VII.

PARTICULAR LATIN RULES

1. MENS LEGISLATORIS- “the intention of the lawmaker”

Matabuena v. Cervantes
Principle: Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal
of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its vowed objectives. It is a
principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much
part of it as what is written. Thus, the court reversed the decision of the lower court.

2. DURA LEX SED LEX- “it is harsh, but it is the law”

People vs. Mapa

Principle: When the law is explicit and clear, there is no room for interpretation
and construction.
People v. Santayana
Principle: The appointment of the civilian as ‘secret agent’ to assist in the
maintenance of the peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently
puts him within the category of a peace officer equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by sec 879.

3. EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS- “the expression of one

thing is the exclusion of another.”

People v Estenzo
Prinicple: Under the legal maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius or express mention is implied exclusion, the express mention of one
thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusion of others not expressly
mentioned. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules
of logic and the natural working of the human mind.

4. EJUSDEM GENERIS- “of the same kind”

 Mutuc v COMELEC
Principle: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class as
those specifically referred to.

5. CASUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST (RESTRICTIVE

RULE)- “a case omitted must be held as omitted”

Peope v Manantan
Principle: Under the rule of asus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person,
object, or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. The maxim ‘casus omisus’ can operate and apply only if and when the
omission has been clearly established. The application of the ‘casus omisus’ does not
proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from
areasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration.Substitution of terms is not omission.

6. PERMISIVE RULE
Lopez v CTA
Principle: Sec 7 of RA 1125 specifically provides that the Court of Appeals has
appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the
other hand, sec 11 of the same Act lifting the enumerating the persons and entities
who may appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision or ruling of the
Collector of Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs.

7. NOSCITUR A SOCIIS- the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word (as in a

statute or contract) should be determined by considering the words with which it is
associated in the context.
Sanciangco v Rono
Principle: It is a rule of statutory construction that when the language of a
particular section of a statute admits of ore than one construction, that construction
which gives affect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the
enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed.
 Caltex v Phil Mining
Principle: Statutory construction is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its
application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others,
by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law.

VII. CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES

1. “MAY” AND “SHALL”

Capati v Ocampo
Principle: It is a well settled that the word “may” is merely permissive and
operates to confer upon discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the
term “may be” connotes possibility, and does not connote certainty. “May” is an
auxiliary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission, or possibility.

2. “OR” AND “AND”

GMCR v Bell Telecommunication
Principle: In interpreting a statute, every part thereof should be given effect on
the theory that it was enacted as an integrated law and not as a combination of
dissonant provisions. As the aphorism goes, that the thing may rather have effect than
be destroyed.

3. “PRINCIPALLY” AND “EXCLUSIVELY”

Alfon v Republic
Principle: Principally is not equivalent to to exclusively. The word “principally”
as used in art 364 of the Civil Code is not equivalent to “exclusively”.

4. “PREVIOUSLY”
Rura v Lopena
Principle: When he applied for probation he had no previous conviction by final
judgment. When he applied for probation the only conviction against him was the
judgment which was the subject of his application. The statute relates "previous" to
the date of conviction, not to the date of the commission of the crime.
5. “EVERY”
NHA v Juco
Principle: "Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all
possible and all taken one by one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a
corporation created as a government-owned or controlled entity. It does not cover
cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar
proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter cases when the appropriate
controversy is brought to this Court.

6. SURPLUSAGES
Demafiles v COMELEC
Principles: In our view, the last portion of the provision — "and shall have
qualified" — is devoid of any meaning, is unmitigated jargon in or out of context, and
does not warrant the respondent's reading that the term of office of the first municipal
officials of Sebaste begins immediately after their proclamation. It is quite probable
that that is what the legislature meant. But here is a clear case of a failure to express a
meaning, and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the courts from assuming
and, consequently, from supplying.itc-alf "If there is no meaning in it," said the King
in Alice in Wonderland, "that saves a world of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to
find any."

