The French Revolution As A Bourgeois Revolution: A Critique of The Revisionists

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The French Revolution as a Bourgeois Revolution: A Critique of the Revisionists

Author(s): Ricardo Duchesne
Source: Science & Society, Vol. 54, No. 3, The French Revolution and Marxism (Fall, 1990), pp.
288-320
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Science& Society,Vol. 54, No. 3, Fall 1990, 288-320
The FrenchRevolutionas a Bourgeois

Revolution:A Critiqueof the
Revisionists*
RICARDO DUCHESNE
IDEA THAT THE ULTIMATE CAUSE of the

French Revolutionof 1789 was a risingbourgeoisie
nourishedby severalcenturiesof developingcapitalism
once commandedwidespreadsupportand,indeed,servedas the
majorframework of research.Beginningin the 1950s,however,
one facetafteranotherof thisclassicMarxistinterpretation has
been called intoquestion.The Revolutionwas not bourgeois,a
small armyof "revisionist" scholarsnow maintains,a) because
capitalism had not become dominantin the Frencheconomy
before1789,and b) becausethe same propertyin offices,com-
mercialcapitaland seigneuries,and the same culturalpursuits
and socialaspiration, werewidelysharedbyboththenobility and
the bourgeoisie.
So broadlyacceptedis the revisionists' critiquethatthe old
Marxistthesis,as one scholarputit,is nowseenas "notonlydead
butin urgentneed ofburial"(Doyle,1980,3). In thisessayI hold
thattalkofburialis premature, that,indeed,a resuscitationofthe
is It
putativecorpse possible. chieflyis becauseof a faultyapplica-
tion of Marx'sclassicformulations by Marxisthistoriansthem-
selvesthatthe revisionist case has prospered.To assume,as so
many orthodox Marxists do, thatthereis a necessaryconnection
betweenbourgeoisrevolutionand the emergenceof capitalism
(i.e.,a wagelabor-capital relation)is thereal error- or so I will
argue. Once this ratheroffhandbut criticalmisconception is
corrected, thereis littlein theempiricalfindings oftherevisionists
* The author wishes to thank S .

Longstaffand Georgia Rondos for theirhelpful com-
ments.
288
FRENCHREVOLUTION 289
thatcannotbe organizedconceptually
accordingto the classical
theory.
1. Marx's PrimacyThesisand theRevolutionary
Bourgeoisie
effort,Marx'saccountof the bourgeois
Like any scientific
revolution can be reducedto a smallnumberofaxiomsor prem-
ises.1(See the Appendix.)
i. The productive forces(PFs)havea propensitytodevelop.However,therate
and path(notthefact)ofthatdevelopment variesaccordingto theexternal
pressuresimpressed uponthePFsbyextra-economic factors.(Development
Premise)
ii. Givenrelationsof production correspondto a definitestageof productive
development. Premise)
(Compatibility
iii. Fromi and ii itfollowsthatovertimethePFs willreacha levelof develop-
mentat whichtheyare no longercompatible withtherelationsof produc-
tionin whichtheyhad previously developed.(Contradiction Premise)
iv. Whentherelations ofproduction ceasetobe suitabletothedevelopment of
them,theywillbe discardedin
the PFs to thepointof seriouslyfettering
favorof new relationsof productionsuitableto theexistingstateof eco-
nomicdevelopment. The establishmentofnewrelations leadstoa changein
the mode of production.
Accordingto thesepremises- whichcomprisewhat I call

Marx's PrimacyThesis- the rise of the bourgeoisiedoes not
requirenewproperty perse,simplythedevelopmentof
relations
newPFs. This Thesispositsa revolutionary bourgeoisiegrowing
up insidethe existingfeudalrelations;"new,higherrelationsof
productionneverappear beforethematerialconditionsof their
existencehave maturedin the wombof the old societyitself
(Marx,1904).Onlywhentheold property begintofetter
relations
thedevelopingforcesare newrelationscalledintoexistence,via
class struggleand revolution.
intensified
Now,whatclasswas notassociatedwithnewrelationsof pro-
duction?The merchants! To appropriatetheavailablesurplusby
buyingcheap and sellingdear is the basis of merchantcapital,
whatever theproperty relationsinwhichproduction is organized.
But how can we connecta classwhichoperatesoutsidethe pro-
1 The followingcompact,deductivepresentationof Marx'stheorydrawson G. A.
1980,51-56; W. H. Shaw,1986,
Cohen,1980,158-159;A. Levineand E. O. Wright,
198; and D. Laibman,1984.
290 SCIENCE fcfSOCIETY
auction process to new PFs? I conceive the expansion of circulat-

ing capital as signifyingthe developmentof the PFs and thus the
basis upon which the revolutionarybourgeoisie challenged the
feudal class. Accordingly,I maintainthat the PFs asserted their
"primacy"over feudal relationsfromwithinthe sphere of circula-
tion. This is, I think,the only "theorem"thatcan be proven true,
or that can be derived by logical reasoning from the premises.
Likewise, it will be seen that this interpretationadequately con-
formsto the existingempiricalevidence. As Marx himselfput it,
speaking of the 16thto 18thcenturies:"the sphere of commodity
circulation was the strictlybourgeois economic sphere at that
time" (Marx, 1904, 158).
Two phases can thusbe delineated in the historicevolutionof
the bourgeoisie. In the first,we see it formingitselfas a class
within the feudal systemon the basis of circulatingor money
capital; in the second, which takes place after the overthrowof
feudalism,we see itinstallingcapitalistownershiprelations,which
allows the PFs to expand as industrialcapital.Of course, thesetwo
phases are not neatlydemarcated. Embryoniccapitalistrelations
do exist prior to the Revolution.Nevertheless,as Marx writes,it
was "under the protectionof this[feudal] regimeof corporations
and regulationsthatcapital was accumulated,overseas trade was
developed, and colonies were founded" (Hill, 1948, 137). Capital-
ist relationswere begottenonly as "the money capital formedby
means of usuryand commercewas preventedfromturninginto
industrialcapital... by the feudal constitution"(Hill, 1948, 141).2
2. The Development
of CirculatingCapital underFeudalism
I need to explain the mechanismby which circulationtrans-

formedfeudal productioninto moneyaccumulation.Let M stand
for money and C for commodities. In simple commodityex-
change, where the aim is the satisfactionof particularwants, a
given producer exchanges a commodityC for money M so that
2 In a way, Marx was aware that the 1789 revolutionbrought to power a commercial
bourgeoisie,not an industrialcapitalistclass. Writingabout the eventsof 1815, he said,
"But was not the Februaryrevolutionaimed directlyagainst the financialaristocracy?
This fact proves that the industrialbourgeoisie did not rule France. The industrial
bourgeoisie can only rule when modern industryadapts all property relationsto suit its
own requirements. . ." (Marx, 1973, 46).
FRENCH REVOLUTION 291
s/hecan in turn buy furthercommoditiesC. In such a process

which we can represent as C-M-C, money merely serves as a
medium of exchange between two use-values. In merchantex-
change, M-C-M' the goal is to make money,whichpresupposes
the exchange of non-equivalents:merchantsexchange money M
fora givencommodityC onlyto exchange thisin turnfora larger
amount of money M'
In practice,merchantcapital presupposes simple commodity
exchange as a connectingbridge between the merchantand the
feudal economy. The merchantcannot trade unless some direct
producers are willingto sell and buy goods. This point is worth
stressing,since commercial capital tends to be looked at ex-
clusivelyin the formof M-C-M1. In the abstractwe can connect
these two circuits,since C-M-C is inevitablyboth a sale and a
purchase,allowingforthe interventionof the merchantwho buys
(M-C) to re-sell(C-Mf ). The unityof these two circuitstakes the
followingform: C-(M-C-Mf)-C. As we will see later, this com-
bined circuitrepresentsa unique social relationbetweenthe mer-
chant and the small producer.
Now forMarx circulationis simplyan exchange of commodit-
ies "at theirvalue." Even if,due to some "accidentaldisturbance"
in supply and demand, the nominal price rises above its original
value, what A gains as a seller he eventuallyloses as a buyer. But
what if A gains withoutB being able to retaliate?Again, the total
value in circulationdoes not increaseone bit,it is onlydistributed
differently between A and B. "If equivalentsare exchanged, no
surplus value, and if non-equivalentsare exchanged, stillno sur-
plus value" (Marx, 1906, 182). How, then, do we explain the
formationof money-capital?While no change in the totalmagni-
tude of value can take place in the processof circulation,a regular
transferof value from A to B via price differentialsis possible.
Merchant'scapital, Marx concludes, "can only have its origin in
the twofoldadvantage gained, over both the sellingand the buy-
ing producers, by the merchantwho parasiticallyshoves himself
in between them" (Marx, 1906, 182). Since the connection be-
tweenthe twoacts- purchase and sale - existsforthe merchant
alone, the merchant is able to profit from the peasants with-
out theirbeing able to retaliate.No alterationin the existingrela-
tions of productionwas entailed in thisprocess. The bourgeoisie
amassed profitsvia the circulation movement C-(M-C-Mf)-C
292 SCIENCE6fSOCIETY
of thatpartof the feudalsurplusmarketedby the directpro-

