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Wit and humor in discourse processing

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Wit and humor in discourse processing

Debra L. Long & Arthur C. Graesser

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processing, Discourse Processes, 11:1, 35-60, DOI: 10.1080/01638538809544690

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 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 1 1 , 35-60 (1988)

Wit and Humor in Discourse

Processing
DEBRA L. LONG
ARTHUR C. GRAESSER
Memphis State University
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Humor and wit are complex cognitive, social, and linguistic phenomena that are relevant
to research in text comprehension, pragmatics, and discourse processing. We begin by
presenting a taxonomy of jokes and wit as a useful, descriptive tool. Next, we argue that
humor processing may occur in a parallel rather than serial fashion by contrasting a serial-
processing, incongruity-resolution model with an alternative dual-processing model. We
subsequently endorse a theory of speech acts as a theoretical framework for the considera-
tion of wit in discourse processing. Specifically, we argue that detailed analytical theories
such as Allen's (1983) are needed to clarify the semantic and computational foundations
of humor and wit. We present a taxonomy of the social functions of wit and argue that the
consideration of wit as a plan for the fulfillment of social and discourse goals will enrich
our theories of conversation.

INTRODUCTION
Humor occurs in virtually all social encounters and much of our written material,
yet it has provoked comparatively little attention in cognitive science. There are
many plausible reasons for this seeming neglect. Perhaps humor is too complex
to study with a systematic, scientific method. Perhaps the functions of humor in
social situations are too multifaceted. Humor is indeed a complex linguistic,
affective, and psychological phenomenon. Like all speech acts, humorous state-
ments must be decoded and comprehended in the context of rules of language,
rules of conversation, the speaker's intentions, and other dimensions of the social
situation. Humor is not amenable to the type of laboratory manipulation that
psychologists favor. Certainly, wit loses the power to amuse when subjected to
repetition and experimental manipulation.
Part of the problem is that existing psychological models of humor fail to
deliver explanatory and complete accounts of humor. Indeed, psychology has
provided only a handful of simple hypotheses and only two or three models
which have a very restricted scope. For example, many physiological theories

Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to Debra L. Long, Department of
Psychology, Memphis State University, Memphis, TN 38152.

35
 36 LONG AND GRAESSER

contend that arousal is the motivating force behind the appreciation of humor.
Humor is a relief phenomenon that occurs when an increase in arousal or tension
has been dispelled (Berlyne, 1967, 1969; Rothbart, 1977). The best known
release theory was developed by Freud (1928) who related humor and sexual
drive. Laughter was a method of restoring balance after conflict or tension.
Contemporary theories relate laughter to increased arousal. Unfortunately, such
a physiological explanation does not satisfactorily distinguish between humorous
and serious experiences that exhibit this physiological pattern. For example, how
do physiological theories distinguish between sexual arousal and the arousal
experienced in a humorous episode?
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Another psychological approach to the study of humor focuses on the cog-

nitive processes involved in humor comprehension (Shultz, 1972; Suis, 1972,
1977). Suis' incongruity-resolution (1977) theory is a two-stage model and is
typical of this approach. The first stage involves the recognition of an in-
congruity. An incongruity is a discrepancy between what was expected and what
occurred in the humorous event. The second stage, known as resolution, is
analogous to a problem-solving task in which a cognitive structure is found to
reconcile the incongruity in the preceding context. The incongruity is rendered
meaningful during the resolution phase. The incongruity-resolution model has
been pursued in developmental research (McGhee, 1976; Shultz, 1976). Essen-
tially, very young children need only recognize incongruity for the appreciation
of humor, whereas older children must also resolve the incongruity.
A third major psychological approach consists of disparagement theories.
These theories emphasize the superiority one feels when favorably comparing
oneself to the inadequacies of a humor target. Humor allegedly involves an
element of hostility, where amusement is found in the misfortune of others,
particularly our enemies. Zillmann and Cantor (1976) contended that amusement
increases when hostility is directed toward a disliked target and decreases when
hostility is directed toward a liked target. Humor ostracizes the out-group, while
at the same time it functions to solidify the in-group (LaFave, Haddad, &
Maeson, 1976; Zillman & Cantor, 1976). It has been suggested by Suis (1977)
that the incongruity-resolution model be merged with disparagement theories for
a more complete account of humor. An unexpected disparagement in a joke is
more likely to be resolved if we dislike the target of the attack.
The above psychological accounts of humor were introduced during or prior
to the early 1970s and exist today with only minor modification. Certainly,
cognitive psychologists have been relatively uninterested in humor as a phe-
nomenon for study. Nevertheless, humor has particular relevance in cognitive
psychology today. With the increasing interest in discourse processing and con-
versational process models, the science may be ready for a serious examination
of humor. Indeed, the primary point of this article is that a very fruitful direction
for future research is to integrate humor with existing theories of discourse.
As with all early explorations of a phenomenon, there are a staggering number
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 37

of questions that could be addressed. Some of these questions address the func-
tion or purpose of humor. What are the purposes of the speaker in the production
of a witty remark? Does laughing at a witty remark serve purposes other than the
recognition of humor? Other questions address humor comprehension. How does
the listener discern the speaker's intention from what is said? Is the comprehen-
sion process in humor simply a special form of ambiguity resolution? Humor
eventually needs to be integrated with existing models of text comprehension.
Are there themes in humor analogous to the themes one finds in stories? What
knowledge structures are involved in humor comprehension and production?
What is the role of inference in humor comprehension? The issues which interest
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cognitive scientists are clearly allied to the topic of humor and can greatly enrich
our existing theories.
The primary purpose of this article is to introduce wit into cognitive psychol-
ogy as an important area of study. First, we will define and contrast humor,
jokes, and wit. Second, we will present a taxonomy of jokes and wit. Third, the
incongruity-resolution model of joke comprehension will be explained and con-
trasted with an alternative model that accounts for the comprehension of both
jokes and wit. Fourth, a speech act model of conversation will be proposed as a
framework for the study of wit in discourse. The social functions of wit in
discourse will be examined in relation to a speech act theory of conversation.
Finally, we will discuss the comic aspect of humor.

