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Domagoj Madunić
domagoj.madunic@gmail.com
CEU Department of History (PhD Candidate)
Last change: 12. Oct. 2010

Conference: Power and Influence in South-Eastern Europe, 16-19th ct.

Proposed panel: Secret Power in South-Eastern Europe

Secret War: Venetian Intelligence and Espionage

Activities during the War for Crete (1645-1669)

Introduction: historical Context

In this paper I would like to touch upon the subject of functioning, in the times of war, of

arguably the best intelligence service in Early Modern Europe, namely that of the Venetian

Republic. The war in question is the War for Crete (1645-1669), the longest war ever fought

between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire, and the area under investigation is

limited to Dalmatian theater of operations.

The control of the Adriatic was of outmost importance for the Venetian war efforts in the

Levant. The loss of control over the Adriatic Gulf, would have resulted in the disruption of

maritime lines of communication, and seriously undermined the Republic's ability to supply

its armies and fleets in the Levant. The key for the control of the Adriatic rested primarily in

the control of its long eastern coast, or of the provinces Dalmatia and Venetian Albania. The

defense of these two strategically important provinces was the responsibility of the

Provveditore Generale (or Governor-General of Dalmatia and Albania) who acted as the

chief-in-command of the all Venetian forces in these provinces and also as the head of the

civil administration.

In addition to the task of bearing the weight of Ottoman military pressure on this strip of

land, the governor-generals were also engaged in a range of other non conventional military

activities, which were however equally important for the Republic's war effort. These
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included: (1) Intelligence gathering (2) stirring up the rebellion among the Ottoman Christian

subjects and (3) conduct of warfare through informal means, such as: assassinations, sabotage,

spread of rumors and similar operations which we would today put under anther common

name of "Black Ops,"and to which the contemporary Venetian sources refereed to as "guerra

sporca" or "dirty war." However, due to the shortness of the time available, in this

presentation I will concentrate mainly on the intelligence service of the governor-generals and

its role in the Republic's overall war effort.

Intelligence gathering: spie, esploratori, conidenti, messo,...

Due to the proximity to the Ottoman lands, governor-generals in Dalmatia functioned as

the eyes and ears of the Republic, feeding the central government with enough data about

Ottoman military preparations or political developments in the Empire to enable the

formulation of the Republics long term strategic policies. In obtaining these important

information, governor-generals relied mainly on the: (1) spies sent on the regular bases to the

Ottoman lands, and (2), on the network of confidents, or persons of trust, who, either for some

material benefit or for other more altruistic reasons, were ready to provide intelligence to the

Republic f St. Mark.

For a person engaged in the profession of espionage whom, today, we would put under a

general label of "spy," the Venetians of the 17th century used varieties of terms: spia, spione,

confidente, esploratore, messo, persona espressa, agente segreto etc. In the 17 th century, the

word spia held derogatory connotations and was mainly used for the persons in the service of

the enemy who were operating under secrecy within one's territory. When referring to its own

spies sent into enemy territory in order to obtain some information, Venetian sources would

usually use words like: esploratore, persona espressa, or messo. The word confidente was

used as a rather general term to refer to all kind of informers. However, in Venetian

documents of Dalmatian origin, it was mainly used to refer to informers resident in the
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foreign states.1

Spies or "esploratori" were dispatched by governor-generals either with the goal of

collecting general rumors on the state of the affairs in the Ottoman lands, or to obtain some

specific information such as: details concerning Ottoman military preparations, movements of

the Ottoman army, transport of war material or information on outbreaks of plague in

Ottoman lands, for example. For the Venetian military effort, of these the most important was

the intelligence related to transport of guns toward Livno – the main Ottoman logistic center

for staging of the attacks on Dalmatia. If the army of Bosnian pasha, was not carrying any

large siege artillery pieces, that was the sure sign that no formal attack on Dalmatian towns

would be attempted this season, and that the Republic could direct more of its scarce military

resources to the Eagea or Crete. Another important service provided by these persons was to

carry letters with news from Venetian confidents in the Ottoman lands to the Venetian towns

on the coast.

