The Clash of Empires

and the Rise of Kurdish

Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926
Ismail Agha Simko and
the Campaign for an
Independent Kurdish State

Mehrdad Kia
The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish
Proto-Nationalism, 1905–1926
 Mehrdad Kia

The Clash of Empires

and the Rise
of Kurdish
Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926
Ismail Agha Simko and the Campaign
for an Independent Kurdish State
Mehrdad Kia
Department of History
University of Montana
Missoula, MT, USA

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 Preface

The present manuscript is an attempt to study the historical causes of the

emergence of the first Kurdish proto-nationalist movement in twentieth-
century Iran. This movement was led by Ismail Agha Simko, one of
the chiefs of the Shakak tribe in northwestern Iran. The rise of nation-
alism among Armenian and Assyrian communities, the backlash from the
Kurdish tribes of the region against the possibility of the creation of an
Armenian or an Assyrian state, the eruption of the First World War, and
the militarization of the region by Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire
before and during the Great War contributed significantly to the outbreak
of a major conflict between the Kurdish tribes of the region and Iran’s
central government. The hostilities intensified after the Iranian govern-
ment tried to centralize political power by creating a modern standing
army in 1921. The revolt staged and led by Simko Agha commenced
shortly after the end of the First World War in 1918 and continued until
August 1922. Though he was defeated, the Iranian government agreed to
allow Simko to return to Iran in 1925. The Kurdish chief, however, staged
a second revolt in 1926. Unlike the first revolt, which had persisted for
almost four years, Simko’s second revolt was quickly put down by a rival
chief of the Shakak Kurds. Through an in-depth analysis of Simko’s life
and political career, this study attempts to identify the underlying causes
for the rise of Kurdish proto-nationalism during and after the conclu-
sion of the First World War and how the Iranian government responded
to the challenge posed by this movement. The suppression of separatist

v
vi PREFACE

rebellions in the borderlands of the country, including Simko’s revolt,

allowed the Iranian state to consolidate its power and initiate an ambitious
program of reforms, which intended to transform Iran from an aggregate
of autonomous political enclaves to a unified nation-state.

Missoula, USA Mehrdad Kia

 Acknowledgments

For my research and in writing this book, I am indebted to many friends

and colleagues. I am deeply grateful to my colleagues at the Univer-
sity of Montana (UM), especially Professor Ardi Kia, the co-director of
the Central & Southwest Asian Studies Center and Professor Michael
Mayer of Department of History, for reading this manuscript and offering
mountains of incisive suggestions. I greatly appreciate our many conversa-
tions and discussions while I wrote this manuscript. My special gratitude
goes to the reviewers who patiently read this manuscript and suggested
numerous perceptive and insightful revisions. For generosity of time and
spirit, I owe a special debt of gratitude to Joyce Brusin, Sarah McClain,
and Ann Marie Carbin, who provided me with much valuable edito-
rial and technical assistance. I am also grateful to Christine Vance, Pam
Marek, and Erik Larson at the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Library at the
University of Montana who worked diligently to provide me with much
of the material necessary to complete this manuscript. I, however, remain
solely responsible for the views, as well as the many inaccuracies, deficien-
cies, and inadequacies this manuscript certainly contains. This work would
not have been possible without the steadfast support of Lucy Kidwell,
my outstanding editor at Palgrave Macmillan and her exceptional team.
Without her patience, encouragement, and unlimited support, I would
not have been able to complete this project.
My four beloved companions during the long journey of writing this
book, Ashley Rose, Fereydoun, Savanak Jān, and Rostam, deserve all my

vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

love and gratitude for their unwavering comradery and companionship.

This book is dedicated to the memory of an extraordinary individual,
a brilliant woman, Kiadokht Kia, whose life, ideas, and memories from
her childhood growing up in western Iran served as a source of inspi-
ration for writing this book. She granted me the honor and privilege of
accompanying her on her trips to western and northwestern Iran.
 Chronology of Simko’s Life

1887, Ismail Agha Shakak known as Simko is born in Chahriq west

of Lake Urumiyeh/Urmia in close proximity to the Iranian-Ottoman
frontier.
1889, Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) is founded.
1891, Sultan Abdulhamid II (r. 1876–1909) creates the Hamidiye Light
Cavalry.
1891–1892, Protests against Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar (r. 1848–1896)
over Tobacco Régie, a concession to a British subject for the production,
sale, and distribution of Iranian tobacco.
1894–1896, Massacres of Armenians under Abdulhamid II through
attacks by Hamidiye regiments on Armenian communities in eastern
Anatolia.
May 1, 1896, Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar is assassinated by Mirza Reza
Kermani a disciple of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani (i.e., Assadabadi).
1896–1907, Mozaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1907) rules.
1901, British subject, William Knox D’Arcy, is granted a 60-year conces-
sion for oil exploration in all regions of Iran except the country’s five
northern provinces of Khorasan, Astarabad, Mazandaran, Gilan, and
Azerbaijan.
1904–1905 Russo-Japanese War: Empire of Japan defeats Czarist Russia.
January 1905, Russian Revolution.
July 4, 1905, Simko’s brother, Jafar Agha, is murdered in Tabriz by the
order of the Qajar crown prince, Mohammad Ali Mirza.

ix
x CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE

October 1905, Ottoman Turks invade and occupy several rural districts
in western Azerbaijan.
1905, Jafar Agha’s father, Mohammad Agha, appeals to the Ottoman
sultan, Abdulhamid II, to avenge the murder of his son.
1905, Simko and his followers seek Ottoman protection. Tahir Pasha, the
Ottoman governor of Van offers land to Simko near Lake Van.
December 1905, Constitutional Revolution commences in Tehran.
August 5, 1906, Victory of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran.
October 7, 1906, First Majlis is convened.
January 9, 1907, Mozaffar al-Din Shah dies.
January 1907, Mohammad Ali Shah (r. 1907–1909) rules.
February 1907, Simko’s father, Mohammad Agha, travels to Istanbul to
make a personal appeal to the Ottoman sultan, Abdulhamid II, to avenge
the murder of his son by Iranian authorities. He eventually dies in an
Ottoman prison.
Spring 1907, Simko returns to Iran.
August 31, 1907, Russia and Britain sign the Saint Petersburg Conven-
tion partitioning Iran into spheres of influence. Shakak-populated terri-
tory in western Azerbaijan falls under the Russian sphere of influence.
June 23, 1908, Mohammad Ali Shah destroys the first Iranian
parliament.
June 23, 1908, Fighting erupts between pro-shah and constitutionalist
forces in Tabriz.
Spring-Summer 1908, Simko joins Eqbal al-Saltaneh, the governor of
Maku, and attacks constitutionalist forces in the towns of Khoy and
Salmas. Simko is appointed governor of Qotur on the Iran-Ottoman
frontier.
July 3, 1908, A CUP cell in the Ottoman Third Army in Macedonia
openly calls for restoration of the 1876 Ottoman constitution.
July 18, 1908, Turkish troops accompanied by the Shakak chief, Ismail
Agha (not to be mistaken with Simko), occupy Qulonji, near Urumiyeh.
Ismail Agha addresses letters to various villages informing them that they
have been annexed by Ottoman Turkey.
July 23, 1908, Abdulhamid II restores the 1876 constitution and calls
for elections.
1909, D’Arcy concession becomes the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
April 12–13, 1909, Opponents of CUP mount a counter-revolution in
Istanbul.
 CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE xi

April 27, 1909, Sultan Abdulhamid II is deposed from the throne and
replaced by Mehmed V (r. 1909–1918).
April 29, 1909, Russian troops occupy Tabriz, the provincial capital of
Azerbaijan.
July 13, 1909, Constitutionalist forces from Isfahan and Rasht enter
Tehran.
July 16, 1909, Mohammad Ali Shah takes refuge in the Russian Legation
in Zargandeh (north of Tehran) and abdicates his throne.
July 1909, Ahmad Shah (r. 1909–1925) rules.
November 15, 1909, Second Majlis is inaugurated.
1910, The Second Majlis establishes the Iranian gendarmerie as a rural
police force with assistance from Swedish officers.
Autumn 1910, Ottoman-Kurdish statesman and diplomat, Abdurrezzak
Bey Bedir Khan, arrives in Tiflis, Georgia, where he meets with Russian
military authorities. Shortly after, the Kurdish dignitary tours the Iranian-
Ottoman borderlands and meets with Simko.
October 1910, Mehmed Zeki, the Ottoman kaymakam/qaimmaqam
(deputy commissioner in charge of the administration) of the Mahmudi
district in the Lake Van region, threatens Simko and demands that the
Kurdish chief hand over the district of Qotur to Ottoman authorities.
March 1911, With Russian encouragement and support, the Kurdish
leader, Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan, initiates close collaboration with
Simko.
September 29, 1911, Ottoman war with Italy over Libya.
November 1911, Russia and Britain issue an ultimatum to the Iranian
government demanding the expulsion of Morgan Shuster, the Amer-
ican financial adviser, who had been hired to reform the Iranian financial
system.
December 21–25, 1911, Russian troops attack constitutionalists in
Tabriz.
December 26, 1911, Russian army reinforcements from south Caucasus
attack Tabriz to crush constitutionalist forces.
December 27, 1911, Tabriz under Russian control.
December 31, 1911, (10th of Moharram in the Islamic calendar),
A group of constitutionalist leaders and activists, including the promi-
nent Shi’i religious leader, Seqat al-Islam Tabrizi, are hanged in Tabriz by
Russian occupation forces.
1912, Kurdish leader, Sayyid (Sheikh) Taha II of Nehri, travels to Tiflis,
where he meets Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan.
xii CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE

1912, Sayyid Taha II and Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan tour Kurdish
tribal areas in the Ottoman-Iranian borderlands. Sometime during this
trip, the two Kurdish dignitaries are joined by Simko.
1912, With support from Russians authorities, Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir
Khan publishes a Kurdish-language newspaper called Rozhi Kurd in
Urumiyeh. When the Russians remove Abdurrezzak Bey from western
Azerbaijan, the task of supervising the publication of Rozhi Kurd falls on
Simko, who continues to publish the newspaper until 1914.
October 8–December 3, 1912, First Balkan War between the members
of the Balkan League-Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro-and the
Ottoman Empire.
December 1912–January 1913, Ottoman Empire withdraws its forces
from western Azerbaijan.
June 29–August 10, 1913, Second Balkan War: Ottoman Empire is
increasingly dominated by the triumvirate of Enver Pasha, Jemal Pasha,
and Talat Pasha.
1912–1913, Simko, backed and encouraged by Russian authorities in
western Azerbaijan, carries out plundering raids in Ottoman territory.
1914, In return for his services to the Czarist government, Simko is
invited to Tiflis, where the Russian governor-general of the Caucasus,
Vorontsov-Dashkov, decorates him and appoints the Shakak chief as the
governor of Somai in western Azerbaijan.
1914, British government buys a majority share in the newly founded
Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
July 21, 1914, Ahmad Shah’s coronation a week before the outbreak of
the First World War.
July 28, 1914, First World War commences.
November 1, 1914, Iran declares its neutrality in the First World War.
October 29, 1914, Admiral Souchon opens hostilities against Russia’s
Black Sea fleet by sinking a gunboat and a mine-laying vessel. The city of
Sevastopol is also shelled.
November 2, 1914, Russia declares war on the Ottoman Empire.
November 5, 1914, Great Britain declares war on the Ottoman Empire.
November 14, 1914, Ottoman sultan declares Holy War.
December 1914, Ottoman troops backed by Kurdish tribal units from
the Mangur, Mamash, and Dehbokri tribes, defeat the Russian client and
the Shahseven tribal chief, Shoja’a al-Dowleh, near Maragheh in eastern
Azerbaijan.
January 2, 1915, Russian troops evacuate Urumiyeh.
 CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE xiii

January 4, 1915, Ottoman forces enter Urumiyeh. Simko joins the

Ottoman Turks.
January 6, 1915, Russian consul general in Tabriz evacuates the city and
withdraws to Russia.
January 8, 1915, Ottoman forces occupy Tabriz.
January 30, 1915, Russian troops re-occupy Tabriz.
March 6, 1915, Russian troops backed by Armenian and Assyrian units
drive the Ottoman Turks and their Kurdish allies, including Simko, out
of Dilman/Dilmaqan (present-day Salmas) the capital of the district of
Salmas.
May 15, 1915, Ottoman forces evacuate Urumiyeh.
May 23, 1915, Ottoman government orders the deportation of all
Armenians.
May 24–25, 1915, Russian troops occupy Urumiyeh.
Summer 1915, Russian authorities exile Simko to Tiflis.
November 1915, Russian forces advance as far as the outskirts of Tehran.
A group of Iranian nationalists leave Tehran and later form a government
in western Iran.
1916, Russian authorities allow Simko to return to Iran.
July 14, 1915–March 10, 1916, Hussein-McMahon Correspondence.
April 26, 1916–October 23, 1916, Sykes-Picot Agreement.
1915–1916, South Persia Rifles (SPR) created and commanded by
British officers in the provinces of Fars and Kerman.
March 15, 1917, Revolution in Russia; Czar Nicholas II abdicates, and
a provisional government is established.
November 7, 1917, Russian Bolshevik Revolution (the October Revo-
lution by the old Russian calendar).
January 8, 1918, President Woodrow Wilson of the United States
proclaims his 14 points.
March 3, 1918, Russia signs the Treaty of Brest Litovsk with the Central
Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria)
ending its participation in the First World War.
The Bolsheviks and the Ottoman Turks reiterate their commitment to
withdraw their troops from Iranian territory.
March 3, 1918, Assyrian leader, Mar Shimun, and a group of his body-
guards are assassinated by Simko and his men. The murder of Mar Shimun
ignites a civil war between Christians (Assyrians and Armenians) and
Muslims (Kurds and Azerbaijani Turks) in western Azerbaijan.
xiv CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE

March 1918, An Assyrian armed band led by Agha Petros capture

Simko’s stronghold at Chahriq. Simko escapes to Khoy where he slaugh-
ters Assyrian refugees.
April-July 1918, Assyrians under the leadership of their military
commander, Agha Petros, fight several campaigns against the Ottoman
Turkish armies.
May 28, 1918, Republic of Armenia established.
June 26, 1918, Soviet Union renounces Czarist Russia’s privileges in
Iran.
July 30, 1918, Assyrians of western Azerbaijan abandon Salmas and
Urumiyeh, turning south in an attempt to reach British lines at Hamadan
in western Iran.
August 3, 1918, An Ottoman army backed by irregular Kurdish units
enters Urumiyeh and immediately attacks the fleeing Assyrians and
Armenians. Simko joins the Turks in attacking the Assyrian refugees.
September 15, 1918, Ottoman Turks capture Baku.
October 1, 1918, An Arab army under the command of Amir Faisal, a
son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, enters Damascus. Mehmed VI (r. 1918–
1922) ascends the Ottoman throne.
October 30, 1918, Mudros Armistice, Allied Occupation of Istanbul.
November 11, 1918, First World War ends.
Late 1918, Former Ottoman diplomat, Sherif Pasha, who will lead a
Kurdish delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, establishes contact with
several Kurdish leaders, including Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji, Sayyid Taha
II, and Simko in order to promote the idea of an independent Kurdish
state.
December 1918, Simko commences his revolt in western Azerbaijan by
attacking rural communities in the districts of Salmas and Khoy.
1919, Soviet-backed Jangal movement under the leadership of Mirza
Kuchak Khan controls the Caspian province of Gilan.
January 1919–January 1920, Paris Peace Conference.
January 1919, At the Paris Peace Conference, the Society for the
Advancement of Kurdistan led by Sherif Pasha proposes the creation of a
Kurdish state.
April–May 1919, Acting as Simko’s ambassador, Sayyid Taha II visits
Iraq. During this visit, Sayyid Taha II presses British officials in Baghdad
for a united Kurdistan under British auspices.
May 1919, Deputy governor of Azerbaijan hatches a plot to assassinate
Simko by sending him a parcel bomb disguised as a box of sweetmeats.
 CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE xv

Simko escapes the assassination attempt, but his brother, Ali Agha, and
several of his attendants are killed.
June 1919, Two men falsely accused of participating in the bombing plot
against Simko are handed over to Simko who executes them.
August 9, 1919, Anglo-Persian Agreement signed.
November 1919, Simko with strong military and logistical support from
nationalist Turks holds country from Khoy to Urumiyeh completely
terrorized.
November 1919, The British government withdraws its vice-consul from
Urumiyeh.
December 1919, Simko attacks the villages of Lakistan in the district of
Salmas, pillaging and massacring their inhabitants.
January–February 1920, Punitive expedition against Simko under the
command of the Russian officer, Colonel Philipov.
January 17, 1920, According to a British report, Iranian government
forces score a decisive victory over Simko and they seize Dilman in the
Salmas district. Simko is forced to retreat to his stronghold at Chahriq.
February 22, 1920, Colonel Philipov proposes terms of peace to Simko.
March 1920, Simko accepts conditions of peace proposed by Philipov.
April 5–April 8, 1920, Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani seizes power in
Tabriz.
April 19, 1920, Abd al-Majid Mirza Ain al-Dowleh, the new governor
of Azerbaijan, arrives in Tabriz.
May 18, 1920, Soviet forces land at various points on the Iranian coast
of the Caspian Sea, including the port of Anzali.
June 5, 1920, Soviet Republic of Gilan established.
June 24, 1920, Ain al-Dowleh leaves Tabriz for Tehran. Khiyabani
consolidates his authority over Tabriz.
August 10, 1920, Treaty of Sèvres provides for an independent Armenia
and an autonomous Kurdistan.
August 1920, Simko captures Salmas and appoints one of his confidants,
Teymur Agha, as its governor.
August 1920, Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat is appointed governor of
Azerbaijan.
September 1920, Sayyid Taha II asks for arms and money for an
independent Kurdistan from British authorities in Iraq.
September 13, 1920, Iranian Cossacks seize control of Tabriz and
disperse Khiyabani’s supporters.
xvi CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE

September 14, 1920, Khiyabani is killed by Iranian Cossacks in Tabriz.

After the death of their leader, Tabriz democrats establish contact with
Simko and encourage the Kurdish chief to attack Urumiyeh.
September–October 1920, Simko resumes his attacks against Urumiyeh.
November 1920, Turkish nationalists defeat Armenia.
December 2, 1920, Peace Treaty of Alexandropol (Gümrü) ends the
Turkish-Armenian War.
December 1920, Simko and Sayyid Taha II seize Urumiyeh.
February 21, 1921, Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabi and Reza Khan stage
a coup d’état. Sayyid Ziya is appointed prime minister and Reza Khan is
appointed commander of the Cossack Brigade.
February 26, 1921, Iran abrogates the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement.
February 26, 1921, Iran signs a treaty of friendship with the Soviet
Union.
February 27, 1921, Ahmad Shah bestows upon Reza Khan the title of
Sardar Sepah (the Commander of the Army).
March 16, 1921, Treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and the
Turkish nationalists.
March 1921, Simko defeats an Iranian army under the command of Zafar
al-Dowleh (later Brigadier General Hassan Moqaddam) at Tasuj north of
Lake Urumiyeh.
April 24, 1921, Reza Khan Sardar Sepah is appointed minister of war.
June 22, 1921, Majlis denounces the 1919 Anglo-Persian Agreement.
August 1921, A gendarmerie officer in Khorasan, Colonel Mohammad
Taqi Khan Pessyan, revolts against the central government.
August–September 1921, Turkish nationalists defeat Greek forces.
October 1921, General Amanollah Mirza Jahanbani is appointed Chief
of Staff of the Army.
October 3, 1921, Gendarmerie commander, Colonel Mohammad Taqi
Khan Pessyan, is killed in a skirmish with a pro-government Kurdish tribal
force in northern Khorasan.
October 7, 1921, Simko captures Savojbolagh (Mahabad) after defeating
a gendarmerie detachment commanded by Major Hassan Malekzadeh.
October 7, 1921, Simko leaves Savojbolagh for Chahriq.
December 5, 1921, Minister of War, Reza Khan Sardar Sepah, initi-
ates the process of reorganizing the Iranian army by issuing the Army
Order No. 1, which announces the creation of a national army through
the unification of the Cossack Brigade, the Gendarmerie, and provincial
troops.
 CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE xvii

December 15, 1921, An Iranian government force recaptures Savojbo-

lagh, but it quickly loses control over the town.
December 1921, At the battle of Tasuj, Simko defeats a government
force under the command of Amir Arshad (i.e., Sām Khan Hajialilu
Qarajadaghi) who is killed on the battlefield.
December 1921, Mirza Kuchak Khan, the leader of the Jangal Move-
ment, dies from frostbite in the Talish mountains.
January 30, 1922, Iranian gendarmerie troopers and officers stationed
in Sharafkhaneh on the northeastern shore of Lake Urumiyeh revolt. The
rebels handpick Major Abolqassem Khan Lahuti as their leader.
February 1, 1922, Lahuti and his supporters seize the city of Tabriz.
February 8, 1922, Lahuti’s uprising is suppressed. Lahuti escapes to the
Soviet Union.
Early March 1922, British intelligence reports state that Simko had re-
captured Savojbolagh once again, but inter-tribal friction had erupted
between Simko, the Kurds of Savojbolagh, and local tribal chiefs, forcing
Simko’s men to evacuate the town.
May 1922, Simko’s forces led by Sayyid Taha II defeat an Iranian army
detachment under the command of Khalu Qorban, who is killed together
with more than two hundred of his men.
June 1922, General Amanollah Khan Jahanbani is appointed
commander-in-chief in Azerbaijan to lead the operations against Simko.
June 1922, As Amanollah Mirza prepares himself to depart for Tabriz,
another large military force is dispatched to reinforce the Maragheh-
Miandoab line east and south of Lake Urumiyeh.
June 17, 1922, Amanollah Mirza leaves Tehran for Tabriz.
June 22, 1922, Iranian statesman and diplomat, Momtaz al-Dowleh,
arrives at the Black Sea port town of İnebolu.
June 24, 1922, Momtaz al-Dowleh arrives in Ankara.
June 30, 1922, Momtaz al-Dowleh submits his credentials to Mustafa
Kemal in an official ceremony, and he holds a meeting with the Turkish
leader followed by meetings with Fevzi Pasha (Fevzi Chakmak), Chief of
the General Staff, and Fethi Bey (Fethi Okyar), the deputy minister of
internal affairs of the provisional Ankara government.
June 1922, As Amanollah Mirza leaves Tehran, a Turkish detachment of
1000–1500 men assembles in Van in eastern Turkey.
July 9, 1922, Simko sends a three-man delegation to the British author-
ities in Mosul in northern Iraq.
xviii CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE

July 18, 1922, Amanollah Mirza leaves Tabriz for the port of
Sharafkhaneh on the northeastern shore of Lake Urumiyeh where he sets
up his headquarters.
End of July 1922, Simko controls all territory west of Lake Urumiyeh
from the outskirts of Khoy in the north to Baneh in the south.
August 5–21, 1922, Military campaign against Simko.
August 9, 1922, Government forces defeat Simko, who flees to his
stronghold, Chahriq.
August 10, 1922, Government troops march through Dilman the capital
of the Salmas district.
August 14, 1922, Government troops capture Simko’s stronghold at
Chahriq.
August 16, 1922, Government troops enter Urumiyeh.
August 21, 1922, Deputy governors are appointed for Urumiyeh and
Savojbolagh.
August 25, 1922, Iran’s minister of war instructs the governors of
Urumiyeh, Salmas, and Khoy to grant amnesty to all Kurds who would
forsake Simko and submit to the government.
September 1922, Turkish nationalists seize Izmir and drive the Greeks
out of Anatolia.
October 1922, Simko and Sayyid Taha II visit northern Iraq.
November 1, 1922, Turkish Grand National Assembly abolishes the
Ottoman sultanate.
January 8, 1923, Simko arrives in Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq as a
guest of Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji.
March 1923, Simko returns to Turkey and joins Ozdemir Bey, the
commander of Turkish forces in Rawanduz.
April 22, 1923, Rawanduz is occupied by British forces.
April 1923, Simko retires to Nehri in southeastern Turkey.
June 1923, Simko is reported to be near Qotur, on the Turkish side
of the frontier, working with the local Kurds, who are robbing travellers
along the Van-Qotur Road.
July 24, 1923, Treaty of Lausanne is signed between Turkey and Britain,
France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes (i.e., Yugoslavia) after a seven-month conference.
July 1923, Simko appeals to Soviet officials for support.
October 26, 1923, Reza Khan is appointed prime minister of Iran.
October 29, 1923, Republic of Turkey is established with Mustafa Kemal
as its first president.
 CHRONOLOGY OF SIMKO’S LIFE xix

December 6, 1924, Sheikh Khazal of Mohammareh (Khoramshahr)

submits to Reza Khan.
March-June 1925, Turkey suppresses Sheikh Said’s rebellion.
May 1925, Simko, his family, and 200 of his followers return to Iran.
June 1925, Reza Khan meets Simko during his visit to Azerbaijan.
October 1925, Qajar prince, Salar al-Dowleh, stages a revolt in western
Iran.
December 15, 1925, Iran’s parliament abolishes the Qajar monarchy and
proclaims Reza Shah Pahlavi the new shah of Iran.
April 22, 1926, Iran signs a treaty of security and friendship with Turkey.
April 25, 1926, Reza Shah’s coronation.
June 26, 1926, Troops stationed in the town of Salmas in western
Azerbaijan revolt.
August 1926, Qajar prince, Salar al-Dowleh, organizes a second tribal
revolt in Kermanshah and Kurdistan, and he establishes contact with
Simko.
August 1926, Salar al-Dowleh’s rebellion fizzles and the Qajar prince is
detained by authorities in Iraq.
October 1926, Simko revolts, but he is quickly defeated. The Kurdish
chief flees to Iraq.
May 1928, Simko departs Iraq for Turkey.
April 1929, Iran recognizes Iraq.
July 1929, Simko returns to Iraq with about 50 followers and establishes
himself in a village in the Rawanduz district.
July 1930, Simko returns to Iran after he is appointed governor of
Oshnaviyeh southwest of Lake Urumiyeh.
July 19, 1930, Simko is killed in an ambush by Iranian authorities at
Oshnaviyeh.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
2 Historical Setting: Iran on the Brink of Collapse 23
Qajar Dynasty and European Imperialism 25
Anglo-Russian Rivalry and the Constitutional Revolution 27
Iran During First World War 30
Reza Shah Pahlavi 37
Western Azerbaijan, the Home of Simko and the Shakak Tribe 46
Kurds of Western Azerbaijan 52
3 Shakak Tribe and the Rise of Simko 57
Shakak/Shikak Kurds 58
Rise of Simko 65
Ottoman Turks Invade Western Azerbaijan 70
Simko, Constitutional Revolution & Ottoman Invasion 75
Simko & the Russian Occupation of Azerbaijan 80
Simko & Sayyid Taha II 87
4 Simko, Competing Nationalisms, and the Great War 95
On the Eve of the First World War 96
Simko, Russian Evacuation & Ottoman Invasion 98
Assyrian Refugees Arrive in Western Azerbaijan 105
An Assyrian-Armenian-Kurdish Line of Defense 109
Murder of Mar Shimun 115
Mar Shimun’s Murder Ignites a Civil War 120

xxi
xxii CONTENTS

5 Fall of Empires and Simko’s Revolt 125

Simko’s Rebellion Commences 131
First Military Campaign Against Simko 137
Khiyabani’s Revolt 141
Sayyid Taha II as Simko’s Ambassador 147
End of Khiyabani 150
6 Simko’s Wars and the Rise of Reza Shah 157
Sayyid Taha II and Simko’s Revolt 158
Battle of Tasuj 161
Simko Captures Savojbolagh (Mahabad) 165
Simko Defeats Amir Arshad 171
Creating a Standing Army 179
Momtaz al-Dowleh’s Mission to Ankara 184
7 Simko’s Downfall 189
Lahuti’s Rebellion 190
Khalu Qorban: yet Another Debacle for the Government 197
Amanollah Mirza Jahanbani 202
Defeat of Simko 207
Simko’s Tribal Coalition Fizzles 213
8 In Search of a New Patron: Simko Sandwiched
Between Iran and Turkey 219
Simko in Northern Iraq 220
Simko, Turkish Nationalists, and Russian Bolsheviks 224
Simko Returns to Iran 231
Simko and Salar al-Dowleh 238
End of Simko 244
9 Conclusion 251

Bibliography 265
Index 279
 List of Maps

Map 0.1 Iran and its neighbors xxiv

Map 1.1 Iran and the location of West Azerbaijan Province 22
Map 2.1 Western Azerbaijan’s Districts 55
Map 2.2 Kurdish Tribes of Iranian Kurdistan 56
Map 5.1 Treaty of Sèvres 128

xxiii
Map 0.1 Iran and its neighbors
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Ismail Agha Shakak/Shikak/Shekak (1887–1930) also known by the

Kurdish diminutive of Simko or Semko or Simitqu or Semitqu has always
been something of an enigma.1 The bare facts of his life are well known,
but despite his notoriety, the man himself remains elusive. Descriptions by
contemporaries, especially those written by Iranian historians and British
officials, regarded him with varying measures of revulsion and loathing;
they denounced the Kurdish chief as a vicious brigand and a treacherous

1 For Simko’s life and career, see, Hashem Ahmadzadeh and Gareth Stansfield, “The
Political, Cultural, and Military Re-awakening of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement
in Iran,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 2010), pp. 11–27. Hassan
Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, (London: Oxford University Press,
1966). Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1965).
Mehdi Bamdad, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran Dar Qarn-e 12th, 13th, and 14th Hijri, 6
Volumes, (Tehran: Zavvar Press, 1979). Kaveh Bayat, “Ismail Aqa Semitqu,” in Farhang-e
Namavaran-e Moaser-e Iran, Vol. 1 (Tehran, 2002), pp. 578–580. Kaveh Bayat, Ravabet-e
Iran va Turkiyeh: Az Soqut-e. Dolat-e Osmani ta baramadan-e Neza.m-e Jomhuri (1297–
1302 Shamsi), (Tehran: Pardis-e Danesh, 2015). Ahmad Chupani, Masale-ye Ismail Agha
Semko dar Azerbaijan va Mokrian, (Tehran: Nashr-e Ana, 2015). Donyaha, Daneshnameh-
ye Farsi, https://donyaha.ir/biography/Ismail-Agha-Simko. Michael Gunter, Historical
Dictionary of the Kurds, (Lanham, MD, and Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, Inc.,
2004). Muhammad Rasul Hawar, Simko u bzutnaway natawayatiy Kurd, Hikumeti
Herêmi Kurdistanê, (Silêmanî: Wazarati Roshnbiri, 2005). Hassan Malekzdeh-ye Hirbad,
Sarnevesht-e Heyratangiz, (Tehran: Bina, 1949). Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va
Mafhum-e Ab va Khak: Zendeginameh-ye Khodnevesht-e Sepahbod Amanollah Jahanbani,
Edited by Parviz Jahanbani, (Tehran: Ferdows Press, 2001). Amanollah Jahanbani,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_1
2 M. KIA

villain who plundered and murdered unarmed and defenseless commu-

nities in northwestern Iran. Dismissing the Kurdish leader as a ruthless
and bloodthirsty bandit, some went so far as to blame the American
missionaries and diplomats stationed in northwestern Iran, for instigating
Simko’s separatist uprising.2 In more recent times, a group of scholars
and writers has striven to salvage Simko’s seemingly tattered reputation.
They presented a sympathetic portrayal of the tribal chief as a popular
leader, who was victimized by oppressive Iranian authorities and dehu-
manized by a biased anti-Kurdish historiography. Some among these have
claimed that Simko’s revolt originated “as a reaction to the homogenizing

Az Tezar ta Shah: Zendeginameh va Khaterat-e Sepahbod Amanollah Jahanbani, (Tehran:

Elm Press, 2019). Wadie Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement Its Origins and Devel-
opment, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2006). Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah
Sale-ye Azarbaijan, (Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 1978). Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh-
ye Iran, (Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 1978). Sirwan Khosrozadeh, “Avamel-e Moasser
dar Piruzi-ye Qoshun-e Mottahad al-Shekl dar Jang-e Shakar Yazi (Mordad-e 1301),”
Motaleat-e Tarikhi-ye Jang, Vol. 4, No. 3, Autumn 1399 (Solar) (2020), pp. 55–
73. Sirwan Khosrozadeh, Shekast-e Ordu-ye Ahanin, Gozareshi az Hamleh-ye Simko beh
Mahabad va Enhedam-e Hang-e Chahardahom-e Jhanadermeri, (Mehr 1300 Shamsi),
(Tehran: Shirazeh Ketab-e Ma). Sirwan Khosrozadeh, “Vakavi-ye Avamel-e Moasser dar
Shuresh-e Dovvom-e Simko (Mehr 1305),” Motaleat-e Tarikhi-ye Jang, Vol. 6, No. 3,
1401 (Solar) (2021), pp. 35–46. Farideh Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of
the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). Chris
Kutschera, Le Mouvement National Kurd, (Paris: Editions Flammarion, 1979). Hussein
Madani, Kurdistan u stratejiy dewletan, Vol. 2, (Stockholm: Spartryck. 2001). David
McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997). Rahmatollah
Khan Moatamed al-Vozara, Urumiyeh dar Moharebeh-ye Alamsouz az Moghaddameh-ye
Nesara ta Balva-ye Ismail Agha, 1298–1300, Edited by Kaveh Bayat, (Tehran: Shirazeh
Press, 2001). Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, (Tehran: Zavvar Press,
1982). Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Gozaresh-e Iran, (Tehran: Noghreh Press, 1985).
Kamal Soleimani, “The Kurdish Image in Statist Historiography: The Case of Simko,”
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2017-11-02), pp. 949–965. Abbas Vali, Kurds
and the State in Iran: The Making of Kurdish Identity in Iran, (London: I.B. Tauris &
Co Ltd., 2011). Martin van Bruinessen, “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The
Case of Simko’s Revolt,” in Richard Tapper, The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran
and Afghanistan, (London: Croom Helm, 1983). Martin van Bruinessen, “A Kurdish
War Lord on the Turkish-Persian Frontier in the Early Twentieth Century: Isma’il Agha
Simko,” in Touraj Atabaki, Iran and the First World War: Battleground of the Great
Powers, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 69–93. Martin van Bruinessen, Kurdish Ethno-
Nationalism Versus Nation-Building States, Collected articles, (Istanbul: ISIS Press, 2000).
Martin van Bruinessen, “Shakak,” in C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, and
G. Lecomte (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition, Vol. IX, (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
2 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, (Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 1978),
p. 830.
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

Persian-first policy of Reza Shah, who wanted to build a nation based on

the cultural and linguistic features of the Persians as the dominant ethnic
group.”3 This assertion, however, ignores the basic fact that Simko’s
rebellion commenced in late 1918, when Reza Shah was an ordinary
officer in the Iranian Cossack Brigade, and the rebellion was suppressed
in August 1922, three years before Reza Shah seized the throne of Iran.
Even Simko’s short-lived revolt in September–October 1926, after Reza
Shah had ascended to the throne of Iran, was caused primarily by a
conflict between Simko and a tribal rival, rather than by any policy imple-
mented by the central government in Tehran, which was barely in control
of northwestern Iran.
Other authors, in their attempt to salvage Simko’s reputation, have
gone even one step further and, ignoring the appalling violence and
brutality perpetrated by the Kurdish chief, celebrated him as a refined
and elegant man, a rare modernizer, who not only kept a piano in his
frontier outpost at the fortress of Chahriq on the border between Iran
and the Ottoman Empire, but also “installed telephone lines that linked
his headquarters in Chahriq” to nearby towns of “Savojbolagh, Dilman
and the other main centers of the territory he controlled.”4 The campaign
to rehabilitate the Kurdish chief as a nationalist icon has resulted in the
emergence of a new Simko Agha whose name appears on billboards and
streets, especially in the Kurdistan Region of northern Iraq, while his
military exploits are celebrated in Kurdish-language television shows and
websites. These programs and productions often depict Simko’s activi-
ties as motivated by the nationalistic dream of unifying the Kurdish tribes
of northwestern Iran and creating an independent Kurdish state. Such
claims may resonate with a segment of contemporary Kurdish viewership,

3 Hashem Ahmadzadeh and Gareth Stansfield, “The Political, Cultural, and Military
Re-awakening of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran,” Middle East Journal, Vol.
64, No. 1 (Winter, 2010), pp. 11–27, p. 13. Simko’s rebellion commenced in late 1918,
when Reza Shah was a junior army officer, and it ended in August 1922 more than three
years before Reza Shah (at the time, Reza Khan Sardar Sepah) seized the throne of Iran.
As a minister of war, who was trying to create a unified and integrated army, Reza Khan
did not have either the power or the authority to introduce “homogenizing Persian-first”
policies even if he wished to. Reza Shah’s cultural policies belong to a period long after
the suppression of Simko’s uprising, and many of them date back to the decade of 1930s
after Simko had already been assassinated by Iranian authorities.
4 Kutschera, Chris, Le Mouvement National Kurde, (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), p. 48.
4 M. KIA

but they fail to reveal the complexity of Simko as a historical figure and
political leader.
Far more intriguing than the English, Kurdish, and Persian narratives
on Simko is a rather innovative attempt by Turkish nationalist historians,
who, in writing about the Kurdish-Assyrian conflict, portrayed Simko and
the Kurdish leader, Sayyid (Sheikh) Taha II, “as warriors who fought for
the Turkish army” against Russian imperialism. In addition, both men
“cooperated” with the Turkish military and even the local “Turcomans”
to put an end to “Assyrian atrocities.”5 This last effort falls under the
category of fictional romance and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this
humble study.
Instead of becoming engrossed in the battle of nationalistic narratives
and issuing a guilty or innocent verdict, this book attempts to high-
light the main contours of Simko’s life and to capture this elusive figure.
My objective in writing this book is to analyze the underlying polit-
ical and historical circumstances that shaped Simko and enabled him to
emerge as the leader of the first major Kurdish separatist movement in
twentieth-century Iran. I believe that the Kurdish chief’s life and career
can provide us with a useful framework to discuss how radical transfor-
mations on the immediate periphery of the Kurdish-populated region
in Iran impelled him to demand an independent state. Simko’s revolt
was directly impacted by the dramatic transformation of the Middle East
from a region dominated by multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-
religious empires to a region littered by “nation-states,” some of which
were created by the British and French colonial administrators. To the
north, Czarist Russia collapsed, and out of two revolutions, the first in
March 1917 and the second in November 1917 (the October Revolu-
tion by the old Russian calendar), a new entity called the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) emerged. In the underbelly of Russia, in the
south Caucasus, three new countries, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia,
also declared their independence in the aftermath of the collapse of the
Russian Empire only to be attacked, occupied, and annexed by the Red
Army and converted into Soviet socialist republics in 1920 and 1921.
To the west in Anatolia, the Ottoman Empire disintegrated, and from its

5 Metin Atmaca, “Fragile Frontiers: Sayyid Taha and the role of Kurdish Religio-Political
Leadership in the Ottoman East During the First World War,” Middle Eastern Studies,
Vol. 54, No. 3 (2018), p. 372.
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

ashes a secular and nationalist Turkish republic arose under the leader-
ship of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). To the south in Mesopotamia, Britain
and France carved several artificial states from the carcass of the Ottoman
Empire, including a new country called Iraq that contained an unruly
mix of diverse religious and ethno-linguistic communities. By patching
up three dissimilar provinces of the former Ottoman Empire, Mosul,
Baghdad, and Basra, with disparate populations of Shi’i Arabs, Sunni
Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, Jews, Turkmens, etc., who had never
displayed any desire to cohabit the same national space, the British created
a country that was far from being a nation. Finally, to the east in Iran,
the feeble, fragile, and utterly inept Qajar state was first jolted by a mili-
tary coup and eventually overthrown and replaced by a modernizing and
centralizing regime under Reza Shah, the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty
(1925–1979). As age-old empires collapsed and a new political map of the
region emerged, Kurdish leaders in Iraq and Turkey attempted to create
autonomous or independent enclaves or states; Simko Agha’s rebellion in
northwestern Iran was just one example of such efforts.
Much of the scholarly work on Simko has focused on the post-
First World War period, especially the four years between 1918 and
1922, when he staged his revolt and gained control of the territory
corresponding with much of the present-day Iranian province of West
Azerbaijan. Consequently, the formative period in his political develop-
ment between 1905 and 1918, and the last eight years of his life following
his defeat at the hands of the Iranian government in 1922 have been
downplayed or completely ignored. Worse, much of the literature on the
role and impact of Simko after the First World War has emphasized the
military campaigns against the Kurdish chief and his efforts to thwart
them. This approach has generally overlooked the extensive relationships
between Simko and Iranian, Russian, Turkish, and British authorities, as
well as the political and ideological aspects of Simko’s rebellion, especially
the significant influence of prominent Kurdish leaders, such as Sayyid
Taha II of Nehri.
Simko’s tumultuous political career was born out of his rage at the
treachery and violence unleashed against his brother by the Iranian
government. His alienation from Iran was reinforced by the support he
received from the Ottoman Turks and their pan-Islamic propaganda after
1905. As a young khan, Simko witnessed the rapid disintegration of the
Qajar state, the victory of the constitutional revolution in 1906, the
6 M. KIA

subsequent conflict between the Qajar monarchy and Iranian constitu-

tionalists, the invasion and occupation of parts of northwestern, first by
Ottoman Turks and then by Czarist Russia, and finally, the open warfare
in Azerbaijan between the pro-shah forces backed by Russia and the
constitutionalist forces supported by revolutionaries from south Caucasus.
As an up-and-coming tribal leader, Simko learned how to survive on
the borderlands of empires by forming an alliance with one power, and
then switching his loyalty to another as conflicts raged and the balance
of power shifted. Thus, from 1905 to 1907, the Kurdish chief sought
the protection and patronage of Ottoman Turks, but in 1908, as the
fighting erupted between the pro-shah and constitutionalist forces in
western Azerbaijan, Simko joined the Khan of Maku in his devastating
attacks against the revolutionaries in the towns of Khoy and Salmas. In
return for his services to the Iranian monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah (r.
1907–1909), Simko was appointed governor of the frontier district of
Qotur in northwestern Iran. In 1909, after Russia occupied parts of Azer-
baijan, the Kurdish chief established a close patron-client relationship with
Russian authorities, going so far as to become a paid and armed agent of
the Russian government before the commencement of the First World
War. In his capacity as a local client of Russia, Simko organized plun-
dering raids against rural communities inside Ottoman territory, and he
instigated Kurdish revolts against Turkish rule.
Simko’s personal relationship with prominent Kurdish leaders,
including Sayyid Taha II and Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan, acquainted
him with influential Kurdish leaders in the Ottoman Empire and Europe.
At the same time, these contacts planted the seeds of an embryonic form
of nationalism in his mind. But, Simko’s actual drive to establish an
independent Kurdish state originated not as a reaction to Reza Shah’s
nationalist policies, but much earlier during the First World War, as a
response to Assyrian and Armenian nationalists, who with support from
Czarist Russia had embarked on a campaign to carve autonomous or
independent enclaves or states in northwestern Iran and eastern Anatolia.
This was not the first time that Kurdish nationalistic sentiments had been
aroused by the possibility of an Assyrian or an Armenian state being
created with support from European powers. Such a Christian political
entity could reduce the status of Kurds of the region to that of second-
class subjects and undermine the economic power and political prestige of
the Ashirats or the Kurdish tribal elites. Almost thirty-five years before the
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

eruption of hostilities between Simko and Christian Assyrians and Arme-

nians, the Kurdish leader, Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri, had warned about
the eruption of a Kurdish nationalist backlash if European powers insisted
on carving an independent Armenian state in eastern Anatolia:

What is this I hear that the Armenians are going to have an independent
state in Van, and the Nestorians [Assyrians] are going to hoist the British
flag and declare themselves British subjects? I will never permit it, even if
I have to arm the women.6

Almost four decades later, Sheikh Ubeydullah’s grandson, Sayyid Taha

II, who was also a close confidant and brother-in-law of Simko, repeated
his grandfather’s sentiments when expressing his opinion regarding repa-
rations for the Assyrian refugees who intended to return to Iran and
reclaim their lost homes in western Azerbaijan after they had been evicted
forcibly by the Ottoman Turks and their Kurdish allies in the summer
1918:

There you are, these Christians [Assyrians] are not returning to their homes
in peace. They aspire to become a big nation with us Kurds as their
subjects, so much so that they have an ‘ambassador’ in London, which
is much more than we have.7

As with many other parts of Iran, western Azerbaijan, the home of

the Shakak Kurds and their chief, Simko, contained a mosaic of ethnic,
linguistic, and religious groups. Kurdish tribal groups lived side by side
with non-Kurdish groups, including Shi’i Azerbaijani Turks, Turkic Qara
Papakhs, Christian Assyrians and Armenians, as well as a small Jewish
community scattered among various urban centers of the region. The Shi’i
Azerbaijanis, Assyrians, and Armenians not only dominated the urban
and rural economies of northwestern Iran, but also enjoyed significant
support from power centers outside of the region. Shi’i Azerbaijanis and
especially the Turkic Shi’i tribal groups acted as allies of Iran’s central

6 Wadie Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement Its Origins and Development, (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2006), p. 83. The remark was made by Sheikh Ubeydullah to
an Ottoman official and repeated in a report by Vice Counsel Clayton to Major Trotter,
Bashkale, July 11, 1880, Parliamentary Papers (Turkey, 1881), 5:7.
7 Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918–1920,
(Washington, DC: Westphalia Press, 2016), p. 308.
8 M. KIA

government, while the Assyrians received assistance and protection not

only from the Russian government, but also from various American and
European Christian missionaries. Since 1836, foreign missionaries had
introduced modern schools, colleges, and hospitals as well as western
ideas, values, and institutions among the Assyrian and Armenian commu-
nities. By 1914, the Assyrians of western Azerbaijan enjoyed the privileged
position of being the most urbanized and educated segment of the society,
a position that made them a subject of envy and resentment by their
Muslim neighbors, especially by the Kurds, who had remained semi-
pastoral, semi-rural, poor, and uneducated. To counter the alliances made
by the Assyrian and Armenian Christians with European powers, Simko
relied at times on the patronage and support of Ottoman Turks and later
Turkish nationalists, though he also served Russian political and military
objectives—especially before and intermittently during the First World
War. On several occasions, he also pleaded for assistance from British
authorities in Iraq, but there is no evidence that he ever received any.
Exploiting the general anxiety and insecurity of Kurdish tribal chiefs,
which had been aroused by the reports of the Assyrian and Armenian
schemes for independence, Simko mobilized the support of Kurdish tribes
in northwestern Iran under his leadership. The Kurdish ruling elite, as
represented by the warrior caste of powerful tribal groups, monopo-
lized military and pastoral life. They owned a vast amount of real estate,
including villages where the subject class, namely the peasant population,
also called Gurans or Ra’ayat, resided. The peasant cultivators, some of
whom were Assyrian Christians, had no voice in the affairs of the tribes
who ruled them, and they were generally treated as an inferior caste.8
Though the tribal warrior caste were far less numerous than the peasants,
they ruled as the lords of the country.9 The Kurdish tribal chiefs under-
stood that the creation of an Assyrian or Armenian state posed a direct
threat to their political and economic privileges.

8 For a detailed analysis of the term, “Gūrān,” see, V. Minorsky, “The Gūrān,’ in
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 11, No.
1 (1943), pp. 75–103, (Cambridge University Press on behalf of School of Oriental and
African Studies).
9 William Spottiswoode, “Sketch of the Tribes of Northern Kurdistan,” Transactions
of the Ethnological Society of London, Vol. 2 (1863), pp. 244–248, Published by: Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, p. 244.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

By the winter 1918, Simko had concluded that the Kurdish tribes
of western Azerbaijan must unify under his leadership and use every
means possible, including open warfare, to prevent the Assyrians and
Armenians from realizing their nationalistic dreams. Alarmed by the possi-
bility of an independent Assyrian state and convinced that the Assyrians
aimed at nothing less than the subjugation of the Kurdish populations
trapped within their borders, Simko treacherously murdered the Assyrian
leader, Mar Shimun. The murder of Mar Shimun ignited a civil war
between the Christian (i.e., Assyrian and Armenian) and their Muslim
(i.e., Kurdish and Azerbaijani Turk) neighbors. Thousands of defense-
less civilians were slaughtered in the ensuing bloodbath, including a
significant number of defenseless Kurds. In spring–summer 1918, after
Ottoman Turks invaded northwestern Iran, the Kurdish chief re-ignited
his relentless and murderous rampage against the Assyrian and Armenian
communities of western Azerbaijan. Simko joined Ottoman troops and
local Iranian officials as they unleashed a campaign of physical expulsion
directed against the Assyrian and Armenian communities of northwestern
Iran.
The fall of Czarist Russia and the subsequent withdrawal of Russian
forces from Iran after the Bolshevik revolution, the defeat and the disin-
tegration of the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of the Great War in
October 1918, the total collapse of Iranian governmental authority in
western Azerbaijan during and after the end of the Great War, as well as
the defeat of armed Assyrian and Armenian groups in the summer 1918
created a political and military vacuum that Simko tried to fill for nearly
four years. Simko feared the return to western Azerbaijan of Assyrians and
Armenians, who were living as refugees under British protection in Iraq.
He gained access to a large quantity of arms and ammunition abandoned
by the Russian and Ottoman armies, and he recruited several hundred
members of the disbanded Ottoman artillery units for his army. He then
felt confident that he could fill the vacuum left behind by the Russians
and Ottoman Turks and convert western Azerbaijan to a territorial base
for his future Kurdish state.
From December 1918 to August 1922, the Kurdish chief rallied the
support of his tribe, the Shakak, as well as the neighboring Kurdish tribes,
to his cause. With significant support from remnants of Ottoman army
units, and after 1919, with direct assistance from the Turkish nationalist
movement led by Mustafa Kemal, Simko created a formidable army. His
newly organized military force allowed him to impose his authority over
10 M. KIA

a vast region in western Azerbaijan, extending from Salmas in the north

to Baneh in the south.10 Though initially victorious against the small
and ill-equipped armies dispatched against him by the Iranian govern-
ment, Simko failed to transform his political base from a mosaic of
small and unruly tribes into a unified confederation capable of laying
the foundation for a functioning state. He also refused to address the
socio-economic grievances of the Kurdish, as well as the non-Kurdish
communities, of the region. Worse, Simko’s Kurdish fighters acted as an
irregular body of raiders, who lacked regular rations and organizational
discipline. They relied almost exclusively on plundering villages to feed
themselves, carrying off grain and cattle, and killing many of the defense-
less inhabitants. Simko’s refusal to convert his campaign of destruction
into a movement for construction of a new political and social order
undermined his legitimacy as a serious leader with a credible roadmap
for the future of the region. Because of his devastating attacks against
rural and urban communities of the region, Simko alienated a significant
segment of the local population and failed to gain any support from the
non-tribal population of northwestern Iran. Worse yet, by treating the
non-Kurdish communities as existential enemies whose very physical pres-
ence constituted a direct threat to the security of a future Kurdish state, he
forced them to seek the support and protection of power centers outside
the region. With the emergence of a modern standing army in Iran under
Reza Khan (later Reza Shah) in autumn 1921, and the victory of the
nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) in Anatolia
in summer 1922, Simko ran out of time, support, and the resources
necessary to realize and implement his dream.
In the absence of any written documents or detailed pronouncements
that would shed light on Simko’s ideas and beliefs, the best we can do
is to reconstruct the Kurdish chief’s political goals through a critical
and non-ideological inquiry of all available historical sources, including
reports and analyses by European officials, diplomats, and intelligence
officers. In a detective-like inquiry, the investigator is obligated to collect
and analyze all available evidence and examine it regardless of its origin
and biases. The detective goes where the evidence leads him/her. As for
this manuscript, my initial reading of secondary sources led me to the
erroneous conclusion that Simko’s revolt was a direct response to the

10 Edmonds, C. J. Kurds Turks and Arabs, (London: Oxford University Press, 1957),
p. 305.
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

centralizing policies of the Iranian government. A more in-depth search

through primary sources, however, revealed that my initial findings were
faulty and deficient.
Understanding Simko’s revolt requires an in-depth study of the intri-
cate and multi-faceted relationship between Iran, the Ottoman Empire
(later the Kemalist Turks), Russia (later the Soviet Union), and Britain
before, during, and immediately after the First World War, when Iranian
Azerbaijan emerged as a battlefield for contending powers and competing
forms of nationalism. Any historical analysis of this critical period also
demands a more thorough appreciation of the divisive and acrimonious
relationship between the Kurds, Azerbaijani Turks, Assyrians, and Arme-
nians of northwestern Iran in the first two decades of the twentieth
century. Without the emergence of nationalist movements among Chris-
tian Assyrians and Armenians, who were supported by Russia and western
Christian missionaries, a Kurdish nationalist uprising backed by nationalist
Turks would not have come to fruition. My approach does not ignore
or dismiss the crucial role of the Iranian government and its policies
with regard to Simko, especially after the rise of Reza Shah. However, it
does emphasize that Simko’s revolt commenced long before the Iranian
state adopted a set of nationalistic policies. Additionally, I maintain that
Simko’s uprising targeted much more than one center of political power,
namely Tehran. In this context, I propose a more holistic approach that
highlights the role and impact of local and regional players, including the
Ottoman and Kemalist Turks, the British in Iraq, the Armenians and the
Assyrians of Urumiyeh, Salmas, and the Hakkari region of southeastern
Anatolia, and the Russians, both Czarist and Bolshevik. I believe that
such an approach allows us to develop a much less knee-jerk and a far
more nuanced understanding of the historical context in which Simko’s
separatist movement emerged.
Simko lived a tumultuous and chaotic life filled with conflicts and
contradictions. He was at once a victim and a victimizer, a shrewd tacti-
cian and a wily schemer, a source of inspiration, as well as a target of
deep-seated hatred and revulsion, a frontier warlord, and a desperado
fighting for survival in a multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious
setting that was undergoing a radical transformation as a result of the rise
of competing nationalisms and the eruption of imperial conflicts and wars.
For a time, Simko dreamt of creating his own independent state though
he lacked both the social base and the actual means to implement it.
12 M. KIA

In the second chapter of the book, I offer a historical framework for the
rise of Simko and his separatist movement in the context of the disinte-
gration of the Qajar state, especially after the victory of the constitutional
revolution of 1906. My argument in this chapter is that at the dawn
of the twentieth century, Iran contained a mosaic of ethnic, linguistic,
and religious groups and environments. This mosaic had evolved for
centuries through migration, adaptation, and assimilation. Each commu-
nity possessed its own unique social organization and political leadership.
Thus, heterogeneity constituted the most basic characteristic of Iranian
society. The Qajar state, which came to power in 1794, failed to integrate
these disparate and fragmented communities into one unified system.
In this same chapter, I also focus on the defeats the Qajars suffered at
the hands of Russia and Britain. These defeats undermined the legitimacy
and credibility of the central government. The humiliating treaties Iran
was forced to sign with Russia and Britain opened Iranian markets to
cheaply made goods from European countries. The flooding of Iranian
bazaars with European products destroyed the viability of the coun-
try’s native industries, driving a large number of manufacturers into
bankruptcy. The anger and alienation of Iran’s traditional middle class
ultimately ignited a popular movement that forced the Qajar monarch,
Mozaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1907), to grant a constitution in August
1906. Instead of strengthening the position of the central government vis-
à-vis the tribal zones of the country, the new parliament became involved
in a power struggle with the reactionary monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah.
The conflict between the shah and the parliament resulted in the erosion
of state power in the country’s distant provinces. The disappearance of
governmental authority enhanced the power and prestige of tribal chiefs
and provincial magnates. It also encouraged direct military intervention
by Iran’s neighbors, namely the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Britain.
The First World War and the occupation of the country by foreign armies
only intensified the disintegration of the Iranian state.
I also argue that after Russian and Ottoman forces evacuated Iranian
territory, the weak central government in Tehran could not fill the gap
left by them. The situation in the tribal zones of the country, especially
in Azerbaijan, was chaotic, and the Iranian government was completely
incapable of putting things in order. The inability of the Iranian state to
impose its authority over the distant provinces of the country allowed
tribal chiefs and provincial power centers to organize separatist move-
ments. Sensing the inability of the Iranian government to consolidate
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

its authority, Simko organized a strong army and rose in open rebellion.
In the absence of any effective resistance by the state, the Kurdish chief
quickly imposed his authority over significant parts of western Azerbaijan.
In response to the growing disintegration of governmental power and
propelled by the nationalist dream of preserving the territorial integrity
of their country, elements within the Iranian intelligentsia and the mili-
tary staged a coup d’etat in February 1921. The victory of this coup
signaled the rise of Reza Khan, who would be crowned as Reza Shah
Pahlavi in April 1926. Before seizing the throne, Reza Khan ended the
political fragmentation of the country by embarking on a campaign to
suppress powerful provincial magnates and tribal chiefs, including Simko.
The second chapter ends with a brief description of the physical and
human geography of western Azerbaijan, the home of the Shakak tribe
and the birthplace of Simko.
In Chapter 3, I have attempted to present a brief and episodic history
of the Shakak, the most powerful Kurdish tribal group of northwestern
Iran, which had settled in the rural districts of Somai-Baradoost (Bradost),
Chahriq, and Qotur. As a tribe on the Iranian–Ottoman frontier, the
Shakaks were expected to serve as the wardens of the frontier defending
Iranian territory against Ottoman military incursions. In reality, however,
the Shakak frequently switched their loyalty, at times to the Ottoman
sultan. In this chapter, I have attempted to discuss Simko’s political career
after Iranian authorities in Azerbaijan treacherously killed his brother,
Jafar Agha. The death of his brother, followed by the passing of his father
in an Ottoman prison, allowed Simko to emerge as one of the leaders of
the Shakak.
Simko’s rise to the leadership of the Shakak corresponded with the
invasion of several rural districts in western Azerbaijan by Ottoman Turks
in 1905. Russia countered the Ottoman invasion by occupying parts of
northern and eastern Azerbaijan in 1909. Czarist forces extended their
control over Azerbaijan in 1911, eventually forcing the Ottoman Turks
to evacuate their troops from northwestern Iran in 1912. The growing
rivalry between Russia and the Ottoman state over the vital strategic
region split the Kurdish tribes into two warring camps, namely those who
sided with the Ottoman Turks and those who threw their lot behind
Russia. As I describe in this chapter, in 1905 Simko lent his support
to the Ottoman Turks and even moved with a group of his followers
to the territory east of Lake Van. In 1907, however, he returned to
Iran, and, during the semi-civil war between Mohammad Ali Shah and
14 M. KIA

the Iranian constitutionalists, joined the pro-shah forces and slaughtered

anti-shah revolutionaries in Khoy and Salmas. This chapter ends with
a description of the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan and notes how
Simko was recruited by the Czarist authorities to carry out plundering
raids in Ottoman territory. In the years immediately prior to the First
World War, the Kurdish chief served as a functionary of Russian imperial
administration in Azerbaijan, receiving a regular salary from the Russian
government.
In Chapter 4, I focus on Simko’s activities during the First World
War. When the war commenced, Simko was an ally of Czarist Russia.
In early January 1915, however, Russia suddenly withdrew its forces from
Azerbaijan. Shortly after the Ottomans invaded the province, Simko aban-
doned his alliance with the Russians and joined the Turks. During the
Ottoman occupation of western Azerbaijan, Simko attacked and plun-
dered Assyrian and Armenian communities. He also watched the forced
deportations and massacres committed by the Ottoman government
against its own Armenian population in eastern Anatolia. As refugees
crossed into Iran, Simko and his men lay in ambush at the Qotur Pass
and attacked the bruised and battered Armenians. Because of his collab-
oration with the Ottoman Turks, Russian authorities banished Simko to
Tiflis, after they re-occupied Azerbaijan in the winter and spring 1915.
The Kurdish chief, however, was allowed to return to western Azerbaijan
a year later, this time as an ally and agent of Russian forces in the province.
In this chapter, I pay special attention to the period following the
victory of the two Russian revolutions in 1917 and the subsequent
withdrawal of Russian forces from northwestern Iran. To fill the gap
left behind by the retreating Russian army and to organize a line of
defense that would resist the impending Ottoman invasion of the region,
the British proposed an alliance between armed Armenian and Assyrian
bands and Simko (the most powerful Kurdish chief in the region). The
proposed British scheme failed to materialize, but the negotiations for
the creation of a united front created a direct link between Simko and
the Assyrian leader, Mar Shimun. Mar Shimun hoped that, through an
alliance with Simko, the Assyrians could defend and protect themselves
against a Turkish invasion of northwestern Iran. Simko used this oppor-
tunity to propose a meeting with Mar Shimun. After the conclusion of the
meeting, Simko and his supporters treacherously murdered Mar Shimun
and most of his bodyguards. The murder of Mar Shimun in March 1918
ignited a civil war between the Christian and Muslim communities of
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

western Azerbaijan, resulting in the death of thousands of innocent civil-

ians. The principal objective of this chapter is to demonstrate that Simko
had developed an embryonic form of Kurdish nationalism characterized
by intense anti-Assyrian and anti-Armenian sentiments during the First
World War.
In Chapter 5 of this book, I discuss the beginning of Simko’s revolt,
which commenced in December 1918 and ended in August 1922, when
it was suppressed by Iran’s armed forces. I argue that the evacuation of
foreign forces from Azerbaijan, and the inability of the Iranian govern-
ment to re-impose its authority over the province, created a vacuum that
Simko tried to fill. I also explain how Simko created a formidable army
by recruiting several hundred Ottoman artillery officers. Outside Iran, the
fall of the Russian Empire resulted in the creation of three new countries
in southern Caucasus, namely Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, while
the defeat and disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the Great War,
allowed the victorious western powers to make provision for a Kurdish
state in the treaty of Sèvres in 1920, though they forsook this pledge
three years later in the treaty of Lausanne.
In this chapter, I also describe how Simko commenced his revolt
by attacking and plundering villages in the rural districts of Khoy and
Salmas. These attacks caused enormous pain and suffering among the
rural population of the region, who demanded the suppression of Simko
by state authorities in Tehran and Tabriz. The government responded to
Simko’s raids by raising an army and dispatching it to western Azerbaijan.
Simko was defeated in a costly military campaign in January–February
1920. Though victorious against Simko, the central government could
not impose its authority over Azerbaijan because much of Iran’s meager
military resources were concentrated against Mirza Kuchak Khan and
his Soviet-backed movement based in the Caspian province of Gilan.
Thus, Simko survived his defeat at the hands of government forces, and
he managed to re-ignite his revolt after the veteran democrat, Sheikh
Mohammad Khiyabani, seized power in Tabriz, the provincial capital of
Azerbaijan, in April 1920. Khiyabani’s revolt further undermined the
authority of the central government in northwestern Iran and allowed
Turkic and Kurdish tribal chiefs, including Simko, to act as indepen-
dent leaders who commanded their own armies and conducted their own
foreign policy.
The collapse of governmental authority in Azerbaijan, as well as the
signing of the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10, 1920, which provided for an
16 M. KIA

independent Armenia and an autonomous Kurdistan, encouraged Simko

to send his closest confidant, Sayyid Taha II, to northern Iraq in order to
request financial and military support from the British authorities in the
country. I use Simko’s revolt and Khiyabani’s seizure of power in Tabriz
to explain why the Iranian government embarked on a campaign to re-
impose its authority over Azerbaijan by sending a new governor, Mokhber
al-Saltaneh Hedayat, to Tabriz. The new governor suppressed Khiyabani’s
revolt, but he failed to defeat Simko.
In Chapter 6, I discuss the military campaigns organized by Iranian
authorities to suppress Simko’s rebellion, and I try to explain why they
failed. As long as the bulk of government forces was concentrated against
Mirza Kuchak Khan in Gilan, Tehran could not raise a large military force
to quell the Kurdish revolt in western Azerbaijan. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the armies dispatched against Simko were generally small,
ill-equipped, and poorly commanded. Lacking any knowledge of modern
warfare, Iranian officials in Azerbaijan divided their small forces into even
smaller units and tried to attack Simko’s position from both north and
south. The Kurdish chief understood well the fundamental flaws of this
strategy and defeated government troops by assembling larger and better
equipped armies. Simko’s victories against government forces in March
1921, October 1921, and December 1921 increased his popularity and
enhanced his prestige among Kurdish tribes in both northwestern Iran
and eastern Anatolia. Consequently, the size of his army grew as chiefs
from neighboring tribal groups rallied to his flag. Despite his growing
power and influence, however, Simko failed to convert his tribal force
into an institutional foundation for creating an independent state. Tribal
armies were internally fragmented entities that lacked political, organiza-
tional, and ideological cohesion. They also relied exclusively on raiding
and plundering rural and urban communities rather than building a new,
effective, and operational political order.
One section of this chapter focuses on the creation of a unified
and integrated national army by Reza Khan, Iran’s minister of war in
autumn 1921. The establishment of a modern army allowed the Iranian
government to suppress Simko’s rebellion and restore state authority over
western Azerbaijan after it had suffered a series of embarrassing defeats at
the hands of the Kurdish chief. The last section of this chapter has been
devoted to the diplomatic efforts by the Iranian government to isolate
Simko and deny him any military assistance from foreign sources. In this
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

context, I have described how Iranian authorities established a close diplo-

matic relationship with the Turkish nationalists in Ankara as a means of
cutting off one of Simko’s main sources of military, financial, and logis-
tical support. Tehran understood that neutralizing Simko required more
than a strong and unified army. The campaign to defeat Simko demanded
that his main foreign backer, namely the Kemalist Turks, be convinced
that Simko and his rebellion posed a threat to the security of both Iran
and Turkey. Once Tehran and Ankara had reached an understanding on
the need to suppress Simko’s revolt, and the two armies had coordinated
their operations against the Kurdish rebel, the Iranian forces could attack
Simko’s positions in western Azerbaijan.
In Chapter 7, I analyze the campaign organized by the Iranian govern-
ment to defeat Simko and the significant obstacles and setbacks it faced
in imposing its authority in Azerbaijan. The first of these was the
revolt staged by Iranian gendarmerie officers stationed at the port of
Sharafkhaneh on the northern shores of Lake Urumiyeh in late January
1922. The rebels led by Major Abolqassem Khan Lahuti quickly seized
the city of Tabriz and arrested the governor-general, Mokhber al-Saltaneh
Hedayat. The rebels were joined by Tabriz democrats, who had not
forgotten and forgiven the murder of their leader, Sheikh Mohammad
Khiyabani, by Mokhber al-Saltaneh and the Iranian Cossacks. Panicked
by the sudden collapse of governmental authority in the provincial capital
of Azerbaijan, the Iranian government ordered all military forces that
had been sent against Simko to divert their attention to Tabriz and
the suppression of Lahuti’s revolt. Though the uprising was defeated
on February 8, 1922, the challenges confronting the central govern-
ment were far from being over. In late May as the government troops
were once again preparing themselves for a final assault against Simko,
a government military unit led by the Kurdish leader, Khalu Qorban,
suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of Simko’s forces. The defeat
and the death of Khalu Qorban caused a panic among government
troops who fled their posts, allowing Simko’s army to penetrate as far
east as Maragheh in eastern Azerbaijan. The minister of war Reza Khan
responded to the embarrassing defeat suffered by Khalu Qorban by
appointing a new commander, General Amanollah Mirza Jahanbani, as
the head of all government forces in Azerbaijan. The last section of this
chapter is devoted to the introduction of General Jahanbani and how he
organized and led a successful campaign against Simko, who was finally
defeated in August 1922. The Kurdish chief and a large group of his
18 M. KIA

followers fled into the Turkish territory. The majority of the tribal leaders
who had joined Simko surrendered and opened negotiations for a pardon
with the central government.
In Chapter 8, I have tried to reconstruct Simko’s life and activities after
he was defeated by the Iranian government. During the last period of his
life, extending from 1922 to 1930, Simko became a true nomad and a
rebel without a cause. Travelling from Turkey to Iraq, he tried to re-arm
his supporters and re-ignite a tribal uprising inside Iran. He negotiated
with the British authorities in northern Iraq and pleaded for military and
financial support from them, but they turned down his requests. He then
appealed to influential Kurdish chiefs in northern Iraq, especially Sheikh
Mahmud Barzanji, the then ruler of Sulaymaniyah, for assistance, but he
did not receive any. Distraught by a lack of sympathy and support, Simko
left Iraq and allied himself with the Turkish nationalists, who recruited
him in their campaign to capture Mosul. After it became clear that the
Turks were negotiating with the British to resolve their territorial disputes,
and that they planned to apply an iron fist policy to control their own
Kurdish population, Simko returned to Iran. But the Iran to which he
returned was very different from the Iran from which he had fled in 1922.
In place of a feeble and incompetent Qajar state, a new modernizing and
centralizing government had emerged under the leadership of Reza Khan,
soon to become Reza Shah. In sharp contrast to his Qajar predecessor, the
Pahlavi shah had no tolerance for insubordination and rebellious behavior,
especially on the part of tribal chiefs. With hopes of regaining his former
status as the supreme leader of the Shakak fading fast, Simko rolled the
dice and revolted in a loose coalition with several neighboring tribes. This
rebellion was quickly put down with a great deal of support from other
branches of the Shakak. Even his Kurdish allies defected and abandoned
him to his fate. Simko had no alternative but to seek refuge in Iraq. His
presence in northern Iraq was viewed by Baghdad as a security threat.
Thus, after long and protracted negotiations between the governments of
Iraq and Iran, Simko returned to the bosom of a regime that had never
forgotten or forgiven his rebellions. He was enticed to return to Iran
with a promise that he would assume a position of authority as a district
governor of Oshnaviyeh, but this was, from the very beginning a trap, a
deadly trap, which would cost him his life.
Simko was a frontier warlord who utilized the patron-client system to
maintain and expand his power. For two years, extending from 1905 to
1907, he served as the client of the Ottoman Turks who had invaded
 1 INTRODUCTION 19

and occupied several rural districts in western Azerbaijan. In 1907, he

returned to Iran and adopted the Khan of Maku and through him the
Qajar monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah, as his new patron. When the
Russians invaded Iran in 1909, Simko switched his loyalty and offered his
services to the Czarist authorities in northwestern Iran. Russia used her
Kurdish clients, including Simko, to destabilize Ottoman rule by orga-
nizing tribal revolts in eastern Anatolia. Regardless of which patron he
served, Simko remained a warlord determined to increase his power and
influence on the borderlands of three empires.
The most comprehensive definition of a warlord has been articulated
by Kimberly Marten, who identifies four shared characteristics. First,
a leader and his armed men “take advantage of the disintegration of
central authority to seize control over relatively small slices of territory.”11
Second, the motivation and actions of this leader and his supporters
are rooted in self-interest rather than ideology.12 Third, the authority
of the warlord is based on personal charisma and ties of patronage.13
Fourth, “the personalistic rule” of the warlord intensifies “the fragmenta-
tion of political and economic arrangements across the country.”14 Within
this theoretical framework, I argue that, under a unique set of histor-
ical circumstances characterized by the collapse of state power, eruption
of inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence, and incessant intervention by
neighboring imperial powers, a warlord operating on the frontiers of
empires could transition from a brigand and a client of imperial powers
to a leader of a separatist movement.
As a warlord in the borderlands of empires, Simko could only main-
tain his power by playing the role of a tightrope walker. He had no other
alternative but to adjust himself to the shift in balance of power in the
region. A variety of statements and letters attributed to Simko clearly
demonstrate that he changed the tone and content of his statements in
accordance with the nationality and political orientation of the individual
he was communicating with. Thus, when he met an American missionary

11 Douglas Carr, “Roman Warlords and the Early Medieval World,” p. 2, in H. Christie
and M. Kasten (ed.) Current Approaches to People Places and Things in the Early Medieval
Period; Proceedings of the 12th Annual Early Medieval Archaeology Student Symposium,
(Oxford: British Archaeological Reports), pp. 83–94. See also, Kimberly Marten, “War-
lordism in Comparative Perspective,” International Security, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Winter,
2006/2007), p. 48.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
20 M. KIA

in 1920, the Kurdish chief appealed to humanitarian impulses of his audi-

ence and emphasized the plight and suffering of his people, while at
the same time adopting an anti-Russian, anti-Turkish, and anti-Iranian
posture:

Here I am living at the top of my mountain, my people eating grass….and

no one about us but the false Russians, the false Turks and the false
Persians. How can my voice reach Paris? You must carry my appeal. We
need help and we look especially to America.15

Five years later, when he was desperate to save his neck by fleeing
Turkish territory, Simko used a pro-Iran disguise and pleaded to Iranian
authorities to allow him to return to Iran. In a letter to the governor-
general of Azerbaijan, the previously anti-Iranian rebel posed as an Iranian
patriot determined to demonstrate his loyalty and fidelity to the shah and
his motherland, Iran:

My companions and I are Iranians, and our race is also Iranian, but,
because of traitorous paid agents, who are known to everyone, we were
forced to leave our homeland and take residence in a foreign country. I
want to prove that I have never intended to betray, and I have always been
mindful of the independence and dignity of my homeland.16

A short time after Iranian authorities allowed him to return to his

birthplace, Chahriq, Simko discarded his expressions of devotion to Iran
and the Iranian monarch and began to organize a new anti-government
revolt for which he sought British assistance. According to a British
intelligence report, Simko was cherishing the dream of establishing an
autonomous Kurdish state with support from Britain, “the only power,”
according to the Kurdish chief, which could “save the Kurdish race from
being crushed to death between the Persian and the Turk.”17

15 H. Mackensen, “A Remarkable Rescue,” The Kurdistan Missionary, June 1920, as

quoted in Susan Meiselas, Kurdistan In the Shadow of History, (New York: Random
House, 1997), p. 101.
16 Sirwan Khosrozadeh, “Vakavi-ye Avamel-e Moasser dar Shuresh-e Dovvom-e Simko
(Mehr 1305),” Motaleat-e Tarikhi-ye Jang, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1401 (Solar) (2021), pp. 35–46,
p. 38.
17 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, July 3, 1925 [E 4280/82/34], No. 361, Intelli-
gence Summary No. 18, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Edited by R. M. Burrell,
14 Volumes, Volume 7, (London: Archive Editions, 1997), p. 303.
 1 INTRODUCTION 21

Simko began his career as a frontier brigand in a geographical region

characterized by the growing erosion of state power and the mounting
polarization among its ethnic and religious communities. As a result of the
impotency of Iran’s central government and the interventionist policies of
Russia and the Ottoman Empire, western Azerbaijan became increasingly
politicized and militarized, with each community being forced to choose
an imperial patron to protect itself against its own neighbors. Assyrian and
Armenian communities opted for Russian patronage, while some of the
Kurdish tribes sided with the Ottoman Turks. The commencement of the
First World War converted Simko from a run-of-the-mill brigand into a
political actor fighting for his tribe’s survival. When neighboring empires
disappeared and inter-ethnic and inter-religious violence was settled, the
former brigand and client of imperial powers transitioned into the leader
of a campaign that aimed at creating a Kurdish state in northwestern Iran.
After the Iranian army defeated him in August 1922, Simko sought the
patronage and protection of British authorities in northern Iraq. When his
pleas for support and protection were rejected by the British, he threw
himself at the mercy of nationalist Turks and served them for a time as
a loyal client in their fight against the British. In 1925, when he realized
that the Kemalist Turks were determined to crush any form of Kurdish
autonomy or independence in Anatolia, he pleaded with Iranian authori-
ties to allow him to return to his homeland, pledging that his sole purpose
was to demonstrate that he was not a traitor, but a loyal client of his
majesty, the shah. Survival in the borderlands of empires never allowed
Simko to transcend the imperial framework and the patron-client system
in which he had operated for much of his life. His attempts at creating a
Kurdish autonomous or independent enclave were condemned to failure
because he always relied on the support of a regional power to sustain his
campaign. Reliance on a patron simply meant that he was always being
manipulated as a tool so that his patron could gain the upper hand in a
larger power play in the region.
This book is divided into nine chapters. Aside from the first chapter
(Introduction), the second chapter, which focuses on the decline of the
Qajar state and the growing intervention of foreign powers in the internal
affairs of Iran, and the last chapter (Conclusion), the remaining six chap-
ters follow a chronological order tracing the development of Simko from
a frontier brigand to an ally and client of the Ottoman state and Russia,
eventually emerging as the leader of a separatist movement at a historical
juncture characterized by the collapse of the Qajar state, Czarist Russia,
22 M. KIA

and the Ottoman Empire. The present narrative makes no pretense of

offering bold new interpretations. It is designed as an introduction to
the study of the relationship between tribalism and proto-nationalism in
the borderlands of early twentieth-century Iran. In the process, this book
hopes to provide the reader, who does not have any prior knowledge
or expertise on the subject, with an overview of the fascinating political
history of northwestern Iran and the role of a prominent Kurdish tribal
leader in shaping that history before, during, and immediately after the
First World War (Map 1.1).