ducers.
3. CirculatingCapital in 18th Century

France
Industry:AccordingtoJan Marczewski, "sincethe beginning

of the 18thcenturythe economicgrowthof France has been
following a continuously risingcurve"(Marczewski, 1956,386). If
therewas a "take-offintosustainedindustrialgrowth,he says,
thenitoccurredsometimeduringthemid-18thcenturyor at the
latesttoward1799. In whatfollowsI argue thatthisgrowthwas
not based on capitalism,but on the extensionof pre-industrial
productionthroughthecirculation-forms of commodity, money,
and capital.This involvedtwo interrelated movements:1) the
appropriation of (absolute)surplusfromthedirectproducersvia
the circuitC-(M-C-Mf)-C, and 2) the formalsubsumptionof
feudalismto the self-expansion of moneycapital.
To be sure,thegrossphysicalproductof industry and hand-
icraftrosefroma yearlyaverageof385 millionlivresfor1701-10
to 1,573millionfor1781-89,representing a fourfoldincreasein
volume(Crouzet,150). I estimate, however,thatthisincreasein
industry was achievedmainlyby extendingthe existingscale of
operations,withonlyincremental innovations. Granted,in this
period France saw the introduction of thelatestin Englishtech-
nology,suchas Newcomen'sfireengineand JamesWatt'ssteam
engine.There was theAnzincoal miningcompany,whichon the
eve oftheRevolution had 12 steamengines;or Le Creusotfound-
ry which used not wood butcoal withsteamenginesand forges.
But thesewereexceptionalcases.
Ratherit was the merchant-turned-producer in the textiles
sectorwho led and shaped the growthin industry.And this
expansionin textileswasbasedon changesin theorganization, as
opposed to the technology, of production.Yes, coal and iron
productionincreasedsubstantially, 700% and 300% respectively
(Vovelle,1984,47). However,ifwe takeindustry and handicraft
as a whole,we findthatFrenchheavyindustrylagged behind
textilesin overallterms.For one, thetextileindustry, whetherin
the urbanmanufactory or in the ruraldomesticsystem, was,in
termsof theestablished units,presentin everylocalityof France,
fromthe northof the Paris basin to Languedoc. For another,
textileswerepredominant in the numberof workersemployed,

and in the dynamismof some of its sectors,such as linenand
cotton.Marczewski, forexample,has calculatedthatthe rateof
growth in the cotton industry averaged3.8% per yearbetween
1710 and 1790,a ratemuchhigherthanthatforindustry (1.9%)
as a whole(Crouzet,150).
By"organizational" changesin textilesI meantheelaboration
of a putting-out systemagainstthetraditional guildsand thesmall
cottageworkshops, and the division of labor in the urbanman-
ufactory, specialization of
by types employment and withineach
employment.The putting-out systemcombinedan extensive
commercialnetworkof local, regional,and even international
markets, connecting thousandsof rurallaborerswitheach other
in successivestagesof production.Underthissystemmerchants
managed to insertthemselvesfullybetweenboth supplyand
demand,advancingrawmaterialsor toolsto theproducers,and
marketing the finishedproduct.Because of thistheyshortened
thetimebetweenthepurchaseof rawmaterialsand themarket-
ingofthefinishedgood,thereby accelerating therateofturnover
(i.e., increasingthe velocityof circulation).
Concerningthe urban manufactory, it was more a case of
intensifying the labor process than of shortening thecirculation
time.In thefirstplace,bybreakingdownthelaborprocessinto
extremely simpletasksthemerchant-manufacturer convertedthe
artisan/peasant from a casual producer into an increasingly spe-
cializedworker(unsupervised, they tended to work at theirown
pace). Also, by concentrating hundredsof workersunder one
roof,thismerchantcreateda uniformqualityand pace of work,
eliminating theembezzlement of stock.This wasa directincrease
in the rateof absolute surplusvalue,includingthe economiesof
large-scaleproductionas wellas thenumberof personsworking
on each product. But one wonders: were these merchants
appropriating a "feudal"surplus?Was notthemerchant-turned-
producercontrolling thesmallproducersbyadvancingtoolsand
rawmaterials? I shallreturnto thisquestion.Sufficeitto saynow
thattheywere not extracting capitalistsurplusvalue, since the
merchant-turned-producer not yeta buyerof labor power.
was
Both the manufactory and the putting-out systemborderedon
capitalism, but were not yetgovernedbywage-labor.These mer-
chantstreatedthelaborersas traderswhoweregivenrawmateri-
als and toolson creditagainstthe returnof a finishedproduct
294 SCIENCEö> SOCIETY
thatwas boughtfromthelaborerat a marketprice.The house-

hold spinnersand weaversafterall had the option,at least in
principle,of sellingthefinishedgood as independentproducers
in the marketsof nearbytowns.Nor had the workersin the
"manufactures royales"(the4,000at Anzinor the3,000at Littry)
much in commonwiththe industrialproletarianof the 19th
century;theytoo weresemi-peasants who returnedto thecoun-
trysideduringharvesting sowing.In generalthemoneysunk
and
in fixedcapitalin the textilesindustry was littleas looms were
smalland inexpensive, plusrelatively buildingsand millswere
few
necessary. 1789 France had only 900 spinningjennies, as
In
comparedto 20,000 in GreatBritain(Rude, 1974, 72).3
Agriculture:On thewholetheincreaseinthegrossagricultural
product between 1715 and 1789 was 40%, at constantprices
(Ladurie, 1975, 16). An impressivechange, but one which
Morineau labelled as "developmentwithinstagnation."This
growthwas obtainedthroughan absolutewideningin the culti-
vatedland,i.e.,clearingof wastelands, drainingof marshes,and
reclamationof abandonedfields.Again,the use of workingor
circulatingcapital played a major part in this expansion:the
introduction of new crops like maize,broadeningof the vine-
yards,monetarization and regionalspecialization, and fertilizers.
The area ofcultivation wasalso extendedthrougha higherinput
of peasantlabor,stillusing"medievaltechniques"like wooden
plows. As J. C. Toutain's studyof Frenchagriculturaloutput
indicated,yieldsin termsof seed plantedhardlyvariedbetween
1700 and 1790,oscillating around 5 to 1 on a nationalaverage
(Ladurie,1972, 141). It is true thatsomeof thesechangesraised
productivity levels,particularly the reductionof fallowland by
replacingthe rotationof grain and fallowwithgrainand corn(or
catchand foddercrops).In thenortheastern regionsof Flanders,
3 Marx explicitlywrites that the formationof the urban manufactoriesinvolved no

technicalchange: "With regard to the mode of production itself,manufacturein its
strictmeaning is hardlyto be distinguished,in its earlieststages, fromthe handicraft
tradesof the guilds,otherwisethan bythe greaternumberof workmensimultaneously
employed by one and the same individual capital. The workshop of the medieval
masterhandicraftsmanis simplyenlarged. At first,therefore,the differenceis purely
quantitative"(quoted in Lukács, 1973, 55-56). Anothersimilarremark:"At firstcapital
subordinateslabor on the basis of the technicalconditionsin whichit historicallyfinds
it. It does not, therefore,change immediatelythe mode of production" (quoted in
Poulantzas, 1982. 159). What capital can thisbe whichsubsumesthe laborer "at first"if
not circulatingcapital?
Alsaceand theGaronnevalleytheincreaseinoutputwasbasedon
higheryields.The restof Francecontinuedthesameagricultural
trendof 3, 4 or 5 centuriesback (Morineau,1970).
Transportation: Anotherarea of growthwasthetransport sys-
tem, the most importantsingle economiccomponentof the
sphereofcirculation. (Thoughfixedcapitalin theformof roads,
carriagesand draughtanimalshas alwaysbeen crucialto the
transport sector,transportationcontrolsthecarrying capacityand
thespeed of supplyand demand.)FernandBraudelevenspeaks
of a "greatroad revolution." Perhapsan overstatement, though
the 18thcenturydid see thebeginningsof a truenationalroad
and canal network.By theend of theAncienRegime, therewere
40,000kmofroads,8000kmofnavigablerivers,1000kmofcanals
(Braudel, 1984,322). In 1734,the canal Crozetwas completed,
linkingtheSommeto theOise,a tributary of theSeine.Withthe
completionof othercanals,Parisstoodat the centerof a canal
networkpenetrating muchof northernFrance.Progressin road
building was tendingto reachmanypartsof France,i.e., Paris-
Rouen, Paris-Peronne, Paris-Melun.In 1715 it took 20 days to
travelfromParistoLyons;in 1787thistimewasreducedto 13-16
days.Transportation costsbetween1715 and 1770 fellbyabout
13% (Price,1975, 9). This advancein transportation shortened
circulationtime, raised therateof surplusvalue,increase money
accumulationand, therefore,the rate of developmentof the
(feudal)productiveforces.
Prices:The growthof moneycapitaltookon the formof a
long phase of risingprices.As thepriceseriescompiledbyLab-
rousseindicate,pricesincreased64% from1726-1741to 1784-
1789. On theotherhand,wagesrose only10-25%, indicatinga
significantfall in real wages (Vovelle,47; Ladurie, 1975, 19).
Labor, then, suffereda relativeimpoverishment, a di-
reflecting
recttransfer of incomefromthelaborers-consumers to themer-
chants(includingthe tenantfarmers.)
Trade:Trade was thefastestgrowingsectorof theeconomy.
Betweenthe 1720sand the 1780stheratioofforeigntradeto the
grossphysicalproductrose from10 to 25% (Marczewski,1956,
372). This high percentagechange expressedthe remarkable
developmentof thesea and colonialtrade,whichincreasedten-
fold.The rateof growthperannumin thissectorwasthehighest
in theeconomy(4.1% between1716 and 1748),as comparedto
thatin industry-1.9% for the century(DeVries, 1976, 144).
296 SCIENCEöfSOCIETY
Moreover,trade stimulatedthe growthof new industrieslike