DEFINING HUMOR, JOKES, AND WIT

For the purposes of this paper, humor will be defined in its broadest sense.
Humor is anything done or said, purposely or inadvertently, that is found to be
comical or amusing. In contrast, jokes are defined as anything done or said to
deliberately provoke amusement. Jokes are also context-free and self-contained
in the sense that they can be told in many conversational contexts. Wit will be
defined as anything deliberately said that provokes amusement in a specific
conversational context (i.e., context-bound).
The distinction between context-bound and context-free humor is a conve-
nient one that we will adopt in this analysis. Context-free jokes do not need to be
tied to the preceding conversational context. For the most part, a joke contains
within it all of the information necessary to understand the message or point. In
other words, a joke carries all the context necessary for comprehension and is
easily transported from one situation to another. One need only negotiate for
enough time to tell a joke in a social situation to be reasonably assured that the
audience will be able to grasp the point. In contrast to jokes, wit relies much
more on previous conversational context, topic of conversation, shared knowl-
edge between the speaker and listener, and aspects of the social situation. All of
us have had the experience of trying to relate an amusing happening or anecdote
to a new audience and being unable to convey the humor of the original incident.
 38 LONG AND GRAESSER

In these situations you often hear comments such as, "I guess you had to be
there." The speaker must supply a complex recreation of previous context to
relay successfully an example of wit to an uninformed audience. The spon-
taneous nature of wit has made it difficult to study. It is therefore not surprising
that psychologists have most often studied jokes. Suis' (1972) incongruity-reso-
lution model explains how jokes are comprehended but, as we will see later, its
application to the comprehension of wit is limited.
An important distinction between jokes and wit lies in the pragmatic goals of
the interchange. The goals of the speaker are very different when planning a
witty statement than when telling a joke. Wit differs from jokes in that its
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capacity to amuse is often secondary to social and communication goals. This

article describes some of the interchanges in which wit functions as a plan for
achieving a broad profile of social goals.
A further distinction between jokes and wit is that jokes are highly stylized
forms of expression. Jokes have precise opening formulas that signal the listener
to expect a humorous exchange (e.g., "Did you hear the one about . . . " ) . In
addition, these opening formulas negotiate for speaking time or control of the
conversation. The cues that occur preceding a witty utterance may be more subtle
(e.g., a smile or a dead-pan expression) than those occurring before jokes.

A TAXONOMY OF JOKES AND WIT

Psychologists have developed some taxonomies in the study of humor. Tax-
onomies are useful as a first step in the introduction of new material into a
research domain. Such classification schemes are descriptive tools which help
ensure that researchers end up discussing humor of the same type. The different
humor categories are also theoretically useful to the extent that they relate to our
theories of comprehension, development, and personality.
Taxonomists have made a distinction between monothetic and polythetic clas-
sification systems (Sokal, 1974). Monothetic taxonomies are those whose en-
tities have defining attributes necessary and sufficient for determining category
membership. Any entity possessing the defining attributes is a category member,
whereas any entity lacking one of the attributes is not a member. In addition, a
monothetic system is mutually exclusive. An entity can be assigned to one and
only one category. In polythetic taxonomies, entities are those that share a large
proportion of attributes but do not necessarily share any single attribute. Entities
are not assigned membership based on defining attributes, rather, membership is
assigned by typicality or family resemblance. Entities may also belong simul-
taneously to more than one category. Thus, polythetic classification systems are
more difficult to define precisely because they are based on typical attributes of
category members.
The following taxonomy of jokes and the attendant examples are from The
Antioch Humor Test (Mindess, Miller, Turek, Bender, & Corbin, 1985). This
classification system is representative of the type of joke taxonomies that humor
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 39

researchers have found useful. Table 1 contains a listing of the joke categories.
This taxonomy of jokes is a classification system by content or theme. This
scheme sorts jokes into the following 10 categories:

1. Nonsense
Jokes of this type are lighthearted, playful jests or puns, not intended to
make evaluative statements. Elephant jokes would be classified under this
heading.

"Knock, knock."
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"Who's there?"
"Butcher."
"Butcher who?"
"Butcher arms around me honey, hold me tight."

2. Social satire
This type of humor comments on social institutions or policy. It is essen-
tially evaluative in nature.

"The trouble with political jokes is that they often get elected."

TABLE 1

A Taxonomy of Jokes
1. Nonsense
2. Social satire
3. Philosophical
4. Sexual
5. Hostile
6. Demeaning to men
7. Demeaning to women
8. Ethnic
9. Sick
10. Scatological
A Taxonomy of Wit
1. Irony
2. Satire
3. Sarcasm and hostility
4. Overstatement and understatement
5. Self-deprecation
6. Teasing
7. Replies to rhetorical questions
8. Clever replies to serious statements
9. Double entendres
10. Transformations of frozen expressions
11. Puns
 40 LONG AND GRAESSER

3. Philosophical
These jokes comment on the human condition, God, fate, or life in
general.

A man orders a pair of pants from the tailor. It takes him six weeks to
complete the job. Incensed, the customer berates him. "God took only six
days to create the world, and you take six weeks to make a pair of pants."
"Yes," replies the tailor. "But look at these pants—and look at the world!"

4. Sexual
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These jokes have sex as the topic. The jokes may range from mildly
suggestive to downright vulgar.

Gentleman to lady, while pouring her a drink:

"Say when."
Lady: "Right after this drink."

5. Hostile
These jokes attack people rather than social institutions or policy. Often
these jokes involve sarcasm or insults.

A man goes to a psychiatrist, who gives him a battery of tests. Then he

announces his findings. "I'm sorry to have to tell you that you are hope-
lessly insane." "Hell," says the client, indignantly, "I want a second
opinion." "Okay," says the doctor, "You're ugly too."

6. Demeaning to men
These are jokes in which men are the derogatory target of women.

Male: "What do I have to give you to get a kiss?"

Female: "Chloroform."

