GMIC Project France Report 15012024.9.33

Communications,
media and
internet
concentration in
France, 2019-2021
www.gmicp.org
GMIC Project – France Report 2024
Contributors
Bruno LEFEVRE, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Sorbonne Paris Nord

University, LabEx ICCA
Philippe BOUQUILLION, Professor, Sorbonne Paris Nord University,

Director of the LabEx ICCA
Acknowledgements
This report is an initial summary of the work carried out in France in 2022
and 2023 by the Excellence Laboratory on Cultural Industries and Art
Creation - LabEx ICCA - as part of the international Global Media and
Internet Concentration - GMIC - project coordinated by Dwayne Winseck,
of the University of Carleton, Canada. The project covers 38 countries and
aims to assess the evolution of economic concentration in around thirty
sectors of activity over the long term (from the 80's to 2027). This project
follows on from previous work by Eli Noam between 2009 and 2016. The
GMIC project is actively supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada (SSHRC), to which we would like to express
our sincere thanks. We would also like to extend our warmest thanks to
the French departments responsible for regulating and analysing the
telecoms, cultural and creative industries markets, in particular the
Ministry of Culture (DGMIC), the CNC, Arcom and Arcep, whose work has
been a valuable source of information.
Recommended citation
Lefevre, B. & Bouquillion, P. (2023). “Communications, Media and Internet

Concentration in France Report, 2019-2021.” Global Media and Internet
Concentration Project. https://doi.org/10.22215/gmicp/2024.2

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Contents
Executive summary .................................................................................................... i
Introduction ................................................................................................................ 1
Media concentration: What to study, why, and how? ........................................... 2
Observing and analyzing media concentration.............................................................. 4
Concentration in the cultural and media industries in France: Discussion, debate
and research ....................................................................................................................... 4
Originality and methodological challenges .................................................................... 9
Telecoms and internet access services ................................................................. 12
Wireline ............................................................................................................................. 15
Wireless ............................................................................................................................. 16
ISPs ..................................................................................................................................... 17
Multichannel video distribution ..................................................................................... 19
Analysis of the degree of market concentration.......................................................... 21
Online media and traditional media services (content media) ......................... 23

Broadcast, pay TV, online video services ...................................................................... 25
Newspapers, magazines, radio, online news media .................................................... 27
Music services, books, digital games ............................................................................. 28
Analysis of market concentration .................................................................................. 29
Broadcast, pay TV, online video services...................................................................................... 29
Newspapers, magazines, radio, online news media..................................................................... 30
Music services, publishing, digital games ..................................................................................... 31
Core internet applications ...................................................................................... 34
Analysis of market concentration .................................................................................. 35
Internet advertising ......................................................................................................... 35
OS, search engines, browsers ......................................................................................... 37
Development and concentration trends across the communication, internet

and media ................................................................................................................. 42
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 45
References ................................................................................................................ 49

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Figures
Figure 1: Evolution of France global market revenues, 2017-2021 (current US$,

millions) ....................................................................................................................... 3
Figure 2: Revenues for the telecom and internet access services, 2019-2021
(current US$, millions) ............................................................................................. 14
Figure 3a: Evolution of wireline services revenues, 2015-2022 (current US$,
millions) ..................................................................................................................... 15
Figure 3b: Evolution of market shares of wireline services market, 2017-2021
(%) .............................................................................................................................. 15
Figure 4a: Evolution of wireless services revenues, 1998-2022 (current US$,
millions) ..................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 4b: Evolution of market share of wireless services market, 2017-2022
(%) .............................................................................................................................. 17
Figure 5a: Evolution of internet services providers revenues, 2015-2021
Figure 5b: Evolution of market share of internet services market, 2015-2021
(%) .............................................................................................................................. 18
Figure 6a: Evolution of multichannel video distribution revenues for IPTV
satellite and cable technologies, 2015-2021 (current US$, millions) ................. 19
Figure 6b: Evolution of market share of multichannel video distribution
market, 2017-2021 (%) ............................................................................................. 20
Figure 7: CR4 Scores for the telecom and internet access services, 2019-2021
(based on revenue) .................................................................................................. 21
Figure 8: HHI Scores for the telecom and internet access services, 2019-2021
(based on revenue) .................................................................................................. 22
Figure 9: Revenues for online media and traditional media services, 2019-2021
Figure 10: Revenues 2016-2021 and market share 2021 for audiovisual
services (current US$, millions) .............................................................................. 26
Figure 11: CR4 Scores for online media and traditional media services, 2019-
2021 (based on revenue) ......................................................................................... 30
Figure 12: HHI for online media and traditional media services, 2019-2021
(based on revenue) .................................................................................................. 31

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Figure 13: Revenues for core internet sectors, 2019-2021 (current US$,
millions) ..................................................................................................................... 34
Figure 14: CR4 Scores for core internet sectors, 2019-2021 ............................... 35
Figure 15a: Revenues for digital advertising, 2013-2022 (current US$, millions)
.................................................................................................................................... 36
Figure 15b: Revenues for digital advertising, 2019-2022 (current US$, millions)
.................................................................................................................................... 36
Figure 16: HHI scores for core internet sectors, 2019-2021 ................................ 37
Figure 17a: Operating system market share for desktop, 2016-2021 (% users)
.................................................................................................................................... 38
Figure 17b: Operating system market share for mobile, 2016-2021 (% users) 38
Figure 18: Search engines market share, 2016-2021 (% users) .......................... 39
Figure 19a: Web browser market share for mobile, 2016-2021 (% users) ........ 40
Figure 19b: Web browser market share for desktop, 2016-2021 (% users) ...... 41
Figure 20: Development of network and media industries, 2019-2021 (current
US$, millions) ............................................................................................................ 42
Figure 21: CR4 scores for the network media economy, 2019-2021 .................. 43
Figure 22: Leading communications-internet and media companies in France,
2021* (current US$, millions).................................................................................. 44

i
Analyzing the Communications,

Internet, and Media Industries
Insights from the Global Media &
Internet Concentration Project—France
Executive summary
This report is part of an international research programme. However, because it focuses
specifically on around thirty French markets, it is intended to contribute to the
reflections, debates and research carried out in France, both within laboratories and by
public institutions. As such, this report incorporates contemporary economic players
present in one or more of the markets analysed, sometimes via diversified activities or
forms. Many cultural industry sectors (press, audiovisual, books, music) are now
structured around 'traditional' players and 'new' entrants, particularly those whose
activities are based on digital services. In addition, this study provides both a sector-
based and a global analysis, making it possible to highlight the diversity of the activities
of a single economic group, and therefore to assess changes over time in both vertical
integration strategies and convergence and diversification strategies. Finally, the
analysis of factual data, both economic and audience, makes it possible to characterise
the evolution over time of a dual dynamic of diversification of offerings and
concentration of final owners, a dynamic which essentially concerns the activities of
production, distribution and broadcasting of cultural and information content.
The methodological pitfalls and limitations of this study are explained below.
The broadcasting of audiovisual content (free and pay TV, content and VoD platforms) is
a second type of service that combines major global trends with the specific features of
each activity. Broadcasting, whether free or pay, is still dominated by national, public
and private players (mainly the France TV, Canal+ and TF1 groups), despite very strong
growth in this sector since the 2000s, including from foreign audiovisual groups. Online,
despite several national and European attempts, the broadcasting of audiovisual
content remains dominated by North American platforms. These dominant offerings
are supplemented by numerous niche services, either from independent economic
players or from national audiovisual groups.
The French audiovisual markets appear relatively concentrated (CR4 of 70 to 80), but
without a monopolistic position of any of these groups, whether national or
international (HHI of 800 for online video services, 3500 for broadcast TV, and 4500 for
pay TV). The total volume of these markets is around $12 billion a year, of which more
than 75% is for TV and 25% for online video services. The business models of all these

ii
players are undergoing a process of hybridization in France. This is taking the form of
partnerships between national broadcasters and international platform owners, as well
as with ISPs. Distribution and broadcasting agreements are becoming a structuring
factor in these markets, where overall growth has tended to slow since 2020. Here
again, public policies to regulate broadcasting, extended to all broadcasters of
audiovisual content, constitute a constraining framework for the balance of power
between transnational groups and local leaders.
A cross-sectional analysis of the audiovisual, media and cultural goods industries

highlights their increasing financialisation and concentration in the hands of a few
business leaders active in France and abroad. Through acquisitions and net
integrations, as well as through takeovers of decision-making bodies and through
capital participation, some investment companies and industrial groups are expanding
and diversifying their business portfolios. This phenomenon particularly affects the
media (newspapers, TV, magazines, radio) and book publishing (production and
distribution). These activities are characterised by CR4 concentration indices that
increased by 10 points between 2019 and 2021, reaching values of between 70 and 90,
with a trend towards monopoly situations. These trends also pose major challenges in
terms of diversity of opinion and freedom of expression, with economic concentration
having a negative impact on cultural diversity.
Finally, a third group of activities concerns interface services between users and digital
services: operating systems, web browsers, search engines, but also application
distributors and social networking platforms. These transnational activities are largely
dominated by a handful of North American groups (Alphabet, Apple, Microsoft, Meta,
Amazon). The main impact of this domination, and even of these duopolies in favour of
foreign groups, is a major transfer of the advertising market to these digital services
(including Alphabet and Amazon), at the expense of traditional media and broadcasters.
The online advertising market will reach 9.6 billion dollars in 2022, compared with 3
billion in 2013, with annual growth of 10-20%. France is one of the world's top ten
markets in this sector. In 2022, 44.5% ($4 billion) of digital advertising spending will be
on search engines, and 25% ($2.2 billion) on social networks. These revenues have
quadrupled since 2010. Overall, basic internet services have grown from 8.1 billion
dollars in 2019 to 10.5 billion dollars in 2021, mainly via online advertising and the
distribution of apps.
A cross-sectional analysis based on revenues shows that the four leaders in the French
market are the telecoms operators, due to their control of networks, access to digital
services and their role as content distributors. The next largest groups are Alphabet and
then Vivendi and Lagardère. The latter’s businesses were merged in 2023 via the
acquisition by Vivendi. The dynamics of concentration affecting certain sectors are
closely monitored by national and European regulators, with the aim of avoiding
monopoly positions because of their potential negative impact on the diversity of
opinions and forms of expression. Public regulators also try to limit the influence of
transnational players by forcing them to adapt to national regulations, through taxation,
investment obligations and quotas for local works.

