Pre-Trial

45. G.R. No. 128046 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

RAMON CHUA UY, accused-appellant.

FACTS: RAMON Uy was arrested by the elements of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the
Philippine National Police in the course of a buy-bust operation. The trial court was
not convinced of RAMON's claim of innocence and frame up. During the pre-trial,
the parties agreed on a joint trial and to dispense with the testimony of Forensic
Chemist Loreto F. Bravo.7 They also agreed on the marking of the exhibits for the
prosecution.
At the trial, the accused found guilty for the crime charged. On his appeal, He insists
that at the pretrial he did not waive the testimony of the chemist but only "stipulated
on the markings of the prosecution's evidence."

ISSUE: WON the pre-trial agreement, to dispense with the testimony of Forensic
Chemist Loreto F. Bravo, may be considered an admission of such chemist on
contents of seized bag.

RULING: No. The court ruled in negative.

Under Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court expressly provides: Sec. 40. Pre-
trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during
the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced
to writing and signed and his counsel.
It may at once be noted that neither RAMON nor his counsel made express admission
that the contents of the plastic bags to "be marked" as Exhibits "D," "D-1," "D-2," "D-
3," "D-4," and "E" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. That RAMON agreed to
dispense with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Bravo may not be considered an
admission of the findings of Bravo on the contents of the plastic bag. Strictly, from
the tenor of the aforequoted portion of the Joint Order, it is clear that RAMON and his
counsel merely agreed to the marking of the exhibits, and the clause "thereby
dispensing with the testimony of forensic Chemist Loreto E. Bravo" must be
understood in that context.
Even granting for the sake of argument that RAMON admitted during the pre-trial
that Exhibits "D" to "D-4," inclusive, and Exhibit "E" contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride, the admission cannot be used in evidence against him because the
Joint Order was not signed by RAMON and his counsel. To bind the accused, the
PRE-TRIAL ORDER MUST be SIGNED not only by him but also his COUNSEL as
well.

TRIAL
46. CESAR MATAS CAGANG, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,
FIFTH DIVISION, QUEZON CITY; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN; AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: Office of the Ombudsman received an anonymous complaint alleging the
graft and corruption at the Vice Governor's Office, Sarangani Province by diverting
public funds given as grants or aid using barangay officials and cooperatives as
"dummies." OMB filed Informations for Violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 and Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of Public
Documents against Cagang, Camanay, Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Mangalen. Cagang
filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss with Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest.
Cagang argued that there was an inordinate delay of seven (7) years in the filing of the
Informations. he argued that the delay violated his constitutional rights to due process
and to speedy disposition of cases. The OMB, on the other hand, filed a
Comment/Opposition arguing that there was no showing that delay in the filing was
intentional, capricious, whimsical, or motivated by personal reasons The
Sandiganbayan denied the Motions to Quash/Dismiss.
Cagang filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it
dismissed his Motion to Quash/Dismiss since the Informations filed against him
violated his constitutional rights to due process and to speedy disposition or cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of his constitutional rights to speedy

disposition of cases reason that the motion should not be denied.

RULING:
No. This Court finds that there is no violation of the accused's right to speedy
disposition of cases considering that there was a waiver of the delay of a complex
case.
Every accused has the rights to due process and to speedy disposition of cases.
Inordinate delay in the resolution and termination of a preliminary investigation will
result in the dismissal of the case against the accused. Delay, however, is not
determined through mere mathematical reckoning but through the examination of the
facts and circumstances surrounding each case.
For the purpose of determining whether inordinate delay exist, a case is deemed to
have commenced from the filing of the formal complaint and subsequent conduct of
preliminary investigation . Nonetheless, the accused must invoke his or her
constitutional rights in a timely manner. The failure to do so could be considered by
the courts as a waiver of right.

47. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HUBERT JEFFREY P.

WEBB, respondent. G.R. No. 132577 August 17, 1999
FACTS: Webb, herein respondent, was accused of rape with homicide. During the
course of the proceeding in the trial court, he filed a Motion to Take Testimony by
Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the depositions of five (5) citizens
and residents of the United States before the proper consular officer of the Philippines
in Washington D.C. and California, as the case may be. Respondent further alleged
that the taking of the oral depositions of the aforementioned individuals whose
testimonies are allegedly "material and indispensable" to establish his innocence of
the crime charged
The prosecution thereafter filed an opposition to the said motion. The trial court
denied the motion of respondent on the ground that the same is not allowed by
Section 4, Rule 24 and Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court.

ISSUE: WON the court gravely abused her discretion in denying the motion to take
testimony by oral depositions in the United States which would be used in the
criminal case before her Court.

