach-
ers appears to be resigned to the schools’
eventual merger or closure.
This also illustrates that individual
government schools cannot face compe-
tition from the private sector unless the
education department backs them up.
These schools are part of a system, not
just individual entities. In this case, the
department could, through its regulatory
powers, have refused the permission
to open another private school in the
village. The village already has two
private schools. An oversupply of small
suboptimum schools, whether govern-
ment or private, goes against the nature
of education as a public good. This is a
negative externality for all, since these
small schools would never be able to
provide a viable school culture that en-
compasses both cognitive and non-cog-
nitive aspects.
The arguments on the public good
nature of education are important be-
cause the supply of low-fee private schools
is seen as a viable option based on mar-
ket decisions. One needs to understand
how they undermine public education.
As Sarangpani and Winch (2010) argue,
the structure that is reproduced is regres-
sive. It does not address the broad aims of
education beyond numeracy and literacy.
It does not increase welfare for all,
though it does provide access to schools
in a situation where government schools
are dysfunctional.
Even without a ban, the department
officials could have actively held meet-
ings at the village to show that the middle
school was performing competently and
there was no reason for the students
to move out. An active campaign and
meetings by the education department
officials could have been organised and
provided a counter to the market for
more low-fee schools.
This did not happen. The middle school
gave up after a number of years of
struggle. It was the teacher group that
put up the resistance but gave up when
a new principal was appointed. In com-
parison, the staff at primary schools of
the same village had given up long back.
The enrolment at Class 1 for boys in
primary school in 2015–16 was four,
while for girls, it was seven. Left to fend
62
for themselves, the primary schools in
this village have been resigned to their
fate. The primary school for boys was
merged with the girls’ school. Their
enrolment history is in Table 2. The
enrolment continues to slide. This is the
usual story of well-connected villages.
Table 2: Primary School (Girls) in the Same Village
Year Enrolment Remarks
2010–11 99
2011–12 90
2012–13 71
2013–14 70
2014–15 62
2015–16 60
2016–17 94 Boys’ school is closed and
merged with this school
2017–18 81
2018–19 69
2019–20 57
Source: Field data from teachers.
There is no effort from the state gov-
ernment to stem this loss of public trust.
They still view this problem as the sole
responsibility of teachers of individual
schools. We have previously witnessed
active campaigns for literacy in the
form of the school chalo abhiyan. There
was no such response. The minister for
education of the earlier government
belonged to this rural area but was
largely indifferent and unconcerned
with these developments. At a function
for the model school in Dewas, where
the minister was present, one former
teacher explained the elements that made
up that model school—adequate staff, labs
and the principal enforcing the timetable.
The people are the same he said. This is
the core. This model school, which is
now in great demand by all students,
was once known as the most notorious
school in the town. Every school could
be revived if this could be turned
around into a model school.
This illustrates the struggles that
these government schools are going
through, since there is no solid plan
by the government nor any attempt to
motivate teachers and break the vicious
cycle. This is a silent retreat during the
past 10 years. We are responsible for the
slow creation of unviable small schools
due to our inaction.
The school administration knows that
if school teams are in place and teaching
ensured, attendance improves on its own
and children come back to government
february 17, 2024
schools. In the past year, both government
and private schools were closed. However,
the Covid-19 pandemic provided a good
opportunity to turn around government
schools. The real digital reach for the
government schools in MP is just 2%
of its students and in this context, the
community-supported learning centres by
teachers and others have been a good
idea (Biswas 2020). The community learn-
ing centres promoted by the government
through teachers provide a genuine base
for rebuilding public trust. Would this
be followed up by a campaign to enrol
more children in government schools,
remains an open question.
According to the Unified District Infor-
mation System for Education or UDISE
data 2018–19, the enrolment in private
unaided schools in MP was 39%. In neigh-
bouring states like UP and Rajasthan, this
was 46% and 47%, respectively. Are we
not moving in that direction?
For goods like education where it is
difficult to figure out quality, certain vocal
parents leaving government schools is a
disaster. It does not enhance competition
but makes it complacent and worse off
than before. Kumar (2010) points out that
it is complex to appraise the quality of
education. The demand for private schools
is based on the “ease with which accuracy
can be replaced with vacuous, though
visible indicators.” Bose’s (2020b) study
for Delhi shows that “Exit begets exit” and
enlarges the Low Free Private Schooling
(LFPS) sector of dubious quality.
We could compare our experience
with Karopady’s (2014) study of Andhra
Pradesh (AP). When the sample students
are controlled for family background,
the disadvantaged group scores are almost
the same whether they are at a private
school or a government school. He com-
ments towards the end of the paper that,
“the low absolute level of learning across
both government and private schools
are a cause of concern.” This is the real
issue coming out from our conversa-
tions with teachers. Everyone, whether
in private low-fee school or government
school, is worse off because of the low
benchmark provided by public schools.
This is the negative externality that
people recognise. LFPS have occupied
because of the dysfunctionality of the
vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

