Memory & Cognition (2022) 50:641–654

https://doi.org/10.3758/s13421-021-01211-z

Episodic-semantic interactions in spontaneous thought

Magda Jordão 1 & Peggy L. St. Jacques 2

Accepted: 15 July 2021 / Published online: 9 August 2021

# The Psychonomic Society, Inc. 2021

Abstract
The distinction between a semantic memory system, encompassing conceptual knowledge, and an episodic memory system,
characterized by specific episodes, is one of the most important theoretical proposals in cognitive science. However, the
distinction between systems has rarely been discussed in relation to spontaneous thought that comes to mind with reduced
cognitive effort and intentionality. In this review, we propose that the growing research on spontaneous thought can contribute
to current discussions on the interaction between the episodic and semantic systems. Firstly, we review research that shows that,
as in deliberate retrieval, spontaneous thoughts are influenced by both episodic and semantic memory, as reflected by the mix of
semantic and episodic elements in descriptions of spontaneous thoughts, as well as semantic priming effects in spontaneous
thoughts. We integrate the current evidence based on the interplay between cues and semantic activation. Namely, we suggest
that cues are key to access episodic memory and modulate the frequency of spontaneous thought, while semantic activation
modulates the content of spontaneous thought. Secondly, we propose that spontaneous retrieval is a privileged area to explore the
question of functional independence between systems, because it provides direct access to the episodic system. We review the
evidence for spontaneous thought in semantic dementia, which suggests that episodic and semantic systems are functionally
independent. We acknowledge the scarcity of evidence and suggest that future studies examine the contents of spontaneous
thought descriptions and their neural correlates to test the functional relationship and inform the interaction between episodic and
semantic systems.

Keywords Spontaneous thought . Involuntary autobiographical memory . Priming . Episodic memory . Semantic memory

Introduction Maillet & Schacter, 2016) and in a handbook entirely dedicat-

Over the past 15 years, a new area of research has emerged
that focuses on spontaneous thoughts, generally defined as
mental contents that come to mind with reduced effort, inten-
tion and control (Christoff et al., 2016; Cole & Kvavilashvili,
2019). Recently, there has been an effort to systematize the
growing evidence on spontaneous thought, in publications
suggesting alternative theoretical frameworks (Ciaramelli &
Treves, 2019; Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2021; Mildner &
Tamir, 2019), reviews examining age-related differences in
spontaneous thoughts (Jordão, Ferreira-Santos, et al., 2019;
* Magda Jordão
magda.jordao@gmail.com
1 as described by participants (e.g., Jordão et al., 2020; Jordão, Pinho, & St.
Academic Unit for Ageing and Stroke Research, Bradford Institute
for Health Research, Bradford Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation
Trust and University of Leeds, Bradford, UK
2
Department of Psychology, University of Alberta,
Edmonton, Canada
ed to the area (Christoff & Fox, 2018). The involvement of the
episodic and semantic memory systems has been an important
part of this discussion, as authors attempt to explain how
spontaneous thoughts occur (Berntsen & Hall, 2004;
Mildner & Tamir, 2019; Mills et al., 2018) (for proposals
less focused on the episodic and semantic memory systems,
see also Barzykowski, Radel, et al., 2019b; Mazzoni, 2019;
Vannucci et al., 2019). Here, we focus on how research on
spontaneous thought about the past and/or future1 (and previ-
ous considerations about its reliance on the episodic and se-
mantic memory systems) can contribute to the discussion of
the episodic-semantic interaction, namely to the functional
independence between systems.
1
Please note that spontaneous thought may be atemporal or about the present
Jacques, 2019; Vannucci et al., 2017). Conceptually, there is a variety of
thoughts that may occur spontaneously, and have been associated with the
default-mode network, that may be atemporal or restricted to the present, such
as metacognitive thoughts or appraisals of one’s own mental state (for different
types of mental content see, e.g., O’Callaghan et al., 2015).
642
Most of the previous research discussed here has focused
on spontaneous thoughts about the past, and to a lesser extent,
about the future. Following from the definition of spontaneous
thought mentioned above, these are mental contents about the
past and future that are experienced as less dependent on ef-
fort, intention, and control (Christoff et al., 2016; Cole &
Kvavilashvili, 2019). This broad definition includes involun-
tary autobiographical memories and future thoughts, which
are defined as past events and images of the future that come
to mind without a previous attempt to recall or imagine (e.g.,
Berntsen et al., 2015). For that reason, research on involuntary
autobiographical memory and future thoughts is considered
an important part of this discussion, and henceforth referred
to as spontaneous past and future thought.
The current review is organized around four main sections.
First, we provide an introduction to the episodic-semantic inter-
action debate, defining the key concepts, summarizing recent
theoretical proposals, and highlighting the question of the func-
tional dependence (or independence) between episodic and se-
mantic memory systems. Second, we show that in spontaneous
as in deliberate thought, there is evidence for an interaction be-
tween episodic and semantic memory systems. To do this, we
review research related to semantic priming and the descriptions
of spontaneous thought. Despite the interaction between episodic
and semantic systems, we conclude that the overall evidence
indicates that direct access to the episodic memory system is at
the core of spontaneous past and future thought occurrence.
Third, we suggest that studying spontaneous past and future
thought is a unique avenue to explore the episodic-semantic in-
teraction. To analyze the functional independence of the episodic
memory system in spontaneous retrieval, we review evidence on
semantic dementia that suggests past and future episodic
thoughts can be accessed spontaneously when the semantic
memory system is compromised. In conclusion, we highlight
the need for future research and detail ways in which studies
on spontaneous thought could provide key information on how
episodic and semantic elements intertwine.
Theoretical contextualization
In our daily life, we make use of our memories in different
ways. For example, when looking at a cup, most of us can
recall what the purpose of a cup is and how to use it.