7. Demeaning to women
These are jokes in which women are the derogatory target of men.

Q. Why did God make man before He made woman?

A. Because He didn't want any advice on how to do it.

8. Ethnic
Jokes of this type have as the derogatory target a particular ethnic group.
(Many apologies to the Irish.)

Q. What's eight miles long and has an IQ of forty?

A. The St. Patrick's Day Parade.
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 41

9. Sick
Jokes in this category target death, deformity, disease, physical handicaps, or
mental handicaps.

A blind man enters a department store, picks up his dog by its tail and begins
swinging it over his head. A clerk hurries over and says, "Can I help you, sir?"
"No thanks," he replies. "I'm just looking around."

10. Scatological
These jokes deal with bodily functions or excrement in any form.
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Q. Why do farts smell?

A. For the deaf.

Naturally, as in any polythetic system, these groupings have some overlap. The
last example dealt with a bodily function, yet also targeted a handicapped person.
It could be classified as either a sick or a scatological joke. Although a classifica-
tion system like this is somewhat arbitrary, it does help to organize thinking and
provide some structure to jokes as a class of humor.
A comparable taxonomy for wit does not yet exist. In order to devise a
categorization scheme, we looked for an accessible interaction where wit would
be generated, and where we would have some observable indication of amuse-
ment. We decided that television talk shows, in particular the guest-host interac-
tions, would be our source. Audience laughter was used as the measure of
amusement. We analyzed 20 "Tonight" shows and 10 "Phil Donahue" shows
for examples of wit. A remark was counted as a witticism if it was a statement
that occurred during a guest-host interaction and the audience laughed. Remarks
addressed directly to the audience, such as Johnny Carson's monologue, were
classified as jokes rather than wit. The Phil Donahue shows were included
because the topics on these shows were often serious, and it was less likely that
the audience laughed because they were instructed to do so.
The examples of wit, although amusing at the time, are considerably less
amusing in print, and need substantially more context in order to re-create the
situation. Most of the examples are from the television episodes. However, a few
categories were impossible to re-create and preserve the original humor. Those
are described in the form of anecdotes.
Whereas the taxonomy of jokes is a classification system by topic, the tax-
onomy of wit is categorized by intent or style. In other words, a witticism is seen
as indicative of a speaker's intention. Table 1 contains a listing of the wit
categories.

1. Irony
The classic definition of irony maintains that the speaker expresses a state-
ment in which the literal meaning is in direct opposition to its intended
 42 LONG AND GRAESSER

meaning. Recently, there has been a debate over the traditional definition.
Jorgensen, Miller, and Sperber (1984) argue that the ironist is "mention-
ing" the literal meaning of an utterance and expressing an attitude toward
it. Clark and Gerrig (1984) argue that in being ironic, the speaker is
conversing on two levels. The speaker pretends to be an injudicious person
addressing an uninitiated audience, and at the same time expects his
intended audience to discover his pretense and infer his attitude toward the
ironic statement. Both theories agree that ironic statements are evaluative;
the speaker expresses a personal opinion. This personal opinion need not
always be negative; irony is used by a speaker to praise or to blame.
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Johnny Carson and guest were discussing a recent lottery, in which the prize
was 10 million dollars. Johnny asked the guest, "What could any lady
possibly do with 10 million dollars?"

2. Satire
Like the satirical category in the joke taxonomy, a statement of this type
pokes fun at social institutions or social policy. The intention of the speaker
is to critique some aspect of society.

Johnny Carson and guest were talking about Soviet politics and the guest
remarked that the Soviet leader had just completed his first hundred days in
office. Johnny remarked, "Now, that must be some kind of record, 100 days
without a cold."

3. Sarcasm and hostility

This type of wit targets an individual rather than social institutions or
policy. It is the intention of the speaker to chastise. An anecdote about
Winston Churchill provides a good example.
At a fashionable dinner, a dignified lady rebuked Winston Churchill. "Sir,
you are drunk." "Yes", replied Churchill, "and you are ugly. But tomor-
row I shall be sober and you shall still be ugly."
4. Overstatement and understatement
This type of wit changes by inflection the speaker's intended meaning.
Often the last statement made is repeated with different emphasis to change
the intended meaning. Wit of this type is very similar to the type of irony
described by the echoic mention theory of irony (Jorgensen et al., 1984). In
echoic mention, a previous statement (stated explicitly or implicitly) is
repeated by the speaker. The speaker indicates by his tone of voice and
inflection (scornful, approving, doubting, etc.) his attitude toward the
statement.

Guest to Johnny Carson: "Have you ever been married?"

2nd guest replies: "Has he ever been married!"
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 43

5. Self-deprecation
These are remarks that target oneself as the object of humor. The intention
may be to demonstrate modesty, to put the listener at ease, or to ingratiate
oneself to the listener.

Johnny Carson and a guest are discussing a movie called Weird Science, in
which two teenage boys create their ideal woman.
Johnny Carson: "That may be the answer, build my own."

6. Teasing
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This type of wit holds as the object of amusement another's personal

appearance or foibles. It is unlike hostility and sarcasm because the inten-
tion is not to seriously insult, offend, or chastise.

Joan Rivers commiserates with Cher about being so thin that her bikini
bottom must be fitted by a gynecologist.

7. Replies to rhetorical questions

Wit of this type violates a conversational expectation. Rhetorical questions
are not asked with the expectation of a reply. A reply is given by the
listener that surprises the speaker. The intention is often simply to entertain
a conversational partner or audience.

Phil Donahue and his guest were discussing a recent political development in
Washington and the guest asked, "Why do we Republicans take all the heat
for bureaucratic snafus?" Phil replied, "Well, there's just something about
you that ticks us off."

8. Clever replies to serious statements

This category involves clever, incongruous, or nonsensical replies to se-
rious statements or questions. Statements are deliberately misconstrued so
that the listener replies to a meaning other than the one intended by the
speaker. Alternatively, the listener may reply to an intention other than that
meant by the speaker. The following example should illustrate this last
point.

Joan Rivers asked her guest, "You just bought a house at the beach, didn't
you"
Guest replies, "What are you? From the government?"

9. Double entendres
A statement or a word is deliberately misperceived or misconstrued so as to
entertain a dual meaning. This dual meaning is often sexual in nature.