distilleries
refineries, and shipping.These enterprisestogether
withthecolonialtradewereat the forefrontof theurbanpros-
perity.4
4. Commodity
Relationsin Agriculture
The French18th-century economywas in many

agricultural
a
ways three-storey economic with
structure, a feudal ground
floor, a second floor of simplecommodity circulation(C-M-C),
and an upper storeyof M-C-M1. Unfortunately thereare no
preciseestimateson the amountsof goods marketed.Robert
Forstertellsus thatin 1789 "themaximumnumberof peasants
who enteredthe market(was) about 600,000" (Forster,1970,
1604).As Young'sdescription ofthepeasantwhowalkedmilesto
selljust a fewchickenssuggests, manypeasantswerestilllivingon
themarginsof themarketeconomy,comingto themarketto sell
(or buy)a portionof theirowncrop.A higherproportion of the
totalweremétayers, who rentedland on a sharecropping basis-
thatis, shared part of theirproducewiththe landlord.These
peasantswerethusprimarily concernedwithsubsistence agricul-
ture.On a nationalaveragesharecropping amountedto% to% of
the totalland tenureforms(Moore, 1969,56). Still,it wouldbe
wrongto assumethatall the producefromthesesharecroppers
was foruse. A largeproportion ofthesepeasantsweretiedto the
marketthroughcommercial debts,guaranteedbytheharvest,or
even theirproperty.Moreover,the need to meetthe taxesof a
rapidlyexpandingcentralizedstatedrovemanypeasantsto sell
theircropsin returnforcash.
It is hard to believethatmostpeasantswere self-sufficient,
sincethevastmajority had onlya fewscatteredplots,too smallto
maintaina familythroughout theyear.Morineau,usingmaterial
fromChampagne,estimates thatbelowa yieldperseed of 5 : 1 on
a fourto fivehectarefarmself-sufficiency was impossible(Huf-
ton,1983,321). Nowin mostpartsof France,75% ofthepeasan-
try- themanouvriers - had lessthanfivehectares,and in nearly
everyprovince at least25% of theholdingswere smallerthanone
hectare.And theyieldper seed in manyof thesesmallplotswas
4 This overall growthin the PFs coincided withan almost 300% increase in the number
of bourgeois over the 18th century!(Doyle, 1980, 129).
as low as 3 : 1 or 2 : 1! These peasantswereno doubtobligedto

pass throughthe sphereof circulationas seasonalworkersand
consumers(thoughother"options"like vagrancyor starvation
were available). Forster'sfigureprobablyrepresentsthe rich
tenant-farmers (the"bonlaboureur") whoproduceda largesurplus
speciallyforthe market.
Once we add themoney-holdings whichmadeup theotherVs
to lAof the leased land,it is obviousthatmerchantshad ample
opportunities to exploitthepeasantry. Underthisformof feudal
the
rent, peasantgave thelord nothissurplusproducts,butcash
payments.Consequentlythe peasantwas obligedto sell his sur-
plus himselfon the market.Granted,moneyrentperse did not
overturntherelationsof production:moneyrent,laborservices,
paymentin kind,thesewereall formsof feudalcoercion,since
possessionof the land in each case was conditionedby certain
obligations. Stillmoneyrentimpliedcirculation (C-M-C) and in
thissense potentially a merchant-peasantmoneyrelation- one
based not on customor status,but on voluntaryexchangesor
contractsbetweenformally equivalentpersons.
5. Transitionto Capitalismand BourgeoisRevolution
One tendencyamongMarxists - thosewho mightbe called

class struggle theorists - belittlesthe role of the merchant
bourgeoisiein theoverthrow offeudalism.Althoughthistenden-
cy includes other importantfigures,it is to MauriceDobb and
George Comninel that I shalldirectmyattention. Our discussion
begins with Dobb, thought it should be clear thatComninelac-
ceptsmuchof what Dobb his
says,carrying approachfurther.
According to Dobb, what makesthe interestsof classesin-
trinsically
opposed is the exploiter/exploitedrelationat thepoint
of production,theinherentconflict betweenthosewho produce
and those who appropriatethe surplus. He minimizesthe
merchant/noble conflict becausethiswas nota surplusextraction
relation,as opposed to the peasant/lord conflictwhichwas an
exploitativerelation. He writes:
The basicsocialrelation[offeudalism] restedon theextraction of thesurplus

product[from the peasantry]by the feudal rulingclass. ... It followsim-
mediatelyfrom thisthatthe basicconflictmust have been between thedirect
298 SCIENCE Sí SOCIETY
producers and theirfeudal overlordswho made exactions ... by dint of feudal

rightand feudal power . . . and not any directclash of urban bourgeois elements
with feudal lords. (Hilton, 1976, 166.)
Similarly,Dobb criticizesHenri Pirenne and Paul Sweezy for

theiridentificationof productionfor the marketwithcapitalism.
Merchants, he contends, accumulate their capital simply by
circulatingpart of the existingsurplus.Accordingly,Dobb asks,if
the merchant bourgeoisie was extractingits wealth within the
existingfeudal relations,was itnot likelyto be a conservativeclass,
more interestedin preservingfeudalism than transformingit?
Consider this statement:
The existence . . . wasnotinconsistent

ofa tradingbourgeoisie withtheexistence
of a predominantly feudalmode of production.. . . Indeed,feudalseigneurs
sometimesthemselves engagedin trade. . . and theirsons oftenwentinto
partnershipwith merchants whilethelatteracquiredland and titlesof gentry.
(Dobb, 1970,8.)
In separate ways,the class struggleMarxistsand the revisionists

agree on thispoint: the trade-basedbourgeois was not seeking to
overthrowthe feudal class as much as tojoin the noble order. Yet
Dobb (unlike the revisionists,or even Comninel, as we will see)
retains the idea of the bourgeois revolutionas a confrontation
between two politicallyconscious classes, the nobilityand the
bourgeoisie (though not merchantsbut industrialand agrarian
capitalists)correspondingrespectivelyto feudalism and capital-
ism.
For Dobb it was a bourgeoisie linked with new relations of
production which made the bourgeois revolution,against both
landlords and merchants. He detects the really revolutionary
bourgeoisie in "small to middling-sizedmen" rising from the
ranks of direct producers- prosperous craftsmenor peasant
farmers.This bourgeoisie emerged out of the "internal"struggle
in feudalism between the nobilityand the peasantry over the
distributionof the economic surplus. In thiscontext,the success-
ful struggleby the small peasant proprietorsto minimizefeudal
exploitation(e.g. abolitionof serfdom)set the conditionsfor the
rise of new social relations.The commutationof labor services,
especiallythe introductionof moneyrent,created more freedom
for the peasant-laborerin the use of his labor time. Once the
peasant was able to control his labor time and market his own
produce, he managed to amass savings,to increase production,
and accumulate. In thisprocessof marketingsome would prosper
and otherswould failand be reduced to laboringforthe success-
ful ones. Graduallythe "winners"set out to organize large hand-
icraftsor consolidate land holdings and enclose them. Thus was
born the capitalist/proletarian social relation. In England Dobb
saw this group of "pettybourgeois" in the improvingyeomen
farmer.
The question arises: how were the pettyproducers merelyby
retainingtheirown produce able to accumulate capital? Now Dobb
does recognizethat"interaction"withthe marketwas part of this
accumulationprocess and thatmarketcompetitionwas the cause
of the differentiation of the producersinto the well-to-doand the
impoverished. But in that case I would want to know how this
self-employedcommodity producer could accumulate capital,
consideringthatmarketexchange, according to Dobb himself,is
nothingmore than a redistributionof the existingsurplus prod-
uct? If Dobb answersthatthese producersaccumulated capital by
lessening,throughclass struggle,feudal rents,he would be back
with a feudal mode of production. And neithercan he answer
that the initial capital originated in wage-labor,since that is to
presuppose the existence of the very thing whose origin he is
supposed to explain. Clearly, we can get out of this circular
argumentonlyby supposing a typeof surplus extractionpreced-
ing capitalistrelationsyet differentfrom feudal exploitation.
The crucial problemwhichDobb has failed to see is this:how
can accumulation,and hence surplus extraction,occur through
simple commodityexchange between independent producers in
the absence of any form of labor exploitation at the point of
production?UnderlyingDobb's dilemma is his belief that a sur-
plus can be extractedonly in the sphere of production. Below I
intend to offeran answer in the formof a theoryof exploitation
that is operative for a simple commodity/merchant economy, in
which both feudal and capitalistrelationsare absent.
Thus far in this paper I have argued that although in the
process of circulation"onlychanges of formof the same mass of
value take place" neverthelesscirculation indirectlystimulates
"feudal" production,both in the form of money capital and by
intensifying the exploitationof the directproducers. In addition,
I have emphasized the unique source of merchantcapital as a
300 SCIENCE& SOCIETY
transferof value from the direct producers according to