Sometimes, a particular cup may also prompt us to remember
the circumstances in which that cup came to be in our posses-
sion – a gift from our mother on our first day in a new house of
our own – and take us back to that moment in time. The first
example highlights that memory reflects knowledge of the
world, whereas the second example shows that memory is
specific and gives us information about what, where, when,
and who, and is likely accompanied by a sense of travelling
back in time. These memories are instances of semantic and
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
episodic memory, respectively, and were first captured by the
groundbreaking work of Endel Tulving (Tulving, 1983).
Semantic memory is defined as knowledge-of-the-world,
without a specific time or sense of personal experience asso-
ciated, whereas episodic memory is defined by a personal
experience of mentally travelling in time to a particular situa-
tion in the past (Tulving, 2002), and supports mental time
travel to the future (Tulving, 2005). Episodic memory is relat-
ed, but distinct from autobiographical memory, which is de-
fined as being about one’s own experiences, and will some-
times overlap with instances of episodic memory that involve
personal experiences (e.g., Conway, 2005; Wheeler et al.,
1997). However, autobiographical memory may also take
the form of knowledge about oneself, without a sense of trav-
elling in time to a particular experience, being closer to se-
mantic than episodic memory (Wheeler et al., 1997).
Autobiographical memory is an important concept in the
current review for several reasons. First, autobiographical
memory research has been pivotal in the episodic-semantic
interaction discussion, by showing that there are personal
memories with both semantic and episodic characteristics
(Renoult et al., 2012). Secondly, theories of autobiographical
memory have suggested hierarchical structures that describe
episodic and semantic memory interactions for personal infor-
mation (e.g., Conway, 2005). Finally, spontaneous thoughts
have been shown to be frequently about self-related content
and thus closely linked to autobiographical memory
(D’Argembeau, 2018). Throughout the review we develop
these aspects, in which episodic, semantic, and autobiograph-
ical memory intersect.
The episodic-semantic distinction was first proposed as a
heuristic that led to important new avenues of research, but
Tulving soon came to believe that these represented, in fact,
functionally and structurally distinct systems (for a historical
review, see Renoult & Rugg, 2020), distinguishable based on
what they do and how they do it (Tulving, 2002), and with
particular neural substrates and behavioral or cognitive corre-
lates (Tulving, 1985). The distinction between episodic and
semantic memory was initially met with resistance, but found
support in evidence from studies of amnesic patients and brain
activation in healthy individuals (for a review, see Tulving,
2002). Currently, a renewed interest is emerging in the ques-
tions about the episodic-semantic distinction and, more impor-
tantly, the interaction between the episodic and semantic
memory systems (Irish & Vatansever, 2020; Renoult et al.,
2012; Renoult et al., 2016; Renoult et al., 2019) – to what
extent do these systems interact? What type of interaction
exists? Does the interaction blur the distinction between sys-
tems? Is there a continuum between them? “A continuum of
what?” (Tulving, 1983, p. 67). In the next section, we explore
these questions, focusing first on defining the episodic-
semantic distinction, in Tulving’s terms, and his understand-
ing of the interaction between these systems. Then, we
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
highlight new evidence that has emerged about the interaction
and new theoretical perspectives developed to accommodate
it.
The episodic-semantic distinction: The question of
functional independence and a new focus on the
interaction
What does it mean to say that the episodic and semantic memory
systems are independent? First, Tulving clearly notes what it
does not mean – that the two memory systems are cut off from
one another. Since the first formulations of Tulving’s theoretical
proposal the interaction between systems has been acknowl-
edged: the “[episodic memory] operations require, but go be-
yond, the semantic memory system” (Tulving, 2002, p. 5).
Tulving distinguished the interaction of the two systems at
encoding compared to retrieval. At encoding, when we are learn-
ing new information, the semantic memory system is necessary
for events to then be encoded in the episodic memory system. In
simpler terms – if we cannot learn the concept of a train (semantic
memory system), how can we learn the experience of travelling
in one for the first time (episodic memory system)? At retrieval,
however, the relationship between the two systems can be differ-
ent. When information already learned comes to mind, this can
involve both semantic and episodic memory systems, or only
one of them (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998), that is, the systems
can function independently. This clearly does not mean that the
systems are mutually exclusive and will not interact, but that they
do not necessarily have to. Additionally, this means that although
one system may function worse when the other is compromised,
they should not be affected to the same degree (Tulving, 1983).
This prediction was analyzed in case studies of patients who
endured damage in the neural structures that support episodic
memory (e.g., hippocampal damage), in particular the case of
patient KC (Rosenbaum et al., 2005). Of note, KC showed pre-
served general and personal knowledge acquired before neural
damage, but was unable to recall and re-experience personal
experiences, in line with a selective damage in the episodic mem-
ory system and the functional independence of systems.
Functional independence was further supported by evidence
from neural activation that points to the brain lateralization of
functions associated predominantly with semantic versus episod-
ic memory (Habib et al., 2003, but see more recent evidence
below), and other cases of developmental (vs. acquired) amnesia
(Baddeley et al., 2001). Recently, alternative findings and ideas
have renewed the interest in these systems and focused on the
episodic-semantic interaction.
Renoult et al. (2019) recently reviewed the literature on the
episodic-semantic interaction and concluded that the systems
are "inextricably intertwined" (p. 1052). In particular, they
discussed evidence showing (1) the mix of semantic and epi-
sodic elements in personal narratives (personal semantics,
Renoult et al., 2012), (2) the neural activation overlap shown
643
by functional neuroimaging (e.g., Burianova et al., 2010; Kim,
2016), and (3) the crucial supporting role of semantic memory
in episodic future thinking (Irish & Piguet, 2013). It is possible
that the two systems work so closely and dynamically that
they cannot be distinguished. Alternatively, it is possible that
the current evidence reflects episodic and semantic memory
systems being independently engaged during the same task.