Johnny Carson and guest were discussing an Eastern city that doesn't allow
liquor sold within city limits.
 44 LONG AND GRAESSER

Guest: "Yes, the town is really dry."

Johnny: "What do you do when you want a little?"
Guest: "You mean liquor?"

10. Transformations of frozen expressions

This type of wit involves transforming adages, well-known phrases, or
shared knowledge into novel statements. Often folk-sayings or phrases
from television are given novel meanings in the conversation.

Johnny Carson was discussing diet with a nutrition expert and said, "I had to
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eat fifteen bowls of corn flakes to get the same nutrition in one bowl
of "

11. Puns
There were no instances of puns on the tapes we transcribed, although they
occur in natural conversation. A pun is the humorous use of a word that
evokes a dual meaning or the use of words that have the same sound but
different meanings.

When you step on a grape it gives a little whine.

The first four categories of the taxonomy are always evaluative in nature. Irony,
sarcasm, overstatement, and understatement are all expressions of opinion. The
speaker states a belief, asserts blame, or praises through this type of wit. More
will be said about the pragmatics of this taxonomy when a model of discourse
and wit is presented later in this paper. The remaining categories are intended to
entertain rather than to assert opinion. These categories may be more data-driven
in nature. It is possible that a pun is only generated because a speaker accesses
alternative meanings of a particular word and wishes to share his amusement
with his audience. Puns would usually not be generated when an evaluative
statement was intended.

THE INCONGRUITY-RESOLUTION MODEL

Suis (1972) has proposed an information-processing model for the appreciation

of jokes and cartoons. He suggests a two-stage process that relies on the genera-
tion and disconfirmation of a listener's expectations.
In the first stage, the listener finds his expectations about text or discourse
disconfirmed by the ending or punch line of a joke. In the second stage, the
listener engages in problem-solving, trying to find a "cognitive rule" that re-
solves the punch line with the preceding context. If such a cognitive rule is
found, the incongruity is resolved and the listener judges the joke to be funny.
Figure 1 is a diagram of Suis' model.
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READ

IN LAUGHTER

STORE FORMULATE PREDICT TEXT IS IT FIND COGNITIVE

YES SURPRISE IS IT
SETTING NARRATIVE TEXT PREDICTION ENDING? RULE THAT MAKES
FOUND?
SCHEMA MATCH? ENDING FOLLOW

FROM TEXT

YES

RETAIN SCHEMA
IS IT THE
ELABORATE WITH NO LAUGHTER
ENDING?
NEW TEXT PUZZLEMENT

YES

NO SURPRISE

NO LAUGHTER

FIG. 1. Suis' (1972) incongruity-resolution model of humor appreciation

 46 LONG AND GRAESSER

For the purpose of describing the incongruity-resolution model, consider the

following example:

I used to snore so loud that I would wake myself up. But I solved the problem. Now
I sleep in the next room.

The model claims that the following sequence of events occurs:

1. The first line of text is read in: / used to snore so loud that I would wake
myself up.
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2. The text setting is stored, and a narrative schema is formulated.

3. The listener predicts the next entry of text. For example, / solved the
problem.
4. The listener asks, does the test prediction match the incoming text? In this
instance it does.
5. Has the joke ended? No, there is additional text.
6. The schema is retained and elaborated with new text: But I solved the
problem.
7. Again a prediction is made about text. For example, So, I started sleeping
on my side.
8. The punch line is delivered: Now 1 sleep in the next room.
9. Does the text prediction match the punch line? In this case it does not.
10. The listener asks if the joke has ended. If it has, he is surprised at the
incongruity between his prediction from the context and the punch line.
11. The listener searches for a cognitive rule that makes the ending follow from
the preceding context. For example, the snorer has the mistaken belief that
if he moves into the next room, he will be unable to hear himself snore.
12. If such a rule is found, the listener experiences amusement. If a cognitive
rule is not found, the listener experiences puzzlement and no amusement.

As shown in Figure 1, there are other feedback loops in this model. If the listener
successfully predicts the punch line, this results in no surprise and no laughter.
Suis' incongruity-resolution model is compatible with a linguistic theory of
humor proposed by Raskin (1984). Raskin proposes a script-based semantic
theory of verbal humor. He claims that jokes are compatible with two distinct
scripts that are opposite in certain specified ways (i.e., good/bad, sex/no sex,
etc.). The joke begins with the presentation of text consistent with one script.
Second, a script-switch trigger (ordinarily the punch line) is presented that is
inconsistent with the currently evoked script. The listener searches for an alter-
native script with which the text is compatible. Humor occurs due to the overlap
in the two scripts. As you may notice, Raskin's search procedure for the second
compatible script is similar to Suis' resolution phase.
The incongruity-resolution model makes the assumption that humor com-
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 47

prehension proceeds in the serial fashion specified in Figure 1. Literal meanings

are processed first. Alternative or figurative meanings are constructed only when
there is a discrepancy between a punch line and preceding context. Suis (1972)
clearly states his serial position:

Information processing strategies and capabilities are such that initial information is
usually processed with a single interpretation. Therefore, the recipient cannot
maintain a set of multiple interpretations, one of which happens to be correct, (p.
84)

The incongruity-resolution model has difficulty explaining text that can be

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resolved without attending to the humorous meaning. Consider the following

quip delivered by Artemus Ward (Nilsen, 1983) during the Mormon-Gentile
conflict over polygamy:

The pretty girls in Utah mostly marry Young.

