Philosophical Review

Galileo's Philosophy of Science

Author(s): Leonardo Olschki
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Jul., 1943), pp. 349-365
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
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 GALILEO'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
I
AT THE age of twenty-five-thesame numberof years after
Galileo's death-Isaac Newton already held in his mind the
solutionof themost conspicuousof all the problemson whichhe
ever speculated:gravitationand the calculus. These two principal
achievementsof Newton's genius are interconnected because the
quantitativeinterpretation of motionas a universalphenomenon
impliedthe conceptionof the infinitesimal as a mathematicalno-
tion. For the human mind there is no betterway to catch and
describea body in motionthan the methodof fluxionsby which
the space coveredby such a body can be calculatedby its velocity
at everyinstant.
Justso theyoungscientistwas bringingto fruitionin an analyti-
cal way the systemof knowledgeand the methodsof science
already inauguratedby Galileo Galilei more geometricoand with
experimental tests.As a younginstructorat theuniversityof Pisa,
Galileo
and also at the same age of twenty-five, had already made
the decisivesteps whichled to a new scienceof motionand con-
sequentlyto a new philosophyof nature. These revolutionary
changesin scienceand philosophydependedon some simplerules
concerningthe fall of bodies, velocity,acceleration,concussion,
and the basic propositionsof Galileo's dynamics,ratherthan on
astronomicaldoctrinesand cosmologicalspeculations.
The influenceof Tycho Brahe, Copernicus,Kepler, and Gior-
dano Bruno, is scarcelyperceptibleout of the fieldsof scientific
and philosophicalspecialization.The new,and universal,course of
thoughtand researchcharacteristicof moderncivilizationis re-
presentedby conceptionsand methodspertinentto a branch of
science apparentlyeven more limited.This circumstanceis ex-
plainedby the factthatthetechnicalspecializationof theseelemen-
tary notionsis merelyan aspect of Galileo's basic and universal
conceptionsof motion,matter,inertia,vacuum,and relativity. The
intuitivebackgroundand the speculativeconsequencesof these
conceptionsmarktheturnin the evolutionof scienceand thought
whichseparatesthemodernfromtheantiqueand mediaevalminds.
Galileo's youthfulachievementsdo not consist in definitely
349

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350 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.

formulated, statementsor in fundamentalpropositionsof a sys-

tematiccharacter.The fragmentsof his firsttreatisede motu,
whichhe broughtto a close almostfortyyears later near the end
of his life, show his determinationto detach the whole of the
phenomenaof motionfromits more or less latentphilosophical
and metaphysicalbackgroundin order to investigatein a limited
fieldof observationand speculationthesingleas well as thegeneral
problemshavingreferenceto the subject.
This is the firstmodernexample of an attemptto create and
develop a sectionof naturalscience as a single disciplineof uni-
versal value. It was not Galileo's purpose to correctthe mistakes
and to rectifythe conclusionsof the doctrinespredominatingin
his epoch. The passionateardor of the young scientistrefusedto
compromiseor to followthe example of his timidand hesitating
precursorswho always contentedthemselveswithpartialsolutions
in thepracticaland theoreticalfieldsof physicalresearch.
All these hesitations,contradictions,and perplexities,which
broughtinextricableconfusionintothe scienceof motionor led it
to an impasse,dependedupon the traditionaland generalbeliefof
the metaphysicaloriginand essence of motionas taughtby Aris-
totelian,Platonic,Neoplatonic,and Thomisticphilosophy.In this
doctrineall the problemsconnectedwithphenomenaof this kind
presupposean ontologicalbackgroundand religiousimplications,
even when theyare tentatively solved with a quantitativemethod
of investigationas promotedby the Occamists of the school of
Paris.' The divine originof "natural" motionis statedand con-
firmedin all the systemsof Christianphilosophyin evidentaccord
with conceptionsand doctrinestaughtin antiquity.
There is perhaps no other section of philosophyin which an
agreementso consistentand lastingis to be foundas in the ancient
and mediaevaldefinition of motion.The fundamental propositions
of Thomas Aquinas in this respectgive a clear idea of the intel-
lectual courage and the degreeof emancipationwhich had to be
attainedin order to achieve the radical secularizationof this sec-
tion of natural philosophy.According to this doctrine,funda-

1On Galileo's precursorsand their doctrinesof motioncf. A. Koyr'e,

Etudes Galileennes(3 vols.,Paris, 1939) I 7 et seq. and passim,withcriti-
cal referencesto the literatureconcerning this subject.

