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The Role of Nontraditional Security in

China–US Relations: common ground or
contradictory arena?
Zhang Jiadong & Zheng Xin

Version of record first published: 05 Apr 2012

To cite this article: Zhang Jiadong & Zheng Xin (2012): The Role of Nontraditional Security in
China–US Relations: common ground or contradictory arena?, Journal of Contemporary China, 21:76,
623-636

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 Journal of Contemporary China (2012), 21(76), July, 623–636

The Role of Nontraditional Security in

China– US Relations: common ground
or contradictory arena?
ZHANG JIADONG and ZHENG XIN*
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The China–US relationship is a multidimensional complex one involving both traditional and
nontraditional security issues. However, nontraditional security issues (NTS) have become
paramount in reshaping Sino–US relations, though there is no absolute boundary between NTS and
traditional security. With both traditional security issues and NTS issues being solved according to
the involved nations’ prior experience in dealing with traditional security matters, it stands to
reason that there is a very fine line, if that, between NTS and traditional security and that they are not
necessarily mutually exclusive. Although the energy threat is more likely to be considered a
traditional security matter than concerns such as the terrorism threat or climate change issue, the
energy threat actually contains some NTS characteristics, like how to get full use of natural
resources and the relevance with climate change. This article, to some extent, explains the dynamic
between traditional and nontraditional security through the case study of China–US relations.

Introduction
Admittedly, the US is the world’s most powerful country in terms of its
diversification of power. The US economy, military, and international politics are
unrivaled and yet, China has rapidly developed into the world’s second largest
economy. Bearing in mind the different political systems and cultures, the China– US
relationship can be summarized as opposites striving for teamwork. NTS mirrors this
relationship to some extent; in the midst of competition there can be cooperation.
More precisely, the common national interests of these two countries often coincide
with their different strategic orientations. The complexity of NTS makes it difficult to
explain the relationship between China and the US, especially when defining whether
they are friends or foes.

Characteristics of China– US relations

The complex relationship that China and the US share resulted in many scholars
failing to concisely define this unique dynamic. Due to this situation, to define the

* Zhang Jiadong is a Ph.D. and Associate Professor at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. Zheng
Xin is a postgraduate student in international politics at School of International Relations and Public Affairs (SIRPA),
Fudan University. The authors would like to acknowledge Miss Jessica De Mont’s editorial contribution to this paper.
The authors can be reached by email at jiadongszhang@fudan.edu.cn

ISSN 1067-0564 print/ 1469-9400 online/12/760623–14 q 2012 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2012.666833
 ZHANG JIADONG AND ZHENG XIN

role of NTS in China– US relations proves a difficult task. In order to accomplish this
task, the first step is analyzing Sino –US relations.

China– US relations: theory and framework

China– US relations present a puzzling bilateral relationship. The most frequently
cited description by Chinese and American scholars may be Mr Deng Xiaoping’s
famous argument that the ‘China– US relationship is neither to be too good nor to be
too bad’ (hao bu dao na li qu, ye huai bu dao na li qu). Other equally vivid expressions
such as Professor Lampton’s ‘Same bed, different dreams’;1 or Chinese scholars’
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favorite idioms of ‘neither enemy nor friend’ ( fei di fei you) or ‘both enemy and friend’
( ji di you you), ‘we are in the same boat’ (tong zhou gong ji), or ‘on the same boat
among the storm’ ( feng yu tong zhou), and other similar descriptions illustrate that
there is a very complicated tie binding China with the US. Probably, the only consensus
achieved by both China and US governments, academia, and civilian society may be
that the China– US relationship is the most important bilateral relationship in the
world. Indeed, the US embassy in Beijing has become Washington’s second biggest
overseas government building. The importance of China– US relations originates
not only from common interests, but also from the strategic contradiction between
these two nations and its ensuing hidden potential risk.2
The vast majority of Sino–US scholars believe the China–US relationship to be
a strategic relationship with global significance though hampered by several significant
problems: first, lack of strategic mutual trust is the key factor restricting its further
development.3 Second, unbalanced development and unclear rules of interaction
between China and the US are also important factors in China–US relations. Third,
some sensitive problems, such as the Taiwan issue, may lead to military conflicts
between China and the US someday if the two countries can’t handle them well. Other
potential risk factors include the efforts of the US to strengthen its alliance system in East
Asia, the US military presence in the region,4 increasing threats of China’s neighboring
countries launching nuclear programs, and China’s military modernization.5
It is held by some Americans that Chinese leaders are as bellicose as Germany’s
last emperor William II one century ago, believing that war between China and the
US as inevitable and only a matter of time.6 Nonetheless, the potential confrontation
points between the two countries over such matters as Taiwan and other hot-topic
1. David M. Lampton, Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing US–China Relations, 1989–2000 (University of
California Press, 2011).
2. Yan Xuetong, ‘The instability of China–US relations’, World Economics and Politics no. 12, (2010), pp. 11 –12.
3. During President Obama’s first visit to China in November 2009, Chinese President Hu Jintao put forward five
points to improve China–US relations. The first point among them is ‘persevere to improve mutual strategic trust
between China and the US’. See ‘Hu Jintao met US President Obama’, People’s Daily, (18 November 2009).
4. Suisheng Zhao, ‘Shaping the regional context of China’s rise: how the Obama administration brought back
hedge in its engagement with China’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(75), (2012); June Teufel Dreyer, ‘The
shifting triangle: Sino–Japanese–American relations in stressful times’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(75),
(2012).
5. Qiang Xin, ‘Cooperation opportunity or confrontation catalyst? The implication of China’s naval
development for China–US relations’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(76), (2012).
6. Such as Robert Kagan, John Mearsheimer, and Arthur Waldron’s arguments. See Joseph Nye, ‘The future of
China–US relations’, American Studies Quarterly no. 1, (2009), pp. 13– 14.