Map 1.1 Iran and the location of West Azerbaijan Province

 CHAPTER 2

Historical Setting: Iran on the Brink

of Collapse

Far from being a unified nation, Iran entered the twentieth century a
fragmented political entity comprising a mosaic of ethnic, linguistic, and
religious communities. Each region of the country possessed its own
unique characteristics, which distinguished it from others in geography,
climate, ethnic and linguistic composition, social organization, religion,
and local customs. Thus, heterogeneity constituted the most fundamental
characteristic of the country. The Qajar dynasty, which was established
in 1794, lacked the two pillars of a modern state, namely a professional
standing army and an efficient bureaucracy to impose its authority. In
the absence of a strong centralized government, the country was divided
into numerous semi-autonomous regions in which local notables, provin-
cial magnates, and tribal chiefs reigned as despotic potentates with a high
degree of independence within the regions they controlled.
In theory, the shah stood at the top of the power pyramid and ruled
as an absolute monarch. In reality, however, the Qajar monarchs enjoyed
no effective power outside of their capital, Tehran. To finance the state
and its various departments, they had to rely on tribal chiefs, influential
landowners, and provincial power brokers to collect taxes. The age-old
Iranian theory of the divine right of kings enhanced the importance
and centrality of monarchy. According to this theory, the institution of
monarchy had been created by God, and the monarch functioned as
God’s representative on earth. As the representative of God on earth,

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 23

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_2
24 M. KIA

the shah was obligated to preserve the peace, security, and stability of the
empire he ruled. Administering justice constituted the most important
duty of a sovereign. The failure to protect his subjects from injustice and
foreign invasion could justify the overthrow of the government. Despite
his absolute power, the shah could not violate the precepts of the Islamic
law or the sharia (Persian: shariat ); the opinion of the Muslim commu-
nity, expressed through the Shi’i ulama, had a strong influence on his
decisions and actions. In the Shi’i Muslim-populated areas of Iran, the
spiritual domain belonged to the Shi⊂i religious hierarchy, who acted
as the sole interpreters and guardians of Islamic heritage and identity.
They preached that God had entrusted his flock (i.e., the people) to the
shah and the ruler was, therefore, responsible for the care and protection
of the Shi⊂i community. In the predominantly Sunni Muslim-populated
regions of the country, especially in the Kurdish-populated areas of north-
western and western Iran, tribal chiefs, who owned villages and vast
landed estates, dominated political and pastoral life, while the sheikhs and
sayyids of various Sufi orders, many of whom were also large landowners,
constituted the cultural elite of the community.
For most of its existence, the Qajar state lacked sufficient means to
impose its authority. In a vast country such as Iran, which did not have
modern roads and railroads, and where regions were separated by rugged
mountains, arid plains, lush forests, and vast deserts, the ruling elite
deployed divide-and-rule tactics to neutralize any challenge to its rule.
As such, when a tribal chief or a provincial magnate revolted against the
authority of the central government, the shah appealed to regional power
centers in close proximity to the rebellious subject to suppress the mutiny.
After all, the drive to undermine the fragile balance of power in a province
posed a direct threat, not only to the power and prestige of the central
government, but also to the authority and autonomy of the surrounding
provincial magnates.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 25

Qajar Dynasty and European Imperialism

The Qajars tried to consolidate their authority over the provinces of their
empire by appointing loyal tribal chiefs, who were “entrusted with duties
of tax collection and of providing military forces for the government.”1
Any hope of centralizing power was significantly undermined, however,
after Czarist Russia humiliated the Qajars first in 1813 and again in 1828.
As a result of the devastating defeats it suffered, Iran was forced to sign
the humiliating treaties of Golestan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828),
ceding Georgia, Armenia, Shirvan, and Erran (the present-day Republic of
Azerbaijan) to Russia and pay a heavy war indemnity. The treaty of Turk-
menchay also granted extraterritorial privileges to Czarist Russia in Iran.
Following the model set by Russia, “fifteen other countries, including the
United States, obtained capitulation rights” in Iran “between 1855 and
1900.”2 The legitimacy of the Iranian state was further damaged when
the British landed troops in southern Iran and forced the Qajar monarchy
to renounce its claims to Afghanistan. In the Treaty of Paris, signed
in 1857, the British, who were anxious to protect their most precious
colony, India, from a future military attack from Russia, forced Iran to
renounce its claims to Afghanistan, especially the city of Herat.
The defeats at the hands of Russia and Britain, and the loss of vast
territories, caused a sharp decrease in the revenue coming into the central
government in Tehran. Further pressure from Russia and Britain forced
the Qajars to remove existing tariffs and taxes and open the Iranian
market to cheaply made goods from Europe. This policy resulted in
a sharp increase in the volume of imported consumer products from
Russia, England, and other European countries. The flooding of Iranian
bazaars with factory-made products from Europe and the inability of the
native manufacturers to compete with European goods intensified anti-
government sentiments among the country’s traditional middle classes
centered in the bazaar. During the second half of the nineteenth century,
a growing number of Iranian artisans and handicraftsmen lost their small

1 Farhad Kazemi, “The Military and Politics in Iran: The Uneasy Symbiosis,” in Towards
A Modern Iran: Studies in Thought, Politics and Society, Eli Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim
(eds.) (London: Frank Cass, 1980), p. 218.
2 Yeselson, Abraham. United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883–1921, (New
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1956), p. 16.
26 M. KIA

businesses and fell into the ranks of a newly emerging working class that
was forced to search for jobs in Russia’s industrial centers such as Baku.
Beginning in the 1870s, Russia and Britain embarked on a policy of
obtaining political and commercial concessions from the Qajar state. In
1879, Russia organized the Cossack Division as an elite cavalry force for
the Qajar monarch, Nasser al-Din Shah (r. 1848–1896). Russian enter-
prises also established financial and economic monopolies in Iran. These
included Caspian fisheries and telegraph lines, as well as road and railroad
construction (especially in Azerbaijan), and the Discount and Loan Bank
(Bank-e Esteqrazi-ye Russ ). Through this bank, the Russian government
provided loans to Qajar shahs and members of the Iranian aristocracy,
thus expanding its influence over the country’s ruling elite. Meanwhile,
in 1888, the British gained the right to open the Karun River, the only
navigable river in Iran, to steam navigation and international trade. A year
later, they established the Imperial Bank of Persia (Bank-e Shahanshai-ye
Iran) with a monopoly over issuing currency. In 1890, a British national
was granted a monopoly for the sale and distribution of all tobacco in
Iran, while in 1901, a concession was granted to a British syndicate,
headed by William Knox d’Arcy, to explore for oil and produce petroleum
anywhere in Iran except the country’s northern provinces. Thus, the rapid
decline of the Qajar state and its dependency on Russia and Britain,
which had already commenced in the first half of the nineteenth century,
accelerated during the long reign of Nasser al-Din Shah and the much
shorter reign of his successor, Mozaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1907). As
the British representative in Tehran wrote in 1895:

The governorships of provinces and other high posts are systematically

sold by the Shah to the highest bidder, and sold for short periods, so that
the country is plundered and the administration disorganized. The Central
Government is weak, and is defied not only by the provincial authorities,
but by the Mullas, or priesthood, whose power has become greater than
it should be. The finances are in disorder, and during the last three years
there has been an annual deficit of £50,000. Heavy arrears of pay are due
to the troops and the civil establishment. The army is a worthless rabble,
without serviceable arms or drill, or the semblance of discipline. There are
no trustworthy courts of justice. There are practically no roads, so that
the expansion of trade is greatly hampered; finally, the country is being
flooded with copper money, which is causing much loss and suffering to
the poorer classes and is giving rise to bread riots. Among the principal
causes of this state of affairs are the greed and timidity of the Shah. It is
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 27

his want of firmness and courage that has led to the regrettable increase
in the power of priesthood, for whom the Persians have little love, and
his perpetual demands for money can only be met by starving the public
departments.3

Anglo-Russian Rivalry
and the Constitutional Revolution
For much of the nineteenth century, as the country descended into a long
period of turmoil and decline, the rivalry between Russia to the north
and Britain to the south in India continued unabated. By 1903, Russia’s
political and economic position in Iran had attained such domination that
the Russian consul general in Tabriz viewed Azerbaijan “as an offshoot of
the Caucasus and almost a Russian province,”4 while another high Czarist
official could state brazenly that “our task is to make Persia an obedient
and useful but sufficiently strong tool in our hands and to retain for our
own economic interest a large Persian market.”5
The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), which ended with the humili-
ating defeat of Russia, followed by the eruption of the Russian revolution
of 1905, undermined, albeit temporarily, the dominant position of Russia
inside Iran. The disappearance of Russia from the Iranian theater embold-
ened the Ottoman Empire, Iran’s neighbor to the west. The Ottomans
invaded and occupied several Kurdish-populated rural districts in western
Azerbaijan in late 1905. They pressured the Kurdish tribes of north-
western Iran to declare their allegiance to the Ottoman sultan as the caliph
or the religious and spiritual head of all Sunni Muslims. The Shakak, a
Sunni Kurdish tribe on the Iranian-Ottoman frontier and their chiefs,
including Ismail Agha, also known as Simko, initially joined the Ottoman
Turks.
The temporary withdrawal of Russia from Iran’s internal affairs, the
economic crisis caused by events in Russia, and the impotence of the Qajar
dynasty in the face of the political and economic challenges confronting

3 FO 60, No. Confidential 6704, December 1895, Memorandum by M. Durand on

the Situation in Persia, British Public Record Office, Kew.
4 Wratislaw, A. C., A Consul in the East, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons,
1924), p. 184.
5 Eudin, Xenia Joukoff and Robert C. North. Soviet Russia and the East 1920–1927 A
Documentary Survey, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), p. 7.
28 M. KIA

Iranian society provided a golden opportunity for a coalition of urban

classes in Tehran to demand the establishment of a constitutional form
of government. The Iranian constitutional revolution, which erupted
in December 1905 and culminated with the granting of a constitu-
tion and a parliamentary system of government in August 1906, was an
urban movement based on the participation of the Shi’i clergy, traditional
middle classes centered in the bazaar, and western-educated notables and
intellectuals. The movement represented the first systematic attempt in
the history of Iran to reject absolutist monarchy and replace it with a
new political system based on a representative government. The newly
established parliamentary system as embodied by the National Consulta-
tive Assembly (Majlis-e Showra-ye Melli) imposed significant limitations
on the powers of the shah. It, however, failed to replace the tradi-
tional institutions of the country with a new political and legal structure
that could lay the foundation for a unified and integrated nation-state.
One of the fundamental weaknesses of the new political system was
the complete absence of cooperation between the executive branch as
represented by the shah and the legislative branch as personified by the
Majlis. Another critical drawback was the total lack of a financial struc-
ture, including a unified tax system, to generate sufficient revenue for the
central government to introduce badly needed reforms.
While the newly elected parliament attempted to consolidate its
position, Russia and Britain were busy reformulating their relationship
regarding Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. On August 31, 1907, the
two powers signed the Anglo-Russian Convention in Saint Petersburg.
This secret agreement aimed to remove Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet
as sources of discord between the two powers. To end their century-
old rivalry, Britain and Russia divided Iran into spheres of influence, a
Russian zone in the north, a British zone in the south, and a neutral
zone covering the rest of the country and presumably left to be ruled by
the Iranian government. In negotiating the Saint Petersburg Convention,
Russia and Britain maintained total secrecy and refused even to share the
content of their agreement with the Iranian government, thus effectively
treating Iran as their protectorate or a country that lacked the legal right
to have any say in its own political future. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 was widely interpreted
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 29

as the first step toward the eventual partition of Iran by the two Euro-
pean powers.6 Western Azerbaijan, the home of Simko and the Shakak
Kurds, fell within the Russian sphere of influence as defined by the Saint
Petersburg Convention.
Meanwhile, the Iranian parliament’s increasingly hostile and uncoop-
erative attitude toward the shah, as well as an assassination attempt on his
life, pushed the reigning monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah (r. 1907–1909),
a highly religious, superstitious, and reactionary man, who already feared
and despised the Majlis, and the press, into the arms of his Russian mili-
tary advisers and ultra conservative members of the ulama. The growing
unity among these anti-democratic forces allowed the shah to utilize the
increasing chaos and anarchy in the provinces, as well as the naked attacks
on his power by the parliament, to rally and mobilize his base in support
of a military coup that destroyed the first Iranian parliament on June 23,
1908.
In reaction to the suppression of the parliament, Tabriz, the provincial
capital of Azerbaijan, rose in rebellion against the authority of the shah.
Constitutionalist forces led by charismatic figures such as Sattar Khan and
Baqer Khan, who hailed from the lower social strata, armed the popula-
tion and seized control of the city. To suppress the rebellion in Tabriz,
Mohammad Ali Shah raised an army and dispatched it to Azerbaijan.
He also called on the tribal chiefs of Azerbaijan to rally to his flag and
to attack constitutionalist forces wherever they found them. Among the
Kurdish leaders who threw their support behind the Qajar monarch was
one of the chiefs of the Shakak, Simko, who targeted constitutionalist
forces in Khoy and Salmas. At the same time, he raided and plundered
Assyrian, Armenian, and Shi’i Azerbaijani villages.
In April 1909, the raging battle between the shah’s supporters and the
constitutionalists in northwestern Iran provided a convenient excuse for
the Russian forces to invade Azerbaijan in the name of opening the roads
to food supplies and restoring law and order in the province. Russian
military presence in Azerbaijan gradually expanded from Tabriz to other
major urban centers of the province, eventually forcing the Ottoman
troops, who had occupied several rural districts in western Azerbaijan
since 1905, to withdraw in late 1912.

6 Toynbee, Arnold J. Survey of International Affairs 1925, Volume I, The Islamic World
Since the Peace Settlement, (London: Oxford University Press, 1927), p. 534.
30 M. KIA

Back in Tehran, the parliament was restored in July 1909, after chiefs
of the Bakhtiyari tribe seized Isfahan and pro-constitution forces captured
Rasht. The two constitutionalist armies from the south and the north
marched to Tehran and forced the reigning Mohammad Ali Shah to abdi-
cate by seeking refuge at the Russian embassy at Zargandeh north of
Tehran. On the evening of 17 July, a day after the Qajar monarch had
abdicated, an extraordinary grand council composed of notables, promi-
nent members of the clergy, and some of the former deputies of the
first Majlis proclaimed Mohammad Ali Shah’s second son, Sultan Ahmad
Mirza, the shah.7 Because the new monarch was only 12 years old, the
constitutionalists appointed the head of the Qajar tribe as the Regent.
Once again, however, the Majlis failed to institutionalize its authority
by establishing a strong and stable government capable of defending
the country and introducing badly needed reforms. In November 1911,
Russia and Britain issued an ultimatum to the Iranian government
demanding the expulsion of Morgan Shuster, the American financial
adviser, who had been hired to reform the Iranian financial system.
Then, on 21 December, Russian troops in Tabriz launched attacks against
constitutionalists in the city. Five days later, Russian army reinforcements
from south Caucasus attacked Tabriz and crushed the constitutionalist
forces in the city. By 27 December, Tabriz was under full Russian military
control. Four days later, on December 31, 1911 (corresponding to 10th
of Moharram in the Islamic calendar when Shi’i Muslims mourn the death
of Hussein, the grandson of Muhammad, the prophet of Islam and their
third imam), a group of constitutionalist leaders and activists, including
the prominent Shi’i religious leader, Seqat al-Islam Tabrizi, were executed
in Tabriz by Russian occupation forces. Under pressure from Czarist
Russia, the second Majlis was closed down and, with the exception of
a short and aborted session in 1914, was not re-opened until 1921.

Iran During First World War

In spite of declaring its neutrality, Iran was invaded by Russian, Ottoman,
and British troops during the First World War. In addition, German
spies began to operate in various parts of the country, especially in the
south among tribal groups. Russia and Russians “excited almost universal

7 Barclay to Grey, Tehran, February 10, 1910, Persia Annual Report, 1909, Confidential
9642, [8669], No. 19., in Iran Political Diaries. Volume 4, p. 403.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 31

hatred” among Iranians, and this feeling was extended to Britain as the
ally of Russia and its “partner in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,”
which had partitioned Iran into spheres of influence.8 The Ottoman
Empire was also feared for its expansionist designs in northwestern and
western Iran, but at the same time, the Ottoman Pan-Islamic propaganda
commanded a certain amount of sympathy among Muslim Iranians.9
The invasion of Iran by foreign forces resulted in famine and starva-
tion throughout the country, especially in its western and northwestern
provinces. During “the last months of 1914, and in 1915 and 1916,”
famine prevailed, and deadly diseases spread. Compounding matters, the
whole area west of Lake Urumiyeh was stripped “bare of supplies and of
flocks by the Russians or the Turks.”10 Widespread famine introduced
diseases in its wake; “hundreds of thousands fell victim to starvation,
typhus, cholera,” and influenza.11 Typhus and influenza “each in turn
brought destruction to the country.”12 In Urumiyeh alone, an epidemic
of typhoid killed four thousand people.13 Most towns and villages located
in western Azerbaijan and Kurdistan were bombarded and laid waste
by the Russians and Ottoman Turks. Nearly all homes were gutted or
destroyed. Whether kept for agricultural use or for breeding purposes,
livestock were killed and consumed. As disease and famine condi-
tions spread throughout the country, the Qajar monarch, Ahmad Shah
(r. 1909–1925), seized it as an opportunity to enrich himself by hoarding
“the country’s entire grain crop” and selling it “to his starving subjects
at colossal prices.”14 While in the capital, Tehran, many of his subjects

8 British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 15, Supplement to Eastern Affairs Volumes, 1918–1939. Edited by Robin Bidwell,
(University Publications of America, 1989), p. 21.
9 Ibid.
10 Wilson, Arnold T. Loyalties Mesopotamia, Volume II 1917–1920 A Personal and
Historical Record, (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 31.
11 Abraham Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883–1921, p. 137.
12 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, July 16, 1923, Persia. Annual Report, 1922, Confidential
(12221), [E 8057/8057/34], No. 314., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6,
p. 359.
13 Coan, Frederick G. Yesterdays in Persia and Kurdistan, (Claremont: Saunders Studio
Press, 1939), p. 276.
14 Time Magazine, September 8, 1941, p. 18.
32 M. KIA

died from starvation every day, the shah insisted on receiving special
payments from the government before he could release the grain he was
hoarding. It is not surprising, therefore, that his subjects bestowed upon
the young monarch the title of Ahmad the Grocery Boy or Ahmad Allāf
in Persian.15
Devastation and depopulation hit the Kurdish-populated regions of
Iran especially hard, in particular those on the Ottoman-Iranian frontier,
which were ravaged and ransacked by both Russian and Ottoman troops.
The flocks of Kurdish tribal groups in western and northwestern Iran were
so “depleted by the depredations of the Russians that they had nothing to
barter for food, which was scarce and dear.”16 A once powerful Kurdish
tribe, the Mamash, which at one time “boasted of 2,000 horsemen,”
could “scarcely muster 200 infantry” after the end of the war.17 Because
tribal groups possessed large quantities of arms and horses, they were
frequently treated as a military threat by foreign armies. On many occa-
sions, Russian troops killed “males able to bear arms” and left “women
and children, old men and dogs” to starve “amidst the smoking ruins of
their homes.”18 The destruction of the tribal and rural communities by
opposing foreign forces brought the trade of the country to “a stand-
still.”19 Further, the central government in Tehran was unable “to collect
internal taxes.”20 In the absence of any local or governmental supervision,
the country’s intricate system of irrigation also broke down, causing trees
and vineyards to die. In Urumiyeh, landlords and peasants were reduced
to poverty, and many of them resorted to begging on the streets.21 As
the Iranian memorandum to the Paris Conference stated:

15 Malekzadeh, Mehdi. Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran, (Tehran: Elmi Press,

1980), 7 Volumes, Volume 7, pp. 1622–1623. See also, Time Magazine, September 8,
1941, p. 18.
16 Arnold T. Wilson, Loyalties Mesopotamia Volume II 1917–1920, p. 84.
17 Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918–1920,
p. 227.
18 Arnold T. Wilson, Loyalties Mesopotamia Volume II 1917–1920, p. 32.
19 Millspaugh, A. C. The American Task in Persia, (New York & London: The Century
Co., 1925), p. 114.
20 Ibid.
21 Frederick G. Coan, Yesterdays in Persia and Kurdistan, p. 280.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 33

La Perse, bien que pays neutre, a souffert par la guerre des pertes
plus sensibles que certains belligérants. Sa position spéciale de pays
envahi par les armées belligérantes, ses provinces dévastées, sa population
décimée, lui donnent équitablement droit, par analogie, aux réparations
et dédommagemments dus aux pays belligérants……..Les provincesde
Hamadan, Kermanshah, Kurdistan et Azerbaidjan formant les régions les
plus fertiles et les plus riches de La Perse, devinrent alors des champs
de batailles entre les Russes et les Turcs, qui y commirent pillages,
incendies, massacres…et viols. Des villes et des villages furent bombardés;
des forêts et des vergers détruits, pour faciliter les opérations militaires
et fournir du combustible….Une des plus riches villes d’Azerbaidjan
Ourmia [Urumiyeh], a été pillée et incendiée à plusieurs reprises.22 (Persia,
although a neutral country, suffered greater losses from the war than
some belligerents. Her special position as a country invaded by belligerent
armies, her devastated provinces, her decimated population, give it an equi-
table right, by analogy, to reparations and compensation due to belligerent
countries. The provinces of Hamadan, Kermanshah, Kurdistan and Azer-
baijan, forming the most fertile and richest regions of Persia, then became
battlefields between the Russians and the Turks, who committed looting,
burning, massacres…and rapes. Towns and villages were bombed; forts and
orchards destroyed to facilitate military operations and provide fuel…..One
of Azerbaijan’s richest cities, Urumiyeh, was looted and burned several
times)

Thus, a country that had not been a belligerent during the First World
War suffered more from the war than any other non-belligerent country,
its territory having been invaded and occupied by both Axis and Allied
powers.23 As one author wrote during the war, Iran “had been exposed to
violations and sufferings not endured by any other neutral country.”24 In
the earlier stages of the war, the Ottoman Turks, and then the Russians,

22 Droit aux Réparations. Copie extraite du Mémorandum préparé la Conférence de la

Paix (Communicated by Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, December 3, 1919.), Doc.
138 [157766], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, pp. 97–98.
23 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, July 16, 1923, Persia Annual Report, 1922, Confidential
(12221), [E 8057/8057/34], No. 314., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6,
p. 359.
24 Nicolson, Harold, Curzon: The Last Phase 1919–1925: A Study in Post-War
Diplomacy, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1939), p. 129.
34 M. KIA

had been mainly responsible for converting Iranian territory into a devas-
tated war zone. After the withdrawal of Russian forces in 1917, the British
were left in occupation of parts of Iran, and upon them fell the full force
of Iranian resentment and hatred. By the time Britain and the Ottoman
Empire signed the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, marking
the end of the First World War in the Middle East, nearly two million
Iranians had perished from starvation and disease.
The end of the First World War and the departure of foreign troops
from Iranian territory left a vacuum that the feeble and inept Qajar state
could not fill. The Qajar monarchy lacked the military and administrative
muscle to impose its authority and to restore law and order to the devas-
tated country. Three distinct military units existed in Iran at the time: the
Russian-officered Cossack Division; the Swedish-officered gendarmerie
under the supervision of the Iranian government; and the British-
organized—and British paid—South Persia Rifles.25 The South Persia
Rifles were controlled by British officers and for the most part confined to
the two provinces of Fars and Kerman, while the Gendarmerie, organized
with the support of Swedish officers, were untrained for anything but
simple police duties.26 The Cossack Brigade was “slightly better drilled,”
but the discipline of its units was at best untrustworthy, and the attitude
of their Russian officers was unpredictable.27 The absence of a unified
standing army caused the spread of banditry, anarchy, chaos, and the
general absence of security and order in the provinces. This made the
government appear weak, impotent, and irrelevant to the life of ordi-
nary people, especially outside the capital. It is not surprising, therefore,
that immediately after the end of the First World War, Iran witnessed the
eruption of several movements challenging the authority of the central
government.
Beginning in 1915 and extending all the way to autumn 1921, in the
Caspian province of Gilan, the nationalist, anti-Russian and anti-British

25 British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939.
Volume 15, p. 34.
26 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, June 18, 1920, Doc 253, [204984], No. 394., in British
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 16,
p. 182.
27 Ibid.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 35

leader, Mirza Kuchak Khan (1880–1921) organized an anti-government

movement. Mirza Kuchak Khan denounced the central government in
Tehran as undemocratic, corrupt, inept, and a puppet of British impe-
rialism. He advocated implementation of major socio-economic reforms
that called for improvement in the living conditions of the peasant cultiva-
tors. On May 18, 1920, a Soviet force landed at the port of Anzali on the
southern shore of the Caspian and hastily advanced to the city of Rasht,
the capital of the province of Gilan. On June 5, 1920, Mirza Kuchak
Khan, the leader of the Jangal movement, declared the establishment of
the Soviet Republic of Gilan in collaboration with the Communist Party
of Iran, also known as Hezb-e Adalat or Justice Party.28 The Soviet-
backed socialist republic based in Gilan lasted until October 1921 when
government forces entered Rasht.
Additionally, in April 1920, the veteran democrat and former Majlis
deputy, Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani (1880–1920), seized the city of
Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, which he re-named Azadistan (Land of
Liberty). Khiyabani remained the master of Tabriz until mid-September
1920, when he was overthrown and killed by the Iranian Cossack Divi-
sion. Like Mirza Kuchak Khan in Gilan, Khiyabani denounced the central
government in Tehran as weak, corrupt, and subservient to foreign
powers. Finally, starting in late 1918, one of the chiefs of the Shakak
tribe in western Azerbaijan, Ismail Agha, known by his nickname Simko
(1887–1930), raised the flag of rebellion and embarked on a campaign to
establish an independent Kurdish state. By spring 1922, Simko enjoyed
the support of numerous Kurdish tribal chiefs in both Iran and eastern
Anatolia. In sharp contrast to the earlier-mentioned movements based in
Gilan and Tabriz, Simko’s uprising enjoyed a tribal base, and it did not
express any particular opposition to the pro-British policies of the ruling
establishment in Tehran. In fact, in sharp contrast to Kuchak Khan in
Gilan and Khiyabani in Tabriz, Simko enjoyed a cordial relationship with
British authorities in Iraq through the agency of his brother-in-law and
close confidant, Sayyid Taha II of Nehri, and he sought their support for
his efforts to establish an independent state in northwestern Iran. Simko’s
movement was also unique in that it made no claim to stand for Iranian
nationalist aspirations of independence from foreign powers and a true

28 For the origins and history of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan, see Cosroe
Chaqueri, The Soviet Socialist Republic of Iran, 1920–1921, (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
36 M. KIA

democratic system of government. Instead, Simko called for separation

of the Kurdish-populated regions of northwestern Iran as the prerequi-
site for the creation of an independent Kurdistan. The revolts in Gilan,
Azerbaijan, and among the Kurds of northwestern Iran undermined the
authority and legitimacy of the Qajar state and the archaic ruling class in
Tehran.29
While separatist movements smoldered in northern and northwestern
regions of the country, the Shahseven tribes raided and looted urban and
rural communities in eastern Azerbaijan; “unrest and lawlessness prevailed
among the Turkmen tribes” of northern Khorasan; in the west and north-
west the Kurdish tribes were challenging the authority of the central
government; and “any success by Simko might have led them to throw in
their lot” with that Kurdish chief, “with the likely result of a general revolt
and a separatist movement” in Iranian Kurdistan.30 Also in the west,
southwest, and the south, the weakness of the central government left
the Lurs, the Bakhtiyari (i.e., Lur-e Bozorg), the Qashqai, the Khamseh
tribe of Fars, the Arab ruler of Mohammareh (i.e., Khoramshahr), Sheikh
Khazal, and all the tribal groups in the hinterland of the Persian Gulf ports
in a state of practical independence.31 This “state of affairs was seriously
aggravated by an intense Bolshevik propaganda…aiming at the destruc-
tion of British influence” in Iran and “the acquisition of a dominant
position” for the Soviet Union “through a process of disintegration.“32

29 Between April and early October 1921, a third uprising erupted in the north-
eastern province of Khorasan under the leadership of the nationalist gendarmerie officer,
Colonel Mohammad Taqi Khan Pessyan (1892–1921). The challenge to the authority of
the central government in Tehran came after Pessyan’s nemesis, the former governor
of Khorasan, Qavam al-Saltaneh, was appointed prime minister. To suppress Colonel
Pessyan’s uprising, the central government in Tehran appealed to the Kurdish tribes of
northern Khorasan to stage a rebellion. In a confrontation between the pro-government
Kurdish tribal forces and Pessyan’s detachment, the colonel was shot and killed. The
death of Pessyan ended the rebellion and restored the central government’s authority in
northeastern Iran.
30 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, May 21, 1923, Doc. 231 [E 6353/77/34] No. 221.,
in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
18, p. 340.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 37

Reza Shah Pahlavi

Desperate for restoration of governmental authority, introduction of
fundamental reforms, and rejuvenation of Iran’s armed forces, the prime
minister, Vosuq al-Dowleh, negotiated a highly unpopular agreement
with the British government on August 9, 1919. Though the agree-
ment reiterated the British respect for the independence and territorial
integrity of Iran, it also undertook to supply the Iranian government with
expert advisers, who would be invested with sufficient power to intro-
duce modern administrative reforms. Additionally, the agreement made
a commitment to dispatch a British military mission, which would assist
the Iranian government with the creation of a uniform army supplied
by modern military equipment and munitions.33 The British government
also pledged to provide the Iranian government with a substantial loan
and to cooperate with Iran in constructing railways and improving the
country’s road communications. The security for the British loan was
to be provided by the revenues generated by Iranian customs or other
sources of income at the disposal of the Iranian government. Finally,
the two governments agreed to the creation of a joint committee of
experts for the purpose of examining and reorganizing Iran’s customs
tariff system. If ratified by the Majlis, the Anglo-Persian Agreement would
have granted the British government a dominant financial and military
position in Iran and effectively converted the country into a de facto
British protectorate.
Several writers, including the historian, Hossein Makki, the author
of the multi-volume, Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran, claimed that in sharp
contrast to his prime minister, the reigning monarch, Ahmad Shah (r.
1909–1925), opposed the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 1919,
refusing to endorse it when he visited London several months later. This
claim was mere fiction. The available documents clearly demonstrate that
Ahmad Shah had accepted a monthly payment of £2,500 from the British
in return for lending his support to Vosuq al-Dowleh.34 On August 16,

33 British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939.
Volume 15, p. 33.
34 See, Memorandum on the Persian Question, Foreign Office, June 14, 1920, No.
464, [2044900/150/34], in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series,
Volume XIII , Edited by Butler, Rohan, J. P. T. Bury, M. E. Lambert, (London: Her
Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1963), p. 518.
38 M. KIA

1919, a week after the agreement had been signed, Ahmad Shah left Iran
for Europe. As his devastated country confronted the aftermath of four
years of war, famine, disease, and foreign occupation, Ahmad Shah having
entered into a bribery scheme with the British government chose to spend
the next ten months vacationing, gambling, and entertaining himself in
Italy, Switzerland, France, and England. The shah eventually reneged
on his promise to the British and withdrew his support for his prime
minister, furious not so much over the agreement, but rather because
Vosuq al-Dowleh had delayed reimbursing him for his exuberant lifestyle
in Europe’s gambling houses.
The Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, which had been negotiated
secretly, aroused a storm of indignation and outrage in Iran. Intense anti-
British sentiments erupted across the country when the terms of the
agreement were revealed. Though the agreement had been signed by
the representatives of the two governments, it could not go into effect
without being ratified by a majority of deputies in the Majlis. The Fourth
Majlis, however, had not been elected at the time when the agreement
was signed. Assuming erroneously that the Iranian parliament would ratify
the agreement without any serious opposition, the British government
and the pro-British prime minister, Vosuq al-Dowleh, proceeded with its
implementation. The presumptuous attitude of the British government
and their ally, Vosuq al-Dowleh, backfired, enraging the public and many
among the members of the political class in Tehran. The public mood
was further exacerbated when it was revealed that Vosuq al-Dowleh and
two of his ministers, the minister of foreign affairs, Firuz Mirza Nosrat
al-Dowleh, and the minister of finance, Akbar Mirza Sārem al-Dowleh
(both princes of the Qajar ruling family), had received handsome bribes
from the British for signing the agreement. This added fuel to an already
volatile situation characterized by a resurgent Iranian nationalism.
On May 18, 1920, as the row between the pro-British Vosuq al-
Dowleh and his opponents was reaching a new height, Soviet Red Army
units landed at the port of Anzali on the southern shore of the Caspian
Sea. From Anzali, the Soviet forces marched against Rasht, the provincial
capital of Gilan, forcing the British army units in the city to withdraw.
The message from Moscow to both Tehran and London was very clear:
As long as the British retained their role as the dominant imperial power
in Iran, the Soviet Union reserved the legitimate right to establish itself in
northern Iran through buffer republics between Russia’s fragile southern
belly and the British to the south. If the British intended to take over Iran
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 39

by bribing the shah, his prime minister, and two of the cabinet ministers,
then the Soviets reserved the right to establish their own revolutionary
client regime in Gilan. With the shah withdrawing his support from his
prime minister, the Soviet army units in occupation of Gilan, and newspa-
pers clamoring over the 1919 agreement and denouncing it as a national
disgrace that posed a direct threat to the independence of the country,
Vosuq al-Dowleh resigned as the prime minister on June 24, 1920, and
immediately left the country.
Though they had lost their closest ally in Tehran, the British expected
the shah, who had received a monthly subsidy from the British govern-
ment, to persist in his support for the Anglo-Persian Agreement. The
shah himself expressed hope to the British ambassador in Tehran that if
he replaced Vosuq al-Dowleh’s cabinet with one equally acceptable to
the British government, his monthly subsidy would be continued.35 The
recommendation from the British ambassador in Tehran was to continue
paying the shah his monthly subsidy because if London wished to keep
the Qajar monarch well-disposed to British policies, then it had to shower
him with money because money was the thing the shah loved the most:

He [Ahmad Shah] is now thoroughly well disposed towards us and deter-

mined to work with us in his own rather odd way. Best method of keeping
him in this frame of mind is to give him…as much money as we can for
that is what he loves most in the world.36

Despite relentless pressure from the British government and the

complete subservience of Ahmad Shah to British demands, the new prime
minister, Mirza Hassan Khan Moshir al-Dowleh, imposed a moratorium
on the implementation of the agreement arguing that before any further
enactment of its clauses, the treaty had to be first ratified by the new
parliament. Before the new Majlis could convene, however, an earth-
quake shook the foundation of Iran’s political order. In the early hours
of February 21, 1921, detachments of the Iranian “Cossack brigade,
numbering 2,500–3,000 men, with 8 field guns and 18 machine guns
under the command of Colonel Reza Khan, marched from Qazvin on

35 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, June 25, 1920, [206097/150/34], No. 417., in

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series, Volume XIII , p. 538.
36 Ibid.
40 M. KIA

Tehran, and entered the town…shortly after midnight.”37 The Cossacks

“encountered no serious opposition from the gendarmerie or the police,
and assumed control of town, which was immediately put under martial
law.”38 Shortly after seizing the capital, the civilian leader of the coup, the
pro-British journalist Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabai, was appointed prime
minister. The commander of the Cossack division that had marched to the
capital, Reza Khan, was elevated to the command of the Cossack Brigade,
receiving the title of Sardar Sepah (Commander of the Army). In April,
Sayyid Ziya reshuffled his cabinet and appointed Reza Khan Sardar Sepah
as the minister of war.
Many in Iran, both then and now, have claimed that the British
government had prior knowledge of the February 1921 coup and in
fact conceived, designed, and implemented it. The belief among many
Iranians and even some Europeans at the time was that the coup was
supported by the British authorities in Tehran and Qazvin.39 No details
or protestations on the part of the British embassy in Tehran “had
the slightest effect in dispelling this belief.”40 The Cossacks themselves
“strengthened the prevailing impression by boasting that they had British
support,” presumably because “their leaders” had told them so “in order
that they might be encouraged in their enterprise by the feeling that they
had a force behind them ready to help them if necessary.”41
According to the conspiracy theory, which was developed and embel-
lished later by its opponents, the coup was a British plot designed to
secure the long-term geopolitical interests of Britain in the Middle East
and South Asia by creating a neutral but unified Iran that served as
a buffer between Communist Russia and British India. If the takeover
was organized by the British officers in Iran, then it follows that the
Iranian military leader of the February coup, Reza Khan, was nothing

37 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, February 21, 1921, [E 2379/2/34], No. 681., in

Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series, Volume XIII , p. 729.
38 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, March 31, 1921, [E 6160/2004/34], No. 39., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, pp. 7–8.
39 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, March 1, 1920, Doc 505, [4926/2/34], No. 31., in
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
16, p. 376.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 41

but a puppet and a stooge of British imperialism, and whatever he would

do in the next twenty years must be viewed as somehow serving the
political and economic interests of Great Britain. What is true is that
the British commander, General Ironside, “who was then supervising
the withdrawal of remaining British troops” from Iran, had “met Reza
Khan several times, and was very impressed by his military abilities.”42
He and perhaps other British officers were also aware of the impending
coup. There is, however, no evidence in any of the available documents
to suggest that the British government had any plans to replace the
Qajar dynasty. Indeed, both the available documents, as well as Reza
Shah’s policies during his reign, clearly demonstrate that, far from being
an instrument of British foreign policy, he was an independent-minded
Iranian nationalist who suppressed all provincial power centers, central-
ized all authority in his own hands, and significantly reduced the influence
of Britain and the Soviet Union in Iran. Under his leadership, the Iranian
government expelled British influence from Iran, getting rid of British
advisers and disbanding the British—officered—and British—paid—South
Persia Rifles. Reza Shah’s policies may be viewed as a series of auda-
cious attempts to transform and modernize Iran after a century of defeat,
humiliation, and inept governance.
Reza Khan was a man of humble origin. He was born on March 15,
1878, in the village of Alasht, in the district of Savad Kuh, in the Caspian
province of Mazandaran. His father, Abbas Ali Khan known as Dadash
Beyk, who died a few months after Reza’s birth, was an army colonel from
Mazandaran. His mother, Nush Afarin Khanom, was the daughter of a
family of mohajerin or “the refugee inhabitants of the Caucasian districts
wrested by Russia” from Iran by the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828), who
chose to emigrate to Iran “rather than remain in their native land under
Russian rule.”43 Powerfully built and “well above the average height, with
a quiet voice and a direct manner of speech” which was most unusual
among his compatriots, Reza began his career as a soldier in the Iranian

42 R. M. Burrell (ed.), Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 6, p. v. See also,

Lord Ironside (ed.). High Road to Command: The Diaries of Major-General Sir Edmund
Ironside, (London: Leo Cooper Ltd, 1972), pp. 147–168.
43 Lorraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 31, 1922, Doc. 233 [E 3074/6/34], No.
62, in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
17, p. 283.
42 M. KIA

army at the age of fifteen.44 He then joined the Iranian Cossack Brigade,
a military unit that had been organized as an elite cavalry force by the
Russian government for the Qajar monarch, Nasser al-Din Shah, after he
returned from his second trip to Europe in 1879.45 After serving as a
trooper for several years, Reza gradually “rose from the ranks” through
sheer energy and ability, gaining “the approval of the Russian instructors”
of the Cossack Division “for his courage and fearlessness.”46
After the coup of February 1921, Reza used his position as the
commander of the Cossack Brigade, and later as the minister of war,
to create a modern and highly centralized national army based on
universal military service. This army would act as the principal vehicle
for suppression of powerful tribal khans and provincial power centers.
Steady progress in the strength, organization, and efficiency of the new
military force was made in the next two years much of it due to “the
untiring efforts” of Reza Khan, “whose declared policy, ever since he
had come into power,” was to create and maintain an army, “capable,
firstly of ensuring peace and order” within the confines of Iran, and “sec-
ondly, of protecting the country from external aggression.”47 Having
secured much of the country under his control, Reza Khan emerged as
the new prime minister on October 28, 1923. On December 12, 1925,
a constituent assembly abolished the Qajar dynasty and designated Reza
Khan as the new shah of Iran and the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty
(1925–1979).
Reza Shah used the newly created army not only to concentrate all
power in his own hands, but also to hasten the modernization and trans-
formation of Iran from an aggregate of autonomous communities into
a unified and integrated nation-state. Determined to create a modern,
centralized, and secular political system, in 1927 Reza Shah introduced
a judiciary based on the French legal system. A year later, he invited an
American expert, Arthur Millspaugh, to reorganize the country’s public

44 Ibid.
45 E’temad al-Saltaneh, Mohammad Hassan Khan. Tarikh-e Montazam-e Nasseri,
(Tehran: Donya-ye Ketab, 1988), 3 Volumes, Volume 3, p. 1991.
46 Biographies of Leading Personalities in Persia, Persia Confidential [E 693/693/34],
No. 1, February 7, 1930, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 8, p. 582.
47 Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia, Annual Report, 1923, Confi-
dential (12445), [E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965.
Volume 6, p. 717.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 43

finances. A central bank, or Bank-e Melli-ye Iran, was also founded in

1928. By 1933, the British Imperial Bank of Persia had “to relinquish its
note-issuing powers.”48 Through a massive construction program, roads,
as well as modern factories and plants, were built across the country.
Roads and railroads allowed the government to send its troops to the
four corners of the country and quell the tribal rebellions that challenged
the authority of the new shah. In 1927, Reza Shah initiated the project
of building the Trans-Iranian Railway connecting the Persian Gulf to the
Caspian Sea. The 1,397-kilometer-long railroad (868 miles) required the
construction of 174 large bridges, 186 small bridges, and 224 tunnels,
including 11 spiral tunnels.49 This massive construction project, which
was funded by national taxes to avoid foreign investment and control, was
completed eleven years later in 1938.50 Government-sponsored projects
such as the Trans-Iranian Railway created new jobs.
In response to the growing demand for a modern educational system,
schools and colleges were introduced. The first modern university in
the country, the University of Tehran, was established in 1934. Iranian
students were also sent abroad with support from the Iranian government.
When he was asked whether it was a good idea to educate Iran’s “best
men in Europe,” Reza Shah explained that “it would be much better to
educate them” in Iran where they were “going to live, and with whose
progress they must inevitably be concerned,” but the country did not
yet have “the necessary machinery.”51 Iran needed all sorts of technical
experts, and these had to be trained in Europe:

I hope that the young men we send to France and Italy will realize that
civilization is different for every country. I don’t want to turn the Persian
into a bad copy of a European. That is not necessary, for he has mighty
traditions behind him. I want to make out of my countrymen the best
possible Persians. They need not be particularly Western or particularly
Eastern. Each country has a mold of its own, which should be developed

48 Geoffrey Jones, “The Imperial Bank of Iran and Iranian Economic Development,
1890–1952,” Business and Economic History, 1987, Volume 16, pp. 69–80, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 71.
49 See, UNESCO World Heritage Convention, https://whs.unesco.org/en/list/1585.
50 Ibid.
51 Forbes, Rosita, Conflict Angora to Afghanistan, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes
Company, 1933), p. 202.
44 M. KIA

and improved till it turns out a citizen who is not a replica of anyone else,
but an individual sure of himself and proud of his nationality.52

Concurrent with establishment of new educational institutions and study

abroad programs, modern medical care facilities grew and developed
extensively to prevent and control the major epidemics and endemics
prevalent in Iran at the time, including plague, cholera, small-pox,
typhus, influenza, and malaria. Agriculture also expanded and agricultural
production increased significantly as roads and railroad lines opened new
markets.
A nationalist modernizer as forceful and driven as Reza Shah was
bound to have his detractors. Impressed by his reforms, but angered
by his disregard for rule of law, these critics denounced Reza Shah as
a pseudo-modernizer who had merely introduced the façade of moder-
nity. He built railroads, airports, factories, hospitals, and modern schools
and colleges, but he also rejected the institutions that serve as the prereq-
uisites for a democratic society based on a representative government. He
was also condemned as a dictator who refused to tolerate any criticism or
opposition by his opponents, especially among the members of the Shi’i
clergy, the urban intelligentsia, and large landowning families and tribal
chiefs.
Determined to impose the authority of the central government in the
tribal zones of the country, Reza Shah embarked on a campaign to disarm
all tribal groups especially the larger and the more powerful tribal confed-
erations such as the Bakhtiyari and the Qashqai though the campaign
also targeted the Lur and Kurdish tribes of western and northwestern
Iran, as well as the Turkmen tribes of the northeast. Once the tribes had
been disarmed, the government began to carry out a policy of forced
sedentarization, an idea promoted and advocated by many reform-minded
intellectuals and political leaders since the constitutional revolution of
1906. This campaign compelled migratory tribal groups to abandon their
nomadic mode of existence and settle in newly created villages. In April
1923, Reza Khan presented a bill for conscription to the Majlis, making
“military service compulsory” for all Iranian subjects “between 20 and
45 years of age.”53 The new law effectively abolished the traditional

52 Ibid., pp. 202–203.

53 Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia Annual Report, 1923, Confi-
dential (12,445), [E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 45

Bonicheh system under which “each village, district, or tribe” was “obli-
gated to furnish a certain quota of recruits proportionate to the amount of
its revenue assessment.”54 The drafting of young men under the military
conscription law aroused the opposition of the Shi’i clergy, the bazaar,
and the country’s tribal chiefs. On August 2, 1935, the government also
banned the usage of all honorific titles such as ayatollah, grand ayatollah,
agha, amir, beyk, ilkhan, and khan. This policy was aimed at eliminating
class distinctions but also intended to further weaken and undermine the
power and prestige of the prominent members of the clergy, as well as the
large landowners and tribal khans.
In the process of secularizing Iranian society, Reza Shah significantly
curbed the power of the Shi’i clergy, unveiled the women of Iran, and
required men to shave their beards and abandon their traditional garb
and headgears in favor of the newly introduced Pahlavi hat. He also
attempted to introduce a new national identity that glorified Iran’s ancient
history as well as the Persian language and culture. The construction of a
new and homogenized national identity minimized, and at times ignored,
differences in language, culture, social organization, local traditions, and
regional identities and loyalties. When the state’s nation-building policies
aroused the reaction of regional power centers, the government resorted
to repression to silence the opposition. Tribal chiefs, who were believed to
pose a threat to Reza Shah’s authority, were jailed and at times executed.
Throughout the Qajar rule (1794–1925), one of the most serious
challenges confronting the Iranian state was the problematic relation-
ship between the center and the periphery. Under weak governments, the
tribal zones of the country functioned independent of the center and were
often ruled by their own powerful tribal chiefs or provincial magnates,
who possessed their own armies and administered justice in accordance
with local customs and traditions. Though there is no scientific compu-
tation of the nomadic and semi-nomadic population, the majority of
sources guesstimate that before the commencement of the First World

Volume 6, p. 718. See also, M. Saunders, Tehran, April 14, 1923, Intelligence Summary
No. 15, Doc. 214 [E 5823/71/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and
Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the
Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 18, p. 307.
54 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 9, Tehran, March 4, 1922, Doc. 178 [E
4077/69/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 18, p. 269.
46 M. KIA

War, nearly one-quarter of Iran’s roughly 10 million population, that is

over two million, lived as members of a tribal group.55 As long as the
central government lacked the military and administrative muscle to exer-
cise any authority over this mosaic of tribes and regional power centers, it
had no option but to resort to a divide-and-rule strategy, fomenting inter-
tribal jealousies and rivalries, setting one tribal chief against another, and
at times, bribing one chief or powerful landlord with gifts and promises of
special favor and support in his struggle against a neighboring rival. Reza
Shah’s reign signaled the beginning of a process that would reverse the
relationship between the center and the periphery, converting the central
government to the dominant power and the tribal groups into subservient
parties condemned to submission.
Simko’s rebellion commenced nearly three years before the emergence
of Reza Khan as Iran’s strongman. From late autumn 1918 to summer
1922, the central government in Tehran lacked the military means to
confront the Kurdish chief and suppress his rebellion. The absence of a
standing national army allowed Simko to expand his power and impose his
authority over much of the territory of present-day West Azerbaijan. Once
a modern army was organized, and after Iran signed a treaty of security
and friendship with the newly emerging Turkish nationalist government
in Ankara under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), Simko’s
fate was sealed, and his rebellion was doomed.

Western Azerbaijan, the Home

of Simko and the Shakak Tribe
The area corresponding to the present-day territory of the Iranian
province of West Azerbaijan bordered the Ottoman Empire to the west,
the Russian Empire to the north, the Kurdish-populated province of
Ardalan (present-day Kurdistan) to the south, and Lake Urumiyeh56
and eastern Azerbaijan to the east. The plains of western Azerbaijan,
including the plain of Urumiyeh, the plain of Salmas, and the plain of
Khoy, were some of the most productive and prosperous areas of Iran.
For example, the villages in the plain of Urumiyeh, which stretched fifteen

55 Curzon, George N. Persia and the Persian Question, (London: Frank Cass & Co.
Ltd., 1966), 2 Volumes, Volume 2, p. 270.
56 For the names of the Lake Urumiyeh also known as Lake Shahi, see Nader Mirza,
Tarikh va Joghrafiya-ye Dar al-Saltaneh-ye Tabriz, (Tehran, 1972).
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 47

miles south and twenty miles north of the ancient city of the same name,
were for miles “covered in summer with gardens” that produced “melons
and cucumbers in abundance;” with “orchards laden with apples, pears,
peaches, plums, apricots, quinces, cherries, and mulberries,” while the
“grapes of the vineyards” were “proverbial for their excellence.”57 Agri-
cultural crops, including “wheat, maize, beans, melons, potatoes, carrots,
turnips, beets, capsicum, chilis, ….eggplants, lady’s fingers, castor-oil (for
burning), cotton, madder, salsify, scorzonera, celery, oil-seeds of various
sorts, opium, and tobacco” all flourished around Urumiyeh.58 It is not
surprising, therefore, that the immensely rich plain received the title of
the Paradise of Iran.59
As with many other regions of Iran, western Azerbaijan contained a
mosaic of ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities. The area was
populated by a highly heterogeneous population of Shi’i Azerbaijani
Turks, Sunni Muslim Kurds, Shi’i Turkic Qara Papakhs, Christian Assyr-
ians (Nestorians), and Armenians, as well as a small Jewish community and
even smaller Chaldean and Russian Orthodox enclaves. The majority of
the Azerbaijani Turks, Assyrians, Armenians, and Jews lived in villages and
towns, including Maku, Khoy, Dilman (formerly Shahpur and present-
day Salmas), Savojbolagh (present-day Mahabad), Miandoab, Sulduz
(present-day Naqadeh), and Urumiyeh, as peasant farmers, shopkeepers,
handicraftsmen, traders, and merchants, while the majority of the Kurdish
population lived either as semi-nomadic tribal groups or as peasant culti-
vators in the districts of Sulduz and Oshnaviyeh (Ushnu), as well as
several mountain frontier districts, including Qotur, Chahriq, Somai-
Baradoost, Anzal, Targavar, Margavar, Lahijan, and Dasht. Kurdish-
populated villages were scattered on the slopes of the Zagros Mountain
range that separated western Azerbaijan from eastern Anatolia.
The town of Urumiyeh, the largest urban center of western Azer-
baijan with a population estimated either between 20,000 and 30,000,
or 30,000 and 40,000 in the second half of the nineteenth century,

57 Jackson, A. V. Williams. Persia Past and Present a Book of Travel and Research,
(London: The Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1906), p. 88.
58 Bird, Isabella. Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, (The Perfect Library, 1891), 3
Volumes, Volume III, p. 147.
59 Ibid. See also, A. V. Williams Jackson, Persia Past and Present, p. 86.
48 M. KIA

contained a majority Afshar Turk population with a considerable sprin-

kling of Assyrian, Armenian, and Jewish families.60 The city also served as
an operational base for Shi’i Muslim merchants from southern Caucasus,
including the towns of Yerevan, Shusha, and Orduabad.61 The Afshar
were a Turkic tribal group from whose branches in Khorasan hailed the
Iranian monarch, Nader Shah (r. 1736–1747), who, at the zenith of his
power, ruled a vast empire that stretched from northern India in the
east to northern Iraq in the west. The chiefs of the Afshar were the
most powerful landowners in western Azerbaijan. They owned numerous
Muslim- and Christian-populated villages in the region. In the second
half of the nineteenth century, the Afshar tribe furnished three regiments
of infantry and 800–900 horsemen to the central government.62 The
authorities in Azerbaijan relied heavily on the chiefs of the Afshar to
maintain law and order in the region west of Lake Urumiyeh.
Aside from the Afshars, Urumiyeh was home to an ancient and vibrant
Christian Assyrian population. Two wards of the town were inhabited
only by Christians, most of them Assyrians, while 25,000 Assyrians
and 5,000 Armenians lived in villages surrounding Urumiyeh before
1900.63 Aside from the plains of Urumiyeh and Salmas, Assyrians also
inhabited northernmost areas of Mesopotamia and the Hakkari region
of the Ottoman Empire in southeastern Anatolia. In western Azer-
baijan, Assyrian communities extended as far west as the rural districts
of Targavar, Margavar, Baradoost, and Chahriq, on the border with the
Ottoman Empire. The majority of the Assyrian Christians were peasant
farmers who lived in compact villages along rivers such as Nazlu Chai,
to the north of Urumiyeh, the Shahar Chai, flowing through Urumiyeh,

60 Curzon, George N., Persia and the Persian Question, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2015), 2 Volumes, Volume 1, p. 536. See also, A. C. Wratislaw, A
Consul in the East, p. 195. See also, Cities and Trade: Consul Abbott on the Economy
and Society of Iran 1847–1866. Edited by Abbas Amanat. (London: Ithaca Press, 1983),
p. 226. See also, Wilson, S. G. Rev., Persian Life and Customs, (New York: Fleming H.
Revell Company, 1900), p. 94.
61 J. I. Eadie, Report of Eadie-Bristow Mission Addressed to Advanced General Head-
quarters, Tiflis, in Doc. 54, in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle
East, 1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 36.
62 Cities and Trade: Consul Abbott on the Economy and Society of Iran 1847–1866,
p. 230.
63 S. G. Wilson, Persian Life and Customs, p. 94.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 49

and Barandouz Chai to the south of the town.64 All these rivers flowed
eastward from the Zagros Mountains and emptied into Lake Urumiyeh.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the British diplomat, K.
E. Abbott wrote that there were 30,000–40,000 Assyrian Christians in the
district of Urumiyeh, and they dwelt in 166 villages.65 Writing in the last
decade of the nineteenth century, the British statesman, George Curzon,
estimated the population of the Assyrian community of the region to be
somewhere between 20,000/25,000 and 44,000.66 The British diplomat,
Albert Charles Wratislaw, however, estimated the population of Assyrians
to be 30,000 on the Iranian side and 100,000 on the Ottoman side.67
The Russian diplomat and scholar, Basile Nikitine, who served as his
country’s consul in Urumiyeh during the First World War stated that
thirty-seven villages in the plain of Urumiyeh were inhabited by Chris-
tians only, and fifty-nine had a mixed population.68 Before the First World
War, “nearly a third of the Assyrians held their land freehold, and a large
number had definite and permanent rights of tenure.”69 The Assyrian
sharecroppers were obligated to pay a rent to the village aghas or land-
lords, who were most often Azerbaijani Turks or Kurdish tribal chiefs.70
As for the Armenian population in Azerbaijan, according to an American
Presbyterian missionary, there were 4,000–5,000 in Tabriz, 10,000 in the
district of Salmas, a small number in Khoy, and between 6,000 and 7,000

64 M. Saunders, Tehran, January 7, 1922, Intelligence Summary No. 1, Doc. 147 [E

2463/69/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 18, p. 220.
65 Cities and Trade: Consul Abbott on the Economy and Society of Iran 1847–1866,
p. 211.
66 George Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Volume 1, p. 546.
67 A.C. Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, p. 196.
68 Basile, Nikitine, “Le vie domestique des Assyro-Chaldeens du plateau d Ourmiyah,” in
Ethnographie, 1925, p. I-25. Ethnographic, 1926, p. 25.
69 Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia Annual Report, 1923, Confi-
dential (12445), [E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965.
Volume 6, p. 731.
70 George Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Volume 1, p. 547.
50 M. KIA

in Urumiyeh and the surrounding rural communities.71 By the begin-

ning of the First World War, one source estimated the total population of
Christians in Urumiyeh and the surrounding communities at 35,000.72
Given the significant size of the Christian population in western Azer-
baijan, Christian missions were established in Urumiyeh and other urban
centers of the region. Beginning in 1835, an American Presbyterian
mission was introduced in Urumiyeh with the goal of building primary
schools, high schools, a college, a hospital, and a printing house.73 The
first mission school opened in 1836 under the direction of Rev. Justin
Perkins. In addition to the American Presbyterian establishment, there
was also a Roman Catholic mission organized by French priests based in
Urumiyeh.74 Beginning in 1858, French Roman Catholics “established
two stations among the Chaldean Catholics in Urumiah and the plain
of Salmas.”75 By the end of the nineteenth century, “there were seven
French priests in the field.”76 The Anglican Church also sent mission-
aries to Iran in the 1840s, but they did not establish themselves until
1888, when they began to work actively among Assyrians. By 1891, the
Anglican missionaries had “established a College for Priests and Deacons,
and schools for boys and girls.”77 To the south of Urumiyeh, in Savojbo-
lagh, a German Lutheran Orient Mission had been established in 1905.
As one American traveller and scholar wrote at the turn of the century,
“America, France, England, and Russia” were “all represented in the

71 “Urmia: Statement by the Rev. William A. Shedd, D.D., of the American (Presbyte-
rian Mission Station at Urmia: Communicated by the Board of Foreign Missions of the
Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A,” in Viscount Bryce, The Treatment of Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire 1915–16, (London: G. Doniguian & Sons, 1916), p. 101.
72 Ibid.
73 Wishard, John G. Twenty Years in Persia A Narrative of Life Under the Last Three
Shahs, (London: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1908), p. 125. See also, Hooman Este-
lami, The Americans of Urmia: Iran’s First Americans and Their Mission to the Assyrian
Christians, (New York: Bahar Books, 2021). See also, Michael Zirinsky, “American Pres-
byterian Missionaries at Urmia During the Great War,” Iran Chamber Society. See also,
Michael P. Zirinsky, “Harbingers of Change: Presbyterian Women in Iran, 1883–1949,”
American Presbyterians: Journal of Presbyterian History (1992), pp. 173–186.
74 Ibid.
75 Abraham Yeselson, United States-Persian Diplomatic Relations, 1883–1921, p. 7.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 8.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 51

cause, and some work” was “done by Germans and Swedes in the villages
of the Urumiah plain.”78
Given the presence of various missionary groups, it is not surprising
that the rate of literacy among the Assyrians of Urumiyeh was much
higher than the non-Assyrian communities, and educated Assyrians staffed
all missionary schools, newspapers, and hospitals under the supervision
of foreign missionaries. The high level of education and political aware-
ness allowed Assyrians, even in the rural areas of western Azerbaijan, to
introduce their own political and professional associations. By September
1911, the inhabitants of the large Assyrian village of Khosrowabad had
created a new organization called “Union Nationale Chaldéenne” or the
Chaldean National Union.79 Although Christian missionaries introduced
modern education, as well as western values, ideas, and institutions to the
Assyrian community, their activities had a polarizing impact on the region.
The privileged position of the Assyrians made them a subject of envy
and resentment by their Muslim neighbors, especially the Kurds, who
remained pastoral, rural, and desperately poor. Furthermore, as a result
of proselytizing by foreign missionaries, the Assyrian community itself was
divided up into several religious communities. In many villages, one could
find Nestorians, Chaldeans, Russian Orthodox, American Presbyterians,
and “protégés of the English mission.”80
Adding to the remarkable diversity of western Azerbaijan’s popula-
tion was the presence of the Turkic Qara Papakhs of Sulduz (Naqadeh)
and Sardasht, who had emigrated to the region from the neighborhood
of Yerevan in southern Caucasus, when the district they inhabited was
ceded to Russia by the Treaty of Turkmenchay signed in 1828.81 At the

78 A. V. Williams Jackson, Persia Past and Present, p. 105.

79 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1911, [FO 371/1178-
1179 & FO 416/51], Barclay to Grey, Tehran, December 1, 1911, [Confidential 50544],
No. 236, Enclosure in No. 1, Diary (No. 7) of the Itinerary of the British and Russian
Delegates from Urmia to Tabreez through Anzal and Salmas, September 9–16, 1911, in
The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Edited by Richard Schofield, (Oxford: Archive Editions,
1989), 11 Volumes, Volume 4, p. 536.
80 O’ Conor to Grey, Constantinople, February 5, 1908, [4587], No. 57, Report by
Vice-Consul Dickson on His Recent Journey Through Turco-Persian Territory, Enclosure 2
in No. 174., in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958. Volume 4, p. 265.
81 Marling to Grey, Tehran, January 24, 1908, [5420], Enclosure in No. 200, Wratislaw
to Marling, Urmi, December 28, 1907, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958. Volume 4,
p. 271.
52 M. KIA

time when the Iranian authorities settled the Qara Papakhs in Sulduz
southwest of Lake Urumiyeh, the town and its surrounding communi-
ties were populated by Mamash, Mangur, and Zarza Kurds, as well as
smaller Assyrian and Jewish communities. In return for keeping “four
hundred horsemen at the service,” the Qara Papakhs were “exempted
from all taxes.”82 The central government regarded the Qara Papakhs as
a body the Qajar shah could rely on as a sort of local rural police, as well
as “auxiliaries to his army in times of emergency.”83

Kurds of Western Azerbaijan

While most Azerbaijani Turks, Assyrians, Armenians, and Jews lived as
peasant cultivators or urban dwellers on the fertile plains of western Azer-
baijan, the majority of the population in the foothills and the uplands of
the Zagros Mountain range, separating Iran from the Ottoman Empire,
were Sunni Muslim Kurds. The Kurdish population of western Azer-
baijan comprised two principal social classes. The first were “the Kurds
proper,” or in actuality, the warrior caste of powerful tribal groups called
Ashirat.84 The second was the subject class or the peasant cultivators
called “Gurans” or “Ra’ayat.”85 The peasant population had no voice in
the affairs of the tribes who ruled them, and they were generally treated as
an “inferior caste.”86 Though the tribal warrior caste or the Ashirat were
far less numerous than the Ra’ayat, they ruled as lords of the country.87
The Ashirat Kurds monopolized “military and pastoral life,” while the
Ra’ayat cultivated the soil, “an occupation intolerable to the spirit of a

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 William Spottiswoode, “Sketch of the Tribes of Northern Kurdistan,” Transactions of
the Ethnological Society of London, p. 244. See also, Amir Sharaf Khan Bitlisi, Sharafnameh:
Tarikh-e Mofassal-e Kurdistan, (Tehran: Elmi Press, 1964), p. 34.
85 Ibid. See also, V. Minorsky, “Shakak,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition (1913–
1936). Edited by Th. Houtsma, T.W. Arnold, R. Basset, R. Hartmann. See also, V.
Minorsky, “The Gūrān,’ in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Univer-
sity of London, Vol. 11, No. 1 (1943), pp. 75–103, (Cambridge University Press on
Behalf of School of Oriental and African Studies), p. 77.
86 V. Minorsky, “The Gūrān,’ in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies,
p. 78.
87 William Spottiswoode, “Sketch of the Tribes of Northern Kurdistan,” p. 244.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 53

true nomad.”88 The tribal population lived under the reign of their hered-
itary chiefs or aghas or khans, who were usually quarrelsome; feuds and
inter-tribal wars were common. The tribal chiefs who “combined a ruth-
less medieval authority with a plentiful supply of rifles” were “a scourge
not only to the Christian population and the government, but also to
their own settled tribesmen, who were little better than serfs.”89 The
Kurdish peasant cultivators lived “nearly entirely from wheat cultivation
and cattle farming.”90 They inhabited small villages organized into patri-
archal households. The mountain villages were for the most part small
and isolated from one another and from the plains.91
Warfare and raids defined social groupings, and tribal warriors domi-
nated public life. Individual chiefs and tribes built their reputation on
warfare. The more successful a tribe was in warfare, the more clans it
attracted and the greater its position became. Rival branches within a tribe
dealt with one another brutally. Conflict took the form of feud, and each
act of aggression brought retaliation in kind. The chief of the tribe was a
patriarchal despot whose authority had no limits.92 He could dispose of
the property of anyone as he saw fit.93 Tribal chiefs could also order the
caning, and even the execution, of any of their subjects at their discre-
tion.94 They measured their status by the number of villages they owned,
the horsemen and cattle they controlled, and their marital productivity.
Like the number of cattle, the number of wives showed a man’s social
position. Polygyny was, therefore, common among the chiefs.
The Kurdish tribes of western Azerbaijan lived on the border between
Iran and the Ottoman Empire. Survival on the borderlands of two

88 Ibid.
89 Iraq Civil Commissioner, Wilson, Arnold Talbot and Gertrude Lowthian Bell. Review
of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, (Franklin Classics, 2018), p. 57.
90 M. Berberian and J. S. Tchalenko. “Field Study and Documentation of the 1930
Salmas (Shahpur-Azarbaidjan) Earthquake,” Imperial College, London: Geological Survey
of Iran, 39, 271–342, 1976, p. 154. For the Kurdish tribes of West Azerbaijan,
see Ebrahim Eskandar Niya, Sakhtar-e Sazman-e Eilat va Shive-ye Maeishat-e Ashayer-e
Azarbaijan, (Urumiyeh: Anzali Press, 1987).
91 Ibid.
92 Basile Nikitine. Les Kurdes. Étude Sociologique et Historique, (Paris: Imprimerie
Nationale, Librairie C. Klincksieck, 1956), p. 120.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
54 M. KIA

empires meant that the Kurdish tribal chiefs had to deal with two govern-
ments rather than just one. It also meant that the tribal groups were under
constant pressure to shift their loyalty, especially when conflict erupted
between the two neighboring states. Beginning with the Safavid dynasty
(1501–1736) in the sixteenth century, and especially after the Ottoman
Empire defeated Iran at the Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, Iranian rulers
viewed the Kurdish tribal groups of western Iran as buffering entities
against Ottoman incursions from the west. Kurdish loyalty and coopera-
tion with Iran’s central government was, therefore, necessary to maintain
peace and order on the western frontiers of the country. Though the
Kurdish tribal groups remained essential for the maintenance of border
security, Iranian governments also viewed them as a threat, because they
were armed and enjoyed boundless mobility.
The Ottoman-Iranian frontier was never a true frontier, as many
Kurdish tribes were migratory and spent half of the year on the Ottoman
side of the border and half in Iran. Kurds from either side came up into
the hills for the summer by mutual arrangement among each other. One
could, therefore, find Kurdish tribes from the Ottoman Empire grazing
their flocks on the Iranian side and vice versa.95 Some of the tribes,
which were semi-nomadic, “migrated yearly between the high moun-
tain pastures in summer and their stronghold villages further down in
the valleys in winter.”96
Iranian authorities rarely interfered in the internal affairs of Kurdish
tribal groups under their rule. Until the advent of the Pahlavi state in
1925, the central government exercised minimal authority in Kurdish-
populated regions of western Azerbaijan. In the absence of an interven-
tionist central government, the hereditary chiefs governed their tribes
as local princes. The policy of Iranian governments centered on the
principle of letting the Kurdish chiefs do as they pleased as long as
they did not stage tribal rebellions and paid their taxes (or at the
least a symbolic tribute to the central treasury). The Kurdish tribes of
western Azerbaijan were fond of raiding villages and plundering caravans.
The non-Kurdish peasantry, especially the Christians of the Urumiyeh
plain, were exposed to “great losses of sheep and cattle from Kurdish

95 C. H. D. Ryder, Turco-Persian Frontier Commission, India Foreign Secretary, No.

13, April 1, 1915, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Volume 6, p. 273.
96 Tchalenko, John. Images from the Endgame, (London: Saqi Books, 2006), p. 92.
 2 HISTORICAL SETTING: IRAN ON THE BRINK OF COLLAPSE 55

mountaineers,” including those who crossed the Turkish frontier and

returned into Ottoman Turkey “with their booty.”97 Both the urban
and rural population of western Azerbaijan, including the Azerbaijani
Turks, the Assyrians and Armenians, regarded the semi-nomadic Kurds
with apprehension, a reaction to the predatory instincts of the roaming
tribesmen. Despite this thorny relationship, the Kurdish and non-Kurdish
populations came together from time to time to trade (Maps 2.1 and
2.2).