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No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 35i

mentallyuncontradicted, motionhad been impressedby the Divine

Spiriton the celestialspheresas a qualityinherentin theheavenly
substance.The ultimateaim of this sphericalmotionis the "assi-
milatioad Deum in causando" and the generationand regulation
of all inferiorthingson behalfof man.2In our rigidearthlysphere,
however,motionis only a temporary,accidental,"violent" dis-
turbanceof a naturalorderwhichassignsceaselesscircularmotion
to theheavenlybodies and to the eartheternalrest.
These few maximsout of the manywhich determinethe scho-
lasticphilosophyof naturealreadyrevealthe qualitative,finalistic,
and metaphysicalconceptionof motionas a fundamentalcosmo-
logicalphenomenon.There is littleplace leftforthe discussionof
the earthlyaspects of motionwithinthis system.A dialecticand
deductivechain of argumentscan easily harmonizethese basic
assumptionswiththegradationof spiritualand moralvalues which
determines thestructureof an orderlyand well arrangeduniverse.
It has been possible to work out on that basis a more or less
coherentphilosophyof motion,but nevera scienceof motion.
This is the reasonwhytheprecursorsof Galileo-the theoretical
ones as well as the empirical-always failed to find a common
principlewhichcould embracein a coherentsystemof knowledge
both the qualitativeand the quantitativeaspects of the problem.
Thus the artisans, architects,engineers,and artillerists,of the
Renaissance were never able to harmonizetheir problemsand
experienceswiththatphilosophyof motion.3For the same reason
the contemporaryastronomerswere unable to insert into any
frameworkof classical and Christiancosmologythe heliocentric
systemof Copernicus.Tycho Brahe's negativeattitudetowardthis
doctrineand Kepler's hesitationsare explainedby this fact.4The
irreconcilablediscrepancybetweenthephysicaland themetaphysi-
cal conceptionof motion became the crucial problem of the
philosophyof nature.
The year I590 was the climax of this contradictory evolution
and one of themostdramaticepisodesin the historyof ideas. The
Lib.
2 Summa Theol. I, qu. lxx, art 3; qu. civ, ayt.2 etc.; ContraGentiles
III, Cap. xxii etc.; LiberSententiarum, dist.XXXVII, qu. iv (Solutio etc.).
3For the historyof these effortscf. the author'sGeschichteder neu-
sprachlichen wissenschaftlichenLiteratur(3 Vols.) l919-1927.
4 There is an extendedliteratureon this subject. Cf. the concise and
acute remarksof A. Koyre,op. cit. II 22-44.

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352 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.

intellectualsituationat that time is impressivelyrepresentedby

two facts characteristicof the new trends in philosophyand
science.In thatyear GiordanoBruno had alreadypublishedall his
principalworkspartiallydevotedto a speculativeextensionof the
Copernicandoctrine.5 In all theseworksin verse and prose Bruno
eludes any definiteconsiderationof the cosmologicaland physical
problemsof motionand angrilyrepudiateseveryattemptat a quan-
titativeinterpretation of natural phenomena.In the same year
Galileo had already terminatedhis preparatorytreatiseon the
theoryof motionwhichreveals a trendof speculationproceeding
exactlyin the reverseorder.6
By eliminatingone afterthe othermost of the speculativeele-
mentsof the doctrineof motion,or by treatingthemin a strictly
mathematicalway, the youngscientistopened to systematicinves-
tigationthe unlimitedphysicalspace in which a privilegedform
of motionhas no sense. In thatspace everysortof motionis only
a functionof the "gravity"to whicheverything in natureis sub-
jected-even fire and air-because gravity is the fundamental
cause of motionindependentof the shape and the "nature"of the
mobilebody.In thisway celestialmechanicsbecomesonlyan aspect
of the generalruleswhichexplainthe fall or swimmingof bodies,
the inclinedplane, and the different formsand variationsof mo-
tion.7
It is on thisbasis thatthe heliocentricsystemwas transformed
intoa problemof mechanicsand could be insertedintothe frame-
work of a mathematicaland experimentalscience.From now on
this fundamentalcosmologicalproblemis closely connectedwith
Galileo's speculationson the phenomenaof motionwhereverthey
mightbe measured and observed.In separatingthese investiga-
tions from the doctrinesand methodsin which the science of
motionremainedenmeshedup to his time,Galileo surpassed all
Classificationand chronologyin the author'sbook on GiordanoBruno
(Bari 1927) 7 et seq.
'Galileo Galilei, Opere (Edizione Nazionale, 2o Vols., Firenze, i890-
I919) I 25I-4I9. Cf. for this treatiseG. Wohlwill,Galilei und sein Kampf
fur die Kopernikanische Lehre (2 Vols. Hamburg-Leipzig,i909) I 8o
et seq. and A. Koyre,loc. cit. I
In spite of his appreciationof Gilbert'stheoryof magnetismGalileo
rejectedtheforceof attraction as a mechanicalprinciplebecauseit reminded
him of the conceptsof "sympathy" and "antipathy"in the Aristotelianand
Scholasticnaturalphilosophy whichhe consistently opposed.

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No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 353

his precursorsin intellectualcourage and scientificdiscernment.

