Agric Hum Values (2012) 29:287–301
DOI 10.1007/s10460-011-9337-7
Risk, anti-reflexivity, and ethical neutralization in industrial
food processing
Diana Stuart • Michelle R. Worosz
Accepted: 2 September 2011 / Published online: 11 September 2011
 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract While innovations have fostered the mass
production of food at low costs, there are externalities or
side effects associated with high-volume food processing.
We focus on foodborne illness linked to two commodities:
ground beef and bagged salad greens. In our analysis, we
draw from the concepts of risk, reflexive modernization,
and techniques of ethical neutralization. For each com-
modity, we find that systems organized for industrial goals
overlook how production models foster cross-contamina-
tion and widespread outbreaks. Responses to outbreaks
tend to rely on technological fixes, which do not constitute
the reflexive change needed to holistically and effectively
address foodborne illness in the long term. We contend that
powerful anti-reflexivity movements resist calls for reform
and successfully maintain industrial goals and organiza-
tion. Actions that thwart changes in agrifood systems to
better protect consumers are unethical, yet they continue to
be successful. We argue that specific techniques of ethical
neutralization play an important part in their success.
Research on anti-reflexivity and techniques of neutraliza-
tion will serve to further expose the ethical issues associ-
ated with the industrial agrifood system and foster new
guiding principles and organizational designs for food
production.
D. Stuart (&)
Kellogg Biological Station and Department of Sociology,
Michigan State University, 3700 East Gull Lake Drive,
Hickory Corners, MI 49060, USA
e-mail: dstuart@msu.edu
M. R. Worosz
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology,
Auburn University, 306A Comer Hall, Auburn, AL 36849, USA
Keywords Food processing
Food safety
Reflexive
modernization
Anti-reflexivity
Techniques of
neutralization
Abbreviations
FSIS Food Safety and Inspection Service
FSMA Food Safety Modernization Act
HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points
LGMA California Leafy Greens Marketing Agreement
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
Introduction
New evidence continues to highlight the negative impacts
of industrial food production in the United States (US) and
worldwide. While the agrifood literature is replete with
critiques of industrialized agriculture, fewer studies have
addressed industrialization in food processing. Food pro-
cessing has undergone extensive industrial changes
including mechanization, allowing for the rapid production
of mass quantities of standardized products with limited
human labor. As seen in agriculture, capital costs have
replaced costs in labor resulting in larger and more ‘‘effi-
cient’’ high-volume production systems. While those that
promote these changes emphasize unprecedented levels of
low cost food, there are many hidden costs. Borrowing
from economics, these ‘‘externalities’’ of industrialized
food processing include negative impacts to human health
and wellbeing (e.g., Nyachuba 2010), worker safety (e.g.,
Culp et al. 2008), rural communities and livelihoods (e.g.,
Ollinger et al. 2005), and the environment (e.g., Tusseau-
Vuillemin 2001).
As evidence continues to reveal the impacts of industrial-
ized food processing, issues with large-scale production,
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profit-orientation, and technological optimism have become
apparent. We closely examine how food processing systems
based on these industrial tenets are linked to widespread
outbreaks of foodborne illness. We will illustrate how
powerful forces and ideologies continue to support these
systems, despite a growing awareness of associated harm.
As illustrated by recent, high profile outbreaks linked to
products such as meat, eggs, peanut butter, cookie dough,
and salads, foodborne illness has become a prominent
externality associated with industrial food processing. These
outbreaks impact large numbers of consumers across vast
geographic areas. Food safety issues have become more
apparent to US consumers, resulting in pressure to pass new
food safety laws (Worosz 2009). However, responses to
outbreaks have avoided significant deviation from the
dominant principles and organizational strategies of indus-
trial food production and have largely relied upon the
adoption of new technological fixes.
While a number of scholars have investigated food
safety, we take this research further by: (1) specifically
illustrating how strategic industrial designs result in
widespread outbreaks, (2) demonstrating how powerful
actors resist production changes that would better address
outbreaks, and (3) exploring specific techniques industrial
actors use to maintain current production systems. While
some scholars have convincingly argued that current
efforts to address food safety will remain inadequate
(Juska et al. 2003; Dunn 2007), we will examine the
specific organizational flaws that render current approa-
ches ineffective. Other work has critiqued responses to
outbreaks and food safety governance (Konefal et al.