Map 2.1 Western Azerbaijan’s Districts

97 Isabella Bird, Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan, Volume III, p. 160.

 56
M. KIA

Map 2.2 Kurdish Tribes of Iranian Kurdistan

 CHAPTER 3

Shakak Tribe and the Rise of Simko

Among the Kurdish tribal groups of western Azerbaijan, the Shakak,

a Kurmanji-speaking Sunni Muslim (i.e., Shafi’i) tribe,1 was the most
powerful during the first three decades of the twentieth century. The
origins of the Shakak tribal confederacy are shrouded in mystery. Tribal
groups did not usually have their own historians who would write an
account of the origins of the tribe, how it had come into existence, how
it had grown or diminished in size, the battles it had fought, the victories
it had scored, the defeats it had suffered, and how it had conducted its
relationship with neighboring tribes and states.
In this chapter, I will attempt to share with the reader the informa-
tion I was able to collect on the Shakak tribe from a variety of sources.
These sources include accounts, articles, and reports written by historians,
travellers, foreign diplomats, British intelligence officers, and even Chris-
tian missionaries. Needless to say, the majority of these narratives were
written by authors who had not lived among the Shakak, did not speak
their language, and lacked an in-depth knowledge of their history, tradi-
tions, and customs. Worse, they shared the prevalent bias and stereotype

1 At least one source stated that Shakaks were believed to have been Christian until
sometime in the nineteenth century. See, for example, Correspondence respecting the
Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1907 [FO 416/31–34 & FO 371/503], Extracts from the
“Times ” of September 24, 1907, “The Turco-Persian Frontier Question,” in The Iran-Iraq
Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 175.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 57

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_3
58 M. KIA

among the urban population about nomadic tribes as predatory raiders,

whose sole purpose in life was to plunder rural communities. Unfortu-
nately, the disjointed and fragmentary information presented here fails to
constitute a comprehensive and cohesive whole, but it does provide useful
information about a tribe that played an important role in the history of
northwestern Iran before, during, and immediately after the First World
War.

Shakak/Shikak Kurds
In his comprehensive history of the Kurdish people, the sixteenth-century
Kurdish historian, Amir Sharaf Khan Bitlisi, did not mention the Shakak,
though he wrote about the Shaqaqi tribe whose name has a striking
resemblance to Shakak.2 In Iran, there is little mention of the Shakak
Kurds until the last decade of the eighteenth century. The Shakak
most probably migrated from southeastern Anatolia, first to the plain of
Urumiyeh and subsequently, at an unknown date, to the hilly districts of
Somai-Baradoost, and Chahriq on the Iranian-Ottoman frontier. Some
branches of the Shakak grazed their animals as far south as the rural
district of Targavar, which was also used by branches of the Harki tribe.3
Chahriq, which served for many decades as the stronghold of Shakak’s
paramount chiefs, including Simko, was located in the western part of
the district of Salmas. Sandwiched between Lake Urumiyeh to the east
and the Zagros Mountain range that separated Iran from the Ottoman
Empire to the west, Salmas was described by an American traveller in
the last decade of the nineteenth century as a “well-watered and fruitful
plain.”4 Watered by the Derik and Zola Chai or Zola Rud (Zola River),
also known as Salmas Chai (Salmas River),5 the fertile plain of Salmas
contained eighty villages. Dilman or Dilmaqan (the name of present-day
Salmas until it was destroyed in 1930 by an earthquake) and Kohneh

2 Bitlisi, Amir Sharaf Khan, Sharafnameh, p. 196, 201.

3 Moshir al-Dowleh, Mirza Ja’afar Khan, Resale-ye Tahqiqat-e Sarhaddiyeh, Mohammad
Moshiri (ed.), (Tehran: Bonyad-e Farhang-e Iran Press, 1969), p. 160.
4 S. G. Wilson, Persian Life and Customs, p. 89.
5 R. T. Günther, “Contributions to the Geography of Lake Urmi and Its Neighbor-
hood,” The Geographical Journal, Vol. 14, No. 5 (November, 1899), pp. 504–523, 506.
See also, M. Berberian and J.S. Tchalenko, “Field Study and Documentation of the 1930
Salmas (Shahpur-Azarbaidjan) Earthquake,” p. 152.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 59

Shahr (present-day Tazeh Shahr) served as the “chief towns” of the

district with “five thousand inhabitants” each.6 Dilman, the capital of the
district, had “a court-house, a custom-house, post and telegraph offices,
and a bazaar.”7 In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the inhabi-
tants of the plain of Salmas were mostly Shi’i Azerbaijani Turks as well
as “six thousand Armenians, three thousand Chaldeans and Assyrians,
and five hundred Jews.”8 The majority of the Shakak Kurds of western
Azerbaijan lived on the western edge of the Salmas, Khoy, and Urumiyeh
districts.
Simko’s birthplace, Chahriq, had been claimed by the Ottoman Turks
on several occasions9 and occupied by a Russian army in 1828 during the
second Russo-Iranian war. The rural district contained a diverse popula-
tion of Sunni Kurds, as well as Christian Assyrians and Armenians. The
fortress of Chahriq enjoyed “a natural fortification,” from which issued
“an immense fountain of water,” the Zola Chai.10 Serving as the main-
stay of the prosperity of the district of Salmas, Zola Chai originated from
the mountains along Iran’s border with the Ottoman Empire and flowed
into Lake Urumiyeh, a majestic sheet of water “about 80 miles from north
to south, and, 24 miles from east to west,”11 or according to another
source, “eighty-four miles long” and “between twenty and thirty miles
broad.”12 Near the foot of the plain of Salmas outside the village of Khan
Takhti (literally meaning the ruler’s throne) southeast of Dilman on a

6 S. G. Wilson, Persian Life and Customs, p. 89.

7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 90.
9 Donboli, Abd al-Razzaq Maftun, Maaser-e Soltaniyeh, Tarikh-e Jangha-ye Iran va
Russ, (Tehran: Ibn Sina Press, 1972), pp. 341–342.
10 S. G. Wilson, Persian Life and Customs, p. 89.
11 R. T. Günther, “Contributions to the Geography of Lake Urmi and Its Neighbor-
hood,” The Geographical Journal, p. 509.
12 George Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Vol. 1, p. 532. In his book, Twenty
Years in Persia A Narrative of Life under the Last Three Shahs, John Wishard states that
Lake Urumiyeh measures “ninety miles long and nearly thirty miles wide.” See, John
Wishard, Twenty Years in Persia A Narrative of Life under the Last Three Shahs, p. 124.
60 M. KIA

rocky hill sat an ancient petroglyph that depicted the founder of the Sasa-
nian dynasty Ardeshir I (r. 224–241) and his son and successor Shahpur
I (r. 239–270), presenting rings to two standing men.13
An Iranian official, who was intimately familiar with the tribe, wrote
that the Shakak were divided into two main branches, the Avdoi (i.e.,
Avdovi/Awdoi/Abdoi/Abdui/Abdoi) and the Mamadi (i.e., Mamdoi/
Muhammadi).14 According to one scholar, the “paramount chieftains of
the tribe’s known history belonged to one of the two chiefly lineages…the
Abdovi/Avdoi and the Kardar.”15 Each sub-division of the Shakak was
divided further into smaller branches. For example, a British report
mentioned the Finik/Fanak/Fenak and Delan, as the branches of “the
large Kardar sub-division of the Shakaks.”16 Simko’s branch, the Avdoi,
settled mainly in the rural district of Chahriq and Qotur. Both Chahriq
and Qotur were located in close proximity to the Iranian-Ottoman fron-
tier. Though segments of the Shakak had moved into Iranian territory
from southeastern Anatolia, several branches of the tribe remained in the
Ottoman Empire. In his article on the Kurdish tribes of the Ottoman
Empire published in 1908, Mark Sykes described the Shakak as “a notable
tribe” of 6,000 families, who spent only “three months in tents,” and
could, therefore, “be called sedentary.”17

13 A. V. Williams Jackson, Persia Past and Present, pp. 79–88. See also, S. G. Wilson,
Persian Life and Customs, pp. 89–90. See also, Ehsan Shavarebi, “A Reinterpretation of
the Sasanian Relief at Salmas,” in Iran and the Caucasus, Vol. 18 (2014), pp. 115–133,
Leiden: Brill.
14 Nezam al-Saltaneh Māfi, Hossein Qoli Khan, Khaterat va Asnad, Edited by Ma’a-
sumeh Māfi and Mansureh Etehadiyeh (Nezam Māfi), 2 Vols., (Tehran: Nashr-e Tarikh-e
Iran, 2007), Vol. 2, p. 447. See also, Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political
Study. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 48. See also, Barclay to Grey, Gulhak,
July 1, 1911, Persia Confidential, No. 29936, Enclosure 2 in No. 1, Diary of the British
and Russian Delegates from Khoy to Urmia, June 12 to 22, 1911, by H.S. Shipley, in
The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 497.
15 Martin van Bruinessen, “Shakak,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, New Edition. Edited by
C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, and G. Lecomte, (Leiden: Brill, 1997),
Vol. IX, p. 245.
16 Barclay to Grey, Gulhak, July 1, 1911, Persia Confidential, [29936], Enclosure 2 in
No. 1, Diary of the British and Russian Delegates from Khoy to Urmia, June 12 to 22,
1911, by H.S. Shipley, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 498.
17 Mark Sykes, “The Kurdish Tribes of the Ottoman Empire.” The Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 38, July–December, 1908,
p. 461.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 61

Information about the Shakak Kurds in Iran suffers from a paucity

of reliable sources. One of the first references to the Shakak in Iranian
sources was made by the Kurdish author, Abd al-Razzaq Maftun Donboli,
who wrote a history of the Russo-Iranian wars during the reign of the
second Qajar monarch, Fath Ali Shah (r.1797–1834). Donboli mentioned
the active participation of the Shakak in a 15,000-man army raised by
Abbas Mirza (1789–1833), the Qajar crown prince, to restore law and
order in Khoy and Salmas in 1799.18 The same author mentioned a
certain Ismail Agha as the chief of the Shakak of Urumiyeh in 1811.19
The stronghold and the tomb of Ismail Agha, who died in 1816, was
located on the bank of Nazlu Chai, one of the rivers that watered the
plain of Urumiyeh.20 From references in Donboli’s book, it becomes
clear that some of the Shakak Kurds of Iran had originally settled in the
district of Urumiyeh. They were then most probably forced to move out
of Urumiyeh by the Afshar Turks and settled in the frontier districts of
Somai-Baradoost, Chahriq (in Salmas district), and Qotur (in the district
of Khoy) on the Iranian-Ottoman frontier.21 By pushing the Shakak out,
the Afshars made themselves the sole masters of Urumiyeh, the most
prosperous and agriculturally rich district in western Azerbaijan.
In 1821, the Shakak were mentioned as a Kurdish tribe causing cross-
border disputes between the Ottoman state and Iran. In a letter written
by the Qajar crown prince, Abbas Mirza, to the Ottoman governor of
Erzurum, the Iranian doyen reassured the Ottoman official, who had
complained about regular raids by the Shakak, that the Iranian authorities
would do their best to contain and control the unruly Kurdish tribe.22 In
1832, after a rebellion by Kurdish tribes in Urumiyeh district, the Qajars
re-imposed their authority over western Azerbaijan by raising a Kurdish
tribal army from Chahriq, Derik, Somai-Baradoost, Margavar, Targavar,
and Oshnaviyeh. That force eventually pacified the region.23

18 Abd al-Razzaq Maftun Donboli, Maaser-e Soltaniyeh, p. 55.

19 Ibid., p. 260.
20 V. Minorsky, “Shakak,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, First Edition (1913–1936).
21 Ibid.
22 Nassiri, Mohammad Reza (ed.)., Asnad va Mokatebat-e Tarikhi-ye Iran, 2 Volumes,
(Tehran: Keyhan Press, 1987), Vol. 1, p. 258.
23 Jahangir Mirza, Tarikh-e No, (Tehran: Ali Akbar Elmi Press, 1948), p. 174.
62 M. KIA

In the 1830s, the British author, Sheil, mentioned the Shakak and
observed their “large and variegated turbans,” their “wild, expressive,
manly countenance,” and their military hardware of a spear, a sword,
and “when they can afford the purchase, a pair of long Turkish pistols,”
but the author did not offer any estimate of their population.24 In
1844, the Shakak chief, Yahya Khan, who carried the title of Ilkhan (the
chief of the tribe), offered his sister as a bride to the reigning Qajar
monarch, Mohammad Shah (r. 1834–1848), thus converting himself into
the brother-in-law of the Iranian sovereign. In return, the Qajar king
appointed the Shakak chief the governor of Khoy, Salmas, and Urumiyeh,
the latter incorporating all the frontier districts of northwestern Iran,
including Chahriq.25 The same Yahya Khan served as the governor in
Chahriq when Sayyid Ali Mohammad Shirazi, known as the Bāb (1819–
1850), the founder of the messianic Bābi movement, was imprisoned at
Chahriq in May 1848.26 Even after he retired from his post, Yahya Khan
remained the sole landed proprietor and fief holder (tuyuldar) of the
region, and he and his family continued to reside in Chahriq.27
In the deliberations of the Ottoman-Iranian Delimitation Commis-
sion, which worked from 1849 to 1855 on a comprehensive survey
of all border regions, the Shakak were mentioned as a prominent and
influential tribe.28 These references clearly demonstrate that, like many
other Kurdish tribes, the Shakak regularly crossed the Iran-Ottoman
border, especially during their seasonal migrations or whenever they
felt mistreated by either Iranian or Ottoman authorities. At times, the
Ottoman or Iranian officials encouraged an unruly chief of the tribe to
rebel and defect so that they could claim the tribe’s grazing lands as their
own. Thus, on at least one occasion, the Ottoman authorities encouraged
the Shakak tribal chief of the Somai-Baradoost to forsake his loyalty to
the Iranian government and re-settle his clan on the Ottoman side of the
border. Using this shift in loyalty as the model, the Ottoman authorities

24 Lady Shiel, Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia, (London: John Murray, 1856),
p. 337.
25 Afshar Sistani, Iraj, Moghadameie bar Shenakht-e Ilha, Chadorneshinan va Tavayef-e
Ashayeri-ye Iran, 2 Vols, (Tehran: Homa Press, 1987), Vol. 1, p. 156.
26 Ibid. See also, Bamdad, Mehdi, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran, Vol. 2, p. 479.
27 Mirza Ja’afar Khan Moshir al-Dowleh, Resale-ye Tahqiqat-e Sarhaddiyeh, p. 166.
28 Ibid., pp. 154, 160, 161, 162, 165.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 63

then appealed to other branches of the Shakak to replicate the defecting

agha and seek Ottoman protection.29
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the close alliance between
the Qajars and the Shakak leadership began to unravel. In 1851, a chief of
the Shakak, Ali Agha, was accused by Iranian authorities of pro-Ottoman
sympathies. The Kurdish chief was detained as a rebel and dispatched to
the court of the Qajar monarch, Nasser al-Din Shah.30 In 1853, the same
Qajar monarch tried to impose the authority of the central government
over the Shakak by appointing a sarparast (overseer) for the tribe.31 The
sarparast was supposed to represent and safeguard the interests of the
tribe and act as an intermediary between the tribe and the governor-
general of Azerbaijan. In 1856, Iranian authorities accused a chief of
the Shakak named Sultan Bey, of receiving orders from an Ottoman
army commander to revolt against the Qajar state.32 Though eventually
forced to submit to the authority of the Iranian government, Sultan Bey
remained in a state of rebellion, eventually attacking and murdering a
local Qajar army commander before he was himself killed.33
In the 1860s, the British consul, Keith Edward Abbott, described the
Shakak as “a troublesome but not very numerous” Kurdish tribe residing
in two rural districts of Somai and Chahriq on “the Turkish and Persian
frontiers.”34 Abbott further observed that their chiefs, Mirza Agha and
Ali Agha, were “continually at war or petty strife with each other though
brothers.”35 In an article on the tribes of northern Kurdistan, published
in 1863, William Spotswood wrote that the Shakak Kurds were found
between Lakes Urumiyeh and Van.36 He also added that during “the last

29 Ibid., p. 165.
30 E’temad al-Saltaneh, Mohammad Hassan Khan, Mearat al-Buldan, 4 Vols, (Tehran:
Tehran University Press, 1982), Vol. 2, p. 1057. See also, Sabri Ates, , The Ottoman-
Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843–1914, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2015), p. 180.
31 Ibid., p. 1176.
32 Iraj Afshar Sistani, Moghadameie bar Shenakht-e Ilha, Chadorneshinan va Tavayef-e
Ashayeri-ye Iran, Vol. 1, p. 156.
33 Ibid., p.158.
34 Cities and Trade: Consul Abbott on the Economy and Society of Iran 1847–1866,
p. 231.
35 Ibid.
36 William Spottiswoode, “Sketch of the Tribes of Northern Kurdistan,” p. 245.
64 M. KIA

ten years” many of the Shakak tribesmen had adopted a settled mode
of life, coming in “to buy and sell at the weekly markets held in the
larger villages or towns; and many of them travelled peaceably on trading
expeditions with the Nestorian [Assyrian] and Armenian caravans.”37
This change, according to the author, was partly “owing to the influ-
ence” exerted on the Shakak, “through the Nestorians, by the American
missionaries established at Urumiyeh.”38
In July 1876, when Iranian troops attacked the rural district of
Margavar, their numbers included Shakak horsemen and foot soldiers.39
Four years later in 1880, when the Kurdish leader, Sheik Ubeydullah of
Nehri, attacked Iran from Ottoman territory, the Shakak tribe opposed
the invasion. In 1896, the Shakak “ambushed some 800 Armenian revo-
lutionaries retreating from Van in the Ottoman Empire, while two years
later they were chasing Armenians” on behalf of the Iranian govern-
ment.40
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the British statesman,
George Curzon, projected the population of the Shakak, a tribe of “noted
robbers” at 1,500 families.41 By 1907, a British report described the
Shakak as a large tribe occupying “many villages on the slopes north
and northeast of Baradoost” and the hilly country of Somai; “a turbulent
lot, more pastoral than agricultural, but wholly brigand,” and “contin-
ually raiding the villages in the north of Urmia plain and Salmas,” as
well as “in the Turkish side in Gawad and Bashkala.”42 According to
the same source, the Shakak were “a rather finer fighting type than most
Kurds…well-armed and generally well horsed, and much feared by the

37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 FO 416/35–38 & FO 881/9130, O’Conor to Grey, Pera, February 22, 1908,
[7165], No. 85, Note communicated by the Ottoman Government to the Persian Embassy
at Constantinople, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 276.
40 Gunter, Michael, Historical Dictionary of the Kurds, (Lanham, Maryland, and
Oxford: 2004), p. 186.
41 George Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Vol. 1, p. 555.
42 FO 416/35–38 & FO 881/9130, Dickson to O’Conor, Van, December 14, 1907,
No. 23, Enclosure 2 in No. 174, Report by Vice-Consul Dickson on his recent Journey
through Turco-Persian territory, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 263.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 65

Persians and other Kurds.”43 By 1920, the population of the Shakak in

northwestern Iran was estimated at 2,000 families.44
The short and fragmented references to the Shakak generally portray a
tribal confederacy growing in size and ascending in power during the first
decade of the twentieth century, when both the Ottoman Empire and
Russia embarked on a policy of expanding their presence and influence
in northwestern Iran. Beginning in 1905, the Ottoman Turks occupied
parts of western Azerbaijan. Then, in 1909, Russian troops invaded Azer-
baijan and seized Tabriz, the provincial capital. The central government
in Tehran proved to be helpless in the face of foreign aggression. Without
an army and an efficient governmental structure capable of defending the
country’s borders, the Qajar state became increasingly inconsequential. As
Iranian authority vanished from Azerbaijan, and the province emerged as
a battleground between the Russian and Ottoman empires, the Kurdish
tribal chiefs of northwestern Iran, including Simko, sought new impe-
rial patrons and protectors. In 1905, many chose the patronage of the
Ottoman sultan, who claimed to be the caliph or the religious and spiri-
tual head of all Sunni Muslims in the world, but after 1909, when Russian
forces occupied parts of northwestern Iran, some, including Simko, opted
for a tactical alliance with the Czarist authorities.

Rise of Simko
Ismail Agha Shakak, also known as Simko, Semko, Simitqu, Semitqu, one
of the chiefs of the Shakak, was born in 1887 in Chahriq, in close prox-
imity to the Iranian-Ottoman frontier. Both his father, Mohammad Agha,
and his grandfather, Ali Agha (also known as Ali Khan), had served as the
chief of the Avdoi branch of the Shakak tribe. During his tenure as the
head of the Avdoi branch, Ali Agha carried out raids in Ottoman territory,
forcing the Turks to demand that the Kurdish chief be removed from the
border region between Iran and the Ottoman Empire. In 1880, when
Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri invaded western Azerbaijan from Ottoman
territory, Ali Agha refused to join the invaders. Instead, the Shakak chief
gave a quota of soldiers to the Qajar army, “but it was believed that

43 Ibid.
44 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 48. See also, Iraj
Afshar Sistani, Moghadameie bar Shenakht-e Ilha, Vol. 1, p. 159.
66 M. KIA

for one he gave in loyalty, he gave five to the enemy.”45 The Shakak
Kurds also used the distraction caused by Sheikh Ubeydullah’s invasion
to occupy the mountain passes on the Ottoman-Iranian frontier and “to
make roads unsafe.”46
Ali Agha’s activities and the complaints lodged against him by
Ottoman border officials caused the Iranian authorities in Azerbaijan to
dispatch troops against him.47 The Kurdish chief was detained and trans-
ported to Tabriz where he settled in “a small house under a guard, with
permission to go about on foot, but not to mount a horse.”48 When he
met a group of curious and inquisitive Americans in Tabriz, Ali Agha,
who appeared with his wife unveiled, divulged to his guests that he had
been “in a hundred battles, and that the scars on his face were the results
of these contests.”49 He also told the foreign visitors that “he had known
fifteen men who did not deserve as honorable a death as decapitation; so
he had thrown them down, put stones on their heads, and stamped them
to death with his foot.”50
The detention of Ali Agha caused his son, Mohammad Agha, to
raise the flag of rebellion against the Iranian government.51 The Iranian
authorities dispatched an army under the command of a Qajar prince,
Hamid Mirza Nasser al-Dowleh, to suppress Mohammad Agha’s rebel-
lion, but the prince failed to capture the Kurdish chief, who fled into
Ottoman territory with his sons.52 Meanwhile, Ali Agha died in Tabriz.
With Ali Agha out of the picture, his son, Mohammad Agha, re-
established contact with Iranian authorities and requested that he be
permitted to return to Iran. Anxious to restore peace on its border with
the Ottoman Empire, the Iranian government consented to Mohammad
Agha’s repatriation. Once he had returned to Iran, Mohammad Agha
was appointed governor of Chahriq. The honeymoon between the new
Shakak chief and the Iranian government did not last very long. After a

45 S. G. Wilson, Persian Life and Customs, p. 121.

46 Ibid., p. 120.
47 Nezam al-Saltaneh Māfi, Khaterat va Asnad, Vol. 2, p. 447.
48 S. G. Wilson, Persian Life and Customs, p. 121.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Nezam al-Saltaneh Māfi, Khaterat va Asnad, Vol. 2, p. 447.
52 Ibid.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 67

short respite, Mohammad Agha and his sons organized plundering raids
against rural communities of Khoy, Salmas, and the frontier region.53 In
response, the government set a trap and invited the Kurdish chief and
one of his sons, Jafar Agha, to a meeting where they were to be detained.
Mohammad Agha and his son, however, escaped the trap, killing four
government agents in the process.54
In spring 1905, Iran’s reigning monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Shah,
embarked on his third and last trip to Europe. Mohammad Ali Mirza,
the crown prince and the governor of Azerbaijan, was summoned to
Tehran to serve as the Regent in the absence of his father. As a tempo-
rary substitute, Mohammad Ali Mirza appointed the veteran statesman,
Hossein Qoli Khan Nezam al-Saltaneh Māfi, as the interim governor-
general of Azerbaijan.55 According to an Iranian historian, while the
crown prince was in Tehran, the Shakak chieftain, Jafar Agha, continued
to cause trouble for the central government.56 The Kurdish warlord
carried out swift raids from his stronghold at Chahriq, raiding and plun-
dering villages on the plains of Khoy, Salmas, and Urumiyeh. The attacks
on these rural communities were opposed by peasant farmers and land-
lords alike. Among those who complained vociferously about Jafar Agha’s
raids were chiefs of the rival Mamadi/Mamdoi branch of the Shakak,
who owned extensive real estate, including villages, in western Azerbaijan.
This did not mean, however, that Jafar Agha and his attacks were unpop-
ular among all segments of Kurdish society. To the contrary, the Kurdish
chief enjoyed immense popularity among the poorer sections of Kurdish
society, who viewed him as a hero at least in part because he distributed
a portion of his loot among the poor.57 Basil Nikitine, who served as
Russia’s consul in Urumiyeh during the First World War, wrote, “sou-
vent, après avoir dépouillé un richard, il distribuait une partie du butin

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 A. C. Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, p. 206. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e
Mashruteh-ye Iran, (Tehran: Amir Kabir Press, 1978), p. 143.
56 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 143. See also,
Safaei, Ebrahim, Rahbaran-e Mashruteh, 2 Vols, (Tehran: Javidan Press, 1968), Vol.
2, p. 37.
57 Martin van Bruinessen. “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The Case of Simko’s
Revolt,” in Richard Tapper, The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan,
(London: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 380.
68 M. KIA

aux miséreux” (often after robbing a rich man he distributed part of the
booty to the poor).58
In response to Jafar Agha’s raids, the Qajar government “resorted to
the old tried and tested method” of neutralizing a rebellious tribal khan
by appointing him governor of a “border district.”59 Thus, the authori-
ties in Tabriz named Jafar Agha Sarhad Dar (Warden of the Frontier) for
Chahriq and the adjoining districts.60 As a representative of the govern-
ment on a frontier district, the authorities hoped that the Kurdish chief
would cease his raiding campaigns against the rural communities he had
to govern. The new position kept the Kurdish chief quiet, but only
temporarily. He soon resumed his old practice of plundering defense-
less villages on the plains of Salmas and Khoy. Clearly, the government
strategy of neutralizing Jafar Agha by bribing him with a new position
and title had proved to be a failure. The governor-general, however,
refused to give up and pulled another trick from his hat. This time,
Nezam al-Saltaneh resorted to an old diplomatic ruse. Claiming that he
intended to discuss the border disputes between Iran and the Ottoman
Empire and reconcile any discord that existed between the Shakak and the
Iranian government, the governor invited Jafar Agha to Tabriz under safe
conduct. To reassure the Kurdish chief of his safety, Nezam al-Saltaneh
swore on a copy of the Quran that if Jafar Agha “came, he should leave
Tabriz in safety and honor.”61
Reassured by the promise of safe conduct, Jafar Agha, who was by then
recognized as the chief of the Avdoi of the northern section of Shakak
at Chahriq, travelled to Tabriz in late spring 1905, accompanied by an
entourage of seven Shakak tribesmen, including his maternal uncle.62
While the Kurdish chief was being entertained by local officials in Tabriz,

58 Basile Nikitine. Les Kurdes. Étude Sociologique et Historique, p. 79. See also, Martin
van Bruinessen, “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The Case of Simko’s Revolt,”
p. 380.
59 Ibid.
60 Barclay to Grey, Gulhak, Tehran, December 19, 1911, [1954], No. 248, Enclosure 2
in No. 101, Joint Report by Messrs. Shipley and Minorsky, British and Russian Delegates,
on the State of Affairs on the Turco-Persian Frontier, June 8–September 16, 1911, in The
Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 549.
61 W.A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern Kurdistan. (London: A & C
Black Ltd., 1922), p. 216.
62 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 143.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 69

Nezam al-Saltaneh sent a telegram to the crown prince in Tehran and

informed him that the Shakak chief and his father could be pacified if the
government offered Jafar Agha a three-year tax forgiveness, and bestowed
upon the young chieftain the title of Salar al-Ashayer (Leader of Tribes)
as well as a sword of honor and a one thousand toman salary. In return,
the government could ask Jafar Agha to convince his father to return
from Ottoman territory to Iran.63 Once his father had returned to Iran,
Mohammad Agha would be re-appointed as the governor of Chahriq, and
his son could assume the governorship of Somai-Baradoost after he had
removed Mostafa Khan, the rival chief of the Mamadi/Mamdoi branch
of the Shakak.64
Nezam al-Saltaneh sent his proposal for peace to the crown prince in
Tehran. In response, the crown prince rejected any form of reconciliation
with the Shakak chief and ordered Nezam al-Saltaneh to either imprison
or execute Jafar Agha.65 After a short stay in Tabriz, Jafar Agha informed
the governor that he intended to depart the city and return home. On
the day of his departure, July 4, 1905, Jafar Agha paid a visit to bid
farewell to the governor, who had organized a reception in his honor.66
The Kurdish chief was asked to wait in an anteroom, where an agent
of the governor entered and “discharged a revolver into the chieftain’s
body.”67 A group of armed guards also murdered two of Jafar Agha’s
bodyguards waiting outside in a corridor for their chief.68 The remaining
members of Jafar Agha’s entourage killed nine agents of the governor
before fleeing Tabriz for the safety of their home territory west of Lake
Urumiyeh.69 The authorities in Tabriz “made as much capital as they

63 Nezam al-Saltaneh Māfi, Khaterat va Asnad, Vol. 2, pp. 447–448.

64 Ibid., p. 448.
65 Ibid. Se also, Hedayat, Mokhber al-Saltaneh, Khaterat va Khatarat, (Tehran: Zavvar
Press, 1982), p. 323. See also, Ebrahim Safaei, Rahbaran-e Mashruteh, Vol. 2, p. 37. See
also, Mehdi Bamdad, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran, Vol. 1, pp. 240, 453.
66 Hardinge to the Marquees of Lansdowne, Gulhak, July 19, 1905, No. 157, in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965, Vol. 2, p. 417.
67 A.C. Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, pp. 207–208. Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e
Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 144.
68 Ibid., p. 208.
69 Nezam al-Saltaneh Māfi, Khaterat va Asnad, Vol. 2, p. 448. See also, Ahmad Kasravi,
Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 144. According to another source, Jafar Agha had already
departed Tabriz loaded with honors and decorations, when one hundred yards from the
70 M. KIA

could out of the three corpses, having them dragged in triumph through
the streets and then hung them by the heels, like carcasses in a butcher’s
shop, from a first-floor balcony overlooking a public square.”70 The local
paper in Tabriz praised the cowardly murder of Jafar Agha, and the crim-
inal behavior of Iranian authorities, as a triumph of the government’s wise
policies.71 For his part, Simko was quoted by one author as saying that
after the murder of his brother, he would never trust an Iranian, or “look
on one as a gentleman again.”72

Ottoman Turks Invade Western Azerbaijan

In October 1905, a few months after Jafar Agha’s murder by Iranian
authorities in Tabriz, Ottoman army units invaded and occupied several
rural districts in western Azerbaijan. The Turks exploited the Russo-
Japanese war (1904–1905), as well as the Russian revolution of 1905,
to carve out a narrow corridor inside Iranian territory. Ottoman Turkish
forces, accompanied by irregular Kurdish units, first occupied the rural
district of Lahijan southwest of Lake Urumiyeh. The district incorpo-
rated the villages of Vazneh and Passveh on the Iranian side of the
frontier.73 The principal tribes of this region were the Sunni Kurdish
tribes of Mangur and Mamash. The headquarters of the Mangur was
at Vazneh, while the headquarters of Mamash was at Passveh, a forti-
fied village “24 miles west of Savojbolagh.”74 In spring 1906, the

gate of the city he was called back for a last word. The Kurdish chief returned to Tabriz
and entered the governor’s reception room where he was shot dead from “behind a
grating.” See, W.A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern Kurdistan, p. 216.
70 A.C. Wratislaw, A Consul in the East, p. 208. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e
Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 145.
71 Basile Nikitine, Les Kurdes. Étude Sociologique et Historique, p. 80.
72 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally: A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great
War, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920), p. 36.
73 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1906, [FO 371/149 and
FO 416/26–29], O’Conor to Grey, Constantinople, May 2, 1906, [15460], No. 302,
Enclosure in No. 110, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, pp. 38–39. See also,
Grey to Findlay, May 19, 1910, Confidential [14951], No. 35, Enclosure in No. 1, in
The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 421.
74 Ibid. See also, Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1906, [FO
371/149 and FO 416/26–29], Duff to Grey, Tehran, April 24, 1906, [16424], No. 113,
in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Volume 4, p. 41.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 71

Ottomans designated Lahijan as a sanjak or an administrative sub-unit

of Sulaymaniyah (in present-day northern Iraq), and appointed a Turkish
kaymakam (qaimmaqam) (deputy governor/commissioner in charge of
the administration) for the rural district.75 The Turks then expanded
the area under their occupation to incorporate a strip of territory along
the Iranian border extending from a point southwest of Savojbolagh to
a point west of Khoy.76 The main objective of the Ottoman invasion
was to secure a boundary that would allow the Turkish army to move
troops from Mosul in northern Iraq into the Russian-controlled southern
Caucasus.77 The Turkish occupation of rural districts in northwestern
Iran also made it easier for the Ottoman forces to hold the frontier against
a future Russian attack. By occupying the remote mountainous border
area, the Turks secured their possession of vital mountain passes, whose
strategic value could be immense in any future Russo-Ottoman war.78 As
they expanded the territory under their control, the Ottomans called on
the Kurdish tribes of western Azerbaijan to rise and attack the non-Sunni
towns and villages of the region.
The Qajar government was convinced that the Turks held territo-
rial designs on northwestern Iran and that they intended to manip-
ulate the Sunni Kurdish tribes of the region as a convenient tool to
implement their expansionist policies. The weak and incompetent Qajar
monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, and his inept and Russophile crown
prince, Mohammad Ali Mirza, lacked the military muscle and the polit-
ical acumen to dislodge the Ottoman forces. Unable to counter Ottoman
aggression on their own, the Iranian authorities appealed to Britain and
Russia to exert pressure on the Ottoman government to withdraw its
forces from western Azerbaijan. These diplomatic efforts, however, failed
to produce any positive results.

75 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1906, [FO 371/149 and

FO 416/26–29], Duff to Grey, Tehran, April 24, 1906, [16424], No. 113, Enclosure in
No. 135, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 41.
76 “Urmia: Statement by the Rev. William A. Shedd, D.D. of the American (Presbyte-
rian) Mission Station at Urmia; Communicated by the Board of Foreign Missions of the
Presbyterian Church of the U.S.A.,” in Viscount Bryce, The Treatment of Armenians in
the Ottoman Empire 1915–1916, p. 100.
77 Ibid.
78 Schofield, Richard (ed.), The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. xxiii.
72 M. KIA

By May 1906, the Ottomans had completed their occupation of

the rural districts of Targavar, Margavar, and Somai-Baradoost west of
Urumiyeh and appropriated the share of the harvest designated to be
sent as tax to the Iranian government.79 The Shakak occupied many of
the villages on the slopes north and northeast of Baradoost and the adja-
cent hilly country of Somai. At the time when Ottoman troops invaded
the area, the chief of the Shakak in this section was a certain Ismail Agha,
who collaborated with the invading Turks. With encouragement from
Ottoman officials, the Shakak intensified their campaign of robbery and
murder.
When the Iranian government sent an expedition to re-impose its
authority over western Azerbaijan in spring 1907, the Ottomans mobi-
lized a counter-expedition, which drove back the Qajar army over the
course of the summer, re-capturing the whole of the highlands west
of Urumiyeh.80 Once again, the occupying Ottoman forces encouraged
Kurdish tribal groups to raid, plunder, and burn the rural communities of
western Azerbaijan—especially the Armenian and Assyrian villages up to
the very gates of Urumiyeh.
The Ottomans combined their military incursions into western Azer-
baijan with a policy of winning over the Kurdish tribes of Iran by “bribes
and threats.”81 They also appealed to pan-Islamism or the unity of all
Muslims under the leadership of the Ottoman sultan-caliph as the reli-
gious and spiritual leader of all Sunni Muslims. This Ottoman strategy
succeeded most often when applied to the Sunni Kurdish tribal groups
such as the Shakak. However, the majority of Shi’i Kurds, and even
some Sunni Kurdish groups, “resisted” the Ottoman agitation “despite
the anarchy and ruin effected in their territories under the incitement of
Turkish agents.”82 For example, Kurdish tribes of Marivan and Owraman
(Avroman), though Sunni and torn by petty warfare, refused to open

79 Spring-Rice to Government of India, Tehran, November 9, 1906, [39527], in Iran

Political Diaries 1881–1965, Vol. 3, p. 47.
80 Spring-Rice to Grey, Abinger Hall, Dorking, December 21, 1907, General Report
on Persia for the first Nine Months of the year 1907, Confidential (9095), [883], in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965, Vol. 3, p. 405.
81 Louther to Grey, Constantinople, February 28, 1911, [8102], Enclosure in No. 122,
Greig to Louther, Mosul, No. 1 Confidential, Mosul, January 12, 1911, British Public
Record Office, Kew.
82 Ibid.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 73

negotiations with the Turks. Farther south, in the vicinity of Kerman-

shah, the Ottomans confronted even stiffer resistance from the “Ali Allahi
Guran,” and the “Shi’i Kalhor,” the largest Kurdish tribe in Iran.83
Among the first Kurdish tribal chiefs to join the Ottoman invading
forces was Simko, who used the murder of his brother, Jafar Agha, as
the impetus to organize a series of plundering raids against Shi’i Azer-
baijani, as well as Assyrian and Armenian rural communities surrounding
Urumiyeh.84 Accompanied by a large number of his men, Simko then
went over to the Ottoman Turks and sought their protection.85 Tahir
Pasha, then Ottoman governor of Van, befriended Simko and gave him
and his men some land some thirty miles east of Van.86 In return for
his close alliance with Ottoman authorities, Simko was promoted to the
rank of colonel in the Hamidiye Light Cavalry Regiments.87 An irregular
militia composed of Kurdish cavalry battalions headed by their own tribal
chiefs, the Hamidiye units were organized by the Ottoman sultan, Abdul-
hamid II (r. 1876–1909) in 1891. One of the main objectives for creation
of the Hamidiye regiments was to transform the Kurdish tribes of eastern
Anatolia from autonomous political entities challenging the authority of
the state into an arm of the central government as it tried to suppress
Armenian nationalists.
Simko and his father, Mohammad Agha, also used the Ottoman inva-
sion of western Azerbaijan as an opportunity to appeal to the Ottoman
sultan, Abdulhamid II, to avenge the murder of Jafar Agha. In February
1907, Mohammad Agha travelled to Istanbul to make his appeal to
the sultan in person. Once in Istanbul, the Kurdish chief received a
warm reception from Turkish officials, and the Porte bestowed the title
of “pasha” upon Mohammad Agha.88 When the Iranian government
became aware of Mohammad Agha’s activities in the Ottoman capital,
it instructed its ambassador in Istanbul to neutralize the embarrassment

83 Ibid.
84 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 425.
85 FO 416/35–38 & FO 881/9130, Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman
frontier, 1908, O’Conor to Grey, Constantinople, February 5, 1908, Enclosure 1 in No.
174, Report by Vice Consul Dickson on his recent Journey through Turco-Persian territory,
Van, December 14, 1907, No. 28, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 267.
86 Ibid.
87 W. A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally, p. 36.
88 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 145.
74 M. KIA

caused by the Shakak chief. What exactly followed is unclear. What we

do know is that the Ottoman government rescinded the title of pasha
that Mohammad Agha had received.89 The Shakak chief was subsequently
imprisoned in the Ottoman capital, where he died a short time later. Many
years later, a Russian official ascribed Simko’s “hatred of the Turks” to
the fact that the Kurdish chief’s father had died in an Ottoman prison in
Istanbul.90
When Simko’s patron, Tahir Pasha, was removed from the gover-
norship of Van and replaced by a certain Ali Bey, differences emerged
between the Shakak chief and the new governor. As a result, Simko and
his people returned to Iran in spring 1907. Between his departure in
1905 and his return in 1907, Simko and his father lost their control over
Chahriq. In Simko’s place, the Iranian authorities appointed his rival, the
Shakak chief, Ismail Agha, the district governor of Somai and their tax
collector at Baradoost.91 Consequently, upon arriving in Iran, Simko was
appointed by the Khan of Maku as the governor of the frontier district
of Qotur, where he collected all the taxes “for his own pocket,” lived
in great state, and periodically raided “the villages in Salmas and Khoy
Plains,” when he was in need of money, “taking their sheep as a punish-
ment for their not accepting the Shah.”92 The Kurdish chief also joined
forces with the “Jalali and Aroshi Kurds of the Khan of Maku,” Eqbal
al-Saltaneh, who treated Simko as his lieutenant.93 Thus, Simko fell into
the Qajar orbit.

89 Ibid.
90 Reynolds, Michael A. Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman
and Russian Empires 1908–1918, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), No.
97, p. 69.
91 FO 416/35–38 & FO 881/9130, Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman
frontier, 1908, O’Conor to Grey, Constantinople, February 5, 1908, Enclosure 1 in No.
174, Report by Vice Consul Dickson on his recent Journey through Turco-Persian territory,
Van, December 14, 1907, No. 28, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 267.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid. See also, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, March 23, 1909, [11849], No.
296, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 354.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 75

Simko, Constitutional
Revolution & Ottoman Invasion
Simko’s return to Iran corresponded with the dawn of a new era in Iranian
history, as well as the country’s relationship with Russia, Britain, and the
Ottoman Empire. The constitutional revolution, which had commenced
in December of 1905, ended on August 5, 1906, after the reigning Qajar
monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Shah, granted a constitution and ordered the
establishment of a national consultative assembly. Despite initial jubilation
surrounding the creation of a parliament, the relationship between the
Majlis and the royal court deteriorated quickly after the death of the ailing
shah on January 8, 1907, and the ascendency of his son, Mohammad Ali
Shah, as the new ruler of Iran. The knee-jerk declarations at the time
by some western-educated notables and intellectuals that the granting
of a constitution marked the beginning of a new era replacing monar-
chical absolutism with a new political system based on law and democratic
principles proved to be a lazy fantasy; these bombastic pronouncements
reflected a complete lack of appreciation for the durability of authoritari-
anism as a persistent and unrelenting phenomenon in Iran’s long and rich
history.
The growing conflict between Mohammad Ali Shah and the Majlis
erupted into a semi-civil war after the Cossack Brigade under the
command of the Russian officer, Colonel Liakhov, attacked and destroyed
the parliament on June 23, 1908. In the days following the bombard-
ment of the Majlis, the provincial capital of Azerbaijan, Tabriz, emerged as
the bastion of Iranian nationalism and constitutionalism. Pro-constitution
forces in Tabriz, Khoy, and Salmas, backed by revolutionaries from
southern Caucasus, mobilized their supporters, while the shah called on
his supporters among the Turkic and Kurdish tribes of the province to
rally to his flag and crush the constitutionalists in Tabriz and other urban
centers of the province. In response, the governor of Maku, Eqbal al-
Saltaneh, rose in support of the shah and appealed to the Kurdish tribes
of western Azerbaijan and eastern Anatolia to attack the pro-constitution
forces in the districts of Khoy and Salmas. One of the chiefs to join
the Khan of Maku was Simko who, together with several other Kurdish
chiefs, raised an army of three thousand men. After a three-day battle
and “a great slaughter,” the Kurdish army, led by Simko and Eqbal
al-Saltaneh’s nephew, inflicted a humiliating defeat on constitutionalist
76 M. KIA

forces near Khoy in January 1909.94 The military victory was followed by
a sustained campaign of looting villages and killing the rural population.95
By the time the violent confrontation ended, most villages in the area had
fallen into “a pitiable condition,” either “oppressed by the revolutionaries
of Khoy and Dilman [capital of the district of Salmas],” or “pillaged and
massacred by the reactionaries of the Khan of Maku and his lieutenant,
Simko Agha.”96 After his clash with constitutionalist forces, Simko was
appointed governor of the district of Qotur on the Iranian-Ottoman fron-
tier.97 By collaborating with the Khan of Maku, Simko also gained a free
hand in attacking and plundering rural communities between Dilman and
Khoy.
The civil war between Iranian constitutionalists and the pro-shah tribal
chiefs such as Simko provided the newly established Young Turk govern-
ment in Istanbul with an opportunity to rejuvenate the Turkish “forward
policy” and dispatch an expeditionary force to Khoy, while another
Ottoman detachment occupied three villages in the Salmas district.98
After seizing power in July 1908, the Young Turk regime had with-
drawn some of its troops from Iranian territory, though a number of
Ottoman military detachments remained in occupation of several rural
districts in western Azerbaijan. Once they had consolidated their position
in Istanbul in 1909, the Young Turks reverted back to a more aggressive
policy vis-à-vis Iran.
During their incursions into Iranian territory, the Ottomans relied
on support from Kurdish tribes of western Azerbaijan, including the

94 FO 416/35–38 & FO 881/9130, Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman

frontier, 1908, O’Conor to Grey, Constantinople, February 5, 1908, Enclosure 1 in No.
174, Report by Vice Consul Dickson on his recent Journey through Turco-Persian territory,
Van, December 14, 1907, No. 28, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 267.
See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 811. See also, McDowall, David,
A Modern History of the Kurds, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 111, No. 36.
95 Malekzadeh, Mehdi, Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran, Volume 5, 1113.
96 Lowther to Grey, Constantinople, March 23, 1909, [11849], No. 205, Enclosure in
No. 1, ice-Consul Dickson to Lowther, Van, February 24, 1909, in The Iran-Iraq Border
1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 354.
97 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran, p. 473.
98 Grey to Findlay, May 19, 1910, [14951], No. 35, Enclosure in No. 1., in The
Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 422. See also, Lowther to Grey, Constantinople,
May 25, 1910, [19085], No. 341, Enclosure in No. 1. Morgan to Lowther, Van May 9,
1910, p. 425.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 77

Shakak. This open support allowed the Turks to occupy several frontier
districts west of Lake Urumiyeh, including Simko’s birthplace, Chahriq,
in July 1908.99 On 18 July, some 120 Turkish troops occupied Qulonji
(Kulunji), twenty miles north of Urumiyeh.100 On this particular occa-
sion, the invading Ottoman troops were accompanied by fifty armed
Kurds led by a Shakak chief named Ismail Agha who “addressed letters
to various villages informing them that they had been annexed by
Turkey.”101 The letters by the Shakak chief, who should not be mistaken
for Simko, legitimized the right of the Turkish invaders to collect taxes
from the native population in western Azerbaijan.102 Ottoman troops in
the company of the Shakak chief also collected taxes in Chahriq.103
In sharp contrast to the Shakak chiefs of Somai and Chahriq, who
collaborated with Ottoman authorities, Simko refused to join the invading
Turks. The Iranian authorities had, in their despair, entrusted the mainte-
nance of order from Maku to the borders of Urumiyeh district, to Eqbal
al-Saltaneh.104 The Khan of Maku in turn mobilized the support of Simko
and neighboring Kurdish chiefs by allowing them a free hand to pillage
rural communities in the districts of Khoy, Salmas, and Urumiyeh. Backed
by Eqbal al-Saltaneh, Simko went one step further and confronted the
Shakak chiefs who had joined the Ottomans.
The efforts by the Khan of Maku and Simko to maintain Iranian
authority over western Azerbaijan did not deter the Young Turks from
fortifying their claims over Iranian territory by all means possible,
including Kurdish tribal raids, military occupation on the pretext of
protecting Ottoman subjects, intimidation intended to drive the rural
communities of western Azerbaijan into soliciting Ottoman nationality,

99 Barclay to Grey, Tehran, February 10, 1910, Persia. Annual Report, 1909, [8669],
No. 19, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Vol. 4, p. 433.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
103 Sabri Ates, The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843–1914,
,
p. 245.
104 FO 416/35–38 & FO 881/9130, Marling to Grey, Gulhak, June 15, 1908,
[23119], No. 144, Enclosure 1 in No. 51, Wratislaw to Marling, Urmi, May 17, 1908,
No. 8, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 322.
78 M. KIA

and distribution of Ottoman passports.105 In December 1909, the

Ottoman forces advanced all along the line and occupied the rural districts
of Somai-Baradoost, Targavar, Margavar, Dasht, and Sulduz. By May
1910, the Young Turk regime was appointing civil administrators (idareh
memuri) to govern Sulduz, Oshnaviyeh, and Chahriq, the birthplace of
Simko.106 Additionally, Ottoman administrators were stating, openly and
publicly, that instead of protesting the occupation of its territory, Iran had
to recognize that the districts that had been occupied by the Turks were
now the property of the Ottoman state.107
Though the constitutionalist forces seized Tehran in August 1909 and
forced Mohammad Ali Shah to abdicate, Simko remained loyal to Iran’s
central government, refusing to follow the model set by Shakak chiefs of
Chahriq and Somai, who had thrown their support behind the Ottoman
Turks. Simko’s refusal to join the Turks angered the Ottoman authorities
in western Azerbaijan. In October 1910, Mehmed Zeki, the Ottoman
kaymakam of the Mahmudi district in the Lake Van region, wrote Simko
to warn the Kurdish chief that he had no choice but to cooperate with
Ottoman officials and hand them the district of Qotur.108 Using a carrot
and stick approach, the Ottoman official promised Simko a pardon for
his past crimes, a “robe of honor” and “the governorship” of Somai and
Qotur if he surrendered Qotur to the Turkish authorities.109 Mehmed
Zaki threatened Simko that if he failed to accommodate the Turkish
demands, the Ottoman government could easily destroy him “in four
hours,” even if he flew “to the gates of Tabriz.”110

105 Grey to Findlay, Persia Confidential [14951], No. 35, in The Iran-Iraq Border
1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 422.
106 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1910 [FO 371/948–949],
Lowther to Grey, May 25, 1910, Persia Confidential [19085], No. 341, Enclosure in No.
1, Morgan to Louther, Van, May 9, 1910, No. 11, The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol.
4, p. 425.
107 Ibid.
108 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1911, [FO 371/1178–
1179 & FO 416/51], Barclay to Grey, Gulhak, December 19, 1911, [1954], No. 248,
Annex 1 to Joint Report by Shipley and Minorsky, Translation of the Report of the
Governor-General of the Urmia to the Persian Foreign Office, October 15, 1910, No.
313., in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 559.
109 Ibid., pp. 559–560.
110 Ibid., p. 559.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 79

The district of Qotur incorporated thirty-five villages111 and had long

served as a bone of contention between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. In
spring 1849, Ottoman troops had seized the district and forced Iranian
authorities to evacuate it.112 In the deliberations of the Ottoman-Iranian
Delimitation Commissions of 1849–1852, the Qotur district remained
a source of disagreement between the two governments. According to
the Article 60 of the Congress of Berlin (June 13–July 13, 1878), the
Sublime Porte agreed to cede to Iran the town and territory of Qotur.113
After 1905, recognizing the growing weakness of the Qajar state, the
Ottomans tried to renege on their international commitments and regain
control over the predominantly Kurdish-populated district.
Simko forwarded the threatening letter he had received from the Turks
to Iranian authorities. In response, the governor of Urumiyeh wrote to
Simko that, as a warden of the frontier, the Kurdish chief was obligated
to inform the Ottoman official that the Turkish troops must evacuate
Chahriq and deliver it to Iranian authorities.114 Otherwise, the Ottomans
should prepare themselves to meet “with a severe repulse” especially if
they decide to trespass on Iranian territory.115 The Iranian governor also
reminded Simko that the Turks were enticing him with the governorship
of Somai only to undermine his allegiance to the Iranian state.116 Simko’s
persistent refusal to collaborate with Turks ignited the fury of Ottoman
commanders in western Azerbaijan. One of these officers, Remiz Bey, not
only denounced the Avdoi branch of the Shakak as “inveterate robbers”

111 Mirza Ja’afar Khan Moshir al-Dowleh, Resale-ye Tahqiqat-e Sarhaddiyeh, p. 178.
112 Ibid.
113 Adamiyat, Fereydoun, Amir Kabir va Iran, (Tehran: Kharazmi Press, 1982), p. 598.
See also, Congress of Berlin, Les Protocoles du Congrès de Berlin Avec le Traité Prélim-
inaire de San-Stefano, (St Albans: Wentworth Press, 2019). See also, W. N. Medlicott,
The Congress of Berlin and After: A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement,
(London: Methuen & Co, January, 1938). On the illegal occupation of Qotur or Qatur
by Ottoman forces, see Barclay to Grey, Tehran, December 19, 1911, [1954], No. 248,
in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 546.
114 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1911, [FO 371/1178–
1179 & FO 416/51], Barclay to Grey, Gulhak, December 19, 1911, [1954], Annex
1 to Joint Report by Shipley and Minorsky, Translation of the Report of the Governor-
General of the Urmia to the Persian Foreign Office, October 15, 1910, No. 313., in The
Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 559.
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
80 M. KIA

and “evil-doers,” but also threatened that if the chief of the Avdoi
Shakaks, Simko, were not handed over to Ottoman authorities by Iran,
the Ottoman kaymakam of Chahriq would direct the Shakak chief, Omar
Agha, to seize Dilman the capital of the district of Salmas.117 This note
clearly indicated that Simko’s birthplace, Chahriq, had been annexed and
ruled directly by the Turks, who were playing one Shakak chief against
another.

Simko & the Russian Occupation of Azerbaijan

Simko escaped the wrath of Ottoman authorities in western Azerbaijan by
establishing a friendly relationship with Russian officials in the province.
As early as April 1909, Russia had used the opportunity created by the
semi-civil war between the Qajar monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah, and the
constitutionalist forces to invade Azerbaijan and station troops in Tabriz
and several other towns. One of the main objectives of Czarist Russia was
the incorporation of Azerbaijan into the Russian Empire. Another goal of
the Russian invasion was to pacify and silence Tabriz, the heart of Iranian
nationalism and constitutionalism. Using Tabriz as their operational base,
Russian authorities expanded their military occupation of Azerbaijan in all
directions, especially toward the western districts of the province, which
the Ottoman Turks had occupied.
The power and influence of Czarist Russia in Azerbaijan increased
significantly in December 1911, after Russian occupation forces in Tabriz,
backed by reinforcements from south Caucasus, attacked constitutional-
ists in the city. Despite heroic resistance by the people of Tabriz, the
Russians forced the city into submission by executing some of its most
prominent leaders, including the highly respected Shi’i religious leader,
Seqat al-Islam Tabrizi, on 31 December. The bloody repression unleashed
by Czarist armies against Iranian constitutionalists in 1911 solidified
Russian military presence in Azerbaijan. By October 1912, the Czarist
army had assembled a force of 4,000 men in the Urumiyeh region, some

117 Barclay to Grey, Tehran, December 1, 1911, [Confidential 50544], No. 236, Diary
(No. 7) of the Itinerary of the British and Russian Delegates from Urmia to Tabreez through
Anzal and Salmas, September 9–16, 1911, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4,
p. 534.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 81

of whom were dispatched to Khoy and Salmas.118 As long as Russian

troops occupied strategic positions in Azerbaijan, the Ottoman Turks felt
justified maintaining an equal number of troops in the western districts of
the province.119
The balance of power in northwestern Iran shifted dramatically when
Ottoman forces began to evacuate western Azerbaijan in November
1912,120 after the member states of the Balkan League, namely Serbia,
Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro, attacked the Ottoman Empire in
the First Balkan War. On November 15, 1912, “the Ottoman Minister
of Foreign Affairs admitted that his government had been at fault” in
western Azerbaijan’s border zone “since 1905.”121 The Ottoman ambas-
sador at Tehran also informed the Iranian government that “the Porte was
prepared to withdraw its troops from the contested zone” provided Iran
would occupy the evacuated districts and “undertake the protection of the
Sunni population.”122 The Iranian government “agreed to the proposal,
and the withdrawal of the Turkish troops commenced.”123 By the end of
November, the Ottoman Empire “had evacuated all its former garrisons”
and Iranian troops, “under various local chiefs,” were reoccupying the
border districts.124 By December, Ottoman troops were withdrawing
from the rural districts of Sulduz, Lahijan, Vazneh, Margavar, Sardasht,
and Baneh, as well as villages adjacent to the Salmas plain.125 The Turkish
withdrawal, which was completed in early 1913, allowed the Iranian
government to dispatch officials to take charge of the districts evacuated

118 Townley to Grey, Tehran, October 29, 1912, Persia Confidential, [48927], No.
226, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Vol. 5, p. 453. See also, Townley to Grey,
Tehran, March 18, 1913, Persia Annual Report, [15876], No. 66, in Iran Political Diaries
1881–1965, Vol. 5, p. 482.
119 Townley to Grey, Tehran, February 18, 1913, Persia Annual Report 1913, [15876],
No. 55, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Vol. 5, p. 482.
120 Townley to Grey, Tehran, November 27, 1912, No. 240, Persia Confidential
[53557], No. 240, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Vol. 5, p. 456.
121 Schofield, Richard (ed.)., The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 5, p. xxvi.
122 Townley to Grey, Tehran, March 18, 1913. Persia Annual Report, 1912, Confiden-
tial (10,210) [15876] No. 66, in Iran Political Diaries, Vol. 5, p. 482.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Schofield, Richard (ed.)., The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Volume 5, p. xxvi. See
also, Louther to Grey, Constantinople, November 28, 1912, Persia Confidential [51232],
No. 1004, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 5, p. 509.
82 M. KIA

by Ottoman Turks.126 Kurdish tribal chiefs, who had collaborated with

Turkish occupation forces, hurriedly switched their allegiance to Iran.
Anxious to convey the message that they were the new masters of the
region, Russian authorities rushed to inform the Kurdish leadership in
the region that the departure of Turkish troops had been accomplished
as a direct result of Russian intervention, and it had nothing to do with
the policies and actions of the toothless Qajar state.127
In demonstrating their determination to remain the supreme power
in northwestern Iran, the Russians did not decrease the number of
their troops in the Khoi-Urumiyeh area, which had been “considerably
increased just before the Turkish evacuation, although the ostensible
reason for their presence,” namely “the Turkish menace, had been
removed.”128 As Russia accelerated the process of converting Azerbaijan
into a province of the Russian Empire, the Czarist army increased its
forces throughout the province. By the end of 1913, Russia maintained
approximately a ten-thousand-man army in Azerbaijan, of which 2,000
were at Tabriz, 3,000 at Khoy, 1,500 at Urumiyeh, 2,000 in Ardabil, and
a few hundred in Savojbolagh.129 The most difficult task for the Russian
troops was the maintenance of security on the Ottoman-Iranian fron-
tier. The Russian force along the line running from Khoy in the north
to Savojbolagh in the south was inadequate to secure the porous border
between the Ottoman Empire and Iran, unless Russia enlisted the support
of various Kurdish chiefs, including Simko, who in return for their services
received generous payments from the Czarist government. By 1912, the
Russian authorities were funneling significant amounts of cash and arms
to Kurdish tribal chiefs.130
The growing military presence of Russia in northwestern Iran, espe-
cially after 1911, convinced Simko to collaborate closely with Czarist
authorities. To survive on a border region, where the balance of power

126 Ibid.
127 John Tchalenko, Images From the Endgame, p. 92.
128 Townley to Grey, Tehran, March 18, 1913. Persia Annual Report, 1912, Confiden-
tial (10,210) [15876] No. 66, in Iran Political Diaries, Vol. 5, p. 482.
129 Townley to Grey, Tehran, February 18, 1914, Persia Annual Report, 1913, [10393],
No. 55, Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Vol. 5, p. 571.
130 Somakian, Manoug. Empires in Conflict: Armenia and the Great Powers, 1895–1920,
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), p. 52. See also, Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires:
The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 63.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 83

shifted on a regular basis, the Kurdish chief required a powerful patron

and protector to safeguard his authority. The Russians were also anxious
to use the Kurdish tribes of the region as a means of consolidating their
military presence in Azerbaijan.
At the same time, the Russians sought to destabilize Turkish rule in
eastern Anatolia. One of the strategies utilized by Russia was to take
advantage of the Ottoman preoccupation with the Italian invasion of
Libya (1911) followed by the two Balkan wars (1912–1913) to instigate
Kurdish tribal rebellions in the regions of Siirt, Van, and Bitlis. In March
1911, with Russian encouragement and support, the Kurdish notable,
Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan, established contact with Simko.
A grandson of Emir Bedir Khan, the last hereditary prince of the
Kurdish Bohtan principality in Ottoman Kurdistan, and the son of the
Ottoman high official, Nejib Pasha Bedir Khan and his wife, Hanife,
Abdurrezzak Bey had joined government service from a young age.
Beginning in 1885, he worked for four years at the Ottoman ministry
of foreign affairs.131 In 1889, he was dispatched to Russia, where he
served at the Ottoman embassy in Saint Petersburg. When he returned
to Istanbul, Abdurrezzak Bey requested a promotion. He was appointed
to a position at the Ottoman consulate in Tehran, but he was recalled
to Istanbul before reaching the Iranian capital. Instead of returning to
Istanbul, Abdurrezzak Bey travelled first to Yerevan and thence to Tiflis,
Batumi, and Kiev. He eventually ended up visiting England, where he
stayed for a short time in Brighton in the winter 1894.132 Under pressure
from the Ottoman government and his father, Nejib Pasha, Abdurrezzak
Bey returned to Istanbul and was appointed the assistant to the master of
ceremonies in the Yildiz Palace in January 1895.
In March 1906, Abdurrezzak Bey was accused of plotting the murder
of the prefect of Istanbul, Ridvan Pasha. The Kurdish dignitary and
“all male members of the Bedirkhani family over the age of twelve,” as
well as a large group of his relatives were rounded up and transported

131 For Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan’s life, see Bedirhan, Abdurrezzak, Otobiyografya,
translated by Hasan Cuni, (Istanbul: Perî Yayinlari, 2000). See also, Barbara Henning,
Narratives of the History of the Ottoman-Kurdish Bedirhani Family in Imperial and Post-
Imperial Contexts: Continuities and Changes, (Bamberg: University of Bamberg Press,
2018).
132 Barbara Henning, Narratives of the History of the Ottoman-Kurdish Bedirhani
Family in Imperial and Post-Imperial Contexts: Continuities and Changes, p. 304.
84 M. KIA

by boat to Tripoli in Libya, where they were put on trial.133 Abdur-

rezzak Bey was found guilty, and he was sent to Yemen to serve his
prison terms. After the Young Turk revolution of 1908, he remained
imprisoned but was eventually released in 1910. After his release, Abdur-
rezzak Bey returned to Istanbul, but he found his former life in the
Ottoman capital in shambles. With state power in the hands of the
Young Turks and with no political future in sight, he eventually defected
to Russia in autumn 1910. The Kurdish dignitary visited Tiflis where
he met with Russian military officials.134 After some days of briefing,
he toured the Ottoman-Iranian borderlands to establish contact with
Kurdish tribal chiefs, including Simko, who acted as his aide.135 One of
the objectives of collaborating with Simko was to counter the Ottoman
Empire’s “incitement of Ottoman Kurds and to restrain Iran’s Kurds from
looting and attacking government institutions and Christians, all the while
working to build Russia’s influence inside Kurdistan.”136 In their propa-
ganda work on behalf of the Russian government, Abdurrezzak Bey and
Simko utilized “ethnicity,” and they distributed leaflets that declared “this
land is our land,” and that “Bitlis and the neighboring territories” were
Kurdish.”137
Collaboration with prominent Kurdish leaders such as Abdurrezzak
Bey Bedir Khan enhanced Simko’s prestige and power. It also allowed
him to demonstrate his loyalty and fidelity to the Russian authorities, who
protected him from any encroachment by the Ottoman Turks and Iranian
officialdom. By July 1911, a British official visiting the Ottoman-Iranian
frontier at Qotur could report that Simko, who acted as “the chief of the
Avdoi branch of the Shakak Kurds,” enjoyed “a position almost as equally
independent of the Persians as of the Turks,” the latter of whom “he

133 Ibid., pp. 277–278.

134 Ibid., p. 309.
135 Ibid.
136 Telegram of Kokhanovskii, 8 March 1911 [22 March 1911], quoted in Michael
A. Reynolds, “Abdürrezzak Bedirhan Ottoman Kurd and Russophile in the Twilight of
Empire,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Vol. 12, No. 2, spring
2011 (New Series), Slavica Publishers, pp. 411-450, 431.
137 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman
and Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 60.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 85

greatly dislikes.”138 With Russian support and encouragement, Simko,

who served as the governor of Qotur,139 carried out raids in Turkish
territory, on at least one occasion, carrying off several thousand sheep.140
In 1913, “acting under encouragement” from Russian forces and
taking advantage of the Second Balkan War (1913), Simko stirred up
a Kurdish uprising against the Ottoman state in eastern Anatolia.141
Greatly alarmed by the spread of instability in their eastern provinces,
the Ottomans responded to the Simko-backed rebellion by unleashing a
campaign of repression against their Kurdish population. Another tactic
adopted by Ottoman authorities was to order their agents in western
Azerbaijan to plan the assassination of leading Kurdish figures who were
supporting Russia in the Ottoman-Iranian border area, among them
prominently Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan and Simko, “or to put a bounty
on their heads” to encourage others to murder them.142 Yet a third
approach was to embroil Simko in a conflict with his Russian “friends
and patrons.”143 Thus, members of the rival Mamadi/Mamdoi branch
of the Shakak were paid by Ottoman Turks to attack Russian officials
on the Iranian-Ottoman frontier. Such attacks caused embarrassment for
Simko and ignited inter-tribal conflict between the main branches of the
Shakak.144 The Ottoman government also pressed Russia and Iran to

138 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1911, [FO 371/1178–

1179 & FO 416/51], Barclay to Grey, Gulhak, July 1, 1911, Persia Confidential,
[29936], No. 110, Enclosure 2 in No. 1, Diary of the British and Russian Delegates
from Khoy to Urmia, June 12 to 22, 1911, by H.S. Shipley, in The Iran-Iraq Border
1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 497.
139 Barclay to Grey, Tehran, December 19, 1911, [1954], No. 248, Enclosure 2 in
No. 101, Joint Report by Shipley and Minorsky, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol.
4, p. 546.
140 Louther to Grey, Constantinople, April 10, 1912, Persia Confidential, [15583],
No. 304, Enclosure in No. 1, Molyneux-Seel to Louther, Van, March 25, 1912, in The
Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 5, p. 148.
141 British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), First Edition. (Simla:
Superintendent, Government Central Press, 1923), p. 397.
142 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman
and Russian Empires 1908–1918, pp. 64–65.
143 Wilson to Grey, October 31, 1914, Persia and Central Asia Confidential, [74128],
No. 38, Enclosure in No. 1, Report on the Proceedings of the Turco-Persian Frontier
Commission from July 16 until its termination October 26, in The Iran-Iraq Border
1840–1958, Vol. 6, p. 20.
144 Ibid.
86 M. KIA

keep Simko as far away from the Ottoman border as possible.145 As late as
July 1914, however, Simko retained his position as Russia’s most trusted
Kurdish tribal ally in northwestern Iran.
The Russian-backed operations carried out by Simko and Abdurrezzak
Bey Bedir Khan were not confined to carrying out raids and polit-
ical propaganda in Ottoman territory. Beginning in 1912, with support
from Russian authorities, Abdurrezzak Bey published a Kurdish-language
newspaper in Urumiyeh.146 When the Russians removed Abdurrezzak
Bey from western Azerbaijan, the task of supervising the publication of
the newspaper fell on Simko, who continued to publish it until 1914.147
In return for his services to the Czarist government, Simko was invited
to Tiflis, Georgia, where the Russian governor-general of the Caucasus,
Vorontsov-Dashkov, decorated him and appointed the Shakak chief the
governor of the rural district of Somai in western Azerbaijan.148 In
response to the news of the appointment, the Ottoman government
protested Vorontsov-Dashkov’s decoration of Simko, complaining about
the Kurdish chief’s destructive attacks against Ottoman villages.149 The
Ottoman protests “were to no avail” because, as the Russian consul in
Van remarked, Simko “is someone that we need and we should support
him, since his hatred toward the Turks is without limit. And that bene-
fits us.”150 One Russian official ascribed Simko’s “hatred of the Turks”
to the fact that the Kurdish chief’s father, “who had lived” in Istanbul

145 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman
and Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 65.
146 Martin Van Bruinessen, “Kurdish Tribes and Simko’s Revolt,” in Richard Tapper
(ed.), The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and Afghanistan (London: St. Martin’s Press,
1983), p. 384. See also, Farideh Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of the Kurds in
Iran: Pastoral Nationalism, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p. 78. See also, ‘Rozhi
Kurd Newspaper 1913–1914’, Zhin Archive Centre, Sulaimani, as quoted in Chnor Jaafar
Ahmad, “The Dilemma of Kurdish Nationalism As A Result of International Treaties
and Foreign Occupations Between the Years 1850 to 1930.” University of Glasgow MA
Thesis, April 2019, p. 111.
147 Ibid.
148 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman
and Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 69.
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 87

and had known Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan, had “died in an Ottoman
prison.”151
The appointment of Simko as the district governor of Somai demon-
strated that the Czarist state treated Azerbaijan as a Russian province.
Indeed, using the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention as its legal tool, Russia
converted all northern provinces of Iran, for all intents and purposes,
into a large Russian province, with governors of Azerbaijan, Gilan,
Qazvin, and Maku, as well as local tribal chiefs, such as Simko, acting
as Czarist agents and officials who received and carried out orders from
the Russian consul generals.152 Meanwhile, despite their public recogni-
tion of Simko’s services to His Majesty the Czar, some Russian authorities
privately expressed their skepticism that the Shakak Kurds offered any
real military value in case of a war. The Russians concluded that Simko’s
“exploits were little more than poorly disguised banditry” that boiled
down “to cattle rustling.”153

Simko & Sayyid Taha II

Capitalizing on his newly found position with Russian occupation forces
in northwestern Iran, Simko established close links with another pro-
Russia Kurdish notable, namely Sayyid Taha II, the son of Sayyid
Mohammad Sadiq, and the grandson of the Kurdish leader, Sheikh Ubey-
dullah of Nehri (d. 1883). The family of Sheikh Ubeydullah, also known
as Sadat-e Nehri, hailed from the district of Shamdinan, or Shamzinan, in
the Hakkari region of southeastern Anatolia. Acknowledged as the leader
of the Naqshbandi-Khalidi Sufi order, Sheikh Ubeydullah was viewed as a
holy man by his followers. The sheikh’s father, Sayyid Taha I, enjoyed
a close association with the third Qajar monarch, Mohammad Shah
(r. 1834–1848), whose reign witnessed the revival of Sufi activities and the
emergence of the messianic Babi movement. The Qajar monarch granted
the Kurdish Sufi leader vast last grands (tuyul ) in western Azerbaijan.
One of Mohammad Shah’s wives, the mother of Abbas Mirza Molkara,

151 Ibid., No. 97, p. 69.

152 Buchanan, George. My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, (Devon:
A & F Publications, 2020), p. 87.
153 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman
and Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 69.
88 M. KIA

the half-brother of Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar, viewed herself as a follower

of Sayyid Taha I.
In 1880, Sheikh Ubeydullah invaded Azerbaijan at the head of a
20,000-man army. The Kurdish leader seized significant territory, sacked
several towns, and massacred thousands of the region’s Shi’i inhabi-
tants. Throughout his campaign in northwestern Iran, Sheikh Ubeydullah
employed Kurdish nationalistic discourse in his proclamations, insisting
on the principle that Kurds should be treated as a distinct people, inde-
pendent of both the Turks and the Iranians and deserving of a state of
their own. Stunned and panicked by the ferocity of Sheikh Ubeydullah’s
military campaign, the Qajar monarch, Nasser al-Din Shah, who believed
that the Kurdish leader served as a mere instrument of the Ottoman
Empire’s expansionist policies, appealed to Czarist Russia and Britain to
press the Ottoman sultan, Abdulhamid II, to withdraw his support from
the Kurdish leader.154 Under intense pressure from European powers
and forceful protest from the Iranian government, which dispatched a
20,000-man army against the Kurdish leader, the Ottomans withdrew
their support. Ubeydullah’s support among Kurdish tribes also began to
fizzle, forcing him to retreat back into Ottoman territory. In July 1881,
Ottoman authorities arrested the sheikh and sent him to Istanbul, where
he was interned together with his son, Abdul Qadir. A short time later,
however, the Kurdish sheikh escaped the Ottoman capital and returned to
Nehri, but he was arrested again. Eventually, Sheikh Ubeydullah, together
with several members of his family, was exiled to Mecca, where he died
in October 1883. Despite the demise of the sheikh, the power and the
prestige of his family persisted.
As a grandson of Sheikh Ubeydullah, and the son of Sayyid
Mohammad Sadiq, “who was the terror of the frontier until his death,”155
Sayyid Taha II was viewed by many Kurds, both in the Ottoman Empire
and in Iran, as a distinguished leader. A man of great intelligence and
considerable polish, he was described as “physically tireless…and a crack

154 The Persian sources indicate that Iranian authorities had arbitrarily seized some of
the revenue from the land the sheikh had inherited from his father in Azerbaijan, thus
antagonizing and alienating the Kurdish leader.
155 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1907 [FO 416/31–34 &
FO 371/503], Extracts from the “Times ” of September 24, 1907, “The Turco-Persian
Frontier Question,” in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 175.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 89

shot with a rifle.”156 Having received a traditional religious education,

the Sayyid was fluent in Arabic, Turkish, and Persian. He had also trav-
elled extensively in Russia, developing fluency in Russian and French as
well.157
Sayyid Taha II was, like his grandfather and father, a strong proponent
of Kurdish independence.158 He not only enjoyed a prominent religious
and spiritual status, but he was also one of the largest landowners in
northwestern Iran. In western Azerbaijan, he owned considerable prop-
erty in the rural districts of Margavar, Targavar, and Baradoost, while in
the Ottoman Empire his power and influence extended from Rawanduz in
present-day northeastern Iraq to Shamdinan in present-day southeastern
Turkey. Before the invasion of Urumiyeh by his grandfather in 1881, the
family of Sayyid Taha II had owned much more, but the Iranian govern-
ment confiscated some of their villages as a punishment for the invasion of
its territory.159 In addition to his considerable wealth, Sayyid Taha II also
enjoyed tremendous prestige and authority in western Azerbaijan because
he was connected by marriage to the chiefs of the Harki and Begzade

156 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds Turks and Arabs, p. 306.