1
Introduction
The French markets linked to the internet, audiovisual and other cultural content cover
a wide range of professions and players, subject to specific public policies and
regulations. In France, these economic sectors are for the most part organised around
large public and private groups. Action by public regulators, both at national and
European level, has made it possible to severely limit the influence of foreign groups on
these markets, and to prevent vertical integration strategies from leading to the
domination of industrial groups, whether national or international.
For cost reasons in particular, the network infrastructure sectors appear to be relatively
concentrated around four private players with relatively comparable market shares.
Similarly, but for reasons of transnational strategy, the core Internet sectors appear to
be dominated by a few large industrial groups. On the other hand, diversification is
strong in the communication, media and cultural industries sectors, with a CR4 that
tends to increase between 2019 (62.2) and 2021 (64.4). At least, in terms of services,
offerings are tending to grow in most of these sectors. On the other hand, some groups
are present in several of these sectors as a result of diversification strategies, through
acquisitions or takeovers. While this economic concentration concerns four or five
players, it leads some of them to approach near-dominant, or even quasi-monopolistic,
positions when we look at all media or audiovisual activities. These dynamics of
concentration tend to strengthen from 2019 onwards.

2
Media concentration: What to study,

why, and how?
Historically, the French state has developed or supported state-owned groups in the
telecoms (France Telecom, active internationally, privatised in 2013 and since named
Orange), audiovisual (France Télévisions) and radio (Radio France) sectors. The market
shares of these players remain dominant in their sectors. In 1984, the French
government also encouraged the Havas advertising group, owned by the Vivendi group,
to create Canal+, which has since become a major national and international player in
the production and broadcasting of films and audiovisual programmes. Vivendi also has
significant market shares in the traditional and online media, music, live entertainment
and publishing sectors, through the acquisition of groups (including Lagardère in 2023)
and control of decision-making bodies. Vivendi is a central player in these French
markets, to the extent that the risk of a de facto monopoly position is being monitored
by the public authorities. Other industrial groups, in particular those controlled by
investors from sectors other than communications and media, have significant market
shares in these same media and audiovisual sectors: Bouygues, Altice, Iliad and
Germany's Bertelsmann.
These factors have led us to analyse the data collected in two complementary ways. On
the one hand, we assess economic concentration by comparing market shares in terms
of revenues; this analysis must compare both the companies that provide a service and
the groups to which they belong (final owners) or by which they are controlled. On the
other hand, economic concentration also takes its meaning from the measurement of
audience share, which is significant for the media and audiovisual sectors in terms of its
impact on the population.
The various telecoms, media and cultural content sectors on the French market have of
course been characterized since the 2000s by changes in technology and usage,
including massive growth in the use of the internet and digital formats. The mobile
telecoms and internet access markets have grown from $8.6 billion in 2000 to $16.5
billion in 2022, and from $3 billion in 2004 to $15.3 billion in 2022, at the expense of the
wireline market, which has shrunk by more than 60% between 2015 and 2022. Overall
revenues in the ISP and wireless sectors are by far the highest of all the markets
observed (see Figure 1).
Similarly, but to a lesser extent, digital services for broadcasting audiovisual content
have grown ($2.4bn in 2021 compared with $2.2bn in 2016), at the expense of free
($6.2bn in 2021) or pay ($3bn in 2021 compared with $3.7bn in 2011) broadcasting
services, whose revenues nevertheless remain much higher than online video services,
driven by SVoD ($9.2bn compared with $2.4bn). A similar situation is affecting the press
sector, with the overall market showing little change ($7bn* in 2017 compared with

3
$6.5bn* in 2021), but with a partial transfer of revenues (around 7%), particularly
advertising revenues, from print to digital. The online advertising sector has also grown
significantly, from $3 billion in 2013 to $9.5 billion in 2022 (over 300% growth in less
than ten years), leading media groups to review their business models. While most of
the incumbent media outlets have reduced their web presence, a number of pure
players are taking market share in this sector. However, the online advertising market is
still heavily dominated by the GAFAMs, and therefore mainly benefits non-national
groups. Finally, relatively young economic sectors, such as video games, have seen
strong growth from $4.8 billion in 2017 to $6 billion in 2022.
Figure 1: Evolution of France global market revenues, 2017-2021 (current US$,

millions)
80,000
70,000
Revenue (current US$, millions)
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2019 2020 2021
Wireless Internet Service Providers Internet Advertising

Broadcast TV Digital Games Multichannel Video Distribution
Newspapers Pay TV Wireline
Magazines Online Video Services App Distribution
Radio Music Services Online News Media

4
Observing and analyzing media concentration
Structurally, the French communications infrastructure and services sectors appear to

be relatively stable over time, concentrated around a small number of players, most of
them French, but with no risk of monopoly. Moreover, the public regulatory authorities
are keeping a watchful eye on both the industrial and commercial dimensions. On the
other hand, the dynamics of economic concentration, which began at the end of the
twentieth century but are tending to accelerate, especially if majority shareholdings are
included, raise a number of ethical and democratic issues. On this point, having factual
data on the market shares of economic players provides a first level of information both
for characterising the balance of power within these markets and for identifying over-
time dynamics.
The media must also obviously be considered in their symbolic dimension as essential
contributors to the public good and producers of symbolic and political representations.
In other words, the companies that produce, distribute and broadcast this content
contribute to the construction of representations of the world and social relations. This
cultural content has a political dimension. For this reason, characterising the levels and
dynamics of economic concentration in these markets provides us with information
about industrial strategies and major economic trends, as well as helping to identify
issues to be studied in greater detail.
This study, which forms part of the GMIC research being carried out in 38 countries, lays
the foundations for a macro-economic analysis. Other academic research programmes
are providing complementary analyses to this study. At the European level, we are
collaborating in particular on the European Media Ownership research programme,
which aims to assess the ability of citizens in 27 countries to access information
enabling ownership or control of media companies to be established. At the same time,
we are taking part in more qualitative research, particularly into the problems of
cultural diversity in SVoD services in Europe. The central challenge of this research,
which is aimed at analysing long-term economic dynamics on a local and international
scale, lies in linking up the results in order, for the first time, to have access to factual
and analytical data on the power relationships between industrial groups in fluctuating
and heterogeneously regulated markets, within specific historical frameworks.
Concentration in the cultural and media industries in

France: Discussion, debate and research
Concentration in the cultural and media industries has been the subject of much debate
and research in France in recent years. This attention has increased as globalisation has
deepened and information and communication technologies have spread, raising
increasingly important issues for the cultural and media industries. These reflections

5
have been developed in very different social spheres: the academic world; public and
political authorities, including departments of the Ministry of Culture and Parliament;
activist groups; journalists; professional unions and representatives of media and
cultural industries.
Interest in this subject may correspond to three major objectives which are not mutually
exclusive: measuring the degree of concentration in the media and cultural industries
markets; questioning public policies relating to concentration; denouncing the dangers
of concentration for pluralism of information and cultural diversity or, on the contrary,
in the name of the same objectives, arguing in favour of an increase in concentration in
these different markets.
A first observation regarding the measurement of concentration is that only a small

number of academic or consultancy studies have sought to measure as accurately as
possible the level of concentration in France in the media and cultural industries
markets as a whole. In this respect, prior to the current survey reported in this report,
the previous research conducted under the direction of Eli Noam and carried out in
France by Patrick-Yves Badillo, Dominique Bourgeois and Dominique Lesourd (2016) is
singular.
Other attempts to measure concentration have been made, but only at the level of a
single sector, with different methodologies depending on the study and not necessarily
made explicit. What's more, access to these studies is often on a commercial basis and
with high fees being levied. They are not accessible to the general public. One example
is the study by the consultancy firm Xerfi on the French book market in 20231. Other
comparable studies may be carried out by or at the request of independent regulatory
authorities, such as the study commissioned by ARCOM on concentration in the
audiovisual production market in France2. Because of the lack of a cross-sectoral
dimension, comparisons between sectors are not possible and cross-sectoral logics are
not highlighted, while some sectors are not studied at all.
Furthermore, without seeking to produce a precise measure of market concentration,

various research programs aim to study the strategies of major industrial players. This
research can be either sector-based or transversal to the different sectors of the media
and Internet cultural industries. Sectoral research has focused on capital mergers within
a particular sector at the initiative of a small number of industrial players forming an
oligopoly. For example, Jean-Yves Mollier (2022) studies the history of concentration in
the French book industry from this angle. Other research, developed in the 1990s and
2000s on the initiative of the Department of Studies, Forecasting and Statistics (DEPS) of
the Ministry of Culture, has focused on the strategies of the major industrial players in
1
Xerfi, (2023), L'édition de livres en France, https://www.xerfi.com/presentationetude/le-marche-de-l-
edition-de-livres_COM07
2 ARCOM, 2022, Etude sur le tissu économique du secteur de la production audiovisuelle, 6th edition,
March, https://www.audiens.org/files/live/sites/siteAudiens/files/03_documents/groupe/Etudes/Etude-sur-
le-tissu-economique-secteur-production-audiovis

