Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Personality and Individual Differences

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/paid

Dispositional mindfulness: A critical review of construct

validation research
Holly K. Rau ⁎, Paula G. Williams
University of Utah, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Interest in mindfulness has risen exponentially in recent years, yet it remains unclear whether dispositional mind-
Received 4 April 2015 fulness represents a distinct and valid psychological construct. Mapping dispositional mindfulness onto well-
Received in revised form 1 August 2015 established personality constructs is essential for developing and testing theoretical models of mindfulness.
Accepted 23 September 2015
The current paper presents a critical review of dispositional mindfulness that examines historical context, oper-
Available online 23 October 2015
ational definitions, measurement, and convergent and discriminant validity across personality domains. It is con-
Keywords:
cluded that dispositional mindfulness: (a) is a multidimensional construct reflecting the focus and quality of
Dispositional mindfulness attention, (b) appears to exist independently from other forms of mindfulness, such as learned or cultivated
Trait mindfulness mindfulness, and (c) demonstrates associations with well-established personality traits, such as neuroticism
Construct validation and conscientiousness, yet appears to be conceptually unique. Whether dispositional mindfulness should be con-
Personality sidered a basic tendency or a characteristic adaptation is fodder for future research. Additionally, research exam-
ining specific mechanisms underlying dispositional mindfulness (e.g., cognitive skills, attitudes) is needed to
strengthen ongoing construct validation efforts. Researchers are encouraged to capitalize on the growing evi-
dence base and approach DM as a unique individual difference factor strongly rooted in developmental, cogni-
tive, and personality disciplines.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduced as a simple and intuitive concept with implications for
emotional and physical health, the psychological construct of mindful-
ness — a “basic human quality” characterized by the tendency to attend
to and accept present moment experiences (Kabat-Zinn, 1994;
Santorelli & Kabat-Zinn, 2013) — has been met with profound enthusi-
asm. The volume of mindfulness-related publications has risen expo-
nentially over the past two decades, resulting in nearly 500 new
publications in 2012 alone (Black, 2013). These numbers are expected
to increase as over 300 clinical trials related to mindfulness begin
publishing results. The momentum driving this research is warranted.
Numerous psychological and physical health benefits have been linked
to both mindfulness training (e.g., Chiesa & Serretti, 2010; Greeson,
2009; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Keng, Smoski, & Robins,
2011; Smith, Richardson, Hoffman, & Pilkington, 2005) and disposition-
al mindfulness (e.g., Coffey & Hartman, 2008; Creswell, Way,
Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007; Howell, Digdon, Buro, & Sheptycki,
2008; Lakey, Campbell, Brown, & Goodie, 2007).
To date, efforts aimed at establishing the validity of mindfulness
have involved examining the nomothetic span of various self-report
⁎ Corresponding author at: Department of Psychology, University of Utah, 380 South
1530 East, Salt Lake City, UT 84112, USA.
E-mail address: holly.rau@psych.utah.edu (H.K. Rau).
measures of mindfulness (e.g., Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, &
Toney, 2006; Baer et al., 2008; Brown & Ryan, 2003), proposing conceptu-
al frameworks and operational definitions of mindfulness (e.g., Bishop
et al., 2004; Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007), and summarizing empirical
associations with mindfulness (Chiesa & Serretti, 2009; Grossman,
Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004; Hofmann et al., 2010; Keng et al.,
2011). Notwithstanding the importance of these works for informing
our understanding of mindfulness more broadly, several shortcomings
have limited our understanding of dispositional mindfulness in
particular.
First, the implicit assumption that mindfulness interventions “en-
hance” inherent dispositional tendencies toward mindfulness illustrates
a potential misnomer; namely, that all forms of mindfulness are created
equal. Without distinguishing between dispositional and cultivated
(i.e., trained, practiced) forms of mindfulness, assumptions of construct
homogeneity remain unfounded. Examination of the historical and the-
oretical foundation underlying DM specifically is needed to refine oper-
ational definitions and differentiate between related constructs,
including other forms of mindfulness.
Second, despite the near-simultaneous introduction of 11 self-
report measures of mindfulness nearly a decade ago, researchers
have only recently begun to evaluate the conceptual framework
and properties of these instruments (e.g., Sauer et al., 2013;
Grossman & van Dam 2011). Unfortunately, many critiques focus
on only a single measure and fail to address methodological and

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.09.035
0191-8869/© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
interpretive considerations relevant to the DM construct more
broadly. Examination of the psychometric characteristics, such as
factor structure and construct representation, across multiple instru-
ments is necessary to inform current theory.
Third, although numerous investigations of convergent and discrim-
inant validity have been conducted, relatively few of these have been
interpreted through the lens of personality theory. Given that the
term disposition is often used interchangeably with the terms trait and
personality to reflect stable and enduring characteristics (Allport,
1961), personality theory is likely to provide a useful framework for un-
derstanding individual differences in mindful behaviors and experi-
ences. An examination of DM in relation to well-established models of
personality, such as the Five Factor Model (FFM; McCrae & Costa,
2003), could provide important descriptive and predictive information
about the nature of DM.
Somewhat surprisingly, there are currently no reviews that have
integrated theoretical, methodological, and empirical work exclusive
to DM. The relatively recent introduction of DM into the psychologi-
cal lexicon, combined with a rapidly growing literature base, makes
this an opportune time to examine the state of the science for this
construct. The goal of this integrative review, therefore, was to initiate
a formal examination of construct validity informed exclusively by re-
search examining dispositional mindfulness. Specifically, we evaluated
theory specification (i.e., history, definition of mindfulness), measure-
ment (i.e., psychometric considerations), and hypothesis testing
(i.e., convergent and discriminant validity).
1. Theory specification: historical context and current definitions
Historical context is especially important for understanding current
definitions of dispositional mindfulness (DM), which are squarely root-
ed in Eastern religion and directly influenced by Western philosophy
and culture. The Abhidhamma, one of three collections in the doctrine
of Theravada Buddhism (see Bodhi (2000)), contains the Buddhist phi-
losophy most relevant to the psychological construct of mindfulness.
Importantly, the fourth and least discussed text of the Abhidhamma—the
Puggalapannatti (Descriptions of Individuals)—acknowledges innate
individual differences in mindfulness. Analogous to modern person-
ality typologies, the Puggalapannatti classifies individuals according
to stages on the Buddhist path, with some characterized as upatthitasati,
or “alert” and able to sustain mindfulness (“Abhidhammapitake
Puggalapannattipali,” 2000, p.77), and others characterized by
“unmindfulness” (p. 64). In other words, early teachings recognized
mindfulness as an innate individual difference and a set of skills that
require training and practice.
1.1. From East to West
Although recently elevated to iconic status in popular Western cul-
ture, the concept of mindfulness is far from novel. American interest
in Buddhist philosophy stems from the Transcendentalist movement
of the early 19th century (Versluis, 1993), which emphasized individu-
alism and subjectivism over rationalism and objectivism. Interest in
Buddhist philosophy resurfaced during the Beat Era and a variety of
Buddhist establishments were introduced into the American landscape
(McCown & Micozzi, 2011). Over time, these establishments became in-
creasingly westernized, giving rise to a non-religious form of Buddhist
psychology that was eventually popularized under the unassuming
heading of the Stress Reduction Clinic, founded by Jon Kabat-Zinn in
1979. Housed within the University of Massachusetts Medical Center
and designed to help medical patients manage symptoms of chronic
illness, the Stress Reduction and Relaxation Program (later called
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction; MBSR) incorporated Buddhist
teachings and exercises learned during Kabat-Zinn's training in Zen
Buddhism. Central to the initial success of this program was Kabat-
Zinn's secularized representation of mindfulness as an “internal
33
resource” (Santorelli & Kabat-Zinn, 2013) which allowed mindfulness
to capture a broad multidisciplinary audience.
1.2. Definition of mindfulness
Kabat-Zinn's early conceptualizations of mindfulness, which
emphasized non-elaborative observation of present-moment
experiences, dominated the scientific language and formed an irrevoca-
ble bedrock for Western scientific investigations into mindfulness—a
foundation that many are now calling into question. Some have argued
that mindfulness cannot easily be understood in isolation from
theoretically-related Buddhist concepts (Bodhi, 1984; Gunaratana,
2001) and that removing mindfulness from its larger philosophical con-
text may have “denatured and decontextualized” the original construct
in unintentional yet significant ways (Grossman, 2011). Consequently,
concepts such as compassion (Birnie, Speca, & Carlson, 2010; Germer,
2009), altruism (Block-Lerner, Adair, Plumb, Rhatigan, & Orsillo,
2007; Wallmark, Safarzadeh, Daukantaite, & Maddux, 2013), and
moral responsibility (Sheth, Sethia, & Srinivas, 2011) have increas-
ingly become incorporated into the repertoire of mindfulness
language.
Debate over semantics and nomological expanse calls into ques-
tion exactly what Western psychology hopes to gain from mindful-
ness. As stated by Schmidt (2011): “A wish for self-regulation or
coping with chronic pain is quite different from embarking on a spir-
itual path to achieve self-transformation” (p.35). One possibility is
that Westerners may be shifting their expectations of mindfulness,
such that an interest in self-regulation has expanded into an interest
in self-transformation (Shapiro, 1992). Regardless of the moral,
ethical, and spiritual potential, drawing a clear boundary around
mindfulness is necessary to establish theoretical coherence. This
boundary has been acknowledged by traditional Buddhist texts
indicating that mindfulness alone is a necessary starting point for the
development of wisdom, but far from sufficient on its own (A. B.
Wallace & Bodhi, 2006). Expecting mindfulness to represent the full
range of experiences involved with the development of insight is likely
asking too much. Instead, the field of psychology has much to gain from
better understanding the essential components of mindfulness and
developing a concise, testable definition. One such definition, resulting
from a 2004 consensus meeting, provides a helpful background for
examining construct validity:
“The first component involves the self-regulation of attention so that
it is maintained on immediate experience, thereby allowing for
increased recognition of mental events in the present moment. The
second component involves adopting a particular orientation
toward one's experiences in the present moment, an orientation that
is characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance” (Bishop
et al., 2004, p. 232).
2. Measurement: instruments and psychometric considerations
As interest in mindfulness exploded at the turn of the millennium, so
did the number of instruments designed to measure mindfulness. During
a five year period, eight self-report measures of dispositional mindfulness
were introduced: Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown &
Ryan, 2003); Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer,
Smith, & Allen, 2004); Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory (FMI; Walach,
Buchheld, Buttenmuller, Kleinknecht, & Schmidt, 2006); Toronto Mind-
fulness Scale (TMS; Lau et al., 2006; TMS-Trait Version: K. M. Davis, Lau,
& Cairns, 2009); Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer
et al., 2006); Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale—Revised
(CAMS-R; Feldman, Hayes, Kumar, Greeson, & Laurenceau, 2007);
Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHLMS; Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman,
Moitra, & Farrow, 2008); and Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire
34 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
Table 1
Self-report measures of dispositional mindfulness.a, b
Scale
CAMS-R Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale—Revised Feldman et al. (2007)
FFMQ Five Facet Mindfulness Scale Baer et al. (2006)
FMI Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory – 14 item Walach et al. (2006)
KIMS Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills Baer et al. (2004)
PHLMS Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale Cardaciotto et al. (2008)
MAAS Mindful Attention Awareness Scale Brown & Ryan (2003)
SMQ Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire Chadwick et al., 2008
TMS-Trait Toronto Mindfulness Scale – Trait Version Davis et al. (2009)
a
Two-factor solution identified by Kohls et al. (2009).
b
Two-factor solution identified by Lau et al. (2006).
(SMQ; Chadwick et al., 2008). Table 1 lists the factor structure, subscales,
and number of items for each of these measures. The following sections
address a subset of conceptual issues related to the measurement
of mindfulness more broadly and DM in particular (though see
Grossman (2011) for additional considerations).