157 Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918–1920,
p. 307.
158 For Sayyid Taha II, see, Personalities in Kurdistan published by the Civil Commis-
sioner’s Office, 1919. Confidential: Personalities Mosul, Arbil , Kirkuk, Sulaimani and
Frontiers, (Baghdad: Government Press, 1923). See also, Martin Van Bruinessen, “The
Sâdatê Nehrî or Gîlânizâde of Central Kurdistan,” in the Journal of the History of Sufism
Vol. 1–2 (2000), pp. 79–91. See also, Martin Van Bruinessen, Mullas, Sufis and Heretics:
The Role of Religion in Kurdish Society, (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2000). See also, Mehmet
Saki Çakir, Seyyid Tâhâ Hakkârî ve Nehrî Dergâhi, (Istanbul: Nizamiye Akademi, 2017).
See also, Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918–1920.
See also, Metin Atmaca, “Fragile Frontiers: Sayyid Taha and the role of Kurdish religio-
political leadership in the Ottoman East during the First World War,” Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol. 54, No. 3 (2018), pp. 361–381. See also, İhsan Şerif Kaymaz, “Britain’s
Policy toward Kurdistan at the End of the First World War,” Turkish Journal of Inter-
national Relations, www.alternativesjournal.net, Vol. 10, No. 2–3 (Summer-Fall 2011),
pp. 101–125.
159 Dickson to O’Conor, Van, December14, 1907, No. 23, Report by Vice-Consul
Dickson on his recent Journey through Turco-Persian territory, Enclosure 2 in No. 174, in
The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 265.
90 M. KIA

Kurds of Margavar and Baradoost, who were neighbors to Simko and his
Shakaks.160
The alliance between the Sayyid and Simko was sealed with the
marriage of the Shakak chief to Sayyid Taha II’s sister. Taking Sayyid Taha
II’s sister as his wife bolstered Simko’s legitimacy among the Kurdish
tribes of Iran and the Ottoman Empire. It also extended his influence
across the border into the Hakkari region of Ottoman Kurdistan. In
return, Sayyid Taha II, who had no military force of his own, could
use Simko’s army to expand his influence and implement the dream
of creating an independent Kurdish state. The partnership between the
Kurdish chief and the suave Sayyid would serve as the foundation for a
campaign to establish an independent Kurdistan after the conclusion of
the Great War in 1918.
Sayyid Taha II enjoyed a close relationship with both the Ottoman and
Russian governments. After the Young Turk regime invaded and occupied
several rural districts in western Azerbaijan in 1909, the business-savvy
Sayyid showed up in Urumiyeh to purchase or lease lands and villages
belonging to the local landowners in the areas occupied by the Turks.161
The Kurdish leader subsequently travelled to Russia, where he developed
fluency in Russian and established a close alliance with Czarist authori-
ties.162 There was at one time an idea that Sayyid Taha “might be used
as the figurehead of a nominally independent Kurdistan under Russian
auspices,”163 although Russia’s first choice for leadership of a future
Kurdish state was Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan.164
In 1912, Sayyid Taha travelled to Tiflis, where he met Abdurrezzak
Bey. Together, the two Kurdish leaders set out on a tour “among the
Kurdish tribes in the Ottoman-Iranian borderlands, heading towards

160 Correspondence respecting the Perso-Ottoman frontier, 1907 [FO 416/31–34 &
FO 371/503], Extracts from the “Times ” of September 24, 1907, “The Turco-Persian
Frontier Question,” in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol. 4, p. 175.
161 Barclay to Grey, Tehran, December 19, 1911, [1954], No. 248, Enclosure 2 in
No. 101, Joint Report by Shipley and Minorsky, in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958, Vol.
4, p. 555, and Annex 1 to Joint Report, p. 560.
162 Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918–1920,
p. 307.
163 Iraq Civil Commissioner, Wilson, Arnold Talbot and Gertrude Lowthian Bell.
Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, p. 69.
164 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman
and Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 59.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 91

Khoy” in western Azerbaijan.165 Some way into their trip, Abdurrezzak

Bey and Sayyid Taha II were joined by Simko.166 During this trip,
as Abdurrezzak Bey and Sayyid Taha were about to enter Shamdinan
in southeastern Anatolia, the two Kurdish dignitaries were arrested by
Ottoman authorities.167 On the way to Van, however, the military
unit transporting the two prisoners was attacked by a group of armed
Kurds.168 This attack allowed the two Kurdish notables to escape captivity
and seek refuge in Iran.169 The two dignitaries eventually found their
way to Saint Petersburg, where they “were honorably received by Czar
Nicholas II, who promised them money and a large number of rifles.”170
To protect himself from the Young Turk government, which had identi-
fied him as a client of Russia, Sayyid Taha II eventually settled in a village
in western Azerbaijan in close proximity to the Iranian-Ottoman frontier
and just across from his home base in Shamdinan.
During the First World War, Sayyid Taha II undermined his close ties
with the Russians by establishing contact with Ottoman authorities and
German agents. In response, the Russians, who had come to mistrust the
Kurdish leader, detained Sayyid Taha II and destroyed his house at Nehri
when they crossed the Ottoman frontier in 1916.171 The Sayyid remained
in prison until the Russian revolution of March 1917, which overthrew
the imperial regime. The upheaval in Russia allowed the Sayyid to flee
captivity and return home.172 Soon after his flight from Russia, Sayyid
Taha II arrived in Mosul in northern Iraq, agitating for a Kurdish tribal
rebellion. Toward the end of 1917, the then Russian consul in Urumiyeh
was visited by a messenger from the Istikhlas-e Kurdistan (Liberation
of Kurdistan) Society, who handed him a letter from Sayyid Taha II
requesting that the Russian diplomat arrange an interview for him with

165 Barbara Henning, Narratives of the History of the Ottoman-Kurdish Bedirhani

Family in Imperial and Post-Imperial Contexts: Continuities and Changes, p. 313.
166 Ibid.
167 Ibid.
168 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
170 Ibid., p. 314.
171 Iraq Civil Commissioner, Wilson, Arnold Talbot and Gertrude Lowthian Bell,
Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, p. 69.
172 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, No. 17, pp. 111–112.
92 M. KIA

the remaining Russian officers in order to agree on a common action

against the Turks for the liberation of Kurdistan.173 Toward the conclu-
sion of the Great War, the Kurdish leader established direct ties with
the British who were consolidating their rule over Iraq. In the Kurdish-
populated districts of northern Iraq and extending into southeastern
Anatolia, the British intended to use influential Kurdish leaders, including
Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji and Sayyid Taha II, as a means of imposing
their authority with minimum cost and conflict. Sayyid Taha was viewed
by the British authorities to be the ideal candidate to rule Rawanduz in
present-day northeastern Iraq and Shamdinan in present-day southeastern
Turkey.
Little has been written about Simko’s activities in the years before
the commencement of the First World War, when both the Ottoman
Empire and Czarist Russia tried to impose their rule in parts of north-
western Iran. The scarcity of reliable sources has led at least one scholar
to claim that “neither the Turks nor the Russians occupied Shakak lands
before the Great War,” and “Simko’s contacts with both were mainly indi-
rect.“174 The scanty sources and intelligence reports that I have used in
this chapter, however, portray Simko as a highly engaged chief, acting
first as a client of Ottoman Turks between 1905 and 1907 and later,
especially between 1908 and 1909, as a supporter and defender of the
Qajar monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah. When Ottoman troops occupied
Shakak-populated districts of Somai and Chahriq, several Shakak chiefs
collaborated directly with the invading Ottoman Turks. Simko, however,
refused to revive his alliance with Ottoman authorities. He remained
steadfast in his support for the reactionary and Russophile Mohammad
Ali Shah and the Khan of Maku, Eqbal al-Saltaneh. After Russian forces
invaded Azerbaijan in 1909, Simko gradually shifted his position and
adopted Czarist Russia as his new patron. By 1913, the Kurdish chief had
emerged as a paid instrument of Russian policy in western Azerbaijan. His
subservience to Russian authorities allowed Simko to emerge as the most
powerful Shakak chief in northwestern Iran. By serving Russian interests,
Simko tried to expand his power from Qotur over the southern sections
of the Shakak territory and regain his control over Chahriq and Somai.

173 Basile Nikitine. Les Kurdes. Étude Sociologique et Historique, p. 195.

174 Martin van Bruinessen. “Kurdish Tribes and the State of Iran: The Case of Simko’s
Revolt,” p. 383.
 3 SHAKAK TRIBE AND THE RISE OF SIMKO 93

Simko’s conduct prior to the commencement of the First World War

reveals that the Kurdish chief always operated within the framework of the
patron-client system. With every significant shift in the balance of power,
he offered his services to the highest bidder and the most formidable
power broker regardless of the ideology and religious affiliation of the
patron. When the Sunni Muslim Ottomans invaded western Azerbaijan
in 1905, Simko sought their patronage as a means of protecting himself
and his tribe against Iranian authorities who had murdered his brother. In
1907, he returned to Iran and adopted the Khan of Maku and, through
him, the Shi’i Iranian monarch, Mohammad Ali Shah, as his new patron.
In return for attacking and suppressing the constitutionalist forces in
western Azerbaijan, Simko was rewarded by his new patron with the
governorship of Qotur on the Ottoman-Iranian frontier.
In 1909, after the invasion of Azerbaijan by Russia, Simko recog-
nized that a new imperial power was supplanting both the Qajar state
and the Ottoman Empire as the supreme power in northwestern Iran.
Thus, he switched his loyalty and adopted Russia, a European Chris-
tian power, as his new patron. In return for his services, Russian officials
provided him with arms, a regular salary, and protection against both
the Ottoman Turks and the Iranian authorities. It is true that during
his tenure as a Russian client, Simko became acquainted with Kurdish
nationalistic ideas as propagated by Russian officials and promoted by
Kurdish notables in the Ottoman Empire such as Sayyid Taha II and
Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan, who were dreaming of creating a Kurdish
state under Russian protection. However, the nationalism of a Russian
client could only be a contradiction in terms because it lacked any inde-
pendence of thought and action on behalf of any Kurdish community.
Here, Kurdish nationalistic ideas were promoted not as an expression of
genuine nationalistic sentiments among a Kurdish polity, but instead as
an instrument of Russian interventionist policies, which aimed at under-
mining the security and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and
Iran. Paid functionaries of the Russian imperial establishment could hardly
be acknowledged seriously as heroes of Kurdish nationalism.
 CHAPTER 4

Simko, Competing Nationalisms,

and the Great War

In discussing Simko’s activities during the Great War, at least one scholar
has asserted that the Kurdish chief “stood aloof from the real fighting,
trying to keep all doors open, while expanding his control of the fron-
tier districts.”1 This assessment dilutes the significance of one of the most
eventful and formative periods in Simko’s political life and disregards the
devastating impact of the Kurdish chief’s activities on the urban and rural
communities of northwestern Iran. Simko used the four years of the war
profitably. In the beginning of the war, he acted as an ally of Russia.
When the Russian forces evacuated Iranian territory in early January
1915, Simko joined the Ottoman Turks, only to switch back to an alliance
with Russia when she returned and pushed the Turks out of western
Azerbaijan. He remained a client and ally of Russia until Russian troops
evacuated the Iranian territory after the victory of the 1917 Bolshevik
revolution. In March 1918, Simko murdered the Assyrian leader, Mar
Shimun. This murder ignited a civil war between the Christians (i.e.,
Assyrians and Armenians) and the Muslims (i.e., Kurds and Azerbaijani
Turks) of western Azerbaijan. Far from standing aloof, Simko used this
conflict to slaughter the Assyrian refugees who had settled in the district
of Khoy. In summer 1918, Simko once again joined the Ottoman Turks

1 Ibid., p. 384.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 95

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_4
96 M. KIA

as they invaded northwestern Iran and chased the Assyrian and Arme-
nian Christians from their ancient homeland. Thus, during the war, the
Kurdish chief remained highly active. He switched his alliances according
to the balance of military power in the region, and in the process consol-
idated his position as the most powerful Kurdish tribal chief in western
Azerbaijan.

On the Eve of the First World War

On the eve of the First World War, Simko was an obedient client of
Russia. In May 1914, several months before the eruption of hostilities,
Russian authorities organized a conference of their closest Kurdish allies.
The most prominent participant in this conference was Abdurrezzak Bey
Bedir Khan, whom the Russian authorities had selected as the leader of all
Kurdish tribes of Iran.2 Another important delegate to the conference was
Said Beyk of the Haydaranlu tribal confederation. The branches of this
tribe resided in Mush, Bayezid and Van provinces of the Ottoman Empire,
as well as in the districts of Maku and Khoy in northwestern Iran. Another
member of the Kurdish coalition was Simko.3 One of the main objectives
of the meeting was to discuss the logistics of a coordinated attack by the
Russian-funded and Russian-armed Kurdish alliance against the Ottoman
Empire. As late as August 1914, the Russians were “instructing Simko”
to “attack Ottoman border positions,”4 and the Russian consul at Khoy
was providing the Kurdish chief with money and weapons.5 The Kurdish
chief’s alliance with Russia, however, came to a sudden end after Ottoman
Turks invaded western Azerbaijan in December 1914 and the Russian
armies evacuated northwestern Iran in early January 1915.

2 Kieser, Hans-Lukas, Margaret Lavinia Anderson, Seyhan Bayraktar, and Thomas

Schmutz (eds.), The End of the Ottomans: The Genocide of 1915 and the Politics of Turkish
Nationalism, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2021), p. 70. See also, Tuncay Öğün, “Osmanli
Basininda Cihad-i Ekber: İran Örneği,” Journal of Turkology, pp. 91–114, 2018, p. 96.
3 Ibid., p. 71.
4 Ibid., 74.
5 İbrahim Ethem Atnur, “İsmail Ağa Simko’nun Aşireti, Ailesi ve Reisliğinin İlk Yılları,”
Tarihte Türkler ve Kürtler Sempozyumu/Bildiriler (Ankara, 09–10 Ocak 2014), IV, Türk
Tarih Kurumu Yayını, Ankara 2014, s. 259–280. See also, Tuncay Öğün, “Osmanli
Basininda Cihad-i Ekber: İran Örneği,” p. 96.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 97

When Russian forces withdrew from Azerbaijan and after the Ottoman
Turks occupied Urumiyeh and Tabriz in January 1915, the Kurdish chief
switched his loyalty and joined the invading Turks. Once Russian forces
returned a short time later and re-established their military dominance
in Azerbaijan, they banished Simko to Tiflis. The Kurdish chief tried
desperately to patch up his broken patron-client relationship with Russian
authorities. After a short exile in Georgia, Simko returned to Iran as a
reformed servant of his majesty, the Czar.
The arrival of thousands of Assyrian and Armenian refugees from the
Ottoman Empire and the formation of Assyrian and Armenian armed
bands in western Azerbaijan radically transformed the balance of power in
favor of the Christian communities of the region. With significant backing
from Czarist authorities, Assyrians, under the leadership of Mar Shimun,
embarked on a campaign to lay the foundation of an autonomous
enclave in northwestern Iran under Russian protection. The departure
of Russian troops from Iran in 1917 orphaned the Assyrian and Arme-
nian communities and exposed them to attacks from the Ottoman Turks
and pro-Ottoman Kurdish tribal chiefs.
After Russian troops withdrew from Iran, Simko collaborated with
British military and intelligence officers, who tried to form an anti-
Ottoman coalition that incorporated armed Assyrian and Armenian
bands, as well as the Shakak Kurds. Though he expressed his commit-
ment to join the British, Assyrians, and Armenians in a united front
against the Ottoman Turks, Simko stabbed his potential allies in the back
when he assassinated the Assyrian leader, Mar Shimun, in March 1918.
When Ottoman Turks invaded Iran in summer 1918, Simko joined the
invaders and participated in attacks against the fleeing Assyrian and Arme-
nian refugees, who were trying to reach the British line of defense at
Hamadan in western Iran. By late October 1918, when the First World
War ended in the Middle East, Simko had emerged as the only survivor of
a bloody conflict that had resulted into the destruction of the Assyrian and
Armenian communities of northwestern Iran. The actions of the Kurdish
chief were motivated not only by self-preservation, but also by a deep
sense of fear and hatred for the Armenian and Assyrian Christians. Simko
believed that the Assyrian community, in particular, was planning to estab-
lish an independent or autonomous enclave in western Azerbaijan with
assistance from western powers. Simko feared that the establishment of
such an Assyrian entity would result in the Kurds living as a persecuted
minority. This would have left the Kurds a vulnerable minority in an area
98 M. KIA

governed by Assyrians. The name of the game was survival at any cost,
and if survival meant switching sides in accordance with the change in the
tide of the war and selling one’s services to the highest and most powerful
bidder, so be it. The game of survival was, however, played with an eye
on the rising nationalistic activities of the two communities the Kurdish
chief feared and resented the most, the Assyrians and the Armenians.

Simko, Russian Evacuation & Ottoman Invasion

In Iran, even before the commencement of the First World War, violence
had erupted between Assyrian and Armenian armed bands backed by
Russia, and Kurdish tribal units armed by Ottoman Turks. The Russian
strategy was to manipulate anti-Turkish sentiments among Armenians and
Assyrians to undermine Ottoman rule and incite the Christian communi-
ties of the Ottoman Empire as well as pro-Russia Kurdish chiefs, such
as Simko, to rebel against Turkish authorities. The Turks, on the other
hand, exploited pan-Islamism and the status of the Ottoman sultan as
the caliph of all Sunni Muslims to mobilize Kurdish tribal groups of
eastern Anatolia and western Azerbaijan against Russia and its Arme-
nian and Assyrian allies. In Russian-occupied Azerbaijan, Kurdish tribal
chiefs financed and armed by Ottoman Turks rallied to the flag of Jihad
(Holy War) and embarked on a campaign of terror against Assyrian
and Armenian communities. In response, Assyrian and Armenian Chris-
tians organized their own militias backed by Russia and attacked Muslim
villages. Unlike the majority of the Kurdish chiefs of western Azerbaijan,
Simko remained loyal to his Russian employers and attacked “Ottoman
targets.”6 At the time clashes between Russian forces and pro-Ottoman
Kurds were escalating. The Russian governor-general of the Caucasus,
Vorontsov-Dashkov, ordered the Russian army to “punish the Kurds
mercilessly, not neglecting the most extreme measures, especially toward
the leaders.”7
During the Great War, Azerbaijan emerged as a battleground between
the armies of Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire. On October 29,
1914, the Ottoman Empire opened hostilities against Czarist Russia by

6 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and
Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 118.
7 Ibid.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 99

attacking the Russian Black Sea fleet. On 2 November, Russia declared

war on the Ottoman Empire. Even before Russia entered the war, Iran
had declared its neutrality on 1 November in a royal decree signed by
the eighteen-year-old Qajar monarch, Ahmad Shah, but the weak Qajar
state was unable to enforce the neutrality of its territory. The Iranian
government also “asked Russia to withdraw her troops from Azerbaijan
and elsewhere,” a request which the Czarist regime turned down.8
At the commencement of the First World War in the summer of
1914, Russia was in occupation of Azerbaijan and its main urban centers,
including Tabriz, Khoy, Maku, Salmas, and Urumiyeh. In late summer
1914, as the war got underway, cross frontier skirmishes erupted between
the Ottoman and Russian forces and their local proxies. Inside “Russian-
occupied Iran, Kurdish bands encouraged by Ottoman propaganda for
holy war against infidels began burning churches and wreaking havoc.”9
At the very same time, Assyrian and Armenian communities formed
their own militias, while “Russian-backed Kurds, including those led by
Simko,” and the “gangs of the Assyrian Agha Petros” began to attack
Ottoman targets.10 In the latter part of December 1914, an Ottoman
Turkish army backed by Kurdish irregular units from the Mangur,
Mamash, and Dehbokri tribes defeated the Shahseven tribal chief and the
Russian client, Shoja’a al-Dowleh, near Maragheh east of Lake Urumiyeh.
This victory allowed the Ottomans to advance northward toward the
provincial capital of Tabriz. About the same time, a large Turkish army
under the direct command of Enver Pasha invaded the southern Caucasus
through Kars in eastern Anatolia. The Ottoman Third Army, however,
suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Russians at Sarikamish on
the road to Kars. Out of 118,174 active Ottoman troops on 22 December
only 42,000 survived by the time the campaign ended in early January.11
Though he had inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Ottoman forces
at Sarikamish, General Alexander Myshlayevsky, the deputy commander

8 Townley to Grey, Tehran, January 16, 1915, Persia Confidential, [17798], No. 112.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 5, p. 662.
9 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and
Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 118.
10 Ibid.
11 See Mesut Uyar, “Ottoman Strategy and War Aims During the First World War,” in
Herausgegeben von Holger Afflerbach (ed.), Purpose of the First World War: War Aims
and Military Strategies, (De Gruyter Oldenbourg; Digital Original Edition, 2015), p. 174.
100 M. KIA

of Russia’s Caucasian Army, was panicked by the advance of the Ottoman

force approaching Tabriz. He ordered the evacuation of Russian troops
from Tabriz and Urumiyeh because he believed that he did not have
adequate troops to defend Russian positions in Azerbaijan against the
advancing Ottoman forces from the south. On 2 January, Russian troops
evacuated Urumiyeh. A day later, Russian forces abandoned Salmas.
According to the New York Times, when it became known on the night
of 2 January that the Russian forces were evacuating Urumiyeh “about
10,000 Christians fled, most of them without money, bedding, or provi-
sions.”12 The majority of the fleeing Assyrians and Armenians started
out on foot, “through mud knee-deep, across the mountain passes in
freezing weather.”13 At Dilman they were joined by many more from
the district of Salmas.14 An American diplomat stationed in Azerbaijan at
the time wrote that the entire northern section of the Urumiyeh plain
learned of the withdrawal of the Russian troops about 10:00 p.m. on
the night of Saturday, January 2, 1915.15 By midnight the exodus of the
entire Christian population had commenced, and by the next morning
the Christian villages of the region “were practically deserted.”16 About
one-third of the Assyrian population of Urumiyeh and Salmas abandoned
their homes and fled with the Russian army toward southern Caucasus.17
Hundreds of Assyrians, mostly women and children, who had attached
themselves to the retreating Russian forces, “perished by the roadside”
from freezing temperatures, hunger, and exposure.18 Many Assyrians
and Armenians, who did not follow the Russian troops in their retreat
flocked into Urumiyeh and sought refuge at the American Presbyterian
Missionary and the French Catholic Mission in the hope that the Stars

12 New York Times, Dilman, Persia, April 24, (via Petrograd to London, April 26),
1915.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 “First Exodus from Urmia, January 1915: Report Dated 1st March, 1915, from the
Reverend Robert M. Labaree of the American Mission Station at Tabriz to the Hon. F.
Willoughey Smith, U.S. Consul at Tiflis,” in Viscount Bryce., The Treatment of Armenians
in the Ottoman Empire 1915–16, p. 105.
16 Ibid.
17 Naayem, Joseph. Shall This Nation Die? (New York: Chaldean Rescue, 1921),
p. 269.
18 Ibid.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 101

and Stripes or the Tricolor would protect them from the invading Turks
and their Kurdish allies. According to one source who worked at the time
in Urumiyeh, “when the troubles began, the total Christian population,
including a thousand refugee families of mountaineers, was about thirty-
three thousand,” but “after exodus to Russia approximately twenty-five
thousand remained.”19
On 4 January, an Ottoman army entered Urumiyeh. The town
remained under Turkish rule until May 15, 1915.20 Meanwhile, on 5
January, the Russian forces began to evacuate Tabriz. A day later on
6 January, the Russian consul general left the city and “withdrew to
Russia.”21 Two days later, on 8 January, an Ottoman army entered
Tabriz. The sudden Russian withdrawal and the arrival of Ottoman forces
inspired Russia’s “erstwhile ally” Simko to switch his loyalty and join the
“ranks of the Ottoman force.”22 The Kurdish chief viewed the Russian
military withdrawal from Urumiyeh and Tabriz as a sign of weakness.
Further, it provided him with an opportunity to attack and plunder
Assyrian and Armenian communities of the region after several years of
restraining himself due to his alliance with Russian authorities in western
Azerbaijan. With blessing and support from his newly adopted patrons,
the Ottoman Turks, Simko took the field and embarked on a devastating
campaign to sack towns and villages west of Lake Urumiyeh.23
During the Turkish occupation of western Azerbaijan, Ottoman and
Kurdish troops, including Simko’s Shakak fighters, committed horrific
outrages against the local population, especially the Assyrian commu-
nities. Christian populated villages were looted and burned down,

19 Shedd, Mary Lewis. The Measure of A Man: The Life of William Ambrose Shedd
Missionary to Persia, (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1922), p. 152.
20 Viscount Bryce., The Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire 1915–16, p. 99.
21 Townley to Grey, Tehran, January 16, 1915, Persia Confidential, [17798], No. 12.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 5, p. 662. See also, Marling to Grey, Tehran,
December 5, 1915, Persia Confidential, [19857], No. 157., Iran Political Diaries 1881–
1965. Volume 5, p. 723.
22 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and
Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 126.
23 Allen, William Edward David & Paul Muratoff., Caucasian Battlefields: A History of
the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828–1921, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), p. 296.
102 M. KIA

and “a large number of their inhabitants” were murdered.24 Hundreds

of women and girls “were violated, about a thousand Christians were
killed, and four thousand died of disease.”25 According to one source,
twenty percent of the Assyrian population in west Azerbaijan perished
in the five months the Turks and their Kurdish allies occupied the
area west of Lake Urumiyeh.26 According to one source, at the town
of Haftevan in the district of Salmas, 800 “Christian men and boys
were tortured, and hacked to pieces.”27 According to the same source,
before evacuating Salmas, the retreating Turks “ruthlessly mutilated and
destroyed the French Catholic Mission” in Khosrowabad.28 One of the
chief perpetrators of the plunders and massacres in the district of Salmas
was Simko. After pillaging Patehvir/Patavour, Simko adopted the village
as his residence during the Ottoman occupation of Salmas.29
Beginning in late spring 1915, Simko also had the opportunity to
watch closely the Ottoman military operations against the Armenian
population in eastern Anatolia. Shortly after the commencement of the
First World War, many Armenian officers and soldiers serving in the
Ottoman army defected, joining the Russian army with the hope that
the defeat and collapse of Ottoman power would allow them to fulfill
their dream of establishing an independent Armenian state. The defec-
tions were followed by an uprising of the Armenians in the city of Van in
eastern Anatolia in April 1915. Alarmed by the spread of the Armenian
nationalist movement, a small inner circle within the highest echelons of
the Ottoman state, known as Special Organization (Teshkilat-e Mahsusa),
designed and implemented the plan for removal of the entire Armenian
population in order to affect a “permanent solution” to the question of
Armenian nationalism in Ottoman lands. In accordance with the orders
issued by this inner circle, the Ottoman state adopted a policy of forcibly
relocating the Armenian population to the Syrian desert.

24 Ahmad, Kamal Madhar. Kurdistan During the First World War, Translated by Ali
Maher Ibrahim, (London: Saqi Books, 1994), p. 97.
25 Mary Lewis Shedd, The Measure of A Man: The Life of William Ambrose Shedd
Missionary to Persia, p. 152.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 192.
28 Ibid., p. 191.
29 Joseph Naayem, Shall This Nation Die? p. 272.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 103

Beginning in May 1915, virtually the entire Armenian population

of central and eastern Anatolia was removed from their ancient home.
This policy was then replicated in western Anatolia. Hundreds of thou-
sands of Armenians, and according to some, nearly 1.5 million human
beings perished from starvation, disease, and exposure. Many were raped,
robbed, and murdered by Ottoman army units and irregular Kurdish regi-
ments. On numerous occasions, Kurdish tribal chiefs completed massacres
initiated by the Ottoman troops. Simko was one of the tribal leaders who
ordered his men to lie in ambush at the Qotur pass on the Ottoman-
Iranian frontier and wait for Armenian refugees who had escaped death.
Surprising the battered and bruised Armenian deportees, Simko’s men
“put them to death in a new massacre.”30
While Simko was busy attacking and massacring the fleeing Armenian
population, his eldest son was destroying Assyrian villages and churches
in the Hakkari region of southeastern Anatolia, especially in the district of
Jilu west of the Iranian-Ottoman frontier. According to one source, the
young Shakak Agha, who served as one of the leaders of armed Kurdish
bands looting Assyrian rural communities in Jilu, had proclaimed “that he
would not rest till he had seen the ruin of every Christian church in the
land.”31 As he stood at the door of the Church of “Mar Zeia” watching
the destruction and the removal of the plunder, “a bullet fired at extreme
range took him in the head.”32
The Turkish occupation of Azerbaijan proved to be short-lived. On
January 30, 1915, Russian forces re-captured Tabriz.33 Another Russian
army unit captured Khoy and began to push south toward Dilman in the
district of Salmas. Simko, who had joined the invading Ottoman armies,
honored his alliance with the Turks and fought the Russian forces south
of Khoy. The Russian army nevertheless quickly overcame the Kurds.34

30 Alaauddin Sijjadi. Kurdish Revolutions, Kurds and the Iraqi Republic (in Kurdish),
Baghdad 1959, pp. 251–254, as quoted in Kamal Madhar Ahmad, Kurdistan During the
First World War, p. 156.
31 W. A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern Kurdistan, p. 370.
32 Ibid.
33 Eagleton, William J., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, (London: Oxford University
Press, 1963), p. 9.
34 Kinnane, Derk. The Kurds and Kurdistan, (London: Oxford University Press, 1970),
p. 46.
104 M. KIA

Simko’s tribal force was no match for the much larger and far better-
equipped Russian army. On 6 March, a Russian army backed by Armenian
and Assyrian units drove the Ottoman Turks and their Kurdish allies out
of Dilman.35 Simko had no alternative but to retreat to his stronghold
along the Iranian-Ottoman frontier.36
Shortly after Russian troops occupied Dilman, reports of the destruc-
tion of numerous Christian villages in Dilman and Urumiyeh, whose
inhabitants had been massacred by Kurds, began to reach Tabriz and
Tehran.37 The same reports also indicated that some ten thousand
Assyrian Christians had fled Turkish territory for Iran.38 Russian armies
pushing farther south from Dilman, forced the Turks to evacuate
Urumiyeh on 15 May. Nine days later, on Sunday, 24 May, the advanced
guard of the Russian army entered the town and by the end of the
next day, 15 May, Urumiyeh was under full Russian occupation.39 In
November 1915, Russian forces advanced from Urumiyeh to Savojbo-
lagh, where they raped and massacred a large segment of the town’s
Kurdish population.40 During the First World War, Savojbolagh changed
hands between the Russians and Ottoman Turks eight times, gaining
notoriety as the Iranian town most victimized and vandalized by foreign
troops.41
During their occupation of Urumiyeh and Salmas, Russian military
authorities imposed an informal truce on the warring Kurds and Assyr-
ians. Under Russian protection, the Assyrian communities west of Lake

35 Imperial War Museum, Operations in Persia, 1914–1919, (London: Her Majesty’s

Stationary Office, 1987), p. 59.
36 Eagleton, William J., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, p. 9.
37 Imperial War Museum, Operations in Persia, 1914–1919, p. 59.
38 Ibid.
39 Kamal Madhar Ahmad, Kurdistan During the First World War, p. 97. See also,
Eagleton, William J., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, p. 9. Mary Schauffler Platt, The War
Journal of a Missionary in Persia. (New York: The Board of Foreign Missions of the
Presbyterian Church, 1915), p. 49.
40 Imperial War Museum, Operations in Persia, 1914–1919, p. 126. See also, Ismail
Shams, “Ta’asir-e Monazeat-e Russiyeh va Osmani bar Vazeiyat-e Savojbolagh (Mahabad-
e Konuni) dar Jang-e Jahani-ye Avval ba Takiyeh bar Matbuat va Asnad,” Tarikh Nameh-ye
Iran-e Ba’ad az Islam, Year 13, No. 32, Autumn 1401, pp. 51–76, pp. 61–62.
41 Ismail Shams, “Ta’asir-e Monazeat-e Russiyeh va Osmani bar Vazeiyat-e Savojbolagh
(Mahabad Konuni),” pp. 51–76, p. 51.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 105

Urumiyeh grew in size, confidence, and military capability, as thousands

of Assyrians from the Hakkari region of southeastern Anatolia fled their
homes and sought refuge in northwestern Iran.

Assyrian Refugees Arrive in Western Azerbaijan

With the commencement of the First World War, the Russian government
adopted a policy of destabilizing the Ottoman Empire by encouraging the
Assyrians of southeastern Anatolia to revolt. To ensure an Assyrian revolt
against the Ottoman state, the Russian authorities promised arms and
logistical support to the Assyrian community in Hakkari. The commander
of Russian forces in Azerbaijan, Lieutenant General Chernozubov, wrote
a letter to Mar Shimun, the Patriarch of the Assyrian Church of the
East, and requested Assyrian participation in military operations against
Ottoman armies in eastern Anatolia and northwestern Iran. In response,
Mar Shimun travelled to Salmas to meet the Russian general and request
direct military assistance.
Already in August 1914, before the eruption of open warfare,
the Ottoman government had become increasingly concerned about a
possible alliance between Russia and the Assyrian leadership. The Turkish
governor of Van requested a meeting with Mar Shimun. During this
meeting, the Ottoman official promised that his government would
provide assistance to the Assyrian community if the Assyrian leadership
remained neutral and refused to join Russia in the impending war.42
Mar Shimun responded that his attitude was conditioned by the actions
of the Turks toward the Christian population, and that he could not
commit himself to a policy of neutrality until he consulted with the
leaders of his community.43 Between August and October, the clashes
between Kurds and Assyrians in southeastern Anatolia intensified, and
any chance of reconciliation between the Ottoman government and the
Assyrian community faded. The Assyrian leadership was convinced that
the attacks waged by the Kurds enjoyed the blessing of Turkish authori-
ties, and that they were, in fact, an integral part of a larger campaign to
cleanse eastern Anatolia of its Christian population.

42 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun. Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar Shimun,
(London: The Faith Press, 1920), pp. 77–78.
43 Ibid., p. 78.
106 M. KIA

Once the Ottoman Empire entered the war in November 1914, all
semblance of law and order vanished in the Hakkari region of south-
eastern Anatolia. Angered by repeated attacks waged by pro-Ottoman
Kurdish tribes against Assyrian mountain communities, alarmed by the
systematic massacre of Armenians of eastern Anatolia, and emboldened by
the initial successes of the Russian armies against Ottoman forces in the
winter of 1915, the Assyrians began to contemplate a revolt against the
Ottoman state.44 With Kurdish raids against Assyrian populated districts
increasing, and the city of Van falling into the hands of Russian forces in
spring 1915, Mar Shimun concluded that the Assyrian community had
no alternative but to throw in its lot with the Triple Entente against
the Ottoman state.45 Thus, on 10 May, the Assyrian leader called his
people to arms.46 He sent a formal declaration of war to the governor
of Van, informing the Turkish official that the six Assyrian districts of
“Tiari, Tkhoma, Jilu, Baz, Ishtazin,” and “Dizan felt obliged to sever
their political relations with the Ottoman government.”47
Instead of fulfilling her pledge, Russia failed to provide Mar Shimun
and his followers with any military assistance. The failure of Russia
to arm its Assyrian allies allowed Ottoman forces backed by irregular
Kurdish units to intensify their attacks on Assyrian positions. For nearly
six months, Assyrians defended their villages against relentless assaults
by Turks and their Kurdish allies. In October 1915, when they found
themselves hard pressed and running out of ammunition, the Assyrian
fighters abandoned their villages en masse and fled eastward, coming
down to northwestern Iran and joining their co-religionists on the plains
of Urumiyeh and Salmas. By then, the Assyrians had lost thousands
of men, women, and children to fighting, illness, and famine.48 The
Russians, who were in control of the region, dispersed the newly arrived
Assyrians in various Christian and Muslim villages in the districts of Khoy,

44 Silverfarb, Daniel. Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986), p. 33.
45 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally: A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great
War, p. 15.
46 Ibid.
47 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun. Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar Shimun,
p. 84.
48 Ibid., p. 89.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 107

Salmas, and Urumiyeh.49 Thus, some 25,000 Assyrian Christians “fearful

of sharing the fate of the Armenians” settled in western Azerbaijan, almost
“doubling” the population of the region’s Assyrian community.50 These
Assyrians, commonly referred to as the Jilu, displayed a striking resem-
blance to the nomadic Kurds. After crossing the border into Iran, the
armed and battle-hardened Assyrians embarked on a campaign of “well-
arranged raids” against the Kurdish tribes of the Hakkari region, but also
against “the nomadic Harki [the allies of Simko],…acquiring quite a lot
of sheep.”51 They also carried out plundering raids in the neighborhood
of Urumiyeh.52
From among the displaced Assyrians of Hakkari, Russia organized
two battalions of the Assyrian mountaineers, who were placed under
the command of Russian officers. A third battalion was added later
and “organized under the special command of the Assyrian Patriarch,”
Mar Shimun.53 These regiments fought under overall Russian command,
and they were “utilized” as auxiliaries of the Russian army on expedi-
tions against both Turks and Kurds until the dissolution of the Russian
Empire in 1917.54 For his unshakable alliance with Russia, Mar Shimun
was invited to Tiflis, Georgia, where he received “a special telegram of
congratulations” from Czar Nicholas II.55 The Assyrian leader was also
decorated with the Order of St. Anna by the Grand Duke Nicholas Niko-
laevich, a grandson of Emperor Nicholas I and the commander-in-chief of
Russian forces in the Caucasus region.56 Aside from Russian authorities,

49 Ibid.
50 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 50. See also William
A. Shedd’s Forward to Mary Schauffler Platt (ed.), The War Journal of a Missionary in
Persia. (New York: The Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church, 1915).
51 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally: A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great
War, p. 33.
52 W. A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern Kurdistan, p. 376.
53 Austin, H. H., The Baqubah Refugee Camp, (London: The Faith Press, 1920), p. 23.
See also, H. H. Austin, Introductory Letter to W.A. Wigram, in Our Smallest Ally: A
Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great War, p. ii.
54 Ibid. See also, H. H. Austin, Introductory Letter to W.A. Wigram, in Our Smallest
Ally: A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great War, p. ii.
55 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun, Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar Shimun,
p. 89.
56 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally: A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great
War, p. 35.
108 M. KIA

Mar Shimun also enjoyed the moral and humanitarian support “of the
American missionaries, who had been there for many decades endeavoring
to convert the Nestorian Christians to Protestantism.”57
The arrival of the Assyrians of the Hakkari region of southeastern
Anatolia and their close alliance with Czarist Russia aroused the trepi-
dation of the Kurdish tribal chiefs of northwestern Iran, especially Simko.
The Shakak chief viewed the influx of thousands of armed Jilu Assyrians
as an invasion of his territory by an alien Christian community. Kurdish
leaders such as Simko were convinced that the Assyrians aspired to create
their own autonomous or independent state under the protection of
western powers. Under this Assyrian state, the Kurds could be turned
into second-class subjects.58
With the expulsion of Turkish forces and the re-imposition of Russian
rule over the entire territory of western Azerbaijan, Simko had no alterna-
tive but to swallow his hatred for the Assyrians and Armenians and submit
to Russian authorities. The re-occupation of the region by Russian troops
forced Simko to stop his attacks against the Assyrians and once again
switch his loyalty from the Young Turks to the Russian Czar. To appease
the Russian authorities and to demonstrate his fidelity to the Russian state,
at least on one occasion, he detained an anti-Russian Iranian Azerbaijani
fighter, Bakhshali Khan, who was staying with him as a guest.59 Simko
ultimately handed Bakhshali Khan to the Russians, who executed the ill-
fated Azerbaijani in Khoy.60 In return for his betrayal of Bakhshali Khan,
the Kurdish chief requested a pardon for his collaboration with Ottoman
Turks.61 Because Simko had joined the Ottoman Turks in their fight
against Russian forces, and since the Kurdish chief had played a central
role in murdering “1,000 innocent persons,” mostly Assyrians, in Salmas,

57 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 50.

58 See for example, Sayyid Taha’s statement to a British officer in northern Iraq
regarding the political objectives of Assyrians. See Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan:
Experiences of a Political Officer 1918–1920, p. 308.
59 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, pp. 454–455.
60 Ibid. See also, Mehdi Malekzadeh, Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Mashrutiyat-e Iran, Volume
7, pp. 1598–1599.
61 Ibid., p. 455.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 109

during the Ottoman occupation, the Russians arrested him and banished
him to Georgia.62
Recognizing that a large segment of Ottoman troops operating in
Iran consisted of Kurdish irregular units, and to counter the pan-Islamic
propaganda disseminated by the Turks, the Russian authorities quickly
modified their anti-Kurdish stance and re-established close working rela-
tionships with Kurdish tribal chiefs on the Iranian-Ottoman frontier. In
pursuit of this policy, the Russian government released Simko, “with
whom they began to cooperate for the sake of their ‘higher’ aims, which
dictated giving him the meagre monthly allowance of 5,000 gold rubles
after he was set free.”63 Thus, Simko was converted yet again into a hired
client of an imperial power, this time, Czarist Russia, with a fixed monthly
salary. Though deeply hostile to the newly arrived Assyrian refugees from
southeastern Anatolia, Simko maintained a neutral attitude toward them
after his return to Chahriq, knowing full well that he could not afford to
jeopardize his relationship with Russian authorities.

An Assyrian-Armenian-Kurdish Line of Defense

The abdication of Czar Nicholas II on March 15, 1917, followed by
the Bolshevik Revolution on 7 November of the same year (the October
Revolution by the old Russian calendar) had a profound impact on the
situation inside Iran. The Bolshevik seizure of power and the ensuing
withdrawal of Russian troops from Iran gave rise to great hopes among
many Iranians that their country would regain its true independence. The
European power that had dominated Iran for more than a century and
had partitioned the country in collaboration with Britain in 1907, had
collapsed.
The effects of the first Russian revolution of March 1917 were soon
evident on the discipline of the Russian troops in Iran, “where they looted
successively the bazaars of Qazvin, Hamadan, and Urumiyeh.”64 While
the Russian troops were looting freely wherever they passed, the specter
of famine was hanging over the land, northwestern Iran was threatened

62 Kamal Madhar Ahmad, Kurdistan During the First World War, p. 97. See also, Maria
T. O’Shea. Trapped Between the Map and Reality Geography and Perceptions of Kurdistan,
(London: Routledge, 2004), p. 100.
63 Ibid., p. 98.
64 Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 5, p. 797.
110 M. KIA

by an Ottoman invasion, the revolt in the Caspian province of Gilan

was spreading, and the Iranian government lacked an adequate armed
force that could ensure law and order.65 Initially, the new Russian provi-
sional government continued to adhere to all its previous agreements with
Britain, and Vladimir Minorsky, the then acting head of the Russian diplo-
matic mission in Iran, resumed work on his special project of creating
two “autonomous democratic republics” out of Iranian Azerbaijan and
Kurdistan.66 This project curiously resembled Stalin’s plan for Iran after
the end of Second World War, when, with the direct support of the Soviet
authorities, Sayyid Jafar Pishevari founded the Autonomous Republic of
Azerbaijan based in Tabriz (September 1945), and Qazi Mohammad
established the Republic of Mahabad (January 1946).
In the weeks following the collapse of the Czarist regime, the large
Russian army occupying vast swaths of territory in Iran became demor-
alized and eventually degenerated into bands of marauders. Throughout
the spring and summer of 1917, Russian forces abandoned their trenches,
disobeying their superiors, and on some occasions, murdering their
commanders.67 In June 1917, Russian Cossack officers and soldiers
stationed in Isfahan “took to highway robbery,” and the country around
the city “was overrun by hordes of robbers.”68 The Russian troops in
northwestern Iran still retained their position though they were no longer
receiving either pay or food regularly.69 Their consequent lack of disci-
pline and loss of morale, however, gradually rendered them of such little
fighting value that by the middle of October all that the British could
hope was that they would not evacuate Iran.70
With the victory of the Bolshevik revolution, all semblance of disci-
pline vanished. Between December 1917 and March 1918, most Russian
troops evacuated Iranian territory though some Czarist officers and
commanders remained in Iran and entered British military service. As

65 Ibid.
66 The material is available in Minorsky’s private correspondence with the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See, Denis V. Volkov, Russia’s Turn to Persia: Orientalism in
Diplomacy and Intelligence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 112.
67 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azarbaijan, p. 706.
68 Sykes, Percy. A History of Persia, 2 Volumes, (London: Macmillan & Co Ltd, 1958),
Volume II, p. 486.
69 Imperial War Museum, Operations in Persia, 1914–1919, p. 255.
70 Ibid.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 111

they embarked on their journey back to their country, Russian soldiers

and officers destroyed villages and small towns, especially in Hamadan,
Kermanshah, Kurdistan and Azerbaijan.71 No one, especially no woman,
was safe from molestation at the hands of the Russian soldiers, who pulled
down houses to secure food and fuel.72 Many Russian soldiers and offi-
cers sold their arms to the highest bidder, frequently tribal chiefs such
as Simko, who wished to augment the military capability of their armies.
The Russian army units also left behind large stockpiles of arms, ammu-
nition, and military equipment, including cannons and machine guns in
Tabriz and the port of Sharafkhaneh on the northeastern shore of Lake
Urumiyeh. One knowledgeable Iranian source claimed that the departing
Russian troops had left behind 100,000 rifles, a significant number of
machine guns, a large quantity of munitions, and even long-range moun-
tain cannons.73 Most of these were snatched up by tribal groups in
Azerbaijan, including Simko’s Shakaks. The militarization of the country
bolstered the position of tribal chiefs vis-à-vis the government in Tehran.
Armed tribal groups, which already enjoyed autonomous status, could
now demand full independence from a government that could not even
defend its own capital.
The departure of Russian forces from Iran exposed the Black Sea-
Baghdad line of defense, especially south Caucasus and Azerbaijan, to
an Ottoman invasion. To buttress the collapsing front and block German
designs on India, the British tried to induce armed Armenian and Assyrian
groups to join in a united front and defend northwestern Iran against
the impending Turkish attack. Between the Assyrians, based in Urumiyeh
and Salmas, and the Armenians in the Van region, lay the territory of the
Shakak Kurds. The “allied liaison officers conceived the notion that these
three elements might be combined into a coherent line of defense.”74
A British scheme proposed by General Offley Shore of the Mesopotamia
Expeditionary Force called for the creation of a new alliance between the
Armenians of Van, the Assyrians of Urumiyeh and Salmas, and “a Kurdish
chief whose territory consisted of the range of mountains separating those

71 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azarbaijan, pp. 705–724.

72 Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, Volume II, p. 486.
73 Jahanbani, Amanollah., Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, (Tehran: Ferdows
Publisher, 2001), p. 232.
74 W. A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind: Life in Eastern Kurdistan, p. 378.
112 M. KIA

two lake basins.”75 This Kurdish Agha was none other than Simko, the
paramount chief of the Shakak, who maintained a cordial relationship with
British officials and intelligence officers. Of all Kurdish chiefs in the region
lying west of Lake Urumiyeh and east of Lake Van, Simko seemed to be
the most formidable.
The Armenian commander in Van expressed his opposition to an
alliance with Simko because “he had the deepest suspicion of the Kurd’s
good faith, but he was overruled” by General Shore.76 The British
dispatched an Intelligence Service officer, Captain George Gracey, to
Simko’s stronghold at Chahriq to negotiate with the Kurdish chief.77
Gracey, who was at the time attached to the British Military Mission
at Tiflis, had arrived “in the autumn of 1917” to “mobilize Armenians,
Assyrians, and Kurds, to defend part of the front between the Black Sea
and Baghdad,” and “form an army which would stop the advance of the
Turks from Mosul” in northern Iraq.78 Initially, Gracey’s intention was to
form this army from among the existing Assyrian armed bands and to this
end he “held several meetings with the Assyrians; the last of these being in
the house of the Mar Shimun, the spiritual leader of the Assyrians.”79 The
meeting “was attended by Russian, French, and U.S. consular officers.”80
According to a report of the meeting:

The gist of the whole discussion directed to a mutual understanding having

two points in view. First that the Assyrians should furnish men to make the

75 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally: A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great
War, pp. 35–36.
76 Ibid., pp. 36–37.
77 Ibid., p. 37. See also, John Fisher, “Man on the Spot: Captain George Gracey and
the British Policy towards the Assyrians, 1917–45.” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 44, No.
2, 215–235. According to John Fisher, Gracey was a former missionary who had worked
in Urfa in southeastern Anatolia, developing fluency in Turkish and Armenian, as well
as limited fluency in Kurdish and Russian. He had also served with the British Military
Mission at Tiflis as a Special Intelligence Officer. In 1918, he had been dispatched on a
special mission to combat Ottoman propaganda among Kurdish tribes, which may have
brought him into contact with Simko. He had then worked for the Foreign Office as
British Commissioner at Erivan.
78 John Fisher, “Man on the Spot: Captain George Gracey and the British Policy
towards the Assyrians,” p. 219.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 113

fighting force and to protect the Salmas, Urumia [sic] and Solduz front
until the arrival of the Allied army. Second that the Allies take it upon
themselves to furnish money, munitions, officers and an adequate force.81

Gracey found the Assyrians divided,82 but the fallback position of

creating a combined Assyrian-Armenian-Kurdish force remained viable.
The British intelligence officer enjoyed a close friendship with Simko and
was intimately familiar with Kurdish tribal politics.83 Accompanied by
Lieutenant Robert McDowell, an American missionary, who had worked
with him on intelligence duties,84 Gracey travelled to Chahriq to meet
with the Shakak chief.85
As a shrewd tactician, Simko was well aware that he had to collaborate
with British authorities, who in the absence of Russia, had emerged as the
only power broker in Iran. However, if he was to retain his position as the
most powerful Kurdish tribal chief in western Azerbaijan, Simko had to
counter the threat posed by the armed Assyrians led by Mar Shimun and
the Council of Assyrian Christians, which controlled Urumiyeh after the
withdrawal of Russian forces. The Kurdish chief was also cognizant of the
fact that any British-backed alliance with the Assyrians could undermine
his ties with the Ottoman Turks and the Kurdish tribes on both sides of
the Iranian-Ottoman border, especially his close allies, the Harki chiefs
of the districts of Margavar and Targavar, who had always been hostile
toward the Jilu Assyrians of southeastern Anatolia.86
Though Simko despised Armenians and Assyrians and vehemently
opposed the idea of an alliance with them, he was determined to ascertain
the exact details of the British plan. Thus, the Kurdish chief concealed his
actual feelings and pretended that he was fully committed to coopera-
tion with the two Christian communities. During his negotiations with
Gracey, Simko expressed his readiness to join the anti-Ottoman alliance,

81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 Norman Solhkhah (ed.), The Assyrian Martyr Mar Benjamin Shimun Patriarch of
the Church of the East, (Chicago: The Assyrian Genocide Studies, 2008), p. 10.
84 John Fisher, “Man on the Spot: Captain George Gracey and the British Policy
towards the Assyrians,” p. 230.
85 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally: A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great
War, p. 37.
86 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 53.
114 M. KIA

swearing on the Quran “to fight for English, Kurds and Armenians in
fellowship with Mar Shimun,” whom he referred to as the “honorary
head of Kurdistan.”87
On learning about the British scheme, Mar Shimun agreed to join
the anti-Ottoman front, though he confessed to Gracey that he shared
the Armenian leader’s suspicion and doubts regarding Simko’s honesty.88
In response, the British officer reportedly told Mar Shimun: “Well, you
probably would do well not to trust him too far; but if you and the Arme-
nians work together, then you have him [Simko] between the jaws of your
pincers, and he can do little harm.”89 As the events that followed would
demonstrate, the grave doubts expressed by Mar Shimun were more than
justified. Simko, “who had been given a most exaggerated idea of his
own importance by a rather ill-timed visit of some French officers after
the agreement had been made by Gracey,”90 could not have cared less
about loyalty and honoring promises when he considered the security and
integrity of his own tribe to be in jeopardy. Indeed, the British assess-
ment of Simko’s intensions was either extremely naive or intentionally
misleading.
Having secured the agreement of the Armenians of Van and the
Assyrians of western Azerbaijan to join Simko in a united front, a Franco-
British military mission transported to Urumiyeh part of the war material
the allies had stockpiled in Tiflis, Georgia, for the use of the Russian
army.91 British intelligence officers also organized a meeting between
the potential allies. Though all parties agreed to cooperate toward the
creation of a united front to defend western Azerbaijan against the
Ottoman Turks, the British scheme did not materialize, partially because
it relied on the participation of Russian commanders and trainers. The
Russian army had disintegrated, and there was no longer a sufficient
number of Russian officers willing to collaborate with the British plan
and provide training and leadership for a joint Assyrian-Armenian-Kurdish
force.

87 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally: A Brief Account of the Assyrian Nation in the Great
War, p. 37.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 52.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 115

Murder of Mar Shimun

Though the British scheme for the defense of the Black Sea-Baghdad
line of defense failed, Mar Shimun and Simko continued their informal
contacts. In pursuing the creation of a safe haven and an autonomous
enclave for his people, Mar Shimun was well aware of the limited mili-
tary capabilities of his armed bands. Anticipating an Ottoman Turkish
invasion of western Azerbaijan and gravely concerned about the safety
of his community, the Assyrian leader embarked on a policy of forging an
alliance with Simko. Toward that end, Mar Shimun travelled to Urumiyeh
to request the blessing and support of the Central Assyrian Council for a
peace agreement with the Kurdish chief. Having listened to their leader,
the Assyrian Council agreed with Mar Shimun that it was crucial for the
Assyrians to form an alliance with the Kurds in a united front against
the Ottoman Turks. The Council then selected a certain Shmoel Khan,
who enjoyed a close friendship with Simko, to carry a message from Mar
Shimun to the Kurdish chief at his stronghold of Chahriq. The Assyrian
envoy returned from his visit to Chahriq with the promising news that
Simko would be pleased and indeed honored to meet with the Assyrian
leader.
Returning to Salmas from his meeting with the Assyrian Council in
Urumiyeh, Mar Shimun received an invitation from the Iranian district
governor of Salmas to a dinner reception at Dilman. The purpose of the
meeting was to calm the inter-communal tensions, especially the conflict
between the Assyrians and the Azerbaijani Turks. At the conclusion of
the meeting with the Iranian officials, as Mar Shimun was returning to
his home at the village of Khosrowabad, a messenger arrived bearing an
invitation from Simko requesting a meeting with the Assyrian leader at
Kohneh Shahr in the district of Salmas. In his letter to the Assyrian leader,
Simko had written that he was “very anxious to meet with Patriarch at any
convenient place, to discuss peace.”92 He also wrote that he had gone to
Kohneh Shahr near the town of Dilman, the capital of Salmas district, and
that he was “in great hope” that the Assyrian leader would join him there
for a meeting.93 Mar Shimun immediately convened the Central Council
of Salmas to discuss the invitation he had received from the Kurdish

92 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun. Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar Shimun,
p. 96.
93 Ibid., pp. 96–97.
116 M. KIA

chief. Although the majority of the Council expressed their reservations

regarding a meeting with Simko, the British intelligence officer, Captain
Gracey, who was in attendance, encouraged the Assyrian leader to meet
with the Kurdish chief. Members of Mar Shimun’s family, including his
brother, Rab Khalia Dawid, as well as a well-informed Armenian, warned
that Simko intended foul play and that he would be killed by the Kurdish
chief. Mar Shimun nevertheless refused to cancel the meeting.94
On Sunday, March 3, 1918, accompanied by his brother, Dawid, his
chief negotiator, Shmoel Khan, four Russian officers, and a significant
number of bodyguards, Mar Shimun travelled to Kohneh Shahr, one
of the two main towns in the district of Salmas, where he was greeted
by Simko. The central objective of the meeting between Mar Shimun
and Simko at Kohneh Shahr was to chart the contours of an alliance
between the Assyrians and the Kurds. Mar Shimun arrived at Kohneh
Shahr with a large company of armed bodyguards, while Simko came
to the meeting accompanied by only a handful of his followers, a ruse
intended to allay the fears of the Assyrian leader. One source claimed that
the bulk of Simko’s armed fighters arrived at Kohneh Shahr sometime
after the meeting between the two leaders had already commenced.95
Another writer stated that Mar Shimun’s brother, Dawid, had already
noticed a group of armed Kurds on the roofs of nearby buildings when
the Assyrian leader arrived at the meeting. When Dawid inquired who
the armed men were, Mar Shimun dismissed his brother’s concern by
replying that the Kurds had probably wanted “to get a good view” of
the meeting.96 In her book, Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of
Mar Shimun, Mar Shimun’s sister, Lady Surma, wrote that as her brother
drove up to the house in Kohneh Shahr, where he was to meet with
Simko, “there were many men with rifles on the house roofs,” but the
Assyrian leader, and the armed men accompanying him, assumed that they
had just gone up to see the arrival of the Assyrian delegation.97
The meeting took place at the home of Teymur Agha, a close confi-
dant of Simko, who would later serve as the Kurdish chief’s governor of

94 Frederick G. Coan, Yesterdays in Persia and Kurdistan, pp. 266–267.

95 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, pp. 726–727.
96 W.A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind, p. 380.
97 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun. Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar Shimun,
pp. 97–98.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 117

Kohneh Shahr and Urumiyeh.98 Simko came out to meet the patriarch,
receiving him with all honor, and conducted him into the house, where
they drank tea together.99 During the meeting, Simko displayed utmost
respect to Mar Shimun as the “religious head of Kurdistan.”100 At least
one author stated that, during their meeting, Mar Shimun appealed to
Simko to join him in creating an independent state in western Azerbaijan.
The Assyrian leader reportedly told the Kurdish chief, “This land, which
is called Kurdistan today has been our homeland, but the difference in
religion has separated us….We should unify and seize the control of this
land and live together. We have organized an army, but we do not have
a sufficient number of cavalries. Because you have many mounted men
if you join us, we will go and seize Tabriz.”101 According to the same
source, Simko agreed to lend his support to the project. Mar Shimun’s
sister, Lady Surma, however, contradicted this account, and stated that
Mar Shimun spoke with the utmost frankness to Simko about peace,
saying, “I assure you in all honesty, that we have not the least intention
of doing any harm in Persia, or of carving out a place for ourselves in it.
We only wish to defend ourselves from the attacks of the Turks, Simko
then replied asserting his complete agreement with this idea.”102
At the conclusion of the meeting, Mar Shimun kissed Simko “as a
mark of affection,”103 while Simko, “courteous host to the last conducted
his guest to his carriage,” kissed Mar Shimun’s hand “and turned back
into the house.”104 According to one source, as the Assyrian leader was
about to step into his carriage, Simko fired a shot into his back. The
shot that struck Mar Shimun in the back served as a signal to Simko’s
followers hiding on adjacent roof tops to open fire on the Assyrian lead-
er’s entourage, murdering most of them. Mar Shimun, who had been
wounded by the first bullet, was shot a second time and killed by Ali

98 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, pp. 494–495.

99 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun. Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar Shimun,
p. 98.
100 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally, p. 41.
101 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 727.
102 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun, Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar
Shimun, p. 98.
103 Frederick G. Coan, Yesterdays in Persia and Kurdistan, p. 267.
104 W.A. Wigram, Our Smallest Ally, pp. 41–42.
118 M. KIA

Agha, Simko’s younger brother.105 Another source claimed that after

accompanying Mar Shimun to the door, Simko turned around, which
was the signal to his men to open a volley from the adjacent roofs.106 The
Assyrian leader “fell pierced with five bullets, while his unsuspecting guard
dropped all around him.”107 According to one source, “a hundred and
twenty of the 150 men who had accompanied Mar Shimun were killed
by Simko and his men.”108 In her version of events, which was based on
the account of a Russian officer accompanying Mar Shimun, the Assyrian
leader’s sister wrote that Simko escorted the Assyrian leader to the gate
and kissed his hand. Mar Shimun and a Russian officer accompanying him
then took their seats in the carriage, “when suddenly a shot was fired at
him; this was followed by a volley from the roof, from the windows, and
in fact, from all sides.”109 According to Lady Surma, as many as forty
of the Assyrian horsemen were killed or wounded, and “in the confusion
that followed some found refuge in the houses of Armenians.”110
These accounts have been contradicted by yet another source, which
stated that after a confrontation between Assyrians and Muslims, a peace
conference was held, which resulted in a satisfactory conclusion. It was
“so satisfactory that Mar Shimun that same day accepted an invitation to
drink tea with the notorious Kurd, Simko.”111 This invitation proved to
be a trap. After the end of their meeting, Simko “dismissed the Assyrian
Patriarch with a kiss, and at the same moment gave a signal to his
men who fired and killed Mar Shimun and some forty-five of his body-
guard.”112 According to this account, the number of Assyrians killed was
much smaller than the number claimed by other sources. Regardless of
the inconsistency in the number of Assyrians killed, all sources agree that

105 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 727.

106 W.A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind, p. 380.
107 Mary Lewis Shedd, The Measure of A Man, p. 238.
108 Mary Lewis [Mrs. W.A.] Shedd Papers, 1918, Columbia University Libraries
Archival Collections.
109 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun, Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar
Shimun, p. 98.
110 Ibid.
111 Summary by Rev. E.W. McDowell, DD, in W.A. Shedd’s The Urumia Exodus,
(Board of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A.), p. 23.
112 Ibid.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 119

only a few bodyguards of Mar Shimun managed to escape the bloody

melee.
A more recent account has claimed that Mar Shimun, who distrusted
Simko, agreed to meet with the Kurdish chief because he was gravely
concerned by the absence of an organized Assyrian militia that could
defend the Assyrian community against an Ottoman Turkish attack.113
According to this source, the Assyrian leader was initially planning
to create a militia comprising Assyrian and Armenian fighters under
the command of an Assyrian officer who served at the time in the
Russian army. Despite strong support from the Assyrian community, Mar
Shimun’s plan for organizing a joint Assyrian-Armenian militia did not
materialize. As a fallback option, Mar Shimun conceived of a plan to form
an alliance with Simko. It is not clear whether this was originally his idea,
or a plan proposed by the British intelligence officer, Captain Gracey, who
had suggested that Mar Shimun meet with Simko.
At least one author, Mary Lewis Shedd, who lived and worked in
Urumiyeh at the time, stated that Simko murdered Mar Shimun “at the
instigation” of Iranian authorities “in high position,” a claim repeated
by Mar Shimun’s sister, Lady Surma, who wrote that the local Iranian
officials had hatched a plan for the destruction of the Assyrian commu-
nity, and principally of Mar Shimun, though Simko acted as “the hand
and agent” in the plot.114 Shedd also claimed that Mar Shimun and
Simko had attended a meeting with the representatives of the Iranian
government in Salmas. At the conclusion of this meeting, Simko invited
the Assyrian leader to a “friendly conference” at Kohneh Shahr,115 three
miles northwest of Mar Shimun’s home in the village of Khosrowabad.116
Another author, W.A. Wigram, also asserted that the Iranian governor had
written plainly to Simko Agha “to tell him that he might earn the grati-
tude” of the Iranian government “by the assassination of Mar Shimun,” a
hint that the Kurdish chief took “promptly.”117 Another writer, however,

113 See, Norman Solhkhah, The Assyrian Martyr Mar Benjamin Shimun Patriarch of
the Church of the East, pp. 9–10.
114 Mary Lewis Shedd, The Measure of A Man, p. 238. Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun,
Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar Shimun, p. 99.
115 Ibid.
116 Mary Lewis [Mrs. W.A.] Shedd Papers, 1918, Columbia University Libraries
Archival Collections.
117 W.A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind, p. 380.
120 M. KIA

contradicted the claim that Simko acted on behalf of the Iranian govern-
ment and stated that “there were rumors that Simko had taken a Turkish
bribe” to carry out his assassination of Mar Shimun.118
Neither Shedd nor Mar Shimun’s sister, Lady Surma, produced any
evidence for their assertions. Nor do we have any documents from
western diplomats or officers that suggest any culpability on the part
of either the Iranian or Ottoman officials in the murder plot. Nonethe-
less, the existence of a plot hatched by either local Iranian authorities or
Ottoman officials is not out of the question. By early 1918, a consensus
had emerged among Iranian officials and Kurdish chiefs such as Simko
that the presence of armed Christian communities in western Azerbaijan,
especially the Assyrians and their leader, Mar Shimun, constituted a lethal
threat to the territorial integrity of Iran as well as to the power and
influence of Kurdish tribal chiefs. With Assyrians seizing the most impor-
tant urban centers of the region, namely, Urumiyeh and Dilman, the
Ottoman Turks also viewed the Assyrian presence in northwestern Iran as
a formidable challenge to their war efforts in the east. Regardless of which
government may have encouraged or bribed Simko, it is clear that the
Kurdish chief would not have assassinated the Assyrian leader if the elim-
ination of Mar Shimun did not serve his own objectives. Simko viewed
the Assyrians as a direct threat to the supremacy of Kurdish tribal elites in
western Azerbaijan and a serious obstacle to the realization of his political
ambitions and greater strategic goals.

Mar Shimun’s Murder Ignites a Civil War

The scope and the brutality of Simko’s murderous plot against the
Assyrian leader shocked many local and foreign observers; yet to many
of those who knew Simko’s long record of duplicities and betrayals, the
assassination of Mar Shimun came as little surprise. The tragic irony
of Simko’s action is that, at the very moment when he ignited a civil
war between Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians, and Azerbaijani Turks, famine
was spreading throughout western Azerbaijan. Because of fighting and
famine, thousands of Kurds were leaving their villages and seeking refuge
with Presbyterian missionaries in Urumiyeh, in the hope of being fed by

118 William Eagleton Jr, The Kurdish Republic of 1946, p. 10.

 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 121

the Americans.119 As thousands of Kurds were dying of starvation, the

Kurdish leader was planning a series of deadly attacks against Assyrian
refugees near Khoy, which would inevitably result in a violent reprisal by
armed Assyrian bands against Kurdish communities.
The treacherous assassination of Mar Shimun ignited a violent and
bloody civil war between the Kurds and the Assyrians. Outraged by
the murder of their leader, armed Assyrian bands unleashed a campaign
of terror against their Muslim and Jewish neighbors, massacring Kurds,
Azerbaijani Turks, and Jews in the districts of Salmas and Urumiyeh. In
one day alone, two to three hundred Kurds and Azerbaijani Turks were
massacred by armed Assyrians who robbed and looted Muslim homes
and villages.120 According to another source, some 10,000 Muslims (i.e.,
Kurds and Azerbaijani Turks), and Jews were killed by armed Assyrian
bands.121 An Assyrian army led by one Agha Petros and the Russian
officer, Count Cosmin, attacked and defeated Simko.122 After thirty-
six hours of fighting, they forced the Kurdish chief to abandon his
stronghold at Chahriq.123 With some 500 followers Simko managed to
escape Chahriq for Khoy before his fortress was sacked and looted.124
The Assyrian attackers captured Simko’s mother and niece (the daughter
of Jafar Agha) and took them to Urumiyeh.125 One source claimed
that, upon entering Chahriq, the victorious Assyrian force discovered
Simko’s private papers, including a letter from the governor of Azerbaijan
“suggesting the murder” of Mar Shimun.126
The Assyrian victory against Simko was short-lived. The events that
followed the murder of Mar Shimun clearly demonstrate that Simko “had

119 Mary Lewis Shedd, The Measure of A Man, p. 236.

120 Mary Lewis [Mrs. W.A.] Shedd Papers, 1918, Columbia University Libraries
Archival Collections.
121 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 730.
122 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun, Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar
Shimun, p. 100.
123 H. H. Austin, The Baqubah Refugee Camp, p. 26.
124 Ibid.
125 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 731.
126 W.A. Wigram, The Cradle of Mankind, p. 381.
122 M. KIA

been carrying out a well-prepared plan.”127 The Kurdish chief recog-

nized that, with the departure of Czarist forces and the failure of the
British to organize a united front against the impending Turkish invasion,
the Assyrian and Armenian communities of western Azerbaijan had lost
their principal foreign protectors. The murder of Mar Shimun allowed
Simko to decapitate the leadership of the Assyrian community and ignite
a campaign “to cleanse” western Azerbaijan of its Christian population.
The attacks by armed Assyrian bands against Muslim communities (Kurds
and Azerbaijani Turks) provided Simko with a convenient justification
to rally the support of the Kurdish tribes of the region and resume his
raids against Assyrian villages. This time around, however, he focused his
attacks on a community of Jilu Assyrians, who had settled in the vicinity
of Khoy in 1916.128 According to one Assyrian source, Simko and his
men “massacred some 3,800 of the Christians” of Khoy, “mainly women
and children.”129 Several years after the bloody attack on the Assyrians,
Iranian army officers came across a killing field on the plain between
Salmas and Khoy. According to one Iranian officer, the entire plain was
“covered with bones and skulls” of “some 2000 Assyrians fleeing to the
north who had been overtaken and massacred by the pitiless Kurds.”130
Many of the Assyrian villages were “abandoned and all were half-ruined
by the Shakkaks of Simko.”131
The vacuum created by the withdrawal of the Russian army allowed
the Ottomans and their Kurdish allies to invade northwestern Iran. From
April to the end of July 1918, the Assyrians under the leadership of their
military commander, Agha Petros, fought several campaigns against the
invading Turks, scoring a number of impressive victories. As their stock of
ammunition began to run dangerously low, however, the Assyrians were
forced to abandon Salmas and Urumiyeh. Recognizing the hopelessness

127 D. K. Fieldhouse (ed.), Kurds, Arabs and Britons The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in
Iraq, p. 81.
128 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 741. See also, John Elder,
History of the Iran Mission, (Literature Committee of the Church Council of Iran, 1960),
p. 68.
129 Surma D’Bait Mar Shimun, Assyrian Church Customs and the Murder of Mar
Shimun, p. 100.
130 Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, p. 136.
131 Ibid.
 4 SIMKO, COMPETING NATIONALISMS, AND THE GREAT WAR 123

of the military situation, Assyrian and Armenian families began to evac-

uate Urumiyeh on July 30, 1918, turning south in an attempt to reach
British lines at Hamadan in western Iran.132 On 3 August, a Turkish army
backed by irregular Kurdish units, entered Urumiyeh, and immediately
fell upon the fleeing Assyrians and Armenians. Simko “joined the Turks
in hunting down the Assyrians,” before “they could reach the safety of
British protection to southeast at Hamadan.”133 Thousands of Assyrians
and Armenians were killed as they attempted to escape western Azerbaijan
for the safety of the British line. Those refugees who survived the flight
from Urumiyeh to Hamadan, comprising the Assyrians of western Azer-
baijan, the Jilu Assyrians of the Hakkari region, and the Armenians of Van,
were settled by the British authorities in a camp at Baqubah, thirty-one
miles or fifty kilometers northeast of Baghdad.134 The Assyrian refugees
“numbered 40,000 added to which there were 10,000 Armenians from
the Van district who had escaped with the Assyrians.”135
Recognizing the necessity of adjusting himself to the new reality on the
ground, Simko declared his loyalty to the Ottoman Empire and joined
“the Turkish 5th Division at the head of a body of 1,000 Kurdish irreg-
ulars.”136 The acceptance of Ottoman patronage provided Simko with
a powerful ally against the Assyrians and Armenians and was aimed at
utilizing Turkish military power to destroy the remaining Assyrian popu-
lation in western Azerbaijan. For years after the end of the Great War,
Simko remained resolute in his determination to prevent the return of
the Assyrian and Armenian refugees to their homes.