One particular difficulty in understanding the episodic-
semantic interaction relates to the process of selecting a par-
ticular memory. Most of the previous research relies on mem-
ory tasks in which participants are asked to remember specific
episodes and will frequently rely on their deliberate attempt to
remember (but, see Ball, 2007; Barzykowski, Niedźwieńska,
& Mazzoni, 2019a). Theory and evidence (e.g., Conway,
2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Prebble et al.,
2013) suggest that retrieval of a particular episode relies on
progressively moving through a knowledge hierarchy that
starts by accessing more semanticized forms of autobiograph-
ical memory, including lifetime periods and general events,
before accessing specific episodes that constitute episodic
memory. A similar hierarchical process has been suggested
to be the basis of episodic future thinking (Conway et al.,
2019; Irish, 2016). This contrasts with past and future
thoughts that come to mind without previous intent (e.g.,
Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008). In the following sections, we
argue that considering episodic-semantic memory in past
and future spontaneous thoughts can provide a unique way
to understand the functional interdependence of these systems,
when compared to the large majority of research in this area
focused on deliberate retrieval.
Spontaneous thought
and the episodic-semantic interaction
Spontaneous past thought was recognized since the earliest
experimental research on memory, and was described by
Ebbinghaus in 1885 as coming to mind “with apparent spon-
taneity and without any act of the will” (Ebbinghaus, 2013, p.
1). Only much later, however, the first experimental attempts
to understand this phenomenon were developed, based on
concepts from involuntary autobiographical memory (for a
review, see Berntsen, 2009) and daydreaming research
(Singer, 1975); and the discussion about how to better under-
stand spontaneous thought is still ongoing (Christoff et al.,
2018; Seli, Kane, et al., 2018; Seli, Kane, Metzinger, et al.,
2018). Here, we define spontaneous thought based on the
reduced effort and intention with which it comes to mind (in
line with Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2019). The less effortful na-
ture of spontaneous past and future thought is supported by
evidence demonstrating that (1) spontaneous past and future
thoughts come to mind faster than voluntary past and future
thoughts (Cole et al., 2016; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili,
644
2008), (2) children between 3 and 4 years old report sponta-
neous past and future thoughts, despite strategic cognitive
ability not being developed at that age (Caza & Atance,
2019; Hjuler et al., 2021; Krøjgaard et al., 2014; Krøjgaard
et al., 2017; Sonne et al., 2019, 2020), (3) older adults with
dementia report detailed spontaneous past thoughts, despite
significant executive function decline (Miles et al., 2013),
and (4) neural correlates of spontaneous past thoughts show
a reduced involvement of areas associated with strategic pro-
cessing, compared to voluntary memory (N. M. Hall et al.,
2008; S. A. Hall et al., 2014).
In the absence of an effortful strategic search, several
mechanisms have been suggested to explain how spontaneous
past and future thoughts occur, including processes of cue-
item discriminability (Berntsen, 2009; Staugaard &
Berntsen, 2014) and, more recently, semantic to autobio-
graphical memory priming (Mace et al., 2019). These mech-
anisms emphasize the role of the episodic and semantic mem-
ory systems, respectively, and are thus particularly important
for the discussion of the episodic-semantic interaction.
Direct access to the episodic memory system: The cue-
item discriminability mechanism
Cue-item discriminability refers to the ability of a cue to isolate a
specific memory (Rubin, 1995), and is particularly important to
explain the emergence of spontaneous past and future thoughts
(Berntsen, 2009). This mechanism was first suggested to explain
spontaneous past thoughts and builds upon the encoding speci-
ficity principle, which states that an episodic memory is more
likely to be retrieved in the presence of a retrieval cue with which
it overlaps (Moscovitch, 1995; Tulving & Thomson, 1973). This
overlap provides direct access to specific events or the episodic
memory system (Conway, 2005; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). However, the ability of a cue to isolate a specific memory
does not depend only on an overlap between the cue and the
memory, but also on the unique relationship between them. This
has been suggested by the concept of cue overload (Watkins &
Watkins, 1975), which refers to a decrease in the probability of a
cue to elicit a memory as the number of different memories
associated with the cue increases (for a similar demonstration,
named as the fan effect, see Anderson, 1974). For example,
London bridge may be uniquely associated with the memory
of walking around London during a single visit to the city.
However, if one lives in London and crosses the London bridge
daily, it will overlap with numerous memories. In both situations,
there is an overlap between the cue and the memory, but only in
the first case is there a unique link between the two. The unique
link is likely to isolate a specific memory, which supports the
view that cue-item discriminability provides direct access to the
episodic system.
The cue-item discriminability mechanism refers to the need
for a unique and distinctive link between the cue and the
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
thought that it elicits, and can explain the occurrence of spon-
taneous past thoughts in both naturalistic (e.g., Berntsen,
1996; Berntsen, 1998) and laboratory settings (e.g., Berntsen
et al., 2013; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Supporting
this idea, several studies have shown that spontaneous past
and future thoughts are frequently associated with a specific
cue identified by participants as triggering the thought (e.g.,
Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Cole et al., 2016; Plimpton et al.,
2015; Schlagman et al., 2007; but see Warden et al., 2019),
and the thoughts that are elicited are specific in nature (e.g.,
Berntsen & Hall, 2004; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Cole
et al., 2016; Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010; Schlagman &
Kvavilashvili, 2008), suggesting that cues that trigger sponta-
neous thoughts are highly discriminable. Additionally, the
frequency of spontaneous past thoughts has also been success-
fully manipulated via cue-item discriminability (Berntsen
et al., 2013; Staugaard & Berntsen, 2014). For example,
Berntsen et al. (2013) manipulated cue-item discriminability
by systematically pairing unique or repeated cues (sounds)
and scenes (pictures). These stimuli were presented first in
an encoding task, which was followed by a separate task in
which sounds were presented on their own. According to the
cue-item discriminability mechanism, the authors predicted
that a unique cue coupled with a unique scene (e.g., the sound
of a particular dog barking in an area of the town you visited
o nc e ) w o u l d c o r r es p o nd t o th e h i g h e s t l e v e l o f
discriminability, and more frequently result in a spontaneous
past thought when the sound cue is presented on its own.