2.1. Content validity, dimensionality, and factor structure
Evidence from multiple measures (FMI, CAMS-R, SMQ, MAAS) sup-
ports mindfulness as a unitary construct (Brown & Ryan, 2003;
Chadwick et al., 2008; Chadwick, Taylor, & Abba, 2005; Leary & Tate,
2007; Walach et al., 2006). Of these, the MAAS evidences is perhaps
the most widely used unidimensional measure of mindfulness
(Carlson & Brown, 2005; MacKillop & Anderson, 2007). The exclusive
focus on everyday attentional lapses, however, has drawn criticism to
the MAAS for being an overly simplified (Grossman, 2011) underrepre-
sentation (Baer et al., 2006) of mindfulness. Interestingly, the original
version of this measure included two factors – presence and acceptance.
The authors concluded that “acceptance is functionally redundant in
mindfulness” and ultimately excluded the acceptance factor on the
basis of limited incremental validity (Brown & Ryan, 2004, p.245). This
judgment call contradicts arguments that acceptance may have greater
explanatory power than awareness based on reports with other mea-
sures (PHLMS; Kohls, Sauer, & Walach, 2009).
Analyses with several other measures (CAMS-R, KIMS, FFMQ, TMS,
PHLMS) support a multidimensional construct (Baer et al., 2004; Baer
et al., 2006; Cardaciotto et al., 2008; Feldman et al., 2007; Lau et al.,
2006). Perhaps most striking is the conceptual similarity resulting
from many two-factor models, including: presence and acceptance
(FMI: Walach et al., 2006; Kohls et al., 2009), awareness and acceptance
(PHLMS; Cardaciotto et al., 2008), presence and acceptance (MAAS;
Brown & Ryan, 2003), and decentering and curiosity (TMS; Lau et al.,
2006). Similarly, facet-level intercorrelations from the FFMQ suggest
that acting with awareness and nonreactivity provide the strongest theo-
retical and empirical association with the mindfulness construct. Impor-
tantly, the conceptual basis of these two-dimensional structures—which
emphasizes both the nature and quality of present-moment
attention—is consistent with the two-component model proposed by
Bishop et al. (2004).
If mindfulness truly is multidimensional (i.e., relative independence
at the facet level), the variance introduced by each lower-level construct
can reduce the precision of single score interpretations. For this reason,
researchers are cautioned against using a summary score to represent
DM and are further encouraged to examine interactions at the facet
level, especially given evidence that facets may be dissociable
(Eisenlohr-Moul, Walsh, Charnigo, Lynam, & Baer, 2012).
2.2. Scale construction
Attention has been given to the wording of certain subscales and
measures. Items on the acceptance subscale of the PHLMS capture expe-
riential avoidance rather than approach-focused behaviors (Bergomi,
Items Factor structure
12 Acceptance, Attention, Awareness, Present focus
39 Accept/nonjudge, Act with awareness, Describe, Nonreactivity, Observe
14 Acceptance, Presencea
39 Accept/nonjudge, Act with awareness, Describe, Observe
20 Acceptance, Awareness
15 n/a
16 Letting go, Nonaversion, Nonjudgment, Observation
13 Curiosity, Decenteringb
Tschacher, & Kupper, 2013), raising the question of whether acceptance
can be defined as the absence of avoidance. Reverse-scoring on the
MAAS suggests that this scale measures attentional failures (Carriere,
Cheyne, & Smilek, 2008; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek, 2006), running on
“automatic pilot” (Williams, 2010, p.4), or cognitive styles characterized
by “being seriously spaced out” (Rosch, 2007, p.262–263) rather than
dispositional mindfulness. Items on the CAMS-R reflect “a kind of mind-
fulness that…could be useful in the treatment of depression” (Hayes &
Feldman, 2004, p.260), which may explain the higher association of
the CAMS-R to measures of psychological distress compared to other
measures of mindfulness (MAAS, FMI, KIMS, SMQ; Baer et al., 2006;
Thompson & Waltz, 2007).
2.3. Response accuracy
The conceptualization of mindfulness as an individual difference
factor poses a theoretical conundrum: those higher in DM should be
able to provide more accurate and reliable self-reports. If so, high scores
could reflect overestimation by individuals lower in DM, and low to
average scores could reflect more modest or realistic accounts by indi-
viduals higher in DM. Indeed, individuals without mindfulness training
report higher levels of DM compared to those just beginning a mindful-
ness practice (Baer et al., 2008). Because most of our knowledge about
mindfulness is based on self-report data, use of other measurement pro-
cedures is encouraged (Baumeister, Vohs, & Funder, 2007; Campbell &
Fiske, 1959). Experience sampling methods and informant reports, for
example, can be used to enhance the credibility of study findings and
improve validity.
2.4. Construct representation
Researchers concerned with construct representation (Borsboom,
Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004) are interested in how items are
interpreted and understood. Westernized mindfulness training often
modifies how people relate to familiar concepts such as ‘attention’ or
‘observing’. Measures that use familiar words to refer to something
other than the lay interpretation are subject to different interpretations
(Grossman, 2008, 2011). Evidence of differential item functioning
(observe facet from FFMQ; Baer et al., 2008) suggests that individuals
may respond differently to items based on exposure to mindfulness
training. One qualitative study found that the ambiguity of words com-
monly used to describe mindfulness (e.g., awareness, experience, notic-
ing, judging) can contribute to unstable interpretations of questionnaire
items (FMI; Belzer et al., 2013). Qualitative interviews examining differ-
ential item functioning may help further clarify group differences in
item interpretation.
2.5. What's meditation got to do with it?
Comparable mindfulness scores have been reported between
American and Thai students and between meditators and nonmeditators
(MAAS: Christopher, Charoensuk, Gilbert, Neary, & Pearce, 2009;
 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43 35

MacKillop & Anderson, 2007), supporting the argument that mindful-
ness reflects a generalizable individual difference factor (Brown &
Ryan, 2004; Goldstein, 2002; Kabat-Zinn, 2003). However, mindfulness
may manifest differently within different populations, most likely
on the basis of exposure to mindfulness training. Mindfulness expe-
rienced during meditation (TMS) is unrelated to mindfulness experi-
enced in everyday life (FFMQ, CAMS-R, MAAS; Carmody, Reed,
Kristeller, & Merriam, 2008; Thompson & Waltz, 2007), and different
response patterns have been observed between samples trained ver-
sus untrained in mindfulness (FFMQ: Baer et al., 2008; KIMS:
Christopher et al., 2009).
In many ways, these results are not surprising. Most measures of DM
were developed to examine mindfulness as a universal dispositional
trait (Brown & Ryan, 2004; Goldstein, 2002; Kabat-Zinn, 2003), and
most were validated using samples naïve to mindfulness practices.
However, there is both theoretical and empirical support indicating
that cultivated mindfulness and dispositional mindfulness are two dis-
tinct and meaningful constructs requiring separate operational defini-
tions and measurement instruments. Using the same measure to
assess two distinct sets of mindfulness attributes (i.e., traits versus
skills) is problematic and can result in different representations of
content domain depending on sample characteristics. Researchers are
therefore encouraged to discuss sample characteristics, including
degree of exposure to mindfulness training, when reporting and
interpreting results.
3. Hypothesis testing: convergent and discriminant validity
The Five-Factor Model of Personality (FFM; McCrae & Costa, 2003) is
an accepted and widely used model for classifying and describing per-
sonality traits (a term used interchangeably with disposition). The
FFM assumes that personality traits emerge during early childhood, be-
come relatively stable by age 30, and govern most behavior of normal
adults including thoughts, feelings, and actions. DM and related
constructs were examined across the five factors in an effort to locate
DM within a well-validated framework of personality. For the sake of
brevity and conceptual organization, psychological constructs that fall
outside of the immediate FFM framework are subsumed under the
five factor headings, organized according to empirical models
(i.e., NEOAC). FFM terminology is used to refer to equivalent constructs
(e.g., neuroticism for trait negative affectivity). Specific DM measures
(see Table 1), and facet-level findings when applicable, are cited paren-
thetically. Results are summarized in Table 2.
3.1. Neuroticism
In the personality literature, neuroticism is alternately referred to as
trait negative affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984), negative emotionality
(Harkness, Tellegen, & Waller, 1995), and emotional instability
(Digman, 1990). Neuroticism is defined by a propensity to experience
negative affect such as anxiety, hostility, depressed mood, and emotion-
al sensitivity (Costa & McCrae, 1992). In brief, individuals reporting high
levels of neuroticism report lower subjective well-being (e.g., Costa &
McCrae, 1980; Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003), evidence increased suscep-
tibility to emotional distress and poor coping (e.g., Connor-Smith &
Flachsbart, 2007; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli,
1999), and are at greater risk for developing psychopathology
(e.g., Clark & Watson, 1991; Kendler, Gatz, Gardner, & Pedersen, 2006;
Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Mineka, Watson, & Clark,
1998; Ormel, Oldehinkel, & Brilman, 2001).
Characteristic features of neuroticism, such as tendencies
toward cognitive and physiological reactivity (Barnhofer & Chittka,
2010; Suls, Green, & Hillis, 1998), are often conceptualized via behavior-
al motivation models. In particular, the Behavioral Inhibition System
(BIS; Grey, 1987), which describes neurobiological processes involved
with detecting and responding to threat cues, is thought to underlie
neuroticism. High BIS activation is thought to reflect over-sensitivity
to threat cues (e.g., anxiety disorders: Fowles, 1988; attention
disorders: Quay, 1988) whereas low BIS activation is thought to reflect
under-sensitivity to threat cues (e.g., psychopathy: Newman, MacCoon,

Table 2
Five factor model associations with dispositional mindfulness.

Total score Subscale score

CAMS-R FFMQ FMI MAAS SMQ Accept Aware Describe Observe Nonreact

Neuroticism (r = −.45) − − − − − −
Self-reported BIS − − − −
Amygdala size, reactivity −
Threat appraisal −
Stress reactivity −
Trait Rumination −
Avoidance-based coping − − − − −
Extraversion (r = .12) + + + + +
Trait boredom −
Risk taking −
Early information processing (LPP) −
Response to feedback (EEG) −
Openness to experience (r = .15) + + + + + + + + +
Trait absorption + + +
Mind wandering −
Emotional intelligence + + +
Alexithymia − −
Reflection +
Agreeableness (r = .22) + + +
Trait aggression −
Rejection sensitivity −
Conscientiousness (r = .32) + + + −
Effortful control +
Trait self-esteem +
Self-acceptance +

Note: Items in bold represent multiple findings.

Total score = significant correlations when only the total score was reported; Subscale scores = significant factor-level associations across measures of dispositional mindfulness, orga-
nized by subscale type; CAMS-R = Cognitive and Affective Mindfulness Scale — Revised; FFMQ = Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire; FMI = Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory; MAAS =
Mindful Attention Awareness Scale; SMQ = Southampton Mindfulness Questionnaire; r = sample-size weighted mean observed correlation resulting from Giluk (2009) meta-analysis;
BIS = behavioral inhibition system; LPP = late positive potential; EEG = electroencephalogram.
36 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
Vaughn, & Sadeh, 2005; Wallace, Malterer, & Newman, 2009). Threat
sensitivity holds important implications for emotion regulation. Neu-
rotic individuals have a lower criterion for detecting aversive stimuli,
and engage in more frequent avoidance behaviors in response to per-
ceived threat (Lommen, Engelhard, & van den Hout, 2010).
Deliberate shifts of attention away from aversive stimuli, including
negative affect, may lead to thought suppression (Wenzlaff & Bates,
1998) or experiential avoidance (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, &
Strosahl, 1996), two maladaptive coping strategies known to prolong
or exacerbate mood symptoms (Beevers, Wenzlaff, & Hayes, 1999;
Gird & Zettle, 2009; Tull & Gratz, 2008). Heightened sensitivity to threat
may also increase risk for rumination (i.e., repetitive negative ideation)
due to biased or habitual attentional processing (Mathews & MacLeod,
2005). Evidence linking neuroticism and rumination (Cox, Enns,
Walker, Kjernisted, & Pidlubny, 2001; Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, &
Sham, 2003; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998) suggest that rumination
is both a cognitive manifestation of neuroticism (Segerstrom, Tsao,
Alden, & Craske, 2000) and an important mechanism linking neuroti-
cism to symptoms of depression and anxiety (Roelofs, Huibers,
Peeters, Arntz, & van Os, 2008).