132 Joseph Naayem, Shall This Nation Die? p. 266.

133 Derk Kinnane, The Kurds and Kurdistan, p. 46.
134 See H. H. Austin. The Baqubah Refugee Camp.
135 Iraq Civil Commissioner, Wilson, Arnold Talbot and Gertrude Lowthian Bell,
Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, p. 58.
136 British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 397.
 CHAPTER 5

Fall of Empires and Simko’s Revolt

The four years extending from 1918 to 1922 proved to be transforma-

tional, not only for Simko, but also for Iran and its neighbors. As old
imperial powers collapsed during and after the conclusion of the First
World War, new political entities and “nation-states” emerged. More
immediately for Simko, for the first time in his political career as a frontier
warlord, the Kurdish chief found himself without any need for imperial
patronage.
To the north, two revolutions in 1917 transformed Simko’s most
powerful imperial patron, Russia, from an autocracy to a socialist state.
The fall of the Russian Empire allowed three new countries, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, to declare their independence in the south
Caucasus region. The victory of the Bolshevik Revolution gave rise to
great hopes among many Iranians, especially after the new communist
regime denounced the policies of the Czarist state in Iran. In the Appeal
to Muslim Workers in Russia and the East, issued on December 3, 1917,
the new Soviet government declared “null and void” the Saint Peters-
burg Convention of 1907, which had divided Iran into Russian and
British spheres of influence. The Soviets also promised to withdraw all
the remaining Russian forces from Iran and guaranteed Iranians “the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 125

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_5
126 M. KIA

right of free self-determination.”1 This announcement was followed by

a note addressed to the Iranian government dated January 14, 1918,
from Leon Trotsky, the Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs, informing
the Iranian government that the Soviet Union had abrogated all secret
treaties between Russia and England regarding Iran that violated the
country’s rights as an independent state.2 In Article VII of the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk, signed on March 3, 1918, by the Soviet state and
the Axis powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman
Empire), the Bolsheviks and the Ottoman Turks reiterated their commit-
ment to withdraw all of their troops from Iranian territory. In view of
the fact that Iran and Afghanistan “were free and independent states,
the contracting parties” obligated themselves “to respect the political and
economic independence and the territorial integrity of these States.”3
The end of the First World War also signaled the dissolution of another
former imperial patron of Simko, namely, the Ottoman Empire. The
empire that had controlled much of the Arab, Kurdish, Armenian, and
Assyrian populated regions of the Middle East for four centuries had
vanished. The new political configuration that emerged in the years imme-
diately following the fall of the Ottoman state represented a radical break
from the past. France and Britain partitioned the predominantly Arabic-
speaking provinces of the Ottoman Empire into artificial states with
boundaries that represented European colonial interests. Immediately to
the west of Iran, in the newly created state of Iraq, the British installed
Amir Faisal, the son of Sharif Hussein of Mecca, as the ruler. Thus, the
British, who were the neighbors of Iran to the east in India, became the
neighbors of Iran to the west as well. Because the newly created state
of Iraq contained a significant Kurdish population, the British became
increasingly involved in Kurdish tribal politics by establishing direct ties
with a significant number of Kurdish leaders in Iraq and southeastern
Anatolia, including Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji and Sayyid Taha II.
The collapse of the Ottoman state liberated the ethno-linguistic and
religious communities that had lived under the autocratic rule of Turkish
sultans for centuries. Kurdish nationalists viewed the disappearance of

1 Hurewitz, J.C. Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, 2 Volumes, (Princeton: D.
Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), Volume 2, p. 28.
2 Degras, Jane (ed.). Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume I , 1917–1924,
(London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 162.
3 Ibid., p. 54.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 127

Ottoman rule as an opportunity to assert their political independence.

In his “Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd people” to the Confer-
ence of Peace in Paris on February 6, 1919, Sherif Pasha, who represented
the Society for Advancement of Kurdistan, proposed the establishment of
an independent Kurdistan based in the Ottoman vilayets of “Darbékirè,
Kharpout, Bitlis, Mossul and Sanjak of Ourfa.”4 The actual proposal for
the creation of a Kurdish state was, however, made in the Treaty of Sèvres
signed on August 10, 1920, between the British Empire, France, Italy,
and Japan and the representatives of the Ottoman government (Map
5.1). The treaty effectively abolished the Ottoman Empire and forced the
sultan to renounce all rights over the Arab world. It also provided for an
independent Armenian state in eastern Anatolia. A Kurdish state east of
the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia and north of
the province of Mosul “was to receive autonomy and the right to appeal
for independence to the League of Nations within a year.”5 The treaty
was immediately condemned by the Turkish nationalist movement led by
Mustafa Kemal. As a result of a successful resistance movement organized
by the Turkish nationalists, the Treaty of Sèvres was never implemented.
Appointed as “Inspector General of Ottoman forces in northern and
northeastern Anatolia,” Mustafa Kemal had been dispatched by the sultan
to disarm and disband the remaining Ottoman army units in eastern
Anatolia.6 By the time Mustafa Kemal arrived in Samsun on the northern
coast of Anatolia on May 19, 1919, he had already decided to disobey
his orders and organize a national resistance movement.7 Support came
from other Ottoman commanders and officers who shared his deter-
mination to remove all foreign forces from Anatolia. After creating a
national congress, which served as a quasi-alternative government to that
in occupied Istanbul, the Turkish nationalists launched successful mili-
tary campaigns against the newly established Armenian state in eastern

4 Metin Atmaca, “Sharif Pasha’s ‘Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd People’ to
the Conference of Peace in Paris on February 6, 1919,” in Sebastian Maisel (ed.), The
Kurds: An Encyclopedia of Life, Culture, and Society, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2018),
pp. 328–329.
5 Zürcher, Erik., Turkey: A Modern History, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), p. 147.
6 McCarthy, Justin, The Ottoman Turks, (London & New York: Longman, 1997),
p. 377.
7 Mango, Andrew, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey, (New York:
Abrams Press, 2002), pp. 218–221.
128 M. KIA

Map 5.1 Treaty of Sèvres

Anatolia and the Greek forces in western Anatolia. The victory over the
Armenians in November–December 1920 and the Greeks in September
1921 and again in August–September 1922 forced foreign occupying
armies to evacuate Anatolia. Having witnessed the decisive defeat of her
forces in summer 1922 and the recapture of Izmir on 9 September by
the nationalist Turks, the Greek government had no other alternative but
to sue for peace. The warring sides signed the Armistice of Mudanya on
October 11, 1922. On 1 November, the Grand National Assembly in
Ankara abolished the Ottoman sultanate.8
Meanwhile in Iran, the end of the Great War and the disappearance
of the Russian and Ottoman empires allowed the central government in
Tehran to re-establish its authority over various provinces of the country.
This effort, however, confronted significant obstacles. Without a standing
army and an efficient bureaucracy, the politically weak, administratively
incompetent, and financially bankrupt Qajar state could not restore law
and order in the country. Local movements filled the vacuum created

8 J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Volume 2, pp. 119–20.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 129

by the dysfunctional state and challenged the authority of Tehran. The

weakness of the central government also encouraged Iran’s neighbors to
re-enter the Iranian theater and pursue their own interests inside Iranian
territory. As early as December 1918, an Iranian official stationed in Khoy
in western Azerbaijan, reported to the Iranian foreign ministry that the
Turks had decided to use a unified force of Kurdish tribes of northwestern
Iran and eastern Anatolia to capture Maku and Khoy. This plan could not,
however, be carried out unless Khoy was first attacked and occupied by
the Kurdish chief, Simko.9
The collapse of two imperial powers, namely the Russian and the
Ottoman empires, as well as the complete disintegration of Iranian
governmental authority in western Azerbaijan, provided Simko with a
golden opportunity to embark on a campaign to create an independent
Kurdish state with support from neighboring Kurdish tribes on both sides
of the Ottoman-Iranian frontier. Without a regional state actor capable of
blocking the emergence of an independent Kurdistan, and in the absence
of armed Assyrian, Armenian, or Azerbaijani groups that could resist his
ascent to total power, Simko saw himself as the only effective authority in
the ungoverned territory west of Lake Urumiyeh.
The Kurdish chief was on the cusp of gaining political independence,
if only he could unify the desperately fragmented Kurdish tribal groups
in western Azerbaijan. He attempted to do so by acting as a champion
of Kurdish nationalism and calling on all Kurdish tribal chiefs to join him
in a crusade to fight the Iranian government and establish an indepen-
dent Kurdish state.10 Forging a Kurdish nationalist movement in Iran,
however, faced an uphill battle because of the highly fragmented tribal
society in which Simko operated. The Kurds of Iran were a collection of
tribes without any cohesion or a distinct national identity. Moreover, the
tribes showed little desire for cohesion. According to a British statesman
and traveler in the last decade of the nineteenth century, the “tribal
feeling” among the Kurds “was very strong,” and in the absence of a
strong central government, individual chiefs had “acquired a position that
was little short of despotic independence.”11 The same assessment of

9 Bayat, Kaveh, Ravabet-e Iran va Turkiyeh: Az Soqut-e Dolat-e Osmani ta Baramadan-e

Neza.m-e Jomhuri (1297–1302 Shamsi), (Tehran: Pardis-e Danesh, 2015), p. 64.
10 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 833. See also, Hassan Arfa,
The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 58.
11 George Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, Volume 1, p. 550.
130 M. KIA

the Kurds was echoed almost two decades later by the Russian army’s
leading ethnographer, who wrote that the Kurds had “neither a clear
national self-consciousness nor a sense of patriotism in the Kurdish-
national sense.”12 In November 1912, a Russian diplomat, Alexander
Iyas, who spoke Kurmanji fluently, wrote to the Russian ministry of
foreign affairs that as far as the possibility of the unification of the Kurdish
population was concerned, “it must be borne in mind that so far it has
shown neither the remotest sign of tribal unity, nor even a shred of
nascent national consciousness.”13 According to the Russian official, not
only were the Kurdish tribes “continually at odds with one another, but
distinct clans within one and the same tribe” were “frequently at one
another’s throats.”14 Additionally, there was “no individual among the
leaders of the local tribes” who enjoyed “sufficient authority to act as a
centre around which the leaders of the other tribes might unify.”15 Finally,
the “local religious leaders, too” carried “no weight owing to the almost
total religious indifference of the Kurds.”16
The absence of a cohesive national identity among the Kurds of north-
western Iran may be explained by the fact that tribalism, and the form of
politics it nurtured, hindered the convergence of tribal communities into a
nation-state system founded upon a sense of national unity. The fragmen-
tation within the Kurdish political establishment can also be understood
in the context of the relationship between the tribe and the state in Iran.
Throughout the Qajar period, Kurdish tribal chiefs acted as indepen-
dent rulers without any supervision or interference from Tehran. Their
subservience to the Qajar shah was at best nominal. Many paid little or
no taxes and they were “kept under no sort of control.”17 Thus, at times,
Kurdish tribal chiefs feared the expansionist designs of a neighboring
tribe much more than the actions of Iran’s central government, which

12 Michael A. Reynolds, Shattering Empires: The Clash and Collapse of the Ottoman and
Russian Empires 1908–1918, p. 66.
13 From Alexander Iyas to the First Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19
November 1912 [December 2, 1912]. Secret. Quoted in John Tchalenko, Images From
the Endgame, p. 95.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., pp. 95–96.
16 Ibid., p. 96.
17 Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918–1920,
p. 228.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 131

lacked any real muscle to impose its authority over the country’s distant
provinces. It is not surprising, therefore, that Iran’s Kurdish tribal leaders
generally preferred to maintain their own autonomy by paying token and
perfunctory homage to a distant and incompetent Qajar state instead of
accepting the absolute sovereignty of one despotic Kurdish chief over the
rest.

Simko’s Rebellion Commences

Despite the fragmentation caused by tribalism, Simko tried to increase
his power and prestige among neighboring Kurdish tribal groups by
enhancing his military capabilities after the end of the First World War.
The occupying armies had left large quantities of arms and ammuni-
tion, including machine guns, cannons, and artillery pieces before they
returned home. Moreover, many Russian and Ottoman soldiers and offi-
cers sold their arms to the highest bidder, including local tribal chiefs
and landowners. This included Simko and his Shakak fighters. Further,
as Ottoman detachments began to evacuate Iranian territory, several
hundred Turkish artillery officers, armed with machine guns and long-
barreled field guns, joined Simko, who agreed to pay them a regular
salary. The recruitment of well-armed and well-trained Ottoman artillery
officers provided the Kurdish chief with a clear military superiority over
the small and badly armed Iranian Cossack and gendarmerie units in Azer-
baijan.18 Despite these efforts, Simko failed to create an administrative
structure capable of integrating the many tribal groups into one unified
movement with concrete political objectives.
Though he was preparing himself for an all-out rebellion against the
central government in Tehran, in his messages to British officials in Iraq,
Simko insisted that his ultimate objective was to maintain law and order.
He also expressed his readiness to make peace with Britain and even
the Iranian government.19 The defeat of the Ottoman state, the occu-
pation of Iraq by British forces, and the continued political and military
domination of Iran by Britain, convinced Simko that he had no choice

18 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat. Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 323.

19 J. I. Eadie, Report of Eadie-Bristow Mission addressed to Advance General Headquar-
ters, Tiflis, Doc. 54, in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 36.
132 M. KIA

but to maintain direct communication with British officials and reas-

sure them that he was amicably disposed to British aims in the Middle
East. For a Kurdish chief who had always operated within a patron-client
system, Britain with all its colonial possessions and post-First World War I
mandates, seemed to be the imperial patron that could provide him with
protection against future threats posed by either the Turks or the Iranians.
Simko’s rebellion commenced in the winter of 1918–1919, shortly
after the First World War ended in the Middle East with the signing of
the Armistice of Mudros on October 30, 1918, between the Ottoman
Empire and a British-led delegation aboard the HMS Agamemnon in the
port of the island of Lemnos. At the end of 1918, the former Ottoman
diplomat, Mehmet Sherif Pasha, who would lead a Kurdish delegation
in the Paris Peace Conference (January 1919–January 1920), established
contact with several Kurdish leaders, including Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji,
Sayyid Taha II, and Simko, “in order to promote the idea of an indepen-
dent Kurdistan.”20 Because of falling out with the Young Turks, Sherif
Pasha had fled the Ottoman Empire and lived in Europe during the First
World War. In 1915, from his place of exile in Paris, Sherif Pasha waged a
campaign against the Young Turk regime, accusing its leaders of “having
for years plotted the extermination of the Armenian people.”21 After the
end of the Great War, he attended the Paris Peace Conference on behalf
of the Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan. The British govern-
ment, however, viewed Sherif Pasha “unfit” to serve as “the Chief of
Kurdistan,” and they preferred working with local Kurdish leaders in the
region, including Sayyid Taha II and Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji.22 The
Kurdish delegation also split into several factions and finally dissolved
before the Treaty of Versailles was signed. Nevertheless, Sherif Pasha
signed an accord with his Armenian counterpart, Bogos Nubar Pasha,
regarding disputed territories in eastern Anatolia claimed by both Kurds
and Armenians.23 This accord generated a great deal of controversy and

20 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 112.

21 “Cherif Pasha Says Young Turks Long Planned to Exterminate the Armenians,” The
New York Times, October 10, 1915.
22 Metin Atmaca, “The Road to Sèvres: Kurdish Elites and Question of Self-
Determination After the First World War,” International Journal of Conflict and Violence,
Vol. 16 (2022), pp. 4–5.
23 Metin Atmaca, “Treaty of Sèvres, August 10, 1920,” in Sebastian Maisel (ed.), The
Kurds: An Encyclopedia of Life, Culture, and Society, (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2018),
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 133

was ultimately rejected by Kurdish leaders, because it excluded the Lake

Van region from the future Kurdish state.24 Sherif Pasha’s communication
with Kurdish leaders in the Ottoman Empire and Iran clearly demon-
strates that Simko had established direct links with prominent Kurdish
nationalists in Europe. It also demonstrates that the idea of establishing an
independent Kurdistan had been discussed openly and extensively before
Simko staged his revolt.
Simko commenced his revolt by first attacking and looting the rural
communities of Salmas and Urumiyeh.25 By late autumn 1918, the
Kurdish chief had expanded his raids northward toward Khoy. To
contain the growing power and influence of Simko in western Azer-
baijan, the Iranian government, which could not even protect its own
capital, adopted a strategy of appeasement. The authorities in Azer-
baijan appointed a certain Sardar Fateh as the governor of Urumiyeh.
Though competent, educated, and favorably disposed toward the Chris-
tian community, the new governor “had no force at his disposal to keep
order” except 300 cavalrymen, of whom only 100 had rifles.26 One of
the direct consequences of this situation was that there was no “security
of life and property,” even in the environs of the main urban centers, to
the extent that the wife and the family of the chief of the police force in
Urumiyeh “were held up and robbed” on the road immediately outside
of the town.27 In the absence of a standing army that could restore
law and order, Sardar Fateh opted for a policy of appeasement, nego-
tiating with Simko and pleading with the Kurdish chief “to restrain his
tribesmen from looting and attacking the peaceful inhabitants” of Salmas
and Urumiyeh.28 This peace initiative did nothing to calm the chaos

p. 326. See also, Metin Atmaca, “The Road to Sèvres: Kurdish Elites and Question of
Self-Determination After the First World War.”
24 Özoglu, Hakan., Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities,
Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries, (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2004), p. 39.
25 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, pp. 493–494.
26 J. I. Eadie, Report of Eadie-Bristow Mission addressed to Advance General Headquar-
ters, Tiflis, Doc 54, in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 36.
27 Ibid.
28 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, pp. 56–57.
134 M. KIA

caused by Simko’s raids against the rural and urban population. Instead,
the Kurdish chief interpreted it as a sign of weakness and intensified his
attacks, concentrating his most destructive assaults on Lakistan, a collec-
tion of nine rural communities west of Lake Urumiyeh and east of Salmas.
Recognizing the gravity of the situation and the futility of negotiations,
Sardar Fateh abandoned Urumiyeh and returned to Tabriz. The depar-
ture of the governor only bolstered Simko’s position and made him even
more confident of his power and authority.
To quash Simko in a quick and devastating fashion, the deputy
governor of Azerbaijan, Mokaram al-Molk, resorted to a drastic measure.
A plan was hatched to assassinate Simko by sending him a parcel bomb
disguised as a box of sweetmeats.29 Sometime in May 1919, the parcel
was assembled by an Armenian expert and forwarded first to Khoy, where
Simko’s mother-in-law resided, and thence to Simko in Chahriq. When
the parcel arrived, Simko’s son brought it to his father, declaring that his
grandmother had sent him a gift of sweetmeats. Suspicious of an assas-
sination plot, Simko threw the parcel to his brother, Ali Agha, while
embracing his son and lying motionless on the ground. Thus, when the
bomb went off, Simko and his son escaped the assassination attempt
unharmed, but the explosion killed Simko’s brother and a number of his
followers.30 In retelling the story of the assassination attempt to a British
official in northern Iraq, Simko explained that one of his ill-wishers, on
this occasion, an Iranian official, had sent him a bomb wrapped in a parcel
and that he “barely had time to throw it” at his brother “when it went
off.”31
The abortive attempt to assassinate Simko provided the Kurdish chief
with a convenient justification to increase the number of his forces and
refuse to pay his taxes to the authorities in Tabriz.32 Declaring that he
had been invested with the authority to rule the region, Simko dispatched

29 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 832. See also, Hassan Arfa,
The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 57.
30 Ibid.
31 Iraq Civil Commissioner, Wilson, Arnold Talbot and Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Review
of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, p. 70.
32 Ernest Bristow, Tabriz, December 31, 1920, Report of Azerbaijan during 1920, Doc.
483 [E 3497/3497/34] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 349.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 135

his men to collect taxes from travelling merchants and non-Kurdish rural
communities located between Salmas and Khoy.33 The news of Simko’s
uprising caused panic among the residents of Khoy, who sent telegrams to
Tabriz and Tehran pleading for military intervention to repel the threat
posed by the Kurdish chief.34 In late May, Simko intensified his raids,
plundering twelve villages near Salmas.35 In the absence of any govern-
ment force capable of defending the area, the local population armed
itself and fought back, forcing Simko’s men to retreat. At the end of
May, however, Simko’s men returned and attacked the rural communi-
ties immediately south of Khoy.36 Once again, the residents of Khoy and
surrounding villages rushed to confront Simko’s army. Only two days
after the firefight outside Khoy, one of Simko’s most trusted men, Teymur
Agha, sent a message to Khoy’s defenders and demanded that the indi-
viduals responsible for the assassination attempt on Simko be handed to
him.37 Simko himself also used the plot on his life as a pretext to demand
that the Iranian authorities detain and dispatch the perpetrators to his
fortress at Chahriq.
The spineless deputy governor-general, Mokarram al-Molk, refused to
admit to his own role in the plot. Instead, he and the newly appointed
governor, Mohammad Vali Khan Sepahdar (Sepahdar-e A’azam), a large
landowner in the Caspian provinces and as such far more interested in the
solution of the Jangal movement,38 blamed the attempt to kill Simko on
three individuals who did not have anything to do with the plot but were
disliked by both the new governor and Simko. One of the accused, the
constitutionalist Qajar prince, Jahangir Mirza, was a man of letters and
a popular educator, who had opened several schools in Khoy. Ironically,
one of these schools, named Cyrus, had been seized and used by Simko
as his residence and headquarters when he escaped the wrath of Assyrians
after the murder of their leader, Mar Shimun, in March 1918.39 Jahangir

33 Ibid. See also, Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, pp. 494.
34 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, pp. 494.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid., pp. 494–495.
38 Cox to Curzon, February 3, 1919, Tehran Intelligence Summary No 19, in Iran
Political Diaries, Volume 5, p. 813.
39 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 496.
136 M. KIA

Mirza tried to evict the Kurdish chief from his school, but failed. The
prince’s efforts, however, aroused the wrath of Simko, who never forgot
or forgave the humiliating experience.
The three men accused of participating in the bombing plot were
arrested and subsequently transported in mid-June by an escort of
thirteen Qarajadaghi tribesmen to Simko’s headquarters at Chahriq.40
Though one of the men managed to escape, the other two, including
Jahangir Mirza, were handed to Simko at Chahriq. The Kurdish chief
had the prisoners, as well as the members of their escort, detained and
tortured before cutting off their limbs and throwing their bodies “from
the high rock on which his castle was built.”41 The thirteen Qarajadaghi
guards were killed because the man who had murdered Simko’s brother,
Jafar Agha, in Tabriz in 1905, was a tribal chief from the Qarajadagh/
Qardagh (Arasbaran), a region south of the Aras River in the present-day
East Azerbaijan province of Iran.42 Despite these cold-blooded murders,
the governor of Azerbaijan, Sepahdar-e A’azam, insisted on his policy of
appeasing Simko by showering him with more favors and gifts. Thus, he
bestowed upon the rebellious Kurdish chief the honorific title of Sardar
Nosrat (Victorious Commander).43
As already mentioned, in late May, Simko had used the attempt on
his life as an excuse to contact the British authorities in northern Iraq.
In expressing his grievances against the Iranian authorities, he wrote
about the attempt on his life and how he had escaped death. The lack
of sympathetic response from the British in Iraq, his need for military
support, and his fear of reprisals “on account of his treatment of Chris-
tians,” convinced Simko to throw himself into the arms of the Turkish
nationalists in eastern Anatolia, who had embarked on a campaign to
remove foreign occupation forces from Asia Minor and establish a Turkish
republic.44 In June 1919, shortly after he had been rebuffed by the British

40 Ibid., p. 498. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 835.
Qarajadagh or Qaradagh or Arasbaran was a region in east Azerbaijan north of Ahar and
south of the Aras River.
41 Ibid. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 836.
42 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 836. See also, Hassan Arfa,
The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 57.
43 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 499.
44 Iraq Civil Commissioner, Wilson, Arnold Talbot and Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Review
of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, p. 70.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 137

authorities in Iraq, Simko attacked Urumiyeh, apparently in retaliation

for the assassination attempt on his life. The raid was intended to humil-
iate and intimidate Ziya al-Dowleh, the newly appointed governor of the
city. According to one source, the Kurdish chief dispatched sixty armed
men to Urumiyeh, where they surrounded and attacked the governor’s
mansion. To the shock and surprise of the Kurdish attackers, however,
the local army units, as well as ordinary citizens, armed themselves and
beat back the assault, forcing Simko’s men to flee. In response to the
military setback in Urumiyeh, Simko ordered his men to seize the port of
Golmankhaneh on the western shore of Lake Urumiyeh. The seizure of
the port was intended to prevent Tabriz from supplying the defenders at
Urumiyeh with food, arms, and ammunition.45 In the process of taking
Golmankhaneh, Simko’s men looted all the goods stored at the port.
By November 1919, Simko’s relentless attacks had forced the British
government to withdraw its vice-consul from Urumiyeh.46

First Military Campaign Against Simko

Beginning in December 1919, Simko intensified his attacks against the
rural communities of Lakistan in the district of Salmas and targeted the
larger villages of the area, especially Sultan Ahmad and Qara Qeshlaq. On
19 December, after a short firefight, Simko’s men supported by a group
of former Ottoman soldiers and officers sacked Sultan Ahmad, pillaging
and killing a large number of its residents, while many women and chil-
dren escaped to the neighboring village of Qara Qeshlaq.47 The next
day, Simko and his army stormed Qara Qeshlaq a short distance east of
Dilman. Once again, a fierce fight erupted between Simko’s army, backed

45 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 839. For a detailed description
of the events in Urumiyeh, see, Rahmatollah Towfiq, Tarikhcheh-ye Urumiyeh Yaddashthaei
az Salha-ye Jang Avval-e Jahani va Ashub-e Ba’ad az An, (Tehran: Pardis-e Danesh,
2010).
46 Cox to Curzon, Tehran, November 21, 1919, Doc. 129 [154739], (No. 747), in
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume
16, p. 89.
47 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 501. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e
Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 851–852. See also, Ali Azari, Qiyam-e Sheikh Mohammad
Khiyabani Dar Tabriz, (Tehran: Safi Alishah Press, 1984), pp. 228–229, p. 236.
138 M. KIA

by Turkish artillery officers, and the village defenders.48 After eleven

hours of intense fighting, Qara Qeshlaq fell. Simko and his men looted
the village and massacred hundreds of its defenseless residents. Those who
could flee abandoned their homes and sought refuge in Sharafkhaneh on
the northeastern shore of Lake Urumiyeh. News of atrocities committed
by Simko were widely publicized and caused widespread outrage, espe-
cially among the Azerbaijani Turks, who demanded urgent action from
authorities in Tabriz and Tehran. As the deputy governor of Azerbaijan,
Sardar Entesar, assembled a force of 1,000 soldiers, 250 gendarmes, and
120 cavalrymen in Sharafkhaneh,49 Tehran also dispatched a sizable army
under the command of the Russian officer, Colonel Philipov, to Azer-
baijan. An officer of the Cossack Brigade, who had stayed in Iran after
the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, Philipov assumed the command of a
combined force of nearly 5,000 men that included Cossack, gendarmerie
and irregular tribal units.50
Philipov’s punitive expedition departed Tabriz for Sharafkhaneh in
early January 1920, joining the force already assembled by Sardar
Entesar. From Sharafkhaneh, the government force advanced to Dilman,
the district capital of Salmas.51 Cooperation “by British aeroplanes”
was “sanctioned by General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Baghdad.”52
Recognizing the superiority of the force dispatched against him, Simko
evacuated the villages and towns he had occupied. Meanwhile, negoti-
ations were opened and Philipov was instructed not to “undertake any
active operations” pending the conclusion of the talks with the Kurdish
chief.53 When the negotiations with Simko fell through, Philipov attacked

48 Ibid. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 852.
49 Ali Azari, Qiyam-e Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani Dar Tabriz, p. 237.
50 Ernest Bristow, Tabriz, December 31, 1920, Report of Azerbaijan during 1920, Doc.
483 [E 3497/3497/34] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle
East, 1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 349. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye
Azerbaijan, p. 853. Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 57.
51 John Hoskyn, Persia Confidential [190387], Tehran Situation Report, for period
ending January 23, 1920, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 831. See
also, Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 503.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 139

Dilman.54 According to a British document, after “a stiff fight,” govern-

ment forces defeated Simko, seized Dilman, and announced a great
victory on 17 January.55 Three hundred government troopers, as well as
four Cossack and four gendarmerie officers, were killed during the battle
for Dilman.56 The number of Kurdish casualties is unknown, but it must
have been significant because Simko quickly retreated to his stronghold,
the fortress of Chahriq.57 Trapped in his castle, Simko tried to “retreat
into Turkish territory,” but he was “cut off by snow.”58
Though the government forces had scored a decisive victory over
Simko, the campaign dragged on into February. Desperate for a peaceful
resolution to his conflict with the central government, the Kurdish chief
resorted to his customary ploy of appealing to the Iranian prime minister
for mercy and clemency, while at the same time sending his brother to
negotiate a peace settlement with the Iranian commanders approaching
Chahriq.59 The initial response from Tehran was negative. The prime
minister, Vosuq al-Dowleh, wrote to the deputy governor of Azerbaijan,
Sardar Entesar, that making peace with Simko did not make any sense,
and he urged the government forces to finish the work of defeating the
Kurdish rebel.60 Meanwhile, Simko cut off all telegraph lines and tried to

54 Iranian sources provide a variety of dates for Philipov’s victory over Simko. For
example, see, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 853. Kasravi stated
that Philipov scored his victory over Simko at Dilman on February 25, 1920. See also,
Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 503. Riyahi wrote that Philipov defeated
Simko on January 26, 1920.
55 Cox to Curzon, Tehran, March 7, 1920, [191973], No. 38, Enclosure in No. 1.,
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 838. See also, Ernest Bristow, Tabriz,
December 31, 1920, Report of Azerbaijan during 1920, Doc. 483 [E 3497/3497/34]
in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume
16, p. 349. See also, Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak,
p. 174. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 853. Mohammad
Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 503.
56 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 503.
57 Ibid. See also, Cox to Curzon, Tehran, March 7, 1920, [191973], No. 38, Enclosure
in No. 1., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 838.
58 Cox to Curzon, Tehran, March 7, 1920, [191973], No. 38, Enclosure in No. 1.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 838.
59 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 504.
60 Ibid.
140 M. KIA

block the roads from Salmas to Khoy and Urumiyeh.61 Despite Simko’s
best efforts, however, Philipov continued his advance against the Kurdish
chief’s stronghold and eventually laid siege to Chahriq.62 Simko had no
other alternative but to accept defeat. Instead of allowing Philipov to
complete his victory by demanding an unconditional surrender, the newly
appointed governor of Azerbaijan, Abdol Majid Mirza Ain al-Dowleh,
ordered the Russian commander to open negotiations with Simko.63
After long and protracted negotiations, it was announced on 22
February that “Colonel Philipov had proposed terms to Simko,” which
the Kurdish chief accepted in early March.64 By then Simko had recog-
nized that his survival depended on reaching an agreement with Philipov
in which: (1) Simko promised to return the goods he and his men had
plundered from the civilian population in Lakistan; (2) Simko agreed to
pay reparations for the expenses the central government had accrued in
its campaign against him; (3) Simko agreed to cease and desist from any
further attacks against Salmas and Urumiyeh; (4) Simko promised to hand
over all his arms and munitions to government authorities; and (5) the
Kurdish chief obligated himself to dispatch his brother, Ahmad Agha, as
a hostage to Tabriz, where he would reside with officers of the Cossack
Brigade. In return for his agreement to these conditions, the government
allowed Simko to remain in Chahriq.65 The expensive expedition against
Simko cost the Iranian government 500,000 toman.66
There were rumors at the time that both the new governor and
Philipov had received a significant bribe from Simko, and certain foreign

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid.
63 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 854.
64 Ernest Bristow, Tabriz, December 31, 1920, Report of Azerbaijan during 1920, Doc.
483 [E 3497/3497/34] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 349. Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 504.
65 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 855. See also, Mohammad
Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 504. See also, Ali Azari, Qiyam-e Sheikh Mohammad
Khiyabani Dar Tabriz, p. 243.
66 Ernest Bristow, Tabriz, December 31, 1920, Report of Azerbaijan during 1920, Doc.
483 [E 3497/3497/34] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 349.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 141

diplomats and agents had interceded on behalf of the Kurdish leader.67

At least one British report confirmed these rumors when it stated that,
aside from its substantial cost, “the only manifest result” of the military
campaign against Simko was that “the chief of the expedition returned to
Tabriz” much richer “by a considerable sum.”68

Khiyabani’s Revolt
Shortly after Philipov had returned to Tehran, a political earthquake
shook the fragile balance of power in Azerbaijan and allowed Simko to
resume his rebellion. In April 1920, a group of democrats led by Sheikh
Mohammad Khiyabani, a business proprietor, a preacher, and a former
deputy to the second Majlis (1909–1911), seized the reins of power in
Tabriz, the provincial capital.69 The son of a wealthy merchant family
from the district of Khameneh near Tabriz, Khiyabani had been trained
as a preacher and prayer leader. During the constitutional revolution, he
joined the ranks of the revolutionaries and fought in defense of his city
when the shah’s army laid siege to Tabriz in 1908. After the abdica-
tion of Mohammad Ali Shah on July 16, 1909, and restoration of the
constitution later that year, Khiyabani was elected to the second Iranian
parliament, which was inaugurated on November 15, 1909. During his
tenure as a deputy to the parliament, Khiyabani emerged as one of leaders
of the Democrat Party, the largest political block in the second Majlis.
Though connected to the social democrats in the Caucasus, and there-
fore, leftist in their political orientation, the Iranian democrats were highly
nationalistic, as well as respectful of Islam though ardently opposed to the

67 See Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, pp. 856–857.

68 Ernest Bristow, Tabriz, December 31, 1920, Report of Azerbaijan during 1920, Doc.
483 [E 3497/3497/34] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 349.
69 For Khiyabani’s family background and political career, see, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-
e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, pp. 842–850, pp. 858–896. See also, Mehdi Bamdad,
Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran, Volume 6, pp. 196–198. See also, Ali Azari, Qiyam-e Sheikh
Mohammad Khiyabani Dar Tabriz, pp. 10–13. Abdollah Bahrami, Khaterat-e Abdollah
Bahrami az Akhar-e Saltanat-e Nasser al-Din Shah ta Avval-e Kudeta, (Tehran: Elmi
Press, 1985), pp. 635–640. Ebrahim Safaei, Rahbaran-e Mashruteh, Volume 2, pp. 442–
444. Homa Katouzian, State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the
Emergence of the Pahlavis, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006), pp. 149–151.
142 M. KIA

involvement of the Shi’i clergy in the political life of the country. After the
second Majlis was closed down under pressure from the Russian govern-
ment in 1911, Khiyabani left Tehran and sought refuge in the Caucasus.
When he finally returned to Tabriz, he opened a shop in the city’s main
bazaar and followed a quiet life.
After the victory of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917 and the with-
drawal of Russian troops, the Democrat Party in Tabriz re-surfaced and
quickly seized control of some of the main organs of power in the city.
When the Ottoman Turks occupied Tabriz in June 1918, however, they
suppressed the Democrat Party. Because of its strong pro-Iranian nation-
alist orientation and its opposition to pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism as
promoted and propagated by Ottoman authorities, the Turks banished
the leaders of the Democrat Party from Tabriz.
After the end of the Great War and the withdrawal of Ottoman forces
from Iranian territory, Khiyabani returned to Tabriz and revived the
Democrat Party together with his close confidants and supporters. The
battle for leadership, however, split the party into two contending factions
with Khiyabani leading the so-called Tajaddod (Modernity) faction. The
charismatic leader used the anger over the August 1919 Anglo-Persian
Agreement, as well as the growing dissatisfaction with the interventionist
policies of the Iranian government to increase his popularity and extend
his influence over the city. Beginning on April 6, 1920, in a series of
confrontations, Khiyabani’s supporters overwhelmed government author-
ities in the city, some of whom were forced to leave Tabriz. By 8 April,
Khiyabani had seized the reins of power in the provincial capital. In
distinguishing his home province from the Republic of Azerbaijan that
had been created in southern Caucasus, Khiyabani changed the name of
the province from Azerbaijan to Azadistan (Land of Liberty) and issued
stamps for his newly established mini state.70
According to those who supported the Azerbaijani leader, Khiyabani
was an Iranian nationalist who despised the corrupt and pro-British polit-
ical establishment in Tehran and advocated the creation of a democratic
system of government for the country. In his speeches and articles, he
reportedly denounced the Anglo-Persian Agreement signed in August
1919. As did other Iranian nationalists, Khiyabani believed that the 1919
agreement converted Iran into a British protectorate. The Azerbaijani

70 Ali Azari, Qiyam-e Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani Dar Tabriz, p. 299. See also,
Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 873.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 143

leader was equally anti-Bolshevik and vehemently opposed pro-Bolshevik

elements in Tabriz. According to the same Iranian sources, he advo-
cated the promotion of Persian language among Azerbaijani children and
utilizing it to teach them Iranian national history.71 To express his soli-
darity and support for the official language of the country, Khiyabani
insisted on using Persian as the language of his declarations and articles.72
In sharp contrast to these sympathetic portrayals, the historian, Ahmad
Kasravi, an active member of a rival faction of the Democrat Party in
Tabriz, painted Khiyabani as an ambitious and authoritarian politician,
who lacked a clear ideology and a cohesive political platform, but appealed
to the illiterate masses by delivering pompous and ostentatious sermons
that included references to Charles Darwin in Azerbaijani Turkish.73
Based on these contradictory statements, it is extremely difficult to reach
a conclusive assessment of Khiyabani’s ideology and political objectives.
But, even if we agree with his most ardent supporters that he was not
a separatist, it is impossible to deny that in seizing Āli Qāpu (the seat
of the government) and appointing himself governor-general, and Khiya-
bani was effectively establishing an autonomous regime in Tabriz with
its own military force and government officials. His attempt to orga-
nize a new army and appoint loyal officials to various governmental
posts in the province without any consultation or approval by the central
government clearly demonstrate that Khiyabani sought to assume exec-
utive power and utilize his newly gained authority to break away from
Tehran. As an Iranian nationalist, he may have cultivated the dream of
establishing a strong autonomous regime in Tabriz and using Azerbaijan
as his operational base to spread his power to Tehran and beyond.
Khiyabani’s activities caused panic in Tehran. The newly appointed
governor of Azerbaijan, Ain al-Dowleh, who was staying, at the time,
in Zanjan, approximately 186 miles (299 kilometers) southeast of Tabriz,
was ordered to proceed rapidly to his assigned post. Many both in Tabriz
and Tehran, however, viewed the eighty-year-old Ain al-Dowleh as the
personification of reactionary politics in Iran. This was especially true of
the Democrats in Tabriz. The constitutional movement of 1905–1906

71 Abdollah Bahrami, Khaterat-e Abdollah Bahrami, p. 635.

72 Ibid.
73 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 845, pp. 871–872.
144 M. KIA

had commenced partially in response to the corrupt, arbitrary and repres-

sive policies of Ain al-Dowleh, who at the time served as the country’s
prime minister. On 19 April, eleven days after Khiyabani had imposed his
rule over Tabriz, the new governor arrived in the city. Khiyabani refused
to meet with the new governor or accept his authority. The Azerbaijani
leader insisted that the Democrats of Tabriz could manage the affairs of
the province without any interference from the weak and corrupt central
government in Tehran. For the next two months, a cat and mouse game
ensued between the new governor and the Azerbaijani leader over the
control of Tabriz.
The battle between Ain al-Dowleh and Khiyabani undermined the
authority of the central government in northwestern Iran, especially after
the governor and his entourage left Tabriz in June 1920.74 Though he
had managed to force Ain al-Dowleh out of the city, Khiyabani failed
to build the political organization and the military force to impose his
authority beyond the confines of the provincial capital.
The absence of effective governmental authority in Tabriz created a
vacuum that allowed Simko to resume his raids. Reneging on his promises
to Philipov, Simko raised the flag of rebellion and once again pillaged
villages and towns in the districts of Salmas and Urumiyeh. Simko’s men
carried off grain, cattle, and household goods. In several villages, they
also killed the defenseless inhabitants. The ferocity and brutality of these
attacks forced the population to flee their villages and seek protection in
Tabriz.
While Azerbaijan was sliding into chaos, on May 18, 1920, Soviet Red
Army detachments landed at various points on the Iranian coast of the
Caspian Sea, including the port of Anzali where a British detachment was
in occupation. The British had no other choice but to withdraw on 31
May. The Russian force then advanced from Anzali to Rasht, the capital of
the Caspian province of Gilan. On June 5, 1920, Mirza Kuchak Khan, the
leader of the Jangal movement, declared the establishment of the Soviet
Republic of Gilan. The Soviet military intervention was directed against
Great Britain and the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 1919. It was
also intended to shake up the political situation in Tehran, where the
Anglophile prime minister, Vosuq al-Dowleh, was forced to tender his
resignation on June 24, 1920.

74 Ibid., p. 887.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 145

The new prime minister, Mirza Hassan Khan Moshir al-Dowleh,

appointed the veteran politician, Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, as the
new governor of Azerbaijan. Mokhber al-Saltaneh was saddled with the
task of suppressing Khiyabani’s revolt, pacifying Simko, and restoring
law and order to the entire province. In August 1920, even before the
arrival of the new governor, Simko used the absence of any governmental
authority in western Azerbaijan to occupy the district capital of Salmas
and appoint his close confidant, Teymur Agha, as its governor.75
In early autumn 1920, the Kemalist Turks furnished Simko with “arms
and ammunition,” as well as military advisers “to instruct his men in
the use of mountain-gun and machine-guns.”76 For Turkish national-
ists, who were fighting the Armenians in eastern Anatolia at the time,
Simko’s army could be used as an auxiliary force to reinforce their eastern
flank, especially to counter the threat posed by Armenians and Assyrians,
some of whom were planning to cross into Iranian territory from Iraq
with large stores of arms. Both Simko and Kemalist Turks were becoming
increasingly alarmed about the developments in British-controlled Iraq,
especially after the Assyrian refugees, who lived at Baqubah refugee camp,
northeast of Baghdad, declared their intention to return to their homes
and communities. Both Simko and the Turkish nationalists were anxious
to prevent the return of British-backed armed Christians to northwestern
Iran. Simko, in particular, was determined “not to yield up an iota of
the gains” which he had acquired “at the expense of the Christians”
during the Great War, when the Ottoman Turks, backed by Kurdish
irregular units, had chased thousands of Assyrians and Armenians out of
their towns and villages.77 As a British report stated, Simko’s “primary
objective” was “to oppose the return of the Christian refugees whose
progress from Urumia to Kurdish districts on both sides of the frontier”

75 C.S. Edwards, Kazvin Division Report for August 1920, Doc. 368 [C 14,882/
14882/34] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 16, p. 270.
76 Ernest Bristow, Tabriz, December 31, 1920, Report of Azerbaijan during 1920, Doc.
483 [E 3497/3497/34] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 349.
77 Iraq Civil Commissioner, Wilson, Arnold Talbot and Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Review
of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, p. 69.
146 M. KIA

was “exciting lively apprehensions among the Kurds” and Iranian author-
ities.78 It is not surprising, therefore, that Simko, supported by Sayyid
Taha II, hurriedly collected his forces in preparation of a confrontation
with returning Assyrian Christians.79 The military assistance provided to
Simko by nationalist Turks empowered the Kurdish chief, not only to
prevent the return of Assyrians to western Azerbaijan, but also to fight
the Armenians, should they attempt to advance toward the district of
Van in eastern Anatolia.80 As with the Hamidiye cavalry units in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Simko’s tribal army was used
by Turkish nationalists to patrol the Iranian-Turkish frontier, while, at
the same time, preventing any Armenian or Assyrian armed band from
establishing itself in western Azerbaijan at the rear of the Kemalist forces.
When the nationalist Turks defeated Armenia in November–December
1920, and the Assyrian refugees in Iraq, led by their commander, Agha
Petros, failed to proceed over the Iran-Iraq border, Simko once again
re-directed his attention against Khoy. The Kurdish chief threatened to
capture the predominantly Shi’i Azerbaijani town unless the inhabitants
drove out the relative of the Khan of Maku, who served as the governor
of the town, a persona non-grata to Simko and his supporters.81 By late
autumn 1920, the arms and ammunition supplied by Turkish nationalists
had allowed the Kurdish chief to emerge as the dominant power in the
districts of Khoy, Urumiyeh, and Salmas.82

78 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, November 24, 1920, [E 2004/2004/34], No. 168,

Enclosure in No. 1. in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 850.
79 Ernest Bristow, Tabriz, December 31, 1920, Report of Azerbaijan during 1920, Doc.
483 [E 3497/3497/34] in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 349.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, November 24, 1920, [E 2004/2004/34], No. 168,
Enclosure in No. 1., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 850.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 147

Sayyid Taha II as Simko’s Ambassador

With Simko resuming his revolt, Sayyid Taha II, the advocate of an
independent Kurdish state, returned from Turkish Kurdistan, first to
Sulduz and thence to Lahijan and Urumiyeh, all along conducting propa-
ganda among various Kurdish tribes for the union of Turkish and Iranian
Kurdistan in an independent state.83 As with Simko, Sayyid Taha II’s
independence project called for unifying all Kurdish tribes behind the
idea of cleansing the region of its non-Kurdish population, especially the
Assyrians, Armenians, but also the Turkic Qara Papakhs, who inhabited
over 110 villages in the districts of Sulduz and Sardasht.84 As part of his
propaganda, the Sayyid claimed that his mission to create a Kurdish state
enjoyed British support.85 In their campaign to create an independent
Kurdistan, Simko, and Sayyid Taha II posited that they could not accom-
plish their political objectives without military and financial support from
Britain, the European imperial power ruling not only India, but also a
vast territory in the Middle East, including Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan,
and Iraq.
Acting as Simko’s ambassador and chief negotiator, Sayyid Taha II
had already travelled to Iraq in spring 1919. During this visit, Sayyid
Taha II pressed British officials in Baghdad “for a united Kurdistan under
British auspices,” including the Kurds in Iran.86 When British authorities
explained to him that their support for a Kurdish state did not include the
Kurds of Iran and that he and Simko could not expect any assistance from
Britain, Sayyid Taha II expressed “great disappointment” and stated that
the separation of Iranian Kurdistan from Iran “was certain to come,” even
if the British government withheld its consent.87 In September 1920,
Sayyid Taha returned to Iraq. While the British planned to discuss repa-
triation for Assyrian Christians who had fled Urumiyeh in July–August

83 Ibid.
84 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, January 17, 1921, [39912004/34], No. 21, Enclosure
in No. 1., Monthly Summary for November 1920, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965,
Volume 5, p. 855.
85 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, November 24, 1920, [E 2004/2004/34], No. 168,
Enclosure in No. 1., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 850.
86 Iraq Civil Commissioner, Wilson, Arnold Talbot and Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Review
of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia, p. 69.
87 Ibid.
148 M. KIA

1918, Sayyid Taha II intended “to obtain British support, i.e. arms and
money for an independent Kurdistan.”88
The timing for Sayyid Taha II’s visit was not accidental. Inside Iran, the
Azerbaijani democrat, Khiyabani, had effectively destroyed the authority
of the central government in Tabriz, creating a new political entity that
enjoyed independence from Tehran. In Gilan, Mirza Kuchak Khan had
declared the establishment of the Soviet Republic of Gilan with direct
support from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, on August 10, 1920,
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan had signed the Treaty of Sèvres with the
representatives of the Ottoman government. The treaty effectively abol-
ished the Ottoman Empire and carved up its territory into new political
entities. Articles 63–64 of the treaty provided for a two-step approach to
the establishment of an independent Kurdish state. First, an autonomous
Kurdish state was to be created “east of the Euphrates, south of the
southern boundary of Armenia and north of the frontier of Turkey with
Syria and Mesopotamia.”89 Within a year, Kurds could appeal to the
League of Nations to seek full independence. If the League decided in
their favor, the treaty stated that Turkey would “renounce all rights and
title over these areas.”90 Sayyid Taha II believed that the rise of Khiya-
bani in Tabriz and the establishment of a Soviet Republic in Gilan signaled
the beginning of the disintegration of the Iranian state. He further inter-
preted the Treaty of Sèvres as a new commitment by European powers,
especially Great Britain, to create a Kurdish state.
The British authorities in Iraq intended to use Sayyid Taha II to
consolidate their authority in northern Iraq and neutralize the threat
posed by Turkish nationalists to Rawanduz and Dasht-e Harir.91 Arnold
Wilson, the British civil commissioner in Baghdad, offered Sayyid
Taha II the governorship of the Shamdinan (in southeastern Anatolia),
Rawanduz, and Dasht-e Harir districts (in northern Iraq) “in return for an
allowance.”92 The Sayyid made four stipulations before he could accept

88 Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918–1920,

p. 308.
89 Karčić, Hamza, “Sèvres at 100: The Peace Treaty that Partitioned the Ottoman
Empire,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Vol. 40, No. 3, 470–479, p. 472.
90 Ibid.
91 İhsan Şerif Kaymaz, “Britain’s Policy toward Kurdistan at the End of the First World
War,” Turkish Journal of International Relations, www.alternativesjournal.net, p. 110.
92 Ibid.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 149

the offer: “first, that a general amnesty be proclaimed; second, that the
country be organized in autonomous groups and that no attempt be made
to set up a single chief in Kurdistan; third, that the Kurds not be placed
under Armenian or Nestorian [Assyrian] domination; and fourth, that
the British government provide material assistance.”93 British authorities
accepted these conditions, but Sayyid Taha II was beholden to Simko and
dependent militarily on the Shakak chief.
Though they were well aware of Simko’s influence and military capa-
bilities, the British authorities in Iraq did not provide him with any direct
assistance. They viewed the Kurdish chief as an adventurer and oppor-
tunist who sold his services to the highest bidder. He had, after all,
collaborated at one point or another with the Qajar state, Young Turks,
Czarist Russia, Kemalist Turks, and even the Bolsheviks. He was also the
murderer of the Assyrian Patriarch, Mar Shimun, and, as such, could
not be accepted as an ally of a European power that claimed to act as
the protector of the Assyrian community in Iraq. More importantly, the
British were well aware that the success of Simko’s project could result in
the dismemberment of the Iranian state.
The defense and security of India were the paramount preoccupa-
tions of the British government, and the British, therefore, viewed Iran,
Afghanistan, and the waters of the Persian Gulf as the borderlands that
had to be protected from both political instability and the expansionist
policies of the Soviet Union. Though imbued with some of the most
condescending, pompous, and openly racist views regarding Iranians,
the British colonial administrators could not ignore certain inherited
maxims.94 The most important of these maxims were: (1) that the unity
and territorial integrity of Iran as a buffer state between the Soviet Union
and British India was essential to the defense and security of India; (2)
that the requirements of Indian security and defense also necessitated
the exclusion of any other great power from the Persian Gulf region;
(3) that British prestige in South Asia and the Middle East rendered it
impossible for Britain to relax its traditional efforts to maintain a domi-
nant position in Iran; and (4) that the oil fields of southwestern Iran

93 Ibid.
94 See for example the following statement: “The gift of reason has not been granted
to the Persians, and the intuition on which they rely is feckless and often rudimentary.”
Nicolson to Chamberlain, Gulhek, September 30, 1926, [E 5994/92/34], No. 486, in
Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, Series IA, Volume II, p. 813.
150 M. KIA

run by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company were a British imperial interest

that had to be protected by force if necessary.95 Additionally, Britain had
signed the Anglo-Persian Agreement in August 1919, which, if ratified
by the Iranian Majlis, would have effectively converted the country into
a protectorate of the British Empire. The ultimate strategy of Britain
was, therefore, to prevent the disintegration of the Iranian state either
under pressure from the Soviet Union or from an internal rebellion. This
did not mean, however, that Britain favored the emergence of a strong
and highly centralized Iran. The preservation of Iran as a loose aggregate
of autonomous political and administrative entities benefited the British
because it allowed them to maintain their influence through multiple
power centers in the country, including the Sheikh of Mohammareh, the
Bakhtiyari chiefs, the Baluchi sardars, and so on.
While they opposed Kurdish nationalist activities in Iran, British offi-
cials in Baghdad encouraged Kurdish nationalistic sentiments in Iraq.
Though subjected to a great deal of internal debates and disagreements,
the gist of the British policy in the early 1920s was to create a Kurdish
autonomous region in northern Iraq as a means of thwarting Turkish
nationalist claims on Mosul and the surrounding districts.96 Thus, it is
not surprising that the British officials in Iraq worked hard “to persuade
the Kurds of Iraq to use their own language,” to publish a Kurdish news-
paper and to employ Kurdish “for all official correspondence,”97 thereby
replacing Turkish, the language used in government offices, and Persian,
the language of private correspondence.98

End of Khiyabani
Until late autumn of 1921, the central government in Tehran concen-
trated its meager military resources not in Azerbaijan, but in the Caspian
province of Gilan, where the leader of the Jangal movement, Mirza
Kuchak Khan, had established the Soviet Republic of Gilan with support

95 Ibid.
96 Kaveh Bayat, “Iran and the ‘Kurdish Question,’” Middle East Report 247 (Summer
2008).
97 Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan: Experiences of a Political Officer 1918-1920,
p. 44.
98 C. J. Edmonds, “A Kurdish Newspaper: Rozh-i Kurdistan,” in Journal of the Central
Asian Society, 12:1, 83–90, p. 84.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 151

from the Soviet Red Army. Because of the presence of Soviet forces
and the close proximity of Gilan to Tehran, the Iranian central govern-
ment was focused almost exclusively on suppressing the Jangal movement.
Both the British forces stationed in Qazvin, almost ninety-four miles or
152 kilometers west of Tehran, as well as the Russian commanders of
the Cossack Brigade, who had remained in Iran after the victory of the
Bolshevik revolution, believed that Mirza Kuchak Khan enjoyed sufficient
military force with support from Moscow to march to Tehran and seize
the capital. With much of its fighting force concentrated on countering
Mirza Kuchak Khan, the government could only spare small detach-
ments of Cossacks and gendarmes for the security and protection of other
provinces, including Azerbaijan. The prevailing attitude in Tehran was
that the situation in Azerbaijan with regard to both Khiyabani in Tabriz
and Simko on the Turkish-Iranian frontier had better be left alone until
the threat posed by Bolshevik forces in Gilan had been dealt with.
Though slow in its response to the unfolding crisis in Azerbaijan,
Tehran remained anxious to re-impose at least its nominal authority over
the province. Thus, in August 1920, the prime minister, Mirza Hassan
Khan Moshir al-Dowleh, dispatched the veteran politician, Mokhber al-
Saltaneh Hedayat, to Tabriz as the new governor of Azerbaijan. The
new governor arrived in Tabriz accompanied by a small group of officers
and personal attendants. These included Major Hassan Malekzadeh, who
would be appointed the commander of gendarmerie forces at Savojbolagh
(Mahabad).99 The new governor also dispatched an army officer, Zafar
al-Dowleh (later Brigadier General Hassan Moqaddam), with a detach-
ment to Tasuj north of Lake Urumiyeh. Mokhber al-Saltaneh’s mission
was clear: he had to restore the central government’s authority in Tabriz,
where Khiyabani had established himself as the unchallenged ruler. Once
he had consolidated his position in Tabriz, the new governor planned to
quell tribal uprisings in the province, especially the attacks by Shahseven
tribes in eastern Azerbaijan and Simko’s rebellion in western Azerbaijan.
Declaring himself as the sole legitimate ruler in Tabriz, Khiyabani
governed the city with a small force, but he could not extend his authority
beyond the confines of the city or collect any taxes; the Shahseven tribes

99 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 182.

152 M. KIA

openly flouted him, and they repeatedly defeated the military expedi-
tions he sent against them.100 The lack of funds and his failure to
suppress the powerful tribal chiefs of the province, significantly under-
mined Khiyabani’s prestige and power. When Mokhber al-Saltaneh arrived
in Tabriz, he requested a face-to-face meeting with Khiyabani. Suspicious
of Mokhber al-Saltaneh’s true intentions, Khiyabani, who had occupied
the governor’s mansion at Āli Qāpu, refused to meet.101 Instead, he
dispatched some of his closest confidants to meet with the new governor
and encourage him to return to Tehran, because Khiyabani and his
supporters had already developed a plan for the growth and progress
of Azerbaijan.102 The pro-Khiyabani forces also refused to vacate the
various government offices, which they had occupied since the departure
of the previous governor in June.103 At this critical juncture, Khiya-
bani made a fatal mistake by dispatching his most loyal military units
to suppress a tribal rebellion in Qarajadagh northeast of Tabriz.104 The
absence of pro-Khiyabani forces allowed Mokhber al-Saltaneh to mobilize
pro-government forces and unleash them against the rebel democrat.
In his memoirs, Mokhber al-Saltaneh claimed that he had tried to
reach a negotiated settlement with the democrats but that Khiyabani’s
supporters insisted that the governor resign his post and return to
Tehran.105 The British intelligence reports indicated that after he had
failed to convince Khiyabani to meet with him in person; the new
governor made an arrangement with the Cossack units stationed in Tabriz
to seize all government buildings and installations.106 On 12 September,

100 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, September 11, 1920, [C 14858/14858/34], No.

138., Enclosure in No. 1. in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 840.
101 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 887, p. 889.
102 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat. Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 316.
103 Report on the Gendarmarie Revolt in Tabriz, February 1922, Doc. 253 [E 4753/
6/34] in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 17, p. 322.
104 Ali Azari, Qiyam-e Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani Dar Tabriz, p. 490.
105 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 316.
106 Report on the Gendarmarie Revolt in Tabriz, February 1922, Doc. 253 [E 4753/
6/34] in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 17, p. 322.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 153

the new governor left the city and visited the barracks of the Cossack
division on the outskirts of Tabriz. Confident of his power, Khiyabani
ignored the governor’s activities and dispatched the loyal gendarmerie
units to re-open one of the roads outside the city, which had been blocked
by Shahseven tribesmen. With the gendarmes leaving Tabriz, Khiyabani
lacked sufficient military force even to defend himself.
The following day, on 13 September, the inevitable clash between
Khiyabani and the new governor backed by Cossack units and irreg-
ular tribal levies, erupted into a full-scale confrontation.107 Mokhber
al-Saltaneh ordered pro-government forces to seize control of the city
and detain Khiyabani. After four hours of fighting, the Cossacks routed
the supporters of Khiyabani and imposed their control over the provin-
cial capital.108 The next day, on 14 September, Khiyabani was shot and
killed in the cellar of a neighbor’s house where he was hiding.109 Several
decades later, Mokhber al-Saltaneh claimed that Khiyabani had committed
suicide after exchange of fire with the Cossacks who had discovered his
hide-out, which had been pointed out to them by a young girl.110
Khiyabani’s supporters vanished, and “the Democrats as a party disap-
peared for the moment, but they never forgave Mokhber al-Saltaneh,”
and they sat in waiting for an opportunity to exact their revenge against a

107 Tehran Monthly Summary, September 1920, Doc. 369 [C 13012/82/34] in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 16, p. 272.
108 Ibid. See also, Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 892. Ali Azari,
Qiyam-e Sheikh Mohammad Khiyabani Dar Tabriz, p. 490, p. 494.
109 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 318. See also, Norman to
Curzon, Tehran, October 13, 1920, [C 13012/82/34], No. 143, Enclosure in No. 1.
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 5, p. 844. The British intelligence report
claimed that Khiyabani was killed after “offering resistance to the Cossacks” who had
“attempted to arrest him.” This statement clearly indicates that the source of this report
was Mokhber al-Saltaneh who intended to put the blame for Khiyabani’s death on the
Azerbaijani leader rather than himself.
110 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 318.
154 M. KIA

governor they blamed for the death of their leader.111 Some of Khiya-
bani’s supporters who fled Tabriz established contact with Simko and
encouraged the Kurdish chief, who had already restarted his rebellion
against the government, to intensify his attacks. The avenging democrats
dispatched a certain Aghazadeh as their envoy to Simko to negotiate an
alliance with the Kurdish leader. Once the two parties had reached an
understanding, Simko appointed Aghazadeh as his governor of Urumiyeh
in early winter 1921. With the support and blessing of Simko, the wily
democrat negotiated the surrender of the largest town in western Azer-
baijan to the Kurdish chief. Thus, Simko’s position by the beginning
of 1921 had improved significantly. He was in control of the districts
of Salmas and Urumiyeh, and he enjoyed the support of the Tabriz
democrats. Though principally focused on quelling the Jangal movement
in the Caspian province of Gilan, the central government in Tehran was
becoming increasingly alarmed about the spread of Simko’s rebellion in
northwestern Iran.
The threat posed by Simko in western Azerbaijan and the Shahseven
tribes in the eastern part of the province not only challenged and under-
mined the power and prestige of the central government, but it also
provided justification for the Bolsheviks and the nationalist Turks to inter-
fere in the internal affairs of the country. In early January 1921, a British
report estimated the strength of the Bolshevik troops in Astara in the
province of Gilan on the border with eastern Azerbaijan and southern
Caucasus at 500 men.112 This force, however, increased until 4,000 men
were concentrated with the object of invading the Ardabil district in
eastern Azerbaijan, using the punishment of unruly Shahseven tribes as
the justification.113 Meanwhile, the nationalist Turks were trying to take

111 Report on the Gendarmarie Revolt in Tabriz, February 1922, Doc. 253 [E 4753/
6/34] in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 17, p. 322.
112 Tehran, Monthly Summary for January 1921, Doc. 515 [E 6158/2004/34], in
British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume
16, p. 386.
113 Ibid.
 5 FALL OF EMPIRES AND SIMKO’S REVOLT 155

advantage of Simko’s quarrel with the Khan of Maku over control of

Khoy to expand their military operations into western Azerbaijan and
use the region as a base to attack Armenia and open a corridor for their
future campaigns against the British in northern Iraq.114 Recognizing the
presence of foreign forces on the margins of the province allowed Simko
to continue his intrigue with both the Turks and the Bolsheviks, while
Sayyid Taha II continued his vigorous propaganda for an independent
Kurdistan.115

114 Ibid.
115 Ibid. See also, Tehran, Monthly Summary for November 1920, Doc. 487 [E 3991/
2004/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 16, p. 356.
 CHAPTER 6

Simko’s Wars and the Rise of Reza Shah

With Khiyabani out of the picture, Mokhber al-Saltaneh switched his

focus to tribal rebellions outside Tabriz, especially Simko’s uprising in
western Azerbaijan. The reports dispatched from Azerbaijan in autumn
1920, indicated that much of the province was practically independent of
the authority of the central government in Tehran. In the northwestern
corner of the province, Eqbal al-Saltaneh, the Khan of Maku, had long
ruled independently, conducting his own foreign policy and negotiating
his own agreements with Russians and Turks. In November 1920, Eqbal
al-Saltaneh allowed Turkish nationalist forces to pass freely through his
territory to attack Armenian nationalists, despite repeated instructions
from the Iranian government that he should observe the official policy
of neutrality and prevent the passage of belligerents through his terri-
tory.1 To the south of Maku, Simko dominated the districts of Salmas and
Urumiyeh. Having received arms and ammunition, first from remnants
of the Ottoman 15th Corps commanded by General Kazim Karabekir,
and subsequently from the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa
Kemal, Simko and Sayyid Taha II seized the town of Urumiyeh in

1 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, November 24, 1920, [E 2004/2004/34], No. 168.,

Enclosure in No. 1., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 5, p. 849.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 157

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_6
158 M. KIA

December 1920.2 The Kurdish chief’s principal objectives were to free

himself from the authority of the governor-general of Azerbaijan and
block the return of Christian refugees, mainly Assyrians and Armenians,
to their towns and villages.

Sayyid Taha II and Simko’s Revolt

Despite Simko’s importance, the leading spirit in the Kurdish indepen-
dence movement was Sayyid Taha II, who hailed from one of the most
prominent Kurdish families of the Ottoman Empire. An advocate of an
independent Kurdistan, Sayyid Taha II conducted propaganda among the
Iranian Kurds for the union of Iranian and Turkish Kurdistan in an inde-
pendent state.3 A capable propagandist Sayyid Taha II had spread the
rumor that his mission enjoyed the full support of the British authorities
in northern Iraq. The propaganda war waged by Sayyid Taha II forced
the British consul in Tabriz to hand an official note to the governor
of Azerbaijan stating that the British government had “no intention
whatsoever of encouraging” a Kurdish national movement and that the
rumor that the British government had assured the Kurdish leadership
of its support was “without foundation.”4 Though the British refused to
support Simko, Sayyid Taha did not give up. To gain the confidence of
the British, or at least to remain in their good graces, Sayyid Taha went so
far as to act as a self-appointed informant for the British. In a letter dated
May 18, 1921, the Sayyid informed a British diplomat that a Kurdish
delegation from Sulaymaniyah had travelled to Van to seek the support
of the Turkish nationalist leader, Mustafa Kemal, against the British in
northern Iraq and that the Turkish leader had provided the Kurds with
fifty Turkish soldiers, artillery, and a machine gun.5

2 Tehran, Monthly Summary for December 1920, Doc. 503 [E 4923/2004/34], in

British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
16, p. 368.
3 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, November 24, 1920, [E 2004/2004/34], No. 168.,
Enclosure in No. 1., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 5, p, 850.
4 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, January 17, 1921, [E 3991/2004/34], No. 21., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 5, p. 855.
5 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, June 17, 1921, [E 9979/2004/34], No. 97., Intelli-
gence Summary No. 6., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 29.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 159

Sayyid Taha II’s talents were not confined to political propaganda and
intelligence gathering for British authorities in Iraq. He was also a charis-
matic military leader with an exceptional aptitude for leading men on the
battlefield. On February 18, 1921, a Kurdish force under the command of
Sayyid Taha II captured the port of Haydarabad south of Lake Urumiyeh
and quickly pushed toward Sulduz, thus expanding the territory under
Simko’s rule.6 One of the strategic objectives of Sayyid Taha II and
Simko was to establish direct contact with the Kurdish tribes of Kurdistan
and Kermanshah and eventually to link up with the Lur tribal groups
of western Iran. A Kurdish movement, led by Sayyid Taha II acting as
its spiritual head and Simko as its military commander, could poten-
tially convince many Kurdish tribal chiefs to abandon their tribal rivalries
and throw their support behind the idea of establishing an independent
Kurdistan.
As Simko and Sayyid Taha II’s campaign to establish an independent
Kurdish state gained momentum, a political earthquake shook the foun-
dation of Iran’s power structure in Tehran. In the early hours of February
21, 1921, detachments of the Iranian Cossack brigade forces, under the
command of Colonel Reza Khan, seized Tehran and put it under martial
law. Shortly after the Cossacks occupied the capital, the former journalist
turned politician, Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabai, was appointed prime
minister. The new prime minister ordered the imprisonment of a large
number of politicians, many of whom remained in detention for the next
three months. The commander of the Cossack division that had marched
to the capital, Reza Khan, was elevated to the command of the Cossack
Brigade, receiving the title of Sardar Sepah (Commander of the Army).
In April, Sayyid Ziya reshuffled his cabinet and appointed Reza Khan as
the minister of war.
The February 1921 coup d’état in Tehran did not have an immediate
impact on Simko’s activities. Enjoying direct support from the Turkish
nationalists in eastern Anatolia, the Bolsheviks in the Caucasus, and the
remnants of the Democrat Party previously based in Tabriz, Simko seized
Urumiyeh, and began to threaten Khoy in January–February 1921.7 With
assistance from the chiefs of Dehbokri and Mamash tribes, Simko also

6 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, March 31, 1921, [E 6160/2004/34], No. 39.,

Enclosure No. 1., February 1921, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 9.
7 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, February 23, 1921, [E 4923/2004/34], No. 28.,
Enclosure in No. 1., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 5, p. 861.
160 M. KIA

organized a force of 1,000 armed men to attack Savojbolagh to the

south.8 A substantial portion of Simko’s military capabilities, however,
derived from the direct assistance he received from the Turkish national-
ists. A British report for February 1921, stated that one Turkish officer
had spent several months with Simko, while another, who represented
the Turkish commander at Bayezid (present-day Doğubayezit) in eastern
Anatolia near the Iran-Ottoman border, was “trying to settle the dispute
between Simko and the Khan of Maku.”9 Late in the same year, the
British consul in Tabriz wrote that many “Turkish nationalist deserters”
were also “joining Simko.”10
While maintaining a close relationship with the nationalist Turks,
Simko also continued his “intrigues with the Bolsheviks,”11 though the
extent of Simko’s relationship with the communist regime remains uncer-
tain. What is fascinating, however, is that the Kurdish chief’s military
successes had brought him to the attention of another armed movement
supported by the Bolsheviks in northern Iran. In June 1921, a messenger
arrived in Azerbaijan with letters inviting Simko to join the revolution
against the Iranian government staged by the Bolshevik-backed Jangal
movement, which had established an independent Soviet socialist republic
in the Caspian province of Gilan.12
Increasingly alarmed by the emergence of a centralizing government
in Tehran and convinced that without direct support from a major Euro-
pean power, his project of creating a Kurdish state was doomed to fail,
Simko appealed once again to British officials in Iraq for political and
military support. To ensure a positive response from the British, the
proud Kurdish chief humbled himself and admitted in a secret memo-
randum that he was well aware that his reputation was “one of treachery

8 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, March 14, 1921, [E 6158/2004/34], No. 34., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 5.
9 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, March 31, 1921, [E 6160/2004/34], No. 39., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 9.
10 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, August 25, 1921, [E 11692/2004/34], No. 163.,
Intelligence Summary No. 16., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 64.
11 Monthly Summary for January 1921, Doc. 515 [E 6158/2004/34], British Docu-
ments on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print,
Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 16, p. 386.
12 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, June 17, 1921, [E 9979/2004/34], Intelligence
Summary No. 6., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 29.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 161

and deceit in dealing with Governments.”13 He reassured the British,

however, that none of his actions had any “hostile intention with regard
to the British government.”14 On the contrary, he had “a sincere desire
to be on friendly terms” with British officials in Iraq, and he wished
to request from them to approach British decision-makers on his behalf
“for the purpose of arranging some mutual understanding.”15 To achieve
this goal, he was willing to go south “as far as Ushnu [Oshnaviyeh]
for the sake of meeting any British representative sent by the British
government.”16 Simko’s pleas for British support remained unanswered.

Battle of Tasuj
Simko’s growing power and his appeal to the British caused anxiety and
fear in Tabriz. The governor of Azerbaijan, Mokhber al-Saltaneh, was
convinced that Simko was nothing but a stooge of the British colonial
administrators in Iraq who were determined to keep Iran unstable and
chaotic by fomenting tribal rebellions. Initially, the governor tried to
reach an amicable settlement with Simko through Turkish officers with
close connection to the Kurdish chief, including one who had spent
several months with him.17 These mediations, however, failed to produce
any concrete results, partially because the governor demanded that Simko
return the guns he had received from the Turkish nationalists.18
With negotiations at a standstill, Mokhber al-Saltaneh opted for the
military option. He mobilized the small and poorly armed Cossack and
gendarmerie units, as well as irregular tribal units, under his control.
Though he had no expertise or training in military matters, Mokhber
al-Saltaneh was determined to crush the Kurdish revolt by relying exclu-
sively on his own ill-conceived and grossly flawed plans. As one Iranian
army officer who participated in the campaign against Simko wrote many

13 Susan Meiselas, Kurdistan in the Shadow of History, (New York: Random House,
1997), p. 101.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Monthly Summary for February 1921, Doc. 516 [E 6160/2004/34], British Docu-
ments on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print,
Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 16, p. 390.
18 Ibid.
162 M. KIA

years later, the governor “had read a German book about the conduct of
war and imagined himself able to conduct military operations against the
tribes.”19 It is not surprising that all of Mokhber al-Saltaneh’s military
operations proved disastrous, because he divided government forces into
several detachments and scattered them in a large area extending from
the district of Maku in the north to Savojbolagh in the south. According
to a British intelligence report, “there was no co-ordination” among
government troops, and “each detachment was ignorant of the move-
ments of the others.”20 There was also “no definite plan of campaign,
and the troops in the sphere of operations” were exceedingly small, and
“ill-supplied with the ammunition of which large stores were available at
Tabriz.”21 Therefore, as long as Mokhber al-Saltaneh was in charge of
military operations in Azerbaijan, Simko and his much larger and better-
armed Kurdish force managed to defend the territory under their control,
while at the same time inflicting humiliating defeats against government
forces dispatched against them.
Mokhber al-Saltaneh commenced his campaign against Simko by
sending a force of about 800 Cossacks and gendarmes under the
command of Zafar al-Dowleh to attack the Kurdish chief from the
north.22 At the same time, a gendarmerie detachment under the
command of Major Hassan Malekzadeh was ordered to sail on the ship
Admiral from the port of Sharafkhaneh on the northeastern shore of
Lake Urumiyeh to the port of Danalu on the southeastern shore of
the lake and eventually establish itself at Savojbolagh south of Lake
Urumiyeh.23 By dividing his forces into two small armies, and by
dispatching a single battalion to Savojbolagh without cavalry cover and

19 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 59.