Other pairings of unique and repeated cues and scenes
would produce lower levels of discriminability and result in
fewer spontaneous past thoughts. Consistent with their
prediction, Berntsen et al. (2013) showed that spontaneous
past thoughts were more frequent for unique cues. In sum,
these findings provide strong evidence for cue-item discrimi-
nability as a key mechanism to explain the emergence of
spontaneous past and future thoughts.
Cue-item discriminability might occur through pattern
completion, whereby a part of a memory prompts the emer-
gence of related information and of the memory as a whole, a
mechanism that has recently been suggested to explain the
emergence of spontaneous thoughts (Mills et al., 2018).
Although this evidence indicates that spontaneous retrieval
processes favor access to the episodic memory system, re-
search on the impact of semantic priming raises new questions
about this conclusion, as we review in the next section.
Semantic modulation: Semantic information in
spontaneous thought, priming effects and semantic-
to-autobiographical memory activation
Not all spontaneous past and future thoughts are triggered by
an identifiable cue and refer to a specific event. For example,
Faber and D’Mello (2018) analyzed free descriptions of
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
thoughts coming to mind while reading a text or watching a
video, and found that around 14% fell on a semantic memory
category, which included general knowledge like facts, mean-
ing and concepts (“I thought about a scene from both “The
Mummy” and “The Return of the Mummy”, p. 5). In a recent
study, looking at descriptions of spontaneous thoughts, we
found a mix of semantic and episodic elements (Jordão
et al., 2020). These results mirror evidence from deliberate
retrieval showing that descriptions of autobiographical mem-
ories involve both semantic and episodic information (Levine
et al., 2002). Moreover, we found that, based on inter-coder
agreement, some spontaneous thoughts were better character-
ized as repeated or extended personal events. Thus, we also
found evidence for personal semantics in past and future spon-
taneous thoughts. Personal semantics refer to memories that
do not fit in episodic or semantic memory but include variable
elements of both (Renoult et al., 2012). If we understand per-
sonal semantics as evidence for a continuum between seman-
tic and episodic memory systems (Renoult et al., 2012;
Renoult et al., 2016; Renoult et al., 2019), our results suggest
that a similar continuum operates in spontaneous thoughts.
Another example of spontaneous thoughts that do not
refer to specific events are spontaneous semantic memo-
ries, consisting of fragments of semantic knowledge,
which have been suggested to rely on semantic priming,
in particular, long-term priming (Kvavilashvili &
Mandler, 2004). This possibility is in line with semantic
priming research, which shows that priming effects can be
long-lasting and persist in long-term memory (for a
review, see Joordens & Becker, 1997). Several studies
have found that priming can influence spontaneous past
thoughts both inside (Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska,
2018; study 2, Mace & Petersen, 2020) and outside the
lab (Mace, 2005), and can have durable effects that last
several days. In these studies, priming was based on vol-
untarily recalling personal specific memories about a par-
ticular time period (e.g., high school). After this, sponta-
neous past thoughts were recorded and compared between
participants who performed the priming or a control task.
The results showed no changes in the overall frequency of
spontaneous past thoughts (Barzykowski &
Niedźwieńska, 2018; studies 2 and 3, Mace, 2005), or
spontaneous task-unrelated thoughts (study 2, Mace &
Petersen, 2020), but spontaneous past thoughts about the
primed time period were more frequent. This effect is
thought to rely on spreading of activation within the au-
tobiographical memory system, which would include ele-
ments from both episodic and semantic memory systems
(Mace, 2010). More recently, it has been shown that spon-
taneous past thoughts may be primed not only by other
autobiographical memories, but also by semantic memory,
in a process called semantic-to-autobiographical memory
priming (Mace et al., 2019; Mace & Unlu, 2020). Mace
645
et al. (2019) tested the impact of semantic memory prim-
ing on spontaneous past thoughts and found an increase in
the number of spontaneous past thoughts that were related
to the content of the priming. Relatedly, semantic person-
al knowledge can also prime deliberate retrieval of auto-
biographical memories (Sheldon et al., 2020).
Semantic-to-autobiographical priming has been demon-
strated using a variety of priming tasks, suggesting the
robustness and generalizability of this effect. For
example, Mace et al. (2019) used a semantic priming task
that consisted of presenting single words of different
levels of familiarity and asking participants to subjective-
ly rate the degree of familiarity. Some of the words were
selected because they are frequently associated with per-
sonal experiences (e.g., summer), and thus were expected
to be effective primes for autobiographical memories. To
elicit and record spontaneous thoughts, they used a stan-
dard vigilance task paradigm in which participants were
presented with groups of horizontal or vertical lines and
asked to respond when the lines were presented vertically
(based on Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). The presen-
tation also included word cues that the participants were
asked to ignore but which have been shown to trigger
spontaneous thoughts. When spontaneous thoughts oc-
curred, the participants stopped the task and wrote them
down. Mace et al. (2019) found an increase in the number
of spontaneous past thoughts in which content was related
to the primed concepts, and no differences in the number
of spontaneous thoughts overall. In a second study, the
authors used a lexical decision task as semantic memory
priming to minimize the possibility of autobiographical
memory activation during the priming task, and
replicated these findings. Mace and Unlu (2020) also rep-
licated the priming effect with sentences and pictures,
supporting the idea that the effect occurs in various
contexts involving language and visual perception.
Semantic priming effects are also evident when more
abstract concepts are primed. For example, Vannucci
et al. (2019) showed a priming effect using left- and
right-pointing arrows as priming material. The authors
proposed that left-pointing arrows should prime the con-
cept of the past and lead to more spontaneous past
thoughts, while right-pointing arrows should prime the
concept of the future and lead to more spontaneous future
thoughts. To test this idea, the authors embedded left or
right-pointing arrows in the vigilance task previously de-
scribed. They found a greater number of spontaneous past
thoughts when participants were primed with left-pointing
arrows, and more spontaneous future thoughts with right-
pointing arrows. Similar to the studies previously de-
scribed, the overall number of spontaneous thoughts
remained unchanged by the priming procedure. Across
all of these studies priming increased spontaneous
646
thoughts related with the content of the primed concepts,
but not the overall frequency of spontaneous past or task-
unrelated thoughts.2
In sum, the evidence reviewed here demonstrates that spon-
taneous thoughts are also influenced by the semantic memory
system. In fact, Mace and Unlu (2020) suggested that
semantic-to-autobiographical memory priming is a ubiquitous
phenomenon, responsible for the majority of spontaneous past
thoughts in daily life. The essential role of semantic memory
has been similarly emphasized for spontaneous thoughts
(Mildner & Tamir, 2019), where it has been suggested that
the semantic memory system is a scaffold for spontaneous
thought.