Meta-analysis reveals neuroticism as the FFM trait most strongly
(negatively) related to DM (r = −.45; Giluk, 2009), consistent with
the well-documented inverse relationship between DM and neuroti-
cism (KIMS accept/nonjudge, act with awareness: Frewen, Evans, Maraj,
Dozois, & Partridge, 2008; KIMS accept/nonjudge, act with awareness,
describe: Baer et al., 2004; McKee, Zvolensky, Solomon, Bernstein, &
Leen-Feldner, 2007; FFMQ accept/nonjudge, act with awareness, describe,
nonreactivity: Baer et al., 2006; Barnhofer, Duggan, & Griffith, 2011;
MAAS: Brown & Ryan, 2003; Coffey & Hartman, 2008; Frewen et al.,
2008; Taren, Creswell, & Gianaros, 2013; Way, Creswell, Eisenberger,
& Lieberman, 2010). DM is also significantly negatively related to each
of the six neuroticism facets, with Angry Hostility, Anxiety, and
Vulnerability—predispositions characterized by heightened levels of
arousal and low thresholds for “minor annoyances”—having the stron-
gest associations (FFMQ total score: McGarvey, 2010).
Based on the relationship between neuroticism and threat sensitivi-
ty, and the relationship between neuroticism and DM, it stands to
reason that DM would be negatively associated with threat sensitivity.
Indeed, DM is associated with lower self-reported BIS (FMI, KIMS
average composite of accept/nonjuding, act with awareness, describe:
Sauer, Walach, & Kohls, 2011), as well as lower neuroendocrine and af-
fective responses to threat (MAAS: Brown, Weinstein, & Creswell,
2012). In addition, the amygdala—a neurobiological structure involved
with processing and responding to threat cues (Ohman, 2005;
Phelps, 2006; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005)—is both smaller (MAAS:
Taren et al., 2013) and less reactive to negative emotional stimuli
(MAAS: Way et al., 2010) in high DM individuals. Consistent with
predictions, evidence of tempered threat sensitivity is accompanied
by evidence of lower threat appraisal, avoidance-based coping
styles, and rumination among high DM individuals (FFMQ accept/
nonjudge, act with awareness, describe, nonreactivity: Baer et al.,
2006; Thompson & Waltz, 2010; MAAS: Coffey & Hartman, 2008;
Brown, Ryan, Creswell, & Niemiec, 2008; Weinstein, Brown, & Ryan,
2009).
Researchers have suggested that DM may offset the detrimental
effects of neuroticism and protect against the development of psycho-
pathology (J. M. Williams, 2008). For example, DM has been shown to
moderate the relationship between neuroticism and depressive symp-
toms, such that higher levels of DM mitigate the development of depres-
sive symptoms for individuals high in neuroticism (FFMQ total score:
Barnhofer et al., 2011; MAAS: Feltman, Robinson, & Ode, 2009). Howev-
er, because the deleterious effects of neuroticism are attenuated only at
relatively high levels of DM (i.e., 90th percentile of sample distribution
on FFMQ; Barnhofer et al., 2011), individuals high in neuroticism may
need to learn specific skills in order to experience the protective benefits
of mindfulness.
To summarize, consistent inverse associations between DM and
neuroticism highlight important differences in emotional sensitivity
and reactivity. Strong inverse correlations between DM and neuroticism
facets Angry Hostility and Anxiety could reflect item content. However,
it is also possible that DM protects against heightened affective arousal,
perhaps through a combination of bottom-up (i.e., neurobiological) and
top-down (i.e., cognitive appraisal) emotion regulation processes. With
the exception of observe, which is not associated with neuroticism (Baer
et al., 2004, 2006; Barnhofer et al., 2011; Frewen et al., 2008; McKee
et al., 2007), DM facets tend to be negatively correlated with neuroti-
cism. Interestingly, act with awareness and accept/nonjudge demonstrate
the most reliable associations. These findings provide additional
evidence of a two-factor, multidimensional model of dispositional
mindfulness. The literature also provides evidence of construct inde-
pendence, such that DM cannot merely be defined as the absence of
neuroticism (e.g., Barnhofer et al., 2011). Given the bidirectional re-
lationship between many personality styles, it is unclear whether
“being mindful may lower neurotic tendencies, or neuroticism may
interfere with mindfulness” (Brown & Ryan, 2003, p.1833). Such
possibilities require empirical investigation, however, since associa-
tions may also be driven by similarities in item content. Future re-
search should examine associations between facets for both DM
and neuroticism to identify lower-level associations and clarify pos-
sible mechanisms by which these individual differences influence
emotional processes.
3.2. Extraversion
Extraversion is alternately referred to as trait positive affectivity
(Watson & Clark, 1997) and positive emotionality (Tellegen, 1985). Ex-
traverted individuals are described as warm, outgoing, and socially en-
gaged (Costa & McCrae, 1992); report higher levels of subjective well-
being (Diener, Sandvik, Pavot, & Fujita, 1992); have lower risk of
mood disorders and early mortality (e.g., Eysenck, 1993; Farmer et al.,
2002; Wilson et al., 2005; Wilson, Mendes de, Bienias, Evans, &
Bennett, 2004); and evidence better disease-related outcomes
(e.g., Carinci et al., 1997; Ironson, O'Cleirigh, Weiss, Schneiderman, &
Costa, 2008; Morris, Robinson, & Samuels, 1993). Despite these protec-
tive benefits, higher levels of extraversion are also associated with risk-
taking behaviors, including reckless driving styles (Taubman-Ben-Ari &
Yehiel, 2012), high-risk sexual encounters (Hoyle, Fejfar, & Miller,
2000), and greater lifetime periods of heavy alcohol use (Eisenlohr-
Moul et al., 2012).
Similar to neuroticism, behavioral motivation models have
been used to conceptualize characteristic features of extraversion.
In this case, differences in sensitivity to and advances toward
reward—represented by the Behavioral Activation System (BAS; Grey,
1987)—are thought to underlie extraversion. The BAS is thought to be
mediated by dopaminergic pathways involved with detecting and
responding to appetitive stimuli (Depue & Collins, 1999). Individuals
reporting greater BAS-related tendencies display greater activation in
reward processing limbic structures during passive viewing of
appetizing stimuli (Barros-Loscertales et al., 2010; Beaver et al., 2006)
and report higher subjective happiness in anticipation of reward
(Carver & White, 1994). Individual differences in appetitive drive have
important implications for emotion regulation and the development of
mood disorders. For example, BAS hypersensitivity is a risk factor for
mania and bipolar disorder (Alloy & Abramson, 2010; Johnson, Edge,
Holmes, & Carver, 2012) whereas BAS hyposensitivity is a risk factor
for major depression (Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow, & Gotlib, 2002;
McFarland, Shankman, Tenke, Bruder, & Klein, 2006). Several of the ex-
traversion facets reflect high levels of arousal and need for stimulation
(i.e., Positive Emotions, Gregariousness, Activity, and Excitement
Seeking; Costa & McCrae, 1992), and increased reward-seeking behav-
iors in general may explain why extraversion is associated with both
protective and risk factors.
 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
Empirical findings regarding associations between extraversion
and DM are equivocal, with some studies reporting positive associa-
tions (KIMS describe: Baer et al., 2004; FFMQ accept/nonjudge, act
with awareness, describe, observe: Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 2011;
MAAS: Niemiec et al., 2010) and others failing to find an association
(CAMS-R, FMI, KIMS, MAAS, TMS; Baer et al., 2006; Latzman &
Masuda, 2013; Thompson & Waltz, 2007). In a recent meta-
analysis, extraversion was the FFM factor least associated with DM
(r = .12; Giluk, 2009), which is somewhat surprising given the link
between DM and tendencies toward positive affect (Branstrom,
Duncan, & Moskowitz, 2011; Brown & Ryan, 2003; Jimenez, Niles, &
Park, 2010).
Studies that do report significant positive associations between DM
and extraversion highlight important facet-level distinctions. For exam-
ple, DM is significantly associated with extraversion facets reflecting the
ability to experience positive affect (i.e., Positive Emotions, Warmth)
rather than high levels of arousal or drive (i.e., Activity, Excitement
Seeking, Gregariousness) (McGarvey, 2010). De-emphasis on the
reward-seeking component of extraversion is consistent with inverse
associations between DM and measures of trait boredom (MAAS:
LePera, 2011) and risk taking (MAAS: Lakey et al., 2007). Thus, although
DM and extraversion both reflect predispositions to experience positive
affect, individuals high in DM may not be especially sensitive to either
threat or reward cues. One study found that DM was negatively associ-
ated with late positive potentials (LPPs)—an index of early information
processing—in response to both high arousal pleasant and high arousal
unpleasant images (MAAS: Brown, Goodman, & Inzlicht, 2013). Another
study found that DM predicted less differentiation of feedback-related
negativity (FRN)—an electroencephalographic index of brain response
to feedback—in response to rewarding versus neutral feedback
(PHLMS accept: Teper & Inzlicht, 2014). These findings suggest that
DM may reflect a neurobiological predisposition toward affective
stability.
Questions remain regarding the emotional landscape of DM. The
intensity conveyed by certain items within the Positive Emotions facet
of extraversion (e.g., “I have sometimes experienced intense joy or ec-
stasy” and “Sometimes I bubble with happiness”; Costa & McCrae,
1992) exceeds the boundaries of emotional equanimity implicit to
DM. Unfortunately, studies reporting associations between DM and
‘positive affect’ fail to distinguish between high arousal positive affect
(e.g., excited, active, enthusiastic) and low arousal positive affect
(e.g., interested, attentive) and often use measures that neglect positive
mood states thought to characterize mindfulness (i.e., tranquil, content,
serene). Of particular interest are eudaemonic mood states, such as awe
and transcendence, which surpass psycho-physical experiences.
Although research is limited, there is preliminary evidence that DM is
associated with correlates of awe, such as nature connectedness
(i.e., sense of oneness with the natural world; Mayer & Frantz, 2009)
(MAAS: Howell, Dopko, Passmore, & Buro, 2011), and may promote
self-transcendence by dissolving self-other distinctions (Vago &
Silbersweig, 2012). Given that awe is most consistently related to the
personality trait openness to experience (Bride, Williams, Baucom, &
Crowell, 2015; Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006), positive mood states char-
acterizing the high-DM individual may better reflect the propensity to
immerse oneself in the immediate experience than a drive to seek out
highly rewarding stimuli.
In sum, the robust findings linking DM and extraversion to propen-
sities toward positive affect likely reflect distinct information processing
and behavioral motivation mechanisms. Extraversion is characterized
by biased attention and response to reward, resulting in greater sensitiv-
ity to and attempts to experience pleasant stimuli. DM, on the other
hand, is characterized by unbiased attention and response to reward,
resulting in tempered sensitivity to a range of stimuli, regardless of va-
lence. Thus, as demonstrated by neuroimaging studies, higher levels of
DM represent attenuated reactivity to external stimuli or feedback
more generally, perhaps due to broadband, nondiscriminatory
37
information processes. Despite these underlying differences, the link
between DM and positive mood states warrants closer attention. A
more precise understanding of DM-specific positive emotionality may
be improved by including measures with increased emotional granular-
ity, such as the Modified Differential Emotions Scale (mDES;
Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003) which uses adjectives
such as ‘contentment’ to capture additional aspects of positive
emotionality.
3.3. Openness to experience
Individuals high on openness to experience are attentive to and
curious about their inner (i.e., emotions, thoughts) and outer
(i.e., activities, foods, social values) experiences (Costa & McCrae,
1992). The emphasis on receptivity to experience makes openness
the second-most investigated personality trait (next to neuroti-
cism/trait negative affectivity) in mindfulness studies (Giluk,
2009). Although several studies have reported a positive association
between DM and openness (CAMS-R, FFMQ, FMI, MAAS, SMQ; Baer
et al., 2006; Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 2011), others have failed to
find an association (MAAS, CAMS-R; Latzman & Masuda, 2013;
Thompson & Waltz, 2007) and a recent meta-analysis reported a
relatively low correlation between the two (r = .15; Giluk, 2009).