public education system. Harma (2009)
in her paper for UP states:
In addition the FGD data illustrates that many
parents feel that LFPs are the “lesser evil of
the two,” and that the real demand is for
improved, functional government schools.
What Next?
To sum up, for decades the patronage
system crimped the capacity of adminis-
tration to take rational steps to improve
the functioning of schools. On top of
this, the identity crisis of teachers dealt
with in detail above in a way reinforced
the practice of patronage.
It may be in order to point out here
that when the government school teams
were debilitated, the upper-caste sections
made a beeline for private schools. Along
with de-regulation policies, this paved the
way for the large-scale entry of private
schools unmindful of quality and stand-
ards in education. Paradoxically, with
the centrally aided scheme, the govern-
ment schools expanded at a rapid pace
than ever. Both trends took root simul-
taneously after 2000. Though school
supply increased, there was no effort to
reform school administration, improve
school teams and supervision and reduce
the impact of patronage. The derelic-
tion of duty by the government trig-
gered a regressive chain reaction with
teachers blaming students from mar-
ginalised sections and administration
blaming teachers.
During the last decade, there has been
a rapid expansion of low-fee schools
drawing poorer students out from govern-
ment schools making many primary
government schools unviable. For parents
who cannot afford the high-fee private
schools, it is a choice between the devil
and the deep sea. The teacher-bashing
attitude sidelined the discussion on sys-
temic issues. As the new round of blame
games gained traction, it dented the
public trust in the system.
Due to government inaction, these
schools have become suboptimal. Post-
pandemic, as per newspaper reports,
nearly 10,000 schools have been closed
and merged. The state policy expects
teachers and individual schools to re-
spond to these market pressures. This is a
totally misplaced thinking. These schools
Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024
exist as a system of government schools
administered by the education depart-
ment. Teams are set up and managed by
them. There is no political effort to restore
the public trust in government schools,
so that they can survive the market
onslaught of private schools. This has led
to a dual structure within the public
schools in MP. On the one hand, the
state has model schools, CM Rise schools
are reasonably functional, properly ad-
ministered, and are in a good shape. On
the other hand, there are a vast majority
of dysfunctional schools with a large
segment of “small schools” waiting to be
closed or merged.
Looking beyond the blame game, it is
clear that a reform agenda needs to be
formulated with a strong message that
the practice of patronage would not be
tolerated. Blatant violations could be
checked. School facilities and function-
ing would be improved. The school ad-
ministration could take up a public cam-
paign by organising local meetings to
enhance public awareness about the
critical role of government schools in
improving the quality of schooling. This
will help bridge the public trust deficit
on the overall educational system.
This could not be just the responsibility
of local teachers. This would imply that
properly selected people should be put
in charge as principals, DEOs, BEOs and
cluster in charge. Teacher gaps could be
filled with fresh recruitment. Basic in-
frastructure needs should be met and
accountability fixed at all levels.
The other likely path as indicated in
some announcements is that of closing
down schools at the village level and
creating a few cluster-level composite
schools such as the CM Rise schools. These
large schools should have facilities, ade-
quate staff and also a transport system
for children to come from surrounding
villages. This could make sense for high
schools but we would be denying primary
and elementary school children access
to quality government schools.
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63
CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation

Wholesale Price Index Foreign Trade

The year-on-year (y-o-y) WPI-infl ation rate declined to 0.3% in January 2024
from 4.8% reported a year ago and 0.7% a month ago. The index for primary
articles grew by 3.8% compared to 4.1% registered a year ago and 5.8% a
month ago. The rate of inflation for food articles increased to 6.9% from
2.7% a year ago. The index for fuel and power declined by (-) 0.5% against
15.0% and that for manufactured products was down by (-)1.1% compared
to 3.1% a year ago.
The trade deficit narrowed down to $19.8 billion in December 2023 from $23.1 bn
registered a year ago. Exports grew by 1.0% to $38.5 bn and imports decreased
by (-)4.9% to $58.3 bn from $38.1 bn and $61.2 bn, respectively. Oil imports
reduced to $14.9 bn compared to $19.3 bn while non-oil imports increased to
$43.3 bn compared to $41.9 bn. During April–December 2023–24, cumulative
exports declined by (-)5.7% to $317.1 bn and imports by (-)7.9% to $505.1 bn
against their respective values of $336.3 bn and $548.6 bn a year ago.