6
this field. For example, two series of studies commissioned by DEPS but carried out by
academic researchers focused on major industrial players in the US, Japan, Europe and
France (see Bouquillion, Miège, Moriset, 2006). The aim was to gain a better
understanding of the rationale behind the creation of media giants at a time when
globalisation was taking hold following the signing of the WTO agreements in 1994 and
the liberalisation of trade in services.
The context at the time was also one of anticipated convergence between the media,
telecommunications and IT, so the aim was also to understand the extent to which the
strategies of these major players (AOL-Time-Warner, Vivendi Universal, Disney News
Corporation, Bertelsmann, Lagardère, Groupe Bouygues, Fininvest, Microsoft, Apple,
Amazon, Sony, etc.) were inspired by convergence and helped to implement it. For each
of these industrial players, the study documented their industrial positioning (in the
various sectors of the cultural and media industries, but also in telecommunications
and electronic equipment), their geographical positioning (in particular to understand
whether they were likely to set up in France and threaten national players) and the
financial dimension of their business. In this respect, the study looked not only at their
shareholding structure, but also at the methods used to finance growth operations, in
order to understand how the move towards financialisation was impacting on their
activities and their capacity for external growth, and thus influencing the balance of
power between French and foreign players.
Second, there has been an ongoing debate in France since the 1980s on public policies
relating to concentration. The aim here is to assess the degree of relevance of public
policies in relation to two issues: firstly, support for national industrial champions and,
secondly, digital transformations. The latter are generally seen as presenting two
challenges linked to concentration: an increase in the number of suppliers and the
number of cultural products on offer, while distribution, despite the diversification of
access routes for consumers, is described as being increasingly controlled by a small
number of players, including the Big Five, and as eluding those firms in the cultural and
media industries. Faced with these two major challenges, the public authorities are
questioning the position of French players in the cultural and media industries in
relation to the global media giants and, since the 2010s, in relation to the global internet
giants.
These considerations mainly concern certain cultural and media industries (books, news
media, cinema and audiovisual). In other sectors, either a very high degree of
concentration seems inevitable and/or without too many harmful consequences (this is
the case for the recorded music market, for example). In this case, the experts usually
underline that other forms of public action can be mobilised, including support for so-
called independent industrial players or promotion of the discoverability of French or
French-speaking content, especially that produced by independents, or video games
and recorded music. Either the high degree of concentration appears to call for new
public policy measures, or the old rules relating to the cultural and media industries
dating essentially from the 1980s appear to be outdated, particularly since the
deployment of digital platforms. These rules essentially consist of setting thresholds for

7
control of a given relevant market (in radio, television and the news media), limitations
on cross-shareholdings in different markets or sub-markets (for example, local and
national news media) and thresholds for ownership by the same industrial player (in
broadcasting).
Two recent reports from the sphere can be cited as examples. In a report co-written in
2022 by the Inspection Générale des Finances and the Inspection Générale des Affaires
Culturelles, it is stated:
"Sector merger control appears to be inappropriate and complex in more

ways than one. Firstly, it is ill-suited to the digital revolution, taking into
account only the terrestrial audiovisual media and the paper press, in a
compartmentalised approach to the media that no longer corresponds to
the convergence phenomena at work. In addition, the thresholds set in
the law for the first part apply automatically and do not allow the sector
to be "fine-tuned", as the Autorité de la concurrence can do when it
authorises a transaction subject to compliance with structural or
behavioural commitments. Finally, the fact that the legislator has raised
certain thresholds to expressly facilitate certain specific transactions
undermines the main advantage of an approach based on thresholds,
namely its predictability and stability. The need for an overhaul of this
system is therefore a long-standing and shared observation, which the
mission's work confirms" (p.2).
Likewise, a 2022 Senate report on media concentration in France (Assouline, 2022) takes
up the same arguments. It states that: "the hearings conducted by the commission of
enquiry were the occasion for a unanimous denunciation of the law of 30 September
1986" (Senate, 2021: 319). The authors of the report add that the current regulations
ignore the fact that the traditional news media have lost influence to the platforms. This
loss of influence is linked in particular to the fact that gatekeepers capture a large part
of the added value linked to the production of information, which increases the long-
standing economic difficulties of the news media in France. The same report also points
out that the methods used to calculate the thresholds are complex, questionable and
vary from sector to sector.
The third observation is that there is a very large number of reflections on the editorial
challenges of concentration, either to show that it constitutes a threat to the pluralism
of information and to cultural diversity or to show that, on the contrary, it is the
indispensable condition for diversity and pluralism. These heated debates used to focus
on two sectors: the news media and the book industry. However, with the deployment
of digital platforms, they have spread to all sectors in recent years, and particularly to
the film and audiovisual industries.
The reasoning is different depending on whether the protagonists want to attack

concentration or, on the contrary, defend it. The former attempt to measure the degree
of concentration by listing the hold of a small number of major industrial players over a
large number of media. One of the most active groups in this field is ACRIMED (Action -

8
Cristique - Médias). ACRIMED publishes "a map of the French media landscape, which
helps to untangle the web of concentration in the ownership of major media”3. These
data, produced in conjunction with Le Monde Diplomatique, a newspaper that is very
committed to the left of the political spectrum, are periodically updated and are reliable.
The idea put forward is that shareholders seek to control the content offered by the
media they own in order to influence the political public arena, either in relation to the
political orientations of the final shareholders (individuals) or in order to promote their
economic interests outside the media and cultural sphere (for example, in the case of
industrial players operating in public markets).
On the other hand, proponents of concentration tend to refer to "economic theory",

and in particular to Steiner's model (1952). For example, Alain Lancelot's emblematic
report on concentration and pluralism in the French media in 2005, made direct
reference to it. Similarly, Nathalie Sonnac (2009) draws direct inspiration from this when
she discusses the magazine press:
"The concentration of activities within a single company is often accompanied by

a policy of "multi-product niches", partly motivated by the search for advertising
targets specialising in certain specific categories of consumers. The magazine
market is particularly significant in this respect: the number of players has never
been so small, yet the number of titles has never been so large". (Sonnac, 2009,
p.34)
In a recent popular science radio broadcast, this same researcher again defended the
link between concentration and pluralism4.
This debate is all the more sensitive in France because the representatives of industrial
interests are very active in defending the supposed advantages of concentration for
diversity and pluralism. This leads them to oppose concentration and diversity or
pluralism on the one hand, and public policies and, in particular, the French policy of
cultural exception on the other (Bouquillion, 2019).
In 2001, Jean-Marie Messier, then the president of the world's number two media
company, Vivendi Universal, highlighted the notion of cultural diversity against that of
cultural exception: "responding [...] to the fear of certain producers and filmmakers
from France who questioned an 'Americanization of French cinema', Vivendi's boss has
bluntly rejected all the criticisms: 'The French cultural exception died', he said, 'and
French anguish is archaic'" (Rousselot 2001). Messier emphasized the power of a
transnational, globalized industrial group to achieve cultural objectives, in this case
cultural diversity, while cultural exception was considered to be a vestige of the past,
from times preceding globalization.
3
Source: https://www.acrimed.org/Medias-francais-qui-possede-quoi
4
See https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceculture/podcasts/l-invite-e-des-matins-d-ete/concentration-des-
medias-la-qualite-de-l-information-en-peril-6019342

9
Some have tried, like Bernard Miège (2000 and 2007), to emphasise that no mechanical
links can be deduced, one way or the other, between concentration and changes in
editorial content.
In conclusion of this very schematic review of studies on concentration, the singular

nature of the present research emerges very strongly: it is the only attempt to measure
concentration precisely, cross-sectorally, cross-nationally with explicit and common
methodologies, and whose results are, moreover, openly available.
Originality and methodological challenges
The aim of the research we present here is to collect and analyse economic data in a
range of sectors. The diversity of these sectors is an initial advantage. On the one hand,
the comparative analysis of these sectors of activity makes it possible to situate the
volume of their respective markets. This is useful for us to put into perspective the
growth of certain sectors and the financial volumes involved. This diversity also provides
a global view of interdependent activities, from infrastructures to broadcasting services,
via production and development activities. Few French or international studies tackle
such a broad spectrum. Finally, this diversity makes it possible to identify industrial
groups active in several of the sectors, which makes it possible to understand their
economic strategy (vertical integration or diversification of business lines) as well as to
assess the domination or control of groups in these different markets.
One of the methodological challenges we faced was defining the scope of the business
sectors analysed. This is an important issue. On the one hand, it responds to the need
for the analysis carried out at the French level to be compatible with those carried out in
the other countries participating in the GMIC project. However, beyond a common
definition, these perimeters also refer to market structures that can vary greatly from
one country to another. Furthermore, the definition of the boundaries of the sectors of
activity also has an impact on the quality of the data collected or calculated: depending
on the sources of these data, the perimeters and definitions of economic activities can
vary, which can make it complex, if not impossible, to establish reliable and
representative data.
In France, many institutions and public bodies produce annual reports on this topic,
particularly as a result of strong public regulation. We give priority to these official data
sources, both for their reliability and for their regularity over time. One of the challenges
of the GMIC programme is to enable the data to be monitored over time, which implies
a methodology and a sustainable source of data production. However, these studies,
analyses and reports generally provide macro-economic data: overall market volumes,
annual comparisons, and sometimes market shares by audience or leading economic
players. We therefore consider such data sources to be reliable and sustainable for
assessing changes in general trends.