Further, although facet-level investigations of DM reveal positive as-
sociations with openness (FFMQ describe, accept/nonjudge: Hollis-
Walker & Colosimo, 2011; FFMQ observe: Bohlmeijer, ten Klooster,
Fledderus, Veehof, & Baer, 2011; Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 2011;
PHLMS awareness: Teper & Inzlicht, 2014), there is not a clear link
between openness and specific components of DM.
The lack of uniform associations suggests that the FFM may concep-
tualize openness in ways that are theoretically distinct from DM. In fact,
certain facets of openness describe cognitive states that are antithetical
to mindfulness. Fantasy, for example, describes the tendency to engage
in musings and daydreams unrelated to the task at hand. This facet is
theoretically similar to the construct mind-wandering, described as “a
shift of attention away from a primary task toward internal informa-
tion” (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006, p.946). As expected, DM is inversely
associated with self-reported and behavioral markers of mind-
wandering (MAAS: Mrazek, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2012). Similarly,
certain items from the Fantasy and Aesthetics facets describe states of
mental absorption (Roche & McConkey, 1990; Tellegen & Atkinson,
1974) and flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990), in which attention becomes
engrossed in an experience, often to the exclusion of a broader range
of available experiences (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Jackson,
Thomas, Marsh, & Smethurst, 2001). Studies indicate that measures of
DM correlate with certain flow subscales (e.g., action-awareness merg-
ing, loss of self-consciousness) but not others (e.g., transformation of
time), suggesting that high-DM individuals may be able to experience
states of present-moment unity without necessarily becoming “lost”
in the moment (Kee & Wang, 2008). Similarly, there is only partial over-
lap at best between measures of DM and measures of trait absorption
(FMI: Walach et al., 2006; KIMS observe: Baer et al., 2004; MAAS:
Brown & Ryan, 2003). Although these findings suggest that DM repre-
sents a functionally distinct and more adaptive mode of self-focused at-
tention (Watkins & Teasdale, 2004), it is also important to recognize
that certain subtypes of mindfulness (e.g., high self-focused attention
in the absence of nonelaborative appraisal) may be functionally similar
to maladaptive forms of self-focused attention such as trait rumination
(Eisenlohr-Moul et al., 2012).
Other facets of openness are more theoretically congruent with
DM. The Feelings facet, for example, describes an ability to notice, at-
tend to, and experience a wide range of emotions. This facet likely
contributes to the stable relationship between openness to experi-
ence and measures of emotional intelligence (Austin, Saklofske, &
Egan, 2005; Saklofske, Austin, & Minski, 2003; Schutte et al., 1998)
and alexithymia (Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994; Taylor, 1994; Wise,
38 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
Mann, & Shay, 1992), constructs used to describe the ability to iden-
tify and distinguish between emotional states (Kooiman, Spinhoven,
& Trijsburg, 2002; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995).
Measures of DM also correlate positively with measures of emotional
intelligence and negatively with measures of alexithymia (KIMS ob-
serve, describe: Baer et al., 2004; MAAS: Brown & Ryan, 2003), and
facet-level analyses suggest that this is largely driven by the describe
subscale (KIMS: Baer et al., 2006). Although several studies have
reported similarly important associations with the describe compo-
nent, including higher life satisfaction, improved emotion regula-
tion, and reduced likelihood of depressive symptoms (FFMQ:
Barnhofer et al., 2011; KIMS: Baer et al., 2004), the ability to label
or describe one's internal experience falls outside most theoretical
models of DM. Thus, it is unclear whether describe merely reflects
emotional intelligence or the absence of alexithymia, or whether
the labeling process itself reflects behaviors supporting mindfulness,
such as decentering (i.e., viewing thoughts or emotions as mental
events rather than reflections of reality; Fresco, Segal, Buis, &
Kennedy, 2007).
The Ideas facet, which describes an analytical or intellectually cu-
rious style, also shares theoretical similarities with DM and re-
searchers often include the word ‘curiosity’ in their description of
mindfulness (Bishop et al., 2004; Kashdan, Afram, Brown, Birnbeck,
& Drvoshanov, 2011; Williams, 2008). Interestingly, one study re-
ported that a positive correlation between DM and trait openness
was entirely accounted for by the Ideas facet (FFMQ; McGarvey,
2010). Notably, some researchers emphasize distinct motivational
and cognitive components of openness and use the alternate label
“Openness/Intellect” (DeYoung, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005); within
the NEO PI-R facets, Ideas primarily reflects the “intellect” aspect of
openness. However, mindful curiosity, which is described as “pre-
reflexive” and emphasizes non-evaluative perceptual receptivity
(Brown & Ryan, 2003), is quite different from the “hungry mind”
quality of intellectual curiosity, which emphasizes active pursuit
of effortful cognitive activity (Von Stumm, Hell, & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2011). Based on this distinction, several constructs related
to the Ideas facet of openness, such as need for cognition (i.e., the ten-
dency to engage in and enjoy thinking; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982;
Fleischhauer et al., 2010) and intellectual engagement (i.e., the ten-
dency to enjoy intellectually demanding activities; Ackerman &
Goff, 1994; Goff & Ackerman, 1992; Rocklin, 1994), are theoretically
distinct from DM despite evidence for an association (MAAS: Brown &
Ryan, 2003; Parisi, Stine-Morrow, Noh, & Morrow, 2009). These
associations may better be explained by the reported link between DM
and tendencies toward reflection (i.e., “intellectual self-attentiveness”;
Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) (MAAS: Brown & Ryan, 2003), although
relatively modest correlations may reflect the shared emphasis on
self-focused attention rather than the experiential and non-analytical
characteristics of DM.
Despite the seemingly intuitive link between openness and
DM—based on attention to and curiosity about experience—empirical
support is lacking. In part, equivocal findings reflect facet-level differ-
ences, such that neither openness nor DM can be consistently repre-
sented by the other at the factor or facet level. Further, certain
openness facets (i.e., Fantasy, Ideas) directly contradict theoretical
models of mindfulness, and other more theoretically congruent facets
(i.e., Feelings) correlate with DM facets least associated with the overall
mindfulness construct (i.e., observe, describe) (Baer et al., 2006).
Although “curiosity” and “willingness” are shared features, the distinc-
tion between active exploration and receptive acceptance highlight
important differences between openness and mindfulness. Stated an-
other way, openness to experience represents a desire to seek diverse
experiences (Aluja, Garcia, & Garcia, 2003) whereas DM represents
ready receptivity toward present-moment experiences. Additional
investigation into conceptual similarities and distinctions may reveal
important mechanisms involved with psychological health. For
example, DM is associated with enhanced visceral awareness (FFMQ:
Gu, Zhong, & Page-Gould, 2013) and emotional awareness (MAAS:
Niemec et al., 2010), and mindful curiosity may be one mechanism
linking heightened awareness to enhanced insight, acceptance, and
subjective well-being.
3.4. Agreeableness
High agreeableness reflects a level-headed, considerate, and trusting
approach to social relationships (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Agreeable
individuals are described as generally good-natured, cooperative,
caring, and concerned for others (Barrick, Mount, & Judge, 2001). Mod-
erate correlations have been reported between DM and agreeableness
in meta-analysis (r = .22; Giluk, 2009), and mild to moderate correla-
tions have been reported in single study investigations of DM and
Agreeableness (CAMS-R, FFMQ, MAAS; Hollis-Walker & Colosimo,
2011; Latzman & Masuda, 2013; Thompson & Waltz, 2007).
Studies that have failed to find a significant association at the factor
level report significant positive associations between DM and Compli-
ance, Trust, and Altruism facets (FFMQ; McGarvey, 2010). At a concep-
tual level, Compliance (e.g., “When I've been insulted, I just try to
forgive and forget”) and Trust (e.g., “I believe that most people are basi-
cally well-intentioned”) are closely aligned with the ability to “take
things at face value” described by DM (i.e., nonelaborative appraisal).
Consequently, dispositionally high agreeable or mindful individuals
may be less likely to perceive social interactions as threatening. Not sur-
prisingly, measures of rejection sensitivity (i.e., heightened perception of
social rejection; Downey & Feldman, 1996; Pietrzak, Downey, & Ayduk,
2005) have been negatively correlated with measures of both DM
(MAAS: Barnes, Brown, Krusemark, Campbell, & Rogge, 2007; Creswell
et al., 2007) and agreeableness (Buckley, Winkel, & Leary, 2004;
Kelliher, 2013; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, Thornquist, & Kiers, 1991).
The relationship between DM and attributes described by the Altru-
ism facet has been interpreted with respect to Buddhist virtues
(e.g., compassion, humility, concern for others; Thompson & Waltz,
2007). Although prosocial qualities may emerge as a byproduct of
being dispositionally high in mindfulness, this specific interpretation
falls outside the current working model of DM. Instead, DM-Altruism as-
sociations have been interpreted as reflecting decreased trait aggression
(MAAS: Heppner et al., 2008; Kelley & Lambert, 2012), and could poten-
tially reflect greater attachment security based on associations with the
Altruism facet alone (Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005;
Shaver, Lavy, Saron, & Mikulincer, 2007). In other words, certain aspects
of DM and Agreeableness may reflect varying degrees of perceived
personal significance, consistent with the hypothesized relationship
between DM and self-transcendence (Vago & Silbersweig, 2012).
In sum, among the relatively few studies that have examined the de-
gree of overlap between DM and Agreeableness, there is preliminary
support for an association, especially between DM and prosocial quali-
ties such as Altruism. Despite this overlap, and the possibility that
dispositionally-high mindful individuals may exhibit more prosocial
features, the mechanisms driving these behaviors may reflect distinctly
different processes. One study found that DM was significantly associat-
ed with increased feedback-related negativity (FRN), or neural affective
reactivity in response to externally-produced feedback (PHLMS total
score, acceptance: Teper & Inzlicht, 2014). Conversely, Agreeableness
was significantly associated with decreased FRN and lower self-
reported acceptance. These findings suggest that DM, especially aspects
associated with nonjudgmental acceptance, may be associated with less
neuroaffective reactivity to immediate external rewards, such as social
approval. Whereas Agreeable individuals may be more sensitive to
social feedback cues and adjust their behavior accordingly, the DM indi-
vidual may engage in prosocial behavior secondary to a nonjudgmental
interpersonal style. It is important to note, however, that a prosocial
interpersonal style exceeds the current working definition of DM and
additional research is needed to test this particular hypothesis.
 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
3.5. Conscientiousness
High conscientiousness characterizes individuals as self-disciplined
and deliberate (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Conscientious individuals are
described as dependable, responsible, rule-abiding, and achievement-
oriented (Barrick et al., 2001). Conscientiousness demonstrates a
significant positive association with DM in a handful of studies (MAAS,
CAMS-R, FFMQ; Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 2011; Latzman & Masuda,
2013; Thompson & Waltz, 2007) and a recent meta-analysis reported
fairly strong correlations between the two traits (r = .32; Giluk,
2009), suggesting that this particular trait may warrant greater atten-
tion in future studies.
On the surface, conscientiousness is associated with certain
metacognitive components of DM (i.e., attentional focus, purposeful ac-
tion). For example, conscientiousness is associated with effortful control
(i.e., the ability to inhibit a dominant response in the service of goal-
directed behavior; Rothbart & Rueda, 2005), a self-regulatory aspect of
temperament that is typically associated with attentional control capac-
ity (Caspi, 1998; Kochanska & Knaack, 2003; Kochanska, Murray, &
Harlan, 2000; MacDonald, 2008; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans, 2000). Relat-
ed constructs, such as delayed gratification (i.e., postponing immediate
reward; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989), are associated with consci-
entiousness (Digman & Inouye, 1986; Digman & Takemoto-Chock,
1981) and are likely to contribute to the greater level of academic
(Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Dollinger & Orf, 1991; John, Caspi,
Robins, Moffitt, & Stouthamer-Loeber, 1994) and occupational (Barrick
& Mount, 1991) success reported for high conscientious individuals.