Consumer Price Index Index for Industrial Production

The CPI-inflation rate decreased to 5.1% in January 2024 from 6.5% a year ago
and 5.7% a month ago. The consumer food price index stood at 8.3% compared
to 6.0% a year ago and 9.5% a month ago. The CPI-rural inflation rate reduced
to 5.3% and urban-inflation rate to 4.9% from 6.9% and 6.0%, respectively,
recorded a year ago. According to Labour Bureau data, the CPI for agricultural
labourers (CPI–AL) stood at 7.7% in December 2023 compared to 6.4% and
industrial workers (CPI–IW) at 4.9% against 5.5%, a year ago.
The IIP stood at 3.8% in December 2023 compared to 5.1% a year ago. Growth rate
in the mining sector decreased to 5.1% and electricity generation to 1.2% from 10.1%
and 10.4%, respectively, reported a year ago. Production in the manufacturing
sector increased by 3.9% against 3.6% a year ago. As per use-based classification,
growth in capital goods segment declined to 3.2% and infrastructure goods to 4.1%
from 7.8% and 11.0% reported a year ago. Production of consumer durables
grew by 4.8% and non-durables by 2.1% against -11.2% and 7.9%, respectively.

Movement of WPI Inflation April–January Merchandise Trade December 2023

December 2023 Over Month Over Year April–December
Year-on-year WPI Inflation in % ($ bn) (%) (%) (2023–24 over 2022–23) (%)
20 Exports 38.5 13.4 1.0 -5.7
2022–23
Imports 58.3 6.9 -4.9 -7.9
15
Trade balance -19.8 -3.8 -14.4 -11.4
10 Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
4.8%
5 Components of Trade December 2022 and December 2023
0.3%
$41.9 billion
0 $43.3 billion
$38.1 billion Non-oil Imports
2023–24 Exports $38.5 billion
40
-5
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan*
$19.3 billion
* Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12 = 100. Oil Imports
$14.9 billion

Trends in WPI and Its Components January 2024* (%) 0

Financial Year (Averages)
Weights Over Month Over Year 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
All commodities 100 -0.3 0.3 1.3 13.0 9.4
Primary articles 22.6 -1.0 3.8 1.7 10.2 10.0 $23.1 billion
$19.8 billion
-27 Trade Balance
Food articles 15.3 -1.4 6.9 3.2 4.1 7.3
2022 DECEMBER 2023 DECEMBER
Fuel and power 13.2 0.4 -0.5 -8.0 32.5 28.1
Manufactured products 64.2 -0.2 -1.1 2.8 11.1 5.6 Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
* Data is provisional; Base: 2011–12=100. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Movement of IIP April–December
Movement of CPI Inflation January 2022–January 2024 IIP Index Value
160
Year-on-year CPI Inflation in %
151.5
9 150
2023
Rural
145.9
5.3% 140

6 2022
CPI (Combined) 130
Urban 5.1%
4.9% 120
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec*
3
* December 2023 are quick estimates; Base: 2011–12=100.

Industrial Growth: Sector-wise December 2023* (%)

0 Weights Over Over Financial Year (Avgs)
Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan F M A M J J A S O N D Jan* Month Year 2021–22 2022–23
2022 2023 2024
General index 100 7.4 3.8 11.4 5.2
* January 2024 is provisional.
Source: National Statistical Office (NSO); Base: 2012=100. Mining 14.4 6.2 5.1 12.2 5.8
Manufacturing 77.6 8.2 3.9 11.8 4.7
Inflation in CPI and Its Components January 2024* (%) Electricity 8.0 3.0 1.2 7.9 8.9
Latest Month Over Over Financial Year (Avgs) Industrial Growth: Use-based
Weights Index Month Year 2021–22 2022–23
Primary goods 34.0 5.4 4.6 9.7 7.5
CPI combined 100 185.5 -0.1 5.1 5.5 6.7
Consumer food 39.1 189.3 -0.7 8.3 3.8 6.6 Capital goods 8.2 5.4 3.2 16.9 13.1
Miscellaneous 28.3 179.4 0.2 3.8 6.7 6.3 Intermediate goods 17.2 5.6 3.4 15.4 3.8
Infrastructure/Construction goods 12.3 8.2 4.1 18.8 8.4
CPI: Occupation-wise#
Industrial workers (2016 = 100) 138.8 -0.2 4.9 5.1 6.1 Consumer durables 12.8 7.8 4.8 12.5 0.6
Agricultural labourers (1986-87 = 100) 1257 0.3 7.7 4.0 6.8 Consumer non-durables 15.3 13.1 2.1 3.2 0.7
* Provisional; # December 2023; *December 2023 are quick estimates; Base: 2011–12=100.
Source: NSO (rural and urban); Labour Bureau (IW and AL). Source: NSO, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