2005; Worosz et al. 2008a; DeLind and Howard 2008;
Tanaka 2008); however, we will explore how powerful
actors resist efforts to better address food safety and will
apply new concepts to help explain their continued suc-
cess. While a growing number of US consumers identify
processing plants as a major source of food safety prob-
lems (Roseman et al. 2005), processing designs remain
largely unchanged. In this paper, we explore how indus-
trial actors continue to impede efforts to address food-
borne illness.
Several theoretical concepts guide our analysis. Drawing
from Beck’s (1992) work on risk society and reflexive
modernization, we examine the causes and responses
associated with outbreaks linked to ground beef and bag-
ged salads. This analysis reveals that although the ‘‘side
effects’’ (Beck 1992) of industrial food manufacturing have
become increasingly visible, very little has been done to
alter these systems in ways that would constitute reflexive
change. Instead, industrial players have been very suc-
cessful at hindering calls for reform through powerful
‘‘anti-reflexivity’’ movements (McCright and Dunlap
2010). We argue that the food industry has a social
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obligation to protect consumers and therefore its lack of
(and resistance to) reflexivity constitutes an ethical viola-
tion. We suggest that this violation remains unaddressed
due to specific techniques of neutralization (Sykes and
Matza 1957) that diffuse responsibility and prioritize
industrial goals over consumer protection.
Risk, reflexivity, and techniques of neutralization
Beck’s theory of the risk society posits that we can no
longer escape the consequences of modernization (Beck
1992). Much of his work is applicable to examining
industrial food systems. Beck (1992) illustrates the side
effects linked to modernization and how the externalities
of industrialization resurface, through a ‘‘boomerang
effect,’’ to impact society. He uses industrial accidents and
nuclear technology to illustrate the risks associated with
modernization. In his examples, society is the perpetrator
but also the victim. Beck links these events to capitalist
production, which is prioritized while turning a blind eye
to side effects: ‘‘in the effort to increase productivity, the
associated risks have always been and still are being
neglected’’ (Beck 1992, p. 60). Within food systems,
industrial changes to maximize profits have also led to
negative side effects, such as the emergence of bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in Europe starting in
the 1980s.
Beck argues that in a risk society the side effects of
modernization are no longer invisible, resulting in
increasing public awareness of risk and the rise of
‘‘reflexive modernization’’ (Beck 1992; Beck et al. 1994,
2003). Reflexive modernization suggests that society is not
only increasingly aware of risks, but is reshaping systems
to address these risks (Beck 1992; Beck et al. 2003).
Reflexivity means abandoning old tools and methods, and
fostering a ‘‘meta-change’’ in both societal perspectives
and social institutions (Beck et al. 2003). This involves
changes in priorities, working towards new solutions, and
adapting systems as new conditions emerge. Truly reflex-
ive change involves a holistic reevaluation of systems and a
willingness to make substantial changes in industrial
organization. While some consumers have raised concerns
about outbreaks, we will illustrate that food processors
have not responded to outbreaks in ways that constitute
reflexive change. This lack of reflexivity may be attributed
to anti-reflexivity movements.
Anti-reflexivity movements have emerged in opposition
to social movements working to address the increasing
risks of modernization. McCright and Dunlap (2010)
describe anti-reflexivity movements that have evolved in
response to rising concerns about climate change. These
counter-movements continue to protect and prioritize
Risk, anti-reflexivity, and ethical neutralization in industrial food processing
industrial capitalism while refuting climate science and
challenging progressive efforts to address risks. McCright
and Dunlap (2010, p. 126) call for scholars of reflexive
modernization to devote more attention towards anti-
reflexivity movements ‘‘as such forces continue to shape
the overall direction of our social, political and economic
order.’’ We contend that significant reforms to better pro-
tect consumers from foodborne illness remain hindered by
powerful anti-reflexivity movements.