Indeed, measures of effortful control are also positively associated
with DM (MAAS: Brown, 2006), consistent with strong positive correla-
tions between DM and the conscientiousness facet Self-Discipline
(i.e., “Once I start a project, I almost always finish it”) (McGarvey, 2010).
With this in mind, it is important to note that the ‘mindful’ attention
state is typically understood from a Gestalt perspective, such that atten-
tion is generally relaxed rather than controlled (Brown & Ryan, 2003).
Once attention becomes “hooked” onto an object outside of immediate
experience (i.e., memory, worry, fantasy), the ability to disengage and
redirect attention may require effortful control (i.e., deliberate or inten-
tional shifts in attention that require self-monitoring and cognitive
flexibility).
Perhaps secondary to the ability to manage thoughts and behaviors,
Conscientiousness is associated with measures of trait self-esteem
(i.e., sense of self-worth associated with being successful; Rosenberg,
1965) (Kwan, Bond, & Singelis, 1997; Robins, Tracy, Trzesniewski,
Potter, & Gosling, 2001) and self-efficacy (i.e., confidence in one's ability
to influence important events; Bandura, 1977) (Caprara, Vecchione,
Alessandri, Gerbino, & Barbaranelli, 2011; Yang, Kim, & McFarland,
2011). Similar findings have been reported with DM (MAAS: Brown &
Ryan, 2003; Heppner & Kernis, 2007; Rasmussen & Pidgeon, 2011).
However, rather than being interpreted with respect to self-mastery
or need for achievement, a healthy sense of self-worth in high DM indi-
viduals is thought to stem from self-acceptance (i.e., non-evaluative
regard for the self; Ryff & Singer, 1996) (MAAS: Heppner & Kernis,
2007; Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, & Lance, 2008), a hypothesis that has
gained empirical support. For example, self-acceptance has been
found to be a stronger mediator of DM associations with depressive
symptoms than other well-established mechanisms, such as positive
emotion and mood regulation (FMI: Jimenez et al., 2010).
To summarize, the theoretical overlap between DM and Conscien-
tiousness has received empirical support, including particularly strong
meta-analytic associations (Giluk, 2009). Closer examination at the
facet level reveals that DM is closely associated with aspects associated
with deliberate attentional control (i.e., Self-Discipline), but may be
less associated with aspects associated with agentic aspirations
(i.e., Achievement Striving). In support of this distinction, one study
found that Conscientiousness predicts greater differentiation of aversive
(vs. neutral) stimuli based on electroencephalographic recordings
39
(Teper & Inzlicht, 2014). This particular type of affective reactivity is
associated with brain regions involved with detecting error and pro-
cessing corrective feedback including the anterior cingulate cortex
(ACC) (Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Interestingly, in this same study, Consci-
entiousness was inversely associated with the acceptance facet of a DM
measure (i.e., PHLMS: Teper & Inzlicht, 2014). Collectively, this suggests
that Conscientiousness may reflect attention to and incorporation
of feedback cues needed to perform “correctly.” In contrast, DM involves
similarly high levels of self-control, but without specific attention
to corrective feedback, consistent with a nonreactive or accepting
personality style. Unfortunately, very few studies have examined DM-
Conscientiousness associations, and even fewer report facet-level
associations, making it difficult to more accurately distinguish
between these two constructs. Researchers examining personality
correlates of DM are therefore encouraged to report both factor-
and facet-level associations.
4. State of the science and future directions
Several important insights about the meaning and nature of
mindfulness can be gleaned from the past two decades of research.
Western psychology has embraced a widely accessible version of
mindfulness that retains the essential qualities of sati (i.e., Pali
term for mindfulness) without requiring extensive knowledge of
Buddhist philosophy. Distinctions have been made between differ-
ent types of mindfulness, referred to here as dispositional
(i.e., trait) and cultivated (i.e., trained, practiced), and researchers
are beginning to identify characteristics unique to each. Operational
definitions have been proposed and used to guide research, leading
to more precise theoretical models, and there are now both theoret-
ical and empirical reasons to believe that DM is a two dimensional con-
struct reflecting both the focus and quality of attention. Importantly,
convergence with related constructs indicates that DM functions ac-
cording to theoretical predictions while simultaneously maintaining in-
dependence, suggesting that DM is more than mere repackaging of
familiar constructs.
Despite these advances, ongoing efforts are necessary to further re-
fine models of DM. First, the two-factor consensus definition proposed
by Bishop et al. (2004) reflects a single perspective that is firmly rooted
in personality psychology, but will likely require modification as
additional data become available. Second, reliance on self-report ques-
tionnaires introduces uncertainty about the validity and reliability of
mindfulness studies and supplemental methods (e.g., qualitative inter-
views, experience sampling, informant reports) should be included
when possible; although these alternative measurement methods may
not provide ‘diagnostic’ utility, they are likely to provide valuable
sources of convergent and discriminant validity.
Finally, mapping DM onto well-established personality constructs is
an iterative process that will require ongoing evaluation (Smith, 2005).
The current review provides an integrative summary of theoretical and
empirical literature that can be used as a foundation for construct
validation efforts, as well as a springboard for new research initiatives.
Researchers are encouraged to capitalize on the growing evidence
base and approach DM as a unique individual difference factor
strongly rooted in developmental, cognitive, and personality disci-
plines. Distinguishing between DM and related constructs can inform
theories specific to DM, as well as theories related to mindfulness and
self-regulation more broadly. Whether DM is best considered a basic
tendency or a characteristic adaptation (McCrae & Costa, 1999) arising
from basic tendencies, such as the broad factors comprising the FFM,
is fodder for future research. Attempts to, as Plato described, “carve
nature at its joint,” may also provide valuable insights regarding the
precise mechanisms by which DM promotes well-being. An under-
standing of the active ingredients linking DM to positive psychological
and physical health outcomes could further inform personality theo-
ry, mindfulness-based interventions, and evidence-based practices
40 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
more generally. Through continued collaboration across disciplines,
the field of psychology stands to benefit from innovative insights
into the nature and function of individual differences in dispositional
mindfulness.
References
Abhidhammapitake Puggalapannattipali. (2000). In O. P. Pathak & V. Gaur (Eds.). Delhi:
Eastern Book Linkers.
Ackerman, P.L., & Goff, M. (1994). Typical intellectual engagement and personality: Reply
to Rocklin (1994). Journal of Educational Psychology, 86(1), 150–153.
Alloy, L.B., & Abramson, L.Y. (2010). The role of the behavioral approach system (BAS) in
bipolar spectrum disorders. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19(3),
189–194.
Allport, G.W. (1961). Pattern and growth in personality. New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston.
Aluja, A., Garcia, O., & Garcia, L.F. (2003). Relationships among extraversion, openness to
experience, and sensation seeking. Personality and Individual Differences, 35, 671–680.
Austin, E.J., Saklofske, D.H., & Egan, V. (2005). Personality, well-being and health
correlates of trait emotional intelligence. Personality and Individual Differences,
38(3), 547–558.
Baer, R.A., Smith, G.T., & Allen, K.B. (2004). Assessment of mindfulness by self-report: The
Kentucky inventory of mindfulness skills. Assessment, 11(3), 191–206.
Baer, R.A., Smith, G.T., Hopkins, J., Krietemeyer, J., & Toney, L. (2006). Using self-report as-
sessment methods to explore facets of mindfulness. Assessment, 13(1), 27–45.
Baer, R.A., Smith, G.T., Lykins, E., Button, D., Krietemeyer, J., Sauer, S., et al. (2008).
Construct validity of the five facet mindfulness questionnaire in meditating and
nonmeditating samples. Assessment, 15(3), 329–342.
Bagby, R.M., Taylor, G.J., & Parker, J.D. (1994). The Twenty-item Toronto Alexithymia
Scale–II. Convergent, discriminant, and concurrent validity. Journal of Psychosomatic
Research, 38(1), 33–40.
Bandura, A. (1977). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral change.
Psychological Review, 84(2), 191–215.
Barnes, S., Brown, K.W., Krusemark, E., Campbell, W.K., & Rogge, R.D. (2007). The role of
mindfulness in romantic relationship satisfaction and responses to relationship
stress. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 33(4), 482–500.
Barnhofer, T., & Chittka, T. (2010). Cognitive reactivity mediates the relationship between
neuroticism and depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48(4), 275–281.
Barnhofer, T., Duggan, D.S., & Griffith, J.W. (2011). Dispositional mindfulness moderates
the relation between neuroticism and depressive symptoms. Personality and
Individual Differences, 51(8), 958–962.
Barrick, M.R., & Mount, M.K. (1991). The Big Five personality dimensions and job
performance: A meta-analysis. Personnel Psychology, 44(1), 1–26.
Barrick, M.R., Mount, M.K., & Judge, T.A. (2001). Personality and performance at the be-
ginning of the new millennium: What do we know and where do we go next?
International Journal of Selection and Assessment, 9(1–2), 9–30.
Barros-Loscertales, A., Ventura-Campos, N., Sanjuan-Tomas, A., Belloch, V., Parcet, M.A., &
Avila, C. (2010). Behavioral activation system modulation on brain activation during
appetitive and aversive stimulus processing. Social Cognitive and Affective
Neuroscience, 5(1), 18–28.
Baumeister, R.F., & Heatherton, T.F. (1996). Self-regulation failure: An overview.
Psychological Inquiry, 7(1), 1–15.
Baumeister, R.F., Vohs, K.D., & Funder, D.C. (2007). Psychology as the science of self-
reports and finger movements. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(4), 396–403.
Beaver, J.D., Lawrence, A.D., van Ditzhuijzen, J., Davis, M.H., Woods, A., & Calder, A.J.
(2006). Individual differences in reward drive predict neural responses to images of
food. The Journal of Neuroscience, 26(19), 5160–5166.
Beevers, C.G., Wenzlaff, R.M., & Hayes, A.M. (1999). Depression and the ironic effects of
thought suppression: Therapeutic strategies for improving mental control. Clinical
Psychology: Science and Practice, 6, 133–148.
Belzer, F., Schmidt, S., Lucius-Hoene, G., Schneider, J.F., Orellana-Rios, C., & Sauer, S.
(2013). Challenging the construct validity of mindfulness assessment–A cogni-
tive interview study of the Freiburg Mindfulness Inventory. Mindfulness, 4(1),
33–44.
Bergomi, C., Tschacher, W., & Kupper, Z. (2013). The assessment of mindfulness with self-
report measures: Existing scales and open issues. Mindfulness, 4(3), 191–202.
Birnie, K., Speca, M., & Carlson, L.E. (2010). Exploring self-compassion and empathy in the
context of Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction (MBSR). Stress and Health, 26(5),
359–371.
Bishop, S.R., Lau, M., Shapiro, S., Carlson, L.E., Anderson, N.D., Carmody, J., et al. (2004).
Mindfulness: A proposed operational definition. Clinical Psychology: Science and
Practice, 11, 230–241.
Black, D.S. (2013). Mindfulness Research Guide. from www.mindfulexperience.org
Block-Lerner, J., Adair, C., Plumb, J.C., Rhatigan, D.L., & Orsillo, S.M. (2007). The case for
mindfulness-based approaches in the cultivation of empathy: Does nonjudgmental,
present-moment awareness increase capacity for perspective-taking and empathic
concern? Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 33(4), 501–516.
Bodhi, B. (1984). The noble eightfold path: Way to the end of suffering. Buddhist Publication
Society.
Bodhi, B. (2000). A comprehensive manual of Abhidhamma: Pali text, translation &
explanatory guide. Onalaska: Buddhist Publication Society Pariyatti Editions.
Bohlmeijer, E., ten Klooster, P.M., Fledderus, M., Veehof, M., & Baer, R. (2011). Psychomet-
ric properties of the five facet mindfulness questionnaire in depressed adults and
development of a short form. Assessment, 18(3), 308–320.
Borsboom, D., Mellenbergh, G.J., & van Heerden, J. (2004). The concept of validity.
Psychological Review, 111(4), 1061–1071.
Branstrom, R., Duncan, L.G., & Moskowitz, J.T. (2011). The association between
dispositional mindfulness, psychological well-being, and perceived health in a
Swedish population-based sample. British Journal of Health Psychology, 16(Pt
2), 300–316.