64 february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation
India’s Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP
2021–22 2022–23 2023–24
` Crore | At 2011–12 Prices Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Private final consumption expenditure 1822102 (17.6) 2121839 (14.2) 2426098 (10.8) 2333501 (4.7) 2182357 (19.8) 2298123 (8.3) 2478700 (2.2) 2399515 (2.8) 2312601 (6.0) 2370094 (3.1)
Government final consumption expenditure 403808 (-2.1) 346501 (11.7) 350565 (5.8) 474406 (11.8) 411243 (1.8) 332450 (-4.1) 348329 (-0.6) 485284 (2.3) 408300 (-0.7) 373513 (12.4)
Gross fixed capital formation 1077836 (61.0) 1209609 (12.4) 1179221 (1.2) 1412108 (4.9) 1297588 (20.4) 1325580 (9.6) 1273453 (8.0) 1538071 (8.9) 1400832 (8.0) 1471938 (11.0)
Change in stocks 28895 (974.6) 31402 (655.9) 29902 (618.9) 33964 (613.8) 31050 (7.5) 30591 (-2.6) 29868 (-0.1) 35954 (5.9) 32256 (3.9) 34154 (11.6)
Valuables 22035 (481.3) 134378 (156.6) 73595 (44.5) 48751 (-51.7) 34959 (58.7) 108206 (-19.5) 45595 (-38.0) 37330 (-23.4) 27633 (-21.0) 103901 (-4.0)
Net trade (Export–Import) 15631 -46285 -91258 -65580 -86460 -146624 -97506 -6264 -258496 -285849
Exports 765031 (46.1) 826729 (25.1) 825929 (27.8) 888144 (22.4) 915111 (19.6) 927872 (12.2) 917492 (11.1) 994047 (11.9) 844252 (-7.7) 968011 (4.3)
Less imports 749401 (44.8) 873014 (26.6) 917188 (19.7) 953723 (6.7) 1001571 (33.6) 1074495 (23.1) 1014998 (10.7) 1000311 (4.9) 1102748 (10.1) 1253860 (16.7)
Discrepancies -59256 (-173.6) -145787 (-293.2) -117350 (-388.8) -124790 (-758.1) -126452 (113.4) -70326 (-51.8) -55812 (-52.4) -128375 (2.9) 114019 (-190.2) 106561 (-251.5)
Gross domestic product (GDP) 3311050 (21.6) 3651659 (9.1) 3850772 (5.2) 4112360 (4.0) 3744285 (13.1) 3878000 (6.2) 4022625 (4.5) 4361515 (6.1) 4037144 (7.8) 4174312 (7.6)

India’s Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

2022–23 ($ mn) 2023–24 ($ mn) 2022–23 (` bn) 2023–24 (` bn)
Item Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Current account -17964 -30902 -16832 -1356 -9203 -8319 -1387 [-2.1] -2466 [-3.8] -1384 [-2.0] -111.6 [-0.2] -756 [-1.1] -688 [-1.0]
Merchandise -63054 -78313 -71337 -52587 -56624 -61034 -4867 -6249 -5864 -4326.1 -4654 -5045
Invisibles 45090 47411 54505 51231 47421 52715 3480 3783 4481 4214.5 3898 4358
Services 31069 34426 38713 39075 35124 39950 2398 2747 3182 3214.5 2887 3302
of which: Software services 30692 32681 33541 34370 33928 35237 2369 2608 2757 2827.4 2789 2913
Transfers 22874 24773 28467 24762 22866 24952 1766 1977 2340 2037.1 1880 2063
of which: Private 23065 24991 28641 25080 23073 25169 1780 1994 2354 2063.2 1897 2080
Income -8853 -11788 -12675 -12606 -10568 -12187 -683 -941 -1042 -1037.1 -869 -1007
Capital Account 22055 1461 28887 6540 34275 9994 1702 [2.6] 117 [0.2] 2375 [3.4] 538.0 [0.7] 2817 [4.0] 826 [1.2]
of which: Foreign investment -1238 12741 6641 4691 20789 4660 -96 1017 546 385.9 1709 385
Overall balance 4595 -30379 11069 5579 24432 2519 355 [0.5] -2424 [-3.7] 910 [1.3] 459.0 [0.6] 2008 [2.8] 208 [0.3]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.