10
However, it is rare to have financial or economic information for each group or

company active on a market, either because it is covered by business secrecy or
because it is not explicitly broken down by activity. In addition to this general,
aggregated data, we must therefore use other types of sources, some of which are less
durable and reliable: company or group activity reports, studies by consultancy firms,
legal publications. In order to minimize the bias that could be generated by this
heterogeneity of information sources, we have defined calculation methods for each
sector studied, based on its economic scope, which are more or less reliable depending
on the markets observed. The presence of transnational groups, whose profit and loss
accounts make no distinction between the different territories in which they are active,
also implies evaluations and estimates that are open to discussion.
For example, it is complex to distinguish between the revenues of an audiovisual group

active in several countries in the production of films and audiovisual content, as well as
games and animated films, in the distribution of this content, and in its broadcasting
through a variety of channels and formats (theatres, public or private broadcasting,
replay online, VoD by subscription, by advertising, or free...). This complexity is
compounded if we wish to distinguish between revenues from public funding,
subscriptions, pay-per-view, the sale of advertising space, the sale of services to other
companies or the exploitation of intellectual property rights.
Finally, with the limitations mentioned above, the assessment of economic

concentration itself can be based on two main types of data: revenues, in relation to the
overall revenues of the sector concerned, or audience, which is significant in terms of
the relative influence of a service provided on the country's population. This distinction
has more or less importance depending on the sector of activity analysed: little impact
for Internet access providers, due to offers at relatively similar rates, but a significant
impact when looking at the press, radio or television.
Two main economic indicators are used to assess the concentration of a sector of
activity and the situations or risks of monopolies. On the one hand, the CR4 index,
calculated by adding the market shares of the four market leaders, provides
information on the diversity of the significant economic players. We will see that this
indicator is close to 100 in the telecoms sector (four companies cover the entire
wireline, wireless and internet access markets) and in the distribution of mobile
applications (Apple and Alphabet share this market). In other sectors, this indicator is
relatively low, at around 60, for the media or audiovisual and film production.
A second concentration indicator used in this study is the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index

(HHI), calculated by adding together the squares of the market shares of all the players
present on this market. The higher the HHI (which can fluctuate between 1,000 and
10,000), the more concentrated the market. The average difference between the
(squares of the) market shares indicates whether the dominant player has a monopoly,
or even a duopoly.

11
We present here our research results for the period 2019-2021. Some data is available
for earlier periods, and will be referred to here in order to place recent market
dynamics in a longer perspective.

12
Telecoms and internet access services

The French electronic communications markets are regulated on behalf of the State by
the Autorité de Régulation des communications électroniques, des postes et de la
distribution de la presse – ARCEP5. ARCEP is an independent administrative authority
created in 1997 to manage the opening up of the electronic communications sector to
competition. Until this date, the market was monopolised by the public operator France
Telecom (now renamed Orange). Since then, ARCEP ensured the development of digital
services throughout the country and its activities have helped to limit foreign operators'
access to the French mobile telephony market, in particular by limiting the market to 4
mobile licences.
Historically, the market for fixed-line services (telephone and internet access) and
mobile services has thus been relatively stable, structured around four companies
headquartered in France:
• Orange, founded in the UK in 1994, was bought out in 2000 by the state-owned
operator France Télécom (a public limited company created in 1988 in response to
the European directive opening up the telecommunications market to competition
and in which the French state is the sole shareholder).
• SFR, founded in 1987 by Générale des Eaux (fluid distribution), now owned by the
Altice group.
• Bouygues Telecom, founded in 1994 by the Bouygues group (construction,
technical services, telecoms, media), which is still the majority shareholder.
• Free, founded in 2012 by the Iliad group (internet and mobile provider), which is
still the majority shareholder.
The first consumer internet access offering dates back to 1995, and until 1998, when the
market was opened up to competition, the public operator France Télécom had a
monopoly on the telecommunications market. Despite numerous attempts by
operators, including MVNOs, to penetrate this market, the four mentioned above have
structured the service offering since the 2010s. It is noteworthy that SFR and Bouygues
Telecom are the initiative of industrial groups in the construction and development of
fluid networks (Compagnie Générale des Eaux and Bouygues). Iliad, the parent company
of Free, is a pure player that has been offering commercially aggressive internet and
mobile services since the 2010s, in particular by taking advantage of the unbundling of
France Telecom's networks by other operators.
These four operators share the fixed telephony, mobile telephony and internet access
markets, including virtual offers. These same players dominate around 60% of the
market for access to other operators' channel packages and video subscriptions
(multichannel video distribution), alongside satellite distributors (EutelSat and the
5
See online: https://www.arcep.fr

13
Canal+ group, 30% of the market by 2021) and, to a lesser extent, cable distributors
(Numericable, 10% market share).
ARPU for fixed services (telephony and internet) has been relatively stable over time
since the 2010s, at just under $44 per month. By contrast, ARPU for mobile services has
been falling steadily over the past 15 years, from $31 per month in 2006 to around $22.
The recent development of subscriptions to the 5G network is tending to push this
average income up again.
The French market, which has been relatively stable since the 2010s, is therefore
characterised by strong public regulation, which has structured the service offering
around four main operators. Orange, which emerged from the former state-owned
France Telecom, remains dominant across all services, with a market share of around
40% in terms of both subscriber numbers and revenues. SFR and Free compete with
around 20% market share each. Bouygues stands out on the mobile market (24%
market share in 2021) but lags behind with around 14% of revenues in fixed-line and
internet access.
The data analysed for these sectors comes mainly from ARCEP and the European
Audiovisual Observatory6, which produce annual global or market-specific studies and
analyses.
“ARPU for mobile services

has been falling steadily over
the past 15 years, from $31
per month in 2006 to around
$22. The recent development
of subscriptions to the 5G
network is tending to push
this average income up
again.”
6
See online: https://www.obs.coe.int/

14
The following sections detail the markets for fixed telephony, mobile telephony, internet
access and video content distribution services provided by third parties (excluding
telecom operators).
As a result of technological development and the growth in telephony (5G) and internet
(very high-speed fibre) usage, this sector has been growing steadily since the late 1990s,
and has stabilised in recent years at around $41 billion.
Figure 2: Revenues for the telecom and internet access services, 2019-2021 (current
US$, millions)
45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2019 2020 2021
Wireline Wireless
Internet Service Providers Multichannel Video Distribution
Total
Thanks to internet access, and in particular the offsetting of the decline in dial-up
revenues by those from broadband and ultra-broadband access (90% of revenues by
2022), wireline revenues (telephony and internet access) have been broadly stable over
the past 10 years, fluctuating between $15 billion and $19 billion.

15
Wireline
The overall wireline market is declining over time: $6 billion in 2015, $2,3 billion in 2022,
down 61% in 7 years.
Figure 3a: Evolution of wireline services revenues, 2015-2022 (current US$, millions)
6,000
Revenue (curret US$, millions)
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Figure 3b: Evolution of market shares of wireline services market, 2017-2021 (%)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
Market share
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Orange Illiad Free Altice SFR Bouygues Telecom Others

16
As in other telecoms activities, the Orange group (formerly France Telecom) is the
leader with a market share of around 40%. Bouygues Telecom and Altice compete for
around 20% of the market each. Iliad Free, which entered the telecoms market in 2009,
has made little headway in the fixed telephony market, focusing instead on internet
access and triple play.
Wireless
The French wireless market comprises mobile subscriptions for individuals and
businesses, the machine-to-machine market, and associated services. It therefore does
not include fixed services and broadband internet access.
This market peaked in 2010 at $21.3 billion, then fell until 2018 and has since grown
again, partly due to 5G technology: $15 billion in 2017; $16.7 billion in 2022.
Figure 4a: Evolution of wireless services revenues, 1998-2022 (current US$, millions)
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
1998 2000 2004 2008 2011 2013 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

17
Figure 4b: Evolution of market share of wireless services market, 2017-2022 (%)
100%
90%
80%
70%
Market share
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Orange Altice SFR Bouygues Telecom Illiad Free
As the incumbent network operator, controlled by the French state, Orange dominates
the French wireless market, with around 40% of revenues and around 35% of users.
The market is therefore stable overall. The main battles are between SFR and Bouygues
Telecom, against a backdrop where Free has gradually built up a market share of
around 15%. Bouygues Telecom has overtaken its rival SFR in 2021, both in terms of the
number of subscribers (20.95% compared with 18.10% in 2021) and revenues (24.2%
compared with 21.6% in 2021).
The operators Orange, SFR and Bouygues Telecom, sometimes in partnership, have
developed around thirty virtual operators - MVNOs, in particular to diversify their
targets and consolidate their positions.
Free has developed a strategy of offering commercial services at prices that are often
lower than those of its competitors, coupled with Internet access.
ISPs
The Internet access market alone is growing every year, from $3 billion in 2004 to $15.3
billion in 2021. The number of French households connected to the internet has risen
from 4% in 1998 to 85% in 2022, with a peak of 86% in 2018 and 2019. Recent very high-
speed technologies, particularly fibre optics, will boost this market by 2023.

18
Figure 5a: Evolution of internet services providers revenues, 2015-2021 (current US$,
millions)
18,000
16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Figure 5b: Evolution of market share of internet services market, 2015-2021 (%)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
Market share
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Orange Illiad Free Altice SFR Bouygues Telecom Others/MVNO

19
Orange also remains the leader in the internet access market. On the other hand, the
Iliad/Free group, which entered the market with a highly competitive offer, has gained
market share from its competitors SFR/Altice and Bouygues Telecom. MVNOs, although
present, still account for less than 5% of the market. By 2022, the opening-up of the
fibre-optic market will tend to reinforce the leading positions of Orange and Free/Iliad.
Multichannel video distribution
This sector covers technical infrastructure services for video and audiovisual access,
marketed via satellite (Sat), cable (Cable) or Internet Protocol (IPTV) connections.
Historically, satellite was considerably deployed in the 2000s, gradually replaced by IPTV
and, to a lesser extent, cable in collective infrastructures. IPTV is commercially
associated with a broadband internet access offer, or Triple Play offer, and technically
requires a TV decoder. The leading technology compared with cable and satellite, which
are experiencing a sharp decline in growth, the IPTV market will continue to grow after
2021, notably as a result of the roll-out of very high-speed fibre optics. As in other
telecoms sectors, the players in the French market are exclusively French.
Overall, all technologies combined, this market is relatively stable over the 2015-2021
period, at $5.3 billion.
Figure 6a: Evolution of multichannel video distribution revenues for IPTV satellite
and cable technologies, 2015-2021 (current US$, millions)
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
IPTV Satellite Cable Total Revenue

20
Figure 6b: Evolution of market share of multichannel video distribution market,

2017-2021 (%)
100%
90%
80%
70%
Market share
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Orange (IPTV) Vivendi Canal+ (Sat) Eutel Sat (Sat)

Iliad Free (IPTV) Alitce SFR (IPTV) Altice Numericable (Cable)
Bouygues Telecom (IPTV) Others
This sector includes the four incumbent operators active in the Internet access market
(Orange, Altice/SFR, Iliad/Free and Bouygues Telecom). Orange's market share has
collapsed in 2020 (from 24% in 2019 to 9%). This was to the benefit of the other three
operators as a result of a strategic choice to prioritise the roll-out of fibre-optics across
France and xDSL lines. Orange has completely stopped its satellite connection services
in 2021.
In addition, the EutelSat and Canal+ groups share the satellite connection market, which
has been in steady decline since 2010. Their respective market shares (around 15% in
terms of revenue) are, in fact, shrinking. The Altice group, which also owns SFR, offers a
cable connection on the French market under the Numéricable brand, which is also
losing significant market share (from 7.5% to 2.5% between 2019 and 2020) as a result
of very high-speed fibre-optic technologies.