The spies usually expected payment for their services. For example carrier of letters from

Sarajevo to Zadar, could earn up to 10 reali per package, depending on the circumstances on

the frontier and urgency and importance of the intelligence they were carrying. As a rule,

spies were recruited from the ranks of persons who were well practiced in the affairs of the

frontier, and furthermore had a means of traveling between the two warring sides. Especially

fit for this service were Venetian Morlacchi, who although subjects of the Republic, still had

relatives living in the Ottoman lands on whom they could rely on both as information sources

and for shelter in the case of danger. Indeed having the ability to claim allegiance to the Grand

Padishah, could made a difference between life and death. For example, in January 1648,

Venetian spy, or "esploratore", Morlaccho Filippo Vicovich, when returning from mission in

Ottoman lands, in the area of Novigrad stumbled upon a camp of an Ottoman raiding party,

1 For more on the Venetian taxonomy and the orign of the terms see: Paolo Preto, Segreti Servizi Veneziani
(Milano, il Saggiatore S.P.A., 2010) pp. 41-49;
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that was assembling for the raid. To avoid any suspicion, esploratre, simply joined the

Ottoman forces for the raid.

Second major source of intelligence was, as mentioned previously, the network of resident

informers. It is almost hard to believe, how extensive this network was. By the 1650's Venice

managed to recruit informers in almost all major Ottoman towns in Dalmatian hinterland:

Sarajevo, Belgrade, Bagna Luca, and Ragusa. Unlike spies, who were recruited mainly from

low social strata, and were mostly Christians, informers or Confidenti, often come from a

higher social ranks and included persons of all religious denominations: Christians, Muslims

and Jews alike.

For example, in the middle 1650's, in Sarajevo governor-general managed to ensure

cooperation from a highly positioned member of the court of Bosinan pasha, who supplied

them with transcripts of received royal commands. Similarly, in Ragusa, a major center of

intelligence activities in the region, in addition to Jewish doctor who regularly sent news

concerning the political developments in the Empire, Venetian informers also included two

Ragusan nobles of Senatorial rank, who kept Venice well informed on the affairs of the

Ragusan government.2 Furthermore, several Ottoman beys from the frontier regions also

counted as Venetian confidents. Some entered Venetian service in order to protect their estates

from raids of Venetian irregulars or to ensure better treatment in a case of capture, others had

even more personal reasons. Such was, for example, the case with Achmet Spahia, one of the

principal beys from Salona (Solin), who provided intelligence to the Republic in order to

further his negotiations for ransom of his children, captured by the Venetian Morlacchi.

Role of the local elites in functioning of Venetian intelligence

service
However, this intelligence service was not a permanent agency, a part of the Venetian pre-

2 Paolo Preto, Segreti Servizi Veneziani, p. 241-242.

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war administration in Dalmatia. On the contrary, it was constructed ad hoc in the course of

war, as the circumstances demanded, and was not given any lasting institutional framework.

Instead, similarly to the common diplomatic practices in the early modern Europe, where

states relied on private persons and their resources in execution of public service, Venetian

governor-generals in Dalmatia and Albania, turned to the local elites for this job. Thus,

Cavalliere Ismail from the Dalmatian island of Korčula, a Zadar patrician of the house Begna,

and Zorzi Papali, a noble from Šibenik, all committed themselves and their own private

resources to the task of maintaining networks of confidents and recruiting of suitable persons

for spying missions.

However, the most important and active in the Venetian intelligence activities in this

region was family Bolizza from Kotor. The Bolizze not only played important role in the local

frontier affairs, but were also one of the main links in the transport of diplomatic mail from

Constantinople or Iedrene to Venice. Two brothers, Francesco and Vicenzo Bolizza,

maintained extensive network of personal connections which covered area from Sarajevo to

Ulcinj, and included entire Hercegovina, Montenegran hinterland and northern Albania. It was

them who recruited two previously mentioned Ragusan senators. However, their greatest

success, and the most famous acquisition was Ali Pasha Cenghich, the head of influential and

well known family, who in the period between 1650 until his capture in battle in 1664,

frequently held an office of sandjak-bey of Hercegovina.