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 THE ROLE OF NTS IN CHINA–US RELATIONS

issues do not reflect the whole picture of the Sino – US military relationship. With the
US as the world’s most advanced country and China as the largest emerging
economy, the necessity arises for both nations to advance their military cooperation;
otherwise they may unwillingly witness a real military conflict between them.
With the military component as one of the foremost important aspects of the Sino–
US relationship, it is worth noting that military exchanges have improved exponentially
from where they began in the late 1970s. Up until April 2011, seven rounds of China–
US defense ministry working level meetings have been held.7 Frankly speaking,
the manner of meetings tends to take the form of both sides skeptically reviewing the
cautiously resumed military-to-military contacts due to notable incidents between
the two. Several such instances include when the US suspended military contacts with
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China and imposed sanctions on arms sales after the Tiananmen Incident in 1989, the
1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crises, the mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in
Belgrade in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001.8
It is clear that the China– US relationship is primarily interest-driven, or interest-
oriented rather than based on shared ideology. However, that is not to say there are
no shared ideological values between the two: sustainable development, peace, and
stability sit well within common universal interests. Acknowledging a lack of shared
ideology, it is fortunate that the China– US relationship is independent of personal
ties between national leaders, and therefore far more able to avoid grave turbulence.9
To improve China– US relations, both nations must turn their conceptualized
model of a zero-sum game into a win– win game in order to enlarge and enhance
bilateral interactions as well as to build and enhance cooperation and other reciprocal
actions in multilateral areas.

Differences and commonalities between traditional security and NTS

Traditional security is measured by military strength, GDP, alliance systems, the
geopolitical situation, and other ‘hard’ factors relevant with national security. From
this angle, it is a zero-sum game among countries due to the limits of land and natural
resources. From the perspective of NTS, international society is introduced as a major
factor, while geographical factors, natural resources, and other ‘hard’ factors are
declining in importance. An increasingly interdependent-competitive model has
replaced the previous ‘enemy vs. friend’ model. In this new model, international
competition and conflict is mingled with international reciprocal cooperation and
peaceful coexistence.
7. ‘7th China–US defense ministry working level meeting held in Beijing’, People’s Daily, available at: http://
english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7346932.html (accessed 20 April 2011).
8. Shirley A. Kan, ‘US–China military contacts: issues for Congress’, Summary, (14 December 2010), available
at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf (accessed 20 April 2011).
9. Liu Weidong and Li Nan, ‘Summary of the “Symposium of the 30th Anniversary of the Establishment of
Diplomatic Relations between China and the US: Past, Present, and Future”’, American Studies Quarterly no. 1,
(2009), pp. 148–154; Wang Hongtao, ‘Conference summary on thirty years of Sino–US relations: retrospect and
prospect’, Contemporary International Relations [XiandaiGuojiGuanxi] no. 1, (2010), pp. 59–60; Cai Cuihong,
‘A summary of the conference on “The US Strategic Trends and the Sino–US Relations”’, Fudan American Review
no. 1, (2010), pp. 180 –197; Bu Cuicui, ‘Fourth workshop on China–US relations being held in Beijing’, Voice of
Friendship no. 1, (2010), pp. 18, 5; Chas W. Freeman, Jr, ‘Sino–American dynamics in perspective’, American
Studies Quarterly no. 1, (2009), p. 8.

625
 ZHANG JIADONG AND ZHENG XIN

The rise of a nation is not merely a threat or a challenge, but also an opportunity for
other countries’ development and social welfare. Scientific progress, globalization
and resulting interdependence are constantly expanding and advancing, which
creates an expanding ‘earth’ for all peoples and nations. A country’s peaceful rise
would not lead to exploitation of other countries necessarily.10 Even in terms of
traditional security, the ‘current international conditions should enable both the
United States and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to
each other’.11 It is clear that during the past three decades, counter to the idea that
countries would fall due to China’s rise, almost all countries have benefited and are
still benefiting from China’s economic development more or less.
Separating traditional and nontraditional security from each other in theory and
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practice is an impossible work, making it difficult to draw conclusions; the Sino– US

relationship is no exception. Solving NTS through international concern and
cooperation is a temptation. As a result, the China– US relationship is confronting
a situation whereby all issues are mutually-influenced and intertwined, making it
necessary to discover how NTS shapes current China– US relations.