21
Analysis of the degree of market concentration
The four sectors observed are relatively concentrated, with four national players
covering the entire market in terms of revenues (CR4 close to 100), and 90% in terms of
subscribers (if MVNOs are included).
Figure 7: CR4 Scores for the telecom and internet access services, 2019-2021 (based
on revenue)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
CR4 score
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2019 2020 2021
Wireline Wireless
Internet Access Multichannel Video Distribution
Telecoms & Internet Access
However, despite Orange's market dominance, variations between market shares are
relatively small, which characterises a market that is both structured and stable and
driven by distinct groups, including their ownerships and strategies, with no risk of
increased monopoly, HHI scores below 3,000 and small gaps between market shares.
The concentration indices are relatively similar for the wireline, wireless and internet
access markets, confirming the stability of this cluster of four active groups. The French
Multichannel Video distribution market appears to be less concentrated, due in
particular to the presence of three groups active in cable and satellite, alongside the
four historic telecoms players.
The historical regulation of the telecoms markets by the public authorities, including via
the incumbent operator Orange, a former public company still majority governed by the

22
French state, largely explains this market structure, and in particular its closure to
transnational groups. This regulation is based on the control of licences, obligations to
share and innovate in infrastructure technology, as part of the opening-up to
competition following the state telecommunications monopoly, and the regulation of
tariffs and commercial offers to end users.
Figure 8: HHI Scores for the telecom and internet access services, 2019-2021 (based
on revenue)
3,000
2,500
2,000
HHI score
1,500
1,000
500
0
2019 2020 2021
Wireline Wireless
Internet Access Multichannel Video Distribution
Telecoms & Internet Access HHI

23
Online media and traditional media

services (content media)
This section brings together sectors of activity which often complement each other and
which aim to disseminate information content to the public, on so-called 'traditional'
media (paper, airwaves) and digital media: newspapers, magazines, online news, radio,
free and private broadcasting, and online video content aggregation services.
In France, broadcasting and digital contents markets are regulated by the national
regulatory authority for audiovisual and digital communication – ARCOM7. ARCOM is the
result of the merger in 2022 of the Broadcasting authority (Conseil supérieur de
l'audiovisuel - CSA) and the Authority for the Distribution of Works and the Protection of
Rights on the Internet (Hadopi). ARCOM thus has national authority over both the
conditions of access for foreign operators and the distribution of their content, and the
protection of intellectual property rights. It was Arcom that negotiated from 2018 to
2021 with the foreign platform industries to transpose the European directive on
audiovisual media services – SMAD - into French law8.
Overall, since the 2000s, the range of services on offer (free and pay TV channels, press
and magazine publishing, radio) has tended to diversify. In the audiovisual sector in
particular, digital formats, including Digital Terrestrial Television (2005) and the
packages associated with ISP offerings, have contributed to a significant increase in the
number of channels and services (replay, VoD) available. The overall volume of these
markets is therefore relatively stable over the period 2019-2022, at around $25bn per
year.
However, all these sectors have been marked by concentration since the 2010s, and this
trend will be even more pronounced in the publishing and audio-visual sectors in the
2020s. While most of the historic players have managed to hold on to their markets, a
number of large groups, mostly national, are capturing the main market shares either
by buying up companies or by taking control of their capital and decision-making
bodies. These concentrations of ownership mainly benefit groups whose historical
business is not in the cultural or communications industries, apart from network
industries, but which have gradually invested in these activities (Vivendi, Altice,
Lagardère, Canal+, TF1). With the exception of a few European investors (including
Czech Media Invest and the Rossel group in the press sector), foreign groups remain a
relatively small minority in the press and audiovisual sectors. They are, however, active
7
See online: https://www.arcom.fr/
8
See online: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2018/1808/oj for The SMA European Directive 2018. See
online: https://www.culture.gouv.fr/en/Presse/Communiques-de-presse/Publication-du-decret-relatif-aux-
services-de-medias-audiovisuels-a-la-demande-SMAD for French transposition 2021.

24
in the distribution of music, video games and, of course, unsynchronised content,

particularly on VoD platforms.
At European and national level, the public authorities are trying to prevent monopolies
and regulate dominant positions. In 2018, a European directive, which has since been
transposed in the member states, obliges Audiovisual Media Services - AVMS - to
comply with the law applied to traditional distributors and broadcasters. In France, the
application of this directive has, on the one hand, limited the number of foreign groups
on the French market and, on the other hand, obliged platform manufacturers to
contribute to the domestic production of audiovisual content, while at the same time
forming part of a chronology of broadcasting rights that attempts to strengthen the
structure of the film (including priority for theatrical release) and audiovisual sectors
(control of exclusive rights).
Figure 9: Revenues for online media and traditional media services, 2019-2021
(current US$, millions)
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
2019 2020 2021
Broadcast TV Digital Games Newspapers

Pay TV Magazines Online Video Services
Radio Music Services Online News Media

25
Broadcast, pay TV, online video services
The audiovisual markets are structured around three main types of player:
• historic national private companies, some of which are also developing their
production, distribution and broadcasting activities abroad
• a public producer and broadcaster
• foreign groups that offer transnational access to content, mainly via PayTV (e.g.
Bertelsmann) and above all online video services (e.g. GAFAM platforms, content
catalogue distributors and publishers, FAST channels)
These audiovisual markets in France are characterized by a strong presence of the

public sector (France TV and Radio France), on a local and national scale, alongside large
historic national private groups (TF1, M6, Canal+) which have, according to specific
strategies, diversified their economic weight: diversification of services in the same
sector or vertical integration of the entire production and distribution chain, with
complementarities between sectors (e.g. Videndi in the audiovisual, radio, press ,
edition).
The four historic operators of telephony and Internet access (telecom networks) offer,
through distribution partnerships, channel packages including audiovisual and video
services. However, only the Orange group has developed a production activity (Orange
Studios) and a VOD service (OCS), which nevertheless remained structurally loss-
making. When it was created in 2008, OCS exclusively offered Orange customers a
bundle of 5 cinema channels and series. From 2010, through the opening of a third of
its capital, Orange joined forces with the Canal+ group which publishes content and
opens the distribution of the channel bundle to other access providers. Partnerships
with Sony Pictures Television, then HBO, enabled the offering to be developed. In 2022,
HBO announced planning to launch its own platform in France and therefore ceased to
collaborate with OCS. A year later, Canal+ acquired the entire capital of Orange Studios
and OCS.
A wide diversity of players therefore co-exist on these content distribution markets:

national and international audiovisual and cinema producers, publishers and
distributors.

26
Figure 10: Revenues 2016-2021 and market share 2021 for audiovisual services
Market
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 share
2021
Broadcast
6,091.6 6,119.5 6,220.6 6,296.2 5,926.1 6,107.7 53.7%
TV
Pay TV 3,107.7 3,054.0 3,070.4 2,989.4 2,961.5 2,938.5 25.8%
Online
Video 2,197.8 2,885.8 2,639.7 2,423.6 2,362.6 2,328.3 20.5%
Services
Total 11,397.1 12,059.3 11,930.6 11,709.1 11,250.2 11,374.5 100.0%
Despite steady growth since 2015, the online video market in 2021 only represents 20%
of the overall audiovisual broadcasting market. Broadcast TV and, to a lesser extent,
PayTV, remain relatively stable markets (around $9 billion per year). However, this
overall observation hides significant disparities in terms of sources of financing for each
of these three sectors.
Broadcast TV advertising revenues, for example, fell by around 12% ($3.2 billion in 2018
and 2019 compared to $2.8 billion in 2020). For PayTV, if advertising revenues (around
5% of revenues) are relatively stable, revenues from user subscriptions (around $2.5
billion per year) fell by around 10% between 2017 and 2020. These revenues have been
partly transferred to platform operators, including subscription VoD. The on-demand
Video market, growing from $2.2 billion in 2016 to $2.5 billion in 2022, is mainly driven
by SVoD (around 87% of the market in 2021); TVoD, through purchase, has tended to
generate less and less revenue since 2018 ($278M in 2018, $235M in 2021).
Faced with the reduction in market growth, in particular due to a ceiling on user
spending, video on demand players are all tending to hybridize their economic model,
in particular by breaking down their services into offers including advertising (including
via Fast TV services) and/or the valorization of user behavior data. Structurally, the
players in linear TV broadcasting and those of the platforms have tended to collaborate
since the 2020s, in varying forms but which share the objective of managing audiences
and subscribers.