HELD: No. A deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be
taken before and not during the trial. In fact, rules on criminal practice regularly on
the defense of alibi, which is Webb's main defense in the criminal proceedings against
him states that when a person intends to rely on such defense, that person must move
for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses with the time provided for filing a
pre-trial motion. And also The only reason for the filing of the motion is "to foreclose
any objection and/or rejection of, as the case may be, the admissibility of defense
Exhibits "218" and "219"." It appears that said Exhibits "218" and "219" have already
been admitted by the trial court. Hence, the taking of the depositions would have been
unnecessary.

48. (G.R. No. 152643 )CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and

THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 19, petitioners, vs.RAUL RISOS, SUSANA
YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B.
BONJE, respondents.

FACTS: Respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public

Document before the RTC. Concepcion, the owner of mortgage property in issue who
affixed her signature to the document, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on
vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to
upper gastro-intestinal bleeding. counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the
latter’s deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due
to her weak physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.

The RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcion’s deposition be taken
before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
Aggrieved respondents filed an action for certiorari before CA. The CA ruled in favor
of the respondents.
Appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. It
ruled that Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before the judge or the
court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before the Clerk
of Court of Makati City;

ISSUE: WON the deposition taken before the Clerk of court of Makati City, where
the prosecutor’s witness confined, is proper.

RULING: No. The conditional examination of witness for the prosecution should be
taken before the RTC of cebu, where the case is pending and not in the court of
Makati City.
The procedure set forth in Rule 119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that
the conditional examination be made before the court where the case is pending. It is
also necessary that the accused be notified, so that he can attend the examination,
subject to his right to waive the same after reasonable notice. As to the manner of
examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted in the same manner as an
examination during trial, that is, through question and answer.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of
taking his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge,
where the case is pending. As correctly held by the CA, if the deposition is made
elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under detention. More
importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to observe the
witness deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility.

49. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. MARIA CRISTINA

P. SERGIO AND JULIUS L. LACANILAO, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: Mary Jane) was arrested upon her arrival at airport in Indonesia for carrying
2.6 kilograms of heroin ( illegal drugs) in her travel luggage. She was tried and later
convicted for drug trafficking under Indonesian jurisdiction and sentenced to death by
firing squad. Jane travel to Indonesia was upon Cristina and Julius false promise of
work abroad. Cristina and Julius were eventually charged before a Philippine court
with Qualified Trafficking in Persons, Illegal Recruitment under RA 8042, and Estafa.
The Philippine Government requested the Indonesian Government to suspend the
scheduled execution of Mary Jane. It informed the Indonesian Government that the
recruiters and traffickers of Mary Jane were already in police custody, and her
testimony is vital in the prosecution of Cristina and Julius. However, the Indonesian
authorities imposed condition that Mary Jane shall remain in detention in Yogyakarta,
Indonesia while taking her testimony. State filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Take
the Testimony of Complainant Mary Jane Veloso bu Deposition Upon Written
Interrogatories.”
Cristina and Julius objected to the motion asserting that the depositions under Rules
23 and 25 of the Rules of Court are not designed to replace the actual testimony of the
witness in open court and the use thereof is confined only in civil cases. Also, they
argued that such method of taking testimony will violate their right to confront the
witness, Mary Jane, or to meet her face to face as provided under Section 14(2) of the
1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:
1. May Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure be applied in criminal cases?
2. Will allowing deposition of Mary Jane violate the right of the accused to confront
the witnesses?

Rulings:
1. Yes. Although the rule on deposition by written interrogatories is inscribed under
Rule 23 of Civil Procedure , the Court holds that it may be applied suppletorily in
criminal proceedings so long as there is compelling reason.
Surely, the case of Mary Jane does not fall under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court in either category. Therefore, a liberal interpretation of the Rules should be
allowed. We should not silence Mary Jane and deny her and the People of their right
to due process by presenting their case against the said accused. Verily, in light of the
unusual circumstances surrounding the instant case, the Court sees no reason not to
apply suppletorily the provisions of Rule 23 of the Rules on Civil Procedure in the
interest of substantial justice and fairness.

2. No, the deposition by written interrogatories will not infringe the constitutional
right to confrontation of a witness of Cristina and Julius.
The right to confrontation is part of due process has a two-fold purpose: (1) primarily,
to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of the witness by cross-
examination; and (2) secondarily, to allow the judge to observe the deportment of the
witness.
1st purpose: The accused were not deprived of their right to cross- examination. they
are allowed to do so through written interrogatories. You can cross-examine thru
written interrogatories.
2nd Purpose: the right to confrontation was also complied with as the judge was
present during the taking of the deposition through written interrogatories.