He acceptedand retainedsome of the old conceptions,8 but they
appear in his thoughttotally outside of the scholastic net of
philosophicaland metaphysicalimplications.Thereby every step
towardthe clarification of the phenomenaof motionbroughtthe
young scientistcloser to a physicalexplanationand justification
of the Copernicansystem.
These were both the scientificand the psychologicalconditions
of Galileo's decisionto directtowardthe sky the telescopehe had
constructed especiallyforthatpurpose.But in doingso he did not
discovermerelyastronomicalfacts.He foundmuchmore than he
had dared to expect.A new universeof immeasurableproportions,
and far fromhuman knowledgeand imagination,was unfolded
beforehis eyes. The infinite-formerly an attributeof God or the
playgroundof visionaryphilosophies-stoodbeforehis eyes as a
physicalpropertyof the space whichappeared for its part and at
the same time as an empirical reality and as a cosmological
problem.The solar systemturnedout to be only a sectionof a
universeof such exorbitantdimensionsthat all the usual notions
of greatand small,of above and below,becameemptywords and
revealedthemselvesto be a sourceof commonerrorsand mislead-
ing nonsense.
Adaptinghis own mindto suchan extensivecosmologicalvision,
he taughthis reluctantand amazed contemporaries to conceiveof
the whole firmament as a tiny,faintlyshiningbody immersedin
theimmensity of space and to imaginebeyondthelimitsof human
sight an innumerablequantityof similar astronomicalsystems.9
In the face of the different astronomicalphenomenarevealedby
the telescope,all the hierarchyof nobility,in which a gradation
of the cosmologicalworthinessof the celestialbodies and spheres
had been established,vanishedas a phantomof senselessimagina-
tionand turnedout to be a prejudiceoriginated-as Galileo says-
by a cowardlyhuman anxietyarisingfromfear of death.'0
Moreover, soon after these celestial discoveriesGalileo aban-
doned the ageold conceptionof a perfectcosmic order and con-
8A. Koyre,op. cit.I 6o et seq., II 17 et seq., III 47 et seq. etc.
9Dialogo dei MassimiSistemietc. (Ediz. Naz.) 392 et seq.
10Ibid. 84.

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354 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.

fessedto a friendhis convictionthat"God orderedthe movements

of thecelestialsphereswithproportionsnotonlyincommensurable
and irrationalbut also totallyimperceptibleto our mind"." On
that occasion he comparedman to an architectwho would have
distributedthe stars in harmoniousproportionsif he had been
inducedto constructthe celestialvault,"whilstit seemsto us that
God had scatteredthemwithoutany rule,symmetry and elegance,
just as if He had disseminatedthemwiththe hand of chance".
Expressions of this kind prove the disruptiveeffectof his dis-
coveries on the traditionaland officialconceptionsof an orderly
universe as taughtand supportedby school and church.When
the advocate of his opinions in the Dialogue on the Principal
Systems of the World asserts that the centerof the universeis
merelyan imaginaryand nowhere existingpoint, and when he
teachesthattherecannotbe essentialdifferences of substanceand
behavior in the heavenlybodies, includingour planet, then the
representativeof the traditionaldoctrinesbursts into the angry
assertionthat"thisway of thinkingleads to the subversionof all
natural philosophyand stirs up confusion and disruptionin
heaven,on earth,and in the whole universe".12
The opinion of this fictitiouspersonage is, of course, nothing
else than Galileo's own conviction.At the beginningof his career
he had recognizedthat his conceptionof motionand space was
irreconcilablewith the Aristotelianand, implicitly,the Platonic
and Scholasticphilosophyof nature.'3 In the fulnessof his years
and experienceshe deniedany possibilityof a compromisebetween
his cosmologicalvision and the doctrinesof those schools and
traditions.It has been reservedto some of our contemporaries to
label Galileo as a Paduan Aristotelianor as a Platonist,and even
to stress the influenceof Neoplatonismon his conceptionsof
nature. In realityhis fundamentalconceptionsof motion and
matter,of geometryand relativity, are just so many radical steps
which took the new philosophyof science and nature definitely

'Cf. Galileo's letterto G. Gallanzoniof Julyi6, i6ii (Ediz. Naz. XI

I49) -
12 Ed. Naz. VII 62.
13 Cf. the fragmentsof the treatiseDe Motu,Ed. Naz. I. Plato's concep-
tion of motionis identicalwith the Aristotelian.
Personalityof Galileo" in
'4 Cf. the author'sarticle on "The Scientific
Bulletinof theHistoryof Medicine"XII (0942) 248-273.

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No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 355