Episodic and semantic elements of spontaneous
thought
It is clear from the above evidence that both episodic and
semantic memory play a role in spontaneous thought.
Namely, the cue-item discriminability mechanism activates
episodic memory by eliciting specific spontaneous thoughts,
while semantic memory activation changes the content of
spontaneous thoughts. Cue-item discriminability seems to be
particularly important for determining if a spontaneous past or
future thought occurs. In addition, the frequency of spontane-
ous thought about the past is influenced by other mechanisms
such as attention and intention (Barzykowski &
Niedźwieńska, 2016; Barzykowski, Niedźwieńska, et al.,
2019; Vannucci et al., 2014). The evidence reviewed here also
indicates that spontaneous thoughts are frequently related to
the primed materials, indicating that semantic priming influ-
ences the content of spontaneous thoughts but does not influ-
ence the occurrence of spontaneous thoughts.3 As we review
below, the role of semantic priming and cue-item discrimina-
bility in spontaneous thought is better understood as part of an
interaction that involves both semantic and episodic memory
systems.
We suggest that a parsimonious way of explaining the im-
pact of semantic priming in spontaneous thought is based on
how cue-item discriminability interacts with the availability of
particular memories through spreading activation. Berntsen
2
The absence of an effect of priming on the overall frequency of spontaneous
past and task-unrelated thoughts is not an indication that the semantic-to-
autobiographical priming does not occur. In fact, an effect on content is pre-
cisely what the authors predicted, as clearly stated in their hypothesis that
“semantic activations cause activations of associated autobiographical memo-
ries (e.g., reading the word garden activates a pool of personal memories
surrounding this concept), and this semantic-to-autobiographical priming pro-
cess subsequently influences the content of voluntarily and involuntarily re-
trieved autobiographical memories” (Mace et al., 2019, p. 302).
3
McVay and Kane (2013) found an increase in spontaneous thoughts when
priming participants’ personal goals but in this case the priming was based on
providing cues related to participants’ personal goals. The increased occur-
rence of these thoughts would thus still be in line with cue-item discriminabil-
ity rather than with an effect of previous activation.
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
(2009, pp. 107–110) suggested that there are several factors
that may influence how cues discriminate particular memo-
ries, such as motivation and how recent a memory is (i.e.,
recency). These factors would moderate the availability of
certain memories and thus the likelihood these are recalled
in relation to environmental cues. For example, if I am moti-
vated to start exercising, seeing an advert about trainers may
remind me of an event in which my friend told me about
online physical exercise videos. This does not mean that those
trainers were particularly related to the memory and discrim-
inated it from all other “trainer-related” memories I have.
However, the fact that I am motivated to start exercising acti-
vates memories about that goal, such as the event of talking to
my friend, which in interaction with the cue, becomes the
most distinctive memory. Thus, memories related to personal
goals would be more activated and, because of that, more
readily available (e.g., Johannessen & Berntsen, 2010). If a
cue is related to several competing memories, the availability
of the memory would interact with the cue to isolate that
memory, rendering its spontaneous retrieval more likely. We
found evidence for this mechanism in spontaneous thoughts
by priming personal goals (Jordão, Pinho, et al., 2019). After
priming, participants performed a vigilance task including
common words and, when randomly probed, described their
spontaneous thoughts. We found an increase in spontaneous
future thought after priming, consistent with the close relation-
ship between personal goals and future thoughts
(D’Argembeau, 2016). Importantly, we also showed that the
majority of spontaneous thoughts were cued by the words in
the vigilance task. Again, this was not due to the content of the
cues, which were not specifically about personal goals or the
future, but rather the interaction of the priming activation with
the cues.
It is possible that semantic priming plays a similar role to
motivational priming by making priming-related contents
more available and consequently more likely to be distin-
guished from other thoughts when a cue is encountered (for
similar reasoning, see Barzykowski & Niedźwieńska, 2018).
Indeed, when studying the effect of priming personal goals in
spontaneous thought, we found this exact pattern: the thoughts
were related to an identifiable cue in the majority of cases, and
priming influenced content but not overall frequency (Jordão,
Pinho, et al., 2019). In other studies involving semantic prim-
ing (Mace et al., 2019; Mace & Petersen, 2020), the number of
primed spontaneous past thoughts for which participants iden-
tified a cue was not reported. However, the authors analyzed
different types of cues (more or less related with the original
priming stimuli), which suggests that a considerable amount
of primed spontaneous thoughts were associated with a cue.
This would be in line with an interaction between cue and
priming in which the cue remains a key element in spontane-
ous thought occurrence. Moreover, semantic-to-
autobiographical priming did not change the specific nature
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
of spontaneous past thoughts – these were still mostly specific,
irrespective of priming (with no exceptions in Mace et al.,
2019; Mace & Unlu, 2020). Again, this suggests that semantic
priming does not change the mechanism by which specific
spontaneous past and future thought occurs.
An alternative hypothesis is that the presence of cues might
limit the impact of semantic priming on the occurrence of
spontaneous thought. In this case, if no cues were present,
there might be an increase in the overall frequency of sponta-
neous thought after priming. This would indicate that seman-
tic priming influences not only the content of spontaneous
thoughts, but also prompts the emergence of thoughts that
would not be experienced otherwise. However, current re-
search does not support this idea. In particular, Stawarczyk
et al. (2011) measured the effect of personal goal priming
during a sustained attention task that included only numbers.