Case of Ali pasha Chengich

First successful official contacts between Venice and Ali pasha were made in winter of

1656, when Chengich initiated negotiations for a local cease fire in the area of Kotor bay and

eastern Hercegovina. Although, this cease-fire was short lived, it marked the beginning of a

long relationship between Chengich and the Venetian Republic. Parallel to the extensive

Ottoman preparations, next year in 1657, for the simultaneous attack on Split or Šibenik, in
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Dalmatia and Kotor to the south, Ali Pasha Čengić started negotiations with governor-general

Antonio Bernardo for a yearly stipend, offering in return his friendship and good will. And

indeed, when in the August 1657 the attack on Kotor began, Ali Pasha in full demonstrated his

worth to the Venetian side.

While new sandjak-bey of Scuttari, assembled almost 8,000 men for the attack, Ali Pasha

as the sandjak of Hercegovina arrived at Kotor leading only 1500 men, half of which were

Christians. Moreover, Čengić formed a separate camp, and in agreement with the Venetians,

took control over the Ottoman artillery, ensuring that guns fired either over the town into the

sea, or that the they were loaded with insufficient gunpowder so that cannon balls would lose

much of its impact when hitting the wall. Additionally, the Christians in Ali Pasha's retinue

served as the couriers between him and governor-general in the town, bringing news of

planned Ottoman attacks and the reports on the state of the moral in the Ottoman camp. Under

these circumstances, one could say that the attack was doomed to failure before it even

started.

However, one should not look at the Ali Pasha in the black and white colors, and judge

him as the simple traitor. In the following years while maintaining warm relations with

Venice, he still ruthlessly pursued Venetian irregulars, haiduchs and Morlachi attacking

Ottoman lands, and dutifully executed imperial commands ordering him to attack Venetian

targets. Although, he would sometimes, as for example in 1663, after his attack on region of

Macarsca, send personal letter to governor-general justifying his actions as the necessary

operation against pirates and robbers, not as an act of hostility against the most Serene

Republic.3

The case of this controversial Bosnian grandee best illustrates complexities of the

Empire’s frontier and the ability of Venice to exert its influence far beyond its borders and

3 Gliglor Stanojević, Dalmacija u doba Kandisjkog rata. Vesnik Vojnog Muzeja JNA , (1959): pp. 140-141;
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organize complex network of its supporters. As the war progressed from year to year, and the

casualties among the Ottoman frontier elites amounted, level of the anarchy on the periphery

of the Empire greatly increased. By the 1650's almost all distinguished members of the "war

party" from the first years of war were either dead or in Venetian captivity. Thus it came as no

surprise that without prospect of imminent victory and peace, the surviving members of the

frontier elites found that their dynastic/family interests diverged from the those of the Empire

they served.

Conclusion: Value of the Intelligence for the Venetian war Effort

In the end what remains to be tackled is the question of the value of the intelligence that

governor-generals gathered. As was mentioned previously, based on the data received from

Dalmatia, which was than compared with those acquired from other sources, the Venetian

Senate formulated its general strategy for the incoming fighting season. Accordingly,

Republic's military resources were allocated to the most threatened theater of operations. For

example in 1658, based on the intelligence that major Ottoman offensive is expected in

Dalmatia that year, the Venetian forces in the province almost doubled over the winter, raising

from 4500 to more than 8,000. Equally, when it was clear that Dalmatia was free of danger of

major Ottoman attack for a particular season, orders were issued to governor-generals in

Dalmatia to prepare and transfer excessive troops to Levant.

In addition to its usefulness for general strategic planning, gathered intelligence was also

of utmost importance for the successful defense of the province. The insight into Ottoman

military plans, namely knowing which Dalmatian town or region was going to be a target of

an attack, granted the Venetian forces in Dalmatia greater flexibility and tactical advantage.

Being able to concentrate its numerically far inferior forces at the single point of an attack,

was crucial for the defense of the province. Furthermore, higher Ottoman officials enlisted as

Venetian confidents tended to act benevolently, and through passivity or slowness avoid
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taking direct actions against the Republic.

The success of Venice, during this war, to preserve control over the eastern Adriatic coast

and secure its maritime lines of communications, can NOT be explained strictly through the

terms of conventional military power: strength of combat forces, fortifications, stocks of war

materials etc, all of which were unquestionably favoring Ottoman side; other, not strictly

combat aspects of the armed conflict, also played equally important role. One of those, as this

paper argued, was Republic's superior intelligence gathering ability, which enabled it to

disperse the fog of war, as much as possible, thus granting the Republic significant strategic

and tactical advantages.