bourgeoispropertyrights.In thisrespectI soughtto proposea
theoryof the relativeautonomyof commercialcapital in the
relations.On theotherhand,Dobb and
contextof non-capitalist
Comninelpostulatethecompletesubordination of circulation
to
thedominantmodeofproduction. Worseyet, Comninel contends
thateventhesurplusgeneratedin theputting-outsystem and the
urbanmanufactory was nothingbuta formof agricultural rent:
Most of the surplus distributedthroughcommercialprofitswas directlyagri-
culturalin origin- not only the grain trade, but also the island trade and the
wine trade and that surplus which was produced and extractedthrough man-
ufacturesessentiallyconformedto this general commercialagrarian structure.
(Comninel, 1987, 194.)
The followingvery shortand plain argumentmay serve to

demonstrate the fallacyof thisview.5
Let us assumeN simplecommodity producers,all of whom
striveto minimizethelabortheyexpendon production.Further,
assumea wealthierproducer(A), who,due to a highercapital-
laborratioand greaterskills,is abletoproducemoregoodsin less
timethana poorerproducer(B). (In termsofthelabortheoryof
value,thehighproductivity laborerwillproducean equal valuein
lesstimethanthelowproductivity assumethatA
laborer.)Finally,
and B exchangetheirgoodswitheach otherin themarket.Then
B willreceivein exchangeforthelabortimehe has sold to A an
equivalentproducedin a shorterlengthof time;in thiscase,
producerA willbe exploitingB. It followsthatexploitation be-
tweentwosimplecommodity producerscan occuralthoughno
surplusvalue was extractedat the pointofproduction. Noticethat
thisunequalexchangedoes notreston any"accidental"disparity
in prices; rather,it involvesa transferof surpluslabor time
entirelywithinthe sphereof competitive markets.
Now,whatifa merchantintervenes betweenA and B? Then
the merchant,notA, would pocketB's surpluslabor time.The
merchantwould thenbe expropriating surplusvalue fromthe
simplecommodity producers without "employing" them.In this
5 The followinganalysis is indebted to J. Roemer, 1982 and 1986). My analysis is a
simplified(if revised) version of Roemer's, though it is clear that Roemer's aim is to
advance a theoryof exploitationin the contextof a simple commodityeconomy in
which no labor is employed. What I did new was to introduce the merchantas an
additional variable.
case,theadded valueMf(in theformulaG-(M-C-Mf)-C) would

reflecttheextralabortimeof B. Here the marketprofitorigin-
ates,notin theagricultural surplus,butin a transfer ofnewvalue
createdby the simplecommodityproducersto the merchant!
Inasmuchas each of thesepettyproducerscommandeddifferent
input-costsperunitofoutput(sincetheywerenotall operatingin
the same marketand productionconditions),the merchant,by
shovinghimselfbetweentheseproducers,could seize thediffer-
encebetweentheindividuallabortimeand the"sociallynecessary
labor time."
In France the merchantestablishedthe putting-out system
and the manufactory preciselyby subordinating Dobb's petty
commodity producers.It is notdifficultto imaginethatthepetty
producer had a hard time finding wayintothe market,that
his
many were forced to put themselves underthe controlof mer-
chantswho alreadyhad a monopolyover marketsand could
providethe necessaryimplements and raw materialson shorter
notice.In Orleans,forexample,merchants controlleda network
of 12,171artisansscattered among various villages.At Lyons,the
merchantstookstrictcontrolof the silkindustryfromthe pre-
viouslyindependentmastercraftsmen: in the 1780s40,000 silk
weaversweretendinglooms.In Marseillesin 1760,38 soap works
employedabout 1000 each (Braudel,1982,329-30). In Louviers
we findfifteenmanufactories employingthousandsof workers.
In and around the townof Elbeuf,therewere 15,000woollen
workersduringthe 1780s (Rude, 1974,67-68). The listis vast;
ruralindustries and manufactures existedeverywhere, spreading
morerapidlyin the18thcentury thanat anytimebefore.(Bothin
numberofworkers employedand in grossphysicalproduct,these
industriesdoubledor trebledduringthecentury.) In 1790at least
one-halfof theruralpopulationwas at leastpartially dependent
on theseindustries!
We could wellclassifythe putting-out systemand the man-
ufactoryas a simplecommodity/merchant neither feudal nor
system,
industrialyeta viableeconomicsystemin its own right.6One
thingis certain:thismerchant-
turned-producer was not feeding
6 P. Sweezy suggeststhis when he writesthat "the interveningperiod was not a simple

mixtureof feudalismand capitalism:the predominantelements were neither feudal
nor capitalist"(Sweezy,"A Critique,"in Hilton, 1979, 49). The problem withSweezy is
that he tends to conceive this transitionalperiod as merelyproduction for exchange
without specifying how this exchange is linked to the mode of production.
302 SCIENCE 6f SOCIETY
off the existingagriculturalsurplus; his revenue was a share of

the produce of domesticworkers.Even if we accept the observa-
tionthatmanycottagerswere casual workerswho continuedto be
tied to a "whole body of traditionalpeasant communitypractices,
rights,and obligations,"the differenceremains: the seizure of a
portionof the cottagers'outputby the merchantswas achieved by
a relationshipof exchange,not by extra-economiccoercion. Cer-
tainlythe merchanthad no privileges,immunitiesor seigneurial
rightsover the labor of the pettyproducers. This is not to deny
that merchantprofitswere usually maintainedthrougha system
of monopoly prices in which the merchantswere price-makers
and the cottage workerswere price-takers.The question is, how
was the merchantable to subsume the "independent"producer? I
would claim it was the economiccontrol the merchanthad over
circulatingcapital, marketingskills,storage facilities,and com-
munication,not any formof feudal privilege.
6. "Whencea bourgeoisie
tocarrytherevolution ifthecapitalistmodeof
was
production not in
yet being at alii" (M. Dobb)
For Comninel, in contrastto Dobb, the bourgeois revolution

in France was not made by a real bourgeoisie because "there
simplywere no capitalistrelations- no appropriationof surplus
value, as opposed to mere profitmaking- thatcan be attributed
to the bourgeoisie . . ." (180). Comninel is left with that "in-
famous" merchantwho aspired towardsnoble statusand, in com-
mon withthe nobility,held propertyin land, commerceand state
office.But if there was a lack of any equivalent in France to the
class of English yeomanry,what was the French Revolutionthen
all about? The noble-bourgeoisconflict,according to Comninel,
mustbe sought in the differenceinjuridical statusbetween these
two classes: the bourgeoisie shared with the nobilitythe same
social relationsof propertybut withoutthe special privilegesof
noble status.
Now, to Comninel this differencein status was significant
because it gave the nobilitya head startover the spoils of office,as
noble privilegewas essentialto any hope for advancementin the
statehierarchy.But whatwas so importantabout the stateoffices?
This bringsus to thecrux of Comninel'sthesis.Simplystated,"the
officesof the stateplayed a keyrole" in class exploitationbecause
they"all restedupon the furtherextractionof surplusfrom

peasantsthroughtaxes,fees,and tithes"(181). The stateoffices
gave accessto thatagricultural surpluswhichtheabsolutist state,
through increased taxation and theformation of a huge bureau-
cracy,had centralized. As Comninelexplains,bythe 18thcentury
a largepercentageof thefeudaleconomicsurplus,in contrastto
"thespecificstructure of truefeudalmanorialism," wasextracted
frompeasantproducersless as feudaldues thanas semi-private
taxcollection, rents,sinecures, and fees.Forthisreasonbourgeois
and noble alike saw the stateas one of the principalmeans of
increasing theirwealthand movingup in thesocialhierarchy. Yet
the nobles were "the pre-eminent beneficiariesof the surplus
extractive powers of the state" because theirstatus gave thenan
easier access to the offices(200). Nevertheless, so long as the
bourgeoisiewas able bymeansof commercial profitto enterthe
nobility, theywerewillingto accepttheirjunior positionin the
eliteand thevalidity of noblestatus.But thencame thedecision
by the Parlement of Paris (1788) thatthe Estates-General should
meet as in 1614, dividingthe propertiedelite into noblesand
non-nobles. The bourgeoisiesawthisas an attempt bythenobility
to "translate theirprivileged statusintoa constitutionalmonopoly
as well" (199). Consequentlya riftoccurredwithinthisruling
elite.The "unprivileged" bourgeoisiewerenow moreinterested
in a stateopen to talent,whilethe nobility(the conservatives)
soughtto preservea statethatfavoredpersonalstatus.
This "intra-ruling classstruggle" wasdirectly linkedto access
to surplusextraction via thestateoffices;it was not,however,a
struggle overtwodifferent "form(s)ofproperty and exploitation"
nor over "thepredominance of one kind of appropriating class
over another"(201). Rather,to Comninelthe merchant/noble
discordwas a politicalconflict - a liberalversusa corporate
ideology- about the sharingout of the surplus (withinthe
framework of thestateoffices), once it had been takenfromthe
basicproducers.Comnineladds thata morefundamental strug-
gle entered the revolution, namely the "primary"strugglebe-
tweenthedirectproducersand theproperty owners.This "fun-
damentalclassstruggle" wasa "conflict ofsocialinterests between
ownersofexploitive property [thenoble-bourgeois and
elite] non-
exploitivedirectproducers[peasantsand artisans]"(201).
I agreewithComninelthatthestateofficeswerea keyvehicle
to thenetproduct,and thatcompetition fortheseofficeswas the

