G.R. No.

165545 March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

n 1955, Clemente Bailon contracted marriage with Alice P. Diaz in Barcelona, Sorsogon. After 15 years Bailon filed
beofre the Court of First Instance a petition to declare Alice presumptively dead. The CFI granted the petition. After
13 years from the granting of the petition Bailon contracted another marriage with Teresita Jarque. Bailon died soon
after and since he was a member of the SSS, Teresita filed a claim for funeral benefits and was granted P 12.000.
Siblings Cecilia and Norma who claimed to be daughters of Bailon and a certain Elisa Jayona contested the release of
funeral benefits, submitting an affidavit stating that Alice was very much alive. A certain Hermes Diaz who was the
brother of Alice likewise filed an affidavit claiming the same.

The SSS then cancelled the payment of the funeral expenses and death pension, ordering Teresita to return the P
12,000. Their ground was that the granted petition to declare Alice presumptively dead was not final, and that Bailon
who deserted his wife in bad faith made the subsequent marriage bigamous and therefore void. Alice herself also
reappeared, asserting that she was the lawful wife of Bailon, and that she was not really absent since she just lived
with her parents in the same town of Barcelona.

The SSC then found Teresita as a common-law wife and therefore not entitled to Bailon's benefits. In a petition brought
about by the respondent before the Court of Appeals, the appellate court sided with the respondent, saying that the
SSS wrongly declared the marriage null and void since only competent courts can nullify a second marriage and that
second marriage contracted by person with absent spouse endures until annulled. Hence the petition

Issue:

Whether or not Bailon and Jarque's marriage was invalid seeing that Alice was not... quite dead yet?

Ruling:

Second marriages in which springs from the first spouse of one of the parties is presumed dead is deemed valid until
proven otherwise by a competent court. In this the SSS erred in its judgment. According to law, the recording of the
affidavit of reappearance will terminate subsequent marriages. Such absentee's mere reappearance, even if made
known to spouses in subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage. Presumption of the validity of the second
marriage continues in spite of the spouse's physical reappearance and by fiction of law must still be regarded as an
absentee. If subsequent marriage is not terminated by affidavit of reappearance but by death, the marriage cannot be
questioned except by direct action for annulment. Voidable marriages cannot be assailed collaterally, and can only be
assailed during the lifetimes of the parties. Upon the death of either party, the marriage is deemed good ab initio.
Respondent is rightful spouse beneficiary of Bailon.
G.R. No. 165545 March 24, 2006

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, Petitioner,

vs.
TERESITA JARQUE VDA. DE BAILON, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

The Court of Appeals Decision1 dated June 23, 20042 and Resolution dated September 28,
20043 reversing the Resolution dated April 2, 20034 and Order dated June 4, 20035 of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) in SSC Case No. 4-15149-01 are challenged in the present petition for
review on certiorari.

On April 25, 1955, Clemente G. Bailon (Bailon) and Alice P. Diaz (Alice) contracted marriage in
Barcelona, Sorsogon.6

More than 15 years later or on October 9, 1970, Bailon filed before the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Sorsogon a petition7 to declare Alice presumptively dead.

By Order of December 10, 1970,8 the CFI granted the petition, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, there being no opposition filed against the petition notwithstanding the publication of
the Notice of Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the country, Alice Diaz is hereby
declared to [sic] all legal intents and purposes, except for those of succession, presumptively dead.

SO ORDERED.9 (Underscoring supplied)

Close to 13 years after his wife Alice was declared presumptively dead or on August 8, 1983, Bailon
contracted marriage with Teresita Jarque (respondent) in Casiguran, Sorsogon.10

On January 30, 1998, Bailon, who was a member of the Social Security System (SSS) since 1960
and a retiree pensioner thereof effective July 1994, died.11

Respondent thereupon filed a claim for funeral benefits, and was granted P12,00012 by the SSS.

Respondent filed on March 11, 1998 an additional claim for death benefits 13 which was also granted
by the SSS on April 6, 1998.14

Cecilia Bailon-Yap (Cecilia), who claimed to be a daughter of Bailon and one Elisa Jayona (Elisa)
contested before the SSS the release to respondent of the death and funeral benefits. She claimed
that Bailon contracted three marriages in his lifetime, the first with Alice, the second with her mother
Elisa, and the third with respondent, all of whom are still alive; she, together with her siblings, paid
for Bailon’s medical and funeral expenses; and all the documents submitted by respondent to the
SSS in support of her claims are spurious.