Characteristics of NTS in China– US relations

Hindsight affords an interesting avenue for evaluating history. Perhaps the most
impressive and telling feature of Sino –US diplomatic ties, from the Nixon years to
today, is the mix between tumultuous and friendly relations. On a colloquial level, we
would call these ‘the rising and falling’ or ‘the ebbing and flowing’ of relations.
During the Cold War, cooperation between China and the US originated from a
shared security threat caused by the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union. In the
immediate post-Cold War era of the 1990s, the established ties remained important
even if absent of a common enemy in diplomatic dealings. In the twenty-first century,
this tie once again picked up speed and has been fostered into one of the most
watched relationships in the world. The revitalized vigor in the relationship primarily
resulted from China’s rise in national power and its cultivation of international
influence. Logically, the China– US relationship is not only a bilateral issue, but also
being internationalized as a regional or global issue,12 particularly in the NTS area.
To deal with the NTS threat, both China and the US have to shift their focus from how
to enhance their national security and maximize military strength to introducing new
methods in adjusting the traditional concept of safety and building national resilience
according to the changing security situation. From this point, international
cooperation and the international order are far superior to any one nation’s efforts
when dealing with energy crises, water and food scarcities, and other NTS threats.
The stability and reliability of the China– US relationship depends on not only
interdependency between the two countries, but also on the restrictions of the
10. Liu Jianfei, ‘China– US relations: go beyond tragedy of power politics’, For the Public Good [Nanfeng
Chuang] no. 22, (2010), p. 45.
11. Charles Glaser, ‘Will China’s rise lead to war?’, Foreign Affairs 90(2), (March/April 2011), p. 85.
12. Wu Xinbo, ‘The re-internationalization of Sino–American relations’, World Economics and Politics no. 8,
(2009), pp. 21–29; Wu Xinbo, ‘Forging Sino –US partnership in the 21st century: opportunities and challenges’,
Journal of Contemporary China 21(75), (2012).

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 THE ROLE OF NTS IN CHINA–US RELATIONS

international order and the norms of international society. From the Chinese
perspective, cooperation in economic and NTS fields would minimize the likelihood
of a military or political confrontation between China and the US.13 It is very
important for China to create and maintain a peaceful international environment for
its sustainable economic development.
Generally speaking, compared with other countries, there are some special
characteristics in NTS issues between China and the US. For other countries, the
solution to the NTS issue independently comes about within the framework of
nontraditional characters. By contrast, China and the US are subject to solving the
NTS issue within a much broader scope referring to the way in which they deal with
the traditional security crisis. Take anti-terrorism activities as an example. China and
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the US take more consideration of factors such as international politics rather than
devoting their efforts and concentrating solely on international collaborations. Also,
for other countries, their options for handling the NTS threat are cooperation or non-
cooperation. Nonetheless, for China and the US, there is no choice due to their size and
importance in the world, so cooperation has to be fully developed and achieved finally.

Cooperation or competition: case studies

China and the US have reached more agreements and have established a greater
cooperation framework in dealing with some NTS threats than in traditional security
threats. However, this cooperation is not normally equal and mutually beneficial. For
the most part, the extent of cooperation on NTS threats is determined by the amount
that the US could gain from China. Therefore, it is arguably feasible to say that China
is still passive and reactive rather than initiative and proactive. As Thomas
J. Christensen has pointed out, ‘China’s counterproductive policies toward its
neighbors and the United States are better understood as reactive and conservative
rather than assertive and innovative’.14 With the US strategy in flux, China– US
cooperation on NTS would show immediate influence and measurable impact.
This paper will discuss these influences and impacts through three topics:
terrorism, energy, and climate change. By the nature of nontraditional issues, which
in general terms is qualitative rather than quantitative, it is difficult to apply
a measurable standard to evaluate the pertinence of such topics; however, the
importance of cooperation when dealing with these topics cannot be overstated.
The most constructive and effective cooperation between the US and China is in the
area of anti-terrorism. Perhaps second to anti-terrorism would be the energy issue.
There exists a hybrid of cooperation and conflict between the US and China when
bridging this international security concern. The most difficult issue in terms of
Sino– US cooperation could arguably be climate change. Heated debates, threats of
sanctions, and claims of breaking treaties are all characteristic of the Sino– US
relationship in regards to climate change and the environment. Agreements in this
field have proven hard to achieve.
13. Wang Jisi, ‘China’s search for a grand strategy: a rising great power finds its way’, Foreign Affairs 90(2),
(March/April 2011), p. 74.
14. Thomas J. Christensen, ‘The advantages of an assertive China’, Foreign Affairs 90(2), (March/April 2011),
p. 54.