50. DATU ANDAL AMPATUAN JR., Petitioner, vs. SEC. LEILA DE LIMA, as
Secretary of the Department of Justice, CSP CLARO ARELLANO, as Chief
State Prosecutor, National Prosecution Service, and PANEL OF
PROSECUTORS OF THE MAGUINDANAO MASSACRE, headed by RSP
PETER MEDALLE, Respondents.
FACTS: 41 informations for murder were filed against petitioner Ampatuan Jr in the
Regional Trial Court, as one of the principal suspect in relation to Maguindanao
massacre. petitioner pleaded not guilty to each of the 41 informations for murder
when he was arraigned. The panel of prosecutors charged 196 individuals with
multiple murder, relying on the twin affidavits of one Kenny Dalandag. Dalandag was
admitted into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ. petitioner, through counsel,
wrote to respondent Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima and Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor Richard Fadullon to request the inclusion of Dalandag in the informations
for murder considering that Dalandag had already confessed his participation in the
massacre through his two sworn declarations. However, Secretary De Lima denied
petitioner’s request. Petitioner brought a petition for mandamus in the RTC in Manila
seeking to compel respondents to charge Dalandag as another accused.

Issue: whether respondents may be compelled by writ of mandamus to charge

Dalandag as an accused for multiple murder in relation to the Maguindanao massacre
despite his admission to the as state witness under Witness Protection Program of the
DOJ.

Ruling: No. As a state witness, the court shall discharge and exclude Dalandag as
accused from the information.
Under Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which requires that "the complaint
or information shall be xxx against all persons who appear to be responsible for the
offense involved." albeit a mandatory provision, may be subject of some exceptions.
one of which is when a participant in the commission of a crime becomes a state
witness. The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may
become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case pursuant
to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the approval of his
application for admission into the Witness Protection Program of the DOJ in
accordance with Republic Act No.6981.
Here, Dalandag availed on the number 2. The admission of Dalandag into the Witness
Protection Program of the Government as a state witness since was warranted by the
absolute necessity of his testimony to the successful prosecution of the criminal
charges. Apparently, all the conditions prescribed by Republic Act No. 6981 were met
in his case. That he admitted his participation in the commission of the Maguindanao
massacre was no hindrance to his admission into the Witness Protection Program as a
state witness, for all that was necessary was for him to appear not the most guilty.
Accordingly, he could not anymore be charged for his participation in the
Maguindanao massacre, as to which his admission operated as an acquittal, unless he
later on refuses or fails to testify in accordance with the sworn statement that became
the basis for his discharge against those now charged for the crimes.

51. RIMBERTO T. SALVANERA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

LUCITA PARANE, Respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Rimberto Salvanera together with Abutin, Lungcay and Tampelix, is
charged with murder before the trial court. All the accused have been arrested and
detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large. The prosecution moved
for the discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix, to serve as state witnesses which
was denied. The prosecution then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals sustained the prosecution. It discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and
Domingo Tampelix from the Information to become state witnesses. Hence, this
appeal.

ISSUE: Whether there is sufficient ground to discharge the accused Abutin and
Tampelix to be a state witness against the petitioner.

RULING: Yes. The court ruled on the affirmative.

In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following
conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense; (2)
The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is
requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the
offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.

In the case at bar, the requirements are present and the court is satisfied from a
reading of the records that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated
on important points by each other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed
through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that
their trustworthiness becomes
manifest.”.

52. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (2ND DIVISION), QUINTIN

SALUDAGA Y BORDEOS, et al.

FACTS: The People of the Philippines filed this petition for certiorari' under rule 65 to
annul and set aside the Sandiganbayan's resolution, granting respondents joint
demurrer to evidence.
That on March 30, 2005, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas charged
the respondents for falsification of public documents under Article 171 of PC. During
the pre-trial, the parties submitted their joint stipulations. Upon prosecution rested
its case and submitted its formal offer of evidence, the respondents filed a joint
motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence which the Sandiganbayan granted. In
praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for insufficiency of evidence, the
respondents argued that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy. They argue that
the People failed to: (1) prove conspiracy, (2) show that Mayor Saludaga took
advantage of his official position to cause the falsification of the subject OR and the
mayor's permit, (3) show that Adriatico executed the subject OR, (4) adduce
evidence that antedating the subject OR is prohibited by law, (5) submit evidence
that De Luna was not a bona fide Pakyaw contractor, and (6) prove that De Luna had
any hand in the execution of the subject OR and mayor's permit.

ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it granted the
respondents demurrer to evidence.

RULING: No. The court ruled that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it granted the respondents’ demurrer to evidence.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer amounts to an acquittal, and the dismissal
order may not be appealed as this would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it may be reviewed through
certiorari under Rule 65. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such
as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where
the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly
abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.
In the case at bar, the People failed to overcome this burden. No convincing evidence
was presented to show how the respondents conspired to commit the crime.
Certiorari shall lie only when the respondent court gravely abuses its discretion such
as when it blatantly ignores facts or denies a party due process. Certiorari does not
correct errors of judgment. Thus, even if the Sandiganbayan erred in weighing the
sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, such error does not necessarily amount to
grave abuse of discretion. It is merely an error of judgment which may no longer be
appealed because it would place the respondents in double jeopardy.

53. (G.R. No. 220598) GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Petitioner, vs

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE SANDIGANBAYAN (First
Division), Respondents.
And (G.R. No. 220953) BENIGNO B. AGUAS, Petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division), Respondent.

FACTS: The court resolve the consolidated petitions for certiorari separately brought
to assail and annul the resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan which respectively
denied their demurrer to evidence, asserting such denials to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
That On July 10, 2012, the Ombudsman charged in the Sandiganbayan former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) and PCSO Budget and Accounts
Manager Aguas (and some other officials of PCSO and Commission on Audit.
After the Prosecution rested its case, the accused separately filed their demurrers to
evidence asserting that the Prosecution did not establish a case for plunder against
them. The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers and dismissed the case against the
accused within its jurisdiction, except for petitioners and Valencia.
Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is proper to assail the
denial of the demurrers to evidence.

RULING: The Court holds that it should take cognizance of the petitions
for certiorari because the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that "the order denying
the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself shall
not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment." And the proper
recourse of the demurring accused was to go to trial.
However, the exercise of this power to correct grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of lurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalitvyof the
Government cannot be thwarted by rules of procedure to the contrary or for the sake
to the convenience of one side. This is because the Court has the bounden
constitutional duty to strike down grave abuse of discretion whenever and wherever it
is committed.

Thus, notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the
demurrers to evidence, the petitioners as the accused could avail themselves of the
remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 21 As
we shall soon show, the Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of
discretion when it capriciously denied the demurrers to evidence despite the absence
of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder, and despite
the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.

54. RENE S. ONG, MAGDALENO B. ALBARRACIN, JR., PETRONIO C.

AALIWIN and J. O. NERIT, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS: On February 8, 1993, Zeny Alfonso purchased a paper bag-making machine
for P362,000.00 from the Solid Cement Corporation. When she went to the
corporation's Antipolo plant, however, no machine could be given to her, it appearing
that the machine sold had been earlier mortgaged to a creditor. Herein petitioners
offered to return the money paid by Mrs. Alfonso but she refused and instead filed a
criminal complaint with the City Prosecutor. An Information for estafa and other
deceit based on Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code was filed with the MeTC.

After pre-trial, the prosecution presented as its sole witness complainant Zeny
Alfonso. The prosecution then formally offered its documentary evidence and rested
its case. On July 12, 1996, petitioners filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to
evidence. Petitioners stressed that all the above-mentioned documents being
uncertified photocopies bearing unidentified or unauthenticated signatures are
inadmissible in evidence. But the MeTC denied it.

The petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the RTC, which
the RTC granted and reversed the decision of the MeTC.

The RTC resolution was raised to the Court of Appeals by the People, which the CA
rendered a reversal decision. Court of Appeals held that petitioners, after the denial by
the MeTC of their demurrer to evidence, should not have filed a petition for certiorari
with the regional trial court.

Petitioners submit that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and jurisprudence
and committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that appeal and not certiorari was
the remedy that should have been availed of by petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence of
petitioners and that certiorari is the proper remedy against such denial?

RULING: Yes. The court erred in denying the demurrer to evidence and that certiorari
is the proper remedy thereof.

The general rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari is not available to challenge
(the denial of the demurrer to evidence) may be subject to exceptions. When the
assailed interlocutory orders are patently erroneous or issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the remedy of certiorari lies.

In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by
petitioners, all documentary evidence submitted by the private complainant were
uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the signatures on which were either
unidentified or unauthenticated. The case presents one such instance calling for this
appropriate remedy. As discussed elsewhere, petitioners have satisfactorily
demonstrated in their demurrer that the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged
against them, hence, there remains no reason to hold them for trial.