In support of her claim, Cecilia and her sister Norma Bailon Chavez (Norma) submitted an Affidavit
dated February 13, 199915 averring that they are two of nine children of Bailon and Elisa who
cohabited as husband and wife as early as 1958; and they were reserving their right to file the
necessary court action to contest the marriage between Bailon and respondent as they personally
know that Alice is "still very much alive."16

In the meantime, on April 5, 1999, a certain Hermes P. Diaz, claiming to be the brother and guardian
of "Aliz P. Diaz," filed before the SSS a claim for death benefits accruing from Bailon’s death, 17 he
further attesting in a sworn statement18 that it was Norma who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses.

Elisa and seven of her children19 subsequently filed claims for death benefits as Bailon’s
beneficiaries before the SSS.20

Atty. Marites C. de la Torre of the Legal Unit of the SSS Bicol Cluster, Naga City recommended the
cancellation of payment of death pension benefits to respondent and the issuance of an order for the
refund of the amount paid to her from February 1998 to May 1999 representing such benefits; the
denial of the claim of Alice on the ground that she was not dependent upon Bailon for support during
his lifetime; and the payment of the balance of the five-year guaranteed pension to Bailon’s
beneficiaries according to the order of preference provided under the law, after the amount
erroneously paid to respondent has been collected. The pertinent portions of the Memorandum read:

1. Aliz [sic] Diaz never disappeared. The court must have been misled by misrepresentation
in declaring the first wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz, as presumptively dead.

xxxx

x x x the Order of the court in the "Petition to Declare Alice Diaz Presumptively Dead," did
not become final. The presence of Aliz [sic] Diaz, is contrary proof that rendered it invalid.

xxxx

3. It was the deceased member who abandoned his wife, Aliz [sic] Diaz. He, being in bad
faith, and is the deserting spouse, his remarriage is void, being bigamous.

xxxx

In this case, it is the deceased member who was the deserting spouse and who remarried, thus his
marriage to Teresita Jarque, for the second time was void as it was bigamous. To require affidavit of
reappearance to terminate the second marriage is not necessary as there is no disappearance of
Aliz [sic] Diaz, the first wife, and a voidable marriage [sic], to speak of.21 (Underscoring supplied)

In the meantime, the SSS Sorsogon Branch, by letter of August 16, 2000,22 advised respondent that
as Cecilia and Norma were the ones who defrayed Bailon’s funeral expenses, she should return
the P12,000 paid to her.

In a separate letter dated September 7, 1999,23 the SSS advised respondent of the cancellation of
her monthly pension for death benefits in view of the opinion rendered by its legal department that
her marriage with Bailon was void as it was contracted while the latter’s marriage with Alice was still
subsisting; and the December 10, 1970 CFI Order declaring Alice presumptively dead did not
become final, her "presence" being "contrary proof" against the validity of the order. It thus requested
respondent to return the amount of P24,000 representing the total amount of monthly pension she
had received from the SSS from February 1998 to May 1999.
Respondent protested the cancellation of her monthly pension for death benefits by letter to the SSS
dated October 12, 1999.24 In a subsequent letter dated November 27, 199925 to the SSC, she
reiterated her request for the release of her monthly pension, asserting that her marriage with Bailon
was not declared before any court of justice as bigamous or unlawful, hence, it remained valid and
subsisting for all legal intents and purposes as in fact Bailon designated her as his beneficiary.

The SSS, however, by letter to respondent dated January 21, 2000,26 maintained the denial of her
claim for and the discontinuance of payment of monthly pension. It advised her, however, that she
was not deprived of her right to file a petition with the SSC.

Respondent thus filed a petition27 against the SSS before the SSC for the restoration to her of her
entitlement to monthly pension.

In the meantime, respondent informed the SSS that she was returning, under protest, the amount
of P12,000 representing the funeral benefits she received, she alleging that Norma and her siblings
"forcibly and coercively prevented her from spending any amount during Bailon’s wake."28

After the SSS filed its Answer29 to respondent’s petition, and the parties filed their respective Position
Papers, one Alicia P. Diaz filed an Affidavit30 dated August 14, 2002 with the SSS Naga Branch
attesting that she is the widow of Bailon; she had only recently come to know of the petition filed by
Bailon to declare her presumptively dead; it is not true that she disappeared as Bailon could have
easily located her, she having stayed at her parents’ residence in Barcelona, Sorsogon after she
found out that Bailon was having an extramarital affair; and Bailon used to visit her even after their
separation.

By Resolution of April 2, 2003, the SSC found that the marriage of respondent to Bailon was void
and, therefore, she was "just a common-law-wife." Accordingly it disposed as follows,
quoted verbatim:

WHEREFORE, this Commission finds, and so holds, that petitioner Teresita Jarque-Bailon is not the
legitimate spouse and primary beneficiary of SSS member Clemente Bailon.