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 ZHANG JIADONG AND ZHENG XIN

China– US cooperation and conflicts on anti-terrorism activities

The official China– US cooperation on anti-terrorism can be traced back to 9/11. The
same day as terror seized the United States, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin called
US President Bush to express the Chinese people’s condolences and sorrow for the
American people’s tragic loss. President Jiang also told his counterpart in
Washington that China would provide every necessary means of support to the
American people. On 20 September 2011, Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan
visited the US as the first visiting foreign minister after the 9/11 incidents. Following
the attacks, China and the United States intentionally and methodically began to
develop intelligence sharing and a heightened level of diplomatic interaction and
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military exchange, as well as placing an elevated priority on cooperation.

After 9/11, intelligence sharing between China and the US reached the highest
level since the end of the Cold War. Both nations’ intelligence agencies met to
discuss how best to fight terrorism. One of the outcomes of these meetings was that
the Chinese government opened a green light to CIA and FBI offices in Beijing.15
In October 2002, the Chinese government approved the FBI’s application for entry
and operation– the FBI’s Beijing office was officially established on 21 April 2005.
The officially sponsored entry of the CIA and FBI into China’s capital was
a monumental step, not only in China–US intelligence sharing and cooperation, but
also in the China– US relationship as a whole. One such example of high priority
intelligence sharing by China to the US was when the Chinese government provided
the US with a trainee name list of a Chinese flight school. This important clue assisted
the US in identifying 9/11 suspects accurately and quickly. On 23 July 2003, China
joined the Container Security Initiative (CSI) launched by the US. Since that time,
China has made a concerted effort to protect American security within Chinese
territory. Additionally, the official mainland Chinese government and the Special
Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau have been cooperating with the
US government in cracking down on financial crimes. The PRC has also greatly
contributed to US security by strengthening its anti-money-laundering system as well
as seizing and cutting terrorist organizations’ financial streams.
Diplomatically, China kept pace with the United States in their anti-terrorism
measures and initiated several measures of US support. At the United Nations, APEC
Shanghai Summit, as well as other international occasions, China supported a multitude
of US initiatives, including the international anti-terrorism statement and the
establishment of other relevant international cooperative institutions. In 2010, China
joined the Global Counter Terrorism Forum launched by the US. Additionally,
China used its friendship with Pakistan to encourage the Pakistani government to join
the United States’ anti-terror war.16 US Anti-Terrorism Coordinator Ambassador
15. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US– East Asia Policy: Three Aspects
(Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 11 December 2002).
16. Some said that Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States must come with PRC acquiescence, pointing to a
PRC envoy’s meeting with Musharraf on 18 September 2001. However, on 13 September 2001, Musharraf had
agreed to fight with the United States against bin Laden. Yet it is impossible for the Pakistan government to make such
an important decision without consultation with the Chinese government. See: Shirley Kan, ‘US–China counter-
terrorism cooperation: issues for US policy’, CRS Report for Congress, Order code RS21995, (12 May 2005).

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 THE ROLE OF NTS IN CHINA–US RELATIONS

Francis X. Taylor once pointed out that China’s biggest contribution to the international
anti-terror alliance was its diplomatic support.17
Militarily, China took several measures to support the US even though China did
not participate in military operations in Afghanistan directly. First, China closed its
border with Afghanistan to prevent Taliban and Al Qaeda members from fleeing into
China. Second, China permitted US navy ships to transit through Hong Kong and
supplied life necessities to the related military personnel. Third, China granted US
fighter jets permission to land at certain Chinese military airports in southern
Xinjiang in case of emergency. The United States has yet to take up this unique
offer.
In return for Chinese cooperation and support in these anti-terrorist efforts, the
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US lent its support to many anti-terror Chinese endeavors. In August 2002, the US
government acknowledged a Chinese terrorist organization, the East Turkistan
Islamic Movement (ETIM), as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). On 11
September 2002, the US stood by China in supporting China’s initiative to put ETIM
on the Security Council’s UN terrorist organization list. China– US anti-terror
cooperation entered into a new stage on 2 October 2003 when an ETIM leader, Hasan
Mahsum (Abdu Mohammad), was killed at the Pakistan– Afghanistan border. Since
October 2004, the FBI has accepted Chinese anti-terrorist trainees and they sent
agents to participate in the 2008 Beijing Olympic Game’s security work.
Additionally, it was discovered that Abdul Haq al Turkistani, who served in Al
Qaeda’s top council, was a leader of the former banned terrorist organization ETIM
and its offspring, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP). In response to this
intelligence, the US government declared a freeze on all of Haq’s overseas assets. At
the beginning of 2010, a US airstrike killed him.18 Whether the US killed Haq
deliberately or not, China indirectly benefited from the removal of an Al Qaeda
councilman. In Afghanistan and Pakistan, US military forces have killed around 100
ETIM members. In a single predator air strike in January 2010, 15 foreign terrorists
from the Turkistan Islamic Party were killed, including 13 Uighurs and two Turks.19
Each of the scenarios mentioned above are examples of the US, intentionally or
unintentionally, supporting China in its anti-terrorist pursuit. In the game of
diplomacy, whereby governments keep score and favors are considered ‘business as
usual’, it was not surprising to see that the United States forewent its UN critique of
China’s human rights in showing its appreciation to China for its cooperation in
combating terrorist networks.
It is safe to say that of all the bilateral cooperation seen between China and the US,
anti-terrorism efforts have gone the smoothest. That said, the vast majority of other
17. Francis X. Taylor’s answer to a question about the Chinese contribution to US anti-terrorism activities at a
news press conference in the US Embassy in Beijing on 6 December 2001. See ‘US counterterrorism coordinator
visits China, identifies China as a good partner in anti terrorism cooperation’, available at: http://news.sina.com.cn/c/
2001-12-11/417462.html (accessed 25 April 2011).
18. Bill Roggio, ‘Al Qaeda-linked Chinese terrorist leader reported killed in US strike in Pakistan’, The LongWar
Journal, (1 March 2010), available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/al_qaedalinked_chine.php
(accessed 7 March 2011).
19. Bill Roggio, ‘US airstrike killed 15 Turkistan Islamic Party fighters in Afghanistan’, The LongWar Jouranl,
(23 January 2010), available at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/01/us_airstrike_killed_1.php
(accessed 28 September 2011).