Bride, D.L., Williams, P.G., Baucom, B., & Crowell, S. (2015). Openness to experience and
awe: Individual differences in response to an aesthetic stimulus. Presented at the annual
meeting of the Association for Research in Personality, St. Louis, MO.
Brown, K.W. (2006). Mindfulness and attentional control: Unpublished data. University of
Rochester.
Brown, K.W., & Ryan, R.M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role
in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(4),
822–848.
Brown, K.W., & Ryan, R.M. (2004). Perils and promise in defining and measuring mindful-
ness: Observations from experience. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 11,
242–248.
Brown, K.W., Goodman, R.J., & Inzlicht, M. (2013). Dispositional mindfulness and the
attenuation of neural responses to emotional stimuli. Social Cognitive and Affective
Neuroscience, 8(1), 93–99.
Brown, K.W., Ryan, R.M., & Creswell, J.D. (2007). Mindfulness: Theoretical founda-
tions and evidence for its salutary effects. Psychological Inquiry, 18(4),
211–237.
Brown, K.W., Ryan, R.M., Creswell, J.D., & Niemiec, C.P. (2008). Beyond me: Mindful
responses to social threat. In H.A. Wayment, & J.J. Bauer (Eds.), Transcending self-
interest: Psychological explorations of the quiet ego (pp. 75–84). Washington, D.C.:
American Psychological Association.
Brown, K.W., Weinstein, N., & Creswell, J.D. (2012). Trait mindfulness modulates neuroen-
docrine and affective responses to social evaluative threat. Psychoneuroendocrinology,
37(12), 2037–2041.
Buckley, K.E., Winkel, R.E., & Leary, M.R. (2004). Reactions to acceptance and rejection: Ef-
fects of level and sequence of relational evaluation. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 40(1), 14–28.
Cacioppo, J.T., & Petty, R.E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 42(1), 116–131.
Campbell, D.T., & Fiske, D.W. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by the
multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56(2), 81–105.
Caprara, G.V., Vecchione, M., Alessandri, G., Gerbino, M., & Barbaranelli, C. (2011). The
contribution of personality traits and self-efficacy beliefs to academic achieve-
ment: A longitudinal study. British Journal of Educational Psychology, 81(Pt 1),
78–96.
Cardaciotto, L., Herbert, J.D., Forman, E.M., Moitra, E., & Farrow, V. (2008). The assessment
of present-moment awareness and acceptance: The Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale.
Assessment, 15(2), 204–223.
Carinci, F., Nicolucci, A., Ciampi, A., Labbrozzi, D., Bettinardi, O., Zotti, A.M., & Tognoni, G.
(1997). Role of interactions between psychological and clinical factors in determining
6-month mortality among patients with acute myocardial infarction. Application of
recursive partitioning techniques to the GISSI-2 database. Gruppo Italiano per lo
Studio della Sopravvivenza nell’ Infarto Miocardico. European Heart Jouranl, 18(5),
835–845.
Carlson, L.E., & Brown, K.W. (2005). Validation of the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale
in a cancer population. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 58(1), 29–33.
Carmody, J., Reed, G., Kristeller, J., & Merriam, P. (2008). Mindfulness, spirituality,
and health-related symptoms. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 64(4),
393–403.
Carriere, J.S., Cheyne, J.A., & Smilek, D. (2008). Everyday attention lapses and memory fail-
ures: The affective consequences of mindlessness. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(3),
835–847.
Carver, C.S., & White, T.L. (1994). Behavioral inhibition, behavioral activation, and affec-
tive responses to impending reward and punishment: The BIS/BAS Scales. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 67(2), 319–333.
Caspi, A. (1998). Personality development across the life course. In N. Eisenberg (Ed.),
Handbook of child psychology (pp. 311–388) (5th ed.). New York: Wiley.
Chadwick, P., Hember, M., Symes, J., Peters, E., Kuipers, E., & Dagnan, D. (2008).
Responding mindfully to unpleasant thoughts and images: Reliability and validity
of the Southampton mindfulness questionnaire (SMQ). British Journal of Clinical
Psychology, 47(Pt 4), 451–455.
Chadwick, P., Taylor, K.N., & Abba, N. (2005). Mindfulness groups for people with psycho-
sis. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 33, 351–359.
Cheyne, J.A., Carriere, J.S., & Smilek, D. (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious
awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and Cognition, 15(3),
578–592.
Chiesa, A., & Serretti, A. (2009). Mindfulness-based stress reduction for stress manage-
ment in healthy people: A review and meta-analysis. Journal of Alternative and
Complementary Medicine, 15(5), 593–600.
Chiesa, A., & Serretti, A. (2010). A systematic review of neurobiological and clinical
features of mindfulness meditations. Psychological Medicine, 40(8), 1239–1252.
Christopher, M.S., Charoensuk, S., Gilbert, B.D., Neary, T.J., & Pearce, K.L. (2009). Mindful-
ness in Thailand and the United States: A case of apples versus oranges? Journal of
Clinical Psychology, 65(6), 590–612.
Clark, L.A., & Watson, D. (1991). Tripartite model of anxiety and depression: Psychometric
evidence and taxonomic implications. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100(3),
316–336.
Coffey, K.A., & Hartman, M. (2008). Mechanisms of action in the inverse relationship
between mindfulness and psychological distress. Journal of Evidence-Based
Complementary & Alternative Medicine, 13(2), 79–91.
 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
Connor-Smith, J.K., & Flachsbart, C. (2007). Relations between personality and coping: A
meta-analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(6), 1080–1107.
Costa, P.T., Jr., & McCrae, R.R. (1980). Influence of extraversion and neuroticism on subjec-
tive well-being: Happy and unhappy people. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 38(4), 668–678.
Costa, P.T., Jr., & McCrae, R.R. (1992). NEO-PI-R professional manual. Odessa, FL: Psycholog-
ical Assessment Resources, Inc.
Cox, B.J., Enns, M.W., Walker, J.R., Kjernisted, K., & Pidlubny, S.R. (2001). Psychological vul-
nerabilities in patients with major depression vs panic disorder. Behaviour Research
and Therapy, 39(5), 567–573.
Creswell, J.D., Way, B.M., Eisenberger, N.I., & Lieberman, M.D. (2007). Neural correlates of
dispositional mindfulness during affect labeling. Psychosomatic Medicine, 69(6),
560–565.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1990). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York: Harper
and Row.
Davis, K.M., Lau, M.A., & Cairns, D.R. (2009). Development and preliminary validation of a
trait version of the Toronto Mindfulness Scale. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy,
23(3), 185–197.
Depue, R.A., & Collins, P.F. (1999). Neurobiology of the structure of personality:
Dopamine, facilitation of incentive motivation, and extraversion. The Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 22(3), 491–517 (discussion 518-469).
DeYoung, C.G., Peterson, J.B., & Higgins, D.M. (2005). Sources of openness/intellect:
Cognitive and neuropsychological correlates of the fifth factor of personality.
Journal of Personality, 73(4), 825–858.
Diener, E., Oishi, S., & Lucas, R.E. (2003). Personality, culture, and subjective well-
being: emotional and cognitive evaluations of life. Annual Review of Psychology,
54, 403–425.
Diener, E., Sandvik, E., Pavot, W., & Fujita, F. (1992). Extraversion and subjective well-
being in a U.S. national probability sample. Journal of Research in Personality, 26(3),
205–215.
Digman, J.M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model. Annual
Review of Psychology, 41, 417–440.
Digman, J.M., & Inouye, J. (1986). Further specification of the five robust factors of
personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 116–123.
Digman, J.M., & Takemoto-Chock, N.K. (1981). Factors in the natural language of person-
ality: Re-analysis, comparison, and interpretation of six major studies. Multivariate
Behavioral Research, 16, 149–170.
Dollinger, S.J., & Orf, L.A. (1991). Personality and performance in “personality”: Conscien-
tiousness and openness. Journal of Research in Personality, 25(3), 276–284.
Downey, G., & Feldman, S.I. (1996). Implications of rejection sensitivity for intimate
relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(6), 1327–1343.
Eisenlohr-Moul, T.A., Walsh, E.C., Charnigo, R.J., Jr., Lynam, D.R., & Baer, R.A. (2012). The
“what” and the “how” of dispositional mindfulness: Using interactions among
subscales of the five-facet mindfulness questionnaire to understand its relation to
substance use. Assessment, 19(3), 276–286.
Eysenck, H.J. (1993). Prediction of cancer and coronary heart disease mortality by means
of a personality inventory: Results of a 15-year follow-up study. Psychological Reports,
72(2), 499–516.
Farmer, A., Redman, K., Harris, T., Mahmood, A., Sadler, S., Pickering, A., et al. (2002).
Neuroticism, extraversion, life events and depression. The Cardiff Depression Study.
British Journal of Psychiatry, 181, 118–122.
Feldman, G., Hayes, A., Kumar, S., Greeson, J., & Laurenceau, J. (2007). Mindfulness and
emotion regulation: The development and initial validation of the Cognitive and
Affective Mindfulness Scale-Revised. Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral
Assessment, 29, 177–190.
Feltman, R., Robinson, M.D., & Ode, S. (2009). Mindfulness as a moderator of neuroticism-
outcome relations: A self-regulation perspective. Journal of Research in Personality,
43(6), 953–961.
Fleischhauer, M., Enge, S., Brocke, B., Ullrich, J., Strobel, A., & Strobel, A. (2010). Same or
different? Clarifying the relationship of need for cognition to personality and intelli-
gence. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(1), 82–96.
Fowles, D.C. (1988). Psychophysiology and psychopathology: A motivational approach.
Psychophysiology, 25(4), 373–391.
Fredrickson, B.L., Tugade, M.M., Waugh, C.E., & Larkin, G.R. (2003). What good are positive
emotions in crises? A prospective study of resilience and emotions following the ter-
rorist attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 84(2), 365–376.
Fresco, D.M., Segal, Z.V., Buis, T., & Kennedy, S. (2007). Relationship of posttreatment
decentering and cognitive reactivity to relapse in major depression. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 75(3), 447–455.
Frewen, P.A., Evans, E.M., Maraj, N., Dozois, D.J.A., & Partridge, K. (2008). Letting go: Mind-
fulness and negative automatic thinking. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32, 758–774.
Germer, C.K. (2009). The mindful path to self-compassion: Freeing yourself from destructive
thoughts and emotions. New York: The Guilford Press.
Giluk, T.L. (2009). Mindfulness, Big Five personality, and affect: A meta-analysis.
Personality and Individual Differences, 47(8), 805–811.
Gird, S., & Zettle, R.D. (2009). Differential response to a dysphoric mood induction proce-
dure as a function of level of experiential avoidance. The Psychological Record, 59(4)
(Article 3).
Goff, M., & Ackerman, P.L. (1992). Personality–intelligence relations: Assessment of
typical intellectual engagement. Journal of Educational Psychology, 84(4), 537–552.
Goldstein, J. (2002). One Dharma: The emerging Western Buddhism. San Francisco: Harper
Collins.
Greeson, J.M. (2009). Mindfulness research update: 2008. Complementary Health Practice
Review, 14(1), 10–18.
41
Grey, J.A. (1987). The psychology of fear and stress. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Grossman, P. (2008). On measuring mindfulness in psychosomatic and psychological re-
search. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 64(4), 405–408.
Grossman, P. (2011). Defining mindfulness by how poorly I think I pay attention during
everyday awareness and other intractable problems for psychology's (re)invention
of mindfulness: Comment on Brown et al. (2011). Psychological Assessment, 23(4),
1034–1040 (discussion 1041-1036).
Grossman, P., & van Dam, N. T. (2011). Mindfulness, by any other name...: trials and trib-
ulations of sati in western psychology and science. Contemporary Buddhism, 12,
219–239.
Grossman, P., Niemann, L., Schmidt, S., & Walach, H. (2004). Mindfulness-based stress re-
duction and health benefits. A meta-analysis. Journal of Psychosomatic Research,
57(1), 35–43.