27
The dynamics of diversification of offers (including a return to linear broadcasting with

advertising for platform industries) and partnerships or acquisitions therefore meet
profitability requirements for these different players. Since 2021, the growth of SVoD
subscriptions has tended to slow down, which limits the growth of Average Revenue per
User – ARPU. The ARPU of SVoD services remains around 30% lower on average than
that of PayTV services.
The diversity of economic models of audiovisual platform manufacturers has notably

guided various types of strategies in France. Disney, for example, has strengthened its
model based on the exploitation of the IP and related rights of its enormous catalog
(already present on TV, with a leisure park, and with blockbusters in theaters), by
signing agreements for the broadcast of franchises with TF1. Netflix has adapted its
subscription model, which is unprofitable and losing growth, by signing partnerships
with distributors (ISPs, Canal+) and diversifying its service offering into Premium,
Essential and Standard (package with advertising). Amazon, for which audiovisual is also
a vector for subscription to e-commerce services, has for its part limited its local
partnerships and has integrated the Warner catalog and HBO blockbuster series into its
offering.
Newspapers, magazines, radio, online news media
The media sector is historically structured around local and national press companies,
and large national groups, for magazines. Two major trends have marked these markets
since the 2000s: a dynamic of economic concentration, and a diversification of activities
towards “multi-channel” and cross-channel (newsletters, social networks, mobile apps).
Thus, if the growth of subscriptions remains a priority objective for publishers,
advertising revenue, including through the organization of events on social networks,
supplements public aid to the press and its distribution.
Combined with a general dynamic of citizen distrust of the media, the diversification of
distribution media has induced new costs, which it is complex to meet in the face of an
increasing diversity of titles, notably with the arrival on the market for pure digital
players. The major newspapers are struggling to remain profitable and are therefore
moving towards mergers (especially the local press) or seeking recapitalization. The
national daily Libération was thus recapitalized to the tune of $15.3 million by Czech
Media Invest (CMI), a Czech investment fund which is significantly increasing its
presence in France in the daily press and magazines (around twenty titles with a high
audience), audiovisual, as well as in publishing sectors. Although already present in
France since the 2000s, CMI has strengthened its presence on the French market (as in
other European countries).
This phenomenon affects the entire sector which generally tends to become
financialized. Thus, like the EBRA group, which belongs to the Crédit Mutuel bank, or
Altice Media, the investment company Sofiouest/ASPDH manages the powerful local

28
press group Ouest-France. In magazine publishing, the trend is also towards

concentration around a few large ownership groups: CMI, Vivendi, Altice, Dassault, etc.
These same players are found in the online news market, where they rub shoulders
with a few pure players. Among them, the French group Reworld Media, created in
2012, has combined the development of new online offers, financed by advertising, and
the repurchase of titles or brands from the traditional press, to the point of holding the
largest number of securities on the French market.
Finally, the broadcast radio sector is dominated by the public group Radio France (7
themes including a local network, 83% public funding). Other large groups like
Bertelsmann, Lagardère/Vivendi or Altice share the radio stations with the largest
audiences, with revenues drawn almost exclusively from advertising, even if distinctions
must be made according to sub-sectors. For example, the big success of BusinessFM for
information, or from NRJ or Fun Radio on music and young people. Finally, let us cite the
case of “Indés Radio”,an economic interest group or holding company which brings
together 130 thematic radio stations and provides a - advertising management function
shared throughout the country.
Music services, books, digital games
This sub-sector of production, distribution and dissemination of cultural content

actually hides strong disparities depending on the sectors concerned. The book
publishing sector, first of all, is dominated by a few large historical groups, most of them
national. The number of productions increases sharply each year (418M copies sold in
2018, 486M in 2021), in a growing market (sale of books and transfers of rights), from
$3B in 2017 to $3.35B in 2021, driven by certain categories (youth, comics, practical).
Digital represents around 9.5% of this market in 2021.
The French recorded music market has grown significantly with the development of
digital services: $523M in 2018, $793M in 2022. Three large transnational production
groups dominate this market: Sony, Vivendi/Universal, and Warner, supported for the
market broadcast platforms through international services. In this market, the Swedish
Spotify has regained the upper hand since the 2020s over the French Deezer
(respectively 30% and 20% market share), developed by the telecoms operator Orange.
The digital format generates around 60% of revenues in 2021 (mainly via streaming),
followed by physical media (CD, vinyl, around 25% of the market), then neighboring
rights (around 13%) and synchronization. Apple is losing market share (8% in 2022),
while Amazon Music and YouTube Music compete at around 15% market share each.
The Soundcloud collaborative platform (free or subscription plan) represents around 5%
of this market share in 2021. Regulation, in particular for better redistribution of income
to artists and producers, is still struggling in 2022 to stabilize this very competitive
market.

29
The French video game market will exceed $6 billion in 2022, compared to $4.8 billion in
2017. In terms of volume and growth, it is one of the most important economic sectors
of the cultural industries. 46% of the market is driven by consoles, 28% by PCs, and 26%
by mobile, which tends to stabilize in 2021 after a period of strong growth since 2017.
Hardware and additional content generate nearly 70% of revenue, with the games
themselves accounting for 25% of revenue. If physical media is taken into account, 82%
of the market is digital.
Esports is a rapidly growing market, both in terms of audience, with the proliferation of
major events, and in terms of revenue. The French state has also created a
development plan for this market, in particular through the training of players in
gaming schools.
Analysis of market concentration
These different markets present specific economic concentration structures and

dynamics.
Broadcast, pay TV, online video services
Thus, the CR4 of the Broadcast TV and radio sectors is close to 100 due to the presence
in each of these sectors of a powerful public group (France TV and Radio France) and a
few groups with a high audience share, therefore generating the highest advertising
revenue (TF1/Bouygues, Europe1/Lagardere-Vivendi, BFMTV/Altice, M6 and
RTL/Bertelsmann). In the Pay TV sector, the market is dominated by the Canal+ group
which, with around twenty general and thematic channels, occupies around 60% of the
market, whose HHI index reaches 4650 in 2021.
However, these sectors appear relatively stable without a strong risk of monopoly,
branch by branch.

30
Figure 11: CR4 Scores for online media and traditional media services, 2019-2021
(based on revenue)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
CR4 scores
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2019 2020 2021
Broadcast TV Pay TV Services

Online Video Services Newspapers
Radio Digital Music Services
Books Digital Games
Audiovisual & Publishing Media
Newspapers, magazines, radio, online news media
The different traditional and online media sectors display CR4s which vary in 2021
between 30 (estimate) for magazines and 87 for broadcast radio. The relatively high
concentration in this sector is explained by the presence of four dominant groups,
despite a diversified offering of channels and services: the public group Radio France
(more than 50% market share), the private groups NRJ, Next RadioTV, Lagardère. This
concentration tends to strengthen over time.
The newspaper market appears increasingly concentrated over the period studied: CR4
from 61.3 in 2019 to 72.3 in 2021, if we group together all the titles owned by the same
group. This trend is reflected in the progression of the HH Index (1320 in 2019, 1660 in
2021), although monopolistic risks appear low. We have not been able to satisfactorily

31
calculate these indicators for the magazines and online news media sector, due to the
lack of reliable data on the income of all economic players present in these markets.
Figure 12: HHI for online media and traditional media services, 2019-2021 (based on
revenue)
5,000
4,500
4,000
3,500
3,000
HHI score
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
2019 2020 2021
Broadcast TV Pay TV Services Online Video Services Newspapers

Radio Digital Music Services Digital Games
Music services, publishing, digital games
The music services market appears concentrated, with four main players who have a
combined 70% market share. These dominant players are music publishers (Vivendi,
Sony, Warner) and streaming platforms (Deezer and Spotify), two types of players
whose economic models - production, publishing, distribution for the former,
distribution for the latter - are difficult to compare.
The publishing sector, for its part, presents an increasing concentration between 2019
and 2021, which risks being further strengthened due to acquisitions or equity
investments. In particular, the acquisition of the Lagardère group (Hachette) by Vivendi
(Editis) in 2023, even with the abandonment of part of the activities to comply with
French and European anti-monopoly regulations, would give Vivendi a market share
greater than 50 %. In certain sectors, such as school textbooks or pocket publishing, this
domination could even reach 70%. In addition to publishing itself, Vivendi would also
control the distribution networks, essential in this sector.

32
Finally, the analysis of the video games market is complex, again due to the coexistence
of heterogeneous professions and economic models, between console manufacturers,
license holders and small national publishers. This sector appears not very
concentrated (CR4 around 50% and HHI which would trend downward around 1000),
On the one hand, large, highly capitalized international publishing groups generate
revenues from mass content and services. On the other hand, particularly for mobile,
small publishers, often independent, enjoy success but only ephemerally. Finally,
creative studios are developing and collaborating on cutting-edge technologies, game
play and graphic designs to produce and market innovative games. The French leader
Ubisoft has been able to develop an international distribution network, notably through
licensing agreements with North American majors, and with the support of Tencent
which acquired 49.9% of its capital. However, in terms of revenue, large international
publishers (including Nintendo, Sony, Electronic Arts) and GAFAM dominate the market
with Twitch (Amazon), Activision, Mojan, ZeniMax (Microsoft), and mobile gaming
platforms from Alphabet and Meta.
Apart from the TV and radio broadcasting sectors, these different sectors therefore
appear relatively unconcentrated and do not present an increased risk of a monopoly
situation. However, this observation may be different if our view embraces a broader
spectrum of activities, Including - in addition to audiovisual - media and cultural content.
Indeed, in most of these sectors we can identify one or two omnipresent groups, even if
they sometimes only occupy secondary positions in the structure of these markets.
This is the case of the Vivendi group, which further strengthened its dominance with the
acquisition of the Lagardère group in 2023. Vivendi is thus present in the audiovisual
sector (Canal+), radio (Europe1, Virgin Radio), and the magazine press (Prisma Media,
Lagardere News), music and live entertainment (Universal, Vivendi Village), video games
(Gameloft), book publishing and distribution (Hachette) and even communications
consulting (Havas).
To a lesser extent, the Altice and Czech Media Invest groups have comparable positions
in the media and the distribution of cultural content. Faced with accusations of
monopoly or excessive domination of markets (press and radio journalists and
publishing professionals have expressed serious concerns since the 2020s), the leaders
of these companies justify their strategy by the need to have access to powerful
national players in order to limit the domination of transnational groups, including
North American platforms and GAFAM, and ultimately safeguard a form of French
cultural exceptionionalism.
Without constituting the heart of the study presented here, these structural economic
dynamics and the discourses which justify them, seem to us, to question the complexity
of analyzing the state of concentration of national markets. Indeed, while keeping in
mind the long French political tradition of defending a “cultural exception”, a detailed

33
analysis of the markets must combine economic analyses, in terms of financial volumes
and market shares, and detailed analyss of the balance of power and powers of
domination which govern relations between economic actors and regulators.