mainpoint of friction
betweenthe bourgeoisieand the nobility.
This analysis,however,is defectivein not identifyingthe eco-
nomicsideoftheliberalprincipleof"a careeropen totalents."As
I see it, underneaththe ideologicalconfrontation
of liberalism
and reactionary there
privilege, was a about
conflict thecompeting
claimsoftwodifferent thenetsurplusproduct:one
formsofappropriating
theotheron contractual
basedon birthrights, relations.Moreover, the
"exploited/exploiter"strugglein 18thcenturyFrance was not
simply thatof a "single,"homogeneouspropertiedeliteagainst
the directproducers.There was an specificconfrontation be-
tweenthe merchantsand the peasant-artisan classes,a conflict
mediatedbypricesand "atthepointofconsumption ratherthanat the
Let
pointofproduction."7 me elaborate
brieflyon thisuniquesocial
confrontationbetweenmerchants and basic producers,thenon
the noble-bourgeois conflict.
fromBelow: Circulationand theFood Riots

7. Class Struggles
Scholarshavegenerallyattributed peasantunrestto seigneu-

rial oppressionand/orthe heavyburdenof royaltaxes.On the
questionof statetaxation,thereis no doubtthatthetremendous
fiscaltighteningsduringthereignsof Louis XIII and Louis XIV
unleasheda seriesof majorpeasantrebellionsagainstthe state.
There is reasonto think,however,thatthe 18thcenturysaw a
relativecessationof thistypeof anti-tax, revolt,
anti-centralizing
displacedby attackson merchants. For one thing, in the 18th
century the tax paid to the state as
stabilized, LeRoy Ladurie
writes"ifnotin realvalue,at leastquitedefinitelyin thepercent-
age ofthetotalgrossagricultural product(exceptin thelast10 or
15 yearsof theAncienRegime)"(Ladurie,1975, 19).
As far as peasant antiseigneurial demonstrations are con-
cerned,they continued unabated throughout the 18th century.
Actuallythe peasant-lord strugglewas intensified as commercial
racketeers towhomthelordleasedtheirseigneurial rightssought
to bolstertheseigneurialsystem to squeezeas muchas theycould
7 G. Rude,in theForewordto Comninel,1987.Rude makesthisstatement

as a sugges-
tionratherthanas an argument,
meaningthatComninel,
byconceiving classconflicts
solelyfromthe standpointof production,
mightencountersome difficulties
in his
proposedfuturestudyof thepopularrevolution.
fromtheserights.For instance,if the lord leased his rightsto

graze cattlein the forest(droitde troupeauà part) the roturier
with
his largeherdswouldattemptto reducethepeasants'use of the
commonsin orderto maximizehisprofits. (Notehoweverthatin
thistypeofexchangetherewasno relationbetweenthemerchant
and the producer. In this case, the commercialprofitwas
obtainedbyenforcing seigneurialrights, thusintensifyingtheold
feudalrelations.)
Eighteenth-century Franceborewitnessto a growingcontest
betweenpettyconsumersand merchants, a conflictinseparable
fromthe growingdependencyof the basic producerson the
market.As Charles Tilly writes,"the timingof the increased
importance of foodriotscoincideswiththegrowthof themarket
. . ." (Tilly,1971).Indeed,as moreand moreofthedirectproduc-
ersweredrivenintothemarket(C-M-C) theyclashedwithfarm-
ers, millers,bakers,hoarders,and grainmerchants(M-C-M1).
The food riotwas generallyorientedtowardpreventing hoard-
and
ing,speculation, profiteering. It is truethat"the market riot
was an old phenomenonin France,"but,as Tillyadds, fromthe
late 17thcentury onwardstherewas"a greatincreaseofsuchriots
. . ." (Tilly,1971,24). The explanationforthiswas theunprece-
dentedgrowthof marketexchangeduringthisperiod.This is
evidentwithregardto thegraintrade,wherea largeand increas-
ing proportionof its supplypassed,notjust throughpeasants'
hands, but additionallythroughthe hands of wholesalemer-
chants- thespéculateur, or theaccapareur. Due to thepressureto
feed such rapidlygrowingurbancentersas Paris,Rouen, Bor-
deaux,Marseilles,or Lyons,thenumberof middlemenspecializ-
ing in storingand handlinglargequantitiesof grainmultiplied.
(In themid-16thcentury thepopulationofParisnumberedabout
130,000;by 1650itwasapproachingthehalfmillionmark,grow-
ing to almost650,000by 1750 (DeVries,151-156).) The taskof
supplyingthis growingurban population- unprecedentedin
Europe's past- forcedthese citiesto reach far outside their
environsfor theirfood supply.This processbrokedown local
self-sufficiency and/orindependentpeasant exchange,forcing
peasants into a nationalmarketdominatedby merchants.Be-
tween 1709 and 1789 seriousfoodriotsinvolving largenumbers
ofpeopleoccurredin 1709-10,1725,1739-40,1752,1768,1770,
1775 (thefamousGuerrede Farines),1785,and 1788-89 (Rose,
1959).AUof theseriots,in contrast crisesofthe

tothesubsistence
17thcentury,whichwerebroughtaboutbyagricultural depres-
sionand hightaxes,coincidedwithhighgrainpricesor shortages
in marketsupply.
8. Class StrugglesFromAbove:theNobilityand theMerchants
The real questionremains:Werenotmerchants in historical

actualityseeking and obtaining noble statusand, in common with
thenobility, holding"proprietary wealth,"i.e.,land, venal offices,
buildings,and rentes? Proprietary wealth,in the 18thcentury,
accountedformorethan80% ofall Frenchprivatewealth!Com-
ninel, for example, acknowledgesthat the term "bourgeois"
standsjuridicallyfortheidea that"property was fullyalienable."
he
But, quickly dismisses thisremark with theobservation that"all
thiswasno lesstruefortheproperty ofthenobility. Indeed there
was no differencein the formsof propertyof nobles and
bourgeoisat all" (181). These two classes were not locked in
"contradiction" - therewas no fettering of the PFs by the old
socialrelationssincemerchants were reinvestingtheirprofitsin
"proprietary" wealth.Moreovera sizablenumberof nobleswere
engaged in trade, industryand finance,resultingin a "con-
vergence" of these two classesintoa singlepropertiedelite.
To deal withthis paradox I differentiate betweena pure
- -
bourgeoisie C-(M-C-Mf)-C and a pure nobility(feudal
dues). The concept"pure,"in thissense,refersto the formof
appropriation as thatwhichmakesa class the thingit is. A pure
merchantis, by definition, someonewho startswithmoney(M),
buyscommodities (C) and sellsthemfora higherprice,whether
in trade,lendingmoneyto thestate,or speculating in stocks.To
be (being)a merchantis to earn capitalin thesphereof circula-
tion;whata particular merchant doeswithhisprofit(expost facto)is
anothermatter.In contrast, a purenobleis someonewhoderives
hisincomebyvirtueof his"lordship," designating a wholerange
of seigneurialrights- juridical,economic,fiscal.
The objectof thisprocedureis to showthatthesetwoclasses
are analyticallydistinguishable and mutuallyirreducibleeven if
theirindividualmembersare mixedand interrelated witheach
other in their ownershipof property.The nobilityand the
bourgeoisiedid notsharea singleformof property;theyshared
twoformsof property.Remember that underlyingthis "single"