out of thetraditionalschemesof thinkingand obsoletemethodsof

investigation.
Some fossil materialcollected from the last ramificationsof
scholasticism willneverrestoreto Aristotlethepaternity of modern
science.'5The part takenby authenticPlatonismin the formation
of Galileo's thoughtis representedby his attemptto imaginean
ideal abstractrealityruled by mathematicalconceptions.'6But his
methodof systematically objectifyingnaturalphenomenathrough
physicalexperimentsand astronomicalobservationstransformed
thatspeculativeimageof theworldintoa functional, concrete,, and
measurablerealitywhichis far beyondthe Platonic influenceand
no longera derivativeof Platonic doctrines. The abstractsphere
of absolutevalidityof his laws of motionis no longerthe Platonic
ideal world but the physicalvacuum,just as Galileo's conception
of geometryas being homogeneouswith the unalterablematter
runs counterto the most elementaryprinciplesof Plato's onto-
logical and cosmologicalsystem.18
There is littleleft,indeed,of thesedoctrinesin Galileo's natural
philosophybased on the convictionof an universe physically
homogeneousand developedintoa scienceof quantitiesand rela-
tions.The epistemological value of mechanicshad neverbeen anti-
cipated, much less proclaimedand taught,by any one of his
'5 The recentattempts to connectGalileo'sconceptionswiththeAristotelian
traditionsof thoughtand school show littleunderstanding of the essential
achievementsof Galileo's scienceand philosophy.In an articledevotedto
"Milieu and Ambiance"publishedin Philosophyand Phenomenological Re-
search, III (1942) 1-42, Professor Leo Spitzer of the Johns Hopkins
Universitytriedto show that "thereis a filiationleadingfromAristotle's
nt6QL6Xov throughthe medieval and Renaissance translationsto Italian
ambiente"firstused by Galileo for the designationof the "space as a
container"etc. In realitythistermneverappears in medievalphilosophical
and scientifictextsor translations. It was evidentlycoinedby Galileo as a
dynamicsubstitute for the Aristotelian designation
of space and mediumas
a ;t6QL6Xov,a termwhichimpliesrestjust as ambienteimpliesmotion.The
historyof thewordmomentum as a dynamiccounterpart of Aristotle'scon-
cept of 'ozn offersa characteristic exampleof similarterminological sub-
stitutesdetermined by new physicalconceptions.(Cf. the writer'sbook on
Galilei und seine Zeit (Halle, I927) 25I-255).
16On the Platonicelementsand trendsin Galileo'sthought cf. ibidemi64-
I66.
17 A. Koyre's conclusionsabout Galileo's Platonism (op. cit., especially

III 267 et seq.) do nottake intoconsiderationthisimportant restrictionand

consequently overratePlato's influenceon the originof modernscience.It
is impossibleto harmonizeGalileo's fundamental conceptionof motionwith
Plato's cosmologyand naturalphilosophy.
18 This opinionis discussedin the Dialogo dei Massimi Sistemi etc. Ed.

Naz. VII 232 et seq.

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356 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.

precursors.' It would have been denied and opposed by all the

schools of philosophyrepresentedin Galileo's era and no less by
the most daring and independentspirits who-like Nicolaus
Cusanus, Copernicus,or Giordano Bruno-never abandoned the
traditionalconceptionof motion.A dialecticalcompromiseor a
syncretistic fusionof doctrineslike those so frequentlyattempted
in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance was out of the question
after Galileo's determination to make the laws of dynamicsthe
startingpointof a new philosophyof nature.He knewof Giordano
Bruno's failure in adapting, in a merely speculativeway, the
Copernicansystemto the emanativedoctrinesof neoplatonicin-
spiration,and in attemptingto substitutefor peripateticschemes
of logic the threadbareartificesof the Lullian thinkingmachine.20
He had been warnedby different kindsof dialecticaltrickswhich
serve-as he says-to accommodatethe facts to a preconceived
purpose instead of accommodatingthe purposes to the facts as
established.
Thus Galileo's attitudetoward the fundamentalproblemsof
natural philosophydoes not reveal hesitationsor contradictions.
He startedwith a decided purpose to ban all metaphysicalinter-
ferencesand philosophicalimplicationsfromhis investigationof
mechanicalphenomena.He kept the same attitudeafterhis celes-
tial discoveries.To Thomas Campanella,who could not understand
this apparent selfmutilationof philosophy,Galileo simply an-
sweredthat"it is more estimableto findout the truth,even in an
insignificantdetail, than to speculate extensivelyon the highest
problems withouta positive and definiteresult".22His precise
historicalpositionis to be explained,notby associatinghis thought
and work withdoctrinesand methodsof the past, but by compar-
19 This can be said also of Archimedes, consideredby Galileo as his
principalmaster (Ed. Naz. XIX 645). Althoughthe famous sentence
"Give me a pointof supportand I will liftthe world" can be interpreted
as the firstoutlook towarda cosmic extensionof mechanicalprinciples,
Archimedesnever abandonedthe staticconceptof equilibrium. Therefore
Koyre's interpretation of Galileo as a Platonist with an Archimedean
trendof thought(op. cit. I 69 et seq. and passim) does not considerthe
essentialdifferencesresultingfromthe new,and fundamental, dynamicand
kinematicinterpretation of physicalphenomena.
' Cf. thebook on Giordano Brunoquotedabove (n. 5) 57 et seq. and 99
et seq.
Dialogo dei MassimiSistemietc. Ed. Naz. VII 96 and i20.
Ed. Naz. IV 738.

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No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 357

ing the intellectualattitudestowardsscience and philosophypre-

dominatingin his era with those which grow out of his specific
problemsand of his scientific insight.

