CASE DIGEST

Case #15 Gunabe vs. Director of Prisons

FACTS:

Petitioners more or less admit that they were charged in criminal cases before the Court
of First Instance of Manila with murder and frustrated murder and that, in virtue of said
cases which are still pending, the petitioners had been detained by the respondent,
Director of Prisons, under proper commitment orders. The petitioners filed a writ of
habeas corpus with a prayer for their release, on the ground among others, that from
one to four months after their arrest, their detention was unlawful as it was a violation of
their right to be delivered to the judicial authorities within six hours following their arrest.
They further contended their cases were delayed to the prejudice of their substantial
rights as defendants therein since the prosecution did nothing until the
liberation of the Philippines and until the date of the filing of the petition for habeas
corpus, which took a period of more than three years. They should be released on
amnesty, because the offenses for which they were prosecuted were political in nature,
allegedly perpetrated by guerrilla men in the furtherance of their resistance movement
during the enemy occupation.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners were unlawfully detained and should be released at once.

HELD:

No. They should not be released. The Court held that although failure of the
authorities (who arrested or are detaining the petitioners) to deliver the offenders, or
in these cases, the petitioners, to the judicial authorities within six hours - which may of
course be the subject of criminal prosecution under article 125of the Revised Penal
Code - it cannot affect the legality of the confinement of the petitioners which was
admittedly under subsisting process, issued by a competent court. The Court further
held that if indeed, the persons alleged to be restrained of their liberty are in the custody
of an officer under process issued by a court or judge having jurisdiction to issue the
process, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be allowed. The second ground cannot also
be sustained because the right of an accused to a speedy trial is necessary relative,
consistent with reasonable delays, and usually depends upon circumstances. The
record did not show that delays were due to the machinations of the prosecution, or that
the petitioners objected to the alleged delays or insisted in the dismissal of the cases by
reason by such delays. As for the question of amnesty, the Court held that it was a
question that should have been ventilated in the trial Court or before the
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission and not in the Supreme Court.

The petition was DENIED, with costs against petitioners.