elite there were two differenteconomic relations- seigneurial
-
productionand merchant'scapital each operatingaccordingto
a specificset of propertynorms:the formeraccordingto custom-
ary law, i.e., homage, noble prerogativesand coerced labor; the
latteraccordingto principlesof freecontractand merchantprop-
erty.This was a composite,not a singleelite; the terms"bourgeois"
and "noble" reflectingthe twodistinctformsof propertycompos-
ing this elite.
George Taylor's findingthat the French bourgeoisie tended
to convertits accumulated profitsinto non-capitalistwealth and
status forgets that this "conversion" was preceded by another
conversion,namelythe transformation of the feudal surplus into
money capital by way of C-(M-C-Mf)-C. Before a merchant
could enterthe noble order,he had to enterthe sphere of circula-
tion. Accordingly,Taylor's "conversion"was predated by a con-
tractual relation wherein all individuals regardless of personal
statuswere formallyfree to amass property.Thus the acquisition
of noble wealthand statusby the merchantsflowedfroma differ-
ent source. Whereas nobles were born privileged(ex nobilusortus),
merchantsgained access to the noble order on the basis of money
and merit.The one was privilegebestowed by blood, the other
privilegebestowedby capital. Now, if naked economic acquisition
could bestow upon any commonerthe same honor as those who
have it by virtueof birth,was not the verynotion of noble rights
being questioned preciselyby this "conversion"? After all, the
essence of the Second Order was thatit was hereditary(stratifica-
tion in termsof status),a principlesignifyingexactlythe reverse
of the principle of individual merit implicated in this "conver-
sion"!
Some revisionistshave gone so far as to argue that the main
conflictwas not between bourgeois and nobles, but withinthe
noble order itself: a poor, provincial and reactionarynobility
versus a rich, urbanized and liberal nobility.BettyBehrens, for
instance,divides the nobilityinto those who had littlewealth and
possessed only their"privilegesin the sense of legal rights,"and
those who combined both legal rightsand "privilegesin the sense
of wealth" (Behrens, 1963; 1976). But why this division? What
sectionof the nobilitywas poor? Where did the wealthof the high
nobilitycome from?Had the revisionistsasked themselvesthese
questionstheymighthaveseen thatthisdivisionwastheresultof
thedependenceof the poor nobility on legal rightsalone,while
the highernobilityhad theserightsplus moneycapital.
Actually, therevisionists are awarethatthemoneyednobility
was rising,the purelyfeudal nobilitydeclining.Yet, in their
eagernessto rejectthe Marxistthesisof a moneyedclassgetting
richerat the expense of the old nobility, theyinsistthat"the
nobilitywas not a classin decline."For example,RobertForster
writesthat many provincialnobles were "active,shrewd,and
prosperouslandlords,"challenging GeorgesLefebvre'sidea of a
degenerating landedclass(Forster,1962).Butwe thenlearnfrom
Forsterhimself(albeitindirectly) thatthatnoblewho depended
solelyon feudal dues was "condemned to poverty and idlenessin
a crumblingprovincialchateau."He failsto note thatthe tradi-
tionallanded class was able to survivein prosperity onlyto the
extentthatit earned moneycapital.As Behrensherselfstates,
even thoughbirthremainedthe formalbasis of noble status,
privileges"if unaccompaniedby wealth,were so valuelessthat
theycouldnotpreventa noblefamily fromfallingintodestitution
and ultimately, fromdroppingout of the estateof the nobility
altogether" (Behrens, 1976,525).
Seigneurial income facedan acutecrisisin the18thcentury as
thevolumeof thesurplusturnedoverto theseigneuras feudal
dues "increasedrelatively littleand oftennot at all" (Ladurie,
1975, 19). Onlythe noble"turnedbourgeois"- the receiverof
groundrent- managedto increasehis income.In fact,liquid
assets(venal fees,mortgages,real estate,shares,ground rent)
weighedmoreand moreheavilyin nobleincomes.Likewisepro-
fitsfrommetallurgy, mining,and tradefar surpassedthoseof
seigneurialrights. Forster mentionsthat in regions around
Toulouse and Bordeaux,and Le Mans, seigneurialdues were
only5% to 8% of landlordrevenue(Hufton,1983,311). At issue
hereis thefactthatin theoverallnationalview,circulating capital
farsurpassedpurefeudaldues in itscapacityto generatewealth.
As confirmed bytheAnnaleshistorianErnestLabrousse:"Noble
or bourgeois,theclass(ofaccumulation ofcapital)remainedthat
whichheld the greatestsurplusof revenues"(Labrousse,1978,
159).
We also learn from revisionists that the "pure" nobility
formedthevanguardof the"feudalreaction"becauseitsidentity
as an order founded in "descentand virtue"was challenged

directly bythis"conversion" ofmoneyintonoblestatus.The petty
nobility, we are told,enjoyed certainprivileges yethad littleor no
hope to climb up the state administrative ladder againstthose
commonerswho had money.For thisreason,thisnobility, Guy
Nogaretpointsout, "triedto establishthe model of a nobility
entirely dedicatedto theprofession of arms... as an antidoteto
. . . the risingpowerof money"(Nogaret,1985,5). In fact,the
18thcentury, to citeanotherrevisionist, saw "unendingprotests
on thepartof theold nobility . . . againsttheattemptto createa
new rulingclass by statefiatand money"(Furet,1981, 107).8
Indeed it was oftenlessernobles,like Cázales, an officeholder
fromLanguedoc,who foughtmostvigorouslyto preservethe
traditional socialhierarchy. On theotherhand,theconstitutional
and liberalmovement amongthenobility waslargelyconfinedto
individualslike Duc d'Aiguillon,Mirabeau,La Rochefoucauld,
and the Duke of Orleans,"wheredistinctions of wealthwere
replacing those of birth"(McManners,41). This liberalaristocra-
and
cy,socially financially secure in the ownership of both profit
and rent,werepreparedto concedejuridicalequalityto "profit"
againstthe decisionthatthe EstatesGeneralshould meetas in
1614.
The nobility wasdejurethesecondorder,and as suchithad a
real homogeneity. Traditionally thislegal definition also corre-
spondedto a clearlydefinedsocioeconomic groupwhichformed
the landowningclass. Yet defactoin the 18thcentury,more so
thanever,thenobility no longerrepresented thisclearlydefined
economicclass,forit was a receiverof profit.Thus thelow and
high nobilitywerejuridicallyunitedyet economicallydivided.
Moneydividedwhatlawunited.Conversely, thehighnobility and
8 Behrens too recognizesthis: "Diatribesagainst the power of money to disruptthe old

relationshipbecame a commonplace in France in the second half of the 18th century
. . ." (Behrens, 1963, 569) In fact,C. Lucas, F. Furet, G. Nogaret, and W. Doyle all
concede the presence of a poor nobilitydepending solelyon feudal rights.What they
refuse to acknowledge is the presence of a rising pure bourgeois class founded on
moneycapital. It is forthisreason thattheyfailto see the connectionbetweenthispoor
nobility,the decline of feudal wealth,and the rise of bourgeois wealth. At one point,
Doyle does come close to admittingthe realityof a rising pure bourgeois. After
mentioningthat the bourgeoisie had almost grown by 300% in the 18th century,he
concedes: "In thisnumericalsense, at least thereis littledoubt thatthe bourgeoisie was
a risinggroup" (129). But having said this,Doyle does not know what to make of it,
believing(erroneously)thatthe notion of a risingbourgeoisie is negated by the act of
ennoblement.Myviewis thatthe revisionist"conversion"thesisis not incompatiblewith
Marx's contradictionthesis.
310 SCIENCE6fSOCIETY
thebourgeoisiewerejuridicallydivided,thoughtendingtowards
economicunity.In thiscase, law dividedwhatmoneyunited.
As largeramountsof moneypassed into the hands of the
nobility,thisclass was therebyrejuvenated("youngand on the
rise"as Nogaretputsit.)Yet in thebackground, unknownto the
nobles,this new wealth, in theveryprocess renewingthenoble
of
order,was destroying thebasisthattheestateof thenobility had
possessed in the past.In time this of
process renewalamounted to
a rupturein thetraditional value system,as thereal mainstayof
noble statusbecameliquidcapital.If originally the noble was a
warriorand a hereditary lord,by the 18thcenturya noble was
nothing but a commoner who had made money!The contradic-
tionwasundeniable:thenoblewasjuridicallytherulingclass,yet
he could continue to rule only if he was economicallya
bourgeois!9
9. The FrenchMonarchy"Embourgeoisified"
The clash betweenmoneyand birthdid not operate im-

mediatelybetweenthe bourgeoiseand the nobility.Rather,the
absolutestate,bycentralizingtheextraction of surplus(taxation)
and turningthefeudallordsand themerchants intopaidofficials,
mediatedthisnoble-bourgeois conflict.In thiscontext,Barring-
tonMoorearguethatvenaloffices"impartedfeudalcharacteris-
ticsto thebourgeoisie"as theseofficesbecamea formof hered-
itarypropertyand grantedcertainimmunities, privilegesor
9 Comninel writesthat the Revolution was not bourgeois because the revolutionaries
were not capitalists."It was not a conflictbetweena decliningfeudal class and a rising
capitalistclass" (196). Again, "If thereis any sense in whichit maybe usefulto consider
the French Revolution a 'bourgeois revolution,'it cannot imply a connection to the
emergence of capitalism . . ." (203). But, as we have seen, this is preciselywhat the
PrimacyThesis postulates. Yet Comninel and the revisionists,assuming that Marx's
theoryassociates the revolutionarybourgeoisie witha capitalistmode of production,
concluded thatthe classic interpretationwas wrongonce theyshowed "thatcapitalism
had not become the dominant mode of production in the French economy before
1789" (Doyle, 18).
Actually Mathiez, Lefebvre,Soboul and Rude were all well aware that capitalism,
employingfree labor and using machine technologysuch as steam engines, the spin-
ningjenny, or coke smeltingforgeshad barelygained momentumin the 18thcentury.
The problemwiththe standard Marxisthistoriography is that,empirically,it knewthat
the 18thcenturyFrenchbourgeoisiewas essentiallya trade-basedclass; on a theoretical
level, however, by equating commerce with capitalism, it committed the error of
viewingthe conflictbetween the nobilityand the merchantbourgeoisie in 1789 as the
embodiment of a contradictionbetween two modesof production - feudalism and
capitalism.
rightsto theirholders(Moore, 1969). But thisis onlyhalf the