Unless one accesses the alternative meaning of Young along with the literal
meaning, there is no reason to decide that the remark is incongruous. One would
have to have advance knowledge that the statement is supposed to be funny or
would have to see the capitalization of Young to find it incongruous. The state-
ment is only humorous if the alternate meaning, Brigham Young, is accessed.
Another problem with the incongruity-resolution model is that it cannot ex-
plain finding the same joke funny more than once. Because the model depends
upon a surprised perceiver, one would have to assume that the recipient cannot
predict the punch line from the text. A joke heard for the second time cannot
meet this assumption. We would have to maintain that the listeners suspend their
memory for the original hearing in order to find the joke humorous a second
time.
A related problem not explained by the incongruity-resolution model is that
listeners often laugh before the punch line is delivered. It appears that listeners
correctly predict the punch line from the text, or find the text itself amusing even
though they have not yet experienced surprise at an incongruity between predic-
tion and punch line.
Jokes are a highly stylized form of humor and most do have punch lines that
are incongruous given the preceding text. The deliberate intention to amuse is
part of the style in jokes. Wit does not have this same form. Very often a witty
remark is entirely context appropriate and it is only by considering alternate
meanings that humor is found. According to the incongruity-resolution model,
surprise must precede resolution. Thus, remarks such as double en tendres (en-
tirely context-congruous) should not be judged as humorous; the resolution pro-
cess should never begin. Consider the example of the double entendre presented
earlier: Carson and guest are discussing the unavailability of liquor.
 48 LONG AND GRAESSER

"What do you do when you want a little?" asks Johnny.

"You mean liquor?" replies the guest.

Unless the sexual implication of the word little is processed, the remark is not
humorous. Incongruity is recognized only if an alternate meaning of the word
little is entertained by the listener. There is no incongruity and, therefore, no
surprise if the listener does not access another meaning.
There is an alternative to viewing joke comprehension as a predominantly
serial process. Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) have proposed a model for the
understanding of metaphor that may be relevant to humor comprehension. Their
model is a dual-processing or parallel-race model. In contrast to serial models of
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processing, a parallel-race model does not assume that people always and uncon-
ditionally understand literal meanings prior to alternate or figurative meanings
(see also Clark, 1979; Gibbs, 1984). A parallel-race model is proposed here as an
alternative to a serial model of joke and wit appreciation.

A PARALLEL-RACE MODEL
Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) claim that figurative meanings may be accessed
and processed at the same time as literal meanings. In addition, processing a
figurative meaning can be primed by preceding context so that it is processed
faster than a literal meaning. The authors used a sentence-verification paradigm
to investigate their hypothesis. Subjects were asked to respond to the literal true
value of a sample of sentences. The experimenters presented subjects with two
types of metaphors: (a) nominative metaphors that are literally false but could be
figuratively true (e.g., some surgeons are butchers); and (b) scrambled meta-
phors that are both literally and figuratively false (e.g., some surgeons are
doors). These metaphors were interspersed with true statements (e.g., some
fruits are apples) and false statements (e.g., some desks are melons). Because the
literal truth value was stressed, the correct response to both a nominative and a
scrambled metaphor was false.
Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) found that it took subjects longer to respond
false to nominative metaphors than to scrambled metaphors or standard false
sentences. This suggests that subjects processed the figurative meanings of the
metaphors even though this was not part of the task, and it interfered with
response time.
Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) have also demonstrated the effect of context on
the comprehension of metaphorical statements. Again, subjects were asked to
respond to the literal truth value of standard truth and false statements, nomi-
native metaphors, and scrambled metaphors. Scrambled metaphors that in the
previous experiments did not interfere with a literal-false decision were primed
with relevant ground concepts. For example, "some marriages are iceboxes"
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 49

would be primed by the word cold in its figurative sense (lack of caring) or in its
literal sense (low temperature). Alternately, the scrambled metaphor would be
primed in a general semantic sense of temperature (e.g., warm). Gildea and
Glucksberg found that subjects who received metaphors primed by a figurative
sentence took longer to make a false response than did subjects who received
metaphors primed by a literal sentence or a filler sentence. The same pattern of
results was observed for scrambled metaphors. This suggests that figurative
priming facilitates processing of metaphorical meaning at the expense of process-
ing literal meaning.
Just as is the case with figurative or metaphorical discourse, some forms of
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humor may involve parallel processing rather than the serial processing asserted
by the incongruity-resolution model. Figure 2 contains an alternative to the
incongruity-resolution, serial model. As text is read in, more than one liteial
meaning may be accessed.
According to Figure 2, when text is read in, both literal and alternate literal or
figurative text meanings are accessed. The activation of Meaning 1 or Meaning 2
can be selectively biased by the preceding context. This is the priming effect
Gildea and Glucksberg (1983) found in their metaphor experiments. For exam-
ple, in a conversation with flirtatious undertones, the sexual context primes the
activation of the sexual meaning of words or phrases in the conversation.
There are two routes to a humorous judgement in this model. First, a ' 'humor' '
judgement is made if Meaning 2 of a word or phrase makes sense given the
preceding text and Meaning 1 does not. This is comparable to the resolution phase
of the incongruity-resolution model. Most jokes are found humorous in this
manner. A joke is understood when the punch line is inconsistent with the text of
the joke but an alternative interpretation of the text or punch line is compatible.
Alternatively, as Raskin (1984) suggests, the text is partially compatible with two
opposing scripts. Consider an example presented earlier.

A man goes to a psychiatrist, who gives him a battery of tests. Then he announces his
findings. "I'm sorry to have to tell you that you are hopelessly insane." "Hell,"
says the client, indignantly, "I want a second opinion." "Okay," says the doctor,
"You're ugly too."

This joke has a punch line that is incompatible with the preceding text. One
entertains an alternate meaning of the phrase second opinion to resolve the joke.
When the punch line does not match the text, but the alternate meaning does, we
have coherent comprehension.
Second, humor comprehension occurs when both Meaning 1 and Meaning 2
are compatible with the preceding text. A humorous judgement is given if an
utterance is compatible in both its senses to preceding text. This occurs in the
comprehension of a double entendre. Two alternate meanings of a word or
phrase are equally meaningful in light of the previous conversation. For example:
 50 LONG AND GRAESSER

ALTERNATEUR
LITERAL
FIGURATIVE
CONTEXT
CONTEXT

READ IN
TEXT
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MEANING 2 MEANING 1
(M2) (M1)
ACCESSED ACCESSED

M2 IGNORED
NOHUMOR

FIG. 2. A parallel-race model of humor appreciation

= indicates compatible with preceding text (congruous)
¥" indicates incompatible with preceding text (incongruous)
Meaning 1 = literal meaning
Meaning 2 = alternate literal meaning or figurative meaning

"I never travel without my diary. One should always have something sensational
to read on the train!"