20 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 38, Tehran, September 24, 1922, Doc. 86
[E 12259/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 18, p. 125.
21 Ibid.
22 Report on Azerbaijan for 1921, Doc 248 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 299.
23 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 182. The British
intelligence reports estimated the size of the gendarmerie force in Savojbolagh to be 600.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 163

sufficient artillery, Mokhber al-Saltaneh condemned the hapless govern-

ment forces to devastating defeats at the hands of Simko and his much
larger and better-equipped army.24 The militarily astute and savvy Kurdish
chief realized that he enjoyed a clear superiority over the smaller forces
dispatched against him, both in size and quality of arms and artillery, and
he could, therefore, overwhelm them, one at a time, with great ease.
In his first move against government troops, Simko concentrated
his forces against Zafar al-Dowleh. The units under Zafar al-Dowleh’s
command consisted of a mixed body of gendarmes and cavalry detach-
ments based in Khoy and a Cossack detachment comprising 600 infantry
and 100 cavalry from Tabriz, which had set up camp at Sharafkhaneh.25
The gendarmes were ordered to march from Khoy southward toward
the village of Shakar Yazi northeast of Dilman, the district capital of
Salmas, while the Cossacks advanced westward from Sharafkhaneh toward
the village of Alma Saray, in close proximity to Shakar Yazi.26 The two
forces were to converge in Dilman and wage a coordinated attack against
Simko’s home base at Chahriq. Recognizing the gap between the two
armies that were approaching Dilman, Simko responded expeditiously. In
late March, 1921, a Kurdish army under the command of Simko surprised
Zafar al-Dowleh at Tasuj, north of Lake Urumiyeh.27 According to one
report, Simko’s forces comprised 1,000 horsemen and 500 infantrymen
and they carried the Turkish flag.28 Shocked by the swiftness of the attack,
the small government force panicked and retreated losing “170 men, 1
gun and 4 machine guns.”29 According to the British consul in Tabriz,
the Cossacks lost “2 mountain guns, 4 machine guns, 200,000 cartridges,

24 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 74.

25 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, April 3, 1921, Doc. 490 [E 4057/3997/34], in British
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 16,
p. 360.
26 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 183.
27 Ibid.
28 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, April 3, 1921, Doc. 490 [E 4057/3997/34], in British
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 16,
p. 360.
29 Report on Azerbaijan for 1921, Doc 248 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 299.
164 M. KIA

all their rifles and 60 horses.”30 The humiliated army also lost 300 camels,
three cannons, and a large quantity of arms. Zafar al-Dowleh saved his life
by seeking refuge on the ship Admiral.31 The defeat was total.
Astonishingly enough, the bungling Mokhber al-Saltaneh sent a tele-
gram to Major Malekzadeh in Savojbolagh that could only demoralize
the ill-prepared and poorly armed gendarmerie unit and its commander:
“Major Malekzadeh, Zafar al-Dowleh demonstrated a total lack of expe-
rience. You need to think of yourself.”32 To fill the vacuum created by
Zafar al-Dowleh’s defeated army, the central government dispatched a
detachment of 1,500 gendarmes composed of three infantry units, two
cavalry detachments and a machine gun squadron to Tabriz. These units
arrived in August 1921. The gendarmerie detachment was to proceed to
Savojbolagh where its Swedish commander, Colonel Lundberg, planned
to “undertake operations against Simko in conjunction with the govern-
ment troops already there.”33 On 25 August, the British consul at Tabriz
informed the British military attaché in Tehran that Simko was alarmed
by the arrival of the gendarmes and prevailed on the inhabitants of
Urumiyeh to send a messenger to the governor-general of Azerbaijan
at Tabriz, “asking that the troops may be dispersed and that the matter
may be settled by peaceful negotiations.”34 Lundberg, however, showed
no inclination to either negotiate or commence active operations against
Simko.35 He claimed that he needed time “for training and further recon-
naissance” and complained that he did not have sufficient funds to pay

30 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, April 3, 1921, Doc. 490 [E 4057/3997/34], in British

Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 16,
p. 360.
31 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat. Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 324.
32 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 183.
33 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 17 , Tehran, August 28, 1921, Doc 82 [E
11698/2004/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 121.
34 Ibid.
35 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 21, Tehran, October 2, 1921, Doc 130
(Secret) in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939.
Volume 17, p. 166.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 165

his men.36 Colonel Lundberg’s refusal to speed up his operations against

Simko allowed the Kurdish chief to switch his focus from the area north
of Lake Urumiyeh to Savojbolagh, where Major Hassan Malekzadeh had
established himself at the head of a small gendarmerie detachment.

Simko Captures Savojbolagh (Mahabad)

For much of summer 1921, Simko remained quiet as Malekzadeh
became increasingly suspicious of tribal activities in close proximity to
his command post. To allay his anxieties, Malekzadeh invited two local
Kurdish chiefs he suspected to a reception, “where he treacherously
arrested them and sent them to Tabriz.”37 The imprisonment of the
two Kurdish chiefs incensed Simko, who “made a forced march with
500 of his own tribesmen, to Savojbolagh, where he was joined by
local Kurds.”38 To deceive Malekzadeh, the Kurdish chief first feigned
an attack against government forces north of Lake Urumiyeh, but
instead marched south to Urumiyeh and entered the city on October
4, 1921. He did not, however, remain in Urumiyeh. Immediately
turning south, Simko, who had by then gathered a combined force
of “3,000 mounted men and 500 infantry,” surprised Malekzadeh and
his gendarmes stationed in Savojbolagh by attacking the town on 6
October.39 Malekzadeh had received repeated warnings about Simko’s
movements, including a message from one of the chiefs of the Mamash,
who had informed him that Simko was approaching Savojbolagh at the
head of a large force.40 After several hours of fierce fighting, Simko’s men

36 Ibid.
37 Report on Azerbaijan for 1921, Doc 246 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 299.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. See also, M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 24, Tehran, October 16,
1921, Doc 132 in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 169. See also the account of an eyewitness living in Savojbolagh
at the time of Simko’s attack in Augusta Gudhart, “The Blood of Martyrs,” Atlantic
Monthly, Vol. CXXX (July–December 1922).
40 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 185.
166 M. KIA

broke over the nearest hills on the morning of 7 October.41 Malekzadeh’s

hesitation and lack of clear strategy, as well as the small size of his ill-
equipped force, which was armed with a single “decrepit cannon” and
four machine guns, allowed Simko to inflict a crushing defeat on the
gendarmerie detachment.42
Until he surrendered, Malekzadeh was unaware that the Kurdish
force that had attacked him was led by Simko, thinking instead
that he had been attacked by an army commanded by Sayyid Taha
II. Thus, when he sent his message of surrender, he addressed Sayyid Taha
II: “Mr. Sayyid Taha, I defended the city with the last bullet, [but] the
tide of the war did not favor me. I will surrender provided that my men
and I are not disrespected.”43 Only after Simko responded to his message
did Malekzadeh realize that he had been defeated by a formidable force
led by Simko himself. Though he did not lead the attack on Savojbolagh,
Sayyid Taha did assist Simko in this successful campaign, a development
that greatly enhanced the Kurdish chief’s position and prestige among the
neighboring tribes.44
According to an eyewitness, who lived in Savojbolagh at the time of the
attack in October 1921, the dead of the gendarmerie garrison numbered
“about seven hundred.”45 An Iranian officer stationed at the time in Azer-
baijan claimed that 200 gendarmes were killed during the battle, while
Malekzadeh and 150 of his troopers were taken prisoner.46 In another
book, the same author stated that of a detachment of 800 men in Savojbo-
lagh; 400 gendarmes had been killed and 385 men had escaped.47 British
sources, however, stated that of the “700 men forming the garrison, 450

41 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, October 25, 1921, [E 14224/2004/34], No. 232.,

in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 90. For a firsthand account of Simko’s
attack on Savojbolagh, see, Augusta Gudhart, “The Blood of Martyrs,” p. 117.
42 Augusta Gudhart, “The Blood of Martyrs,” p. 117. See also, Amanollah Jahanbani,
Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, pp. 184–188.
43 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 188.
44 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, October 25, 1921, [E 14224/2004/34], No. 232.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 90.
45 Augusta Gudhart, “The Blood of Martyrs,” p. 120.
46 Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, p. 119.
47 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 58.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 167

were killed or captured,”48 while 250 gendarmes were “reported to have

escaped.”49 Another British report claimed that 470 out of 600 Iranian
officers and soldiers had been killed, a large number of them murdered
by Simko’s men with machine guns after they had surrendered.50 A more
recent article claims that the force under the command of Malekzadeh
consisted of 1,500 gendarmes and irregular units.51 The same source
maintained that with the exception of 300 gendarmes, who managed to
escape to Maragheh in eastern Azerbaijan and those who chose other
routes to flee the carnage, the remainder of the garrison stationed in
Savojbolagh was massacred, while Simko lost only fifty men.52
The Kurdish chief spared the lives of Malekzadeh and his deputy,
Mohammad Taqi Khan Ālp, and took them back with him to his head-
quarters at Chahriq before he allowed them to return to Tabriz, where
they were court-martialed.53 The rest of the detachment was stripped
naked and executed.54 As an eye witness described, “the captured Persian
garrison being led forth in small parties,” was “shot down by machine
gun fire. All of them were stripped to the waist and barefoot. Some
were made to crouch on the ground, while the rapid fire raked them
over. Others were made to stand in rows and sing the….national song
of Persia. As they sang, the machine guns swept them down like some

48 Persia Annual Report 1922. Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, July 16, 1924, [E 8057/
8057/34], No. 314., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 409.
49 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 24, Tehran, October 16, 1921, Doc 132 in
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
17, p. 169.
50 Report on Azerbaijan for 1921, Doc 248 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 299.
51 Sirwan Khosrozadeh, “Avamel-e Moasser dar Piruzi-ye Qoshun-e Mottahad al-Shekl
dar Jang-e Shakar Yāzi,” p. 60.
52 Ibid., pp. 60–61.
53 See Malekzadeh-ye Hirbad, Hassan., Sarnevesht-e Heyratangiz, (Tehran: Bina, 1949).
See also, Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Gozaresh-e Iran, (Tehran: Noghreh Press, 1985),
p. 375. See also, M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 26, Tehran, October 20, 1921,
Doc 150 [E 293/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle
East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 182.
54 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 188. See also,
Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, p. 895.
168 M. KIA

invisible scythe….. One cannot conceive of men having so little regard

for their own companions as to shoot them down in this manner….. I do
not know how I remained standing when I saw this. I was transfixed with
horror. A horror that would let me neither faint nor turn away.”55 Even
gendarmerie officers and soldiers recuperating at a local hospital were all
massacred with their throats cut.56
Simko seized “all the gendarmerie arms and munitions, including one
gun and four machine-guns.”57 But the gendarmes were not the only
ones who were looted, brutalized, and killed. The people of Savojbo-
lagh including the town’s Kurdish residents and American missionaries
were attacked and their homes ransacked and plundered by armed
Kurds shouting “Ashirat, ashirat,” and “give money.”58 The attackers
murdered prominent Kurdish dignitary, Qazi Latif. Simko’s men “tore
the clothes off three Americans, the Misses Schonhood, Fossum, and
Gudhard, and brutally handled M. Bachimont, a Frenchman attached to
the mission.”59 Mrs. Bachimont whose husband was eventually shot and
killed by Simko’s men “was found two days later in a distraught condi-
tion in a ruined house.”60 According to one eyewitness, “the dead of
the garrison” were left “unburied, lying there in heaps on the river slope,
numbered about 700…..while in the streets lay the dead bodies of men
and horses on which the dogs came and fed. Women had been violated,
and children had been left fatherless and hungry. Every house, whether
Kurdish or Persian, had been sacked and looted.”61 As one British report
stated, the Kurdish houses of which there were many in Savojbolagh
“seemed to have fared no better than the Persian.”62

55 Augusta Gudhart, “The Blood of Martyrs,” p. 119.

56 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 229.
57 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, October 25, 1921, [E 14224/2004/34], No. 232.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 90.
58 Augusta Gudhart, “The Blood of Martyrs,” p. 117.
59 Philadelphia Inquirer, Friday, December 2, 1921, p. 14 ab.
60 Ibid.
61 Augusta Gudhart, “The Blood of Martyrs,” p. 120.
62 Report on Azerbaijan for 1921, Doc 248 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 299.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 169

One source stated that after capturing Savojbolagh, Simko added the
words, “Partisan of the Independence of Kurdistan” to his signature.63
Another source wrote, that after defeating the gendarmerie detachment,
Simko moved his headquarters to Savojbolagh, where he published Inde-
pendent Kurdistan, “a newspaper intended to serve as a mouthpiece for
Kurdish aspirations.”64 This claim was repeated, albeit with a different
emphasis, by another writer, who asserted that Simko founded a news-
paper called Roji Kurd, which was published in Sorani, the Kurdish
language of Savojbolagh, though Simko and the Shakak were Kurmanji
speakers.65 And yet another source stated that Simko “chose Savojbolagh
(later Mahabad) as the capital of his independent Kurdistan, though he
himself did not reside there.”66 The British intelligence reports, however,
stated that after plundering Savojbolagh, Simko immediately “returned
to his home at Chahriq,” west of Lake Urumiyeh, “taking with him the
bulk of the loot, including several machine guns and 700 horses, leaving
Savojbolagh in charge of the local Kurds under one of his lieutenants.”67
These British accounts are substantiated by an eyewitness, who wrote that
Simko’s army abandoned Savojbolagh after “carrying off what plunder
they had gathered,” with only a small Kurdish unit “left in the city as a
rear guard and to look after the wounded.”68 This statement was vali-
dated further by an Iranian officer captured by Simko’s men, who wrote
that after looting the town’s bazaar and stripping its private residences
of household goods, Simko left Savojbolagh for Urumiyeh and Chahriq
on the same day he had sacked it.69 For weeks after the capture of Savo-
jbolagh by Simko’s army no information about the state of things in the

63 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, November 1, 1921, [E 293/285/34], No. 250., in

Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 96.
64 Wadie Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement Its Origins and Development, p. 141.
65 Amir Hassanpour, Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan, 1918–1985, (San
Francisco: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), p. 163.
66 Farideh Koohi-Kamali. The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral
Nationalism, p. 80.
67 Report on Azerbaijan for 1921, Doc 246 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, pp. 299–300.
68 Augusta Gudhart, “The Blood of Martyrs,” p. 120.
69 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 229.
170 M. KIA

town reached the outside world, because the telegraph wires had been
cut.70
Though Simko may have designated Savojbolagh as his capital, there is
ample evidence that he quickly lost control over the town, which changed
hands several times before it was fully recovered by government forces ten
months later in August 1922. As early as 20 October, M. Saunders, the
British Military Attaché in Tehran wrote that Savojbolagh was held not by
Simko’s men, but by local Kurds who were “willing to come to terms with
the Government” provided they were “granted an amnesty.”71 Another
British intelligence report stated that government forces had reoccupied
Savojbolagh “about the 10th of December” 1921.72
The government, however, quickly lost control over the town. In
early March, the British intelligence reports stated that Simko had re-
captured Savojbolagh once again. However, inter-tribal friction quickly
erupted between Simko and the Kurds of Savojbolagh, and local tribal
chiefs forced Simko’s men out of the town.73 The reports mentioned
above clearly demonstrate that Simko never held Savojbolagh for any
length of time, and he could not have, therefore, used the town as his
capital. Additionally, the political geography of his rebellion required
the Kurdish chief to concentrate his forces in Chahriq and Salmas. He
could not over-extend himself southward toward Savojbolagh, despite
the town’s strategic importance. Such a move would have prevented him
from defending his own tribal base. Moreover, if he intended to desig-
nate Savojbolagh as his new capital, Simko would not have destroyed the

70 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 25, Tehran, October 23, 1921, Doc. 146
[E 285/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 179.
71 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 26, Tehran, October 20, 1921, Doc. 150
[E 293/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 182.
72 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 32, Tehran, December 11, 1921, Doc. 195
[E 1953/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 230.
73 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 9, Tehran, March 5, 1922, Doc. 250 [E
4737/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 315.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 171

town, looting, raping, and slaughtering so many of its residents, the over-
whelming majority of whom were fellow Kurds. Similarly, if Savojbolagh
were to serve as his capital, Simko and his followers would not have piled
up hundreds of dead bodies in the center of the town, leaving them to be
eaten by dogs. A would-be capital needed much more than a newspaper.
At the very least, a ruler was required to provide law and order, as well as
peace, security, and the basic sanitary conditions in order for his subjects
to return to normal life.
The victory over the gendarmes in Savojbolagh enhanced Simko’s
prestige. According to one source, after the fall of Savojbolagh, the
Kurdish tribes of the region, “including the Mamash, Mangur, Dehbokri,
Piran, Gowrik, Feyzollahbegi, Poshtdari, Baneh, and Qaderkhani, joined
Simko and threatened Miandoab and Maragheh.”74 A British intelligence
summary also reported that at least one Kurdish tribe (i.e., Haydaranlu),
as far north as Maku in close proximity to Iran’s borders with Turkey and
the Soviet Union, had promised to help Simko.75 Despite the solidarity
expressed by several Kurdish tribal chiefs, the British consul in Tabriz did
not believe that many Kurdish tribes would accept Simko as their leader.76

Simko Defeats Amir Arshad

In response to the humiliating defeat suffered by government forces at
Savojbolagh, the Iranian prime minister, Qavam al-Saltaneh, ordered the
governor of Azerbaijan to lend his support to the Azerbaijani tribal chief,
Sām Khan Amir Arshad, as the commander of a new force raised to
suppress Simko’s rebellion. Amir Arshad and his brother, Sardar Ashayer,
served as the chiefs of the Hajialilu tribe, based in the Qarajadagh or
Arasbaran region of Azerbaijan. In the autumn of 1920, after the defeat
of Armenian forces by the Turkish nationalists in eastern Anatolia, the

74 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, pp. 58–59.
75 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 27 , Tehran, November 6, 1921, Doc. 153
[E 445/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 188.
76 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 26, Tehran, October 20, 1921, Doc. 150
[E 293/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 182.
172 M. KIA

chiefs of Hajialilu had offered protection to Armenian fighters fleeing

across the border into Iran. This allowed Amir Arshad to acquire the
guns, machine guns, and several cannons, which the retreating Armenian
units had transported with them into Iranian territory.77
Fully aware of its own military weakness, the central government
elevated Amir Arshad to the post of the military commander of Azer-
baijan and invested him with power to suppress Simko. Encouraging a
“loyal” tribal chief to fight a “disloyal” one was an old ploy utilized by a
central government that lacked sufficient power to impose its authority on
the distant provinces of the country. In the absence of a formidable and
reliable force of its own, the government handpicked the seemingly loyal
Amir Arshad as the only leader capable of neutralizing the threat posed
by the disloyal Simko, though the Hajialilu and Shakak chiefs remained
in close contact with each other.78
By late October 1921, Amir Arshad had assembled a small force at the
port of Sharafkhaneh on the northeastern shore of Lake Urumiyeh. Amir
Arshad’s detachment, however, lacked the size and the military capability
to advance effectively against Simko. The Azerbaijani tribal chief insisted
that he could mobilize a force of 2,000 men, but by 31 October, when
Mokhber al-Saltaneh and Colonel Lundburg of Iran’s gendarmerie met
with him, he had managed to gather only 200 fighters.79 In a meeting
between the governor, the Swedish commander, and Amir Arshad, Lund-
burg expressed his opposition to any operation being undertaken against
Simko with a force that could not match the size and military capabilities
of the Kurdish chief’s army.80 A few days later, during a conversation with
a British diplomat in Tehran, Iran’s minister of war, Reza Khan, echoed
the Swedish officer’s assessment, stating that, to suppress Simko, the
central government needed to raise a force of 5,000 Cossacks backed by
“friendly irregular tribesmen.”81 The minister of war also complained that
the shortage of funds, as well as the time needed to transport troops from

77 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Gozaresh-e Iran, pp. 373–374.

78 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, July 31, 1921, [E 10100/2004/34], No. 149.,
Enclosure 1 in No. 1., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 45.
79 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, November 18, 1921, [E 445/285/34], No. 274.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 98.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid., p. 101.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 173

other parts of the country to Azerbaijan, had hampered the campaign

against Simko. Until he had concentrated a sufficient number of regular
troops in Tabriz, Reza Khan maintained that government forces had to
avoid another confrontation with Simko. Instead, they should hold the
lines of Khoy-Sharafkhaneh north of Lake Urumiyeh and Miandoab-
Savojbolagh south of the lake.82 Because of the absence of a unified
and integrated command and the division of government forces into the
Cossacks, gendarmes, and tribal units, however, Reza Khan did not exer-
cise sufficient authority to organize a full-fledged military campaign in
Azerbaijan.
By the autumn of 1921, Simko commanded a significant force that
included “4,000 to 4,500 men with six guns and twelve machine guns,”
as well as 200 Turkish officers.83 In November, the British consul in
Tabriz reported that Simko had received “reinforcements of Turkish
Kurds,” increasing his total military strength to “6,000 armed men.”84
The support Simko received from the Turkish nationalists was not
confined to money and military hardware. According to a British report,
the Kurdish chief also enjoyed logistical support from a “pan-Islamic
Kemalist” network organized and financed by the Turkish nationalists in
Iran and Iraq.85 This network brought Kurdish leaders under an organi-
zational umbrella, and it also aimed at “bringing about the fall of Reza
Khan.”86
Despite the opposition of the minister of war to any future military
campaigns against Simko, in November 1921, a gendarmerie squadron,
under the command of Major Hassan Arfa, launched a surprise attack
on the Kurdish village of Yazdekan/Ezdikan in the district of Khoy.
Simko’s army immediately attacked the small government force and wiped

82 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, December 1, 1921, [E 1056/285/34], No. 306.,

Intelligence Summary No. 30., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 108.
83 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, November 18, 1921, [E 445/285/34], No. 274.,
Intelligence Summary No. 28., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 101.
84 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, December 10, 1921, [E 1947/285/34], No. 318.,
Intelligence Summary No. 31., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 114.
85 Lorraine to Curzon, Tehran, December 30, 1921, Doc. 209 [E 2517/6/34], No.
345., in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office
Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
17, pp. 247–250.
86 Ibid., p. 248.
174 M. KIA

it out. The gendarmes lost forty troopers and left nine prisoners behind.87
Though Simko had shown no major activity after the capture of Savojbo-
lagh in October, his movement was spreading southwards.88 A certain
Bahador al-Saltaneh, the recently appointed Iranian governor of Saqqez
threw in his lot with Simko.89 A force of gendarmes sent from Sanandaj
(Senneh) by the governor of Kurdistan to retake the town was repulsed
and forced to withdraw twenty-four miles south of Saqqez to await rein-
forcements.90 Though the gendarmes eventually reoccupied Saqqez, the
minister of war, Reza Khan, recognized the growing popularity of Simko
and ordered Khalu Qorban, the former ally of the Jangal leader, Mirza
Kuchak Khan, to march his detachment from Gilan to Azerbaijan to rein-
force the government troops there.91 The war minister also dispatched
“the first echelon (500 strong) of men” of the Iranian Cossack Division
to Tabriz on 14 November.92 His plan was to concentrate a force of
five thousand Iranian Cossacks in Tabriz before attacking and destroying
Simko’s army.93 Meanwhile, in Tabriz, both the governor, Mokhber al-
Saltaneh, and the ambitious tribal chief, Amir Arshad, were anxious to
score a quick victory against Simko without waiting for the arrival of the
new detachments sent from Tehran.
On December 19, 1921, a force, comprising 2,000 irregular tribesmen,
“some 500 horsemen of the Yurtchi tribe of the Shahsavens,” and about
“400 Armenians” under the overall command of Amir Arshad, began
to advance from Sharafkhaneh toward Dilman, the district capital of

87 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 60.

88 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 29, Tehran, November 20, 1921, Doc. 171
[E 1047/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 17 , p. 201.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 175

Salmas.94 At the same time, a detachment of 700–800 gendarmes95 under

the command of the Swedish colonel, Lundburg, began to push south-
westward from Khoy toward Salmas, Simko’s territorial base.96 Before the
two armies could converge, Simko struck with a force of four thousand
men, surprising Amir Arshad near Alma Saray in the district of Tasuj.97
Stunned by the counterattack, Amir Arshad’s tribal levies panicked and
fled, losing 200 men. Amir Arshad himself was shot and killed by his own
men when he attempted “to check the rout.”98 According to an Iranian
historian, Simko lost 460 men, while Amir Arshad’s army had lost 445
fighters.99 After defeating Amir Arshad’s army, Simko switched his focus
to the gendarmerie detachment headed by the Swedish officer, Lundburg.
Although the gendarmerie detachment stood its ground, it lost six offi-
cers and sixty troopers before it was forced to retreat toward Khoy.100
Though he had decisively defeated the government forces, Simko “made

94 Report on Azerbaijan for 1921, Doc 248 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on

Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 300. See also,
Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 509.
95 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 3, 1922, [E 3904/285/34], No. 8., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 128. See also Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs,
p. 122. Arfa gives the number of Lundburg’s force as 700, while the British Intelligence
Summary of December 24, 1921, states that the number of the gendarmes was “about
800.”
96 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 230. See also,
Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 3, 1921, [E 3904/285/34], No. 8., in Iran Political
Diaries 1881-1965. Volume 6, Enclosure in No. 1., p. 128.
97 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 230.
98 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 3, 1922, [E 3904/285/34], No. 8., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 128. Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va
Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 230.
99 Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 509.
100 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 3, 1922, [E 3904/285/34], No. 8., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 128. See also, Report on Azerbaijan for 1921,
Doc 246 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers
from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle
East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 300.
176 M. KIA

no attempt to follow up his victory,” because he had also “suffered severe

casualties amongst his followers.”101
In his jumbled and misleading account of Amir Arshad’s campaign
against Simko, Mokhber al-Saltaneh blamed the fallen tribal leader for
not listening to his advice, and he claimed that the government forces
had scored a decisive victory against the Kurds, but they had failed to
complete the campaign with desired results.102 The governor of Azer-
baijan also wrote that the irregular tribal units representing the central
government had lost their discipline after their leader, Amir Arshad, was
killed by a bullet fired by his own men. According to Mokhber al-
Saltaneh, Amir Arshad was murdered after the Kurds, including the Jalali
Kurds of eastern Anatolia, who had rallied to Simko’s flag, had fled the
battlefield.103 Back in Tehran, Reza Khan, the minister of war, rejected
this mendacious account and described the battle fought against Simko
as a total defeat. He blamed the failure of the campaign squarely on the
governor of Azerbaijan, who had given orders “for the attack to be carried
out before the arrival of the reinforcements” en route from Qazvin.104
By late autumn 1921, Simko was at the apex of his power. Confident
of his ability to defeat any force sent against him by the Iranian govern-
ment, the Kurdish chief was determined to project his power beyond
the borders of Iran and exert pressure on the most powerful actor in
the region, namely Great Britain, to lend its support to his separatist
campaign. Watching the growing conflict between Turkish nationalists
and the British authorities over control of Mosul, Simko sent a message
to Yousif Ziya, a member of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, stating
that he would provide 15,000 men should Turkey decide to invade
northern Iraq.105 Aside from declaring himself a staunch supporter of
Kemalist Turks, the message to the British officials in Iraq was loud and

101 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 35, Tehran, December 31, Doc. 217, in
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
17, p. 264.
102 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 326.
103 Ibid. See also, Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Gozaresh-e Iran, p. 377.
104 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 3, 1922, [E 3904/285/34], No. 8., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 129.
105 Othman Ali, “The Career of Ozdemir: A Turkish Bid for Northern Iraq, 1921–
1923,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 53, No. 6 (2017), p. 969.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 177

clear: “if you refuse to lend your support to my campaign for an indepen-
dent Kurdish state, I would cause serious headache for you by assisting
your enemy, the nationalist Turks.” Thus, the end of the year 1921
found Simko “in a stronger position than ever.”106 Impressive victories
at Savojbolagh in October and at Tasuj in December enhanced Simko’s
prestige and converted his uprising into a popular movement with signif-
icant support from Kurdish tribal groups in northwestern Iran and across
the border in eastern Anatolia.
The collapse of Mirza Kuchak Khan’s rebellion in late autumn 1921
allowed Reza Khan to shift his focus from northern Iran to western
Azerbaijan and Simko’s rebellion. When he met with the British mili-
tary attaché in early December, the minister of war stated that “his next
campaign will be against the renegade Kurd, Simko, in Azerbaijan.”107
Until December 1921, the central government in Tehran was not in a
position to assemble a formidable force in Azerbaijan and concentrate
on Simko’s rebellion. The governmental authorities in Tehran and Tabriz
recognized that Simko’s revolt was no longer an isolated local rebellion.
There was a real possibility that, if allowed to expand, Simko’s victories
could ignite anti-government uprisings among “the hitherto loyal Kurdish
tribes as far south as Kermanshah.”108
The defeats at the hands of Simko convinced Reza Khan that the
central government could not suppress Simko and other provincial power
centers as long as the Iranian armed forces remained divided into the
Cossack Division, the Gendarmerie, and the South Persia Rifles, and
lacked a unified command structure. Iran’s minister of war was deter-
mined to form a fully integrated national army “commanded and officered
by Iranians only, without the assistance of foreign officers.”109 From the
moment he had reached Tehran in command of the Cossack Brigade,
Reza Khan had pursued the idea of a uniform national force.

106 Report on Azerbaijan for 1921, Doc 246 [E 4717/6/34], in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 300.
107 Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Rule,
(London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), p. 242.
108 Persia Annual Report, 1922. Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, July 16, 1923, [E 8057/
8057/34], No. 314., Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 409.
109 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, August 25, 1921 [E 11692/2004/34], No. 163.,
Intelligence Summary No. 16., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 66.
178 M. KIA

With foreign armies evacuating Iranian territory, he could now carry

out his dream. The Soviets withdrew their forces from the Caspian
province of Gilan after Iran signed a treaty of friendship with Moscow
on February 26, 1921.110 Desperate for a prompt decrease in their mili-
tary commitments in the region, the British also declared their intention
to withdraw their forces from Iran in April 1921, evacuating Qazvin
by the 10th, and Hamadan by 21st, of the month.111 In March 1921,
a joint commission of British and Iranian officials proposed that the
Cossack Division “together with South Persia Rifles and Gendarmerie
be transferred into uniform Regular Army” and that ordinary needs of
“Civil Government” be met by the existing police force, which had to be
increased in size.112
In May 1921, a number of deputies in the Majlis, backed by the press,
declared their support for the idea of creating a unified and fully inte-
grated national army. Seizing on every opportunity to his own advantage,
Reza Khan declared the idea of a unified army as his most important
patriotic objective. It must have been obvious to him that bringing the
Cossack Division, the Gendarmerie, and the remnants of the South Persia
Rifles, under one umbrella would significantly enhance his power and
prestige. To establish a centralized and integrated force responsible for
maintaining the security of the country under his personal command
could pave the path for Reza Khan to emerge as the most powerful man
in Iran.113

110 J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, Volume 2, pp. 90–94.
111 Norman to Curzon, March 16, 1921, No. 697, [E 3370/633/34], in Documents
on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series, Volume XIII , p. 741. The Military
Commission had completed its first report in April 1920. This report consisted of seven
chapters with the first five dealing with examination of existing conditions. Chapter six
detailed proposed organization and chapter seven recommended concrete actions to be
taken in order to implement scheme. Among these, were the establishment of a cadet
school and the creation of an air force. See, Cox to Curzon, Tehran, April 9, 1920,
No. 403, in Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series, Volume XIII ,
pp. 464–465.
112 Cox to Curzon, March 13, 1920, No. 387, [185352/202/34], Documents on
British Foreign Policy 1919–1939. First Series, Volume XIII , p. 450.
113 Malek al-Shoara Bahar, Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran, 2 Volumes,
(Tehran: Zavvar Press, 2008), Volume 1, p. 171.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 179

Creating a Standing Army

With the evacuation of foreign forces from Iran, Reza Khan could assume
full ownership of the campaign to re-establish law and order throughout
the country. The centerpiece of his policy was centralization of power in
the hands of the government by disarming all tribal groups. The disarma-
ment of the tribes was justified on the basis that peace and order could
not be restored unless the tribal zones of the country had been pacified
and subdued. The restoration of law and order, in turn, would create the
necessary environment for reconstruction of the country and resumption
of trade and commerce between various regions of Iran. In implementing
these policies, Reza Khan recognized that, in a country as large as Iran,
the central government could not impose its authority without a modern
system of serviceable roads, highways, railroads, ports, and even airports.
Absent a modern infrastructure that could facilitate the dispatching of
central government forces to the four corners of the country, no central-
ization policy could be sustained for any length of time. Further, the
government needed to increase the size and technological capabilities of
the military to integrate its various units under one umbrella and to supply
it with modern training and weaponry.
In 1921, Iran’s armed forces consisted of approximately “12,000
gendarmes dispersed all over Iran, and 7000 Cossacks, including the
newly incorporated Central Brigade Troops.”114 This tiny force was
armed by “rifles and a limited number of machine-guns with a few
artillery pieces” of “every make.”115 Reza Khan’s policy was “to create
and maintain an efficient national standing army, capable of ensuring
peace and order” at home, and “protecting the country from external
aggression.”116 His efforts resulted in the creation of a highly modern
and centralized army.
In September 1921, the process of disbanding the South Persia Rifles,
which had been created and commanded by British officers, commenced.
On December 5, 1921, Reza Khan initiated the process of reorganizing
the Iranian army by issuing the Army Order No. 1, which announced
the creation of Iran’s Imperial Army through the unification of “the

114 Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, p. 114.

115 Ibid.
116 Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia, Annual Report 1923, [E
3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 717.
180 M. KIA

Cossacks, Gendarmerie and provincial troops.”117 The reconstituted army

was “composed of five divisions: 1. Central (Tehran) Division; 2. North-
western (Tabriz) Division; 3. Western (Hamadan) Division; 4. Southern
(Isfahan) Division; 5. Eastern (Mashhad) Division; and the Northern
Independent Brigade with headquarters at Rasht.”118 Each division was
“to number 10,000 men, and consist of 7 infantry regiments, 1 artillery
regiment, 1 cavalry regiment, and 1 engineer regiment,” with each
commanded by its own administrative units and divisional headquarters
staff.119 By January 1, 1923, the Iranian army was a military force of
30,000 men. Additionally, “a special Gendarmerie force was organized
under the name of Amnieh (Security) for the security of roads.”120
On December 6, 1921, Reza Khan “removed all Swedish officers from
their commands in the gendarmerie” and replaced them with an Iranian
commander, General Amanollah Mirza Jahanbani.121 The next day on 7
December, in a speech made to a group of Iranian gendarmerie officers,
the minister of war stated that “he considered it unnecessary” for Iranians
any longer “to be under the command of foreigners, who took the credit
for all successes themselves,” and that there were now plenty of capable
Iranians “well fitted to take command.”122 In one segment of his speech,
Reza Khan stated: “Gentlemen! Iran, your dear motherland and mine, has
more than ever need its bravest sons. You must exert every effort like men
in the service of your country and the pursuit of its independence. You

117 Hassan Arfa. Under Five Shahs, p. 126. See also, Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran,
December 6, 1921, Doc. 109, [E 13454/4335/34], No. 670., in British Documents on
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 17, p. 150.
118 Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, pp. 126–127. See also, Loraine to Curzon, Tehran,
July 16, 1923, Persia, Annual Report, 1922, Confidential (12221), [E 8057/8057/34],
No. 314., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 408. See also, Loraine to
MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia Annual Report, 1923, Confidential (12445),
[E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 717.
119 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, July 16, 1923, Persia, Annual Report, 1922, Confiden-
tial (12221), [E 8057/8057/34], No. 314., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume
6, p. 408.
120 Hassan Arfa. Under Five Shahs, p. 127.
121 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, December 16, 1921, [E 1953/285/34], No. 326.,
Intelligence Summary No. 32., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 122.
122 Ibid. See also, Donald Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruc-
tion of Iran 1878–1944, (Costa Mesa: Mazda Press, 2016), pp. 60–61.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 181

may be confident that the principles of concentration and unity of speech

will send the best possible fruits of greatness to welcome you. Be alert!
The dust of Ardeshir [the founder of the Sassanian dynasty, 224–651] is
watching you. Be prepared!”123
By January 1, 1924, Reza Khan had managed to increase the strength
of the Iranian army to 41,000 men, “an increase of 11,000” since
January 1, 1923.124 The new army was “equipped with motor-trucks,
armored cars, tanks, and airplanes.”125 It also had “a high-power wire-
less station at Tehran, with branch stations in the provincial centers.”126
The first seven airplanes were purchased in France by the chief of the
staff, General Jahanbani. French instructors were recruited to accompany
the planes, and the instructors were to remain in Tehran “until a suffi-
cient number” of Iranian pilots had “been trained.”127 Additionally, an
airport was constructed at the northwest corner of Tehran.128 In April
1923, Reza Khan presented a bill for conscription to the Majlis, making
“military service compulsory” for all Iranian subjects “between 20 and
45 years of age.”129 Reza Khan’s reforms transformed the army from a
small, ineffective, and disjointed body into the most organized and disci-
plined institution in the country, which served the role of a model and a
vanguard for future governmental reforms.
In addition to the new army, a modern and uniformed police force
was organized in all major urban centers of the country, “with the police

123 George Lenczowski (ed.), Iran Under the Pahlavis (Stanford: Hoover Institution
Press, Stanford University, 1978), p. 20. See also, Donald Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The
Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran 1878–1944, p. 61.
124 Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia Annual Report, 1923, Confi-
dential (12445), [E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965.
Volume 6, p. 717.
125 A. C. Millspaugh, The American Task in Persia, p. 148.
126 Ibid.
127 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, November 26, 1923, [E 257/255/34], No. 549., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 631.
128 Ibid. See also, Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia Annual
Report, 1923, Confidential (12445), [E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political
Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 718.
129 Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia Annual Report, 1923, Confi-
dential (12445), [E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965.
Volume 6, p. 718.
182 M. KIA

of Tehran comparing favorably with police organizations in other coun-

tries.”130 To eradicate banditry, Road Guards known as Amnieh were
“stationed along the highways to ensure safety and security for trav-
elers.”131 As one foreign visitor wrote in early 1924: “travelling over the
500 miles of road from Kasr-i Shirin [Qasr-e Shirin in western Iran on
the border with Iraq] to Tehran, one is struck by the extraordinary disci-
pline of the guards on the roads, their evident contentment and their
courtesy. The traveler comes upon many a guard-house…Everywhere the
same strict discipline, the sentinel on duty properly equipped and armed--
-a great contrast to the ragged, unkempt and unready guard of only a few
years ago.”132 With security restored to all major roads, highway robbery
disappeared, and trade and commerce rebounded.
As part of establishing a new security apparatus, Reza Khan laid
the foundation of a secret service that came to fruition in late 1923.
According to a British intelligence report, the Iranian strongman “orga-
nized four intelligence centers” based in (1) Tehran; (2) Kermanshah
with special attention to Kurdish tribal groups in western Iran and
northern Iraq; (3) Khuzestan with special attention to Sheikh Khazal
and Arab tribes of southwestern Iran; and (4) Istanbul with special focus
on “Turkish affairs.”133 In addition to these centers, “army commanders
at Mashhad, Tabriz, Isfahan, and Hamadan” were “responsible for the
intelligence services in their own divisional areas.”134 The army officer
“commanding Caspian Littoral Brigade” also had his own security orga-
nization.135 To staff the brain center of the secret service based in Tehran,
Reza Khan appointed a chief of counter espionage, an assistant to the
chief, and an army of agents, which included female informants.136
In December 1921, after reorganizing the Iranian military struc-
ture and integrating the Gendarmerie and the Cossack Division into

130 A. C. Millspaugh, A. C. The American Task in Persia, p. 148.

131 Ibid.
132 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, December 27, 1923, [E 1125/455/34], No. 610.,
Enclosure in No. 1., Observations by Mr. Howard on the Situation in Persia, in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 662.
133 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, December 13, 1923, [E 682/255/34], No. 587., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 636.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid., p. 637.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 183

one unified national army, Reza Khan handpicked Brigadier General

Habibollah Sheybani as the commander of all government forces in
Azerbaijan.137 The new commander’s principal task was to restore the
central government’s authority in northwestern Iran by suppressing tribal
rebellions, especially Simko’s revolt.
By the end of 1921, Simko controlled a vast region extending from
Salmas in the north to Baneh in the south. His hold was at best tenuous,
however, largely because the Kurdish chief failed to institutionalize his
power by creating a governmental structure capable of administering
rural and urban communities under his rule. Instead, he continued to
operate as the chief of a raiding party, focused primarily on looting and
plundering, rather than on governing and providing law and order. It
is not surprising, then, that despite Simko’s military victories, observers
on the ground, including the British consul in Tabriz, did not believe
that “many tribes of Kurdistan would accept Simko as a leader,” and that
his rebellion was essentially part of “a wide movement” encouraged by
foreign powers, especially the Turkish nationalists.138 This British analysis
of Simko’s precarious support base and his subservience to the Turkish
nationalists in Anatolia was shared by the minister of war, Reza Khan, in
Tehran.
After the battle of Tasuj in December 1921, the central government
ceased all major operations against Simko. Following direct orders from
Reza Khan, the government resorted to a new strategy of amassing a
large force at Sharafkhaneh in anticipation of a decisive campaign against
Simko in early spring 1922. Before the commencement of a military
campaign against Simko, the Iranian government embarked on a diplo-
matic initiative to establish contact and reach an understanding with the
Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa Kemal based in Ankara. The
Iranian government, including Reza Khan, had concluded that Simko’s
rebellion was part of a wider strategy designed and implemented by the
Turkish nationalists in Anatolia to protect their eastern flank. Believing
that Simko’s success was largely due to the military and logistical assis-
tance he received from the Turkish nationalist movement led by Mustafa

137 Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, p. 127.

138 Bridgeman to Curzon, Tehran, November 1, 1921, [E 293/285/34], No. 250.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 96.
184 M. KIA

Kemal, Tehran dispatched the veteran diplomat and politician, Mirza

Ismail Khan Momtaz al-Dowleh, as its special envoy, to negotiate with
the Turkish officials in Ankara in June 1922.

Momtaz al-Dowleh’s Mission to Ankara

Born in Tabriz into a family that traced its origins to the Afshar
Turks, who had settled in Azerbaijan during the reign of Nader Shah
(r. 1736–1747),139 Momtaz al-Dowleh received his early education in
his hometown before travelling to Istanbul, where he studied law and
French language. After returning to Iran, he joined government service
as a secretary and interpreter, serving at various posts in Azerbaijan and
Kurdistan before joining Iran’s ministry of foreign affairs in 1896.140
In 1897, during the reign of the Qajar monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Shah
(r. 1896–1907), Momtaz al-Dowleh was appointed the attaché to the
Iranian embassy in Istanbul.141 In 1900, he became Iran’s consul general
at the Ottoman capital.142 During his stay in Istanbul, Momtaz al-
Dowleh became acquainted with Ottoman officialdom and established
close friendships with his Turkish counterparts. In 1903, when Ain al-
Dowleh became grand vizier, Momtaz al-Dowleh was appointed the
private secretary and personal interpreter of the new prime minister.143
He accompanied Ain al-Dowleh in this capacity on Mozaffar al-Din

139 For Momtaz al-Dowleh’s life and career, see, Confidential Biographical Notices of
Persian Statesmen and Notables, August 1905, compiled by George Churchill, Acting
Oriental Secretary, His Britannic Majesty’s Legation, Tehran, in Iran Political Diaries
1881–1965. Volume 2, p. 608. See also, Mirza Mehdi Khan Momtahan al-Dowleh Shaqaqi
and Mirza Hashim Khan., Rejal-e Vezarat-e Kharejeh dar Asr-e Nasseri va Mozaffari, Iraj
Afshar (ed.), Ganjineh-ye Asnad-e Tarikh-e Iran, No. 3, (Tehran: Asatir Press, 1986),
pp. 139–140. See also, Mehdi Bamdad, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran. Volume 1, p. 141.
Ebrahim Safaei, Rahbaran-e Mashruteh, 2 Volumes, (Tehran: Javidan Press, 1968), Volume
1, pp. 613–622. See also, British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 263.
140 Mirza Mehdi Khan Momtahan al-Dowleh Shaqaqi and Mirza Hashim Khan. Rejal-e
Vezarat-e Kharejeh dar Asr-e Nasseri va Mozaffari, p. 139.
141 Ibid. See also, British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 263.
142 Confidential Biographical Notices of Persian Statesmen and Notables, August 1905,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 2, p. 608.
143 Ibid. See also, British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 263.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 185

Shah’s last European tour in 1905.144 During the constitutional revo-

lution of 1906, Momtaz al-Dowleh was ordered by the Iranian prime
minister to translate the Ottoman legal code from Turkish into Persian.145
After the victory of the revolution, he was elected as a deputy from
Arak to the first Majlis, ultimately rising to the post of the speaker of
the National Assembly in April 1908 after the presiding speaker, Ehte-
sham al-Saltaneh, resigned suddenly.146 Momtaz al-Dowleh’s tenure as
the speaker of the Majlis was, however, short-lived.
In June 1908, after Mohammad Ali Shah ordered the destruction of
the Majlis, Momtaz al-Dowleh sought refuge in the French embassy in
Tehran. With the intercession of French authorities, the shah agreed to
allow Momtaz al-Dowleh to leave Tehran for Paris, where he joined
the Iranian émigré community. After the abdication of Mohammad Ali
Shah in July of 1909, Momtaz al-Dowleh returned to Iran and was
elected as a deputy from Tabriz to the second Majlis.147 He subsequently
served as the minister of finance, minister of justice, and minister of
commerce in various pre-First World War cabinets.148 After Vosugh al-
Dowleh signed the Anglo-Persian Agreement of August 9, 1921, Momtaz
al-Dowleh emerged as one of the most vocal critics of the treaty. Govern-
ment authorities exiled him to Kashan where he was forced to stay until
Vosugh al-Dowleh resigned from office.149 After the February 1921
coup, Momtaz al-Dowleh was labeled an intriguer and an agitator. He
was arrested and once again sent off into internal exile in Kashan.150

144 Ibid.
145 Mehdi Bamdad, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran, Volume 1, p. 141.
146 Browne, Edward G. The Persian Revolution 1905–1909, (Washington, DC: Mage
Publishers Inc, 2006), p. 199. See also, British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume
II), p. 263.
147 Mehdi Bamdad, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran, Volume 1, p. 141.
148 Mirza Mehdi Khan Momtahan al-Dowleh Shaqaqi and Mirza Hashim Khan, Rejal-e
Vezarat-e Kharejeh dar Asr-e Nasseri va Mozaffari, p. 140.
149 Cox to Curzon, Tehran, September 10, 1919, Doc. 92 [127632], No. 618., in
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
16, p. 56.
150 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, March 1, 1921, Doc. 505 [E 4926/2/34], No. 31.,
in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
16, p. 377.
186 M. KIA

When Qavam al-Saltaneh was appointed prime minister in June 1921,

Momtaz al-Dowleh joined the new cabinet as the minister of educa-
tion.151 A short time later, the government appointed Momtaz al-Dowleh
the head of a mission to negotiate treaties of friendship with the republics
of southern Caucasus. He was subsequently directed to travel to Anatolia
as Iran’s envoy to the Turkish nationalist government in Ankara. Well
versed in international, as well as regional politics, and fluent in Turkish
and French, Momtaz al-Dowleh was believed to be the ideal diplomat
to reach an understanding with the Kemalist Turks regarding Simko and
other relevant matters. Momtaz al-Dowleh and his delegation travelled
from Tiflis, Georgia to Batumi and thence to northern Anatolia, arriving
at the Black Sea port town of İnebolu on June 22, 1922. Two days later,
on 24 June, Momtaz al-Dowleh arrived in Ankara, where he was received
warmly by Turkish nationalists, as well as the ambassadors of the Soviet
Union and Afghanistan. Hakemiyat-e Melliye (National Sovereignty), the
newspaper that served as the organ of the Kemalists, celebrated the arrival
of the Iranian delegation in Ankara in a front-page article titled, “The
Representative of the Brother Country, Iran, in Our City.”152 On Friday,
30 June, after Momtaz al-Dowleh submitted his credentials to Mustafa
Kemal in an official ceremony, the Iranian ambassador held a one-hour
meeting with the Turkish leader. This meeting was followed by meetings
with Fevzi Pasha (Fevzi Chakmak), Chief of the General Staff and Fethi
Bey (Fethi Okyar), the deputy minister of internal affairs of the provisional
Ankara government.153
During a reception organized by the Soviet ambassador to Ankara in
honor of the Iranian delegation, Mustafa Kemal stated that the unity of
the nations of the east, the Soviet Union, Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan
was causing displeasure among the western imperialists.154 He also added

151 Norman to Curzon, Tehran, June 5, 1921, Doc. 519 [E 6678/2/34], No. 326.,
in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B, Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
16, p. 394.
152 Ali Kalirad, “Monasebat-e Siyasi-ye Iran va Turkiyeh (1297–1304 Solar/1919–
1925),” Fasl Nameh-ye Tarikh-e Ravabat-e Khareji, Years 13 & 14, Numbers 52 &
53-Autumn AND Winter 1391, pp. 121–138, p. 129.
153 Ibid., p. 130.
154 Ibid.
 6 SIMKO’S WARS AND THE RISE OF REZA SHAH 187

that the government of Iran and the Iranian nation played a significant
role in the balance of power in the Middle East region:

I am well aware of this fact that for centuries Iran has pursued the real-
ization of a patriotic and holy dream. The Iranian nation is a truly heroic
nation.155

On 7 July, the Iranian newspaper, Vatan (Homeland), wrote that “We

are informed that Kemal Pasha has stated in a telegram that as Ismail
Agha [Simko] is attempting to set up an independent Kurdistan, which
must of necessity create difficulties for Turkey, the Angora Government
is prepared to take joint action with the Persian Government to suppress
Simko.”156
The Iranian government was well aware that the reliance of Turkish
nationalists on Simko and other Kurdish allies had diminished consider-
ably, especially after the Turks had defeated both Armenian nationalist
forces in November–December 1920 and the Greeks at the Battle of
Sakarya in August–September 1921. The mission of the Iranian ambas-
sador, Momtaz al-Dowleh, was to convince the Turkish nationalist lead-
ership that their continuing support for Simko could prove detrimental to
the security of both Iran and the emerging Turkish republic. According
to one source, the Iranian delegation requested that the Turks recall their
military advisers who worked with Simko and not allow the Kurdish chief
to enter Turkish territory when Iranian forces began to chase him out of
northwestern Iran.157
As early as December 20, 1921, Reza Khan had met with Jemil Bey,
an agent of the Turkish nationalist movement in Tehran. An “aide-
de camp to Ihsan Pasha, the Turkish general officer commanding the
army corps at Tabriz in 1918,” Jemil Bey was on friendly terms with

155 Ibid.
156 M. Saunders, July 15, 1922, Intelligence Summary No. 28, July 15, 1922, Doc.
45 [E 8649/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 18, p. 65.
157 Sirwan Khosrozadeh, “Avamel-e Moasser dar Piruzi-ye Qoshun-e Mottahad al-Shekl
dar Jang-e Shakar Yāzi,” p. 67.
188 M. KIA

Simko.158 Receiving a handsome payment from Sardar Sepah, Jemil Bey

was instructed to travel to Simko’s headquarters and negotiate a peace
agreement between the Kurdish chief and Iran’s central government.159
One author stated that the Soviet government, which enjoyed a friendly
relationship with the Iranian government at the time, mediated with the
central government in Tehran on behalf of Simko, “recommending that
autonomy be conceded to the Kurds.”160 The same author also claimed
that the Iranian government “whether because of the reported Soviet
mediation or because of its preoccupation with the task of pacifying the
disaffected elements in various parts of the country, maintained a truce
with Simko during the first half of 1922” and that it even tried to come
to terms with the Kurdish chief “by holding out the prospect of granting
a measure of autonomy” to the Iranian Kurds.161 Around the same time,
in spring 1922, there was also much talk in Tehran of an ex-officer of
the Imperial Russian Army with pro-British sympathies, Captain Verba,
who had been an instructor in the Iranian Cossack Division, meeting with
Simko.162
Though the role played by former Russian officers and the Soviet
government remains murky, the peace negotiations with Simko, through
the agency of the Turkish and Russian intermediaries, seem to have
been part of an overall Iranian strategy of buying time, so that the
ministry of war could assemble a large force in Azerbaijan. As the central
government extended a hand of peace and friendship to Simko, Reza
Khan appointed Brigadier General Habibollah Sheybani as the military
governor of Azerbaijan in January 1922.163

158 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 3, 1922, [E 3904/285/34], No. 8., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 129.
159 Ibid.
160 Wadie Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement Its Origins and Development, p. 141.
161 Ibid.
162 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, pp. 114–115.
163 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 239.
 CHAPTER 7

Simko’s Downfall

In late January 1922, as units of the Iranian army under the command
of General Sheybani conducted reconnaissance in southern Azerbaijan,
the campaign to suppress Simko suddenly unraveled after gendarmerie
officers at Sharafkhaneh on the northeastern shore of Lake Urumiyeh
staged a revolt. Throughout the month of January, rumors had circulated
in Tabriz of “increasing dissatisfaction among the gendarmes in Azer-
baijan owing to their pay being many months in arrears, and also to the
order….promulgated by the Minister of War that the gendarmerie were
to be no longer under the Minister of the Interior but were to be merged
into one force….consisting of Cossacks, gendarmes and other nondescript
elements.”1 The discontent of the gendarmes seems to have originated
with the lateness of their pay and was subsequently exacerbated by the
order that they be integrated with the Cossacks.

1 Report on the Gendarmerie Revolt in Tabriz, February 1922, Doc. 253 [E 4753/
6/34] in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 17, p. 321.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 189

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_7
190 M. KIA

Lahuti’s Rebellion
On January 30, 1922, approximately 700 gendarmerie officers and
troopers stationed in Sharafkhaneh, mutinied, abandoned their position,
and marched first to Sufian and thence to Tabriz. By 1 February, the
mutinous gendarmes commanded by Major Abolqassem Khan Lahuti
(1887–1957) were in control of the provincial capital. The rebels quickly
seized Āli Qāpu, where the governor resided; the Arg, where the govern-
ment stored grain; and the telegraph office, which served as the city’s
communication center.2 Only the small detachment of 200 Cossacks left
behind in the city refused to surrender. Realizing that they were power-
less to stop the gendarmes, the Cossacks exchanged a few shots and
then retired to their barracks on the western edge of the town.3 With
government forces in disarray, the Democrats, or the former supporters of
Khiyabani, who had never forgiven Mokhber al-Saltaneh for the murder
of their leader in September 1920, re-surfaced and joined the rebel-
lious gendarmes, “installing themselves as heads of various government
departments,” including the police.4 They also telegraphed Tehran and
demanded the removal of the governor, who was put under house arrest.5
The time to settle old scores had arrived. A British report claimed that a
group of 270 Bolsheviks, mostly members of Iran’s Communist Party
(Hezb-e Adalat /Justice Party), had also joined Lahuti and fought on his
side.6 Although Lahuti and some of his fellow officers may have been
inspired by the Bolsheviks, the majority of the troopers had joined the
mutiny not to stage a socialist revolution, but to demand fair treatment on
par with the Cossacks, as well as the payment of their overdue salaries. For
the next seven days, Lahuti and his supporters ruled Tabriz, the provincial
capital of Azerbaijan.
Born into a poor working-class family in Kermanshah in western Iran
on October 12, 1887, Lahuti was influenced by Iran’s constitutional
revolution of 1906 and the battles fought against the Qajar monarch,

2 Ibid., p. 322. See also, Mohammad Amin Riyahi, Tarikh-e Khoy, p. 510.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 332.
6 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, February 12, 1922, [E 4707/285/34], No. 71., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 153.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 191

Mohammad Ali Shah, who had bombarded and destroyed the parlia-
ment in June 1908. After Mohammad Ali Shah was forced to abdicate
in July 1909, Lahuti settled in Tehran and joined the police force. In
1911, he joined the newly established Iranian gendarmerie, which had
been created by Swedish officers in 1910 as a rural police force respon-
sible for maintaining security of the country’s main roads. In 1912–1913,
Lahuti served as an officer in the gendarmerie unit stationed in Qom, and
he performed with distinction during military operations against armed
brigands and Bakhtiyari tribesmen.7 He soon rose to the rank of the
commander of his unit. As the leader of the gendarmerie detachment in
Qom, Lahuti became involved in prolonged disputes with members of the
local clergy and the merchant class, who filed complaints against him with
the central government. One source claimed that he was court-martialed
for misappropriating government funds.8 The same source claimed that,
after he was warned against returning to the capital, Lahuti fled to western
Iran where he sought the protection of Ali Akbar Khan, the chief of
the Kurdish Sanjabi tribe, who, at the time, was embroiled in his own
conflict with the Ottoman Turks.9 One Iranian scholar stated that during
the First World War, Lahuti published a newspaper in Kermanshah called
Bisotun.10 A British source, however, claimed that in 1915, at the insti-
gation of Germans, Lahuti and a group of fellow gendarmes had joined
the Ottoman Turks and participated in campaigns against Russian forces
in western Iran.11 Another British source stated that Lahuti had joined
the Ottoman forces after Kurdish tribes of western Iran made peace with
the Turks, but he had written the British privately expressing his readi-
ness to help the Allies. The same source also claimed that having gone
to Kermanshah in March 1916, Lahuti had accompanied the British to
Hamadan, where he received a letter of support from a British officer
recommending him for employment. With the letter in hand, Lahuti went
to Tehran in August 1917, where he was recommended by the British

7 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, February 19, 1922, [E 3815/285/34], No. 85., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 150.
8 Ibid.
9 British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 186.
10 Bayat, Kaveh. Kudeta-ye Lahuti, Tabriz, Bahman 1300, (Tehran: Pardis Danesh,
1997), pp. 30–31.
11 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, February 19, 1922, [E 3815/285/34], No. 85., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 150.
192 M. KIA

officer in charge of the South Persia Rifles. However, because there was
no vacancy for him, Lahuti started an anti-British and an anti-Russian
newspaper.12
After the end of the First World War, Lahuti joined the Iranian exile
community in Istanbul, where he worked at a variety of odd jobs. He
also published a newspaper and opened a bookstore with support from
the Iranian expatriate community, including the deposed Qajar monarch,
Mohammad Ali Mirza.13 He also composed and published a collection of
poetry called Iran Nameh (Book of Iran) modeled after Ferdowsi’s Shah-
nameh (Book of Kings), which described the lives and careers of the kings
of pre-Islamic Iran.14 Returning to Iran in October 1921, Lahuti visited
Savojbolagh, the center of operations for a gendarmerie division under
the command of Major Hassan Malekzadeh. Lahuti knew Malekzadeh as
a fellow officer, and the two men apparently enjoyed a close friendship.
The day after the arrival of Lahuti, Simko attacked Savojbolagh, but
Lahuti managed to escape the town, which was sacked by the Kurdish
chief. When he finally reached Tabriz, Lahuti appealed to the governor
of Azerbaijan, Mokhber al-Saltaneh, for a pardon and requested to be
reinstated in the gendarmerie detachments stationed in the province.
In desperate need of trained officers, Mokhber al-Saltaneh agreed, and
Lahuti joined the Iranian gendarmerie units headed by the Swedish
commander, Colonel Lundberg, whom he knew from his previous tenure
in the force.15 Lahuti was assigned to the gendarmerie detachment
dispatched to Sharafkhaneh, where it was to stay until the arrival of
reinforcements sent from Tehran for the purpose of suppressing Simko.
Shortly after Lahuti’s arrival in Sharafkhaneh, Reza Khan, the minister of
war, ordered the re-organization of the Iranian armed forces, with the
Iranian gendarmerie and the Cossack Brigade merging into one mili-
tary institution. The merger of the two entities caused a great deal
of anxiety and opposition among a significant number of gendarmerie
troopers who were already angry at the government for not paying their
salaries on time. On 30 January, when the gendarmerie officers stationed

12 British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 187.

13 Kaveh Bayat, Kudeta-ye Lahuti, Tabriz, Bahman 1300, pp. 31–32.
14 Ibid., p. 32.
15 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, February 19, 1922, [E 3815/285/34], No. 85., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 150.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 193

in Sharafkhaneh staged their mutiny, Lahuti was handpicked as the leader

of the rebellion. Colonel Lundberg, the Swedish officer in command of
the gendarmerie units in Azerbaijan, tried to quell the revolt among the
gendarmes, who had arrested their commanding officer, but he failed.
As soon as he learned about the fall of Tabriz into the hands of Lahuti
and his supporters, Reza Khan, who was visiting Kermanshah at the time,
cut short his trip and returned to Tehran. The minister of war ordered
“the 3,000 to 4,000 Cossacks who were at Miandoab, with the object
of attacking Simko from the south of Lake Urumiyeh, to proceed imme-
diately to Tabriz and quell the revolt.”16 Realizing that his short reign
as the master of Tabriz was coming to a quick end, on 6 February
Lahuti published a notice declaring that more Cossacks were arriving
and that they intended to fight “against our liberty.”17 The gendarmerie
commander called on the inhabitants of Tabriz to join him against the
government forces, but Lahuti’s desperate plea failed to inspire a positive
response.
On February 8, 1922, the Cossack units under the command of
General Sheybani, converged in Tabriz and joined up with Cossack
detachments already in the city and confined to their barracks. With
the arrival of government forces, fighting erupted between Lahuti’s
supporters and army units loyal to the central government. After several
hours of intense fighting, which commenced at about 10:00 a.m. and
ended at 5:30 p.m., Lahuti and his men were defeated.18 According
to one source, the intense firefight left fifty Cossacks dead and forty
wounded, while the casualties among Lahuti’s supporters were, according
to one report, considerably greater. Another source, however, reported
that Lahuti’s losses were “somewhat less”19 than the Cossacks. Having
pacified the rebels, General Sheybani imposed martial law on Tabriz.

16 Report on the Gendarmarie Revolt in Tabriz, February 1922, Doc. 253 [E 4753/
6/34] in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 17, p. 322.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, February 12, 1922, [E 4707/285/34], No. 8., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 153. See also, Report on the Gendarmarie
Revolt in Tabriz, February 1922, Doc. 253 [E 4753/6/34] in British Documents On
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 17, p. 323.
194 M. KIA

Lahuti and a group of his supporters, estimated to be anywhere between

200 and 350 men,20 fled the city for the Soviet Union.21
In the next chapter of his life, Lahuti emerged as a prominent literary
figure in the Soviet Republic of Tajikistan. He also served for a time as
Tajikistan’s minister of education. Mokhber al-Saltaneh, whose tenure as
the governor of Azerbaijan had proved to be a series of disasters, was
recalled to Tehran and replaced first by a certain Ijlal al-Dowleh, and soon
after by Mosaddegh al-Saltaneh (the future Mohammad Mosaddegh).
The revolt staged by Lahuti forced government troops to abandon their
position south of Lake Urumiyeh and rush to Tabriz. The withdrawal of
the Iranian military units created a vacuum that Simko attempted to fill,
extending his rule to the territory east of the lake. As with the central
government, however, Simko also confronted challenges in the territory
under his control. In the winter of 1922, inter-tribal rivalries erupted into
open conflict between Simko and several Kurdish chiefs of Savojbolagh,
who drove Simko’s forces out of the district.22 This setback, in addition to
the concentration of government troops, made Simko sufficiently anxious
that he began to contemplate making peace gestures to Tehran.23 The

20 For the number of individuals who fled with Lahuti to the Soviet Union, see,
Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, Gozaresh-e Iran, p. 382. See also, Loraine to Curzon,
Tehran, February 12, 1922, [E 4707/285/34], No. 71., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–
1965, Volume 6, p. 153. See also, Report on the Gendarmarie Revolt in Tabriz, February
1922, Doc. 253 [E 4753/6/34] in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and
Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the
Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 17, p. 323. See also, Kaveh Bayat, Kudeta-ye Lahuti,
Tabriz, Bahman 1300, pp. 31–32.
21 Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat. Gozaresh-e Iran, p. 382. According to Abdollah
Mostowfi, the supporters of Lahuti, who were detained by Iranian authorities, were
pardoned by Reza Khan, the minister of war, after the influential Shi’i cleric, Sayyid
Hassan Modarres, interceded on their behalf. The released troopers and officers were
later recruited by the country’s police force and the Iranian gendarmerie. See Mostowfi,
Abdollah., Sharh-e Zendegani-ye Man Ya Tarikh-e Ejtemaei-ye Doreh-ye Qajar, 3 Volumes,
(Tehran: Zavvar Press, 1992), p. 373.
22 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, March 15, 1922, [E 4737/285/34], No. 146., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 169.
23 Ibid.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 195

prospect of an approaching conflict with a large government force inten-

sified his desperate search for new tribal allies as far south as Sanandaj and
Marivan in the present-day province of Kurdistan.24
Simko’s appeal to some of the Kurdish tribes of western Azerbaijan
and Kurdistan received a positive response. In March 1922, the British
consul in Tabriz reported that “the Mamash, Mangur, Dohbukri tribes,
as well as the Kurds in the neighborhood of Saqiz [Saqqez] and Baneh”
had joined Simko.25 Thus, Simko’s military strength, which was estimated
by one British source at 5,000 armed men, grew in size with the addi-
tion of 1,700 Dehbokri, 700 Mangur, and 500 Mamash tribesmen.26
At least one Iranian source estimated that, at the height of his power in
1922, Simko enjoyed the support of a 10,000-man army, as well as 400
Turkish officers, who were responsible for operating his artillery, including
machine guns and cannons.27 Equally alarming for the Iranian govern-
ment was the growing popularity of Simko among the powerful Kurdish
tribal chiefs of the province of Kurdistan. At least one of these, Sardar
Rashid Ardalani, promised Simko to march on Sanandaj when the latter’s
forces had occupied Saqqez.28 Another influential chief, Mahmud Khan
Dizli of Marivan also promised to support Simko.29 According to the
British consul in Kermanshah, the only Kurdish chief who had given a flat
refusal to Simko’s overtures was Mahmud Khan Kanisanan of Marivan.30
While Simko was building a formidable force in western Azerbaijan and
expanding his alliances to the tribes of Sanandaj and Marivan, the central
government was busy consolidating its position in eastern Azerbaijan.

24 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, March 27, 1922, [E 4751/285/34], No. 175., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 6, p. 175.
25 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, March 30, 1922, [E 4754/285/34], No. 180., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 6, p. 178.
26 Ibid.
27 Amanollah Jahanbani, Az Tezar ta Shah: Zendeginameh va Khaterat-e Sepahbod
Amanollah Jahanbani, Edited by Mahmoud Toloui, (Tehran: Elm Publisher, 2019),
p. 147.
28 Cowan to Loraine, Kermanshah, March 16, 1922, Doc. 300, Enclosure in Doc. 299,
No. 5., in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 17, p. 375.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
196 M. KIA

By April 7, 1922, there was a significant concentration of government

forces in Tabriz, Sharafkhaneh, Miandoab, and Khoy.31 The distribution
of government troops was reported by the British consul in Tabriz as
follows:

Tabriz: Cavalry 850; Infantry 650; Guns 8; Machine guns 10; Lewis
guns 13.
Sharafkhaneh: Infantry 3,000; Guns 4; Machine guns 17.
Miandoab: Cavalry 1,200; Infantry 800; Guns 4; Machine guns 10.
Khoy: Infantry 500; Cavalry 50; Irregulars 300.32

The congregation of government forces in Azerbaijan was not,

however, designed exclusively to neutralize the threat posed by Simko.
The central government was also embarking on a new campaign to disarm
tribal groups and concentrate all power in the hands of the central govern-
ment. In the process of disarming Iran’s tribal groups, Tehran was also
removing tribal chiefs as the intermediary strata standing between the
state and the tribal population of the country. The central government
intended to replace loyalty to tribal chiefs with loyalty to the state and
substitute tribal identities with a new national identity. Instead of paying
their taxes to their chief, tribesmen were now converted into full-fledged
citizens, who were expected to abide by the rules and the laws of the state
and pay their taxes to the agents of the central government.
One of the first tribes in Azerbaijan to be disarmed was the Hajialilu
of Qarajadagh, which Simko had defeated in December 1921. After the
death of the Hajialilu chief Amir Arshad in battle against Simko, his
brother, Sardar Ashayer, emerged as the leader of his tribe. On April
19, 1922, government authorities in Tabriz arrested Sardar Ashayer and
his nephew, the son of the deceased Amir Arshad.33 The army detach-
ment dispatched to Amir Arshad’s village seized “a large store of arms
and munitions,” including “1,500 rifles, 19 Lewis guns, 6 machine guns,

31 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, April 18, 1922, [E 5238/285/34], No. 222., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 6, p. 186.
32 Ibid.
33 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, April 30, 1922, [E 5897/285/34], No. 244., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 6, p. 194.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 197

and 2 mountain guns.”34 The military operations conducted against the

tribal chiefs in eastern Azerbaijan culminated in the suppression of the
Aralu and Fuladlu sections of the Shahseven tribe and the execution of
their chiefs in spring 1923.35 The message to the tribes of Azerbaijan,
and all tribal groups across the country, was loud and clear: the days of
tribes arming themselves and behaving as independent political and mili-
tary entities had come to an end. No tribe, even those whose chiefs had
cooperated with the central government, could escape the long arm of
the Iranian state and the policy of tribal disarmament implemented by
Reza Khan, the minister of war.