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 ZHANG JIADONG AND ZHENG XIN

bilateral relations between the two nations can be characterized as diplomatic and
often somewhat tumultuous. It is for this reason that, despite being in the honeymoon
period of China– US anti-terror cooperation, it cannot be said that the two countries
were equal and their policies mutually beneficial. The typical pattern of behavior is
that whenever the US sends a request, China responds accordingly. According to the
Container Security Initiative (CSI),China is in the position of using its own resources
to protect US national security. In the case of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement
(ETIM), what the US had done was merely identify ETIM as a terrorist organization
rather than providing substantial help for the anti-terrorist effort with China. To
further enunciate the unequal relationship, the US collected lots of personal biometric
information of many Chinese elites that the Chinese government hasn’t obtained yet.
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This stands to pose a potential future threat to Chinese national security.

In the short term, a more important issue may be that the US –China anti-terror
cooperation is based on the US’s perception of the terrorist threat and actual and
possible policies that ensue. Following the change in the US’s anti-terror polices, the
two countries’ anti-terror cooperation changed correspondingly. Due to the US
presidency transition and anti-terror policy variation, China–US relations have
undergone fluctuations in friendly and cordial relations over the past two years. Just
as the terrorist threat persists, the two countries have to adjust their policies with
reference to the new US anti-terror posture. Perhaps this model of continuity, with
a healthy degree of change and differing opinions, can be a model for the type of
relationship that can be expected with NTS issues.

China– America energy game

Energy security is a NTS issue as well as a traditional security consideration for both
China and the United States with regards to sustainable development in the future.
Thirty years ago, China and the US signed a bilateral energy technology cooperation
agreement. Since then, at the governmental level, China and the US have signed
a variety of bilateral cooperation agreements. Some such agreements are the
Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Energy Consultation and the Agreement
of Intent on Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology between
the China State Development Planning Commission (SDPC)20 and the US
Department of Energy (DoE), the Energy and Environment Cooperation Initiative
between the two governments, the Statement of Intent on Cleaner Air and Cleaner
Energy Technology, the Cooperation and Statement of Intent on a Cooperative Study
of Natural Gas Utilization in China between the SDPC and the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Energy
Policy Dialogue between the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC) and the US Department of Energy (USDOE), the Cooperation Protocol for
Clean Energy Technology for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, and so on.
20. The State Planning Commission (SPC) had managed China’s centrally planned economy since 1952. In 1998,
the SPC was renamed the State Development Planning Commission (SDPC). In 2003, the SDPC merged with the
State Council Office for Restructuring the Economic System (SCORES) and part of the State Economic and Trade
Commission (SETC) into a newly created National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which gained
greater responsibility and power in overseeing China’s macro economic development.