story.Venalityalso symbolized thedependencyof themonarchy
on bourgeoiscapital.More thanthis,as statepowercame to rest
upon goodsand servicesprovidedbythemarket, thisdependency
gradually shifted the social of
priorities the state to favorthe
principleof merchant property over the feudal nobility.Back in
this
the 1790s,JosephBarnavestated point: "themore the wealth
of thestatecomesfromcommerce. . . thecloserthemerchantis
to governingthe state;the more the wealthof the statecomes
fromland . . . the closerthe noblemanis to the government"
(Barnave,1971, 144).
Fromitsearlieststruggleforcentralization thecrownhad to
encourage the of
growth bourgeois incomes - i.e., to foster
trade,navigation, and increasein the stocksof preciousmetals.
The maintenance ofa bureaucracy and an armydemandedenor-
mous expenditures, and onlywealthymerchantscould provide
the moneyto financethesethroughtaxes,customsduties,and
stateloans.The crownalso neededthesupportofthebourgeoisie
in itsstruggleto suppressthelocalisttendenciesof theold fight-
ing nobility.This was attainedby sellingadministrative and ju-
dicialofficesto the bourgeoisie(or to any noble withsufficient
money-capital). The sale of officesbecamethe majorvehiclein
absorbing commercial profitsintothe statecoffers.(Louis XIV
financedhis warsto a largeextentby the sale of offices.)
By selling state offices,the monarchyreabsorbed the
bourgeoisieintotheserviceofthestate,and broughta transfer of
from a to a
provincialnobility royalnobility - ministers,
power
councilorsof state,intendants,etc.However,therightto servein
the army,the clergy, or the judiciarywas stillconsideredan
essentialprerogative ofthenobility.Indeedcivicdistinctions were
conditionalupon leaving trade. Afterall, the wealth of the
bourgeoisiewas soughtnot forits own sake but as a means to
expansionand military
territorial splendor;and itwasthenobility
whichremainedmostcloselyassociatedwiththoseends. Thus,
althoughthestatewasawarethatitsmilitary ambitions couldonly
be advancedbymerchantcapital,thecrownknewverywellthat
royalty was,in itsoriginsand character,consubstantial withthe
old social power of the ancienne noblesse.This explainsFuret's
obscurephrasethatthe monarchywas "tornbetweenloyaltyto
the old seigneurialsolidaritiesand therequirements of the new
312 SCIENCEö> SOCIETY
social and bureaucratielogic,imprisonedby two contradictory

modes of hierarchy and socialmobility" (Furet,113). The state
was forcedto guaranteenoble privileges percontra"it could no
longer as
live, in the old days,on the personalestateoftheprince
(landed wealth). It needed access to the wealthin circulation"
(Braudel,1982,519). This balancecould notbe sustainedforever.
On variousoccasionsthemonarchy soughtto reaffirm noble
birth,againstmerepossessionof money,overmilitary ranks,as
evidencedin the measuresof 1718 and 1729,theedictof 1750,
and theSegurOrdinanceof 1781.Yetdespitethis"superstructur-
al" goodwill,socialselectionin the 18thcenturywas increasingly
definedbycriteriaotherthanheredity. For instance,in the first
halfof thecentury, thewordsin theroyallettersofennoblement
appeared less as if they were reallyennoblingthan merely
"recognizing" or "maintaining" nobility.The lettersemphasized
the aura of familybackground,or simplythe presumptionof
nobility.Yet, after 1760, ennoblementwas seen as an official
confirmation ofsuchmiddle-class valuesas personalwork,assidu-
ity, and competence.(As written in one letter,"To make
illustriousthemeritbornof personalqualities";Nogaret,38-39.)
The underlying problemwas thatfeudalrightsbythemselves no
longer sufficed to the
acquire higherposts in thejudiciary,army,
or administration. Thisproblembecameparticularly acuteduring
the 18thcenturydue to an overalltrendfor officepricesto
increase(betweentwoand threetimes),so thattheoverwhelming
majorityof buyerswerefinanciers, merchants and industrialists
(Doyle, 1984). In the 18th centuryalone,6,500 new noblefamilies
werecreatedbybourgeoiswealth,a figurerepresenting Vato Vsof
all noble familiesin 1789! (Nogaret,30).10
Our thesisthenis thattheold feudalclass,owningland and
receivingdues, was losinga battleagainsttheeconomic powerof
the bourgeoisieas the mainstayof the monarchy.The pure
bourgeoisierepresented a newsourceofwealth,moveablewealth;
itwas a dynamicclass,supplying themonarchy withrevenueand
publicofficials. Bycontrastthepurenobility wasdependentupon
a decliningformofwealth,i.e. seigneurial rightsofproperty over
10 1 accept Comninel's viewthatland and the statewere "the real locus of bourgeois social
interest."The issue remainsthat"commerce,"as Comninel writesin the same context
(196), "was the primary route by which sufficientwealth could be acquired for a
bourgeois to enter the nobility."
the peasantry.The contradiction was clear: thepurebourgeoisie

possessedthegreaterpartofthefortuneof France,and provided
most of the resourcesand administrative personnel to the
monarchy; nevertheless it held an inferior legal statusto thatof
the nobility.The crisiswas withina monarchysociallyand ju-
ridicallyfoundedon nobleprinciples, butincreasingly dependent
on the revenueand talentproducedby contractual relations.
This contradictionfoundconcreteexpressionin thefinancial
crisis.The principalproblemfacingthemonarchy in thesecond
halfofthe18thcentury wasthatofraisingenoughmoneytomeet
thegovernment's growingfiscalneeds.The abilitytoconductwar
turnedon the sums it could raise in taxes,and these in turn
depended on the net nationalproduct.Of course,the financial
crisis,consideredas an event,was a consequenceof the debts
incurredduringthewarin America.However,froma structural
perspective, itmirroredtheexhaustionoftheproductive capacity
of the lord-peasantrelation.The seigneurialsystemcould no
longerprovidethe requiredrevenuefor the monarchyto op-
erate; not only was seigneurialincome dwindling,but nobles
refusedanydiminution of theirprivileges. This structural crisis
was wellunderstoodby the Physiocrats.
Since the daysof Colbertit was generallyassumedthatthe
way to increasefiscalrevenuewas to enhancethe volumeand
circulationofmoneyavailableforgeneralcommercebyattracting
money from othercountriesand hinderingits export.Colbert
voicedthisidea whenhe said,"commerce is thesourceoffinance,
and financeis thesinewsofwar"(Wolfe,1966,476). This mercan-
tilistdoctrineremaineddominantuntilthe mid-18th century
whenitbecameevidentthatEnglandhad overtaken Francein the
of
conquest foreign markets and colonies, as well as in the in-
troductionof technicalinnovations.It was then that the
physiocraticschool came into prominence.The Physiocrats
pointed to agricultureas the sectorfromwhichthe national
wealthoriginated,and questionedthe mercantilist assumption
that a mere increasein monetarystockswould raise taxable
sources.The noveltyof thephysiocratic thesis,however,was not
simply "that agriculturewas the unique source of wealth,"as
Comninelseems to believe (Comninel,195). For F. Quesnay
(1694-1774) theobstacleto theexpansionof nationalwealthwas
not mercantilism, but that this policywas pursued withina
314 SCIENCE6? SOCIETY
seigneurialsystemof impoverished peasantswithlittlein theway

of large-scalecommercialfarming.Thus when Quesnay spoke
aboutthenetproductcomingfromtheland,he did notmeanthe
naturalagriculture of a manorialeconomy,butcommodity agri-
for
culture,producing themarketand organizedbytenantfarm-
ers (Rubin,1979, 113-116).
In theirownmanner,thePhysiocrats inferredthattherewas
a "contradiction"betweenthe need to develop the agricultural
sector(the PFs) to increasethestaterevenue,and theinnumer-
able feudalpayments and obligations
thattiedthepeasantsto the
landowners.Similarly,theysaw a "contradiction" betweenthe
expansion of trade and industry,and such economic infringe-
mentsimposedby the AncienRégimeas corporatemonopolies,
internaldutiesand tolls,diversemeasuresand weights, and guild
This is whytheyproposedan agrarianreformdi-
restrictions.
rectedat replacingseigneurialobligations witha voluntary con-
tractbetweenlandlordand tenant.Theyadvocateda harmonious
extensionof the marketsystemin an economywherethe old
landowningclasswouldretaintheirrightof ownershipoverthe
land accordingto a bourgeoisformofleasehold.The Physiocrats
also demandeda shiftin government economicpolicy,froma
to
paternalistic a laissez-faireeconomy.Under the paternalistic
policywidespreadgovernment controlswerein forceto protect
landowners, stateindustries and peasantconsumers.The physio-
cratictheoristsargued thatif wealthlay in land, the peasant
proprietorsshould then be allowed to maximizetheirprofits
throughthe freeplayof marketforces.Higheragrarianprofits
wouldin turnincreasethetax-paying capacityof thepopulation,
therebyresolvingthe financialcrisis.
10. The Constitutional
Revolutionof 1789 :
BourgeoisPropertyEnshrined
In 1789, the entirejuridico-political