II
For the firsttime in the historyof science some mechanical
problemsof cosmic validityappeared entirelyseparate from a
systemof learningand philosophy.None of Galileo's precursors
conceived of the mechanicalproblemsthey fruitlesslytried to
solve as principlesof universalvaliditywhichcould explain natu-
ral phenomenain the heavenswiththe same evidenceand cogency
as thoseon earth.It was a new and bold conviction,indeed,thata
physicalexperiment,or a small numberof relations,proportions,
and definitions expressedin mathematicallanguage,would be able
to reveal and to explain the phenomenaoccurringin the infinite
varietyof natureand the unlimitedextensionof the universe.The
epistemologicaland methodicaljustificationof this uncompro-
mising,disruptive,and ambitious"new science" was a new and
difficultintellectualproblemfora generationaccustomedto accept
or to discuss the most differentaspects of natural philosophy
withintheclosed systemof Aristoteliancategoriesof classification
or withinthe more flexibleframeworko~fthe Platonic and ema-
natistdoctrines.
The simple theoreticalacceptanceof the quantitative,experi-
mental,relativisticway of thinkingand investigatingobliterated
the basic principlesof theirfundamentalconceptionsand conclu-
sions. Hence this new sciencehad no authority,support,or con-
firmation,other than the logical necessityof its mathematical
demonstrations and theconcreteevidenceof its experimentaltests.
There was no possibilityof connectingthis method of natural
investigationwith the deductive,distinctive,dialectical,and ana-
logical procedurewhich made the Aristoteliansystemof know-
ledge an almostgapless textureof orderlycognitions.
Thus Galileo's physical,astronomical,and cosmological doc-
trinesappeared isolated in theirown intellectualsphereand sus-
pended in a sort of intellectualvacuum. The new science taught
on the one hand some attestedfacts and a new methodfor the
solutionof natural problems; on the otherhand it revealed the

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358 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.

immeasurableextent of human ignorance and the customary

source of millenaryerrors.By that process Galileo broughthis
contemporaries, in so far as they were thinkingbeings,into an
unexpectedand entirelynew intellectualsituation.All the know-
ledge that seemedto have been an almostdefinitive possessionof
the human mind was presentednow as the far goal of a long and
hard intellectualconquest.Galileo taughtand warned his contem-
porariesnot to thinkof naturalphilosophyin Aristotelian,Peri-
patetic,Platonic,or Scholastic termsor in the way followedby
thephilosophersof the Renaissance.But he could not settleintoa
merely negative attitudewhile teaching a science of universal
extension.He had to substitutefor the old schemesof thinkinga
method equivalent at least both in demonstrativeforce and in
extensivecomprehension. We ought,therefore,to discoverwhat
was his opinionaboutthe significance and goal of a sciencewhich,
though so limitedand fragmentary, dared to replace the most
completeand comprehensive systemsof humanknowledge.
Galileo's repeatedand emphaticalassertionthat "the whole of
philosophyis understoodonly by God"23does not entitlethe his-
torian of his thoughtto qualify him as an agnosticor a sceptic.
In spite of these sincereand devoutexpressionsof humilityand
caution,he undoubtedlyaimed at a final understandingof the
structureof theworld,a problemhe admittedto be the mostnoble
in nature and science.24An expressionlike this reveals that he
knewwhatno productiveand introspective scientistor scholarever
forgets;namely,thata singlestatement, an isolateddetail,a spe-
cialized research, an individual scientificconclusion,takes on
significanceonly if it participatesin a generaltruthof universal
value. Without this conviction,and when detached from this
universal background,researchis merelyan idle troubleand a
mentalsport,or-as Galileo put it-a source of "sagacious inven-
tions for the delightof ingeniousspirits".25
Apparentlyhis systemof science seemed to be withoutany
philosophicalfoundationand comprehensiveoutlook. Descartes
23 Ed. Naz. III 398.
24Dialogo dei MassimiSistemietc.Ed. Naz. VII 398.
Prefaceto the Dialogo etc. Ed. Naz. VII 29. This prefacewas inspired,
26

and even, in part,written,by Pater Riccardiwho wantedto protecthis

friendfroman indictment of the inquisition.

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No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 359