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In the fourth China–US Strategic Economic Dialogue in June 2008, both nations
signed the ‘Decade of Energy and Environment Cooperation Framework’,
highlighting the expectation that China and the US will cooperate under multilateral
frameworks. These frameworks included, but were not limited to, the APEC Energy
Working Group, the International Energy Forum (IEF), the Asia Pacific Partnership
on Clean Development and Climate (APP), the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership
(GNEP), the Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), and the International
Partnership for the Hydrogen Economy (IPHE).
Despite the many agreements and frameworks between China and the US, the
majority of these accords have yet to be implemented effectively. Following the
inauguration of Barack Obama as President of the United States, bilateral cooperation
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on energy gained new momentum. On 16 July 2009, US Energy Secretary Steven Chu
furthered energy cooperation during his visit to China. The two countries agreed to
establish a ‘Joint Clean Energy Research Center’, which would create energy-efficient
cars, buildings, and new carbon capture technology. In November 2009, President
Obama’s visit to China was considered primarily as a ‘visit for energy’ (neng yuan
zhi xing). Since then, the Chinese and US governments have strengthened their
cooperation on energy by addressing the Westinghouse Advanced Pressurized Reactor
(AP1000) and by signing the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) on nuclear safety.
This was conducted between the China National Nuclear Safety Administration
(NNSA/China) and the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission by setting up a shale
gas task force, the release of a US – China Joint Statement on Energy Security
Cooperation, and the launch of a new US –China Renewable Energy Partnership.
It is clear that energy has become an important part of the cooperation between
China and the US and that energy cooperation has promoted strategic relations in
other fields. However, despite the high level of cooperation between both nations
in the energy sector, there still remains a level of disagreement and divergence.
The overarching and guiding reason for Sino– US cooperation on energy issues is
that both countries believe that they are facing the same energy problems, which can
only be overcome with teamwork and a global effort. It is true that both nations are
facing the same threat, but to varying degrees. As a whole, the energy security
problem that the US currently faces is not as urgent as China’s. Usually, about
40– 50% of US oil imports are from the American continent and 20% or less from the
turbulent Middle East.21 Among world powers, the US has the lowest dependency on
oil imports from the Middle East next to Russia. Therefore, energy security for the
US doesn’t have to deal with whether the US can meet its domestic oil consumption
demand, but rather how to control worldwide oil resources. Alternatively, China is
facing a totally different situation. China is an oil-scarce country with its overseas oil
dependence rising rapidly. Since the end of 2009, China’s foreign oil dependence has
already exceeded 50%. China’s dependency on oil from the Middle East is beyond
that of the United States. Due in part to this, it is no wonder the task of fueling the
Chinese society with a sustainable oil supply has become increasingly more difficult.
In other words, energy security is a core national interest for China.
21. Zhang Kang and Zhou Fang, ‘Changes in US reliance on imported oil and oil source mix and enlightenment to
China’, Sino-Global Energy 16(2), (2011), pp. 8–16.

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The energy strategies of China are sharply distinguished from those of the US. The
US possesses the strongest military force in the world and intends to use both high
political tools and market power to solve energy security problems. Currently, the US
is trying to diversify its oil import sources in order to strengthen greater independence
and freedom in dealing with Middle East issues. In the cases of the Iraq War and
South Sudan’s independence, US efforts showed a force advantage and superiority
over China and other international contenders. In the case of Libya, the US was apt to
choose military means to dispel Qaddafi, rather than negotiations and diplomacy,
which were advocated by China, Russia, and some European allies, such as Germany
and Italy. As a developing country, China’s military capabilities and international
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influence remain far behind those of the US. China guarantees its energy security
mainly through robust market power and skillful diplomacy. Even though China
continually keeps a low profile in the energy market, China’s energy demand is rising
faster than most countries. The International Energy Agency (IEA) predicts that
China’s oil demand will rise to about ten million barrels per day by 2030, of which
80% will be imported.22 This is projected to cause severe competition between China
and the US for the acquisition of oil. A historical narrative of the Western world
shows that if the two biggest energy consumers cannot handle their relations well,
then energy is a potential trigger for military conflict.23
In the field of fossil fuels, it stands that coordinating interests and strategies between
China and the US could prove more difficult. For the sake of improving bilateral ties
and mutual interests, as well as for the sake of holding new and renewable energy as
a must-explore arena, it is necessary for China and the US to devote more effort to
collaboration in the energy sector. Perhaps further devotion to a mutually beneficial
energy relationship is deserving of more time than other issues between the two
nations. Certainly, the two countries have cooperated well and have signed plenty of
agreements, protocols, and initiatives. Some of those agreements have been put into
practice and have run a good course. Even though the energy issue is categorized as
nontraditional, there is a strong component of competition associated with it. In his
address from the Oval Office, President Obama said, ‘the consequences of our inaction
are now in plain sight. Countries like China are investing in clean energy jobs and
industries that should be right here in America’.24 Apparently, the two countries’
cooperation in the NTS field is too fragile and sensitive to influence other fields,
including politics and the economy. Logically, China and the US cannot cooperate well
without establishing a more vigorous relationship in other fields, such as the traditional
military arena. Moreover, some of the problems in the energy issue overlap with the
climate change issue, such as the use of new energy and sustainable development
programs.
22. IEA, World Energy Outlook 2004.
23. Flynt Leverett and Jeffrey Bader, ‘Managing China– US energy competition in the Middle East’, The
Washington Quarterly 29(1), (Winter 2005–2006), pp. 187–201; Peter Brookes, ‘Oil obsession’, available at: http://
www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed112904a.cfm; and http://www.washingtonobserver.org/infocus-uschina-
122904CN112.cfm (accessed 12 February 2011).
24. Ki Mae Heussner, ‘Clean energy: why is China ahead of the US? Solar start-up in New Jersey said China gave
them a deal they couldn’t refuse’, ABC News, (16 June 2010), available at: http://abcnews.go.com/
print?id¼10934443 (accessed 28 September 2011).