This remark can be understood in both senses of the word sensational. A humor-
ous judgement is made because both meanings of the word sensational are
accessed and are compatible with the preceding text (i.e., sensational meaning
something great, and sensational meaning arousing or lurid).
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 51

"No humor" judgements are made if: Meaning 1 of a word or phrase is

appropriate and Meaning 2 is not (this occurs in most utterances that are not
humorous in intent) or Meaning 1 is incongruous given the preceding text and an
alternative match cannot be found (puzzlement usually results).
The advantage to viewing humor according to this model is that we are not
limited to describing humor comprehension as a serial process. We have tried to
preserve the advantages of the incongruity-resolution model of joke appreciation
while allowing that wit may be processed in a dual fashion. In this alternative
model, comprehension may occur after the recognition of an incongruity, as
described by incongruity-resolution theory, or comprehension may occur in a
dual-processing manner. If primed by a figurative context, one may access an
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alternative meaning before recognizing that the literal meaning is incongruous.

Thus, the linguistic, conversational, and social context all exert an influence on
the comprehension of a humorous utterance.

WIT IN A SPEECH ACT MODEL OF CONVERSATION

This section considers wit in a model of conversation that allows for the influ-
ence of social goals in the planning and comprehension of speech acts. Recently
there has been great interest in models of conversation that incorporate the use of
plans, goals, and social actions (Allen, 1983; Appelt, 1985; Bruce, 1980; Cohen
& Perrault, 1979). These models view language as a functional tool used to
satisfy a speaker's goals.
A brief review of speech act theory may help explain how wit is used as a plan
for the satisfaction of social and discourse goals. Speech acts are utterances that
are designed to fulfill speaker goals. Speech acts may modify the listener's goals
or beliefs, or may persuade the listener to perform some action on behalf of the
speaker (Allen, 1983).
When the speaker plans an utterance, the decisions are constrained by
the speaker's assessment of the beliefs of the listener. According to Allen
(1983), the speech act "asserting" would be performed only if all of the follow-
ing conditions are met.

1. A speaker believes her or his statement.

2. A speaker believes she or he has a premise for the statement.
3. A speaker has reason to believe that the listener is in ignorance of the
statement or does not believe it is true.
4. A speaker has reason to want the listener to believe the statement.

Asserting a statement involves taking the listener's perspective and building a

model of the listener's beliefs. The speaker constructs an utterance that will
invite the listener to share a set of beliefs with the speaker.
Conversation is a cooperative effort. Both the speaker and the listener are
 52 LONG AND GRAESSER

responsible for the inferences that may be drawn from a particular utterance. The
listener is expected to recognize the speaker's plans, to make an effort to facili-
tate communication, and to identify what inferences need to be made. The
listener is an active, responsible constructor of meaning rather than a passive,
decoder of meaning.
According to Appelt (1985), there are several goals fulfilled by utterances.
Speakers plan to satisfy knowledge state goals. For example, a speaker may
request that the listener provide information, or the speaker may wish to convey
information to the listener. Alternatively, speakers plan to fulfill physical state
goals. For example, a speaker may request that the listener perform some action
that satisfies the speaker's goal. Speakers also plan for social goals. For exam-
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ple, a speaker can design the utterance to persuade a listener to perform an action
or to change a belief. Finally, speakers are assumed to have discourse goals.
Utterances are constructed so that the greatest number of speaker goals are
satisfied in the most efficient manner possible (i.e., the fewest number of utter-
ances). For example, the utterance "Could you pass the salt please?" is designed
to convey to the listener that (a) the speaker does not have the salt, (b) the
speaker would like the listener to perform the action of passing the salt and, (c)
the request is constructed politely so that the listener is encouraged to perform the
action.
Once we consider that witty remarks are functional tools, we can begin to
identify the social and discourse goals involved in the production of a humorous
speech act. Table 2 contains a listing of some of the goals that are fulfilled by
using wit. One advantage to using wit as a plan to satisfy social goals is that it
can be used to embarrass, cajole, influence, request, or persuade, and yet carries
with it a message that the remark is not serious. Wit can be "taken back" by
saying, "I was only joking." Wit is ambiguous in this sense and therefore
"safe."

TABLE 2

A Taxonomy of the Social and Discourse Functions of Wit

1. Self-disclosure and social probing

2. Decommitment
3. Social control
4. Convey social norms
5. Ingratiation tactic
6. Discourse management
7. Cleverness and multiple goal fulfillment
8. Establish common ground
9. Social play
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 53

1. Self-Disclosure and Social Probing

Witty remarks may satisfy self-disclosure goals. A humorous statement conveys
a speaker's knowledge, social adequacy, intentions, and personality. Similarly,
witty remarks are used to probe a listener for information or opinion. Wit is used
because it is too risky to simply state opinions during a social function without
some previous knowledge of the listener's beliefs. A witty remark, such as a
satirical comment, is an evaluative statement. If it elicits approval, it can be
elaborated upon. A speaker can offer as little or as much information as desired
and is thereby in control of the conversation.
Clark and Gerrig (1984) discuss the evaluative dimension of irony. To be
ironical is to express a feeling or an attitude. A listener's understanding of irony
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is extremely dependent upon the common ground the listener shares with the
speaker. But irony can also be used to establish this common ground. If ironic
cues are present (e.g., an ironic tone of voice), the listener is motivated to
discover the irony and the evaluative information the irony contains. This gives
the listener information about the speaker's attitudes that the speaker may be
hesitant to state directly. If disapproval is shown by the listener (e.g., frowning
or not laughing), the remark can be withdrawn by indicating that the listener had
misinterpreted the speaker's intention.
Certain topics that are normally taboo can be discussed humorously. Because
sex is often one of these taboo topics, it is not surprising that the English
language contains a wealth of words with alternate sexual meanings. A double
entendre or innuendo is a means of discussing a topic such as sex and yet
provides a retreat should anyone become offended. It is acceptable to joke about
topics, fears, or actions one would not discuss openly.