They found that participants reported more thoughts about the
future, relating to personal goal priming, but the overall num-
ber of thoughts did not change. This evidence suggests that
priming impacts the content but not the overall frequency of
spontaneous thought, irrespective of the presence and type of
cues used in the elicitation task.
One prediction that follows from our proposal is that if
semantic priming influences cue-item discriminability, as
one of several factors which include recency or motivational
biases, then semantic priming should have a greater effect on
spontaneous thought when the cues are more general. When a
cue is more general, it has the potential to overlap with a
higher number of memories or thoughts such that semantic
priming has a greater impact by increasing the availability of
semantically-related thoughts and isolating them. When a cue
is very specific, it will overlap with fewer thoughts, reducing
the likelihood of semantic impact. In other words, if a cue is
more strongly linked with a particular thought, the increased
availability caused by semantic priming is less important. To
our knowledge there is currently no study that has manipulat-
ed both priming and cues in this way. This could be accom-
plished by analyzing priming effects in paradigms that include
cues with different levels of specificity, as in Uzer and Brown
(2017), or that manipulate cue overlap directly, as in Berntsen
et al. (2013). In Berntsen et al. (2013), a combination of fea-
tures defines a very specific cue, in contrast with the general
verbal cues used in the vigilance tasks in which the priming
effects have been shown (Jordão, Pinho, et al., 2019;
Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008).
In conclusion, the present evidence on the episodic and
semantic elements of spontaneous thought demonstrates an
interplay between systems. Some spontaneous thoughts are
semantic or include semantic elements. At the same time,
current evidence underscores the key role of direct access to
the episodic memory system in order for a spontaneous
thought to occur. The semantic memory system, as in other
types of activation, seems to impact the pool of thoughts that
647
may be directly accessed but does not result in more sponta-
neous thoughts overall. Spontaneous retrieval seems thus par-
ticularly reliant on the episodic memory system and, although
semantic modulation may be involved, this does not always
appear to be required. These characteristics place spontaneous
thought research in a unique position to explore the functional
independence between episodic and semantic memory sys-
tems, as detailed in the next section.
Spontaneous thought as a new approach
to study the functional independence
between episodic and semantic memory
systems
As reviewed in the previous section, behavioral studies indi-
cate that the occurrence of spontaneous thoughts is associated
with a quick and non-effortful access to specific events, which
involves the episodic memory system. Neuropsychological
evidence supports the idea that spontaneous thoughts are a
privileged area to study the functional independence between
episodic and semantic memory systems. For example, episod-
ic spontaneous mind wandering is disrupted in patients with
hippocampal damage in whom the commonly episodic nature
of spontaneous thought is replaced by semantic content
(McCormick et al., 2018). Similarly, hippocampal atrophy in
Alzheimer’s disease has been associated with changes in the
normative profile of mind wandering, which, as in spontane-
ous thought, involves a shift of attention from the environment
to internal mental contents (Smallwood & Schooler, 2015).
People living with Alzheimer’s disease experience more
thoughts about stimuli that are in their environment when
the thought comes to mind, indicating that the mental time-
travel quality of specific spontaneous thought is not as acces-
sible4 (O’Callaghan et al., 2019). Thus, these findings show
the critical role of the episodic memory system in spontaneous
thought.
With respect to the semantic memory system, we suggest
semantics may modulate the content of spontaneous thoughts
or be involved in the voluntary elaboration of a thought that
initially comes to mind spontaneously. The semantic memory
system should also be involved in understanding certain cues,
when these are more general and conceptual. However, if a
cue does not require extensive semantic processing (e.g., a
4
It should be noted that ongoing discussions about the definition of mind
wandering (Christoff et al., 2018; Seli, Kane, et al., 2018; Seli, Kane,
Metzinger, et al., 2018), and differences in the language and concepts used
in mind wandering and involuntary autobiographical memory research, advise
caution when integrating findings from these areas. For example, although
sometimes mind wandering is assumed to be spontaneous, evidence shows
that is not always the case (Seli et al., 2015). Another example is the role of
triggers, which is frequently analyzed in involuntary autobiographical memory
but not in mind-wandering research (Berntsen, 2019; but see Faber &
D’Mello, 2018; McVay & Kane, 2013).
648
personal specific cue, like a personal photograph), we would
expect that the semantic memory system would not be neces-
sary for a spontaneous thought to occur. It is in these cases that
spontaneous thought can be a unique area in which to test the
functional independence between episodic and semantic
memory systems. If the episodic memory system is function-
ally independent, we should find relatively intact spontaneous
thoughts when the semantic memory system is compromised
such as in semantic dementia. Although no studies have di-
rectly analyzed spontaneous thought in semantic dementia,
indirect evidence suggests that spontaneous thoughts are pre-
served, and we review this evidence below.
Voluntary retrieval of specific autobiographical epi-
sodes when very specific cues are provided to prompt
recall and access the episodic memory system directly,
might parallel cue-item discriminability mechanisms dur-
ing spontaneous retrieval to directly access the episodic
memory system. Indeed, personal cues promote fast and
direct retrieval in healthy participants as we would expect
based on cue-item discriminability (Uzer & Brown,
2017). In semantic dementia, several studies have shown
preserved autobiographical memory retrieval for remote
events, when very specific cues such as personal photo-
graphs (Westmacott et al., 2001), or other personal de-
tailed information provided by a close person (Moss
et al., 2003) are used to prompt recall. Based on these
results, we expect that spontaneous thought about the past
will not be impaired in semantic dementia, which would
be in line with the functional independence of the episod-
ic memory system.