34
Core internet applications

This third type of services concerns the economic sectors which technically and
economically underpin activities on the internet. We thus analyzed the sectors of
operating systems, web browsers, search engines for PC and mobiles, app distribution
for mobiles, but also the markets of social networking services and online advertising.
We encountered difficulties in calculating the revenue generated by some of these
activities either because they are apparently free (OS, browsers) or because of the
complexity of accessing reliable data, including on an international scale (income from
digital social networks). We therefore have evolving data for these sectors relating to
their market shares in terms of usage, and not revenue.
Unsurprisingly, the overall volumes of the online advertising or application distribution

markets have seen strong growth since the 2000s (see below). What all of these markets
have in common is their very strong concentration around a few transnational players:
Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon. French companies are almost absent from these
sectors.
Figure 13: Revenues for core internet sectors, 2019-2021 (current US$, millions)
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2019 2020 2021
App Distribution Internet Advertising Total

35
Analysis of market concentration
Most of the sectors analyzed in this third part appear highly concentrated around large
transnational groups.
Figure 14: CR4 Scores for core internet sectors, 2019-2021
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
CR4 score
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2019 2020 2021
App Distribution Internet Advertising Online News Media Social Media Platforms
Search Engines-Mobile Search Engines Mobile OS Desktop OS
Mobile Browsers Desktop Browsers
Internet advertising
The online advertising market will reach $9.6 billion in 2022, compared to $3 billion in
2013, with annual growth of between 10% and 20%. France is in the top ten global
markets in this sector. Alphabet, particularly through its Google search engine,
dominates this market. Amazon appears to be experiencing strong growth currently .
Social networking services constitute a third type of player which mainly benefits from
this market, according to market share, which have evolved at the expense of Facebook
(Meta).
Since 2020, advertising spending on digital media has exceeded that devoted to
“traditional” media (excluding digital): respectively $9.9 billion and $8.8 billion in 2022,
compared to $7.5 billion and $9.4 billion in 2019). In 2022, 44.5% ($4 billion) of digital

36
advertising spending was on search engines, 25% ($2.2 billion) on social networks.
These revenues have quadrupled since 2010.
Figure 15a: Revenues for digital advertising, 2013-2022 (current US$, millions)
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Figure 15b: Revenues for digital advertising, 2019-2022 (current US$, millions)
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2019 2020 2021 2022
Search engines Social Netorks Display E-Mailing

37
Due to the variety of target media and submarkets that make it up, the digital
advertising market appears moderately concentrated: CR4 of 68 in 2019 and 74 in 2021
and an HHI around 3000, which, however, tends to increase over time.
Figure 16: HHI scores for core internet sectors, 2019-2021
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
HHI score
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
2019 2020 2021
Search Engines-Mobile Search Engines Desktop OS Mobile OS

App Distribution Social Media Platforms Mobile Browsers Desktop Browsers
Internet Advertising Online News Media
OS, search engines, browsers
These markets are dominated by transnational publishers and present few structural
specificities compared to other countries.
The operating systems market is dominated by Microsoft Windows on desktops, in

slight decline, going from 79.3% market share in 2016 to 75.15% in 2021, to the benefit
of OSX/Apple, which goes from 16.15 to 18 .8% market share over the same period. The
two systems therefore combine an CR2 significantly higher than 90 and an HHI close to
6000. On mobiles, the offer is more diversified, in particular due to systems provided by
the manufacturers. Here again, two players dominate the market: Alphabet with
Android (66.17% of market share in 2021), and Apple with iOs (33.28% in 2021). The CR2
here reaches 99% and the HHI 5500.

38
Figure 17a: Operating system market share for desktop, 2016-2021 (% users)
100%
90%
80%
70%
% users
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Windows OS X Linux Chrome OS Others
Figure 17b: Operating system market share for mobile, 2016-2021 (% users)
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
% users
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Alphabet Apple Microsoft Linux

Samsung Electronics BlackBerry Sony HMD Global
Nintendo Others

39
The most concentrated market of those studied, that of search engines, dominated at
92% by Alphabet/Google (in 2021, this market share reached 97% on mobile and 82.5%
on desktop). Around ten other services were offered and used in France over the
period, with market share reaching at best 4.5% for Microsoft (Bing & MSN). The HHI of
this sector exceeds 8400, a sign of a long-term monopoly situation.
Figure 18: Search engines market share, 2016-2021 (% users)
100%
90%
80%
70%
% users
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Alphabet Microsoft Verizon

Ecosia Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations DuckDuckGo
Yandex Baidu Microsoft
IAC Publishing Lilo SAS Others
Finally, the web browser market also appears highly concentrated. For mobile, the CR4
reached 97.5% in 2021, with a dominant position of Chrome/Google (57.3% market
share), followed by Safari/Apple (31.2%) and browsers from Samsung and Android. The
HHI at 4320 indicates low monopoly risk. For desktop, the market is also dominated by
Google/Chrome (59.3% market share compared to 49.7% in 2016), followed by
Mozilla/Firefox (15.2%, in continuous decline since 2016) and Apple/Safari (10.6%). At
Microsoft, Edge has gradually replaced Internet Explorer and reached around 10% of
market shares in 2021. The HHI is close to 4000.

40
The markets for systems, browsers and search engines are dominated by North
American transnational groups, in particular Alphabet, dominant in terms of mobile
systems, browsers and search engines. Apple, Microsoft and Mozilla, although present
in their respective markets, remain in the minority.
Figure 19a: Web browser market share for mobile, 2016-2021 (% users)
100%
90%
80%
70%
% users
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Alphabet Apple Samsung Electronics UC Web Microsoft
Mozilla Foundation Opera Microsoft BlackBerry CloudMosa
Sony Yandex Tencent Nintendo MoboTap Inc.
HMD Global Others

41
Figure 19b: Web browser market share for desktop, 2016-2021 (% users)
100%
90%
80%
70%
% users
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Alphabet Mozilla Foundation Apple Microsoft Opera Software
Qihoo 360 Coc Coc Maxthon Yandex

42
Development and concentration trends

across the communication, internet and
media
In addition to detailed analyses by economic sector (around thirty are studied, some of
which are not presented here), comparing cross-sectional trends allows us to make two
types of observations. On the one hand, let us focus on the overall volumes and their
evolution, observing the three main categories of activity which constitute telecoms, the
content industries (media, audiovisual, cultural works), and core internet services.
Telecoms represent a volume of $39 billion in 2021 compared to $38 billion in 2019, the
content industries have changed little, at $26 billion, and core internet services have
grown from $8.1 billion in 2019 to $10.5 billion in 2021. The whole went from a volume
of $71.8 billion to $75.3 billion in three years. This dynamic has its roots in the 2000s but
has strengthened since 2010, in particular due to the massive development of
consumer uses, particularly digital, and the strengthening of sectors such as online
advertising or the distribution of applications.
Figure 20: Development of network and media industries, 2019-2021 (current US$,
millions)
80,000
70,000
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
2019 2020 2021
Telecoms + Internet Access Audiovisual Media + Publishing

Core Internet Sectors Total Network Media Economy ($ millions)

43
On the other hand, the concentration around dominant economic players has remained
more or less stable. The CR4, which represents the market shares of the four largest
players (grouped according to the final owner), reached in 2021 89.5 for Telecoms, 64.4
for the content industries, and 90.1 for core internet services. This indicator is stable at
81.2 for all of these large families, even if we note a very slight increase since 2019
(80.4).
Figure 21: CR4 scores for the network media economy, 2019-2021
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
CR4 score
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
2019 2020 2021
Core Internet Sectors Telecoms + Internet Access

Audiovisual Media + Publishing Network Media Economy CR4
Finally, the collection of data by sector of activity and the systematic linking of services
provided to a final owner, national or not, makes it possible to identify the leading
groups across the entire French internet and digital content market. Compared to
overall financial volumes, this analysis makes it possible to identify the effective weight
of each of these leaders in these markets.
Not surprisingly, due to the significant strength of the telecoms sectors, the four groups
that generate the most revenue are telecom operators. Operators of networks and
infrastructures, they provide telephone and internet communications, but have also
become distributors of digital content and services through their triple play offers.
Orange, the leader, was also a producer of such content via its subsidiary Orange
Studios and a broadcaster via its VoD platform OCS. These two subsidiaries are now
under the control of Vivendi via the Canal+ group. In addition to Alphabet, which
notably captures the majority of the online advertising market, the Vivendi group
occupies a leading position, both in overall volume and in most content-related sectors

44
(media, audiovisual music, book publishing). Its strategy of diversifying its activities
through the purchase or takeover of companies (production, distribution, broadcasting,
exploitation of rights) produce synergies and gives it unique advantages. This position
of Vivendi has strengthened significantly since the 2020s, both through the integration
of OCS and Orange Studios mentioned above and through the acquisition of most of
the activities of the Lagardère group, in the Top 10 of this ranking.
The France TV group, mainly financed by public funds, remains a major player in
audiovisual production and broadcasting. Large transnational groups are of course
present, even if we have seen that their domination generally occurs in specific sectors
(social networks and advertising, video games, SVoD, etc.).
Figure 22: Leading communications-internet and media companies in France, 2021*

17,000
16,000
15,000
14,000
13,000
12,000
11,000
10,000
9,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
0
rte do
an
Ne n
Ni eta
Sp y
uy e
ed ple
e
Ub ts
E flix
ify
es
ad
El io F at
t D oft
Am an
ni e
Al ndi
an *
TV
ic ft
ga et
e
tic
Bo ng
tro nc
o
Fr re
iso
r
d lS
La ab
gu
isn
ot
w
lsm
Ili
az
Be ten
cA
W ros
t
ce
Ap
M
ve
ec ra
a
Al
ia
Ra ute
ph
rd
Or
Vi
M
al
* Acquired by Vivendi in 2023
Wireline Wireless ISP