7. PUNCTUATIONS
Arabay v CFI of Zamboaga del Norte
Principles: a reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso in
question results in the conclusion that Congress, in excluding gasoline from the
general disability imposed on municipalities and municipal districts to exact any kind
of taxes on articles subject to specific tax under the Tax Code, deliberately and
intentionally meant to put it within the power of such local governments to impose
whatever type or form of taxes the latter may deem proper to levy on gasoline,
including a sales tax or one in that form. There is after all no clearly demonstrable and
convincing reason why the law would allow municipal imposition of taxes on
gasoline and yet withhold such power if the imposition is in the form of a sales tax,
when it was a known fact at the time of the enactment of the Local Autonomy Act in
1959 — and this still is true to this day — that gasoline is of no profitable use to the
companies which own it unless turned over to the consuming public which, perforce,
must pay for the right to obtain that commodity.

8. OTHER EXAMPLES
People v Meija
Principle: Jurisprudence dictates that when the law specifies certain
circumstances that will qualify an offense and thus attach to it a greater degree of
penalty, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the
imposition of the graver penalty. Recent rulings of the Court relative to the rape of
minors invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of death, there must be
independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused. A duly certified
certificate of live birth accurately showing the complainant's age, or some other
official document or record such as a school record, has been recognized as competent
evidence.

IX. SPECIAL OVER GENERAL

1. WHAT IS THE RULE REGARDING CONFLICTING PROVISIONS OF

THE SAME STATUTE?

Manila Railroad v Collector of Customs

Principles: When there is in the same statute a particular enactment and a general
one which in its comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former,
the particular enactment must be operative, and the general one must be taken to
affect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of
the particular enactment.
Almeda v Florentino
Principles: There is nothing in Rep. Act 2709 that indicates any intention on the
part of the Legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the provisions of section
14 of the Pasay City charter (Rep. Act No. 183) regarding the appointment of its
secretary by the Municipal Board. The power of appointment of Board employees is
conferred upon the vice-mayor by section 1 of Republic Act 2709; but the preamble
of said section expressly recites that it is an amendment to section 12 of the Pasay
charter, and no other. Because repeals by implication are not favored, unless it is
manifest that the legislature so intended (U.S. vs. Palacio, 33 Phil. 216; Lichauco vs.
Apostol, 44 Phil. 138)

2. WHAT IS THE RULES REGARDING CONFLICTING PROVISIONS OF

DIFFERENT STATUTES?
Laxamana v Baltazar
Principle: Respondent should assume the vacated position. Sec. 21 of the Revised
Election Code, which was taken from Sec. 2180 of the Revised Admin Code, applies
to municipal officers in general while Sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code
applies to the office of mayor in particular. A special provision overrides a general
one. Also, the incorporation of Sec. 2180 in Sec. 21 does not enlarge its scope but
merely supplements it. It has also been consistently held in case of suspension of the
mayor, the vice-mayor shall assume office; the legislature is presumed to be
acquainted with this contemporaneous interpretation. Hence, upon re-enacting Sec.
2180, the interpretation is deemed to have been adopted.

Butuan Sawmill v City of Butuan

Principle: Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the latter general -
and the terms of the general are broad enough to include the matter provided for in the
special - the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that
the special is to be considered as a remaining exception to the general as a general law
of the land, while the other as the law of a particular case.

Arayata v Joya
Principle: Act 1120 prevails. It lays down provisions regarding acquisition,
disposition, and transmission of friar lands, which are contrary to the Civil Code. The
Civil Code is a general law, while Act 1120 is a special law. The special law must
prevail.
3. WHAT IS THE RULE IN CASE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN A SPECIAL
PROVISION OF GENERAL PROVISION OF A SPECIAL LAW?

City of Manila v Teotico

Principles: Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the
latter, because Republic Act 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of
Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire Philippines.

David v COMELEC
Principles: It is basic in cases of irreconcilable conflict between two laws that the
later legislative enactment prevails.