Another area of research that provides indirect evidence is
prospective memory (PM). Memory for future intentions has
been shown to partially rely on spontaneous cognitive pro-
cesses. More specifically, while encoding a future action one
intends to perform is certainly intentional, thoughts about
these intentions often come to mind spontaneously in relation
to a particular event (event-based PM, e.g., Scullin et al.,
2010) or a particular time (time-based PM, e.g.,
Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007). For these reasons, prospective
memory has been identified as a key research area to under-
stand spontaneous future thought (Cole & Kvavilashvili,
2019; Kvavilashvili & Rummel, 2020). In semantic dementia,
time-based but not event-based prospective memory is pre-
served (Kamminga et al., 2014). Kamminga et al. (2014) sug-
gested that one reason for this differential pattern of PM in
semantic dementia is that event-based PM relies more on se-
mantic processing (e.g., “When the alarm rings, please put this
notebook on the floor,” requires an understanding of what an
alarm, a notebook and the floor are), whereas in time-based
PM the requirement for semantic processing is reduced (the
trigger for the action is defined by the sense of time, “in 10
minutes”). This interpretation is supported by a strong rela-
tionship between semantic naming and event but not time-
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
based PM (Kamminga et al., 2014).5 It is possible that
event-based PM tasks using very specific personal cues may
bypass these semantic deficits and prompt recall, as in volun-
tary autobiographical memories. However, this possibility has
not yet been explored in semantic dementia research.
The fact that performance in time-based PM seems to be
relatively spared suggests that at least some forms of sponta-
neous future thought are preserved when the semantic mem-
ory system deteriorates, again indicating a functional indepen-
dence of the episodic memory system. Anecdotal descriptions
from semantic dementia case studies also supports this empir-
ical evidence, with reports that some participants were able to
“keep track of appointments” (Hodges et al., 1992). It should
be noted, however, that the possible strategies used by the
participants (e.g., checking a clock) were not analyzed in
Kamminga et al. (2014), and it is thus uncertain to what extent
the preservation of time-based PM may be due to deliberate
strategies used by the participants, in addition to spontaneous
retrieval. Nevertheless, these findings raise the possibility that
spontaneous future thoughts that consist of relatively simple
instructions (buying a present for my mum at the market this
afternoon) versus more elaborate future scenarios (imagining
the family singing Happy Birthday to my mum in her party
this evening) may be accessible even if the semantic memory
system is compromised. It is less likely that spontaneous fu-
ture thoughts that involve more complex events will be pre-
served. In fact, in deliberate retrieval, the semantic memory
system has been found to be an essential scaffold to episodic
future thinking, as shown by its impairment in semantic de-
mentia (Irish, 2016). According to the idea that spontaneous
future thoughts are often based on memories of imagined fu-
ture episodes that have been previously contructed in a delib-
erate manner (Cole & Kvavilashvili, 2021; D'Argembeau &
Mathy, 2011; Jordão et al., 2020), we would expect similar
deficits in spontaneous retrieval in semantic dementia.
Although we found no studies directly analyzing the im-
pact of semantic dementia on spontaneous thought, there are
no reasons to believe that such analysis is methodologically
impossible. At the moment there are several lab paradigms
that have been successfully used to elicit spontaneous
thoughts. Some of these paradigms require little semantic pro-
cessing and should be adaptable to semantic dementia
(Berntsen et al., 2013; Laflamme et al., 2018; O’Callaghan
et al., 2015). It would also be possible to adapt more natural-
istic paradigms that have been used in other contexts. For
example, St. Jacques and Schacter (2013) used a museum tour
5
This relationship also explains why a greater involvement of spontaneous
thought in event- compared to time-based PM, does not translate in better
preservation of the first. Namely, the spontaneous thought processes in
event-based PM rely on cues that are processed semantically. In time-based
PM, spontaneous thoughts may or may not be triggered by cues (Kvavilashvili
& Fisher, 2007), and are thus not necessarily affected by semantic processing
deficits.
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
to create a standardized naturalistic experience and collected
specific visual cues of this experience using a wearable cam-
era. Later, these cues were used to test deliberate retrieval of
episodic memory against similar photographs. It would be
possibile to integrate these photographs in a vigilance task in
which participants are not asked to voluntarily recall any
memories, but are asked to identify occasions in which they
come to mind spontaneously. This would allow measurement
of the preservation or deterioration of spontaneous thought in
semantic dementia compared to controls, and provide key
evidence for the present discussion about the functional inde-
pendence of the episodic memory system.
The potential of spontaneous thought research to inform
the episodic-semantic interaction debate is not restricted to
studying semantic dementia patients. Another important area
of research with healthy participants has to do with the mix of
episodic and semantic information. Based on facilitated access
to the episodic memory system under spontaneous retrieval,
we would expect differences in this episodic-semantic mix,
compared to deliberate retrieval. For example, older adults
frequently show a distinct pattern of episodic and semantic
elements in autobiographical retrieval that includes an in-
crease of semantic information compared to younger adults
(Levine et al., 2002). However, when we looked at episodic
specificity between age groups in spontaneous retrieval, we
found no evidence for differences in specificity (Jordão et al.,
2020). Thus, the age differences in the episodic-semantic in-
teraction seem to be related to the deliberate retrieval process
itself – both younger and older adults deliberately search for
more episodic detail, and younger adults are more successful
in accessing it, while older adults access more general
(semantic) information. This highlights that at least some of
the semantic information included in memory descriptions
does not require reinstatement of this information, which
would indicate a decreased functional independence between
episodic and semantic memory systems (Renoult et al., 2019).
Rather, it is attributable to the deliberate process of recalling,
which engages additional strategies to access detail, and may
be more or less successful.
In the next section we develop suggestions for two areas we
think are particularly important to advance the knowledge in
this field: the analysis of spontaneous thought content and its
evolution over time, from the moment when it first comes to
mind.
Future studies
Exploring spontaneous thought content: Open-ended
methods and the need for adapted coding systems
As exemplified above, the evidence about semantic and epi-
sodic information in spontaneous thought can provide useful
649
contributions to understand the episodic-semantic interaction.