Foreign Exchange Reserves Variation

2 February 3 February 31 March Month Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
Excluding gold but including revaluation effects 2024 2023 2023 Ago Ago 2022–23 2023–24 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
` crore 4722902 4307107 4340297 24614 415796 69490 382606 68050 668976 590416 302585 102680
$ mn 569521 526239 528083 4573 43282 -33376 41437 -14168 56831 94535 21435 -31532

Monetary Aggregates Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
` Crore 2024 2022–23 2023–24 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
Money supply (M3) as on 26 January 24417051 46392 (0.2) 2522017 (11.5) 1401305 (6.8) 2073291 (9.3) 2044615 (12.2) 1649151 (8.8) 1850031 (9.0)
Components
Currency with public 3322601 66890 (2.1) 152881 (4.8) 134031 (4.4) 46165 (1.4) 402080 (17.1) 283860 (10.3) 240747 (7.9)
Demand deposits 2497799 -78082 (-3.0) 201007 (8.8) 83800 (3.8) 177201 (7.6) 257428 (14.8) 217872 (10.9) 107606 (4.9)
Time deposits 18516240 58224 (0.3) 2151539 (13.1) 1178097 (7.8) 1847274 (11.1) 1376262 (10.9) 1136326 (8.1) 1482362 (9.8)
Other deposits with RBI 80411 -640 (-0.8) 16590 (26.0) 5377 (9.2) 2650 (3.4) 8844 (23.0) 11093 (23.4) 19317 (33.1)
Sources
Net bank credit to government 7212177 -61397 (-0.8) 554812 (8.3) 179736 (2.8) 46644 (0.7) 890012 (17.9) 627255 (10.7) 687904 (10.6)
Bank credit to commercial sector 16794325 85236 (0.5) 2721868 (19.3) 1455937 (11.5) 2364689 (16.4) 629822 (5.7) 948054 (8.1) 1813116 (14.4)
Net foreign exchange assets 5253791 -27143 (-0.5) 458825 (9.6) -59097 (-1.2) 342025 (7.0) 777810 (20.5) 275217 (6.0) 57703 (1.2)
Banking sector’s net non-monetary liabilities 4875839 -49363 (-1.0) 1216294 (33.2) 177048 (5.1) 682379 (16.3) 253594 (8.4) 202476 (6.2) 710963 (20.4)
Reserve money as on 2 February 4515690 45576 (1.0) 260652 (6.1) 186151 (4.6) 128931 (2.9) 570276 (18.8) 468905 (13.0) 317872 (7.8)
Components
Currency in circulation 3420311 41090 (1.2) 122574 (3.7) 164021 (5.2) 41790 (1.2) 406451 (16.6) 279953 (9.8) 244805 (7.8)
Bankers’ deposits with RBI 1009583 -2851 (-0.3) 117148 (13.1) 15709 (1.8) 79106 (8.5) 154979 (28.5) 177859 (25.4) 53751 (6.1)
Other deposits with RBI 85796 7337 (9.4) 20930 (32.3) 6421 (11.0) 8035 (10.3) 8844 (23.0) 11094 (23.4) 19316 (33.0)
Sources
Net RBI credit to government 1080244 10572 (1.0) -206127 (-16.0) -164225 (-11.3) -370881 (-25.6) 107495 (10.8) 350910 (31.9) 529 (0.0)
of which: Centre 1058049 9474 (0.9) -207632 (-16.4) -183291 (-12.6) -392327 (-27.1) 106606 (10.8) 352626 (32.2) 1404 (0.1)
RBI credit to banks and commercial sector 147952 28117 (23.5) 178003 (-592.3) 513651 (-94.5) 242395 (-256.7) -168464 (83.9) -174345 (47.2) 449259 (-82.6)
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI 5013936 29001 (0.6) 471263 (10.4) 100194 (2.3) 426580 (9.3) 608998 (17.0) 243079 (5.8) 144877 (3.3)
Govt’s currency liabilities to the public 32596 0 (0.0) 2806 (9.4) 1778 (6.3) 2311 (7.6) 565 (2.1) 1099 (4.1) 2273 (8.1)
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI 1759039 22115 (1.3) 185292 (11.8) 265247 (20.3) 171474 (10.8) -21682 (-1.6) -48160 (-3.5) 279065 (21.3)

Scheduled Commercial Banks’ Indicators ( ` Crore) Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
(As on 26 January) 2023 2022–23 2023–24 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
Aggregate deposits 20059197 -22630 (-0.1) 2339769 (13.2) 1254115 (7.6) 2015283 (11.2) 1546019 (11.4) 1351801 (8.9) 1578601 (9.6)
Demand 2354985 -77911 (-3.2) 198238 (9.2) 84001 (4.1) 174554 (8.0) 244190 (15.1) 211553 (11.4) 107685 (5.2)
Time 17704212 55281 (0.3) 2141531 (13.8) 1170114 (8.1) 1840729 (11.6) 1301831 (10.9) 1140247 (8.6) 1470916 (10.2)
Cash in hand 84468 -10583 (-11.1) -25963 (-23.5) 24506 (28.5) -5795 (-6.4) 3487 (4.0) -4823 (-5.3) 4338 (5.0)
Balance with RBI 933808 -6039 (-0.6) 120235 (14.8) 130136 (19.0) 123901 (15.3) 6507 (1.2) 140744 (25.9) 126470 (18.5)
Investments 5976157 -15302 (-0.3) 781537 (15.0) 465673 (9.8) 561009 (10.4) 715177 (19.1) 266421 (6.0) 686201 (14.5)
of which: Government securities 5975351 -15371 (-0.3) 781583 (15.0) 465589 (9.8) 561029 (10.4) 722935 (19.3) 266547 (6.0) 686143 (14.5)
Bank credit 16044693 83348 (0.5) 2707157 (20.3) 1446222 (12.2) 2369458 (17.3) 578649 (5.6) 1044026 (9.6) 1783921 (15.0)
of which: Non-food credit 15999075 80869 (0.5) 2711704 (20.4) 1451067 (12.3) 2343745 (17.2) 569159 (5.6) 1050270 (9.7) 1819026 (15.4)