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China– US agreements and disagreements on climate change

Climate change is a global problem that cannot be solved without cooperation
between China and the US. Since President Barack Obama visited Beijing in
November 2009, the two countries have signed a series of bilateral technology
agreements, including the creation of a Clean Energy Research Center (CERC), an
Electric Vehicles Initiative, an Energy Efficiency Action Plan, a Renewable Energy
Partnership, a Twenty-first Century Coal effort, a Shale Gas Initiative, and an Energy
Cooperation Program, among others. Moreover, the Understanding Protocol for
Cooperation in Energy Sciences was signed between the US Department of Energy
and the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Additionally, China and the US maintain
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a cooperative relationship under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,

the Major Economies Forum, the Clean Energy Ministerial, and the US –China
Climate Policy Dialogue.25 It appears that the climate change issue could be an ideal
common goal for China and the US to strengthen their relationship.
Unfortunately, the reality strays from the ideal scenario that could be. Despite both
nations championing their cooperation and coordination in this area, there are still
a number of obstacles and conflicts that remain between them.
From the US perspective, the US and China are the top two greenhouse gas emitters.
Therefore, both nations ought to take similar responsibility for emissions at the
international level. One reason the US refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol was because
the division of obligations for cutting greenhouse gas emissions were different between
rich and developing nations. Rich nations were required to have a more aggressive
cutback while developing nations were not required to do even a fraction of that.
China holds that the international society should consider the climate change issue
historically and distinctively, whereby the cutting of GHS emission should not
hamper developing countries’ development. Moreover, China opposes America’s
initiative to make a climate deal mandating that all countries will have to make
a measurable, verifiable, and reportable timetable of GHS emission cuts. The reason
for this is that China asserts that developing countries cannot predict their quantity of
energy consumption in the near future. That said, it is not unfounded that many
debates or brawls occur between Chinese and American officials, experts, and even
scholars in universities.26
Frankly speaking, the debates between the two countries are not only caused by
national interests, but are also a result of different worldviews. The Chinese people
are inclined to look back and to solve problems through a historical lens, while
Americans are more likely to look ahead without much historical reflection.
Logically, China holds one key argument questioning who should compensate for
today’s problems caused in the past, while the US insists that we should approach this
issue from the right direction and take actions for the world’s future.
Increased energy demand starting from 2007 has come from non-OECD countries
and will continue until 2030. China and India will be responsible for over 53% of
25. ‘Fact sheet: US –China cooperation on climate change, clean energy, and the environment’, (19 January
2011), available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/19/fact-sheet-us-china-cooperation-
climate-change-clean-energy-and-environment (accessed 15 February 2011).
26. Jonathan Watts, ‘China and US clash at climate talks’, The Guardian, available at: http://www.guardian.co.
uk/environment/2010/oct/06/china-climate-talks-us-negotiator (accessed 15 February 2011).

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incremental demand by 2030. The 2009 World Energy Outlook projects that energy-
related emissions of carbon dioxide will increase globally by an additional 11.4
gigatons (Gt) between 2007 and 2030. By 2028, China’s emissions could exceed those
of the United States, Europe, and Japan combined.27 Even though China plans to take
more responsibility, both in the near and distant future, this estimation should not apply
to the United States’ position on China’s energy strategy and greenhouse reduction
obligation, the reason being that China is in a transitional stage, China’s self-
perception is significantly different from how other countries perceive it. China is
already the second largest economy in addition to a world power. Yet, the majority of
Chinese people consider China a developing country, in need of time and resources to
develop its own economy. In this train of thought, China is not in the position to provide
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as much international public good as the Western countries expect. An even worse
situation is that many Chinese may assume it to be an intentional behavior to disturb
the process of its development when the US urges China to take more international
responsibility. The differences between China and the United States are numerous
and will remain a constant source of tension, both now and in the future.

Future of cooperation and competition between China and the US

As analyzed above, NTS is being separated from the traditional security arena as
a concept. However, NTS still keeps a close tie with traditional security in the real
world. In many cases, traditional security concerns accompany the clashes of NTS
issues. Both China and the US are considering many NTS issues through the
traditional security lens and worry that their compromises in the NTS arena could
lead to tremendous and irreversible losses in the traditional security area. There is not
a security dilemma, but rather a ‘prisoner dilemma’ between China and the US, which
is directly related to the absence of mutual strategic trust between the two countries.
China and the US cannot build a relationship of mutual trust overnight. What the
two countries should do, and can do today, is focus on handling China–US relations
in a more positive and rational way. With regards to the NTS threat, both countries
must pay more attention to the following three differences.
First, both nations need to realize that there is a big gap between China and the US
in terms of economic structure and stage of development. The gap lies in the differing
percentages that manufacturing contributes to each country’s GDP and the
distinguishing features of those manufacturing industries: American manufacturing is
high value-added and less energy consuming while in China it is low value-added and
more consuming of resources. Since the US has reached its highest point of energy,
the argument could be made that the US needs to reduce its GHS emissions.
Compared to the US and other developed countries, the average standard of living in
China is lower than the world’s average. China, in order to accommodate the ever-
growing demand for material wealth by its people, will inevitably emit more GHS in
the future. The track that this type of growth puts China on certainly means more
debate and conflict over GHS emissions between China and the US. Yet, this track
27. The IEA projects that world electricity demand will grow at an annual rate of 2.5% between 2007 and 2030.
Some 28% of the world’s incremental growth in electricity demand would occur in China alone. See Joshua W. Busby,
‘China and climate change: strategy for US engagement’, RFF Report, (November 2010), p. 10.