Accordingly, the petitioner is hereby ordered to refund to the SSS the amount of P24,000.00
representing the death benefit she received therefrom for the period February 1998 until May 1999
as well as P12,000.00 representing the funeral benefit.

The SSS is hereby ordered to pay Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit arising
from the demise of SSS member Clemente Bailon in accordance with Section 8(e) and (k) as well as
Section 13 of the SS Law, as amended, and its prevailing rules and regulations and to inform this
Commission of its compliance herewith.

SO ORDERED.31 (Underscoring supplied)

In so ruling against respondent, the SSC ratiocinated.

After a thorough examination of the evidence at hand, this Commission comes to the inevitable
conclusion that the petitioner is not the legitimate wife of the deceased member.

xxxx
There is x x x ample evidence pointing to the fact that, contrary to the declaration of the then CFI of
Sorsogon (10th Judicial District), the first wife never disappeared as the deceased member
represented in bad faith. This Commission accords credence to the findings of the SSS contained in
its Memorandum dated August 9, 1999,32 revealing that Alice (a.k.a. Aliz) Diaz never left Barcelona,
Sorsogon, after her separation from Clemente Bailon x x x.

As the declaration of presumptive death was extracted by the deceased member using artifice and
by exerting fraud upon the unsuspecting court of law, x x x it never had the effect of giving the
deceased member the right to marry anew. x x x [I]t is clear that the marriage to the petitioner is
void, considering that the first marriage on April 25, 1955 to Alice Diaz was not previously annulled,
invalidated or otherwise dissolved during the lifetime of the parties thereto. x x x as determined
through the investigation conducted by the SSS, Clemente Bailon was the abandoning spouse, not
Alice Diaz Bailon.

xxxx

It having been established, by substantial evidence, that the petitioner was just a common-law
wife of the deceased member, it necessarily follows that she is not entitled as a primary beneficiary,
to the latter’s death benefit. x x x

xxxx

It having been determined that Teresita Jarque was not the legitimate surviving spouse and primary
beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, it behooves her to refund the total amount of death benefit she
received from the SSS for the period from February 1998 until May 1999 pursuant to the principle
of solutio indebiti x x x

Likewise, it appearing that she was not the one who actually defrayed the cost of the wake and
burial of Clemente Bailon, she must return the amount of P12,000.00 which was earlier given to her
by the SSS as funeral benefit.33 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration34 having been denied by Order of June 4, 2003, she filed a
petition for review35 before the Court of Appeals (CA).

By Decision of June 23, 2004, the CA reversed and set aside the April 2, 2003 Resolution and June
4, 2003 Order of the SSC and thus ordered the SSS to pay respondent all the pension benefits due
her. Held the CA:

x x x [T]he paramount concern in this case transcends the issue of whether or not the decision of the
then CFI, now RTC, declaring Alice Diaz presumptively dead has attained finality but, more
importantly, whether or not the respondents SSS and Commission can validly re-evaluate the
findings of the RTC, and on its own, declare the latter’s decision to be bereft of any basis. On similar
import, can respondents SSS and Commission validly declare the first marriage subsisting and the
second marriage null and void?

xxxx

x x x while it is true that a judgment declaring a person presumptively dead never attains finality as
the finding that "the person is unheard of in seven years is merely a presumption juris tantum," the
second marriage contracted by a person with an absent spouse endures until annulled. It is only the
competent court that can nullify the second marriage pursuant to Article 87 of the Civil Code and
upon the reappearance of the missing spouse, which action for annulment may be filed. Nowhere
does the law contemplates [sic] the possibility that respondent SSS may validly declare the second
marriage null and void on the basis alone of its own investigation and declare that the decision of the
RTC declaring one to be presumptively dead is without basis.

Respondent SSS cannot arrogate upon itself the authority to review the decision of the regular
courts under the pretext of determining the actual and lawful beneficiaries of its members.
Notwithstanding its opinion as to the soundness of the findings of the RTC, it should extend due
credence to the decision of the RTC absent of [sic] any judicial pronouncement to the contrary. x x x

x x x [A]ssuming arguendo that respondent SSS actually possesses the authority to declare the
decision of the RTC to be without basis, the procedure it followed was offensive to the principle of
fair play and thus its findings are of doubtful quality considering that petitioner Teresita was not given
ample opportunity to present evidence for and her behalf.

xxxx

Respondent SSS is correct in stating that the filing of an Affidavit of Reappearance with the Civil
Registry is no longer practical under the premises. Indeed, there is no more first marriage to restore
as the marital bond between Alice Diaz and Clemente Bailon was already terminated upon the
latter’s death. Neither is there a second marriage to terminate because the second marriage was
likewise dissolved by the death of Clemente Bailon.