Gu, J., Zhong, C.B., & Page-Gould, E. (2013). Listen to your heart: When false somatic feed-
back shapes moral behavior. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(2),
307–312.
Gunaratana, B.H. (2001). Eight mindful steps to happiness: Walking the Buddha's path. Som-
erville: Wisdom Publications.
Gunthert, K.C., Cohen, L.H., & Armeli, S. (1999). The role of neuroticism in daily stress and
coping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(5), 1087–1100.
Harkness, A.R., Tellegen, A., & Waller, N. (1995). Differential convergence of self-report
and informant data for multidimensional personality questionnaire traits: Implica-
tions for the construct of negative emotionality. Journal of Personality Assessment,
64(1), 185–204.
Hayes, A.M., & Feldman, G. (2004). Clarifying the construct of mindfulness in the context
of emotion regulation and the process of change in therapy. Clinical Psychology:
Science and Practice, 11, 255–262.
Hayes, S.C., Wilson, K.G., Gifford, E.V., Follette, V.M., & Strosahl, K. (1996). Experi-
mental avoidance and behavioral disorders: A functional dimensional approach
to diagnosis and treatment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 64(6),
1152–1168.
Heppner, W.L., & Kernis, M.H. (2007). “Quiet ego” functioning: The complementary roles
of mindfulness, authenticiy, and secure high self-esteem. Psychological Inquiry, 18(4),
248–251.
Heppner, W.L., Kernis, M.H., Lakey, C.E., Campbell, W.K., Goldman, B.M., Davis, P.J., et al.
(2008). Mindfulness as a means of reducing aggressive behavior: Dispositional and
situational evidence. Aggressive Behavior, 34(5), 486–496.
Hofmann, S.G., Sawyer, A.T., Witt, A.A., & Oh, D. (2010). The effect of mindfulness-based
therapy on anxiety and depression: A meta-analytic review. Journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology, 78(2), 169–183.
Hollis-Walker, L., & Colosimo, K. (2011). Mindfulness, self-compassion, and happiness in
non-meditators: A theoretical and empirical examination. Personality and Individual
Differences, 50(2), 222–227.
Holroyd, C.B., & Coles, M.G. (2002). The neural basis of human error processing: Rein-
forcement learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativity. Psychological
Review, 109(4), 679–709.
Howell, A.J., Digdon, N.L., Buro, K., & Sheptycki, A.R. (2008). Relations among mindful-
ness, well-being, and sleep. Personality and Individual Differences, 45(8), 773–777.
Howell, A.J., Dopko, R.L., Passmore, H., & Buro, K. (2011). Nature connectedness: Associa-
tions with well-being and mindfulness. Personality and Individual Differences, 51,
166–171.
Hoyle, R.H., Fejfar, M.C., & Miller, J.D. (2000). Personality and sexual risk taking: A quan-
titative review. Journal of Personality, 68(6), 1203–1231.
Ironson, G.H., O'Cleirigh, C., Weiss, A., Schneiderman, N., & Costa, P.T., Jr. (2008). Person-
ality and HIV disease progression: Role of NEO-PI-R openness, extraversion, and
profiles of engagement. Psychosomatic Medicine, 70(2), 245–253.
Jackson, S.A., Thomas, P.R., Marsh, H.W., & Smethurst, C.J. (2001). Relationships between
flow, self-concept, psychological skills, and performance. Journal of Applied Sport
Psychology, 13, 129–153.
Jimenez, S.S., Niles, B.L., & Park, C.L. (2010). A mindfulness model of affect regulation and
depressive symptoms: Positive emotions, mood regulation expectancies, and self-
acceptance as regulatory mechanisms. Personality and Individual Differences, 49(6),
645–650.
John, O.P., Caspi, A., Robins, R.W., Moffitt, T.E., & Stouthamer-Loeber, M. (1994). The “little
five”: Exploring the nomological network of the five-factor model of personality in ad-
olescent boys. Child Development, 65(1), 160–178.
Johnson, S.L., Edge, M.D., Holmes, M.K., & Carver, C.S. (2012). The behavioral activation
system and mania. Annual Review of Clinical Psychology, 8, 243–267.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994). Wherever you go, there you are: Mindfulness meditation in everyday
life. New York: Hyperion.
Kabat-Zinn, J. (2003). Mindfulness-based interventions in context: Past, present, and
future. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10, 144–156.
Kasch, K.L., Rottenberg, J., Arnow, B.A., & Gotlib, I.H. (2002). Behavioral activation and in-
hibition systems and the severity and course of depression. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 111(4), 589–597.
Kashdan, T.B., Afram, A., Brown, K.W., Birnbeck, M., & Drvoshanov, M. (2011). Curiosity
enhances the role of mindfulness in reducing defensive responses to existential
threat. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(8), 1227–1232.
Kee, Y.H., & Wang, C.K.J. (2008). Relationships between mindfulness, flow dispositions
and mental skills adoption: A cluster analytic approach. Psychology of Sport and
Exercise, 9(4), 393–411.
Kelley, T.M., & Lambert, E.G. (2012). Mindfulness as a potential means of attenuating
anger and aggression for prospective criminal justice professionals. Mindfulness,
3(4), 261–274.
42 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
Kelliher, J.L. (2013). Personality, rejection sensitivity and perceptions of social support
adequacy as predictors of college students' depressive symptoms. (Thesis Manuscript)
Western Carolina University.
Kendler, K.S., Gatz, M., Gardner, C.O., & Pedersen, N.L. (2006). Personality and major
depression: A Swedish longitudinal, population-based twin study. Archives of
General Psychiatry, 63(10), 1113–1120.
Keng, S.L., Smoski, M.J., & Robins, C.J. (2011). Effects of mindfulness on psychological
health: A review of empirical studies. Clinical Psychology Review, 31(6), 1041–1056.
Kochanska, G., & Knaack, A. (2003). Effortful control as a personality characteristic of
young children: Antecedents, correlates, and consequences. Journal of Personality,
71(6), 1087–1112.
Kochanska, G., Murray, K.T., & Harlan, E.T. (2000). Effortful control in early childhood:
Continuity and change, antecedents, and implications for social development.
Developmental Psychology, 36(2), 220–232.
Kohls, N., Sauer, S., & Walach, H. (2009). Facets of mindfulness–Results of an online
study investigating the Freiburg mindfulness inventory. Personality and Individual
Differences, 46(2), 224–230.
Kooiman, C.G., Spinhoven, P., & Trijsburg, R.W. (2002). The assessment of alexithymia: A
critical review of the literature and a psychometric study of the Toronto Alexithymia
Scale-20. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 53(6), 1083–1090.
Kotov, R., Gamez, W., Schmidt, F., & Watson, D. (2010). Linking “big” personality traits to
anxiety, depressive, and substance use disorders: A meta-analysis. Psychological
Bulletin, 136(5), 768–821.
Kwan, V.S., Bond, M.H., & Singelis, T.M. (1997). Pancultural explanations for life satisfac-
tion: Adding relationship harmony to self-esteem. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 73(5), 1038–1051.
Lakey, C.E., Campbell, W.K., Brown, K.W., & Goodie, A.S. (2007). Dispositional mindfulness
as a predictor of the severity of gambling outcomes. Personality and Individual
Differences, 43(7), 1698–1710.
Lakey, C.E., Kernis, M.H., Heppner, W.L., & Lance, C.E. (2008). Individual differences in au-
thenticity and mindfulness as predictors of verbal defensiveness. Journal of Research
in Personality, 42(1), 230–238.
Lam, D., Smith, N., Checkley, S., Rijsdijk, F., & Sham, P. (2003). Effect of neuroticism,
response style and information processing on depression severity in a clinically
depressed sample. Psychological Medicine, 33(3), 469–479.
Latzman, R.D., & Masuda, A. (2013). Examining mindfulness and psychological inflexibil-
ity within the framework of Big Five personality. Personality and Individual Differences,
55(2), 129–134.
Lau, M.A., Bishop, S.R., Segal, Z.V., Buis, T., Anderson, N.D., Carlson, L., et al. (2006). The To-
ronto Mindfulness Scale: development and validation. Journal of Clinical Psychology,
62(12), 1445–1467.
Leary, M.R., & Tate, E.B. (2007). The multi-faceted nature of mindfulness. Psychological
Inquiry, 18(4), 251–255.
LePera, N. (2011). Relationships between boredome proneness, mindfulness, anxiety,
depression, and substance use. The New School Psychology Bulletin, 8(2), 15–25.
Lommen, M.J.J., Engelhard, I.M., & van den Hout, M.A. (2010). Neuroticism and avoidance
of ambiguous stimuli: Better safe than sorry? Personality and Individual Differences,
49(8), 1001–1006.
MacDonald, K.B. (2008). Effortful control, explicit processing, and the regulation of
human evolved predispositions. Psychological Review, 115(4), 1012–1031.
MacKillop, J., & Anderson, E.J. (2007). Further psychometric validation of the Mindful
Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS). Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral
Assessment, 29(4), 289–293.
Mathews, A., & MacLeod, C. (2005). Cognitive vulnerability to emotional disorders. Annual
Review of Clinical Psychology, 1, 167–195.
Mayer, F.S., & Frantz, C.M. (2009). The connectedness to nature scale: A measure of
individuals' feeling in community with nature. Environment and Behavior, 41,
607–643.
McCown, D., & Micozzi, M. (2011). New world mindfulness: From the founding fathers,
Emerson, and Thoreau, to your personal practice. Rochester: Healing Arts Press.
McCrae, R.R., & Costa, P.T. (2003). Personality in adulthood: A five-factor theory perspective.
New York: The Guilford Press.
McCrae, R.R., & Costa, P.T. (1999). A five-factor theory of personality. In L.A. Pervin, & O.P.
John (Eds.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 139–153) (2nd ed.).
New York: Guilford.
McFarland, B.R., Shankman, S.A., Tenke, C.E., Bruder, G.E., & Klein, D.N. (2006). Behavioral
activation system deficits predict the six-month course of depression. Journal of
Affective Disorders, 91(2–3), 229–234.
McGarvey, M. (2010). Mindfulness practices and emotional development in adult life: A
developmental framework for research and teaching. (Doctoral dissertation) Harvard
graduate school of education.
McKee, L., Zvolensky, M.J., Solomon, S.E., Bernstein, A., & Leen-Feldner, E. (2007).
Emotional-vulnerability and mindfulness: A preliminary test of associations among
negative affectivity, anxiety sensitivity, and mindfulness skills. Cognitive Behaviour
Therapy, 36(2), 91–101.
Mikulincer, M., Shaver, P.R., Gillath, O., & Nitzberg, R.A. (2005). Attachment, caregiving,
and altruism: Boosting attachment security increases compassion and helping.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(5), 817–839.
Mineka, S., Watson, D., & Clark, L.A. (1998). Comorbidity of anxiety and unipolar mood
disorders. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 377–412.
Mischel, W., Shoda, Y., & Rodriguez, M.I. (1989). Delay of gratification in children. Science,
244(4907), 933–938.
Morris, P.L., Robinson, R.G., & Samuels, J. (1993). Depression, introversion and mor-
tality following stroke. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 27(3),
443–449.
Mrazek, M.D., Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J.W. (2012). Mindfulness and mind-wandering:
Finding convergence through opposing constructs. Emotion, 12(3), 442–448.
Niemiec, C. P., Brown, K. W., Kashdan, T. B., Cozzolino, P. J., Breen, W. E., Levesque-Bristol,
C., & Ryan, R. M. (2010). Being present in the face of existential threat: The role of trait
mindfulness in reducing defensive responses to mortality salience. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 99(2), 344–365.
Newman, J.P., MacCoon, D.G., Vaughn, L.J., & Sadeh, N. (2005). Validating a distinction be-
tween primary and secondary psychopathy with measures of Gray's BIS and BAS con-
structs. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114(2), 319–323.
Ohman, A. (2005). The role of the amygdala in human fear: Automatic detection of threat.
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 30(10), 953–958.
Ormel, J., Oldehinkel, A.J., & Brilman, E.I. (2001). The interplay and etiological continuity of
neuroticism, difficulties, and life events in the etiology of major and subsyndromal,
first and recurrent depressive episodes in later life. American Journal of Psychiatry,
158(6), 885–891.