Capital Markets 9 February Month Year Financial Year So Far 2022–23 End of Financial Year
2024 Ago Ago Trough Peak Trough Peak 2020–21 2021–22 2022–23
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 1978–79 = 100) 71595.49 (17.7) 71386.21 60806.22 (4.0) 59106.44 73327.94 51360.42 63284.19 49009 (63.7) 57362 (18.4) 58992 (0.7)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 1983–84 = 100) 22693.72 (25.2) 22270.27 18133.11 (2.1) 17644.91 22813.04 15562.65 19137.18 14689 (68.2) 17423 (20.1) 17602 (-0.7)
S&P BSE-200 (1989–90 = 100) 9857.30 (29.3) 9624.41 7621.22 (0.7) 7406.09 9915.11 6602.62 8144.55 6211 (71.1) 7412 (20.9) 7389 (-2.0)
CNX Nifty-50 (Base: 3 November 1995 = 1000) 21782.50 (21.7) 21544.85 17893.45 (2.5) 17398.05 22097.45 15293.50 18812.50 14507 (67.9) 17153 (19.7) 17360 (-0.6)
CNX Nifty-500 19961.50 (32.8) 19459.55 15030.10 (0.1) 14601.95 20109.55 12950.75 16003.95 12149 (73.7) 14652 (22.2) 14558 (-2.3)
Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year. | (-) = not relevant | - = not available | NS = new series | PE = provisional estimates
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW february 17, 2024 vol lix no 7 65
 66
Secondary Market Transactions in Government Securities, Forex Market and Money Market—January 2024
1 Settlement Volume of Government Securities Transactions 2 Netting Factor 3 Instrument-wise Break-up of Securities Transactions (` Cr)
Settlement Outright Repo Daily Average (Outright) Daily Average (Repo) a Securities b Funds a Outright Trades b Repo
Period Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Gross Net Netting Gross Net Netting Central Govt Treasury State Central Govt Treasury State
of Trades (` Cr) of Trades (` Cr) of Trades (` Cr) of Trades (` Cr) (` Cr) (` Cr) Factor (%) (` Cr) (` Cr) Factor (%) Dated Bills Govt Dated Bills Govt
January 2024 78645 1100547 42643 6039056 3745 52407 1854 262568 7139603 2489282 65.13 7212525 638309 91.15 900013 140401 60132 2253584 152881 631136
January 2023 60162 785714 35062 5556922 2865 37415 1524 241605 6342636 2369187 62.65 6346175 623075 90.18 645184 100483 40046 1847475 399367 534608
2023–24^ 804517 11209656 420077 63916929 3983 55493 1875 285343 75126585 27385670 63.55 75773772 6952644 90.82 9131519 1566341 511797 23561142 2197854 6184273
2022–23^ 666368 8242880 329631 54913574 3267 40406 1452 241910 63156454 23490837 62.81 62706753 6728889 89.27 6623821 1132420 486639 19163616 3930219 4378704
4 Tenor-wise Settlement Volume of Central 5 Deal Size Analysis (%) 6 Market Share of Top ‘n’ Securities (%)
Government Dated Securities Settlement Period < 5 Cr 5 Cr > 5 Cr <=10 Cr >10 Cr <=20 Cr > 20 Cr Period January 2024 January 2023 2023–24^ 2022–23^
Year January 2024 2023–24^ 2022–23^ % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total
2024 9035 108410 (1.20) 117233 (1.81) Top 5 73.92 78.14 65.85 73.19
CURRENT STATISTICS

Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value
2025 7396 94421 (1.04) 84175 (1.30) Top 10 85.11 86.49 80.36 83.44
January 2024 4.84 0.36 52.94 18.92 19.15 13.58 7.89 9.62 15.17 57.52
2026 18195 276507 (3.06) 470342 (7.26) Top 15 89.28 90.39 85.54 86.51
2027 27356 490347 (5.42) 532580 (8.22) January 2023 5.95 0.41 56.79 21.74 17.54 13.33 6.70 8.77 13.02 55.75
2023–24^ 4.68 0.31 54.32 19.49 18.35 13.06 7.66 9.38 14.99 57.76 Top 20 91.89 92.32 89.28 88.82
2028 63922 548481 (6.06) 68825 (1.06)
2029 18583 180037 (1.99) 224199 (3.46) 2022–23^ 5.69 0.40 57.64 23.30 17.72 14.19 6.92 9.49 12.03 52.61 8 Market Share of Top Five Members
2030 44716 300304 (3.32) 31671 (0.49) (Category-wise) (%)
2031 3288 27185 (0.30) 135105 (2.09) 7 Intercategory Member Turnover Activity for All Category
Buy Sell Categories January 2024 January 2023 2023–24^ 2022–23^
2032 18184 600290 (6.63) 3466994 (53.54)
2033 441144 4389480 (48.51) 39141 (0.60) Category Outright Reverse Repo TREP Uncollateralised Forex Outright Repo TREP Uncollateralised Forex Cooperative Banks 59.63 60.61 54.90 58.39
2034 2577 44004 (0.49) 29904 (0.46) (Funds Lending) Lending@ Money Market Borrowing@ Money Market Foreign Banks 78.81 64.20 64.70 65.36
2035 4386 40440 (0.45) 237650 (3.67) Lending* Borrowing* Public Sector Banks 76.64 62.35 74.61 68.38
2036 10347 650700 (7.19) 760643 (11.75) Cooperative Banks 1.76 0.15 0.47 55.92** 0.22 1.66 0.58 2.64 3.23** 0.23 Private Sector Banks 71.19 85.42 80.38 83.32
2037 144605 665492 (7.36) 2100 (0.03) Financial Institutions 0.97 0.48 0.94 - 0.03 0.01 0.67 9.47 - 0.01 Mutual Funds 57.59 60.86 50.88 54.37
2038 254 4479 (0.05) 2100 (0.03) Foreign Banks 22.24 40.66 1.90 4.86 40.04 18.91 26.98 4.64 2.22 40.89
2039 514 8135 (0.09) 4349 (0.07) Primary Dealers 88.60 91.09 90.08 87.58
Insurance Companies 3.85 3.17 14.11 - - 2.59 0.00 0.03 - -
2040 288 5908 (0.07) 5391 (0.08) Mutual Funds 9.48 37.65 65.60 - - 7.27 0.00 1.06 - - 9 Market Share of Top ‘n’ Members (%)
2041 398 7492 (0.08) 5933 (0.09)
Others 6.08 0.56 14.85 - - 4.85 2.66 4.43 - - Period January 2024 January 2023 2023–24^ 2022–23^
2042 579 10010 (0.11) 5966 (0.09)
2043 268 7223 (0.08) 5568 (0.09) Primary Dealers 15.64 3.11 0.00 0.00 - 22.32 50.82 5.91 75.18 - Top 5 25.58 27.94 27.48 27.78
2044 1216 8391 (0.09) 5653 (0.09) Private Sector Banks 27.43 7.29 1.35 19.37 32.13 28.78 15.35 25.64 8.32 31.90 Top 10 41.63 43.90 43.08 42.98
2045 563 5643 (0.06) 5138 (0.08) Public Sector Banks 12.56 6.94 0.77 19.86 27.58 13.59 2.93 46.20 11.06 26.96 Top 15 55.24 55.61 55.58 54.82
2046 956 6970 (0.08) 4052 (0.06) Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 Top 20 65.81 65.76 65.11 64.08
2047 253 4351 (0.05) 2100 (0.03)
2048 253 4445 (0.05) 2100 (0.03) 10 Trading Platform Analysis of Outright Trades 12 TREP Trading @
2049 276 6238 (0.07) 5056 (0.08) Period OTC NDS-OM Settlement Period Total Daily Average
2050 570 13949 (0.15) 19754 (0.31) Trades % Share Value (` Cr) % Share Trades % Share Value (` Cr) % Share Trades Value Trades Value
2051 3093 26709 (0.30) 64907 (1.00) January 2024 5275 6.66 260799 23.53 73968 93.34 847780 76.47 January 2024 20878 7519024 908 326914
2052 7846 95246 (1.05) 32749 (0.51) January 2023 21319 8041098 927 349613
2053 33809 148175 (1.64) 1479 (0.02) January 2023 3905 6.35 194879 24.64 57618 93.65 596165 75.36
2054 1461 4359 (0.05) 1480 (0.02) 2023–24^ 52955 6.58 2777638 24.80 752124 93.42 8423390 75.20 2023–24^ 195949 67240560 875 300181
2055 343 3933 (0.04) 3143 (0.05) 2022–23^ 45546 6.82 2094759 25.42 622093 93.18 6144589 74.58 2022–23^ 252301 79936729 1111 352144
2056 202 3087 (0.03) 1424 (0.02) 11 Type-wise Settlement Volume of Government Securities Transactions (` Crore) 13 Top 5 Securities—Basket Repo 14 Top 5 Securities—Special Repo
2057 203 3087 (0.03) 1426 (0.02)
2058 203 3088 (0.03) 1424 (0.02) Period Outright Repo Security Trades Value Rate Security Trades Value Rate
2059 233 4954 (0.05) 2467 (0.04) Proprietary Constituent Proprietary Constituent
7.18% GS 2033 518 200041 6.78 7.18% GS 2033 766 126775 6.74
2060 1179 13074 (0.14) 6703 (0.10) Trades Volume Trades Volume Trades Volume Trades Volume
2061 2479 24424 (0.27) 60053 (0.93) FRB 2028 216 100287 6.77 7.18% GS 2037 447 60649 6.74
January 2024 64905 896903 13740 203644 17643 2347052 3680 690549
2062 2049 56605 (0.63) 25083 (0.39) January 2023 47460 618796 12702 166918 13338 1940906 4260 840543 7.41% GS 2036 215 82831 6.78 8.20% OMC SB 2024 121 50534 6.78
2063 24607 143769 (1.59) (0.00)