However, there is still scarce evidence about how and how
much do semantic and episodic elements intertwine in spon-
taneous thought descriptions. Methodological factors seem to
be partially responsible for this. First, it is common to measure
the level of specificity of spontaneous thoughts by asking
participants to classify them as specific versus general events,
or as a specific, repeated or extended event (e.g., Barzykowski
& Niedźwieńska, 2018; Cole et al., 2016; Kvavilashvili &
Schlagman, 2011; Plimpton et al., 2015; Schlagman et al.,
2009; Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). A minority of stud-
ies used participants’ descriptions to determine the specificity
of spontaneous thoughts based on categories, such as dichot-
omously distinguishing episodic versus semantic thoughts
(McCormick et al., 2018; Song & Wang, 2012), autobio-
graphical versus semantic memories (Faber & D’Mello,
2018), or a more diverse number of categories from general
knowledge to specific events with detail (El Haj et al., 2012;
Jordão et al., 2020). In contrast, in deliberate retrieval, much
of the research on episodic and semantic information relies on
a detailed analysis of participants’ descriptions, based on the
autobiographical interview (AI, Levine et al., 2002). The AI
provides a reliable method to analyze episodic and semantic
elements within one description. In this analysis, an event that
is specific can still include a variable proportion of episodic
and semantic elements. This level of analysis seems particu-
larly important in spontaneous thought to identify variations
of episodic specificity, given that a high number of specific
events is frequently reported. The AI and related adaptations
(Addis et al., 2008) have contributed, for example, to the un-
derstanding of prospection (Miloyan et al., 2019). Some of the
disadvantages of the AI, namely the fact that it is time and
labor consuming, have now started to be addressed by semi-
automatized transcription and coding (Wardell et al., 2020).
We suggest that one of the key developments in under-
standing spontaneous thought and the episodic-semantic in-
teraction will be in adapting a detailed classification system of
episodic and semantic details, such as the AI, to spontaneous
thoughts. Firstly, this will depend on using open-ended
methods that allow the collection of descriptions of spontane-
ous thoughts as experienced by the participants. A consider-
able amount of the research on spontaneous thoughts has used
probes with forced-choice response options, which limits the
opportunity to analyze episodic and semantic elements (as
well as introducing bias; Jordão, Ferreira-Santos, et al.,
2019; Weinstein, 2017). Recently, Jordano and Touron
(2018) reviewed findings from think-aloud protocols in the
context of spontaneous thought monitoring. We suggest that
think-aloud protocols could also be an important tool to un-
derstand how episodic and semantic elements interact in spon-
taneous thought. Secondly, the development of a detailed clas-
sification system of episodic and semantic details will have to
be adapted to include implicit information, inferred from what
650
was described. We found the presence of implicit information
to be quite frequent in spontaneous thought descriptions
(Jordão et al., 2020), which is reinforced by the fact that in-
ferred information is mentioned in other classifications of
spontaneous thoughts (Faber & D’Mello, 2018, p. 12).
Establishing a standardized way to deal with implicit informa-
tion, and testing its reliability, will be fundamental to the ad-
vancement of the field.
Spontaneous thought evolving over time: Neural
correlates with high time-precision methods
The growing literature on the neural mechanisms of sponta-
neous thoughts in healthy individuals offers a useful way to
understand this episodic-semantic interaction in spontaneous
thought (for a recent review, see Andrews-Hanna et al., 2018).
To investigate the episodic-semantic interaction in spontane-
ous thoughts, we suggest that high time- precision methods,
such as electroencephalography (EEG) and the analysis of
event-related potentials (ERPs) will be particularly important,
in two specific ways. Firstly, to distinguish brain activity as-
sociated with the emergence versus maintenance of a sponta-
neous thought. In fact, a very important issue in spontaneous
thought has to do with distinguishing the processes associated
with its emergence and its maintenance over time
(Smallwood, 2013). In the present review, we hypothesized
that the semantic memory system modulates the content of
spontaneous thought but not its occurrence. This idea could
be tested by using EEG along with vigilance tasks that include
meaningful cues. In this context, the initiation of spontaneous
thoughts is frequently associated with the cues included in the
task, and its time of presentation can be precisely determined
by the experimenter. Thus, ERPs could be used to assess
whether the occurrence of spontaneous thoughts is consistent-
ly associated with activation in brain regions related with the
episodic memory system, independently of more or less
semantic-related activation.
Secondly, analyzing ERPs for spontaneous thoughts would
be important to provide an alternative method to examine
episodic specificity. In deliberate retrieval, thoughts with dif-
ferent levels of episodic specificity including general facts,
personal semantics and unique episodic memories have been
shown to have a distinguishable EEG profile (Renoult et al.,
2016). Thus, we expect that spontaneous thoughts of different
levels of specificity may also be distinguishable based on their
EEG profile. Identifying these profiles would allow for the
cross validation of episodic specificity between neural data
and behavioral data based on participants’ descriptions.
From this perspective, ERP analysis and the development of
a coding system for episodic specificity in spontaneous
thought, mentioned in the previous section, go hand in hand,
and could be an essential stepping stone for future research.
Mem Cogn (2022) 50:641–654
Conclusion
In this review we explored the episodic-semantic interaction
by focusing on spontaneous thought. We showed that, as in
deliberate retrieval, there is an influence of both the episodic
and semantic systems in spontaneous retrieval. This indicates
that the two systems interact. To define the type of interaction
between them, we focused on semantic priming studies, which
revealed that the impact of the semantic memory system has
been experimentally observed as a modulation of content. On
the other hand, the episodic memory system seems to be par-
ticularly involved in spontaneous thought occurrence, when a
cue leads to direct access of episodic content. Thus, spontane-
ous thought does not depend on a previous semantic search,
and is a privileged research area to analyze the functional
independence of the episodic system. We reviewed neuropsy-
chological investigations of semantic dementia, which suggest
spontaneous thought still occurs when the semantic memory
system deteriorates, and indicates that the episodic memory
system can function independently. Our conclusion is in line
with recent views on the episodic-semantic interaction, which
recognize the existence of an interaction while asserting that a
certain degree of distinctiveness between the systems is pres-
ent (Renoult et al., 2019). Yet, much remains to be understood
regarding the forms of spontaneous thought that mix episodic
and semantic elements, and are not easily categorized as one
or the other. To explore this, we finished by suggesting two
concrete avenues for research: developing a coding system for
episodic specificity in spontaneous thought and analyzing
event-related potentials of spontaneous thought.
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