Multichannel Video Distribution Broadcast TV Pay TV Services
Online Video Services Digital Games Broadcast Radio
Music Services Books Internet Advertising
* The revenues indicated here refer to the activities studied in this project, and do not necessarily
reflect the total revenues of each company

45
Conclusion
This document presents the first results of research carried out in France in 2022 and
2023 and coordinated internationally by Carleton University in Ottawa. The central
objective is to measure and analyze the evolution of economic concentration in around
thirty sectors linked to telecoms, the internet, the media and the cultural industries. In
addition to an analysis in each of the 38 countries and regions concerned, the GMIC
project also makes comparative and contrasting analyses between countries possible.
As mentioned in the introduction, this project encountered two types of methodological

obstacles for the French markets. On the one hand, the definition of the boundaries of
the sectors studied, on the other hand, sustainable access to reliable data sources and
the definition of methods of calculating revenues and/or market shares. Although most
of the sectors that we have analyzed are the subject of institutional studies at national
or European level, this work rarely provides economic information relating to
companies active in these economic sectors. These two difficulties have been generally
overcome, but shortcomings persist in certain sectors (e.g. audiovisual production) or
certain actors (e.g. GAFAM or multi-activity transnational groups). Beyond the impact of
these difficulties on the quality of our results, they also illustrate the complexity of
accessing precise economic information.
With these caveats established, our analyses make it possible to identify some major
trends or dynamics, general or specific to certain sectors of activity.
The first of these lies in the historical importance of public regulatory policies in most of
the observed areas. This is particularly the case for telecoms and ISPs, network
industries, but also for the audiovisual and cinema sectors, and the distribution of this
cultural content whatever their format and media. This national context partly explains
the structure and levels of concentration in these sectors. This regulation aims in fact to
manage the balance of power between economic actors, or their relative weight, but
also to support historic national groups in the face of foreign groups, whether through
the regulation of these markets or through anit-monopolistic vigilance.
The telecoms and internet access sectors, regulated by Arcep, are covered by four
national groups with a relative balance of market shares. The Orange group, from the
former public company France Telecom, dominates these markets of which it controls
40-50%. The structure of these markets appears relatively stabilized over time. The
audiovisual broadcasting and cinema sectors, whether via television or free or paid
online services, are also subject to strict regulation by public authorities, via the CNC
and Arcom. The development of digital formats and uses, then the arrival of North
American platforms (Asian transnational players are still little present in these markets

46
in France), have of course reconfigured the professions, economic models and

relationships of forces between economic actors.
European directives (including the SMAD directive of 2018) left room for maneuver to
states for domestic application. The CNC, both legislator and regulator, thus ensured
rounds of negotiations with national professionals and new entrants, including SVoD
platforms, both in terms of taxation and investment obligations in French production
and a regulatory timeline for the distribution of produced content. Here again,
therefore, the structure of the audiovisual markets appears in tension between historic
national players, public and private (France TV, Canal+, TF1) and transnational groups
which have been forced to deal with these market structuring players.
The broadcast TV sector is dominated by four large national groups which account for
nearly 95% of the market. In the PayTV sector, the diversity of offers is greater, including
from international players. The role of ISPs, via their triple play offering and distribution
agreements, remains essential in this sector. The Canal+ group, owned by Vivendi,
dominates this market, both because of its historical seniority and its ambitions to
support production and develop exports. In the regulatory framework negotiated by the
public authorities, this domination allowed it to have influence over the strong audience
of SVoD platforms. A leading financier of cinema and major broadcaster in PayTV
(although losing momentum) Canal+ has strengthened its position as a content
distributor, through agreements with the main broadcasters in the audiovisual market,
including North American platforms. (except Amazon).
Through this balance of forces and regulatory frameworks, these audiovisual markets
appear relatively concentrated (CR4 of 70 to 80), but without a monopolistic position of
any of these groups, whether national or international (HHI of 800 for online video
services, 3500 for broadcast TV, and 4500 for PayTV).
A second trend, in resonance with public regulation, lies in a dynamic of financial

concentration of groups active in French markets. This financialization affects all sectors
of the distribution of cultural content and the media. Through acquisitions and net
integrations, as well as through takeovers of decision-making bodies and through
capital participation, some investment companies and industrial groups are expanding
and diversifying their business portfolios. These investors are national (P. Drahi/Altice,
V. Bolloré/Vivendi, in the media, publishing, cultural industries) and international (D.
Kretinsky/CMI in the media and book publishing sectors).
Their strategies affect the sectors of newspapers, whose CR4 increased from 61 in 2019
to 72 in 2021, radio, whose CR4 increased from 82.7 in 2019 to 87.2 in 2021, or even
publishing (CR4 of 62.9 in 2019 vs. 74.4 in 2021). The overall CR4 of audiovisual media
and publishing activities thus increased over this same period (62.3 in 2019, 64.4 in
2021). These dynamics of economic concentration and decision-making affect
professionals in these sectors, both in the media, where editorial lines tend to be
imposed and harmonized without consultation, and in publishing, where production,

47
but especially the distribution circuits of diffusion, tend to approach monopolistic

situations.
Finally, a third type of economic sector is dominated by transnational companies. These

are activities linked to interfaces between users and digital content: content and social
network platforms, but also operating systems, browsers and search engines,
dominated by Netflix, Disney, Amazon, Sony, Warner, Alphabet, Meta and Microsoft.
Despite several attempts, no French or European player has emerged that is truly
47ompetitive with these international groups. Some exceptions, however, in the
recorded music sector, are still in reconfiguration: Universal, integrated into the Vivendi
group, also present in Live, or the Deezer streaming platform, developed by Orange,
which occupies 30% of the market, in competition with the Swedish Spotify. These
positions of domination (99% market share for Google in search, etc.) also raise
questions around digital sovereignty.
This third type of market structure is also that of online advertising, the market which
has grown the most in 20 years (x4 between 2010 and 2020), and which remains
dominated by GAFAM, at the expense of national broadcasters, in particular “
traditional”. 70% of this market is captured by search engine(s) and digital social
networks.
In addition to analyzing the structure of these different markets, it seems necessary to

us to also compare them with each other. Certainly, dynamics of concentration (TV,
media) and reconfigurations at the expense of national players (VoD, advertising) are
observed. But the dynamics of economic concentration seem to us to also need to be
analyzed according to the respective volumes of these different markets and the
profitability of the activities. For example, the volume of the broadcast and pay TV
markets reached $9.2 billion in 2021, compared to $2.3 billion for online video services,
mainly SVoD. That same year, the video games market reached $6.1 billion and that of
online advertising $8.4 billion. The relative weight of the players who dominate these
different markets is therefore economically different. The analysis of Average Revenues
per User – ARPUs – also appears essential to us in this effort to evaluate the profitability
of the activities of economic actors. The ARPU for PayTV is, for example, 30% higher
than that of SVoD services.
Finally, a cross-sectional reading of our results makes it possible to distinguish the

leading communications-internet and media companies on the French market (see
above). The four leaders are the telecom operators, who manage the networks and
access to digital services, via infrastructure but also via distribution services, such as
triple play offers and access to free and paid channel bundles and services. of VoD. The
next groups are Alphabet, but also Vivendi and Lagardère, the majority of whose
respective activities merged in 2023 via the acquisition by Vivendi. Newly consolidated,
this communications group will have unprecedented private economic influence in
France, in sensitive sectors such as media, communication and cultural industries.

48
This document is a milestone. This work of collecting and calculating economic

concentration data and their analysis will continue in the coming years. It seems to us
that we can constitute a solid and lasting basis for analysis and comparison of markets
and the structural dynamics that drive them. We also plan to soon compare the results
relating to the French market with those obtained in other European and international
countries.

49
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Communications,

Bruno LEFEVRE, Post-Doctoral Researcher, Sorbonne Paris Nord

Philippe BOUQUILLION, Professor, Sorbonne Paris Nord University,

Lefevre, B. & Bouquillion, P. (2023). “Communications, Media and Internet

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Online media and traditional media services (content media) ......................... 23

Development and concentration trends across the communication, internet

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Figure 1: Evolution of France global market revenues, 2017-2021 (current US$,

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Analyzing the Communications,

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

A cross-sectional analysis of the audiovisual, media and cultural goods industries

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Media concentration: What to study,

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Figure 1: Evolution of France global market revenues, 2017-2021 (current US$,

Wireless Internet Service Providers Internet Advertising

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Observing and analyzing media concentration

Structurally, the French communications infrastructure and services sectors appear to

Concentration in the cultural and media industries in

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

A ﬁrst observation regarding the measurement of concentration is that only a small

Furthermore, without seeking to produce a precise measure of market concentration,

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

"Sector merger control appears to be inappropriate and complex in more

The reasoning is diﬀerent depending on whether the protagonists want to attack

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

On the other hand, proponents of concentration tend to refer to "economic theory",

"The concentration of activities within a single company is often accompanied by

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

In conclusion of this very schematic review of studies on concentration, the singular

Originality and methodological challenges

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

However, it is rare to have ﬁnancial or economic information for each group or

For example, it is complex to distinguish between the revenues of an audiovisual group

Finally, with the limitations mentioned above, the assessment of economic

A second concentration indicator used in this study is the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann Index

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Telecoms and internet access services

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

“ARPU for mobile services

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Orange Illiad Free Altice SFR Bouygues Telecom Others

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Orange Altice SFR Bouygues Telecom Illiad Free

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Orange Illiad Free Altice SFR Bouygues Telecom Others/MVNO

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Multichannel video distribution

IPTV Satellite Cable Total Revenue

GMIC Project – France Report 2024

Figure 6b: Evolution of market share of multichannel video distribution market,

Orange (IPTV) Vivendi Canal+ (Sat) Eutel Sat (Sat)

Bouygues Telecom (IPTV) Others

GMIC Project – France Report 2024