Khalu Qorban: yet Another

Debacle for the Government
Among the armed units dispatched against Simko was a small detach-
ment under the command of the Kurdish leader, Khalu Qorban. From
1915 to 1921, Khalu Qorban had played an important role as an ally
of Mirza Kuchak Khan, the charismatic leader of the Jangal movement
based in the Caspian province of Gilan. He had originally travelled to
Gilan with his uncle, the leader of a detachment of 150 gum workers
and Kurds from Kermanshah. When his uncle was killed in a skirmish,
Khalu Qorban emerged as the leader of the Kurdish unit.36 After the
Jangal movement unraveled in autumn 1921, Khalu Qorban abandoned
Mirza Kuchak Khan who died in December 1921 from frostbite in the
Talish mountains. On 21 December, Khalu Qorban, accompanied by his
lieutenant, Khalu Morad, also a Kurd, arrived in Tehran.37

34 Ibid.
35 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 13, Tehran, March 31, 1923, Doc. 203 [E
4911/69/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 294. See also, M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 22,
Tehran, June 2, 1923, Doc. 262, in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and
Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the
Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 373.
36 Gilak, Mohammad Ali. Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Jangal, (Rasht: Gilakan Press, 1992),
p. 55.
37 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 33, Tehran, December 18, 1922, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 17, p. 244.
198 M. KIA

As Simko’s rebellion gained momentum, the government conceived a

plan to rid itself of Khalu Qorban by rewarding the former revolutionary
with the honorific title of Salar Mozaffar (Victorious Commander) and
dispatching him at the head of an expeditionary force against the Kurdish
chief.38 Marching from Tehran in late autumn 1921, Khalu Qorban and
his detachment reached Savojbolagh after quick stops at Miandoab and
Sā’in Qalaeh (present-day Shahin Dezh).39 The original plan called for
Khalu Qorban and his Kurdish detachment to establish a base in Savo-
jbolagh. When the gendarmes under Lahuti seized Tabriz in February
1922, however, Khalu Qorban and his Kurdish fighters were ordered to
abandon their position in Savojbolagh and advance rapidly toward Tabriz
to assist in the suppression of Lahuti and his supporters.
After the suppression of Lahuti’s revolt, Khalu Qorban and his
contingent joined the forces holding the line of defense south of Lake
Urumiyeh. In May, after positioning his force northeast of Savojbolagh,
Khalu Qorban received intelligence that the town’s population had joined
Sayyid Taha II and his band of 800 fighters in looting raids in the vicinity
of Bukan southeast of Savojbolagh.40 Believing that there was no fighting
force left in Savojbolagh, Khalu Qorban advanced quickly and seized the
town without any resistance. When the news of the fall of Savojbolagh
reached Sayyid Taha II, the Kurdish sheikh and his fighters returned
and attacked Khalu Qorban’s forces.41 On May 27, 1922, Kurdish tribal
units, under the overall leadership of Sayyid Taha II, defeated Khalu
Qorban’s forces. Khalu Qorban and 200 of his men were killed during
the firefight.42 As Khalu Qorban’s forces fled “hurriedly towards Tabriz
via Maragheh,” panic spread among government forces, which evacuated

38 Ibid. see also, Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat. Khaterat va Khatarat, p. 331.

39 Mohammad Ali Gilak, Tarikh-e Enqelab-e Jangal, p. 519.
40 Loraine to Balfour, Gulhak, June 9, 1922, [7333/285/34], No. 344., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 214.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. See also, Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 61.
See also, Sirwan Khosrozadeh, “Avamel-e Moasser dar Piruzi-ye Qoshun-e Mottahad al-
Shekl,” p. 63. See also, Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, July 16, 1923, Persia Annual Report,
1922, Confidential (12,221) [E 8057/8057/34], No. 314., in Iran Political Diaries
1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 410.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 199

Miandoab and Sā’in Qalaeh.43 The garrison of Sā’in Qalaeh “consisted

of 600 gendarmes,” of whom “400 fled to Tabriz and 200 retreated
southward.”44 The collapse of Khalu Qorban’s forces allowed Simko to
seize Miandoab and Sā’in Qalaeh southeast of Lake Urumiyeh and to
threaten Maragheh east of the lake.45 According to one source, with
government forces fleeing en masse, Simko advanced toward Maragheh
and sacked the town in June.46 For the first time in the history of the
conflict between the central government and Simko, the Kurdish chief
was in position to attack Tabriz, the provincial capital of Azerbaijan. As
one British diplomat wrote almost a year later, if Simko had “scored one
more victory, he would have been the chieftain of all western tribes and
would have established a Republic.”47
The victory over Khalu Qorban’s detachment, followed by the capture
of Miandoab and Sā’in Qalaeh, enhanced the morale of Simko’s allies and
caused a large number of Kurdish tribes to join him. Simko’s newly gained
confidence was demonstrated in his appeal to the tribes of Luristan to rise
and “join forces with the Kurds.”48 The central government in Tehran
had no option but to sue for peace. According to one source, Simko
and the delegates of the Iranian government reached an agreement under
which the Kurdish leader promised to cease his attacks against Iranian
government forces, as long as the government stopped its attacks against

43 Loraine to Balfour, Tehran, June 9, 1922, [E 7333/285/34], No. 344., in Iran

Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 214.
44 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 23, June 11, 1922, Doc. 16 [E 8373/
285/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 18, p. 21.
45 Oriente Moderno, Anno 2, Nr. 2 (15 July 1922), Istituto per l’Oriente C. A. Nallino,
p. 115. See also, Loraine to Balfour, Tehran, June 6, 1922, Doc. 271 [E 5752/6/34],
No. 241., in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 17, p. 343.
46 Ibid.
47 Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, p. 258.
48 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs 1925: The Islamic World Since the
Peace Settlement, p. 539. Oriente Moderno, Anno 2, Nr. 2 (15 July 1922), Istituto per
l’Oriente C. A. Nallino, p. 115.
200 M. KIA

his positions.49 The government and Simko also agreed to exchange pris-
oners of war and allow freedom of trade. The peace agreement with Simko
allowed the central government to dispatch a new and much larger army
to Azerbaijan in order to restore order in northwestern Iran.50
Simko’s victories against government forces generated international
reverberations, and the world media, through hyperbolic dispatches
published in Turkish newspapers, took notice of the unfolding crisis in
northwestern Iran. One of these embellished reports dispatched by the
Associated Press on July 9, 1922, and published in the New York Times on
10 July, stated that, after defeating the Iranian army, “the bandit Simko”
had “proclaimed a Kurdish Republic, assuming the Presidency himself.”51
The report also stated that Simko, who “commanded 35,000 men” and
received assistance from the Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal, was marching
to Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan.52 According to the same dispatch,
the new Kurdish republic was to incorporate the towns of Kermanshah,
Salmas, and Urumiyeh.53
The news of humiliating military setbacks in Azerbaijan forced the
Iranian government to offer interviews to the international press and
deny that Iran’s armed forces had been defeated by Simko. In its July
19, 1922, issue, the Washington Post reported that the Iranian ambas-
sador to the United States, Mirza Hossein Khan Alai (later Hossein Ala),
had denied the news that “the Persian bandit,” Simko had proclaimed
a Kurdish republic and had assumed its presidency after defeating the
Iranian army.54 What the Iranian diplomat could not refute, however, was
the fact that, by the end of July 1922, Simko controlled all of the terri-
tory west of Lake Urumiyeh from Khoy in the north to Saqqez and Baneh
in the south.55 Indeed, “the inactivity and total absence of the offensive
spirit” shown by government forces, operating against Simko for nearly

49 Oriente Moderno, Anno 2, Nr. 2 (15 July 1922), Istituto per l’Oriente C. A. Nallino,
p. 115.
50 Ibid.
51 The New York Times, July 10, 1922.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Washington Post, July 19, 1922.
55 Loraine to Balfour, Tehran, July 3, 1922, [E 8437/6/34], No., 419., in British
Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 39.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 201

six months, handed Simko the initiative and improved the morale of his
troops.56 Added to this, the defeat of government forces by Simko north
and south of Lake Urumiyeh gained the Kurdish chief more territory
and further allies, and lowered the morale and discipline of the govern-
ment forces.57 By late spring 1922, Simko’s territorial gains had assumed
alarming proportions, and he was now viewed by Tehran as the principal
threat to the territorial integrity of the Iranian state, a reality recognized
by Iran’s minister of war, Reza Khan.58 Tehran was especially alarmed by
reports that Simko was intensifying his propaganda among the Kurdish
tribes of western Iran, in one case, promising governorship of Sanandaj
to a Kurdish chief, Mahmud Khan Kanisanan of Marivan, if he took the
town.59
The defeat suffered by government forces in May 1922, dealt a serious
blow to Reza Khan’s original plan regarding the restoration of govern-
mental authority over western Azerbaijan. Tehran newspapers accused
British officials of fanning the flames of a Kurdish rebellion in general
and instigating a revolt among the Kurdish tribes of western Iran led by
Simko. An article published in the newspaper, Haqiqat (Truth), claimed
that the British consul in Kermanshah, joined by a certain Major Green-
house, had visited the tribes of Kurdistan as well as the representatives
of Simko in an effort to organize a tribal revolt based on an alliance
between the Kurdish tribes of western Iran and Simko.60 In a meeting
with the British military attaché in Tehran, the minister of war, Reza
Khan, stated that the disaster at Savojbolagh “was due to the fact that
Khalu Qorban and the men under him were practically irregular troops

56 Loraine to Balfour, Tehran, July 3, 1922, [E 8437/6/34], No. 419., in British

Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II , Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 38.
57 Ibid.
58 Susan Meiselas, Kurdistan In the Shadow of History, p. 104.
59 Cowan to Loraine, Kermanshah, May 25, 1922, Doc. 28 [E 8437/6/34], No.
419., in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign
Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939,
Volume 18, p. 39.
60 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, May 24, 1922, [E 7320/285/34], No., 303., Appendix,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 206.
202 M. KIA

and they showed no fight at all.”61 He also added that the defeat would
allow Simko to “gain further adherents from tribesmen” who, until then
had been “sitting on the fence.”62
In consequence of Khalu Qorban’s defeat, the minister of war
dispatched 5,000 reinforcements to Tabriz.63 Of these, 2,000 were to
march via Qazvin and Zanjan to Tabriz, while 1,000 men were ordered
to push from Hamadan toward Sā’in Qalaeh, via Bijar in the province of
Kurdistan, against Simko’s right flank.64 With promises from the Turks
that they would not render any assistance to the Kurdish chief and a
commitment from Ankara that, should Simko cross the frontier into
Turkey, they would arrest him and hand him back to Iranian authorities,
Reza Khan made up his mind to attack and crush Simko.

Amanollah Mirza Jahanbani

Frustrated with General Sheybani, who was delaying his offensive against
Simko, and anxious to finish the operations against the Kurdish chief
before the arrival of autumn 1922 (which would have made the move-
ment of troops and supplying them extremely difficult), Reza Khan
appointed chief of staff of the army, General Amanollah Mirza Jahan-
bani, as the commander-in-chief of all government forces in Azerbaijan.
General Jahanbani was the son of Amanollah Mirza Ziya al-Dowleh
and the great grandson of the second Qajar monarch, Fath Ali Shah
(r. 1797–1834). In autumn 1903, he was sent by his father to Saint
Petersburg, where he attended Nikolaevsky War Academy.65 In 1907,

61 Loraine to Balfour, June 9, 1922, Doc 10, [E 7332/6/34], in British Documents

On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part
II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 14.
62 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
63 Washington Post, July 19, 1922.
64 M. Saunders, Interview with the War Minister June 8, 1922, Document 11, Tehran,
June 8, 1922, Enclosure in Document 10, [E 7332/6/34], in British Documents On
Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II,
Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 15.
65 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, pp. 28–30.
Amanollah Mirza’s real name was Nosratollah, but he assumed his father’s name,
Amanollah, when he was sent to Russia.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 203

he was appointed to the Nikolaevsky Cadet Corps.66 After gradua-

tion, Amanollah Mirza attended Mikhailovsky Artillery School and the
War Academy.67 On February 5, 1912, while he was studying in Saint
Petersburg, Amanollah Mirza’s father, Ziya al-Dowleh, who served as
the commander of the Cossack Division in Tabriz and for a time as
the governor-general of Azerbaijan, committed suicide in the British
consulate at Tabriz. The suicide apparently resulted from his fears of
Russian vengeance for his open support for Iranian constitutionalists
and his sharp criticism of Russian atrocities in Azerbaijan.68 In 1916,
Amanollah Mirza “entered the Cossack Division with the rank of captain,
and was made aide-de-camp to the Russian general Starosselsky, then
commanding officer of the Cossack Division.”69 Amanollah Mirza was
then elevated to the position of “Staff Officer to Colonel Temer-
nobouzoff when the latter commanded the Persian Cossack Brigade.”70
Though he had never taken part in politics, after the coup of February
1921, Amanollah Mirza threw his support behind Reza Khan Sardar
Sepah, the head of the Cossack Brigade and later the minister of war.71
In October 1921, “Amanollah Mirza became Chief of Staff of the army,”
and “in June 1922, he was appointed commander-in-chief in Azerbaijan”
to lead the operations against Simko.72

66 Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence. Intelligence Report: Centers

of Power in Iran. May 1972, No. 2035/72, p. 22.
67 Ibid.
68 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, pp. 391-392. See also, British
Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 38. See also, Barclay to Grey, Tehran,
February 20, 1912, Persia Confidential, [10465], No. 37, in Iran Political Diaries 1881-
1965, Volume 5, p. 414. In June 1911, when Mokhber al-Saltaneh, the governor of
Azerbaijan resigned from his post, Ziya al-Dowleh, who served as the commander of
Iranian troops in the province, was appointed governor-general. On December 27, 1911,
under pressure from Russian occupation forces, Ziya al-Dowleh took bast in the British
consulate in Tabriz. See, Barclay to Grey, Tehran, June 14, 1911, Persia Confidential,
[25682], No. 99., in Iran Political Diaries 1881-1965, Volume 5, p. 317. See also,
Townley to Grey, Tehran, March 18, 1913, Persia Annual Report, 1912. [15876], No.
66., in Iran Political Diaries 1881-1965, Volume 5, p. 466.
69 Confidential, [E 5601/1688/34], No. 212, Leading Personalities in Persia, 1947 ,
Le Rougetel to Bevin, Persia, June 27, 1947, p. 15.
70 British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 38.
71 Biographies of Leading Personalities in Persia, Persia Confidential [E 693/693/34],
No. 1, February 7, 1930, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 8, p. 598.
72 British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II), p. 38.
204 M. KIA

Aside from regular army units he commanded, Amanollah Mirza

enjoyed the support of several tribal groups of Azerbaijan. The
Moghadam tribe of Maragheh, the Afshar tribe of Urumiyeh and Sā’in
Qalaeh, and the Hajialilu tribal group based in Qarajadagh (Arasbaran),
joined government forces and provided irregular units as reinforcement.
Simko’s military victories had caused great anxiety, not only for the central
government, but also for these Shi’i Azerbaijani tribes, who viewed the
rise of the ambitious Kurdish chief as a direct threat to their traditional
power and privileges.
In June 1922, as Amanollah Mirza prepared himself to depart for
Tabriz, the minister of war dispatched a large force to reinforce the
Maragheh-Miandoab-Savojbolagh line. Composed of 1,600 troops, this
military unit advanced toward Azerbaijan via Hamadan.73 Another
detachment from Miyaneh comprising the Qazvin Regiment of 856 men,
and the Khorasan Regiment numbering approximately 2,000, brought
the total of the forces in the southern front (east and south of Lake
Urumiyeh) to 3,600 troops.74 Meanwhile, Amanollah Mirza left Tehran
for Tabriz on June 17, 1922. On 28 June, shortly after arriving in Tabriz,
he “held an inspection of troops.”75 Three weeks later, on 18 July,
Amanollah Mirza left Tabriz for the port of Sharafkhaneh on the north-
eastern shore of Lake Urumiyeh, where he set up his headquarters.76
As Amanollah Mirza was leaving Tehran for Tabriz in June, a Turkish
detachment of 1,000 to 1,500 men, began to assemble in Van in eastern
Turkey, in close proximity to the Iran-Turkey frontier.77 According to
an agent providing reports to the British government, the Turks had
demanded that Simko (1) “dismiss all Turkish Kurds” who were with
him and send them back to Turkey; (2) return to the Turks “all arms

73 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan Against Ismail Agha (Simko),

undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 103.
74 Ibid.
75 Loraine to Balfour, Tehran, Tehran, July 13, 1922, [E 8631/285/34], No. 439., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 230.
76 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, August 8, 1922, [E 10,119/285/34], no. 497., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 241.
77 Loraine to Balfour, Tehran, July 13, 1922, [E 8631/285/34], No. 439., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 230.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 205

and munitions” he had received from Turkish sources; and (3) submit
to the Iranian government and “hand over all arms and munitions in his
possession” to the Iranian authorities.78 By summer 1922, British diplo-
matic and intelligence sources reported that the Turkish nationalists were
no longer lending any support to Simko and his followers. According
to the British ambassador in Tehran, the fact that Simko was in favor
of an “independent Kurdistan, with possibly himself at the head of the
State,” mitigated against “the prospect of assistance being rendered him”
by the Ankara government.79 Nevertheless, the Kurdish leader continued
to enjoy the support of “a considerable number of Turkish officers and
men amongst his following,” whom the ambassador believed “to be
adventurers serving him without instructions from their government.”80
Sensing that he was being sandwiched by Turkish nationalist forces
from the west and an Iranian army “rejuvenated by the reforms of Reza
Khan” from the east,81 Simko hurriedly dispatched three Kurdish mullahs
as his representatives to Iraq to seek “assistance or intervention” from
British authorities.82 On 9 July, Simko’s envoys left Urumiyeh for Mosul
in northern Iraq.83 The Kurdish chief also sent an urgent summons to
Sayyid Taha II, who was on his way to a meeting with British offi-
cials in Iraq.84 One British official even claimed that Simko had sent a
representative to Baku to obtain Russian Bolshevik assistance, though the
British consul in Tabriz could not confirm the accuracy of the report.85
Though they had supported Kurdish nationalist aspirations in northern
Iraq, the British had no interest in becoming entangled in a campaign to

78 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, August 8, 1922, [E 10,119/285/34], No. 497., in

Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 243.
79 Lorraine to Balfour, Tehran, July 3, 1922, Doc. 28 [E 8437/6/34] in British Docu-
ments On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print,
Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 38.
80 Ibid.
81 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds Turks and Arabs, p. 305.
82 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, August 8, 1922, [E 10,119/285/34], No. 497., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 243.
83 Ibid.
84 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds Turks and Arabs, p. 252.
85 Lorraine to Balfour, Tehran, July 3, 1922, Doc. 28 [E 8437/6/34] in British Docu-
ments On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print,
Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 38.
206 M. KIA

undermine Iran’s territorial integrity or in providing arms, money, and

logistical support to a tribal chief they had dismissed as a brigand and an
opportunist.
Meanwhile, Amanalloh Mirza was putting the final touches on his
campaign against Simko. While in Sharafkhaneh, the Iranian commander
augmented the artillery capabilities of several naval vessels on Lake
Urumiyeh, including the battleship, Admiral, by mounting it with two
Russian rapid-fire mountain guns.86 He also waited patiently for all
detachments under his command to assemble on the plain of Tasuj north
of the lake. In finalizing his plans, Amanollah Mirza “consulted a Russian
officer of the old Czarist army,” Colonel Andrievsky, “who had gained
intimate knowledge of conditions” in Urumiyeh in 1916–1917, when
the Russians were in occupation of the town.87 The Iranian comman-
der’s plan was to attack “round the north end” of Lake Urumiyeh against
Simko’s “stronghold at Chahriq,” while “leaving a sufficient force at
Savojbolagh to prevent the Kurdish chief from escaping south.88 The plan
was carried out with discipline, and it “proved a complete success.”89
By July 19, 1922, a formidable army had been assembled and prepared
for a slow march against Dilman and ultimately Simko’s headquarters at
Chahriq.90 At the last moment, General Jahanbani managed to convince
Kazem Qushchi, a local landowner and brigand, who had fought Simko
in the past, to join government forces in their march against Dilman.91
Kazem and his armed men controlled the village of Qushchi, situated in
the Anzal district at the northwest corner of Lake Urumiyeh.92

86 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, pp. 249–250.

87 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, July 16, 1923, Persia Annual Report, 1922, Confidential
(12,221) [E 8057/8057/34], No. 314., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6,
p. 410.
88 Ibid.
89 Ibid.
90 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 61. See also, Sirwan
Khosrozadeh, “Avamel-e Moasser dar Piruzi-ye Qoshun-e Mottahad al-Shekl dar Jang-e
Shakar Yāzi,” p. 64.
91 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, pp. 247–248.
92 Kazem Qushchi or Ghushchi and his men played an important role in the campaign
against Simko. However, after he rebelled against the government, Kazem and his small
army were attacked by a government force of 700 men in December 1923. The local
landlord and rebel was killed during the battle. See, Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran,
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 207

Defeat of Simko
Preparations for the military campaign against Simko were completed by 5
August, when government forces began to advance toward Salmas.93 On
the same day, British intelligence sources reported that “the government
advance guards” had “established contact with Simko’s outlying posts,”
and had driven them back.94 The attack on Simko’s positions commenced
with an assault on his right flank. The battleship Admiral shelled the port
of Golmankhaneh on the western shore of Lake Urumiyeh.95 A multi-
pronged assault from water and land was intended to intimidate Simko’s
forces and convince the Kurdish chief that he was fighting a superior force
in a hopeless battle.
On 5 August, columns of troops began to converge slowly on
Salmas.96 Three days later, the actual advance into the district of Salmas
commenced with a column under Bassir Divan (future General Fazlollah
Zahedi) leading the push toward Dilman, the capital of Salmas.97 The
battle was joined after Simko struck with the bulk of his troops northeast
of Dilman, attacking one of the government units, the Arak Regiment also
called Foj-e Ahmadi, named after the unit’s commanding officer, Yavar
Ahmad Khan.98 The main body of government forces immediately moved

March 4, 1924, Persia Annual Report 1923, Confidential 12,445, [E 3362/2635/34],

No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 720.
93 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, pp. 249–250. See
also, Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, September 29, 1922, [E 12,259/285/34], No. 597.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965, Volume 6, p. 276. See also, M. Saunders, Report
on the Operations in Azerbaijan Against Ismail Agha (Simko), undertaken by the Persian
Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British Documents On Foreign Affairs:
Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey,
Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 101.
94 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, August 22, 1922, [E 10,848/285/34], No. 523., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 246.
95 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, pp. 249–250.
96 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan Against Ismail Agha (Simko),
undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 101.
97 Ibid.
98 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 38, Tehran, September 24, 1922, Doc. 86,
[E 12,259/285/34] in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
208 M. KIA

up to support the hard-pressed Ahmadi detachment and “a pitched battle

was fought.”99 After several hours of intense fighting, Simko’s forces were
routed, losing 250 fighters.100 According to a British intelligence report,
a party of six hundred government troops was attacked and surrounded
by eight hundred pro-Simko Kurds.101 Government forces who could see
the fight through their field glasses rushed to rescue.102 Simko’s forces
were defeated after four hours of intense fighting. Government troops
lost sixty killed, fifty wounded, and six prisoners, while the Kurds lost
250 fighters.103
In a series of clashes that followed northeast of Dilman between the 8th
and the 9th of August, government forces inflicted a crushing defeat on
Simko’s 10,000-man army, which, by then, included 3,000 Kurds from
Turkey.104 Simko’s men fought courageously and ferociously, attacking
four times, “using their swords and daggers, which was most unusual” for
tribesmen, but, for the first time since their defeat at the hands of Philipov
in January–February 1920, they were confronting a superior force at all
levels, including discipline, leadership, and fire power.105 Thus, after an
intense firefight, government troops captured the capital of the district of
Salmas, Dilman, which was defended by 700 Kurds under the command
of the Shakak chief, Omar Agha.106 According to one source, the casu-
alties among the defending Kurds were estimated at 500 to 600 men.107
With Omar Agha and his men fleeing Dilman, Simko’s forces retreated

1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 125. See also, Loraine to Balfour, Tehran, September 29,
1922, [E 12,259/285/34], No. 597., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6,
p. 276.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan Against Ismail Agha (Simko),
undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 102.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 62.
105 Hassan Arfa, Under Five Shahs, p. 136.
106 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 275.
107 Ibid., p. 276.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 209

toward Chahriq.108 Simultaneously, army detachments from Khoy and

Maku advanced from the direction of Qotur toward Simko’s stronghold
at Chahriq.109
On 10 August, government troops concentrated in the district of
Salmas and marched through Dilman, the district capital, at 9:00 A.M.110
With Dilman serving as their operational base, government forces
advanced toward Chahriq, Simko’s stronghold, the next day. Iranian
army detachments were divided into three columns and, after an intense
artillery barrage, captured Simko’s headquarters on 14 August.111 The
Chahriq fortress, including the building Simko had designated as the site
where he would declare the independence of Kurdistan, was blown up by
the order of General Jahanbani.112 In a telegram to Reza Khan, General
Jahanbani informed the minister of war that he had captured Simko’s
headquarters and that the Kurdish chief had fled.113 Two days after the
capture of Chahriq, government troops entered Urumiyeh after they
had killed Simko’s designated governor.114 On 18 August, skirmishes
were reported from Baradoost-Margavar-Oshnaviyeh line, but there was
no trace of Simko and his main army.115 On 21 August, government
authorities felt sufficiently confident to appoint deputy governors for

108 Ibid., pp. 275–276.

109 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan Against Ismail Agha (Simko),
undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 102.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid. See also, Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak,
pp. 268–269. See also, Hassan Arfa, The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study, p. 62.
113 Malek al-Shoara Bahar, Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Ahzab-e Siyasi dar Iran, Volume 1,
pp. 310–311.
114 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan Against Ismail Agha (Simko),
undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 102.
See also, Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 313. See also,
Persia Annual Report 1922. Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, July 16, 1924, [E 8057/8057/
34], No. 314., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 410.
115 Ibid.
210 M. KIA

Urumiyeh and Savojbolagh.116 Notices were also published, which guar-

anteed “security for all those who wished to return” to Urumiyeh.117 A
few refugees returned to their homes, but the bulk awaited an official
proclamation allowing them to do so.118 The authorities were afraid to
issue this proclamation as long as Simko was at large, and so to accept
responsibility, for the safety of the region.119 On the same day, General
Jahanbani returned from Urumiyeh to his headquarters at Sharafkhaneh
on the northeastern shore of Lake Urumiyeh.120
By the time the Iranian forces arrived in western Azerbaijan, the towns
of Urumiyeh and Salmas, as well as the villages in the theater of oper-
ations, had been reduced to ruins.121 Urumiyeh in particular had been
knocked to pieces; only a few Muslim homes remained, while the town’s
Christian quarter had been completely destroyed.122 The population of
the town, the urban heart of the region, had decreased from 30,000 at
the commencement of the Great War to 10,00. Even “the fields and vine-
yards” had been “badly damaged.”123 In late winter 1923, the central
government in Tehran allowed 3,000 Assyrian refugees to return, but
the population was now extremely poor and in need of “assistance in

116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
118 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 43, Tehran, October 29, Doc. 110 [E
14,483/285/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 159.
119 Ibid.
120 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan Against Ismail Agha (Simko),
undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 102.
121 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 41, Tehran, October 15, Doc. 102 [E
13,955/285/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 144.
122 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 43, Tehran, October 29, Doc. 110 [E
14,483/285/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 159.
123 Ibid.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 211

money, grain-seed, and plough-oxen.”124 By late September 1923, the

British ambassador in Tehran was able to report to London that Assyr-
ians and Armenian refugees were steadily returning to the Urumiyeh
area, and all those who were in Tabriz had been repatriated.125 Some
“1,500 refugees from Hamadan” were also “reported to be on their way”
to Urumiyeh “via Bijar and Maragheh accompanied by Miss Shedd, an
American missionary doctor.”126 A British report for 1923 concluded that
in 1922 and up to August 1923 “about 5,000 refugees had returned to
Urmia [Urumiyeh] from and via Tabriz, and by the end of the year a
further 3,000 had proceeded thither from Kermanshah and Hamadan,
while 200 more natives of Urmia awaited at Tabriz their opportunity
to return.”127 There were also about “1,000 Assyrians still in and near
Kermanshah.”128 Nearly “all of them” had “found employment,” and
many did not show a “keen desire to follow the rest of their brethren to
Urmia.”129 The news of the suffering and destruction of urban and rural
communities in western Azerbaijan during Simko’s rule devastated and
outraged the population in Tabriz where the bazaars were illuminated in
celebration of the Kurdish chief’s defeat.130
The campaign against Simko displayed the emergence of a new cadre of
young Iranian army officers who would rise to prominent positions during
the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1941–1979). Haj Ali
Razmara, who commanded a detachment during the fight against Simko,
would graduate from the military academy at Saint-Cyr and subsequently

124 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 10, Tehran, March 11, 1923, Doc. 186
[E 4081/69/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 275.
125 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, September 29, 1923, Persia Confidential [E 10,594/
69/34], No. 437., in Iran Political Diaries, Volume 6, p. 605.
126 Ibid.
127 Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia Annual Report, 1923, Confi-
dential (12,445), [E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965.
Volume 6, p. 731.
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
130 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan against Ismail Agha (Simko)
undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 102.
212 M. KIA

rise to the directorship of the Tehran Military Cadet College in 1938,

and the rank of general in 1944. He was appointed the prime minister
of Iran in June 1950. The general turned prime minister served as the
head of the government until March 7, 1951, when he was assassinated
by Khalil Tahmassebi, a member of the Islamist group, Fadayeen-e Islam,
which enjoyed the support of the powerful clergyman, Ayatollah Sayyid
Abolqasem Kashani, and a junior member of the clergy at Qom, namely
Ruhollah Khomeini.
Another detachment commander, Bassir Divan, would emerge as
General Fazlollah Zahedi. Zahedi played an important role in several mili-
tary campaigns during the reign of Reza Shah, including the one which
led to the detention of the Arab ruler of Mohammareh (Khoramshahr),
Sheikh Khazal. He was subsequently appointed governor of Khuzestan.
He also served as the governor of Isfahan before the invasion of Iran by
the British and Soviet forces during the Second World War. Suspected
of collaborating with Germans, Zahedi was detained by the British and
sent into exile in Palestine. Zahedi returned to Iran in 1945. In 1949, he
was appointed the chief of police of Tehran. In the short-lived premier-
ship of Hossein Ala (March–April 1951), he served as the minister of
the interior. When Mohammad Mosaddeq (April 1951–August 1953) was
appointed prime minister, Zahedi retained his post and continued to serve
as minister of the interior until December 1951. In August 1953, mili-
tary units led by Zahedi, who had been appointed by Mohammad Reza
Shah as the new prime minister, overthrew the Mosaddeq government.
The military takeover enjoyed the support of both the United States and
Britain. Zahedi served as the prime minister until April 1955. After leaving
office, Zahedi served as Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations at its
European headquarters in Geneva.
A third officer, Gholamali Bayandor, an artillery specialist wounded
by three bullets during the battle against Simko, refused to abandon
the battlefield until he was taken to hospital by force. Because of the
exceptional bravery and dedication displayed during the campaign against
Simko, Bayandor received the highest medal of courage. He later joined
the Iranian naval forces, rising to the post of the commander of the Impe-
rial Iranian Navy from 1931 to August 25, 1941, when he was killed on
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 213

the deck of his battleship after it was attacked by the British forces which
had invaded Iran.131
Finally, the fourth officer, Hassan Arfa, who had fought Simko on
several occasions before and during the August 1922 victory, rose to the
rank of general and the chief of the General Staff (1944–1946) before
he was appointed Iran’s ambassador to Turkey (1958–1961) and Iran’s
ambassador to Pakistan (1961–1962). Arfa wrote two important books
on the history of twentieth-century Iran, Under the Five Shahs, and The
Kurds: An historical and political study.

Simko’s Tribal Coalition Fizzles

In less than three weeks, in August 1922, the government forces seized
Salmas, Urumiyeh, Chahriq, Oshnaviyeh, Savojbolagh, and Sardasht,
“practically without opposition.”132 By the end of August, Simko’s army
of 10,000 men had been reduced to 1,000. The Kurdish chief had
no alternative but to retreat into Turkish territory. According to Iran’s
minister of war, Simko had been completely crushed after one “stiff fight
in which valiant resistance of Simko’s Kurdish regulars was overwhelmed”
by superior Iranian numbers, who had fought well, suffering “some 250
casualties.”133 Simko lost “not only his guns, machine-guns and ammu-
nition train” but also one of his wives, who was killed.134 In addition, his
six-year-old son, “the apple of his eye,” was captured by Iranian forces.135
One Iranian author claimed that, since the Turks had learned that Simko
had crossed into their territory accompanied by mules packed with money,
they staged a night raid to plunder his caravan.136 During this raid, one

131 Amanollah Jahanbani, Sarbaz-e Irani va Mafhum-e Ab va Khak, p. 258.

132 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 38, Tehran, September 24, 1922, Doc. 86,
[E 12,259/285/34] in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 125.
133 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, August 30, 1922, Doc. 48 [E 8676/6/34], No. 324.,
in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office
Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume
18, p. 71.
134 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds Turks and Arabs, p. 305.
135 Ibid.
136 Hossein Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran, Volume 2, p. 126.
214 M. KIA

of Simko’s wives and one of his sons were killed, but Simko managed
to escape the ambush. According to the same source, the Kurdish chief
offered General Jahanbani a bribe of 10,000 Turkish lira in return for
lenient and compassionate terms of surrender, but the Iranian commander
replied that he could accept no arrangements except an unconditional and
immediate surrender.137
The news of Simko’s defeat spread quickly. On 16 August, the
Times of London reported that the Iranian government’s offensive against
Simko had been carried out successfully “thanks to the ability of Sirdar-i
Sipah, Minister of War.”138 The same source reported that after a major
battle, the Iranian government troops had taken the rebel fortress in
Chahriq, seizing “many prisoners and rifles” and forcing Simko to flee
into Turkey.139 With the disintegration of Simko’s army, his tribal allies
opened negotiations for a pardon with the central government. In early
September 1922, Abdullah Beyk (Beg), a cousin of Simko, sent a message
to the Iranian commander saying that if he was “pardoned he would
surrender” with 400 of his Shakak tribesmen.140 Then late in September,
Sayyid Taha II and sixty of his men travelled to Urumiyeh “to discuss the
terms of peace” with the commander of the Iranian troops.141 Following
Sayyid Taha II, the powerful Shakak chiefs, Omar Khan, “the chief of the
Kardar subdivision of the Shakak,” also surrendered.142 By mid-October,
one British report claimed that Urumiyeh was “full of Kurds who walk
about the streets fully armed and unmolested by the garrison.”143
In addition to Sayyid Taha II and Omar Khan, numerous Kurdish tribal
chiefs surrendered. These included Nuri Beyk and his brother, Assad Beyk
of Targavar; Haji Agha, chief of the Harki Mandan from Mavana [also
in Targavar]; Taher Beyk, Kamal Beyk and Tabur Aghasi, chiefs of the
Begzade in Targavar; Karim Khan Harki, chief of the Sidan Harki tribe

137 Ibid.
138 The Times of London, August 17, 1922 as quoted in Oriente Moderno, Anno 2, Nr.
4 (15 September 1922), Istituto per l’Oriente C. A. Nallino, p. 243.
139 Ibid.
140 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, September 13, 1922, [E 12,245/285/34], No. 571.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 268.
141 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, October 18, 1922, [E 13,955/285/34], No. 267., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 291.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 215

of Margavar. The whole Zarza tribe of Oshnaviyeh also surrendered.144

Additionally, Bahri Beyk, “son of Tamar Agha,” one of the chiefs of
the Avdoi branch of Shakak, and “Simko’s cousin,” surrendered with
fifty families, and was appointed governor of Baradoost.145 Though these
tribal chiefs had supported Simko, the Iranian authorities adopted a “con-
ciliatory policy towards the Kurds” who had participated in Simko’s army
and allowed many who had been, until recently, “fighting on Simko’s
side,” to return to their homes armed and “unmolested by the govern-
ment troops.”146 Sayyid Taha, who had come to Urumiyeh to discuss
peace terms with the Iranian commander-in-chief, and “was being kept
there more or less as a hostage,” however, escaped from Urumiyeh and
“fled to the mountainous region on the frontier” west of the town.147
The Iranian military expressed a willingness “to grant Simko an
amnesty on conditions which will guarantee his future good behavior.”148
But, Simko, who was reported to “be in the mountainous frontier
district” west of Urumiyeh “with a following of not more than 200 men,”
refused to surrender to the Iranian authorities.149 Meanwhile, negotia-
tions regarding the fate of Simko between the Turkish nationalists and
the Iranian government continued. By then, the Turks were readily admit-
ting that they had armed Simko to enable him to prevent Christian (i.e.,
Assyrian and Armenian) refugees from returning to Urumiyeh.150 They
insisted, however, that, contrary to their objectives, Simko had used the
arms they had given him for his own political objectives against the
Iranian government, and that, therefore, they had in no way assisted

144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
146 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, September 29, 1922, [12259/285/34], No. 597., in
Iran Political Diaries, Volume 6, p. 275.
147 M. Saunders, October 22, 1922, Intelligence Summary No. 42, Doc. 105 [E
13,961/285/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 152.
148 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, September 29, 1922, [12259/285/34], No. 597., in
Iran Political Diaries, Volume 6, p. 275.
149 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, November 3, 1922, [E 14,483/285/34], No. 651.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 304.
150 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, October 18, 1922, [E 13,955/285/34], No. 627., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 292.
216 M. KIA

Simko against Iran.151 Despite repeated pleas from Iranian authorities

for security cooperation between the two countries, Turkish authori-
ties refused to surrender Simko unless the Iranian government made a
commitment to forbid the return of Assyrian and Armenian Christians to
Urumiyeh.152
With Simko defeated, the Iranian army dispatched three separate
detachments to three different parts of western Azerbaijan. Because the
absconding Kurdish fighters had split into three separate sections with
Simko and his tribe, as well as the Kurds of Somai and Baradoost
retreating toward Shepiran in Salmas district, Sayyid Taha II with his
men withdrawing to Margavar and Targavar districts, and the Kurds of
Salmas fleeing to Qotur, the first detachment of 2,000 government troops
marched from Salmas via Khoy to Qotur and thence to Maku in close
proximity to Iran’s border with Turkey.153 This column attacked and
burnt Qotur to deny the retreating Kurds from Salmas a source of food
and supply in case they crossed the Iranian-Turkish frontier. The second
detachment of 3,000 armed men proceeded from Urumiyeh directly
westward in a mop-up operation, clearing up the country between Lake
Urumiyeh and the Turkish frontier.154 The third army of 5,000 troopers
advanced against Oshnaviyeh southwest of Lake Urumiyeh, and in close
proximity to Iran’s border with both Iraq and Turkey.155 With much of
his army and support network abandoning him, Simko made one last
desperate maneuver, re-entering Iran with a group of his fighters who
had remained loyal to him, but he was quickly repulsed.
The suppression of Simko’s revolt was celebrated across the country in
ceremonies organized by the Iranian armed forces. The re-establishment

151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan against Ismail Agha (Simko)
undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 103.
See also, Office of the British Military Attaché, Tehran, 3rd September 1922, No. C38/
69., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 263.
154 Office of the British Military Attaché, Tehran, 3rd September 1922, No. C38/69.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 263.
155 Ibid.
 7 SIMKO’S DOWNFALL 217

of Iranian government authority in western Azerbaijan greatly strength-

ened Reza Khan’s position and accelerated his rise to absolute power in
Tehran.156 The moral of the army, which had “suffered from the reverse
at Simko’s hands in the spring and early summer,” changed overnight.157
The birth “of a new spirit and real espirit de corps ” became “apparent
amongst both officers and men,” a spirit that had not been in existence
in Iran “since the time of Nadir Shah in 1745.”158 The minister of war
congratulated the Iranian army on the occasion of the defeat of Simko by
issuing a statement:

At this time when the forces in Azerbaijan have won a complete victory,
eradicated the rebels, captured the town of Salmas, taken the fortress of
Chahriq and cleansed all the western areas of Azerbaijan from the threat of
foreign elements, I extend my appreciation to general Amanollah Mirza,
the commander of the army, for his rapid, decisive action, and also express
my full satisfaction to all the brave officers and men who took part in the
fighting.159

By labeling Simko as an agent of foreign powers, Reza Khan presented

himself as a patriotic leader who had singlehandedly defended the terri-
torial integrity of Iran, while at the same time restoring law and order
to an important frontier province that had effectively operated outside
the authority of the Iranian state for nearly two decades. The consolida-
tion of power in the hands of Iran’s central government allowed Reza
Khan to destroy the last remaining vestiges of autonomous tribal power
in northwestern Iran, as represented by the Shahseven tribes in eastern
Azerbaijan and the Khan of Maku in western Azerbaijan. During March
and April 1923, government forces attacked and killed seven prominent

156 M. Saunders, Report on the Operations in Azerbaijan against Ismail Agha (Simko)
undertaken by the Persian Government from August 5 to 28, 1922, Doc. 77, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 104.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid.
159 Donald Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran
1878–1944, p. 66.
218 M. KIA

Shahseven tribal chiefs.160 Then in January 1924, after decades of domi-

nating Maku and the surrounding districts, Eqbal al-Saltaneh was invited
to Tabriz, where he was detained. Tried for treason, the khan was found
guilty.161 The villages he owned were confiscated and converted into
crown lands.162 His personal property and treasures consisting of twenty
camel loads of silver, ten camel loads of gold, and three locked Russian
safes of unknown contents were transported from Maku to Tabriz by
Iranian military authorities.163 Shortly after the end of his trial, Eqbal
al-Saltaneh either died or was killed in prison.
In the months that followed the Iranian army’s victory over Simko,
Tehran’s newspapers published numerous articles on the underlying
causes for the Kurdish insurgency. Most of these blamed foreign powers
for instigating separatist movements as a means of undermining the efforts
of Reza Khan to restore peace and order in the country. For example, on
May 4, 1923, the Tehran newspaper, Iran, attacked the “Alien,” (i.e.,
the British) for instigating “the Simko insurrection, plunder of property
of the poor inhabitants and disappearance of peace and security, as well
as social and political difficulties,” which had “appeared in the capital and
other towns.”164 But the Persian newspapers did not confine their attacks
to the British. Iran’s neighbor to the north, namely the Soviet Union,
was also criticized for labeling “the outrageous activities of Ismail Agha
Simko…a national movement by the people.”165

160 The seven tribal chiefs were Amir Ashayer of Khalkhal, his brother, Abish Khan,
Amir Firuz, Sardar Ashja’, Hajji Alaei, Noruz Khan Amir Tuman, and Ashja’ Solltan. See,
M. Saunders, Tehran, June 2, 1923, Intelligence Summary No. 22, Doc. 262, in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 373.
161 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 20, 1924, [E 2417/255/34], No. 40., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 6.
162 Ibid.
163 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 15, 1924, [E 1948/255/34], No. 31., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 4.
164 M. Saunders, Tehran, May 5, 1923, Intelligence Summary No. 18, Appendix C,
Doc. 227 [E 6618/69/34], in British Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers
From the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle
East, 1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 336.
165 Ibid., Appendix (D), Leading Article in the Tehran Newspaper “Mihan,” dated May
1, 1923, p. 337.
 CHAPTER 8

In Search of a New Patron: Simko

Sandwiched Between Iran and Turkey

With his headquarters in government hands, Simko fled across the border
into Turkey, but he was betrayed by the Turks, his former backers, who
captured one of his sons “and all his property and killed his favorite
wife.”1 Desperate to save his life and secure British support for his
cause, the Kurdish chief escaped Turkish territory and arrived in northern
Iraq in October 1922.2 Simko travelled to Iraq “in the hope of find-
ing” the British willing and ready “to champion the cause of Kurdish
freedom” against the Turkish and Iranian governments.3 Simko’s brother-
in-law and close confidant, Sayyid Taha II, who arrived independently
a day or two later, however, seems to have understood from the very
outset that the British were unwilling to lend any support to a separatist
Kurdish movement in Iran. They were, however, more than happy to
entertain the appointment of the charismatic Sayyid as the local ruler of
the districts of “Rawanduz, Asra, and Amadiya.”4 It is not surprising,
therefore, that Sayyid Taha II left Simko and flew down to Baghdad to

1 Confidential: Personalities Mosul, Arbil , Kirkuk, Sulaimani and Frontiers, (Baghdad:

Government Press, 1923), p. 92.
2 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds Turks and Arabs, p. 305. See also, D. K. Fieldhouse (ed.).
Kurds, Arabs and Britons The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq, p. 110.
3 Ibid., p. 307.
4 Ibid., p. 306.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 219

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_8
220 M. KIA

take part in the tripartite conversations then in progress between King

Faisal of Iraq, the British High Commissioner, and a delegation from
Sulaymaniyah, regarding the future relationship between the autonomous
Kurdish region of northern Iraq and the Iraqi government.5

Simko in Northern Iraq

By autumn 1922 when Simko arrived in northern Iraq, the British in
collaboration with the French had completed the process of carving
new Arab states from the cadaver of the Ottoman Empire, converting
themselves into the new masters of Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq. To
the north, the Turkish nationalists, led by Mustafa Kemal, had defeated
the Greeks and the Armistice of Mudanya had been signed by the two
warring parties on October 11, 1922. Under that agreement, Turkey had
retained all of Anatolia and Eastern Thrace.6 After the victory of Turkish
nationalists over the Greeks, the conservative government of Bonar Law
(October 1922–May 1923) in London entered into direct negotiations
with Kemalist Turks in Lausanne, Switzerland with the hope of producing
a treaty of peace.7 By the time the Treaty of Lausanne was finally signed
on July 24, 1923, the British had dropped their demand for autonomy
of Turkish Kurdistan. To secure a durable peace agreement, London also
reassured the Turkish nationalists that the Kurds of northern Iraq would
not pose any threat to the security and territorial integrity of the newly
established Turkish republic.8
In the midst of these transformational developments in the larger
Middle East region, Simko met with British officials north of Erbil
on November 6, 1922. He was accompanied by his brother Ahmad,
several minor relatives, and about twenty retainers.9 According to the
British officer, Cecil J. Edmonds, who negotiated with Simko in Persian,
the Kurdish Aghas “were dressed in smart uniforms of British army

5 Ibid.
6 Joseph C. Grew, “The Peace Conference of Lausanne, 1922–1923,” Proceedings of
the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 98, No. 1 (February 15, 1954), pp. 1–10, p. 2.
7 Ibid., pp. 2–3.
8 Saad Eskander, “Southern Kurdistan Under Britain’s Mesopotamian Mandate: From
Separation to Incorporation, 1920–23,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 153–
180, http://doi.org/10.1080/714004389, p. 172.
9 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds Turks and Arabs, p. 307.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 221

serge, Russian top-boots, and the high cylindrical felt hats of the Shikak
completely hidden by the turban of silk handkerchiefs wound tightly
around; the jackets were double-breasted with stand-up collars and full
skirts of cavalry type, the breeches might have been cut in Savile Row.”10
Simko himself was described as a “well-knit, leanish man of middle
height”; his features seeming “very European, the brown tooth-brush
moustache would have graced any British officer, and the regularity of his
shining white teeth was discovered by a winning, almost shy, smile.”11
In sharp contrast to Edmonds, another British officer, Wallace Lyon,
who did not speak Persian and was merely an observer of the meeting,
described Simko as the “greatest brigand of our time” and a leader who
could have emerged as a legitimate nationalist figure had he abandoned
his love for looting and plundering.12 According to Lyon, the “suave”
Sayyid Taha accepted the invitation extended by the British to travel to
Baghdad without any fear or hesitation, whereas “the fidgety” Simko,
after travelling for a short time toward Erbil, suddenly changed his mind
and returned to the border region between Iraq and Turkey.13 Lyon
surmised that Simko was most probably aware that there were armed
“Assyrian Levies” stationed at Erbil’s aerodrome and that they could easily
shoot and kill the man they blamed for the murder of their leader, Mar
Shimun.14
In his meeting with British officials in northern Iraq, Simko expressed
“no particular feeling of resentment” toward the Iranians, “he had given
as good as he had received—but he wanted to get even with the Turks,
who had made a pretense of backing him and had then turned upon
him.”15 When the British informed him that they had no intention of
supporting him with arms and money, Simko expressed his astonish-
ment with their policy of avoiding any confrontation with Iran given that
the Iranian government was cooperating with the Turkish nationalists to
undermine the British position in northern Iraq.

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 D. K. Fieldhouse (ed.), Kurds, Arabs and Britons the Memoir of Wallace Lyon in
Iraq, pp. 111–112.
13 Ibid., p. 112.
14 Ibid.
15 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds Turks and Arabs, p. 307.
222 M. KIA

The British authorities in Iraq saw in Simko and Sayyid Taha II

“a possible way out of the Kurdish imbroglio and a cheap way of
re-establishing [their] authority” in the districts of Sulaymaniyah and
Rawanduz.16 To achieve this end, both Kurdish leaders had to collab-
orate fully and wholeheartedly with British authorities in Iraq, while at
the same time shifting their operational focus from northwestern Iran
and southeastern Anatolia to northern Mesopotamia. Simko rejected and
Sayyid Taha II accepted this proposal. The British viewed Sayyid Taha
in particular as a valuable partner, who could play an important role in
implementing the British strategy regarding northern Iraq. The Kurdish
leader exerted a great deal of influence on the Kurdish tribes of Rawanduz
in Iraq, as well as the tribes of Oshnaviyeh, Margavar, and Targavar in
Iran.17 It is not surprising, therefore, that the British provided Sayyid
Taha II “subsidies of 1000 rupees and the right to receive income from
customs.”18 Additionally, he was sent “a gift of 5000 guns.”19
Having realized that the British had no interest in supporting his mili-
tary operations in Iran, Simko appealed to Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji, the
ruler of Sulaymaniyah, for assistance. Hailing from a family of prominent
sheikhs, Sheikh Mahmud had inherited from his father and grandfa-
ther enormous tribal and religious influence.20 In 1918, shortly after
the British occupation of Iraq, Sheikh Mahmud was made governor of
Sulaymaniyah. In June 1919, however, he revolted and imprisoned the
British personnel in Sulaymaniyah. In response, the British dispatched
an expedition against the Kurdish leader, capturing and exiling him first
to India and then to Kuwait. The region ruled by Sheikh Mahmud was
then brought under direct British control and governed by English offi-
cers until September 1922, “when in consequence of Turkish infiltration
and a series of tribal risings, it was evacuated.”21 After the nationalist
Turks had been forced to withdraw from northern Iraq, Sheikh Mahmud

16 D. K. Fieldhouse, Kurds, Arabs and Britons: The Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq,
p. 111.
17 M. S. Lazarev, Kurdistan i Kurdski vopros (1923–1945) (Vostochnaia literatura,
2005), p. 40.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Confidential [E 8114/3/93], No. 301, Personalities in Iraq 1947 , Busk to Bevin,
September 3, 1947, p. 17.
21 C. J. Edmonds, “A Kurdish Newspaper: Rozh-i Kurdistan,” p. 84.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 223

was reinstated as the governor of Sulaymaniyah.22 Once again, the

Sheikh disappointed the British authorities by establishing direct contact
with Kemalist Turks and proclaiming himself the King of Kurdistan in
November 1922, shortly after Simko arrived in northern Iraq.23 In 1923,
“armed action had to be taken against Sheikh Mahmud to check his
endeavours to establish his influence in the Kirkuk and Erbil provinces.”24
Sulaymaniyah was re-occupied in 1924, “but Sheikh Mahmud was not
brought to terms until 1927.”25
The prospect of an autonomous or independent Kurdish state under
Sheikh Mahmud was an extremely delicate issue for the Iranian govern-
ment because of fears that it would embolden the Kurdish population in
western Iran. Indeed, the communication between the Iranian and British
officials clearly demonstrates that Kurdish sheikh’s activities aroused
considerable apprehension and anxiety in Tehran where the Iranian prime
minister, Qavam al-Saltaneh, expressed his grave concern to the British
ambassador about the “formation of Kurdish administration at Sulay-
maniyah” and the fact that “Sheikh Mahmud was calling himself a
king, appointing ‘ministers’ and sending emissaries” among Iranian Kurds
“inviting their allegiance to himself.”26
On January 8, 1923, Simko, whom the local press had already cele-
brated as “the doughty champion of Kurdistan,” arrived in Sulaymaniyah
with pomp and ceremony, including “a parade of troops, a salute of seven
guns, and the proclamation of a public holiday.”27 After the British turned
down his request for military and financial assistance, Simko pinned
his hopes on Sheikh Mahmud. During their meeting, the Shakak chief
appealed for assistance, but the Kurdish leader refused cooperation and
rejected the idea of lending any support.28 Realizing that neither the

22 Confidential [E 8114/3/93], No. 301, Personalities in Iraq 1947 , Busk to Bevin,

September 3, 1947, p. 17.
23 C. J. Edmonds, “A Kurdish Newspaper: Rozh-i Kurdistan,” p. 84.
24 Confidential [E 8114/3/93], No. 301, Personalities in Iraq 1947 , Busk to Bevin,
September 3, 1947, p. 17.
25 Ibid.
26 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, January 6, 1923, Doc. 130 [E 309/7/34] in British
Documents On Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential
Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume 18, p. 183.
27 C. J. Edmonds, Kurds Turks and Arabs, p. 313.
28 C. J. Edmonds, “A Kurdish Newspaper: Rozh-i Kurdistan,” p. 89.
224 M. KIA

British nor Sheikh Mahmud had any interest in lending their support to
his cause, Simko proposed his surrender to the Iranian government in
January 1923, but Tehran found the terms he had demanded unaccept-
able.29 By the end of January, a British intelligence report stated that,
while Sayyid Taha II “had gone to Mosul,” the British “had not allowed
Simko to go there.”30 The same report also claimed that Simko was near
Erbil and endeavoring through a Kurdish chief named Sheikh Raghib,
to come to terms with the Turks.31 The conditions demanded by the
Turks, however, were rejected by Simko, who by then was in “pitiable
conditions, without followers or money.”32

Simko, Turkish Nationalists,

and Russian Bolsheviks
Without any prospect of support from the British authorities in Iraq
or any immediate reconciliation with Iran, Simko returned to Turkey
and offered his services to the Turkish nationalists based in Ankara. By
the end of March 1923, the Kurdish chief had joined Ozdemir Bey,
the commander of Turkish nationalist forces in Rawanduz.33 The Turks
intended to use the route through Iran, via Urumiyeh, and the passes
leading east from Rawanduz into Iranian territory to reinforce their
troops in northeastern Iraq.34 The ultimate objective of the Turkish
campaign was to recapture Mosul. Ozdemir Bey appointed Simko as
warden of the frontier.

29 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, January 17, 1925, [E 952/82/34], No. 34, W. A.

K. Fraser, Intelligence Summary No. 3., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7,
p. 252.
30 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 4, Tehran, January 28, 1923, Doc. 164
[E 2945/69/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the
Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939. Volume 18, p. 244.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Confidential: Personalities Mosul, Arbil , Kirkuk, Sulaimani and Frontiers, p. 92.
34 Loraine to MacDonald, Tehran, March 4, 1924, Persia Confidential, No. 12445,
[E 3362/2635/34], No. 128., Persia Annual Report, 1923, in The Iran-Iraq Border
1840–1958. Volume 6, p. 605.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 225

Simko’s collaboration with the Kemalist Turks, however, proved to be

short-lived. British forces occupied Rawanduz on 22 April.35 Ozdemir
and his troops were forced to retreat into Iranian territory, where they
were dully disarmed by local authorities.36 Sheikh Mahmud, who had
joined the Turks, also fled across the Iranian frontier. Having witnessed
the collapse of the Turkish campaign at Rawanduz, Simko retired into
Turkey,37 visiting Nehri, the home of Sayyid Taha II in April.38 By the
end of June, Simko was reported to be near Qotur, but “on the Turkish
side of the frontier,” working with the local Kurds, who were “robbing
travelers along the Van-Qotur road.”39 Simko’s decision to ally himself
with the nationalist Turks severed his ties with Sayyid Taha II, whom the
British appointed qaimmaqam of Rawanduz in northeastern Iraq, after
they re-occupied the region in April 1923.40
The signing of the Treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and Britain,
France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) in July 1923,41 proved to be a turning point
for many Kurdish leaders in the region, including Simko. According
to the treaty, the allies recognized the boundaries of the newly estab-
lished Republic of Turkey. Turkey renounced all its claims to the Arab
provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Ankara also recognized British control
over Cyprus and Italian control over the Dodecanese. All parties agreed
that the straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles connecting the Black Sea to
the Aegean had to remain open to all shipping. But as far as the Kurds
were concerned, the most significant concession handed to the Turks was
that the allies dropped their demands for the creation of an autonomous
Kurdish state in eastern Anatolia and cession of territory by the Turks
to the Armenians. The Kurds could no longer rely on the support of

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Confidential: Personalities Mosul, Arbil , Kirkuk, Sulaimani and Frontiers, p. 92.
39 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 26, Tehran, Doc. 267 [E 8431/69/34] in
British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confi-
dential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East, 1918–1939. Volume
18, p. 385.
40 “Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government on the Administration of Iraq for
the Period April 1923–December 1924,” p. 17.
41 J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East. Volume 2, pp. 119–127.
226 M. KIA

the British for their cause. Neither could they rely on the Turks for any
assistance against the British in northern Iraq.
Recognizing that he could no longer use the conflict between the
British in Iraq and the Turkish nationalists in Anatolia to his advantage,
and painfully aware that neither the Turks nor the British had any inten-
tion of providing him with either military or financial assistance, Simko
turned his eyes to the north and appealed to the Soviet Union for support.
During his meetings with Sheikh Mahmud in Sulaymaniyah, Simko had
indicated that in the absence of any military support from the Turks,
who were negotiating with the British for a treaty of peace and under-
standing, the Kurds may have no choice but to enlist the support of
the Soviets. Now, with the news of a rapprochement between the British
and the Turks, Simko saw no realistic alternative but to appeal to the
Soviet officials for assistance. Declaring himself a zealous supporter of the
communist state, Simko wrote to the Soviet consul general in Urumiyeh
that: “We place all our hopes on you. When you provide us with the
necessary assistance and assistance in the name of philanthropy, we are
ready to carry out all your orders.”42 Simko also appealed to his Soviet
contact to act as intermediary between himself and the Iranian govern-
ment. If the Soviets could secure his personal safety, return his lost estates
to him, and restore his leadership over the entire Shakak tribe, he would
follow the wishes of Moscow “in everything.”43
By early December 1923, a British intelligence report stated that Simko
was in a village in eastern Turkey only twelve miles west of Qotur on
the Turkish-Iranian frontier, expecting the return of his son from Ankara
where the Turks had taken him.44 A week later, Simko, accompanied by
“a small band of followers,” raided the Iranian territory, “robbing goods
and sheep from villages in Salmas area.”45 Simko’s raids forced the Iranian
military authorities to strengthen the country’s frontier guards and try to

42 M. S. Lazarev, Kurdistan i Kurdski vopros, p. 41.

43 Ibid.
44 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, December 18, 1923, [E 883/255/34], No. 598., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 639.
45 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, December 22, 1923, [E 884/255/34], No. 606., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 644.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 227

“put a stop to further raiding of this nature.”46 Despite Simko’s incur-

sions into Iranian territory, the new chiefs of the Shakak intensified their
cooperation with Iranian authorities. In November 1923, one hundred
Shakak Kurds arrived in Tabriz to offer their services to the Iranian army.
Though Iran’s minister of war preferred “not to employ irregular forces
in his expeditions,” having found that these had “proved of little value in
previous operations in Gilan and Azerbaijan,”47 the Iranian government
made an exception and accepted the offer from the Shakak.48 The 100
Shakak Kurds joined eighty Shahseven Turks to create “the nucleus of a
new cavalry regiment, which was to be attached to the 3rd Tabriz Infantry
Regiment.”49 Despite the cooperation between the Iranian government
and the new Shakak leadership, Simko refused to stop his raids, especially
after Iranian authorities decided to sell his and Sayyid Taha’s properties
in the Urumiyeh region.50 The loss of his landed estates aggravated the
Kurdish chief, who intensified his attacks against Iranian targets. As early
as the middle of March 1924, British intelligence sources reported that
Simko had attacked the village of Derik in the Salmas district.51
Beginning in the spring 1924, the situation on the Iranian-Turkish
border began to deteriorate. Anxious to secure its northwestern frontiers
against tribal incursions from Turkey and Iraq, the Iranian government
tried to block the movement of Pizhdar Kurds, who traditionally came
over the mountains from Qaladiza north of Sulaymaniyah each summer
to graze their flocks in the Sardasht area of western Azerbaijan.52 With
support from Kurdish tribes in western Azerbaijan, the Iranian authorities
disarmed and taxed the Pizhdars and forced them to return home.53

46 Ibid.
47 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, December 18, 1923, [E 883/255/34], No. 598., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 641.
48 Loraine to Curzon, Tehran, December 22, 1923, [E 884/255/34], No. 606., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 6, p. 643.
49 Ibid.
50 Monson to MacDonald, Tehran, March 6, 1924, [E 3511/255/34], No. 129., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 21.
51 Monson to MacDonald, Tehran, March 26, 1924, [E 3945/255/34], No. 165., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 30.
52 M. S. Lazarev, Kurdistan i Kurdski vopros, p. 84. See also, David McDowall, A
Modern History of the Kurds, p. 224.
53 Ibid.
228 M. KIA

The instability at the border offered Simko a golden opportunity to

raid towns and villages inside Iran. According to one source, Simko’s
men attacked Miandoab and even Maragheh in eastern Azerbaijan.54 The
Iranian authorities responded quickly and a punitive expedition under
the command of Major General Abdollah Khan Amir-Tahmasebi, the
governor-general of Azerbaijan, re-imposed the authority of the central
government on the border region with Turkey. During the campaign
against Simko, Amir-Tahmasebi spread the rumor that Simko’s raids were
inspired and backed by the British, who intended to destabilize the
security of the Iranian state.55
Despite the military successes against the Kurdish chief, by April 1924,
Simko had established himself west of Qotur on the Turkish-Iranian fron-
tier, carrying out raids deeper into Iranian territory.56 A month later,
he was reported to have paid a visit to Van in eastern Turkey before
returning to Qotur again. The British intelligence sources also claimed
that there were signs that Simko was preparing “to cause trouble” in
the Qotur region of northwestern Iran, where there was only “a small
force of government troops.”57 The first sign of Simko’s reappearance
in northwestern Iran was the rapid increase in the number of raids and
murders committed by the followers of Simko’s nephew on the road
between Khoy and Salmas.58 On 19 July, British intelligence reports from
Tabriz indicated that “occasional minor raids” were carried out in north-
western Iran “by Simko’s men,” who were acting as border guards for
the Turkish nationalists, as well as Sayyid Taha II, who had also crossed
the Iranian frontier west of Urumiyeh after an encounter in which he
had defeated an Iranian frontier garrison.59 Sayyid Taha II justified his
invasion of Iranian territory on the basis of seeking compensation for
the confiscation of his landed properties in the Margavar and Baranduz

54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 Ovey to MacDonald, Tehran, June 2, 1924, [E 5856/255/34], No. 272., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 65.
57 Ovey to MacDonald, Tehran, May 7, 1924, [E 5650/255/34], No. 258., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 58.
58 Ibid.
59 Ovey to MacDonald, Tehran, July 29, 1924, [E 7228/255/34], No. 356., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 89.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 229

Chai districts. Simko’s attacks, however, assumed characteristics of plun-

dering and looting unarmed rural communities. In addition, the raids
incited once again a civil war between the Kurdish, the Assyrian, and
the Shi’i Azerbaijani communities. Chaos and instability in northwestern
Iran threatened once again to undermine the legitimacy of Iran’s central
government and to facilitate direct intervention by Turkish nationalists.
In November 1924, Iranian military authorities based in Tabriz were also
receiving reports that Simko “was attempting to instigate the Maku Kurds
to create trouble.”60
The Iranian government officials believed that the Turks supported
Simko’s incursions into Iranian territory and that they used the Kurdish
chief as a convenient tool for their policy of destabilizing Iranian Azer-
baijan. Simko himself readily admitted that he once again enjoyed a
close friendship with the Turkish nationalist government under Mustafa
Kemal. Reporting on a meeting between Simko and the governor of
Van, a Turkish newspaper published in Istanbul quoted the Kurdish
chief as stating that, though the British had offered every assistance,
he did not intend “to be a traitor like Sheikh Taha [Sayyid Taha II]”
and instead wished to help the Turks “recapture Mosul.”61 In the same
article, Simko was quoted as claiming that “the majority of the Kurds
preferred Turkish rule to autonomy.”62 Ankara rewarded Simko’s expres-
sions of fidelity to the Turkish cause. The Kurdish chief was appointed
to an official post in Turkey’s newly created provincial administration
in eastern Anatolia.63 The Turkish support for Simko persisted despite
continued pressure from Tehran on Ankara to remove the Kurdish chief
to a safe distance from the Iran-Turkey frontier and in spite of the fact
that the Turks themselves suspected Simko of having established commu-
nication with the Soviet government.64 A British intelligence report dated
December 6, 1924, stated that the Turkish consul general in Urumiyeh
had attempted to distribute among the local Kurds “photographs of

60 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, November 24, 1924, [E 11555/255/34], No.

548., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 150.
61 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, December 10, 1924, [E 82/82/34], No. 566., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, pp. 158–159.
62 Ibid., p. 159.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
230 M. KIA

Simko seated with honour among Turkish officers.”65 Believing that this
was “an attempt to increase Simko’s prestige” and popularity among
the Kurds of western Azerbaijan, the Iranian government “ordered the
confiscation of all copies.”66
As his men continued to carry out raids in the vicinity of Qotur and
Salmas, Simko re-opened negotiations with Iranian authorities in Azer-
baijan. As early as June 1924, there were indications that Simko was nego-
tiating his surrender with the governor of Urumiyeh.67 On December
20, 1924, the British intelligence sources reported that negotiations were
proceeding between Simko and the Iranian military authorities in Tabriz
for his surrender.68 The same source reported that there were strong
rumors that a meeting had already taken place between Simko and the
general officer commanding the Iranian army division at or near Salmas
and that Simko was already at Kohneh Shahr in Salmas district awaiting
the orders of the central government in Tehran.69
By early 1924, the Turkish officials had started accusing Simko of
being a British agent. In a conversation with the Soviet Plenipotentiary
in Turkey, Yakov Surits, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs, Shukru
Kaya, stated that the “activation of Simko who had crossed from Turkish
to Iranian territory, was the work of the British.”70 According to the
Turkish minister, the British were “preparing a big action in Kurdistan
with the aim of encircling Sheikh Mahmud, who posed a great threat to
Turkey as well.”71 In January 1925, Simko’s negotiations with Iranian
authorities in Azerbaijan hit a snag. The Kurdish chief informed Iranian
officials that the Turks were not allowing his family to leave Turkey, and
that he was consequently unable to return to Iran.72

65 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, December 15, 1924, [E 87/82/34], No. 571., in

Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 162.
66 Ibid.
67 Ovey to MacDonald, Tehran, June 7, 1924, [E 5858/255/34], No. 282., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 68.
68 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, December 31, 1924, [E 319/83/34], No. 582.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 172.
69 Ibid.
70 M. S. Lazarev, Kurdistan i Kurdski vopros, p. 83.
71 Ibid.
72 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, February 10, 1925, [E 1594/82/34], No. 80., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 258.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 231

Simko Returns to Iran

In late winter 1925, as the Turkish government embarked on a campaign
to crush a Kurdish rebellion led by Sheikh Said in eastern Anatolia,
Simko became gravely concerned for his safety. It was becoming increas-
ingly clear that there would be no future for an aspiring and ambitious
Kurdish leader in Mustafa Kemal’s Turkey, where even the suggestion of
the existence of Kurdish identity would become illegal.
Sheikh Said’s rebellion, which had commenced in February 1925,
quickly spread to several provinces with Kurdish majorities. In early April,
Turkish troops suppressed the Kurdish rebellion and detained Sheikh
Said and his closest followers. In May 1925, the Turkish authorities
also detained the Kurdish nationalist leader, Sayyid Abdulqadir of Nehri
and his son, Mohammad. Sayyid Abdulqadir was the son of the Kurdish
leader, Sheikh Ubeydullah, and the uncle of Simko’s brother-in-law and
former close confidant, Sayyid Taha II. Sayyid Abdulqadir was detained
in Istanbul and transported to Diyarbakir, where he and his son were
tried for their alleged connection to Sheikh Said. Both men were found
guilty and executed on May 27, 1925. In late June, Sheikh Said and
a large number of his followers were also hanged. Meanwhile, Sayyid
Abdulqadir’s other son, Abdullah, fled to Iran and he subsequently made
“a temporarily successful stand against the Turks in June.”73 In July, he
contacted British authorities in Iraq through his cousin, Sayyid Taha II,
who at the time served as the governor of Rawanduz. Abdullah asked for
British help against the Turks. The British turned down the request and
ordered Sayyid Taha II to inform his cousin that the Iraqi government
was not at war with Turkey. In August, Abdullah was defeated by the
Turks. The Kurdish leader fled to Iraq accompanied by 200 families.
With the Turkish government unleashing a campaign of massive repres-
sion against the Kurds in eastern Turkey, Simko became increasingly more
concerned for his and his family’s safety and security. Already in winter
1925, the Kurdish chief had re-opened negotiations with the governor of
Azerbaijan on the possibility of returning to Iran as soon as possible. In

73 Great Britain, Colonial Office, “Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to

the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1925,”
p. 22.
232 M. KIA

a letter to Major General Abdollah Khan Amir-Tahmasebi, the governor-

general of Azerbaijan, Simko pleaded for a pardon and the permission to
return to Iran so that he could serve the shah and his homeland:

I want to return to the homeland and Chahriq, the land of my forefathers

and ancestors, and I want to become involved in agricultural and culti-
vation pursuits and serve my shah and motherland. In the midst of these
dark and bleak days in which I have been trapped, I would like to ask
that you agree with my request. I swear to the Quran that I will prove
my loyalty. I will allow my son and two hundred members of my tribe
to remain with you as hostages. All I want from you is to allow me to
return to Chahriq, I request that you restore me to the leadership of my
clans, so that I can serve my homeland, and under the command of the
shah regain the leadership of my tribe. As with other chiefs of the clans,
or Omar Khan, I also request guarantees for my life and security. If I act
in violation of my promises, the government can kill my brother, my son,
and other hostages. After God, you are my only hope.74

In another letter to General Amir-Tahmasebi, Simko, who was by then

desperate to leave Turkey, swore loyalty to Iran and implored from the
governor-general of Azerbaijan to provide him with one last opportunity
to demonstrate his fidelity to his motherland, Iran:

I and my companions are Iranian, and our race is also Iranian, but, because
of traitorous agents and those in charge who are well known to everyone,
we were forced to leave our homeland and take residence in a foreign
country. I want to prove that I have never intended to betray, and I have
always been mindful of the independence and pride of my homeland.75

Simko’s desperate pleas to the Iranian authorities in Azerbaijan, and

especially to the governor-general of Azerbaijan, worked. In May 1925,
the newspapers in Tehran announced that Simko, his family, and 200 of
his followers had returned to Iran.76 Simko met General Amir-Tahmasebi
before proceeding to the locality assigned to him and his retinue in the

74 As quoted in Sirwan Khosrozadeh, “Vakavi-ye Avamel-e Moasser dar Shuresh-e

Dovvom-e Simko (Mehr 1305),” in Motāleat-e Tārikhi-ye Jang, pp. 37–38.
75 Ibid., p. 38.
76 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, May 22, 1925, [E 3405/82/34], No. 283., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 290.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 233

rural district of Somai on the Iran-Turkey frontier.77 On 8 June, Reza

Khan, who had assumed the post of Iran’s prime minister in October
1923, travelled to Azerbaijan and arrived in Tabriz on 12 June.78 Among
those greeting the Iranian chief minister upon his arrival in the capital of
Azerbaijan was Ahmad Agha, a brother of Simko who had accompanied
the Shakak chief on his visit to northern Iraq in the autumn 1922. Simko,
who feared for his life, begged off, pleading illness, and refused to travel
to Tabriz.79
During his trip to Azerbaijan, Reza Khan visited Tabriz, Ardabil, the
Aras Bridge, Maku, Khoy, and Salmas. When the prime minister arrived
in western Azerbaijan, Simko “made his submission personally,” and was
granted permission to settle in his native country of Chahriq together
with a “body guard of armed men.”80 According to one source, during
their meeting in Salmas, Reza Khan, who did not have “any sophisticated
security,” opened the door of his automobile and Simko went in to the car
to welcome the Iranian prime minister.81 Shaking hands with Simko, Reza
Khan reportedly told the Shakak chief, “Simko you look so young. I have
heard about you for a long time.”82 He also asked Simko “if he could
write. Simko said no, but Reza Khan told him that he spoke Persian very
well.”83 The same source claimed that Simko had planned to assassinate
Reza Khan, but he could not carry out his plan.84 Another author, with
strong anti-Pahlavi sentiments, claimed that when Reza Khan arrived in
Salmas, Simko was waiting for him with 800 armed Kurds.85 Upon seeing
the Iranian prime minister, Simko dismounted and greeted the visitor,
but Reza Khan, who had become nervous about the gathering of such a

77 Ibid.
78 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, July 3, 1925, [E 4280/82/34], No. 361., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 303.
79 Ibid.
80 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, July 31, 1925, [E 4879/82/34], No. 416., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 311.
81 Interview with Sannar Mamedi living in Sweden, October 1993, as quoted in Susan
Meiselas, Kurdistan in the Shadow of History, p. 116.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid.
85 Hossein Makki, Tarikh-e Bist Sale-ye Iran, Volume 4, pp. 470–471. Makki’s account
of Simko’s life and career suffers from a number of mistakes and inaccuracies.
234 M. KIA

large number of armed Kurds, responded to him coolly and proceeded

to enter the military barrack where he was staying. Realizing that he may
have walked into a trap, Reza Khan spent an anxious evening in Salmas
before departing the town the next day.86 The meeting between Iran’s
prime minister and Simko took place between the two individuals without
a third person present. What transpired between the two is not known,
but the account of the meeting has been told and re-told in great detail
by a significant number of sources, each with its own embellished and
exaggerated spin.
Though he had militarily defeated the Kurdish chief, Reza Khan recog-
nized that Simko’s power and influence remained intact because he had
survived repeated campaigns organized against him by the Iranian army.
He had now returned to Iran, where he received a red-carpet reception by
the very government that had tried to destroy him. According to a British
intelligence report, Simko’s prestige among the Kurdish tribes of western
Azerbaijan had been enhanced, and he continued to cherish the dream
of establishing an autonomous Kurdish state with support from Britain,
“the only power,” according to the Kurdish chief, that could “save the
Kurdish race from being crushed to death between the Persian and the
Turk.”87
The honeymoon between the Iranian government and the Kurdish
chief proved to be short lived. In summer 1926, Simko began to orga-
nize his second revolt against the Iranian government. As with his first
revolt, the second one also lacked any verifiable link to the “homoge-
nizing Persian-first” policies of Reza Shah, who had only recently crowned
himself as the shah of Iran. The available evidence suggests that there
were both internal and external causes for Simko’s rebellion, but none of
them indicate any connection with the educational or cultural policies of
the Iranian state. In fact, it seems that Simko’s anger and rage was more
directed against the growing power and influence of the fellow Shakak
leader, Omar Khan, rather than any governmental policy or action. There
is also an indication that Simko was most worried about the rapproche-
ment between the governments of Iran and Turkey as demonstrated by
their new treaty of friendship.