edificeupholdingthe
nobleordercametumbling down.The medievalconceptionthata
harmonioussocietyoughttobe dividedintothreeorders- those
who pray,thosewho fight,and thosewho work- was stillalive
juridicallyin the late 18th century.Thus we had a non-
correspondence betweenthepoliticalsuperstructureand theeco-
nomicinstance;the economiccriteriawhichgave the Sociétédès
Ordresits own characterhad been carriedaway by merchant

capital."Such a discrepancy neverlastsforever.The Revolution
of 1789 restoredtheharmonybetweenlaw and fact"(Lefebvre,
1969, 2).
The Constitution establisheda newprincipleof socialmobil-
ity to be regulatedexclusively bythefreemarket.Fromnow on
theofficeswereto be givenaccordingto meritratherthanprivi-
lege, in keepingwiththe rationality of a marketsocietywhere
privateproperty owners exchangeby mutual consent.On August
4, a merchant formofproperty was affirmed - a definitionof prop-
ertythatredeemedpart of the feudalheritagebymaintaining a
distinction betweenpersonalservitude, whichwasabolishedwith-
out compensation(corvéeand mainmorte), and the rightsarising
froma "contract"whichwere declaredredeemable,capable of
being boughtout (droitréels,champarts). Bourgeoislawyersdis-
tinguishedbetween"wrongly acquired"rights- tithe,mortmain,
-
banalités and thoserightsthatweresubjecttopurchaseand sale
in the market.Before1789 theliberty of contractwas tempered
by the statusof those contracting,byprivileges suchas thoseheld
byguildsand societies.But thedecree August4 endorsedthe
of
gradual termination of these restrictions,allowingpeasantsto
contracttheirpropertyas wished.
The Société dèsOrdres gavewayto an individualistic societyin
had
whicheverycitizen equal rights. "Allcitizensbeingequal in its
eyes are equally admissibleto all public dignities,officesand
employments, accordingto theircapacity,and withno otherdis-
tinctionthan thatof theirvirtuesand talents"(TheDeclaration,
clause VI). The Allardelaw (March1791) made freedomof con-
tractthebasisoffuturesocialrelationsbyabolishingcorporations
and privilegedorganizations. The Le Chapelier Law guaranteeda
freemarketin employment, banning all assembliesor associa-
tions, whether of journeymen or masters. Price controls were
eliminated, as wellas internalcustoms barriers and monopolies.
In 1791 the LegislativeAssemblymade freetradein grains,in-
ternaland external,the policyof revolutionary France.These
constitutional to
changes, quote one more revisionist,
werethedeath-knellofnoblepowerin France,forbythemnobleslostthesocial
advantagesupon whichthat power had been built.They
and institutional
markedthe end of the privilegeof birth.Privilegedid not disappear;it was
316 SCIENCE öf SOCIETY
merelyrelabelled "social distinction"and made the reward of abilityand prop-

erty.(Doyle, 1980, 209.)11
The legitimationof powerwasnowtobe derivedfromthesphere

- thatis,fromtheequalityin rightsimpliedin the
ofcirculation
exchangeof commodities. The ownershipof propertyby feudal
prerogativeswas renounced.A new of
ideology liberty,property,
and security
wasproclaimed.A newlegalframework withinwhich
the PFs could moreeasilyexpand was created.
YorkUniversity
Downsview,Ontario,Canada
APPENDIX. SOME DEFINITIONS
I. By productiveforces(PFs) I mean people'snecessaryeconomicin-

terconnection withnature,a relationassociatedwithcertainbasic
biologicalneeds and geographicconditions.The PFs includethe
meansof productionand humanlaborpower.The meansof pro-
duction are tools, transportation, raw materials,machines-
whateveris used in the labor process.Labor powerrefersto the
physicalcapacitiesand thetechnicalknowledgeof the producers.
II. The relationsofproduction designatethe sortof propertyrelations
whichpeople establishin the course of productionamong one
anotheroverthePFs.WhilethePFs as suchare materialincontent,
the relationsof productionare social. Accordingly, the PFs de-
terminethequantity oftheeconomicsurplusas opposedtoowner-
ship relations,whichdeterminethe social formof appropriating
thissurplus.
III. The modeofproduction (MP) is a combination of the PFs and the
relationsof production;it is therefore"doublyarticulated"by a
particulartechnicalstagein thedevelopment ofthePFs,and bythe
corresponding propertyrelations.In thissense,a givenMP speci-
fiestwodistinct yetinteractingprocesses:theproductivity of labor
and the socialformof distribution of the economicsurplus.
11 Doyle writes that "it was the challenge offered to bourgeois assumptions by noble
conservativesduring the preparations for the Estates-Generalthat was to make the
French bourgeoisie forthe firsttimerealize thatit mighthave separate interestsof its
own" (1980, 138). Why would the bourgeoisie realize thatit had interestsof itsown if,
as Doyle himselfclaims,the bourgeoisieshared the same propertyas the nobility?This
statementcan make sense onlyin the contextof our analysisof the economic originsof
the pure bourgeoisie.
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The French Revolution as a Bourgeois Revolution: A Critique of the Revisionists

The FrenchRevolutionas a Bourgeois

IDEA THAT THE ULTIMATE CAUSE of the

* The author wishes to thank S .

Accordingto thesepremises- whichcomprisewhat I call

auction process to new PFs? I conceive the expansion of circulat-

I need to explain the mechanismby which circulationtrans-

s/hecan in turn buy furthercommoditiesC. In such a process

of thatpartof the feudalsurplusmarketedby the directpro-

3. CirculatingCapital in 18th Century

Industry:AccordingtoJan Marczewski, "sincethe beginning

textileswerepredominant in the numberof workersemployed,

thatwas boughtfromthelaborerat a marketprice.The house-

3 Marx explicitlywrites that the formationof the urban manufactoriesinvolved no

Moreover,trade stimulatedthe growthof new industrieslike

The French18th-century economywas in many

as low as 3 : 1 or 2 : 1! These peasantswereno doubtobligedto

5. Transitionto Capitalismand BourgeoisRevolution

One tendencyamongMarxists - thosewho mightbe called

The basicsocialrelation[offeudalism] restedon theextraction of thesurplus

producers and theirfeudal overlordswho made exactions ... by dint of feudal

Similarly,Dobb criticizesHenri Pirenne and Paul Sweezy for

The existence . . . wasnotinconsistent

In separate ways,the class struggleMarxistsand the revisionists

transferof value from the direct producers according to

The followingvery shortand plain argumentmay serve to

case,theadded valueMf(in theformulaG-(M-C-Mf)-C) would

6 P. Sweezy suggeststhis when he writesthat "the interveningperiod was not a simple

off the existingagriculturalsurplus; his revenue was a share of

For Comninel, in contrastto Dobb, the bourgeois revolution

they"all restedupon the furtherextractionof surplusfrom

to thenetproduct,and thatcompetition fortheseofficeswas the

fromBelow: Circulationand theFood Riots

Scholarshavegenerallyattributed peasantunrestto seigneu-

7 G. Rude,in theForewordto Comninel,1987.Rude makesthisstatement

fromtheserights.For instance,if the lord leased his rightsto

1959).AUof theseriots,in contrast crisesofthe

8. Class StrugglesFromAbove:theNobilityand theMerchants

The real questionremains:Werenotmerchants in historical

twoformsof property.Remember that underlyingthis "single"

as an order founded in "descentand virtue"was challenged

8 Behrens too recognizesthis: "Diatribesagainst the power of money to disruptthe old

The clash betweenmoneyand birthdid not operate im-

rightsto theirholders(Moore, 1969). But thisis onlyhalf the

social and bureaucratielogic,imprisonedby two contradictory

the peasantry.The contradiction was clear: thepurebourgeoisie

seigneurialsystemof impoverished peasantswithlittlein theway

In 1789, the entirejuridico-political

Ordresits own characterhad been carriedaway by merchant

merelyrelabelled "social distinction"and made the reward of abilityand prop-

The legitimationof powerwasnowtobe derivedfromthesphere

APPENDIX. SOME DEFINITIONS

I. By productiveforces(PFs) I mean people'snecessaryeconomicin-

Barber,Elinor. 1973. TheBourgeoisie in 18thCentury France.Princeton,New

. 1961."The NobleWineProducers oftheBordelaisinthe18thCentury."

Leet, Don R. and Shaw,JohnA. 1978. "FrenchEconomicStagnation1700-

Rude, G. 1974. Europein theEighteenth Century: and theBourgeois

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