reproachedhim with having sought only "the reasons of some

particularphenomena"and of having "built withouta founda-
tion".26 The French philosopher reveals by the terms of his critical
judgmentsthathe was less emancipatedfromthetraditionalways
of thinkingthan the Italian scientist.Galileo was convincedthat
he had founded a new philosophyin which the extensionand
quantityof the initialknowledgewas irrelevant.He aspiredto the
intensityand the stringentevidence of some basic notions sup-
ported and developed by the conclusiveproceedingsof his new
methodsof science.These notionsoughtto have theabsoluteintui-
tiveand demonstrative certitudeof mathematicalpropositionsand
the forcefulevidence of repeatedlytested experiments.27 In his
own words,he hoped his discoveriesand doctrines"mightserve
to tune some pipes of this great but discordantorgan which our
philosophyis, on which manyorganistsseem to take great pains
to the end of reachinga perfectconcord; but theydo it in vain,
because they leave and keep out of tune three or four of the
principalpipes to which it is consequentlyimpossibleto tune the
restin perfectharmony."28
The principalaim of the new methodsof science is to restore
the philosophicalharmonyof the humanmindby means of a few
well tunedfundamental principlesof a cogentand simpleevidence.
One of these few general ideas on which his whole systemof
science stands is his assumption"that matteris unalterable,i.e.,
always the same, and that because of its eternaland necessary
characterit is possible to produce demonstrationsof it no less
straightand neat than those of mathematics".29 The ubiquityof
matterdeterminesthe universalvalidityof this basic principleof
Galileo's natural philosophy,just as the unalterablecharacterof
matterjustifies,and even requires,mathematicalprocedurein the
interpretationof naturalphenomena.Matterand mathematicsare
26Cf. the letterto P.Mersennein Ed. Naz. XVII 287 et seq.
27There is no reasonto underratethe importanceof the experiments in
Galileo's doctrinesand achievements.If his contemporaries foundthathis
experimentsdid not work (cf. A. Koyre,op. cit. 74) it mustbe admitted
that Galileo had in this fieldmoreroutineand technicalskillthanhis imi-
tators.
' Letterto Mark Welser,May 4, i6I2, Ed. Naz. V II3.
29Discorsi e DimostrazioniMatematicheintornoa due Nuove Scienze
(Ed. Naz. VIII 5I) and the corresponding passage of the Englishtransla-
tionof H. Crewand A. de Salvio, New York I9I4 and Evanston,Ill., i940.

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360 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.

mutuallyinterdependent. One of the conclusionsreached in one

of the fieldsis valid and cogentalso for the other.This is not so
much the startingpoint for a "mathesisuniversalis"as it is the
theoreticalfoundationof an experimentalscience which reduces
human thoughtand physicalexperienceto the necessarycogency
of mathematicalconclusions.
In this way Galileo inaugurated,togetherwithphysicalscience,
the physicalmethodof thinkingwhich is congruentto but not
identicalwith mathematicalthinking.The few but sure proposi-
tions of his mechanicswere the points of departurefor a new
intellectualconquestof the world. In place of a closed systemof
natural philosophyas representedby the traditionaldoctrineshe
offeredan outlookwithunlimitedintellectualexpansion,and for
the old staticimage of the world he substituteda new dynamic
visionof a steadyscientific development.30This visionis supported
by the eternalbelief that God reveals Himself in the majestyof
nature.But Galileo believedthat God reveals Himself also in our
humanmind.The privilegeof readingin the greatbook of nature
is grantedto man on conditionthathe spell out the mathematical
lettersin which it is written.3'Its properand infalliblelanguage
excludes the insidious fallacies of the commonhuman tongues
and the figurativeinterpretation of phenomena.It helps to avoid
the misunderstandings derived from false analogies, and makes
impossibleall the wrong conclusionswhich depend on alogical
inferencesand themetaphoricalsense of words.
To the apparent and delusive knowledge of the traditional
philosophieshe opposes the intuitive,inexorable,and transparent
veracityof the physicalprinciplesand methodswhichare so evi-
dentand universalthatwithintheirspherestherecan be no differ-
ence of opinion among men, nor a breach of understandingbe-
tween man and God. In fact-he says in memorableterms-if
takenextensivelyhumanknowledgeis like nothingin comparison
withthe infinitedivine intelligence;but as to the intensityof the
propositionsacquired by the human mind with the mathematical
3 Galileogave different
butcoherentexpressionto thisidea. Cf. Ed. Naz.
V 309; VIII 56, I3i, and I36; XII 359 et seq. etc. It is mainlyin his
Saggiatore (Ed. Naz. VI) that Galileo illustratedextensively
the contrast
betweenthe progressivenatureof his scienceand the conservative charac-
ter of the traditionaldoctrines.
31II Saggiatore,loc. Cit. 232

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No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 36i

methodof thinkingtherecan be no gradationof theirobjective

and necessarycertitude.In this fieldof knowledgethe human
mind coincideswiththe divinewisdomwith a mere difference of
timebecause theknowledgegraduallyattainedby theinvestigating
human intellectis always omnipresentin the mind of God.32
The philosophicalconsequencesand the epistemologicalimplica-
tions of this daring and sublime thoughtare unequivocal and
inescapable.It was far fromGalileo's intentionto put in question
the transcendenceof the divine mind; but he was convincedof
the divinityof human intelligence.Some of the philosophersof
the Renaissance went so far as to believe that therewas affinity
and congenialitybetweenthe divine and the human mind.33The
relationshipbetweenboth is an old and perhaps inexhaustible
religiousand theologicalproblem.But nobodyhad ever presumed
to attesttheiridentitywithinthe sphereof a measuring,counting,
and weighingscience.This objective,impersonalscience,proceed-
ing along the track of mathematicalconclusions,is able to some
extentto attainthe absolutedivine certaintywhich was formerly
grantedonlyto a few favoredseers in an instantof silentmystical,
rapture.The penetrationof the divinemindand thecontemplation
of thewondersof natureare now possibleto all of God's creatures
who can adapt theirminds to the methodsand conclusionsof a
correctscientificway of thinking.
Althoughan autonomouscreationof the human intellect,by
virtueof its divineaim and supportsciencecannotremainisolated
knowledge.Philosophy,cosmology,
in its own fieldof selfsufficient
theology,and metaphysicscannotoverlookthe achievementsof a
scienceso absolutein itsmethodsand resultsthatit does not admit
within its sphere any contradictionbetween human and divine
knowledge.It was fromthis theoreticaland philosophicalconvic-
tion that Galileo drew the impulse,the courage,and the tenacity,
for challengingboth the representativesof the officialscientific
doctrinesin schools and the guardiansof religiousorthodoxyin
to face the new spiritualsituation
the ecclesiasticalinstitutions,
following from the acquisitions of a new science
incontestable
and his discoveriesin the sky. Thus he set out to convincehis