Parisi, J.M., Stine-Morrow, E.A., Noh, S.R., & Morrow, D.G. (2009). Predispositional
engagement, activity engagement, and cognition among older adults. Neuropsychology,
Development, and Cognition. Section B, Aging, Neuropsychology and Cognition, 16(4),
485–504.
Phelps, E.A. (2006). Emotion and cognition: Insights from studies of the human amygdala.
Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 27–53.
Phelps, E.A., & LeDoux, J.E. (2005). Contributions of the amygdala to emotion processing:
From animal models to human behavior. Neuron, 48(2), 175–187.
Pietrzak, J., Downey, G., & Ayduk, O. (2005). Rejection sensitivity as an interpersonal
vulnerability. In M.W. Baldwin (Ed.), Interpersonal Cognition (pp. 62–84). New
York: The Guilford Press.
Quay, H.C. (1988). Theories of ADDH. Journal of the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, 27(2), 262–263.
Rasmussen, M.K., & Pidgeon, A.M. (2011). The direct and indirect benefits of dispositional
mindfulness on self-esteem and social anxiety. Anxiety, Stress, and Coping, 24(2),
227–233.
Roberts, J.E., Gilboa, E., & Gotlib, I.H. (1998). Ruminative response style and vulnerability
to episodes of dysphoria: Gender, neuroticism, and episode duration. Cognitive
Therapy and Research, 22, 401–423.
Robins, R.W., Tracy, J.L., Trzesniewski, K., Potter, J., & Gosling, S.D. (2001). Personality cor-
relates of self-estetem. Journal of Research in Personality, 35(4), 463–482.
Roche, S.M., & McConkey, K.M. (1990). Absorption: Nature, assessment, and correlates.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(1), 91–101.
Rocklin, T. (1994). Relation between typical intellectual engagement and openness:
Comment on Goff and Ackerman (1992). Journal of Educational Psychology, 86(1),
145–149.
Roelofs, J., Huibers, M., Peeters, F., Arntz, A., & van Os, J. (2008). Rumination and worrying
as possible mediators in the relation between neuroticism and symptoms of depres-
sion and anxiety in clinically depressed individuals. Behaviour Research and Therapy,
46(12), 1283–1289.
Rosch, E. (2007). More than mindfulness: When you have a tiger by the tail, let it eat you.
Psychological Inquiry, 18(4), 258–264.
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University.
Rothbart, M.K., & Rueda, M.R. (2005). The development of effortful control. In U. Mayr, E.
Awh, & S. Keele (Eds.), Developing individuality in the human brain: A tribute to Michael
I. Posner (pp. 167–188). Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association.
Rothbart, M.K., Ahadi, S.A., & Evans, D.E. (2000). Temperament and personality: Origins
and outcomes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78(1), 122–135.
Ryff, C.D., & Singer, B. (1996). Psychological well-being: Meaning, measurement, and im-
plications for psychotherapy research. Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 65(1),
14–23.
Saklofske, D., Austin, E., & Minski, P. (2003). Factor structure and validity of a trait
emotional intelligence measure. Personality and Individual Differences, 34, 707–721.
Salovey, P., Mayer, J.D., Goldman, S.L., Turvey, C., & Palfai, T.P. (1995). Emotional attention,
clarity, and repair: Exploring emotional intelligence using the Trait Meta-Mood Scale.
Emotion, Disclosure, & Health, 125-154.
Santorelli, S.F., & Kabat-Zinn, J. (2013). Stress reduction program. Retrieved
September 11, 2013, from http://umassmed.edu/uploadedFiles/cfm2/SRP_for_
desktop_printing.pdf
Sauer, S., Walach, H., & Kohls, N. (2011). Gray's Behavioural Inhibition System as a medi-
ator of mindfulness towards well-being. Personality and Individual Differences, 50(4),
506–511.
Sauer, S., Walach, H., Schmidt, S., Hinterberger, T., Lynch, S., Bussing, A., et al. (2013).
Assessment of mindfulness: Review on state of the art. Mindfulness, 4(1), 3–17.
Schmidt, S. (2011). Mindfulness in East and West — Is it the same? In H. Walach, S.
Schmidt, & W.B. Jonas (Eds.), Neuroscience, consciousness, and spirituality. New
York: Springer.
Schutte, N.S., Malougg, J.M., Hall, L.E., Haggerty, D.J., Cooper, J.T., Golden, C.J., et al. (1998).
Development and validation of a measure of emotional intelligence. Personality and
Individual Differences, 25, 167–177.
Segerstrom, S.C., Tsao, J.C.I., Alden, L.E., & Craske, M.G. (2000). Worry and rumination: Re-
petitive thought as a concomitant and predictor of negative mood. Cognitive Therapy
and Research, 24, 671–688.
Shapiro, D.H. (1992). A preliminary study of long-term meditators: Goals, effects,
religious orientation, cognitions. The Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 24(1),
23–39.
Shaver, P.R., Lavy, S., Saron, C.D., & Mikulincer, M. (2007). Social foundations of the
capacity for mindfulness: An attachment perspective. Psychological Inquiry, 18(4),
264–271.
 H.K. Rau, P.G. Williams / Personality and Individual Differences 93 (2016) 32–43
Sheth, J.N., Sethia, N.K., & Srinivas, S. (2011). Mindful consumption: A consumer-
centric approach to sustainability. Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science,
39(1), 21–39.
Shiota, M.N., Keltner, D., & John, O.P. (2006). Positive emotion dispositions differentially
associated with Big Five personality and attachment style. The Journal of Positive
Psychology, 1(2), 61–71.
Smallwood, J., & Schooler, J.W. (2006). The restless mind. Psychological Bulletin, 132(6),
946–958.
Smith, G.T. (2005). On construct validity: Issues of method and measurement.
Psychological Assessment, 17(4), 396–408.
Smith, J.E., Richardson, J., Hoffman, C., & Pilkington, K. (2005). Mindfulness-based stress
reduction as supportive therapy in cancer care: Systematic review. Journal of
Advanced Nursing, 52(3), 315–327.
Suls, J., Green, P., & Hillis, S. (1998). Emotional reactivity to everyday problems, affective
inertia, and neuroticism. Personality and Social Psychology, 24(2), 127–136.
Taren, A.A., Creswell, J.D., & Gianaros, P.J. (2013). Dispositional mindfulness co-varies with
smaller amygdala and caudate volumes in community adults. PloS One, 8(5), e64574.
Taubman-Ben-Ari, O., & Yehiel, D. (2012). Driving styles and their associations with
personality and motivation. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 45, 416–422.
Taylor, G.J. (1994). The alexithymia constructs: Conceptualization, validation, and
relationship with basic dimensions of personality. New Trends in Experimental and
Clinical Psychiatry, 10(2), 61–74.
Tellegen, A. (1985). Structures of mood and personality and their relevance to assessing
anxiety, with an emphasis on self-report. In H.H. Tuma, & J.D. Maser (Eds.), Anxiety
and the anxiety disorders (pp. 681–706). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Tellegen, A., & Atkinson, G. (1974). Openness to absorbing and self-altering experiences
(“absorption”), a trait related to hypnotic susceptibility. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 83(3), 268–277.
Teper, R., & Inzlicht, M. (2014). Mindful acceptance dampens neuroaffective reactions to
external and rewarding performance feedback. Emotion, 14(1), 105–114.
Thompson, B.L., & Waltz, J. (2007). Everyday mindfulness and mindfulness meditation:
Overlapping constructs or not? Personality and Individual Differences, 43, 1875–1885.
Thompson, B.L., & Waltz, J. (2010). Mindfulness and experiential avoidance as predictors
of posttraumatic stress disorder avoidance symptom severity. Journal of Anxiety
Disorders, 24(4), 409–415.
Trapnell, P.D., & Campbell, J.D. (1999). Private self-consciousness and the five-factor
model of personality: distinguishing rumination from reflection. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 76(2), 284–304.
Tull, M.T., & Gratz, K.L. (2008). Further examination of the relationship between anxiety
sensitivity and depression: The mediating role of experiential avoidance and difficul-
ties engaging in goal-directed behavior when distressed. Journal of Anxiety Disorders,
22(2), 199–210.
Vago, D.R., & Silbersweig, D.A. (2012). Self-awareness, self-regulation, and self-
transcendence (S-ART): A framework for understanding the neurobiological mecha-
nisms of mindfulness. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 6, 296.
Versluis, A. (1993). American transcendentalism and Asian religions. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
Von Stumm, S., Hell, B., & Chamorro-Premuzic, T. (2011). The hungry mind: Intellectual
curiosity is the third pillar of academic performance. Perspectives on Psychological
Science, 6(6), 574–588.
43
Walach, H., Buchheld, N., Buttenmuller, V., Kleinknecht, N., & Schmidt, S. (2006). Measur-
ing mindfulness–The Freiburg Mindfulness Invetory (FMI). Personality and Individual
Differences, 40, 1543–1555.
Wallace, A.B., & Bodhi, B. (2006). The nature of mindfulness and its role in Buddhist
meditation: A correspondence between B. Alan Wallace and the Venerable Bhikkhu
Bodhi.
Wallace, J.F., Malterer, M.B., & Newman, J.P. (2009). Mapping Gray's BIS and BAS con-
structs onto factor 1 and factor 2 of Hare's Psychopathy Checklist — Revised.
Personality and Individual Differences, 47(8), 812–816.
Wallmark, E., Safarzadeh, K., Daukantaite, D., & Maddux, R.E. (2013). Promoting altruism
through meditation: An 8-week randomized controlled pilot study. Mindfulness, 4(3),
223–234.
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J.D. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive self-focus in depression.
Journal of Affective Disorders, 82(1), 1–8.
Watson, D., & Clark, L.A. (1984). Negative affectivity: The disposition to experience
aversive emotional states. Psychological Bulletin, 96(3), 465–490.
Watson, D., & Clark, L.A. (1997). Extraversion and its positive emotional core. In R. Hogan,
J.A. Johnson, & S.R. Briggs (Eds.), Handbook of personality psychology. San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Way, B.M., Creswell, J.D., Eisenberger, N.I., & Lieberman, M.D. (2010). Dispositional mind-
fulness and depressive symptomatology: Correlations with limbic and self-referential
neural activity during rest. Emotion, 10(1), 12–24.
Weinstein, N., Brown, K.W., & Ryan, R.M. (2009). A multi-method examination of the ef-
fects of mindfulness on stress attribution, coping, and emotional well-being. Journal
of Research in Personality, 43, 374–385.
Wenzlaff, R.M., & Bates, D.E. (1998). Unmasking a cognitive vulnerability to depression:
How lapses in mental control reveal depressive thinking. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 75(6), 1559–1571.
Williams, J.M. (2008). Mindfulness, depression and modes of mind. Cognitive Therapy and
Research, 32, 721–733.
Williams, J.M. (2010). Mindfulness and psychological process. Emotion, 10(1), 1–7.
Wilson, R.S., Krueger, K.R., Gu, L., Bienias, J.L., Mendes de Leon, C.F., & Evans, D.A. (2005).
Neuroticism, extraversion, and mortality in a defined population of older persons.
Psychosomatic Medicine, 67(6), 841–845.
Wilson, R.S., Mendes de Leon, C.F., Bienias, J.L., Evans, D.A., & Bennett, D.A. (2004). Person-
ality and mortality in old age. Journal of Gerontology: Series B, Psychological Sciences,
59(3), 110–116.
Wise, T.N., Mann, L.S., & Shay, L. (1992). Alexithymia and the five-factor model of
personality. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 33(3), 147–151.
Yang, B., Kim, Y., & McFarland, R. (2011). Individual differences and sales performance: A
distal-proximal mediation model of self-efficacy, conscientiousness, and extraver-
sion. Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, 31(4), 371–382.
Zuckerman, M., Kuhlman, D.M., Thornquist, M., & Kiers, H. (1991). Five (or three) robust
questionnaire scale factors of personality without culture. Personality and Individual
Differences, 12(9), 929–941.