In this paper, we explore how the anti-reflexivity
movements that continue to thwart fundamental changes in
food processing utilize techniques of ethical neutralization
(Sykes and Matza 1957). Responses that lack reflexivity
and resist efforts to better protect consumers represent an
ethical violation. The modern food industry is driven by
capitalist logic, as clearly seen through endless new and
value-added food products and increasingly sophisticated
marketing campaigns (Lapierre et al. 2011). However,
a strictly profit-oriented production approach will not result
in the best outcomes for society (Burkhardt 1992). Because
consumers are dependent upon the decisions of food
companies, these companies have a social obligation to
provide safe food (Early 2002). In the face of repeated
outbreaks, we contend that powerful food companies uti-
lize techniques of neutralization to avoid accusations of
unethical conduct and deter significant reform. We explore
techniques of neutralization as a possible explanation as to
how anti-reflexivity movements continue to maintain risky
food production systems.
Originating from the sociology of deviance and disor-
ganization, Sykes and Matza (1957) outline five techniques
of neutralization used by delinquents to rationalize their
actions: (1) denial of responsibility, (2) denial of injury, (3)
denial of the victim, (4) condemnation of the condemners,
and (5) appeal to higher loyalties. Since they were first put
forth, these techniques have been further defined and
explored in a variety of other contexts (e.g., Vitell and
Grove 1987; Umphress and Bingham 2010). We propose
that these techniques of neutralization should be explored
to better understand ethical rationalization and the success
of anti-reflexivity movements in industrial food production.
In the context of food safety, at least three of these tech-
niques help to explain continued resistance to reflexive
change in industrial food processing: denial of responsi-
bility, denial of the victim, and appeal to higher loyalties.
Underlying the denial of responsibility is the argument
that external conditions beyond an individual’s control (or
a company’s control in the case of food processing) are at
fault for a negative outcome. In many cases food pro-
cessing companies have denied responsibility for out-
breaks, blaming others for contamination (Nestle 2003).
For example, companies may blame upstream sources of
289
raw ingredients or downstream suppliers for outbreaks,
overlooking their role in the supply chain.
Denial of the victim has also been a technique of neu-
tralization used by industrial food companies. Food com-
panies have frequently blamed individual consumers
afflicted with illness for poor food handling practices, such
as not thoroughly washing or cooking products (Nestle
2003; Jacob and Powell 2009; Moss 2009a). Although
there have been a few notable exceptions (Moss 2009b),
companies have tended to deny the existence of a true
victim, suggesting that inflicted individuals have acted in
ways that have brought harm upon themselves. While
lawsuits may, to some extent, serve to expose this neu-
tralization technique in the food industry (e.g., the work of
Marler Clark), denial of the victim continues to represent a
powerful narrative to shift attention away from systemic
flaws in production (Jacob and Powell 2009).
Lastly, an appeal to higher loyalties may represent the
most powerful technique of neutralization associated with
industrial food processing. Actions of food processors
continue to illustrate loyalties to productionist ideologies,
profitability, and unwavering faith in science and technol-
ogy. These loyalties represent the central tenets guiding
modern industrialization. In the food industry, research and
development has long focused on maximizing production.
Maximizing production while reducing labor results in
increased profits, as food processors remain first and
foremost profit-driven operations. In addition, unques-
tioned loyalty to technology, or ‘‘technophilia’’ (Burkhardt
1992), continue to shape organization and responses to
problems. Thompson (2001) describes how science and
productionist goals foster ‘‘optimization’’ as a guiding
principle in the food industry. Optimization balances ben-
efits and harms; however, industry reaps the benefits
(profits) while externalizing harms. These loyalties shape
the production systems that continue to foster widespread
outbreaks of foodborne illness.
In this paper, we apply these concepts to empirically
explore two commodities linked to widespread outbreaks
of foodborne illness: ground beef and bagged salad greens.
In each case, we highlight the industrial changes that have
fostered large-scale and concentrated production systems
and how these specific changes have shaped problems with
widespread foodborne illness. We also examine the
responses to repeated food scares and argue that these
responses do not constitute reflexive change. Instead, we
illustrate how food companies have engaged in anti-
reflexivity movements to inhibit significant changes in food
production. Lastly, we explore how techniques of neutral-
ization help to explain the success of the anti-reflexivity
movements that continue to resist reshaping food produc-
tion to better protect consumers.
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Industrial food processing and foodborne illness
Before World War II, food production in the US involved
far less processing that was done by smaller, more disperse
facilities. Mimicking trends in other industries, food man-
ufacturers made strategic changes that reduced costs,
increased production, and increased surplus labor value.