2. Decommitment Tactic
Kane, Suis, and Tedeschi (1977) maintain that humor is a decommitment tactic.
When a speaker's inappropriate behavior is about to be revealed, the speaker
indicates that the past behavior was not intended seriously. Adults are quite
skilled at turning what could be a social disaster into a jest. A related face-saving
action is to defuse an embarrassing situation through laughter. Two friends who
have let a disagreement escalate into an argument may relieve the tension and
prevent themselves from having to back down in public by interjecting a witty
remark.

3. Social Control
The speaker's intention may be to embarrass or to intimidate groups or indi-
viduals. Irony, sarcasm, and satire are used to ridicule out-group members and
control the behavior of in-group members.
Irony, in particular, produces a dilemma. Clark and Gerrig (1984) claim that
the ironist is speaking on two levels. On one level, the speaker is pretending to be
 54 LONG AND GRAESSER

someone speaking to a listener that is real or imaginary. On another level, the

speaker is addressing his or her intended audience and expressing an attitude
toward the person he or she is pretending to be. Because there is a discrepancy
between what is said and what is intended, a reply to either leaves the other
unanswered.
Martineau (1972) presents a model of the social control functions of humor.
He offers several theorems. When humor is judged to esteem the in-group,
humor solidifies the group. When humor is judged to disparage the in-group, it
controls in-group behavior, introduces or encourages in-group conflict, or de-
moralizes and disintegrates the group. When humor is judged to be disparaging
to the out-group, it increases morale and solidifies the in-group, or it encourages
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a hostile attitude toward the out-group. In addition, the humor network defines
who is and who is not an in-group member. Humor is a valuable tool for defining
member status.

4. Convey Social Norms

Nilsen (1983) maintains that the most obvious role of wit is to communicate
social norms. The speaker focuses attention on norms that society is unclear
about, and points out the direction of his or her own opinion. Wit is used in the
place of force because often the people involved are of equal status and wit is the
only disciplinary tool available. With individuals of unequal status, the higher-
status person need only tell the person of lower status what is appropriate; a more
subtle tactic is not necessary. It is assumed that ridiculing someone's action
discourages other group members from performing similar actions.

5. Ingratiation Tactic
If the speaker's goal is to garner attention or foster liking, humor is an acceptable
tactic. Given that most individuals want to be liked, this particular goal has high
priority when planning speech acts. Being liked is often a prerequisite for getting
the cooperation of other people. In a dyadic bargaining paradigm, O'Quin and
Aronoff (1981) found that a humorous gesture from a confederate led to an
increased financial concession by the subject. The confederate in the humor
condition said, "Well, my final offer is $ , and I'll throw in my pet frog."
In addition to an increased financial concession, the remark led to a more
positive evaluation of the task.
Humor can indicate approval in the same way it indicates disapproval. Kane
et al. (1977) contend that humor is often used as an ingratiation tactic to harvest
favors from a powerful person. Because humor is playful, there is less risk that
the lower-status individual will be exposed as insincere in his flattery. For
example, to avoid sounding ingratiating, one may say to the football hero, "You
would make a good running back if you could only catch the ball," rather than,
"You are a really great running back." A back-handed compliment can en-
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 55

gender the approval of a higher-status person without appearing to be motivated

by self-interest.

6. Discourse Management
One of the most important goals in discourse is to direct the flow and topic of
conversation. LaGaipa (1977) videotaped the conversation of friends and found
that a humorous episode significantly increased the rate of conversation as mea-
sured by turn-taking. Ringle and Bruce (1982) have outlined two types of con-
versational moves. Substantive moves are conversational turns which are pri-
marily content bearing; they relay information. Management moves are used to
control the flow of conversation even though they may not contain information
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pertaining to the conversational topic. Wit can be used to perform management

moves, such as, initiation, termination, passing (exchange of control), topic
shift, checking, and so forth. Wit can also be used to avoid stating the obvious.
In situations where there is little shared knowledge between the speaker and the
listener (e.g., strangers), a witty comment about a topic like the weather can
initiate conversation without sounding trite.
Ringle and Bruce (1982) identify several types of input failures that occur in
conversations. Input failures are misperceptions or misinterpretations of words or
phrases in ordinary conversations. Input failures can provide opportunities for
witty remarks. The misinterpretation of a word, phrase, or intention allows the
listener to respond to an alternative and perhaps humorous meaning. In many
conversations, for example, a question addressing the speaker's meaning is an
ordinary checking move intended to forestall or resolve ambiguity. A listener
will often check the speaker's use of a pronoun.

"Then he went to the store."

"You mean George?"

Contrast the above example with the Carson example used earlier.

"What do you do when you want a little?" asks Johnny.

"You mean liquor?" replies the guest.

The Carson example demonstrates how a simple management move can be

altered so that the listener entertains an alternate interpretation.

7. Cleverness and Multiple Goal Fulfillment

Witty remarks are seldom ever direct speech acts. Wit owes some of its humor
value to the fact that it requires a complex inferencing process to discern the
speaker's intention. Allen (1983) presents a plan for understanding a non-
humorous speech act.
 56 LONG AND GRAESSER

Mary is cold and wants Jane to know she's cold. Mary also wants Jane to take some
action to correct an undesirable state of affairs. Mary says to Jane, "It's cold in
here."
We can assume Jane and Mary share the following world knowledge:
1. An agent in a cold room will be cold
2. A cold agent is an undesirable state of affairs
3. The open window is the part of the room that makes it cold
Allen's plan can be summarized as follows:
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(1.1) J BELIEVE M WANT(SURFACE-INFORM(J,M,Cold(Room)))

(1.2) SHARED(M WANT(J KNOW Cold(Room)))
(1.3) SHARED(M WANT(J KNOW Cold(M)))
(1.4) SHARED(M WANT(J WANT (notCold(M))))
(1.5) SHARED(M WANT(J WANT (notOpen(Window))))
(1.6) SHARED(M WANT(J WANT (CIose(J,Window))))
(1.7) SHARED(M WANT(Close(J,Window)))
(1.8) J BELIEVE M WANT(REQUEST (M,J,Close(J,Window)))

The less explicit a statement is, the more important it becomes for the listener to
discern the speaker's goals and plans in order to make the appropriate inferences.
Allen's example has been crudely expanded below to account for a more obscure
request to close the window. Consider the utterance,

I just saw a penguin in this room.