82 Dialogo dei MassimiSisternietc. Ed. Naz. VII 128-130.

3 Cf. W. Dress,Mystikdes MarsilioFicino (Berlin,I929) 82 et seq.

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362 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LII.

generationof the priorityand supremacyof scientificconclusions

over all the contradictory resultsof the speculativeand dialectic
schools and methodsoifphilosophyand also in cases where con-
tradictionsmightbe foundbetweenthetwo formsof divinerevela-
tion,i.e., betweenthe word of God in the Scripturesand the laws
of naturein science.34Words, he says, even if inspiredby God,
are ambiguousbecause theyare subject to the limitedpower of
commonhuman comprehension;on the contrary,the inexorable
and immutablelaws of nature are unequivocal and exactly the
same bothfordivineand humanunderstanding. He firmly believed
thateven the smallesttruthacquired by the human intellectwith
the methodsof science participatesin the universal wisdom of
God.
It is fromthis point of view that Galileo insistentlyasked for
a thoroughrevisionof the doctrinesthenpredominating in schools
and in general European culture.Simultaneouslyhe warned the
theologiansnot to stickat the words of the Scriptureswhen they
seem to contradictthe resultsof cogentdemonstrations and scien-
tificexperiments.The timewill come-he said-when it would be
hereticalto say thatthe earthstands still and the sun moves, .e.,
just the contraryof the opinionthattheywere defendingwithall
the weight of their authority.35 He was convinced that God's
knowledgeis infinitetimes infinite ;36 but he believed in the un-

limitedprogressof sciencein revealingthe secretsof naturewith

a godlike certitude."Science can only advance", says the repre-
sentativeof his doctrinesin theDialogue on thePrincipalSystems
of the World.37And Galileo himselfasked emphatically:"Who
wants to put limitsto the humanmind?"38
3 This idea is extensivelyexplainedin the Letterto the GrandDuchess
Cristina (i6I5) Ediz. Naz. V 307 et seq. Galileo never used the term
physicalor natural "law", which was familiarto Kepler, Descartes,and
Newton (cf. E. Zilsel, "The Genesisof the Conceptof PhysicalLaw" in
this REVIEW LI (1942) 245-279). But Leonardo da Vinci already speaks
of "la naturacostrettadalla ragionedella sua legge che in lei infisamente
vive" (Les Manuscritsde L.d.V. etc. publicspar Ch. Ravaisson Mollien
(Paris, i888) Vol. III, fol. 23 ? 7 [MS C]), and Galileo used the synonym
"decretidella natura" (Ed. Naz. IV 8i) in a strongerand more personal
sense.
3 Ed. Naz. VII 54I (preparatory notesto the "Dialogue on the Principal
Systems of the World").
" Ibid. i98.
"7Ibid.62. It is in his Saggiatore (Ed. Naz. VI 236 et seq.) thatGalileo
expressedthe beliefthatsciencewill be moreperfectwhenthe numberof
its fundamental conclusionsis less.
3 Letterto the GrandDuchess Cristina,Ed. Naz. V I28.

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No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 363