february 17, 2024

2023–24^ 636709 8857569 167808 2352087 178625 25627588 31412 6315681 7.36% GS 2052 149 77483 6.79 6.90% OMC SB 2026 119 44805 6.79
2073 2184 8069 (0.09) (0.00)
Total 900013 9047911 (100) 6476060 (100) 2022–23^ 503741 6302069 162627 1940811 130499 19930096 34438 7542442 7.32% GS 2030 252 73989 6.78 7.30% GS 2053 214 32488 6.74
15 Forex Settlement 16 Category-wise Forex Activity—Deal Type
Settlement Period Cash Tom Spot Forward Total Average Netting Factor: Forex Category Cash Tom Spot Forward
Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Gross Net Netting
(` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) ($ Mn) ($ Mn) Factor (%) Foreign Banks 37.80 42.11 39.11 44.79
January 2024 3045 93296 775601 3798 108466 901820 206053 423124 3517065 8238 149183 1245056 221134 774069 6439543 11639 40740 338923 774069 29474 96.19 Public Sector Banks 28.28 21.96 30.62 21.02

vol lix no 7
January 2023 3181 818600 100025 3523 827843 101107 223136 3460078 422432 9675 1447075 178085 239515 6553596 801649 12606 344926 42192 801649 30748 96.16 Private Sector Banks 33.67 35.76 29.95 34.14
17 Forex Deal Size Analysis (%) Cooperative Banks 0.17 0.11 0.33 0.04

EPW
Settlement Period < 1 mn 1 mn > 1 mn <= 5 mn > 5 mn <= 10 mn > 10 mn <= 20 mn > 20 mn
% to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value
Financial Institutions 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00
January 2024 19.85 1.86 60.07 17.18 10.41 9.79 3.58 9.58 1.56 7.57 4.51 54.02
20 Forex Trading Platform: FX Clear (Amount in $)
2023–24^ 21.99 1.87 57.00 14.61 10.47 9.03 3.58 8.61 1.71 7.44 5.26 58.44
Period Spot Daily Average
18 Market Share—Forex (%) 19 Tenor-wise Forward Trade Analysis (%) Trades Value Trades Value
Period January 2024 January 2023 2023–24^ 2022–23^ Settlement Period < 30 Days > 30 Days & <= 90 Days > 90 Days & <= 180 Days > 180 Days & <= 365 Days > 1 Year
% to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total January 2024 42187 25132 2009 1197
Top 5 32.97 32.43 33.39 34.75
Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value January 2023 36009 18307 1715 872
Top 10 55.07 53.14 55.57 55.87 January 2024 14.62 19.19 24.71 29.28 16.95 19.31 40.63 30.34 3.10 1.87
Top 15 72.80 69.05 71.82 70.81 2023–24^ 389479 235683 1928 1167
January 2023 15.94 26.44 23.21 27.85 15.17 15.59 42.91 28.37 2.76 1.75
Top 20 85.19 81.27 83.42 82.26 2023–24^ 16.87 25.82 21.95 26.32 16.46 17.09 41.63 28.76 3.09 2.01 2022–23^ 292859 153144 1436 751
^ Data pertains to April–January. * Call and Term Money Segment; ** Includes Small Finance and Payment Banks; @ 5 November 2018 onwards; (i) Figures in brackets are percentage to total; (ii) Tables 1 to 11 relate to Government Securities Market; (iii) Tables 12 to 14 relate to Money Market; and (iv) Tables 15 to 20
EPW Research Foundation

Economic & Political Weekly

relate to Forex Market. Source: Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).