However, it is not correct to conclude that simply because the filing of the Affidavit of Reappearance
with the Civil Registry where parties to the subsequent marriage reside is already inutile, the
respondent SSS has now the authority to review the decision of the RTC and consequently declare
the second marriage null and void.36 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The SSC and the SSS separately filed their Motions for Reconsideration 37 which were both denied
for lack of merit.

Hence, the SSS’ present petition for review on certiorari38 anchored on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING

TO LACK OF JURISDICTION.39

The SSS faults the CA for failing to give due consideration to the findings of facts of the SSC on the
prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice; in disregarding the authority of the SSC to
determine to whom, between Alice and respondent, the death benefits should be awarded pursuant
to Section 540 of the Social Security Law; and in declaring that the SSS did not give respondent due
process or ample opportunity to present evidence in her behalf.

The SSS submits that "the observations and findings relative to the CFI proceedings are of no
moment to the present controversy, as the same may be considered only as obiter dicta in view of
the SSC’s finding of the existence of a prior and subsisting marriage between Bailon and Alice by
virtue of which Alice has a better right to the death benefits."41

The petition fails.

That the SSC is empowered to settle any dispute with respect to SSS coverage, benefits and
contributions, there is no doubt. In so exercising such power, however, it cannot review, much less
reverse, decisions rendered by courts of law as it did in the case at bar when it declared that the
December 10, 1970 CFI Order was obtained through fraud and subsequently disregarded the same,
making its own findings with respect to the validity of Bailon and Alice’s marriage on the one hand
and the invalidity of Bailon and respondent’s marriage on the other.

In interfering with and passing upon the CFI Order, the SSC virtually acted as an appellate court.
The law does not give the SSC unfettered discretion to trifle with orders of regular courts in the
exercise of its authority to determine the beneficiaries of the SSS.

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity on August 3, 1988
of the Family Code, the applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law
in effect at the time of their celebration.42

Article 83 of the Civil Code43 provides:

Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse
of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null
and void by a competent court. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under the foregoing provision of the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved or contracted under any of the three exceptional circumstances. It bears noting that the
marriage under any of these exceptional cases is deemed valid "until declared null and void by a
competent court." It follows that the onus probandi in these cases rests on the party assailing the
second marriage.44

In the case at bar, as found by the CFI, Alice had been absent for 15 consecutive years45 when
Bailon sought the declaration of her presumptive death, which judicial declaration was not even a
requirement then for purposes of remarriage.46

Eminent jurist Arturo M. Tolentino (now deceased) commented:

Where a person has entered into two successive marriages, a presumption arises in favor of the
validity of the second marriage, and the burden is on the party attacking the validity of the second
marriage to prove that the first marriage had not been dissolved; it is not enough to prove the first
marriage, for it must also be shown that it had not ended when the second marriage was
contracted. The presumption in favor of the innocence of the defendant from crime or wrong and of
the legality of his second marriage, will prevail over the presumption of the continuance of life of the
first spouse or of the continuance of the marital relation with such first spouse.47 (Underscoring
supplied)

Under the Civil Code, a subsequent marriage being voidable,48 it is terminated by final judgment of
annulment in a case instituted by the absent spouse who reappears or by either of the spouses in
the subsequent marriage.

Under the Family Code, no judicial proceeding to annul a subsequent marriage is necessary. Thus
Article 42 thereof provides:

Art. 42. The subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall be automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse, unless there is
a judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.

A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of reappearance shall be recorded in the civil
registry of the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the instance of any interested
person, with due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to the
fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case such fact is disputed. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The termination of the subsequent marriage by affidavit provided by the above-quoted provision of
the Family Code does not preclude the filing of an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage. 49

If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses
in the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.50 Since the second marriage has been
contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues
inspite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided by law.51

If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by

judicial declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, Tolentino submits:

x x x [G]enerally if a subsequent marriage is dissolved by the death of either spouse, the effects of
dissolution of valid marriages shall arise. The good or bad faith of either spouse can no longer be
raised, because, as in annullable or voidable marriages, the marriage cannot be questioned except
in a direct action for annulment.52 (Underscoring supplied)

Similarly, Lapuz v. Eufemio53 instructs:

In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And
furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable
marriage must be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse," as
expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment
proceeding.54 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears reiterating that a voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a direct
proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and
not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage
had been perfectly valid.55 Upon the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio.56

In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-
beneficiary of Bailon.

In light of the foregoing discussions, consideration of the other issues raised has been rendered
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of
the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There
was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he
claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and
if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
 according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has
an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into
by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

 I

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is
a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be
came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May
22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been
only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation
of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding
about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988
to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Mendoza, JJ., concur.