That the truthripenswithtimehad been a vague feelingsince

antiquity:VeritasFilia Temporis.39 But thisbeautifuldevice took
on a new significancewhen Galileo substitutedfor the extensive
growthof human knowledgethe methodsof an intensiveand
progressivescienceof nature.He knew thatone truthdraws the
next after it, but at the same time he felt that every truthdis-
coveredby naturalscienceis a startingpointfornew speculations
and the key to unexpectedmysteries.For Galileo science is as
unlimitedas its object. But everynew conclusionattainedwithits
methodsrepresentsa new approach of the human to the divine
intellect:VeritasFilia Aeternitatis.
The humanmindis a part of the divinemind,just as our solar
systemis a part of the infiniteuniverse.The limitsexist only in
our understanding,which increases with every conquest of an
intensive and infallible science. Consequentlyno mediator is
needed for our cognitionof the divine intelligenceas soon as we
possess the tools suppliedby this progressivescience.For Galileo
metaphysicsdoes not lie beyondphysicsbecause physicsis a part
of metaphysics.Thus theologyand natural science have, though
theirfieldsand methodsare different, an identicalgoal. On the
basis of its unshakableobjective principlesand with this meta-
physicalsupporthis rationaland empiricalnaturalsciencebecame
identical with natural philosophy.By its very definitionthis
philosophydoes not concernitselfwith ontologicalquestions.It
does not considerbeingbut thatwhichcomes to pass. Its interest
is directedtoward the circumstancesand conditionsin which a
naturalphenomenonoccurs; but it excludes as totallysuperfluous
inquiriesintothe essenceof things.This philosophymakes nature
an object of divinecontemplation and humaninvestigation witha
mere differenceof timeas to the essentialand necessary results.
In theknowledgeof the immutableand inexorablelaws of nature
the divine and the humanmindmeet in an intimateunion which
cannotbe attainedby othermeans or in a different fieldof know-
ledge.
The firstimplicationof Galileo'sphilosophyof scienceis a clear
separationof sciencefromreligionwiththeeffectof securingtheir
3 Cf. the author'sbook on Galilei und seine Zeit 279-280 and F. SaxI in
Philosophyand History (Essays presentedto E. Cassirer,ed. by R. Kli-
banskyand H. J. Paton,Oxford,1936) I97-222.

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364 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. LIT.

coexistencewithoutconflictsof conscienceor contradictionsin

maximsand doctrines.Sciencehas a preeminencein questionscon-
cerningthe human knowledgeof nature,religionin mattersof
humansalvation.If this respectiveautonomyis mutuallyaccepted
therecan neverbe an hereticalconclusionin a naturalphilosophy
whichis based on irrefragableprinciplesand whose methodslead
to a godlike understandingof the universe. Nor can religion
hamperthe fatedadvancementof human knowledge.40
The traditionalsciencegave a finiteimage of the universewith
some lacunae to be filledin by assiduous collectingof facts,by
schemesof logic, or by commonsenseevidence.The new science,
on the contrary,startingfroma personal intellectualexperience,
provedto be an endlesspuzzle withsome reliablerules forits solu-
tion, but without a pattern for its final completion.Galileo's
science is conceivedas a perennialphilosophyof a progressive
and dynamiccharacter,as a slow but steadyintellectualconquest
of the universe. It was the convictionof an intimate,even if
partial,conformity of the human and the divine mind that gave
this fragmentary and inexhaustiblescience its moral value and
the certaintyof its ultimateperfection.
The metaphysical implicationsof Galileo's philosophyof science
exclude everyattemptat a pantheisticinterpretation of nature.On
the otherhand the same fundamentalassumptionfrustratesthe
long effortof the philosophersof the Italian Renaissance from
Ficino to Bruno,who soughtthesolutionof theessentialproblems
of natural philosophyin the frameworkof Platonic doctrinesor
in the schemes of neoplatonicemanatism.41Likewise, Galileo's
speculationsabout motionprove thathe did not intendto dissolve
the entirephilosophyof nature into a sort of universal mathe-
matics and to reduce the structureof the universe to a pure
geometricalsystem.He was far fromrenewingthe conceptionof
God as the divine Geometerwhich Pascal rejected as a pagan
philosophicalmyth.But inevitablythis selfassured,inquisitive,
and aggressivescience,whichpretendedto attaina godlikeknow-
' This is one of the principalconclusionsof the Letter to the Grand
DuchessCristina.
41 This doctrinedeterminedmany characteristicaspects of the Italian
civilizationof the Renaissance,but there is no trace of it in Galileo's
thought.

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No. 4.] GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 365

ledge and a sortof preeminenceover all otherdoctrines,profane

as well as divine,would clash with dogmas and philosophiesin-
spiredby a divinerevelation.A formaljuridicalprocedureinvoked
by Pope Urban VIII seemed sufficient to wipe out a doctrine
whichdared to limitand constrainthe power and wisdomof God
withinthe narrowdistrictof human understanding.
Its finalcondemnationdid not intendto destroyGalileo's new
scienceof motionbut to suppressits necessaryimplications, both
cosmologicaland philosophical.But thisdiscriminating differentia-
tion of science and philosophyturnedout to be a dangerousand
even fatal delusion.This authoritativereactionagainst the intel-
lectualhegemonyof a naturalphilosophybased on physico-mathe-
maticalmethodsof investigationdeprivedthe new science of its
philosophicalsupport and of its metaphysical"raison d'6tre".
Pushed back into the boundaries of a technicaldiscipline,this
powerfulinstrument of knowledgebecame a tool in the hands of
thehomofaberas a sourceof "sagacious inventionsforthedelight
of ingeniousspirits".The technicalspecializationof scienceled to
the spiritualisolationof the human genius. Seen fromthis angle
the divine aspirationof Galileo is not merelyan episode in the
historyof scienceand philosophy.Now morethanever it appears
to be the conditionforthe success of humaneffortsin the secular
strugglefor scientificenlightenment.
LEONARDOOLSCHKI
bei Galilei"in
undWahrheitsproblem
*2 Cf. E. Cassirer,"Wahrheitsbegriff
ScientiaLXII (0937) I2i et seq. and I85 et seq.

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