It is necessary to add a fourth element to the shared world knowledge above:

4. Penguins are found where it is very cold

Step (1.1) above is replaced with (2.1) and an additional proposition is added:

(2.1) J BELIEVE M WANT(SURFACE-INFORM(M,J,In(Penguin,Room)))

(2.2) SHARED(M WANT J KNOW(not In(Penguin.Room)))

When a speaker can use a humorous speech act to fulfill multiple goals, the
speaker is awarded points by the audience. Listeners are very appreciative of
clever remarks that require some inferential links. In addition to cleverly inform-
ing or requesting, a humorous remark fulfills many of the social goals mentioned
above, such as fostering liking, garnering favors, and so forth.

8. Establish Common Ground

Humor provides a feedback mechanism regarding common ground between
speaker and listener. Witty conversation requires an active participation and
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 57

mutual responsibility by the listener. Because humor can subtly probe for or
disclose information, it is a useful tool for negotiating common ground. We
mentioned earlier the importance that common ground has for the understanding
of irony (Clark & Gerrig, 1984) and the implications that irony has for the
negotiation of common ground. A listener's laughter provides an additional
monitoring mechanism for the speaker. In this way, he can gauge the listener's
attention, understanding, and degree of involvement in the conversation.

9. Social Play
The social functions of wit are not always as serious as discourse management
and social control. Many times wit is simply generated for fun as social play.
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Although humor exhibited in play may not have overt social functions, the
comraderie generated through such play may function to strengthen social bonds
and foster group cohesiveness.

A ROLE FOR WIT AND HUMOR IN ADVANCING

THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE
We have argued that a theory of speech acts is a framework that can greatly
enrich our understanding of the way wit functions in the social setting. Detailed
theories such as Allen's (1983) are needed to clarify the semantic and computa-
tional foundations of humor and wit. But can the study of humor add to our
theories of discourse?
Among the major problems to be resolved in theories of conversation are
explaining how people resolve ambiguities and process literal versus figurative
meanings. Both wit and metaphor are vivid examples of statements with multiple
potential meanings that are processed with seemingly little effort. Studies of
metaphor (Honeck & Hoffman, 1980; Ortony, 1979) have helped solve some of
the challenging puzzles in theories of natural language comprehension. We ex-
pect that the study of humorous language (e.g., irony) will be equally enlighten-
ing.
The study of humor may also help us clarify the knowledge, beliefs, and
assumptions necessary for the comprehension of a speech act. Humor is a vehicle
that makes these assumptions salient. We know that a humorous utterance is not
understood when the listener fails to make the appropriate response (e.g., laugh-
ter). A humorous episode may be an illuminating window or unit of analysis for
the study of discourse processes. It may enable us to discover aspects of the
linguistic and social context that are necessary for comprehension, such aspects
that may be, overlooked in the analysis of other types of speech acts.
Conversation is a complex multi-layered phenomenon. Research into wit may
provide us with some insight into how speakers and listeners communicate on
multiple levels. Speakers often address more than one audience and attempt to
fulfill, with a single utterance, a multitude of goals. Irony is an example of a
 58 LONG AND GRAESSER

speech act where there are at least two channels of communication (Clark &
Gerrig, 1984). One channel of communication is a pretense directed toward a
real or imaginary audience. This audience is unaware of the speaker's intended
meaning and assumes that he or she is being sincere. The other channel of
communication is directed toward the intended audience. This "inner circle" is
supposed to discover the speaker's pretense and be amused at "putting one
over" on the uninitiated audience. We may be able to understand these multiple
channels of communication if we carefully examine humorous utterances such as
irony.
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A PUZZLING PARADOX: WHAT MAKES HUMOR FUNNY?

Although this paper has been about humor, almost nothing has been said about
why humor is funny. We have discussed the role of humor in conversation,
social goals, and comprehension, but the "funniness" of jokes and wit has been
virtually ignored. For example, the incongruity-resolution model assumes that
humor occurs because an incongruous punch line is resolved to a preceding text.
But is incongruity a necessary condition for amusement? This notion is intu-
itively appealing, but as we have seen, incongruity is not sufficient for humor.
Suis (1972) explains why puzzles and mathematical dilemmas do not produce
humor. He claims that there is a difference between unpredictability and in-
congruity. Incongruity produces the necessary element of surprise. However, as
we saw earlier, surprise does not always seem to be a necessary condition for
humor. Moreover, when one is surprised by an incongruity, resolution does not
always produce amusement.
Although disparagement theories were not discussed at length in this paper,
such theories attempt to address the question "what is funny about humor?"
Wicker, Barron, and Willis (1980) found that a significant effect on funniness
occurred in jokes where disliked victims were retaliated against. However, re-
taliations that occur in natural conversations may not always be very funny (e.g.,
exchanges that provoke fights). Humor clearly has a motivational, computa-
tional, and affective base that needs further investigation.
There are two experimental methods that may help us make sense of humor.
Subjects can be asked to generate punch lines or witty remarks to joke contexts.
This can give us information about the type of contexts that encourage humor and
what types of humor are spontaneously generated. Second, question-answering
methodologies (Graesser & Clark, 1985; Graesser & Murachaver, 1985) can be
used to probe subjects for their input as to why certain utterances are funny and
others are not. Verbal protocols should help us find some regularities in humor
production.
Even though we may find a pattern to humor, it may be a mistake to conclude
that humor has a single essence. Perhaps humor is too complex a social phe-
nomenon to conform to a single theory.
 WIT AND HUMOR IN DISCOURSE 59

FINAL COMMENTS
We have provided some theoretical context for humor and wit in discourse
processing. We have pointed out where our knowledge is lacking and some of
the directions that research in humor can take. Humor is a complex cognitive,
social, and linguistic phenomenon that is particularly relevant to research in text
comprehension, pragmatics, and discourse processes. Hopefully, we may yet
answer the question "What's so funny?"

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