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OR Ass 3
OR Ass 3
ASSIGNMENT #
AFFAN MUGHAL
02-111211-238
BBA-6C
SUBMISSION DATE: DECEMBER 26, 2023
Question 1.
Answer:
OPEC price per Cheats Slightly Cheats Cheats Heavily Minimum Maximum of the
barrel Moderately minimum
$20 4 15 35 4
$15 5 10 12 5 5
$13 4 5 -5 -5
Maximum 5 15 35
Minimum of the 5
Maximum
Country A wants to make the most profit that they can while OPEC wants to minimize Country A's profits to
increase their own. Country A realizes that OPEC wants to minimize Country A's profits. They look at the
maximum amounts for each choice. The maximum for cheating a little is $5 billion, for cheating moderately it is
$15 billion, and for cheating heavily it is $35 billion. OPEC knows that Country A wants the maximum amount, so
they will look at the minimum amounts for each of their choices. For a $20 price the minimum profit to Country
A is $4 billion, for a $15 price it is $5 billion, and for a $13 price it is a loss of $5 billion. Therefore, Country A
chooses the minimum of the maximums. Therefore, Country A decides that they will cheat slightly while OPEC
will choose the maximum of the minimums, which is $15 per barrel price so that Country A will get a $5 billion
profit. This point is called the "saddle point".
Question 2.
Answer:
B call 1 call 2
A
call 1 0 1
call 2 –1 3
Call 1 0 1 0 0
Call 2 -1 3 -1
Maximum 0 3
Minimum 0
of the
Maximum
The game is said to be fair if the value of the game is the same to both players. Since, a saddle point has been
achieved, indicating that the value of the game is same to both A and B. Thus, it is a fair game.
Question 3.
Kool Ice
Ice Kold Sale on All Sale on Popular
Sale on All 4 –3
Sale on –3 2
Popular
Answer:
Kool Ice
Ice Kold Sale on All Sale on Popular Minimum Maximum of the
minimum
Sale on All 4 –3 -3 -3
Sale on Popular –3 2 -3
Maximum 4 2
Minimum of the 2
Maximum
Since the values are not equal, it indicates that this is a probabilistic problem.
q 1-q
p 4 –3
1-p –3 2
Answer:
1 2 -3 -3 -3
2 -3 4 -3
Maximum 2 4
Minimum of the 2
Maximum
q q
p 2 –3
1-p –3 4
Answer:
A1 1 2 3 1 1
A2 0 3 -1 -1
A3 -1 -2 4 -2
Maximum 1 3 4
Minimum of the 1
Maximum
Since a saddle point has been reached, the game is said to be solved.
Question 6.
Answer:
A’s Strategy:
Minimize p + q
Objective Function:
Cmin = p + q
Subject to :
2p + 6q ≥ 1
4p + q ≥ 1
p ≥ 0, q ≥ 0
B’s Strategy:
Maximize x + y
Objective Function:
Zmax = x + y
Subject to:
2x + 4y ≤ 1
6x + y ≤ 1
x ≥ 0, y ≥ 0
Question 7.
Answer:
B C1 C2 C3 C4 Minimum Maximum of
the minimum
R1 2 3 -3 2 -3
A R2 1 3 5 2 1
R3 9 5 8 10 5 5
Maximum 9 5 8 10
Minimum of the 5
Maximum
Since a saddle point has been achieved, with a value of the game being 5, the game is said to be solved. Thus, A
should select Row 3 and B should select Column 2.
Answer:
B B1 B2 B3 B4 Minimum Maximum of
the minimum
A1 0 -1 2 -4 -4
A A2 1 3 3 6 1 1
A3 2 -4 5 1 -4
Maximum 2 3 5 6
Minimum of the 2
Maximum
A1 0 -1 2 -4
A A2 1 3 3 6
A3 2 -4 5 1
In the above matrix, A1 is dominated by A2 because every element in A1 is less than the corresponding element in
A2. Hence A1 was eliminated. After which, Column-wise, B2 dominates B3 and B4. Hence, they too were
eliminated.
Let, q 1-q
p 1 3
1-p 2 -4
p + 2(1-p) = 3p - 4(1-p) q + 3(1-q) = 2q - 4(1-q)
p + 2 - 2p = 3p - 4 + 4p q + 3 - 3q = 2q - 4 + 4q
-p + 3 = 7p - 4 -2q + 3 = 6q - 4
8p = 7 8q = 7
p = 7/8 q = 7/8
V = 7(7/8) – 4 V = 6(7/8) – 4
V = 17/8 V = 5/4
Question 9.
Answer:
Maximum 1 0
Minimum of the 0
Maximum
Since the values are not equal, it indicates that this is a probabilistic problem.
q 1-q
p 1 -1/2
1-p -1/2 0
1 1 1 1
p– (1-p) = – p + 0 (1-p) q– (1-q) = – q + 0 (1-q)
2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
p– + p=– p+0 q– + q=– q+0
2 2 2 2 2 2
3 1 1 3 1 1
p– =– p q– =– q
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1
2p = 2q =
2 2
p = 1/4 q = 1/4
1 1 1 1
V=– x V=– x
2 4 2 4
V = -1/8 V = -1/8
Therefore, each player should show heads (1/4) of the time and tails (3/4) of the time. The game is unfair to A,
as he will lose on average (1/8) unit each time the game is played.
Question 10.
Answer:
q 1-q
p -3 7
1-p 6 1
Therefore, A should play with Plan P and Q with frequencies (1/3) and (2/3) respectively. While B should play
with Plan S and T with frequencies (2/5) and (3/5) respectively. The value of the game is 3.
Question 11.
Answer:
P = 0, V = 5
Y1 0p + 5(1-p)
P = 1, V = 0
P = 0, V = 4
Y2 -2p + 4(1-p)
P = 1, V = -2
P = 0, V = -3
Y2 2p -3(1-p)
P = 1, V = 2
Chart Title
6
5 5
4 4
3
2 2
1
0 0
P=0 P=1
-1
-2 -2
-3 -3
-4
Y1 Y2 Y3
q 1-q
p -2 2
1-p 4 -3
Therefore, the optimal mixed strategy for player II is (y1, y2, y3) = [0, (5 / 11), (6 / 11)]. The value of the game is
2/11
Question 12.
151 G 194
0 A 42 42 D 151 0 0 194 J 218
0 0 0 0 151 43 194 45 45
0 42 42 42 109 151 239 24 263
194 I 263
0 0
194 69 263
0 B 48 48 E 106
90 90 90 90
90 48 138 138 58 196
0 C 23 106 F 129 129 H 173
173 173 90 90 90 90
173 23 196 196 23 219 219 44 263
2 2 2 2 2
σ P=σ A+σ D+σ G+σ I
2 16+169+25+ 49
σ P=
36
σ P = 2.682
42+109+ 43+69
µ=
6
µ = 43.833
45−43.833
P(x ≤ 45) = P(Z ≤ )
2.682
P(x ≤ 45) = 0.435
P = 0.6664 or 66.64% is the probability that everything will be ready in time.