86 Ibid., p. 471.
87 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, July 3, 1925, [E 4280/82/34], No. 361., in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 303.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 235

The concrete events that triggered Simko’s revolt are murky. We know
that the Kurdish chief had received a message from the commander of the
northwestern division that he had to immediately disband his small army
or else expect severe repercussions for his disobedience. Simko rejected
the ultimatum, and, when summoned to a meeting with the local army
commander stationed in Salmas, arrived at the gathering “with an escort
of several hundred cavalry,” and refused “to dismiss them when told to
do so.”88 Simko’s defiant attitude toward the central government and its
military authorities, impressed Kurdish tribal chiefs of western Azerbaijan,
who began to display signs of restlessness, manifested in particular by
their refusal to pay their taxes.89 Though Simko continued to disobey the
orders issued by government authorities in Azerbaijan, and although the
British intelligence sources both in Iraq and Iran were reporting that the
Kurdish chief intended to stage a tribal rebellion, the Iranian government
did not take any action against him.
Simko’s troubles were not confined to his tense and volatile relation-
ship with representatives of the Iranian government in Azerbaijan. The
arrival of Simko in western Azerbaijan had also ignited an intense conflict
over the leadership of the Kurdish tribes of the region between Simko and
the Shakak chief, Omar Khan. The cause of “the quarrel between the two
was Omar Khan’s refusal to acknowledge Simko as his chief.”90 During
Simko’s absence in eastern Anatolia and Iraq, Iranian authorities had
treated Omar Khan “as the paramount Kurdish chief in Azerbaijan.”91
Naturally, Omar Khan resented being outshined and stripped of that
position “by the returned rebel.”92 When fighting erupted between the
followers of the two Kurdish chiefs, the military authorities tried “to
patch up a peace” with an understanding that if peaceful resolution

88 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, September 12, 1925, [E 5914/82/34], No. 482.,

in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 320. See also, Loraine to Chamberlain,
Tehran, October 21, 1925, [E 6931/82/34], No. 552., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–
1965. Volume 7, p. 333.
89 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, October 21, 1925, [E 6931/82/34], No. 552., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 333.
90 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, January 14, 1926, [E 773/95/34], No. 28., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 456.
91 Ibid.
92 Ibid.
236 M. KIA

proved impossible, they would support Omar Khan.93 One of the reasons
for their support was that shortly after his arrival in Iran, Simko had
returned to his favorite vocation, namely plundering villages to feed his
followers, who according to the Shakak chief, were “on the verge of star-
vation.”94 Though the local military authorities in Azerbaijan favored
supporting Omar Khan, the minister of war, General Abdollah Khan
Amir-Tahmasebi, threw his support behind Simko because, as the former
commander of the northwestern division, he was personally respon-
sible for securing the Kurdish chief’s return.95 Thus, when Omar Khan
collected a significant number of his followers with the intention of
attacking Simko, instructions were sent from Tehran that Omar Khan
had “to be summoned to Tabriz.”96 When Omar Khan refused to comply
with instructions from the government, he was attacked by Simko, who
received support from “a contingent of government troops.”97 The attack
by Simko and the local army units forced Omar Khan to flee and seek
refuge with the Harki tribe, “who handed him over to Simko on promise
of pardon.”98 Simko, in turn, delivered Omar Khan to the military
authorities, who imprisoned him in Tabriz.99
The incarceration of Omar Khan, who had been loyal to the Iranian
government since the suppression of Simko in August 1922, caused
“considerable apprehension in Azerbaijan” regarding the government’s
policy toward Simko.100 More eyebrows were raised when the ministry of
war removed the military commander of the Salmas district because the
Iranian colonel had advocated “the limitation of Simko’s liberty.”101 Even
more shocking was the report that the new shah had sent a “khalat ” (robe

93 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, December 17, 1925, [E 95/95/34], No. 670., in

Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 347.
94 Ibid.
95 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, January 14, 1926, [E 773/95/34], No. 28., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 456.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, February 10, 1926, [E 1443/95/34], No. 80.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 462.
101 Ibid.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 237

of honor) to Simko, and that the Kurdish chief was “collecting money
from the Kurds, nominally to send a return present” to Reza Shah.102
These interactions between the government and Simko were locally inter-
preted as an indication that the government was afraid of the Kurdish
chief.103
The central government had several reasons for its cautious, and at
times supportive, approach toward Simko. First, after his return to Iran,
Simko had repeatedly expressed his loyalty, not only to the Iranian
government, but especially to the person of Reza Khan. For example,
in a meeting with a chief of the police in western Azerbaijan, Simko
“disclaimed all connection with the Turks” and proclaimed his devotion
to Iran’s prime minister “Reza Khan Pahlavi.”104 On a few occasions,
he even went one step further and provided military support to the
Iranian army in its operations against fellow Kurdish chiefs. As long as he
expressed his loyalty to Reza Khan and joined the Iranian forces in their
military campaigns against unruly Kurdish tribes, the Iranian authorities
were willing to turn a blind eye to his activities, including his raids against
“Kurdish villages, which had neglected to show him proper degree of
subservience.”105 Second, for much of the year 1925, the Iranian army
was busy suppressing revolts by Turkmen tribes in northern Khorasan
and Lur tribal groups in western Iran. The central government lacked
sufficient military power to focus on Simko and his supporters. Addition-
ally, plans for transfer of power from the Qajar monarchy to the new
Pahlavi dynasty were well underway by the summer 1925. Reza Khan did
not wish to mar the festivities surrounding his ascendency to the throne
of Iran by a risky military campaign in the northwestern corner of the
country. Any campaign against Simko could be construed as a reminder
that, though he had defeated the Kurdish chief, Reza Khan had failed to
pacify him fully. Finally, the delay in a campaign to punish Simko may
be partially explained by the fact that the Iranian government was in the
process of concluding its negotiations for a peace treaty with the Turkish
government in Ankara. The conclusion of an agreement between the two

102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, November 19, 1925, [E 7535/82/34], No. 608.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 340.
105 Ibid.
238 M. KIA

neighbors obligated Turkey to shut down Simko’s escape route in the

west. After long and protracted negotiations, Iran and Turkey signed a
treaty of security and friendship on April 22, 1926.
The treaty signed by the Iranian prime minister, Mohammad Ali
Forughi, and the Turkish ambassador in Tehran, Memduh Shevket,
signaled the beginning of a new era in the relationship between the two
neighbors, culminating in Reza Shah’s visit to Turkey in 1934. According
to the terms of the treaty, each country guaranteed its neutrality “in the
event of an attack by a third power on the other party.”106 Both countries
promised not to participate in any “financial, economic, or political agree-
ment with other powers which may be inimical to the other party,” and
“to preserve by force of arms the strict neutrality of its territory against
any power waging war against the other party.”107 Both the Turkish and
Iranian governments also made a commitment “to prevent the formation”
within their borders “of any organization of which the design” was “to
disturb the peace of the other country” and to “take all necessary steps
to restrain the tribes each on its own side of the common frontier from
any movement likely to endanger the peace of the other’s territory.”108
Finally, both countries “agreed to negotiate commercial, customs, postal,
and telegraph conventions within six months.”109 Once Reza Shah had
seized the throne in April 1926, and shortly after Iran had signed the
treaty of security and friendship with Turkey in the same month, the
central government in Tehran began to intensify its pressure on Simko
to disarm.

Simko and Salar al-Dowleh

The eruption of a new season of conflict between the central govern-
ment and Simko corresponded with the appearance of the Qajar prince,
Salar al-Dowleh (1881–1961), on the Iran-Iraq frontier. The third son
of the Qajar monarch, Mozaffar al-Din Shah (r. 1896–1907), Abolfath

106 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, June 4, 1926, [E 4065/95/34], No. 268., in

Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 485. See also, Rouhollah K. Ramazani,
The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500–1941, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966),
p. 270. For the full text of the treaty, see, League of Nations Treaty Series, CVI, 261–265.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 239

Mirza known by his title, Salar al-Dowleh, had a long and uninspiring
record of abortive and ruinous revolts against the central government,
first in 1907, and again in 1911.110 In 1907, during the reign of his
brother, Mohammad Ali Shah, the Qajar prince “claimed the throne,
came out in open revolt, and was finally defeated and captured after a
pitched battle lasting three days” at Nahavand in western Iran.111 In July
1911, when his deposed brother returned to Iran to reclaim his throne,
Salar al-Dowleh staged his second revolt with backing from the chiefs of
the Kurdish Kalhor tribe of Kermanshah. After the deposed shah’s army
was defeated near Tehran, Salar al-Dowleh persisted in his campaign.
Seizing the provinces of Kermanshah and Kurdistan, the young prince
proclaimed himself the shah and minted coins with his name inscribed as
“al-Sultan Abolfath Shah Qajar.”112 In late September 1911, the rebel
prince advanced eastward toward the capital, reaching Saveh, roughly
seventy-six miles or 122 kilometers southwest of Tehran, where he was
defeated by a government force.113 The prince, did not, however, give up.
In May 1912, he raised an army and marched from Kermanshah toward
Tehran, but he was defeated, yet once again. One of the Iranian army
officers, who participated in the campaign against Salar al-Dowleh at the
time, was Reza Khan or the future Reza Shah. Among the casualties of
the war against the Qajar prince was the Armenian chief of Tehran’s police
force, Yeprem Khan (Efrem Khan).
In 1925, after a thirteen-year respite, Salar al-Dowleh returned to
western Iran through Iraq determined to stage yet another rebellion
against Iran’s central government. Though he may have entertained a
dream of restoring the Qajar monarchy, the ultimate objective of the fire-
brand prince was more immediate and personal. When banished in 1912
for his rebellions, Salar al-Dowleh had received a handsome pension from
the Iranian government in return for a promise that he would cease and
desist from staging another revolt against the government. As an extrav-
agant person living in Switzerland, however, the prince was unable to

110 For the life and career of Salar al-Dowleh, see, Who’s Who in Persia (Volume II),
pp. 350–351. See also, Mehdi Bamdad, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran, Volume 1, pp. 48–
50. See also, Willem Floor, Salar al-Dowleh: A Delusional Prince & Wannabe Shah,
(Washington, DC: Mage Publishers, 2018).
111 Edward G. Browne, The Persian Revolution 1905–1909, p. 141.
112 Mehdi Bamdad, Sharh-e Hal-e Rejal-e Iran, Volume 1, p. 50.
113 Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-e Hijdah Sale-ye Azerbaijan, pp. 188–194.
240 M. KIA

live in accordance with his means, so he contracted numerous debts.114

With his monthly expenditures far exceeding his income, and his accumu-
lated debts reaching a new height, Salar al-Dowleh left his retreat and his
numerous creditors in Switzerland and proceeded to Iran.
Once he had arrived in Iran, Salar al-Dowleh fomented a revolt by
appealing to the Kurdish tribes of Kermanshah and Kurdistan with whom
he enjoyed a close relationship. The principal objective of organizing a
revolt against the Iranian government was, however, to importune the
British government to bring pressure to bear on the Iranian govern-
ment to pay him more money and settle his debts.115 In other words,
by making himself a nuisance and a security concern, Salar al-Dowleh
intended to compel the Iranian authorities to increase his pension and
erase his debts. For Salar al-Dowleh, who lacked any ideology or political
objectives, staging tribal rebellions was a profitable business that settled
his private affairs and restored his financial health. In this scheme, the
Kurdish tribes played the role of a convenient tool. Their rebellion caused
anxiety in Tehran and forced the British and Iranian authorities to address
the Qajar prince’s financial concerns.
In January 1925, the Qajar prince established himself in Damascus,
where he contacted British officials and requested that they intercede on
his behalf. He hoped that the British could convince the Iranian govern-
ment to restore his pension and make their payments on a regular basis.
To deny Salar al-Dowleh a pretext to stage a revolt, the British, through
their ambassador in Tehran, approached the Iranian prime minister, Reza
Khan Pahlavi, and inquired about the status of the prince and his pension.
Clearly annoyed by the British intercession on behalf of the rebellious
prince, Reza Khan told the British ambassador that Salar al-Dowleh was
“lucky to get his pension and could not expect more.”116 Further, the
Iranian prime minister warned that “if the Prince attempted another of
his foolhardy expeditions, it would probably be cut off altogether.”117
As early as the summer 1925, the agents of the Qajar prince had linked
up with Simko to explore the possibility of the Kurdish chief joining

114 Persia Annual Report. 1925, Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, April 8, 1926, Confi-
dential (13017), [E 2635/2635/34], No. 186., in Iran Political Diaries. Volume 7,
pp. 399–400.
115 Ibid., p, 400.
116 Ibid.
117 Ibid.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 241

Salar al-Dowleh in what would amount to the restoration of the Qajar

monarchy. Though Salar al-Dowleh’s campaign in the spring and summer
1925 unraveled, the Qajar prince refused to abandon hope. Living in
Syria and Lebanon under French surveillance, Salar al-Dowleh managed
to skip town in disguise and found his way once again to the Iran-
Iraq border during May–June 1926. By late summer, the British sources
were reporting that Salar al-Dowleh, who was in Owraman, had once
again established contacts with Simko.118 He also joined Jafar Sultan
(Sardar Moa’tazed), the most powerful tribal chief of Owraman, who
had been for some time awaiting for a favorable opportunity to revolt
against the Iranian government.119 The Qajar prince and the Kurdish
chief appealed to the Kurdish tribes of western Iran, especially those in
Owraman, Marivan, and Kermanshah, to rally to their flag and rise against
Reza Shah.120
When the news of the rebellion spread, some Kurdish tribes of western
Iran and the outlying regions of Iraq assembled an army, and a Kurdish
committee was created for joint actions in Iranian territory.121 The
committee consisted of several prominent Kurdish leaders from northern
Iraq and western Iran, including Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji and Simko.122
Attacks against government troops commenced on a wide front stretching
from Posht-e Kuh, in the western-most part of the historical Luristan, all
the way to central areas of Iranian Azerbaijan.123 The direction of the
main attack by the rebels was the Baghdad–Hamadan highway, with a
special focus on capturing Kermanshah, which came under direct attack
by the rebels. In September, as the rebel army commenced its attacks, a
cousin of Simko named Taj al-Din met with the Qajar prince. By October
1926, the rumor had spread that Salar al-Dowleh himself was planning to
travel to western Azerbaijan in order to meet with Simko.

118 Willem Floor, Salar al-Dowleh: A Delusional Prince & Wannabe Shah, p. 140.
119 Persia Annual Report. 1926, Confidential (13186), [E 870/870/34], No. 41.,
Clive to Chamberlain, Tehran, January 26, 1927, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965,
Volume 7, p. 597. For Jafar Sultan, see, British Intelligence: Who’s Who in Persia (Volume
II), First Edition, p. 165.
120 Ibid.
121 M. S. Lazarev, Kurdistan i Kurdski vopros, p. 86.
122 Ibid.
123 Ibid.
242 M. KIA

As part of their offensive, Salar al-Dowleh and Jafar Sultan advanced

toward Sanandaj, the capital of the present-day province of Kurdistan, and
Ravansar, in the present-day province of Kermanshah in western Iran.124
After defeating a small government force, however, the campaign fizzled
quickly. Government reinforcements arrived in time to block the advance
of the rebel army toward Sanandaj. The government troops were “alto-
gether too formidable a force for Jafar Sultan’s men, so, after looting
some villages on the Sanandaj plain, they returned to their own country
to quarrel over the spoils, Salar al-Dowleh going with them.”125
Recognizing the hopelessness of his military adventures, Salar al-
Dowleh retired into Iraq, where he was detained promptly “by Iraqi
police and removed to Baghdad.”126 The British feared that if released
in Iraq, the penniless and seditious prince would make an attempt to
reach the Iranian frontier in order to organize another rebellion against
the Iranian government.127 After protracted negotiations, Tehran agreed
to pay Salar al-Dowleh’s debts and provide him a subsistence allowance.
Once his financial issues had been settled, the Qajar prince left Baghdad
for Haifa in Palestine on June 23, 1927.128 By then, Salar al-Dowleh’s
rebellion had disintegrated; the Kurdish population of western Iran
had shown little appetite for fighting and dying in the name of Qajar
restoration.
Almost simultaneously with Salar al-Dowleh’s revolt, the Pizhdar
Kurds attacked the Sardasht district in western Azerbaijan. The prin-
cipal objective of the Pizhdar attack was to regain possession of their
grazing land in Sardasht, which Iranian authorities had confiscated.129
After capturing and disarming a government detachment of 400 men,

124 Persia Annual Report, 1926, Confidential (13186), [E 870/870/34], No. 41.,
Clive to Chamberlain, Tehran, January 26, 1927, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965.
Volume 7, p. 597.
125 Ibid.
126 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to
the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq For the Year 1927,
p. 61.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Persia Annual Report, 1926, Confidential (13186), [E 870/870/34], No. 41.,
Clive to Chamberlain, Tehran, January 26, 1927, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965.
Volume 7, p. 597.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 243

the Pizhdars seized Sardasht in August 1926.130 From Sardasht they

advanced northward toward Savojbolagh “creating considerable panic
there and in Tabriz.”131 The tribes in the region, however, remained
loyal to the Iranian government, and when troops arrived from Tabriz,
the Pizhdars eventually retired to their homes.132
Salar al-Dowleh’s rebellion in 1926, the simultaneous incursion by
the Pizhdar Kurds, as well as the lackluster performance of the Iranian
army units, may have provided the necessary impetus for Simko to revolt
against the government. As early as April 1926, reports indicated that
Simko had “fallen out with the military authorities in Azerbaijan owing
to the arrest of one of his subordinate leaders” within the Shakak tribe.133
A skirmish occurred between Kurds and troops at the time of the arrest,
and some Kurds were wounded.134 The same reports also claimed that
Simko’s father-in-law had arrived in Salmas with 200 refugees from
Turkey, which was rumored to be carrying out “a deliberate policy of
massacring Kurds in the area south of Van.”135 Less than a month
later, in May, military authorities in Azerbaijan arrested the chiefs of the
Kurdish Harki tribe, Haji Agha and Haji Hamzeh, both friends and allies
of Simko.136 In August, Simko formed an alliance with the Begzade
Kurds based in the region of Somai-Baradoost. The alliance was joined
by the Harki whose territory lay west of Urumiyeh, in close proximity
to both the Shakak and the Begzade. As in the past, the Shakak and the
Harki began a campaign of raiding non-Kurdish villages, which inevitably
brought them into direct conflict with government forces.137 Although
1,700 to 2,000 Iranian troops were concentrated in the Salmas-Urumiyeh
area, the active fighting against Simko was carried out by his rival, Omar

130 Ibid., pp. 597–598.

131 Ibid., p. 598.
132 Ibid.
133 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, April 8, 1926, [E 2634/95/34], No. 178., in
Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 474.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 Loraine to Chamberlain, Tehran, May 7, 1926, [E 3193/95/34], No. 223.,
Intelligence Summary No. 9, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 479.
137 Persia Annual Report, 1926, Clive to Chamberlain, Tehran, January 26, 1927, [E
870/870/34], No. 41., in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 598.
244 M. KIA

Khan, who had assumed the command of a force of pro-government

Kurds and Turkic Shahsevens.138
Even before the battle was joined, successful scheming and secret nego-
tiations with some of Simko’s supporters ensured their defection and
the defeat and downfall of the Shakak chief.139 Sections of the Harki,
who had supported Simko in the past, defected and joined government
forces.140 When Omar Khan, supported by government troops, began to
advance against Simko’s operational base northwest of Urumiyeh on 17
October, two of Simko’s lieutenants also abandoned him.141 There was
nothing left for Simko to do but to flee. During the military operations
against Simko, the Turkish military attaché in Iran accompanied Iranian
troops, and “acted as liaison officer with the commander of the Turkish
forces,” who “had undertaken to block the passes by which Simko might
flee into Turkey.”142

End of Simko
On October 22, 1926, the Iranian “military authorities in Tabriz
announced that after three days’ fighting, from the 17th to the 19th
October government troops had completely defeated Simko’s forces”
and that the Kurdish chief himself “was a fugitive across the border.”143
According to a British report, however, the truth was that “when it was
seen that Simko was receiving no help from any quarter,” his adherents
turned against him and they had joined his tribal rival Omar Khan.144
Regardless of which version one accepts, there is no denying that, with
the disappearance of Simko, the situation in western Azerbaijan rapidly
calmed down.145

138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Nicolson to Chamberlain, Tehran, November 4, 1926, [E 6476/95/34], No. 542.,
in Iran Political Diaries. Volume 7, p. 516.
144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 245

At the time, it was generally believed that after his defeat, Simko
would take refuge with Sayyid Taha II at Rawanduz, in northeastern
Iraq.146 Sandwiched between Turkey and Iran, Simko together “with
about a hundred followers” fled to Iraq via Turkish territory, and “crossed
the border south of Nehri into the Rawanduz district” in late October
1926.147 By then, Iranian authorities had occupied the villages he owned
in Somai, in western Azerbaijan.148
The revolts of Salar al-Dowleh and Simko created an atmosphere of
“suspicious irritation” in Tehran.149 These suspicions embittered the new
monarch, Reza Shah, who was convinced that both the Qajar prince
and the Kurdish rebel were “deliberately being assisted by the British
authorities in Iraq as part of a policy of Kurdish autonomy under British
protection.”150 The Iranian government “applied for Simko’s extradi-
tion,” but Baghdad did not consent, because “the extradition of political
offenders” was not “permitted under the Extradition Law of Iraq.”151
At the close of 1926, the question of the fate of Simko was still under
discussion.152 In an attempt to hasten a decision, the Iraqi authorities
agreed to allow an Iranian government official to meet Simko in Iraq to
communicate to him Tehran’s terms for his pardon.153 Though the Iraqi
government and the British authorities in the country continued to claim
that they wished to remove Simko from Iraq, Tehran and Baghdad failed
to reach an agreement on the fate of the Kurdish chief. In a report to
the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq, the

146 Ibid.
147 Great Britain, Colonial Office, “Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to
the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq For the Year 1926”,
p. 27.
148 Clive to Chamberlain, Tehran, November 20, 1926, [E 6828/95/34], No. 559.,
in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 7, p. 518.
149 Persia Annual Report. 1926, Clive to Chamberlain, Tehran, January 26, 1927,
Confidential (13186), [E 870/870/34], No. 41., in The Iran-Iraq Border 1840–1958.
Volume 6, p. 655.
150 Ibid.
151 Great Britain, Colonial Office, “Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to
the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq For the Year 1926”,
p. 27.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid.
246 M. KIA

British authorities stated that, at the beginning of 1927, they hoped that
the Iranian government “would adopt a suggestion which had been made
in Tehran that they should send a special representative to meet Simko
on the border and discuss terms with him and that such a meeting might
lead to his return” to Iran.154 These hopes were, however, “disappointed
and no such meeting took place.”155 The Iranian government “offered
to pardon Simko if he would agree to live peacefully on lands which they
would give him outside the Kurdish districts,” but, as Simko “insisted on
being permitted to return to his old tribal area, this offer produced no
results.”156 He consequently remained in the Rawanduz district of Iraq
where, according to the same report, he continued to be “a menace to
good order on both sides of the frontier.”157
In May 1928, Simko departed Iraq for Turkey. A British report stated
that “the embarrassment, which had been caused to Perso-Iraq relations
by Simko taking refuge in Iraqi territory in October 1926, was removed
by his voluntary departure from Iraq into Turkey.”158 The Kurdish chief,
however, returned to Iraq “a little over a year later.”159 Late in July
1929, Simko crossed the Turkey-Iraq border with about fifty followers
and established himself in a village a few miles south of the frontier
in the Rawanduz district.160 Anxious to avoid any embarrassment or
conflict with the governments of Turkey and Iran, the Iraqi authorities
informed Simko that “his presence in Iraq could only be permitted if he

154 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report by His Britannic Majesty’s Government to
the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Iraq For the Year 1928,
pp. 61–62.
155 Ibid., p. 62.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Great Britain, Colonial Office, “Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations
on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1928,” (Colonial No. 44/1929) (London:
Printed and Published by His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1929), p. 40. See also, Wadie
Jwaideh, Kurdish National Movement Its Origins and Development, p. 143.
159 Great Britain, Colonial Office, “Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations
on the Administration of Iraq for the Year 1929,” (Colonial No. 55), p. 44.
160 Ibid.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 247

consented to reside wherever the Iraqi government” had designated.161

The Kurdish chief was also invited to meet Iraqi officials in Rawanduz,
but he declined the invitation.162 Instead, Simko withdrew once again
into Turkish territory, and he remained there until the end of the year.163
Despite the military victory they had scored against Simko, the Iranian
authorities had concluded that they could not restore law and order to
the Kurdish-populated regions of northwestern Iran as long as Simko
remained alive and active. In 1929, Simko received a letter sent from
Tabriz, offering him a full pardon and the governorship of Oshnaviyeh,
a town in close proximity to the Iran-Iraq border.164 Accompanied by
300 of his supporters, Simko returned to Iran in July 1930.165 Once he
had arrived at Oshnaviyeh, Simko was “given command of the garrison
and invested as the governor.”166 The Iranian authorities also put a
house “at his disposal, and special Persian clothes were issued to him
and his followers.”167 According to a British report, the Kurdish chief
was invited to Tehran, but he turned down the invitation.168 For three
days after his return, Simko received the local Kurdish tribal chiefs who
paid their respects and congratulated him on his new position. Meanwhile
the garrison was secretly increased and the Iranian authorities “laid their
plan.”169
On 18 July, Simko expected to welcome General Hassan Moqaddam,
the Iranian army commander, who had expressed a desire to meet
the Kurdish chief in person. Ironically, Brigadier General Moqaddam,
formerly known as Zafar al-Dowleh, was the very army commander Simko

161 Ibid.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
164 A. M. Hamilton. Road Through Kurdistan: Travels in Northern Iraq, (London:
Faber and Faber Limited, 1937), p. 111.
165 Persia, Annual Report, 1930. Confidential [E 3067/3067/34], No. 276, May 22,
1931, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 8, p. 645.
166 A. M. Hamilton, Road Through Kurdistan, p. 111.
167 Ibid.
168 Persia, Annual Report, 1930. Confidential (13929), [E 3067/3067/34], No. 276.,
Clive to Henderson, Tehran, May 22, 1931, in Iran Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume
8, p. 645.
169 A. M. Hamilton, Road Through Kurdistan, p. 111.
248 M. KIA

had defeated at Tasuj, north of Lake Urumiyeh, in March 1921, a humil-

iation the Iranian commander could not have forgotten. After all, he had
saved his life by abandoning his troops and seeking refuge on the ship
Admiral. Following the established tradition, Simko, Khorshid Agha, a
chief of the Harki, and a group of their bodyguards went to the outskirts
of Oshnaviyeh to welcome the Iranian general, but after a long wait they
were informed by a messenger that the meeting had to be postponed
because the car transporting the Iranian general had broken down.170
Accompanied by Khorshid Agha, Simko rode back into town unaware
that, in his absence, the roof tops of homes surrounding his residence had
been occupied by Iranian soldiers armed with rifles and machine guns.171
As Simko and Khorshid Agha approached the Kurdish chief’s residence,
the Iranian troops waiting in ambush opened fire, mowing down the
Shakak leader, Khorshid Agha, and several other Kurdish chiefs accom-
panying them.172 Iranian officers responsible for killing Simko then took
photographs of the Kurdish chief’s body riddled with bullets. The plot
hatched by Iranian officials to murder Simko eerily resembled the ambush
set by the Shakak chief to kill the Assyrian leader, Mar Shimun in March
1918.
On July 21, 1930, Iran’s ministry of war announced the defeat
and killing of “the Kurdish brigand leader Simko,” who, in 1922, had
caused serious disturbances in Iranian Kurdistan.173 The announcement
of Simko’s death was followed by articles in Persian newspapers that
Simko had for the fourth time, asked for forgiveness from the Iranian
government, and had promised to report to the headquarters of the
Iranian army to prove the sincerity of his repentance, but then he had
broken his promise. He was then attached to Oshnaviyeh by three

170 Ibid.
171 Ibid. See also, Persia, Annual Report, 1930, Clive to Henderson, Tehran, May
22, 1931, Confidential (13929), [E 3067/3067/34], No. 276, May 22, 1931, in Iran
Political Diaries 1881–1965. Volume 8, p. 645. See also, D. K. Fieldhouse, Kurds, Arabs
and Britons the Memoir of Wallace Lyon in Iraq, p. 112.
172 Ibid.
173 The Times of London, July 22, 1930 as quoted in Oriente Moderno, Anno 10, Nr.
8 (August 1930), Istituto per l’Oriente C. A. Nallino, p. 380.
 8 IN SEARCH OF A NEW PATRON: SIMKO SANDWICHED … 249

columns and killed with many of his followers.174 The Iranian govern-
ment had gotten its revenge on a Kurdish leader it viewed as a lethal
threat, and the international press gloated. On July 22, 1930, the Times
of London printed a report filed on 21 July, in Tehran, announcing “the
defeat and death of the notorious Shakak Kurdish brigand chief, Simko,”
who had “caused great trouble in Persian Kurdistan in 1922,” and after
that had “marauded in the Turkish and Iraqi sections of Kurdistan.”175
As expected, the treacherous murder of Simko turned him into a martyr
for the Kurdish cause.

174 Le Messager de Téhéran, July 23, 1930 as quoted in Oriente Moderno, Anno 10,
Nr. 8 (August 1930), Istituto per l’Oriente C. A. Nallino, p. 380.
175 The Times of London, p. 13, July 22, 1930.
 CHAPTER 9

Conclusion

A popular joke in the former Soviet Union declared that “the future
is certain; it is only the past that is unpredictable.” This joke reminds
one of George Orwell’s famous statement that “who controls the past,
controls the future,” and “who controls the present controls the past.”1
The old Russian joke as well as Orwell’s statement points to attempts
by totalitarian states to manipulate and control the historical narrative
and employ it for their own political objectives. History is a delicate
and fragile creature and can easily be manipulated, used, and abused by
governments, political movements, politicians, and ideologues. The battle
over the narrative can at times become as important as the actual conflict
over power. As with many other personages in Iranian history, the story
of Simko has also been subjected to this game of political football.
Those who believed that Simko posed a direct threat to the national
unity and territorial integrity of the Iranian state denounced the Kurdish
chief as a violent and brutal brigand, a robber and a murderer, who
caused immeasurable destruction, chaos, and human suffering in north-
western Iran. Highlighting Simko’s violence and brutality before, during,
and after the First World War allowed these authors to ignore the under-
lying causes of Simko’s revolt. Thus, they failed to transcend the gory
details and answer the fundamental question; why did Simko revolt in the

1 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, (London: Penguin Books, 2013), p. 40.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 251

Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4_9
252 M. KIA

first place and what were the reasons for a Kurdish tribal chief to resort
to a proto-nationalist discourse in order to justify his rebellion against the
authority of Iran’s central government.
To the direct opposite, those who advocated some form of autonomy
or independence for the Kurds appropriated Simko as a national hero
who stood up to the injustices perpetrated by Iran’s central government.
In their attempt to manufacture a national icon out of a frontier warlord,
these writers reduced the complex and multi-faceted causes for Simko’s
rebellion to a reaction by the Kurdish chief against the Persianist policies
of Reza Shah the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. Such an analysis faces
several problems. First, Simko’s revolt commenced in late 1918 when
an ethnically and linguistically non-Persian Turkic dynasty, namely the
Qajars, ruled Iran. Second, when Simko staged his rebellion, Reza Khan,
a non-Persian Mazandarani, was a junior officer in Iran’s Cossack divi-
sion without any real power or authority. There was no inkling of any
pro-Persian policy propagated by the weak and inept Qajar state, which
could not defend its own capital, let alone devise cultural policies for the
Kurds of northwestern Iran. Third, at the time that Simko’s revolt was
spreading in northwestern Iran, Reza Khan did not have the authority or
the power to impose any Persianization policies. The best outcome the
central government could hope for at the time was to disarm powerful
tribal groups and impose its nominal authority over the tribal zones of
the country. Though later in his reign as Reza Shah Pahlavi, he advo-
cated the supremacy of Persian language as a means of creating a unified
nation-state, in 1922, there was no trace of such policies.
Instead of using Simko as a means of promoting an ideological agenda,
I have tried to present an in-depth account of the Kurdish chief’s
ideas and political career without constructing a narrative that would
either dehumanize or glorify him. Without discounting his violent and
destructive attacks against urban and rural communities, I have tried to
understand why Simko staged his revolt, what forces were at work in his
immediate periphery to create the pre-conditions for a massive rebellion,
and why he initially succeeded but eventually failed.
In this book, I have discussed Simko’s life and political career in the
context of historic events that transformed Iran and its immediate neigh-
bors to the north and the west in the first three decades of the twentieth
century. Within this framework, I have divided Simko’s life into several
distinct periods. The first period extends from 1905, when he emerged as
the head of the Avdoi branch of the Shakak tribe, to 1914, when the First
 9 CONCLUSION 253

World War commenced. For Simko, the year 1905 proved to be a turning
point. Iranian authorities in Tabriz treacherously murdered his brother,
Jafar Agha, and shortly thereafter, in 1907, his father died in an Ottoman
prison in Istanbul. During this period, Simko became increasingly sand-
wiched between the Ottoman Turks, who invaded western Azerbaijan in
1905 and the Russians who occupied large portions of the province after
1909.
Enraged by the betrayal of Iranian authorities, Simko initially sought
the patronage and protection of the Ottoman Turks, who had invaded
western Azerbaijan in October 1905. He and a group of his followers
fled to eastern Anatolia, where they settled near Van. Simko’s alliance
with the Turks did not last very long, however, and he returned to Iran
in 1907. In the months immediately after his return to Iran, Simko acted
as the lieutenant and protégé of Eqbal al-Saltaneh, the Khan of Maku. In
the battle between the pro-shah and pro-constitution forces that erupted
after Mohammad Ali Shah attacked and destroyed the Iranian parlia-
ment on June 23, 1908, Simko joined the Khan of Maku, who called
on the tribes of western Azerbaijan to throw their support behind their
sovereign. Simko and a group of Kurdish chiefs responded positively to
Eqbal al-Saltaneh’s call. They raised a large army and slaughtered the pro-
constitution forces in Salmas and Khoy. In return for his loyalty to the
shah and his participation in the suppression of constitutionalists, Simko
was appointed governor of Qotur, a rural district on the border between
the Ottoman Empire and Iran.
After Russia invaded and occupied Azerbaijan in 1909, Simko grad-
ually emerged as a stalwart client of Czarist authorities and went as far
as to stage raids and organize tribal rebellions against Ottoman Turks,
which he did with Russian backing. In return for his services to Russia, the
governor-general of the Caucasus decorated Simko and appointed him the
governor of the frontier district of Somai in western Azerbaijan. Through
his Russian contacts, Simko also established a close working relationship
with prominent pro-Russia Kurdish leaders, including Abdurrezzak Bey
Bedir Khan and Sayyid Taha II. It was through his contacts and inter-
actions with highly educated, well-travelled, and politically experienced
Kurdish leaders from the Ottoman Empire that Simko became acquainted
with Kurdish nationalist ideas.
The second period of Simko’s life overlapped with the tumultuous
years of the First World War. It began in late 1914 and ended in late
1918. This period intensified the Kurdish chief’s nationalistic sentiments,
254 M. KIA

which were increasingly directed against Assyrian and Armenian Chris-

tians. At the beginning of the war, Simko served Russia as a reliable client.
When the Russian forces evacuated Azerbaijan in early January 1915,
however, Simko switched his loyalty, this time from the Russian Czar to
the Young Turks. He utilized the Ottoman invasion of northwestern Iran
as an opportunity to plunder and massacre the Assyrian and Armenian
communities of Salmas. He and his men also lay in ambush at the Qotur
Pass and attacked the Armenian refugees who were fleeing Ottoman terri-
tory. For Simko, the Assyrians and Armenians of northwestern Iran posed
an existential threat to the security and privileges of Kurdish tribal elites
of the region. In his view, the establishment of an independent Assyrian
or an Armenian state contested the autonomy of Kurdish tribal life and
reduced the Kurds to the status of a subservient group.
After the Russians re-occupied Azerbaijan in the winter and spring
1915, Czarist authorities banished Simko to Tiflis because of his collab-
oration with the Ottoman Turks. In 1916, Simko returned to western
Azerbaijan as a paid agent of Russia. After the collapse of the Czarist
Empire and the withdrawal of Russian forces from Iran in late 1917,
Simko worked for a short time with British military intelligence officers,
who were endeavoring to buttress the Black Sea-Baghdad line of defense,
especially in south Caucasus and Azerbaijan, against an Ottoman Turkish
invasion. In this effort, the British tried to induce Armenian and Assyrian
groups to work with Simko in order to defend northwestern Iran against
the impending Turkish attack. Though he supposedly joined the British-
backed alliance, Simko undermined the united front against the Turks by
murdering the Assyrian leader, Mar Shimun, in March 1918.
The assassination of Mar Shimun touched off a deadly civil war
between the Christian (i.e., Assyrians and Armenians) and the Muslim
communities (i.e., Kurds and Azerbaijani Turks) of the region. Though
armed Assyrians captured his stronghold at Chahriq, Simko managed to
escape with a group of his followers to Khoy, where he continued to
attack and slaughter Assyrian refugees. The Ottoman invasion of north-
western Iran in summer 1918 allowed Simko to resume his attacks against
the Assyrian and Armenian communities in Salmas and Urumiyeh. The
Turkish invaders backed by local Iranian officials and Kurdish chiefs,
including Simko, chased the Assyrian and Armenian Christians out of
their towns and villages. The expulsion of the Christian population of
Urumiyeh and Salmas districts transformed the demographic composi-
tion of western Azerbaijan in favor of the Kurds and Azerbaijani Turks.
 9 CONCLUSION 255

With the disappearance of armed Assyrian and Armenian bands, Simko

emerged as the most powerful local leader in northwestern Iran.
The third period of Simko’s life, extending from late 1918 to late
summer 1922, witnessed the eruption of Simko’s revolt and his attempt
to establish an independent Kurdish state. The end of the First World War
in late October 1918 found western Azerbaijan free of foreign occupation
forces and stripped of its Assyrian and Armenian communities. After four
years of intense fighting and violence, foreign armies and their allies had
vanished, while the Iranian government remained as impotent and feeble
as before. The disappearance of the Ottoman and Russian armies created
a vacuum that the Qajar state could not fill. Simko moved into the void.
The end of the Great War ushered in a new chapter in Simko’s political
career. The disappearance of foreign armies and the complete absence of
Iranian governmental authority convinced Simko that he could create an
independent Kurdish state in western Azerbaijan. With support from the
remnants of the disbanded Ottoman army units, Simko created a strong
and well-equipped military force that could prevent the return of Assyrian
and Armenian refugees. His refurbished army also allowed him to beat
back the badly organized and poorly trained armies sent against him by
the Iranian government. In his attempt to unify the neighboring Kurdish
tribes around his flag, Simko employed Kurdish nationalism as a conve-
nient tool. He also sought and received military assistance from Turkish
nationalists, who were fighting Armenians in eastern Anatolia. Simko’s
appeal to nationalism, however, proved to be incompatible with the semi-
nomadic and internally fragmented tribal society in which he operated.
Tribal loyalties resisted transformation into a coherent national move-
ment. The internally loose and divided organization of tribal groups also
predisposed Simko’s movement to intense rivalries and fissiparousness.
The participation of numerous tribal chiefs served as a source of
strength and power for Simko, but it also undermined his ability to
transform his uprising into a cohesive movement with concrete political
objectives. His alliance with Kurdish tribes of western Azerbaijan allowed
Simko to increase the size of his army, but the convergence of numerous
tribal identities under one flag also fragmented Simko’s support base and
divided it into opposing factions and loyalties. Indeed, at the zenith of
his power, Simko’s army was at best a makeshift collection of armed
bands lacking a unified and integrated command structure or a coherent
ideology. Though “a brave fighter,” Simko was “ignorant of modern
256 M. KIA

military tactics, and his irregular forces were naturally at a great disadvan-
tage when opposed by a properly equipped and organized force.”2 The
tribesmen fighting under Simko’s flag were not paid other than in plunder
from the enemies they defeated and the towns and villages they sacked.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the loyalty of Kurdish tribal chiefs of
western Azerbaijan remained fragile and transient. Simko’s fate was sealed
once the Iranian state managed to organize a standing army under the
leadership of its minister of war, Reza Khan, and after Tehran and Ankara
resolved their disputes through direct negotiations. When Simko suffered
a devastating military defeat at the hands of Iranian government forces
in August 1922, his tribal coalition collapsed, and his rebellion fizzled.
Simko’s defeat was followed by a mass defection by the very tribal chiefs
who had rallied to his cause.
During the last period of his life, extending from his defeat at the
hands of the Iranian army in August 1922 to his assassination by Iranian
authorities in July 1930, Simko tried to revive his power and stage another
rebellion against the Iranian government, but he failed. In October 1922,
the Kurdish chief travelled to northern Iraq and appealed to the British
authorities for support. When the British rejected his request for assis-
tance, Simko sought Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji’s backing, but his pleas
did not produce any positive results. Having failed in his efforts in
northern Iraq, Simko returned to Turkey and joined the Turkish national-
ists. He also returned to his favorite vocation of raiding merchant caravans
and plundering rural communities on the Iranian-Turkish frontier. After
the Turks suppressed Sheikh Said’s rebellion in the spring 1925, Simko
returned to Iran in 1925. In 1926, the Kurdish chief revolted against the
authority of the Iranian state, but he was quickly defeated by his prin-
cipal rival within the Shakak tribe. After 1926, Simko became a homeless
nomad travelling between Iraq and Turkey, while the Iranian and Iraqi
governments negotiated about his fate. In July 1930, he finally returned
to Iran only to be killed in an ambush organized by Iranian authorities.
Throughout his career, Simko utilized an imperial framework or a
patron-client relationship to ensure his political survival. He served the

2 M. Saunders, Intelligence Summary No. 38, Tehran, September 24, 1922, Doc. 86
[E 12,259/285/34], in British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers From
the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Part II, Series B Turkey, Iran, and the Middle East,
1918–1939, Volume 18, p. 125.
 9 CONCLUSION 257

Ottoman Turks as a client between 1905 and 1907, and again intermit-
tently during the First World War, as the situation demanded. He also
enjoyed Russian patronage and protection for several years before and for
a short time during the First World War. The only period during which
Simko acted as a semi-independent leader was the four years immediately
following the conclusion of the Great War; the Russian and Ottoman
empires had collapsed, and the British, despite their enormous power
and influence in Iran and the greater Middle East, were unwilling to
become involved in the conflict between the Iranian state and Kurdish
tribes of northwestern Iran. Even then, Simko relied heavily on support
from Turkish nationalists, who provided him with considerable military
and logistical support.
The patron-client system did not allow Simko to develop a political
agenda independent of his patrons. For example, before the commence-
ment of the First World War, the Kurdish chief joined Abdurrezzak Bey
Bedir Khan and Sayyid Taha II in promoting Kurdish nationalism. Their
“nationalistic” activities, were not, however, aimed at creating a viable and
independent state for the Kurdish communities of the region. Instead,
their principal objective was to undermine the authority of the Ottoman
government in eastern Anatolia, while at the same time building Russia’s
influence inside the Kurdish-populated regions of Iran and the Ottoman
Empire. As clients of the Czarist state, neither Simko nor the other two
Kurdish leaders enjoyed the freedom to devise an independent nationalist
agenda.
Was Simko a Kurdish nationalist? Or more correctly, could Simko be a
nationalist given the tribal society in which he operated and his propen-
sity for selling his services to the highest and most powerful regional
bidder? The Kurdish communities in northwestern Iran were predomi-
nantly rural and tribal. The majority of the Kurdish population lived either
as semi-nomads or peasant cultivators. The region lacked a middle class
with sufficient economic power to exert its political influence. There was
also no urban intelligentsia or an urban-based educated strata engaged
in articulating modern ideas and objectives for a political movement.
Nationalistic sentiments were, therefore, confined to an extremely small
group of tribal chiefs and local notables, who enjoyed a tenuous rela-
tionship with Kurdish intellectuals and political leaders in the Ottoman
Empire, the birthplace of Kurdish nationalism.
The early impulses of Simko’s nationalism were inspired by Kurdish
nationalist leaders across the border in the Ottoman Empire, including
258 M. KIA

Abdurrezzak Bey Bedir Khan and Sayyid Taha II, who acted as inter-
locutors and the means of transmission for the introduction of Kurdish
nationalism in northwestern Iran. This embryonic form of nationalism
became increasingly more relevant as Kurdish anxiety and insecurity in
western Azerbaijan was aroused in reaction to the ascendency of nation-
alistic organizations and armed groups among Assyrian and Armenian
communities in northwestern Iran. Initially, Simko did not fear a distant
Iranian government, which was practically non-existent at the time. The
Kurdish chief’s primary concern was the emergence of an Assyrian or an
Armenian state that could dominate the Kurdish tribes of western Azer-
baijan with direct assistance from Russia and other European powers. In
other words, Simko’s nationalism was shaped by a deep sense of anxiety
about the possibility that his tribe, as well as neighboring Kurdish tribal
groups, would be reduced to a subservient minority community under
Assyrian rule.
Simko was a tribal chief in search of an independent state. Despite his
call for the creation of a Kurdish state, Simko and his army lacked the
most rudimentary elements of a coherent nationalist movement. Nation-
alist movements were often represented by an educated intelligentsia
(i.e., scholars, teachers, journalists, poets, and writers), which critiqued
the traditional culture of the society and proposed new ideas, policies,
and political objectives. This factor was clearly missing in Simko’s case.
The geographical setting of Simko’s revolt was mountainous and tribal.
Cities and towns were targets of attacks rather than the social base of
the revolt. It is not surprising, therefore, that Simko’s revolt suffers from
a paucity of articles and books written by Kurdish intellectuals in its
support. Raiding and plundering rather than writing and publishing were
the favorite pursuits and pastimes of the leaders. This was not a nation-
alist movement that fit the traditional theoretical model. And yet, Simko’s
revolt contained strong elements of a proto-nationalist movement. The
Kurdish chief’s uprising was separatist in nature. Caught on the border-
lands of age-old empires, it possessed little affinity for either Iran or
Turkey. Instead of viewing the British or the Russians as the evil colo-
nizers, as was the case in the Iranian nationalist discourse, Simko viewed
the Iranian state as the oppressor of his people, and he sought to defeat
it with support from either the Turks, the British, or the Russians.
There is no evidence to suggest that Simko’s opposition to the Iranian
state was based on some form of cultural nationalism, but there is ample
evidence to argue that he viewed the centralizing policies of the Iranian
 9 CONCLUSION 259

government, especially after the creation of a modern standing army, as

a direct threat to his political and economic privileges. His reaction to
the policies of the government in Tehran was, therefore, the reaction of a
feudal lord and a tribal chief rather than the response of a Kurdish nation-
alist intellectual worried about the loss of his/her cultural and linguistic
identity. His complaints about the Iranian government’s policies focused
on the erosion of power for himself and other chiefs to run their terri-
tories as autonomous potentates; such complaints were rarely directed at
the lack of democracy or human, cultural, and linguistic rights.
Simko’s scattered and inconsistent appeal to Kurdish nationalism
lacked a commitment to a program of improvement for Kurdish life in
Iran. Rather, it was for the most part, a tactical ploy to rally the neigh-
boring Kurdish tribes around a unified flag. The Kurdish chief did not
possess any religious legitimacy or spiritual appeal. He also did not have
any new political ideas that could generate excitement and support among
the neighboring Kurdish tribal chiefs. The only idea that he could use as
a convenient tool was the removal of state authority, which would have
allowed the ruling tribal elite of the region to run their affairs without
intervention from the central government. Simko lacked any attachment
to the concept of Iran as a nation-state. He lived all his life in the border-
lands, where he shifted his identity and loyalty in accordance with the
needs of the moment. He expressed his loyalty at one point or another to
Iran, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian Empire, the Turkish republic, and
even to the Soviet state. The sole aim of these fluid and flimsy loyalties
was political survival in a region where the balance of power shifted on a
frequent basis.
Unlike his contemporaries, Mirza Kuchak Khan in Gilan, Khiyabani in
Tabriz, and Pessyan in Khorasan, Simko did not view himself as an Iranian
patriot fighting against the injustices of a corrupt and pro-British estab-
lishment in Tehran. Indeed, he had no problem with the corruption and
the pro-British policies of the Iranian government, which he had manip-
ulated to his own advantage. He even tried to throw in his lot with the
British when it proved convenient. His problem was with the existence of
a country called Iran, and a government that could maintain the indepen-
dence and territorial integrity of the Iranian state. He intended to destroy
its authority in western Azerbaijan so that he could carve out a new state
under his own leadership.
For Simko, his nation was principally the Shakak tribe, a segment of
which he led since the death of his brother and father. The members
260 M. KIA

of his tribe shared a common territory, as well as a common language,

religion, and culture. When he realized that the rise of Assyrian and Arme-
nian nationalism posed a threat to the status and position of his tribe,
Simko responded by targeting these two communities and murdering Mar
Shimun, the most powerful and influential Christian leader in the region.
Simko believed that the Assyrian leader and his supporters posed a direct
threat to the supremacy of the Shakak as the most powerful tribe in north-
western Iran. After Tehran tried to re-impose its authority over western
Azerbaijan, Simko built a strong army and fought against Iran’s central
government. The principal objective in fighting the Assyrians, Armenians,
and later the Iranian government was the preservation of the tribe for
which he was responsible and with which he identified.
In staging his revolt, Simko did not appeal to Islam. Islam and the
distinction between the Sunni Kurds and the Shi’i Azerbaijanis and
Persians did not serve as the primary unifying force or the impetus for
military action. Even his closest confidant, Sayyid Taha II, who enjoyed
enormous prestige and influence, refused to use an Islamic discourse in
support of Simko’s movement. Instead, he appealed to unity among the
Kurdish tribes of northwestern Iran as the first step toward the real-
ization of the dream of an independent Kurdish homeland. In place of
religion, both Simko and Sayyid Taha II relied primarily on kinship and
cross-border tribal solidarity as focal points in their campaign.
Simko’s politics and political worldview were those of a traditional-
minded tribal chief and landowner. As a leader who had been raised as a
member of a tribal aristocracy, he opposed any change to the status quo,
including any political and economic reform that could pose a threat to
the integrity of the traditional social order. Any alteration in the power
structure or any modification in the relationship between the ruler and the
ruled undermined the privileged status that he enjoyed. Thus, concepts
and categories such as democracy, equality before the law, and social
justice were fundamentally alien to his thought process.
As a landowning tribal chief, Simko operated within a multi-layered
social order comprising several principal classes, that is, the landlord and
the peasant, and the tribal chief and the ordinary tribesman. The Kurdish
chief’s political base was the warrior caste of his tribe and several neigh-
boring Kurdish tribal groups. Simko’s uprising was, therefore, a revolt of
a small minority that lacked a broad social base. Neither peasant culti-
vators nor any segment of the urban population, Kurd or non-Kurd,
was mobilized to play any significant role in Simko’s revolt. Simko’s
 9 CONCLUSION 261

intense anti-Assyrian and anti-Armenian stance, as well as his propensity

for looting and plundering defenseless inhabitants, almost irrespective of
ethnicity, made it impossible for the Kurdish chief to find any support or
legitimacy among the rural and urban population in northwestern Iran.
Simko and the tribal chiefs who supported him drew their power and
wealth from land and the peasant cultivators who worked it. As far as
they were concerned, peasant cultivators had to remain wedded to the
land and work so that they could feed their land-owning/semi-nomadic
masters. Simko’s revolt was, therefore, a rebellion of a traditional-minded
tribal-landowning elite that had no intention of empowering the masses
and creating a more open and egalitarian social order.
Simko was the creation of the borderlands, where his tribe functioned
as an autonomous entity with its own army and political organization. He
conducted his own foreign policy and formed alliances with neighboring
tribes and states. When Reza Shah tried to convert the fragmented entity
that he had inherited from the Qajars into a modern nation-state called
Iran, he ran into strong resistance from the tribal chiefs, such as Simko,
who equated the emergence of an Iranian nation-state under a strong
central government as tantamount to the destruction and disappearance
of their own autonomous tribal existence.
Simko was fighting to preserve a privileged way of life that was disap-
pearing fast as tribes and tribal chiefs came under attack by the newly
emerging “nation-states” of the region. The Kurdish chief was born and
raised when multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, and multi-religious empires
reigned supreme. He developed his political skills in the borderlands
of such empires, which had been born of war with their frontiers fash-
ioned by centuries of conquest and conflict. Moreover, these borderlands
contained vast contested territories claimed by imperial bureaucracies that
did not in fact control them. The contested territories lying between the
rapidly declining empires allowed tribal chiefs to carve out autonomous
political entities, where they survived by playing one imperial power
against another.
Acting as a devastating tsunami, the giant waves of the First World
War transformed the political geography of the Middle East. In addition
to the tragic loss of millions of lives, the Great War uprooted the imperial
regimes that had dominated the region for centuries. With the break-up
of the age-old empires, new countries with recognized borders prolifer-
ated throughout the Middle East. These states emerged as the principal
repositories of political loyalty and legitimacy.
262 M. KIA

Simko was a tribal chief. Submission to the authority of a tribal chief

was based on custom. Beginning in 1922, the Iranian state tried to disarm
the tribes and transform Iran from a loose aggregate of autonomous
enclaves into a modern nation-state with a uniform army, a centralized
tax system, and a homogeneous national identity, concepts that were alien
to and opposed by tribal notables. For the new leadership in Tehran,
Iran could not be really independent and orderly until the whole country
was brought under a single and unchallenged authority, which meant the
establishment of a highly centralized national government that enjoyed
the power to disarm the tribal population, so that all physical power could
rest in the hands of the state.
The implementation of this nationalist project converted the govern-
ment into the only institution that enjoyed a monopoly on the legal use
of force. In introducing its centralizing policies, the Iranian government
tried to replace the customary control of the tribal chiefs with a new polit-
ical order based on the unchallenged supremacy of the state. The creation
of a centralized nation-state meant that multiple centers of authority could
no longer compete for power as was the case under the Qajars. The
conflict between the central government and the tribal periphery was
bound to end with the victory of the state because it possessed greater
military and administrative power, a coherent ideology, and vast financial
resources, while the coalition led by Simko was internally fragmented and
lacked the ideological cohesion, the financial base, and the managerial skill
to fight and win.
Simko was the product of borderlands between empires, and border-
lands were bloody places. Further, powerful forces shaped Simko and his
career: the collapse of age-old empires, the destructive impact of the First
World War, and the emergence of new nationalisms (given even greater
impetus by the Great War and its aftermath). These dynamic circum-
stances led Simko to ally himself at different times with the Qajar state
in Iran, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, Turkey, and even Great Britain.
Ultimately, the warlord flirted with a Kurdish proto-nationalism—at least
when it was convenient. This multiplicity of identities and alliances has
allowed historians to cast him in ways that meshed with their own inter-
pretations. Historians undoubtedly will continue to make of him what
they will.
As for this author, the reader will recognize a reluctance to reach
broader conclusions regarding other Kurdish political movements based
 9 CONCLUSION 263

on the unique story of Simko and his revolt. The reason for this hesi-
tation is very clear. The Kurdish tribal leadership in northwestern Iran
operated in a political environment fundamentally different from Kurdish
tribal chiefs in the Ottoman Empire. In Qajar Iran, the Kurdish chiefs
enjoyed far greater autonomy than their brethren across the border. As
a result of centralizing policies implemented by the Ottoman Empire
throughout the nineteenth century, the Kurdish tribal groups of eastern
Anatolia had become far more integrated into the state’s power struc-
ture, and many functioned as the direct arm of the state, supporting the
Ottoman government in its campaign to suppress Armenian nationalists.
Iran witnessed a reverse process, because the power of the Qajar state
was in a rapid decline throughout the same period, especially in the tribal
zones of the country. Lacking the military and bureaucratic institutions
that the Ottomans possessed, the Qajar state, which was in reality a loose
confederation of tribal groups and landowning families, maintained the
fragile balance of power by adopting a policy of minimal intervention.
Instead of acting as an extension of the central government, Kurdish
tribal groups such as Simko’s Shakak operated as autonomous entities that
maintained their own power structure and conducted their own foreign
policy with neighboring states, namely, the Ottoman Empire and Russia.
The Ottoman state was not only more centralized and bureaucratic,
but it was also more ideological than its counterpart to the east. The
Ottoman sultan functioned not only as the temporal but also as the reli-
gious and spiritual head, or the caliph, of his Sunni Muslim subjects,
including the majority of the Kurdish population in eastern Anatolia.
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman appeal
to Pan-Islamism enjoyed the support of many Kurdish tribal chiefs and
notables in eastern Anatolia. Even after the defeat and collapse of the
Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, many Kurdish
leaders continued to display a willingness to support the efforts of Mustafa
Kemal and his fellow officers in removing foreign occupation troops from
Anatolia as long as the leader of the movement remained a Gazi who
fought the infidels in the name of Islam and the sultan-caliph.
In sharp contrast to the Ottoman sultan, the Qajar shahs lacked the
religious legitimacy to rule their subjects. This may explain why they
relied heavily on the support of the Shi’i religious hierarchy to maintain
their control. The situation for the Qajar state worsened in the Sunni-
populated regions of the country, especially in the Kurdish-populated
areas where a Shi’i monarch did not enjoy any automatic legitimacy or
264 M. KIA

support. The only means for the state to win over the Kurdish tribes of
Iran was through bribes and threats. The state often bought the loyalty
of Kurdish chiefs by bestowing honorific titles and increasing the amount
of land and taxes a tribal leader controlled. When the Ottoman Empire
and Russia invaded northwestern Iran in 1905 and 1909, the authority
of the Qajar dynasty vanished, and after the end of the First World War
and the increasing militarization of the country’s tribal zones, it became
impossible for the Iranian state to secure her authority even with bribes
and threats.
Finally, as a result of institutional reforms, including the introduction
of a modern educational system, a Kurdish intelligentsia emerged under
late Ottoman rule. Highly educated and well-travelled, the members of
this intelligentsia served at various levels of the Ottoman state bureau-
cracy, including its palace and foreign policy establishment. The rise of
Kurdish nationalism was partially linked to the rise of this intelligentsia,
which was exposed to a variety of modern European ideas and ideolog-
ical schools. The members of the Kurdish intelligentsia also witnessed the
eruption of nationalist movements, first among the Christian subjects of
the sultan in southeastern Europe and later among the Armenian and
Arab subjects of the empire. If the Armenians and Arabs of the empire
could demand their own nation-states why couldn’t the Kurds, an ancient
people with their own unique identity? This intellectual ferment was
absent among the Kurdish communities in Iran, which were dominated
by tribal chiefs whose political horizons did not transcend political survival
as well as petty tribal jealousies and rivalries. Though rooted in his expe-
rience with the Qajar state, as well as in his deep anxieties and insecurities
regarding the activities of Assyrian and Armenian nationalists, Simko’s
unique proto-nationalism was an extension of Kurdish nationalistic ideas
that had already been cultivated in the Ottoman Empire. Without his
interactions with prominent Kurdish notables and intellectuals from the
Ottoman state, Simko’s revolt would have remained another isolated
tribal rebellion by a frontier warlord who lacked any formative ideology
or overarching political objectives.
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 Index

A 173–175, 179, 180, 183, 188,

Abdulhamid II, 73, 88
Abdullah Beyk, 214
Abdurrezzak Bedir Khan, 6, 83–87,
90, 93, 96, 253, 257, 258
Afshar, 48, 61, 204
Ahmad Shah Qajar, 31, 99
Ain al-Dowleh, 143, 144, 184
Alasht, 41
Amir Arshad, Sām Khan, 171, 172,
174, 196
Amir-Tahmasebi, Abdollah Khan, 228,
232, 236
Amnieh, 180, 182
Andrievsky, Colonel, 206
Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919, 38
Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 150
Anzal, 47, 51, 206
Arasbaran, 136, 171, 204
Arbil , 89, 219, 224, 225
Ardabil, 82, 154, 233
Arfa, Hassan, 1, 60, 65, 107, 108,
113, 114, 122, 132, 133, 136,
138, 162, 163, 166, 171,
198, 206, 208, 209, 213
Armenians, 5, 7, 9, 11, 14, 47, 48,
52, 55, 59, 95, 97, 98, 100, 102,
103, 106, 108, 111, 113, 114,
120, 123, 128, 132, 145–147,
158, 225, 254, 255, 260, 264
Armenia, Republic of, xiv
Assad Beyk of Targavar, 214
Assyrians, 5, 7–9, 11, 14, 47–52, 55,
59, 95, 97, 98, 100, 104–108,
111–116, 118, 120–123, 135,
145–147, 158, 211, 254, 260
Avdoi, 60, 65, 68, 79, 84, 252
Azadistan, 35
Azerbaijan, 4–17, 19–21, 26, 27, 29,
31, 33, 35, 36, 46–55, 57, 59,
61, 63, 65–67, 70–73, 75–82,
85–93, 95–103, 105, 107, 108,
110, 111, 113–115, 117,
120–123, 125, 129, 131, 133,
134, 136, 138–146, 150–152,
154, 155, 157, 158, 160–162,
166, 167, 171–174, 176, 177,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive 279
license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
M. Kia, The Clash of Empires and the Rise of Kurdish Proto-Nationalism,
1905–1926, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44973-4
280 INDEX
183, 184, 188–190, 192–197,
199–204, 210, 211, 216, 217,
227–237, 241–245, 253–256,
258–260
B
Bahri Beyk, 215
Baqer Khan, 29
Baradoost, 48, 72, 74, 89, 90, 215,
216
Barzanji, Sheikh Mahmud, 18, 92,
126, 132, 222, 241, 256
Bassir Divan, 207, 212
Bayandor, Gholamali, 212
Begzade Kurds, 90, 243
Brest Litovsk, Treaty of, xiii
Britain, 5, 8, 11, 12, 20, 25–28, 30,
31, 34, 40, 41, 71, 75, 88, 109,
110, 126, 131, 132, 144,
147–150, 176, 212, 225, 231,
234, 242, 245, 246, 262
C Forughi, Mohammad Ali, 238
Chahriq, 3, 13, 20, 47, 48, 58–63,
65–69, 74, 77–80, 92, 109, 112,
113, 115, 121, 134–136, 139,
140, 163, 167, 169, 170, 206,
209, 213, 214, 217, 232, 233,
254
Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP), ix, x
Constitutional revolution of
1905–1906, 5, 12, 28, 44, 75,
185, 190
Cossack Brigade, 3, 34, 40, 42, 75,
138, 140, 151, 159, 177, 192,
203
Cossack Division, 26, 34, 35, 40, 42,
153, 159, 177, 178, 182, 188,
203, 252
D
D’Arcy, William Knox, ix
Dehbokri tribe, 99
Dilman, 47, 58, 59, 76, 80, 100,
103, 104, 115, 120, 137–139,
163, 174, 206–209
E
Edmonds, Cecil J., 10, 89, 150, 205,
213, 219–223
Enver Pasha, 99
Eqbal al-Saltaneh, 74, 75, 77, 92,
157, 218, 253
F
Fethi Bey, 186
Fevzi Pasha, 186
First World War, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 14,
15, 21, 22, 30, 33, 34, 46, 49,
50, 58, 67, 91–93, 96–99, 102,
104, 105, 125, 126, 131, 132,
191, 192, 251, 253, 255, 257,
261–264
G
Gilan, Soviet Republic of, 35, 144,
148, 150
Golmankhaneh, 137, 207
Gracey, George, 112–114, 116, 119
H
Haji Agha, chief of the Harki, 214,
243
Hajialilu tribe, 171
Hamadan, 33, 97, 109, 111, 123,
178, 180, 191, 202, 204, 211
Hamidiye regiments, 73
Hussein-McMahon Correspondence,
xiii

I Khiyabani, Sheikh Mohammad,
Iran, 2–38, 40–47, 50, 52–54, 58,
61, 62, 64–69, 71–76, 78–82,
85–93, 95–99, 104–111, 113,
120, 122, 123, 125, 126,
128–131, 136, 138, 142–145,
147–151, 154, 159–161, 172,
173, 176–179, 182–188,
190–192, 196, 200, 201, 206,
212, 213, 216–219, 221–224,
227–232, 234–242, 244–247,
251–264
Iraq, 3, 5, 8, 9, 11, 16, 18, 21, 35,
48, 71, 89, 91, 92, 112, 126,
131, 134, 136, 137, 145–150,
155, 158–161, 173, 176, 182,
205, 216, 219–227, 231, 233,
235, 238, 241, 242, 245, 246,
256
J M
Jafar Agha Shakak, 67, 69
Jahanbani, Amanollah Mirza, 1, 17,
111, 139, 151, 162–169, 175,
180, 181, 188, 195, 202,
206–210, 213, 214
K Malekzadeh, Hassan, 151, 162,
Kamal Beyk, 214
Kardar, 60, 214
Karim Khan Harki, 214
Kazem Qushchi, 206
Kazim Karabekir, 157
Kemal, Mustafa, 5, 9, 10, 46, 127,
157, 158, 183, 184, 186, 200,
220, 229, 231, 263
Kermanshah, 33, 111, 159, 182, 190,
191, 193, 195, 197, 200, 201,
211, 239–242
Khalu Qorban, 17, 174, 197, 198,
201
INDEX 281
15–17, 35, 141–145, 148,
151–154, 157, 190
Khoi, 82
Khuzestan, 212
Kohneh Shahr, 59, 115–117, 119,
230
L
Lady Surma, 116–120
Lahuti, Abolqassem Khan, 17,
190–194, 198
Lausanne, Treaty of, 15, 220, 225
Law, Andrew Bonar, 220
Liakhov, Colonel, 75
Luristan, 199, 241
Lyon, Wallace, 221
Mahabad, 47, 151, 165, 169
Majlis, 28–30, 35, 37, 44, 75, 141,
142, 150, 178, 181, 185
Maku, 6, 19, 47, 74–77, 87, 92, 93,
96, 99, 129, 146, 155, 157, 162,
171, 209, 216–218, 229, 233,
253
164–167, 192
Mamash tribe, 159
Mangur tribe, 70, 99, 171
Maragheh, 17, 99, 167, 199, 204,
211, 228
Margavar, 47, 48, 61, 64, 72, 78, 81,
89, 90, 113, 215, 216, 222, 228
Mar Shimun, 9, 14, 95, 97, 105–108,
112–121, 135, 149, 221, 248,
254, 260
McDowell, Robert, 113
Mehmed V, xi
Memduh Shevket, 238
282 INDEX
Miandoab, 47, 171, 193, 196, 198,
199, 228
Mirza Kuchak Khan, 15, 16, 35, 144,
148, 150, 151, 174, 177, 197,
259
Moghadam tribe, 204
Mohammad Agha Shakak, 65–67, 69,
73, 74
Mohammad Ali Shah, 6, 12, 13, 19,
29, 30, 75, 78, 80, 92, 93, 141,
185, 191, 239, 253
Mokhber al-Saltaneh Hedayat, 2, 16,
17, 69, 131, 145, 151–153, 157,
161–164, 167, 172, 174, 176,
190, 192, 194, 203
Momtaz al-Dowleh, Mirza Ismail
Khan, 184–187
Mosaddeq, Mohammad, 212
Moshir al-Dowleh, Mirza Hassan
Khan, 39, 145, 151
Mosul, 5, 18, 71, 91, 127, 150, 176,
205, 224
Mozaffar al-Din Shah, 12, 26, 67, 71,
75, 184, 185, 238
Mudros, Armistice of, 34, 132
N Qara Papakhs, 7, 47, 51, 52, 147
Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar, 26, 42, 63,
88
Nehri, 64, 87, 88, 91, 225, 245
Nezam al-Saltaneh Māfi, 67
Nicholas II, 91, 107, 109
Nuri Beyk, 214
O Rasht, 30, 35, 38, 144
Omar Khan, 214, 232, 234–236, 244
Oshnaviyeh, 18, 47, 61, 78, 161,
213, 215, 216, 222, 247, 248
Ottoman Empire, 3–6, 9, 11, 12, 15,
21, 22, 27, 31, 34, 46, 48,
52–54, 58–60, 64–66, 68, 75,
79, 81, 82, 84, 88–90, 92, 93,
96–99, 105, 106, 123, 126, 127,
129, 132, 133, 148, 158, 220,
225, 253, 257, 259, 262–264
Ozdemir Bey, 224
P
Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza shah, 211,
212
Pahlavi, Reza Khan, 13, 18, 42, 237,
240
Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 13, 18, 37, 252
Paris Peace Conference (1919–1920),
132
Pasha, Sherif, 132, 133
Pessyan, Mohammad Taqi Khan, xvi,
36
Petros, Agha, 121, 122, 146
Philipov, Colonel, 138, 140, 141,
144, 208
Pizhdar Kurds, 227, 242, 243
Q
Qaradagh, 136
Qarajadagh, 136, 152, 171, 196, 204
Qavam al-Saltaneh, Mirza Ahmad
Khan, 36, 171, 186, 223
Qotur, 6, 13, 60, 61, 74, 76, 78, 79,
84, 85, 92, 93, 209, 216, 225,
226, 228, 230, 253
R
Rawanduz, 89, 92, 148, 222, 224,
225, 231, 245–247
Razmara, Hajj Ali, 211
Reza Khan Sardar Sepah, 40, 203
Russia, 4, 6, 11–14, 19, 21, 25–28,
30, 31, 38, 51, 65, 67, 71, 75,

80, 82–87, 89–91, 93, 95, 96,
98, 99, 105–108, 113, 125, 126,
202, 253, 254, 257, 258,
262–264
Russian Bolshevik Revolution, xiii
Russo-Japanese War, 27, 70
S 92, 216, 233, 245, 253
Saint Petersburg Convention, 28, 29,
125
Salar al-Dowleh, Abolfath Mirza, 239
Salmas, 6, 10, 11, 14, 15, 29, 46–49,
51, 53, 58, 59, 61, 62, 67, 68,
74–77, 80, 81, 99, 100,
102–108, 111, 113, 115, 116,
119, 121, 122, 133–135, 137,
138, 140, 144–146, 154, 157,
163, 170, 175, 183, 200, 207,
209, 210, 213, 216, 217,
226–228, 230, 233–236, 243,
253, 254
Sardasht, 51, 81, 147, 213, 227, 242,
243
Sattar Khan, 29
Savojbolagh, 47, 50, 71, 82, 104,
151, 160, 162, 164–171, 174,
177, 192, 194, 198, 201, 206,
210, 213, 243
Sayyid Abdulqadir of Nehri, 231
Sayyid Taha II of Nehri, 5, 35
Sayyid Ziya al-Din Tabatabai, 40, 159
Sèvres, Treaty of, 15, 127, 148
Shahseven tribe, 36, 151, 154, 197,
217
Shakak Kurds, 7, 29, 58, 59, 61, 63,
66, 87, 97, 111, 227
Shakar Yazi, 163
Sharafkhaneh, 17, 111, 138, 162,
163, 172, 174, 183, 189, 190,
192, 193, 196, 204, 206, 210
Sheikh Khazal, 182, 212
Sheikh Raghib, 224
INDEX 283
Sheikh Said, 231, 256
Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nhri, 7, 65, 87
Sheybani, Habibollah, 183, 188, 189,
193, 202
Simko, Ismail Agha, 27
Society for the Advancement of
Kurdistan, 132
Somai, 63, 64, 72, 74, 77–79, 86, 87,
South Persia Rifles (SPR), 34, 41,
177–179, 192
Soviet Union, 11, 36, 38, 41, 126,
148–150, 171, 186, 194, 218,
226, 251
Sulaymaniyah, 18, 71, 158, 220, 222,
223, 226, 227
Sykes-Picot Agreement, xiii
Syria, northern, 148
T
Tabriz, 15–17, 27, 29, 30, 35, 49,
65, 66, 68–70, 75, 80, 82, 97,
99–101, 103, 104, 110, 111,
134–138, 140–144, 148,
151–154, 157–161, 163, 164,
167, 171, 173, 174, 177, 180,
182–185, 187, 189, 190,
192–196, 198–200, 202–205,
211, 218, 227–230, 233, 236,
243, 244, 247, 253, 259
Tabur Aghasi, 214
Taher Beyk, 214
Tahir Pasha, 73, 74
Talat Pasha, xii
Targavar, 47, 48, 58, 61, 72, 78, 89,
113, 214, 216, 222
Tasuj, 151, 161, 163, 175, 177, 183,
206, 248
Tazeh Shahr, 59
Tehran, 3, 11, 12, 15–17, 23, 25, 26,
28, 30–32, 35, 36, 38–40, 43,
46, 65, 67, 69, 78, 81, 83, 104,
284 INDEX
128–131, 135, 138, 139,
141–144, 148, 150–152, 154,
157, 159, 160, 164, 170, 172,
174, 176, 177, 180–185, 187,
188, 190–194, 196–199, 201,
204, 205, 210–212, 217, 218,
223, 229, 230, 232, 236,
238–240, 242, 245–247, 249,
256, 259, 260, 262
Tiflis, 14, 83, 84, 86, 90, 97, 107,
112, 114, 186, 254
Tobacco Régie, ix
Turkey, Republic of, 225
U W
Urumiyeh, 11, 31–33, 46–51, 58, 59,
61, 62, 67, 72, 73, 77, 79, 80,
86, 89–91, 97, 99–101, 104,
106, 107, 111, 113–115, 117,
119–123, 133, 134, 137, 140,
144, 146, 147, 154, 157, 159,
164, 165, 169, 200, 205, 206,
209–211, 213–216, 224,
226–230, 243, 254
Urumiyeh, Lake, 17, 31, 46, 48, 49,
52, 58, 59, 69, 70, 77, 99, 101,
102, 105, 111, 112, 129, 134,
137, 138, 151, 159, 162, 163,
165, 169, 172, 173, 189, 193,
194, 198–201, 204, 206, 207,
210, 216, 248
Ushnu, 47, 161
V
Van, 7, 63, 64, 73, 74, 83, 86, 91,
96, 102, 105, 106, 111, 112,
114, 123, 133, 146, 158, 204,
228, 229, 253
Vorontsov-Dashkov, 86, 98
Vosuq al-Dowleh, Mirza Hassan khan,
37–39
Wilson, Woodrow, xiii
Y
Yeprem Khan, 239
Young Turks, 76, 77, 84, 108, 132,
149, 254
Z
Zafar al-Dowleh, 151, 162–164, 247
Zahedi, Fazlollah, 207, 212
Zarza tribe, 215