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also highlights some of the different situations and scenarios of the climate change
issue that both nations are facing. Although China is willing to limit its potential GHS
emissions for the sake of the global good, the critical question turns out to be, who
will pay for China’s potential losses? Most countries will be reluctant to compensate
other countries’ losses, particularly China’s. Indeed, no country, including the US,
can or would do it. Therefore, unless the US admits that the different climate
scenarios that each nation currently finds itself in originated from the differing
economic structures, the misunderstandings between both countries will persist. Only
if both sides develop an understanding of their counterpart can a bright future for
China– US cooperation be entertained.
Second, China and the US ought to pay more attention to the different roles of NTS
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within each country; that is to say, some of the problems should be given priority
according to different situations, respectively. China’s biological diversity, sparse
natural resources, and natural environment are more fragile than those of the US. For
the US, most NTS issues are not an exigent threat, but for China, some NTS issues are
threatening China’s very survival at the moment. Ideally, when the US is willing to
handle NTS threats while adhering to China’s requirements, it is then that both
countries are more likely to cooperate smoothly and effectively. However,
realistically the facts paint a different picture. The US and China prioritize NTS
differently as well as judge it through different lenses. For China, the top NTS priority
is to find a solution to stop the rapidly deteriorating natural environment while
devising a plan to provide the Chinese people with enough water, oil, food, and
accompanying life necessities. With the US having asked China to make their work
of today work for a better future, it is the Chinese opinion that they are doing just that.
So the gap between China and the US cannot be passed simply through agreements or
memoranda. It is more rational and feasible for China and the US to work together to
solve the specific NTS problems through bilateral cooperation rather than set the
same goals and standards. Whenever some states pursue dominance of the global
agenda, this may result in a new kind of imperialism such as climate change
imperialism, environmental protection imperialism, and so on.
Third, China and the US need to be aware that NTS and traditional security can be
merged and often intertwined with each other when the circumstances are right. There
is no distinct line between NTS and traditional security, even though they have been
termed and coined as distinctly different forms of security. It may not be an important
problem between allies but it is a substantial obstacle between China and the US. Yet,
this phenomenon isn’t an inevitably negative factor between the two countries. There
is an axiomatic consensus between China and the US that both countries should try
their best to avoid a military conflict. This will make the two countries more self-
controlled and rational and able to avoid the possibility of disputes in the NTS field
spreading into the traditional security field.

Conclusion
With the role of NTS in China– US relations rising rapidly, all the traditional security
concerns are rivaling and often overlapping with NTS. Nontraditional security does
not always play a positive role within China– US relations. NTS, in many ways,

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mirrors the complex relationship between China and the United States. While there
are elements of cooperation, there also exist elements of competition and rivalry. It is
due to this aspect that NTS, for China and the US, varies from traditional security and
the arena in which traditional security operates. Just as complex as the China– US
relationship, NTS is a cooperative factor as well as a competitive agenda for the two
countries. This characteristic has established a different interaction model in the NTS
field from that which the two countries had in the traditional security arena. On the
one hand, the China– US relationship has transferred from a bilateral level to a
multilateral or global level; while on the other hand, the China– US relationship has
been evolving into a complex stage composed of zero-sum games, interdependency
games, mutual deterrence games, and win– win games. So this relationship can be
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seen as a multilayer game model between China and the US. In some cases, the
importance of NTS depends on how the elites of China and the US want to use it to
improve or to degrade bilateral relations.28
It is also clear that China and the US are the two most important countries in the
world; that goes for participation in international forums and economic conversations.
Much of the world’s future, both material and natural, as well as the fate of the human
race, will depend on how these two heavyweights interact now and continue to act in
future. Surely, a stronger, more cooperative relationship will secure a brighter future.
To improve China– US cooperation and to avoid unnecessary confrontations, both
nations ought to submit some bilateral issues to multilateral governance and perhaps
even a global governance level. The perpetual and unavoidable problem is the
absence of an effective global governance regime in the NTS arena. The G20 is too
extensive and loose to be an executable and functional regime. IEA is so exclusive
that China, India, and many other developing countries cannot get permission to
participate. Therefore, the ways in which to build a multilateral or global governance
regime within the NTS sphere must be prioritized, by the Chinese, the Americans, and
the world at large, as an issue deserving and demanding action.

28. Xu Xin, ‘Harmonization of NTS securitization in US –China security cooperation’, Ritsumeikan Journal of
Asia Pacific Studies 19 (December 2005), pp. 3–4, available at: http://www.princeton.edu/cwp/publications/xu_xin_
harmonization_of_nts_securitization_rjaps_vol_19.pdf (accessed 7 March 2011).

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