Processors use automated devices such as washing, mixing,
shaping, and chopping machines capable of processing
large quantities of food rapidly. To increase returns on
capital investments, production systems have become
increasingly centralized and concentrated with fewer pro-
cessing plants producing the majority of food. Labor has
been reduced, mechanization has increased, and produc-
tivity has grown to levels previously thought unimaginable.
Despite achievements in production, large-scale industrial
processing systems are linked to unprecedented widespread
outbreaks of foodborne illness. These outbreaks stem from
the emergence and spread of bacterial pathogens, such as
Escherichia coli and Salmonella (see CFSAN 2009). Here
we examine two cases of industrial processing: ground beef
and bagged salads.
Our case studies are informed by extensive literature
reviews, personal interviews, and visits to processing
facilities. For each case, extensive literature reviews were
conducted of peer-reviewed journal articles, newspaper and
magazine articles, and government documents and business
reports. Regarding the ground beef case study, observations
took place in small and large-scale slaughter and process-
ing facilities in Michigan between 2007 and 2008 and in
Alabama in 2008. During this time, interviews took place
with facility operators and staff responsible for regulatory
compliance, as well as a regional food safety director.
Multiple discussions with key informants took place
between 2009 and 2011. For the bagged salads case study,
interviews were conducted between 2006 and 2009 in the
Central Coast region of California, where a large portion of
US leafy greens are produced. Interview respondents
included crop growers, salad processors, food safety
auditors, government employees, and representatives from
food and agriculture organizations. Data in each case were
analyzed qualitatively to identify key themes and findings.
Ground beef
The industrialization of ground beef
Processing for ground beef can be loosely divided into
slaughter and post-slaughter value-added facilities. The
former has been detailed quite extensively in the literature
(Fitzgerald 2010; Horowitz 2006; Libecap 1992; Sinclair
1906; Yeager 1981). At the turn of the 20th century, pro-
cessing in slaughter facilities was already organized in an
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assembly line fashion. However, speed was ‘‘balanced by
precise hand labor,’’ taking approximately 70 men to dress
out 60 cattle in an hour (Horowitz 2006, p. 37). In general,
dressed beef was sent to neighborhood butchers to be cut
for consumers. Food safety was overseen by the US
Department of Agriculture (USDA) and was limited to
organoleptics, or ‘‘poke and sniff,’’ in large-scale pack-
inghouses (Libecap 1992; Yeager 1981). For nearly half a
century, this production system remained essentially
unchanged: between 1899 and 1954, output per man-hour
increased only 0.5% per year (Skaggs 1986).
In the decades following World War II, new tools
(i.e., continuous rail, hide skinners and washers, mechani-
cal knives and saws) and architectural designs facilitated a
15% increase in meatpacking productivity (Skaggs 1986).
This era also saw the first major change in food safety for
beef production, the Wholesome Meat Act.1 In addition to
direct and continuous inspection, subsequent regulations
centered on building materials and designs as a means of
improving sanitation (Wiser 1986). New independent firms
grew rapidly by building ‘‘state-of-the-art’’ facilities in
non-unionized, ‘‘right-to-work’’ Midwestern states where
they could pay lower wages (Gouveia and Juska 2002) and
be closer to livestock producing areas (Skaggs 1986). New
entrants, such as Cargill and ConAgra, drove out smaller
and older slaughter plants (Ollinger et al. 2005) and
industry concentration tripled between 1977 and 1992.
Today, the top three suppliers control 81% of the packing
industry (Mintel 2008a). The top four US beef packers
slaughter 400 cattle an hour (Fitzgerald 2010) and process
more than 94,000 head a day (Hendrickson and Heffernan
2007).
Ground beef and pre-made hamburger patties make up
the largest segment of the beef processing industry
(Romans et al. 2001; Giamalva et al. 2008). Between 1982
and 1992, patty production increased by 154%, largely due
to demand from fast food restaurants. To meet this demand
for inexpensive mass-produced products, processing facil-
ities reshaped how they operate: plant size doubled, new
technologies were adopted, line speeds increased 50–80%
(Fitzgerald 2010), and employee wages and selling prices
dropped. To make large quantities at low costs, ground
beef processors may grind 4,000–12,000 pounds of beef an
hour continuously for 20 h a day (Armstrong et al. 1996).
These facilities often ‘‘commingle meat from many car-
casses’’ (MacDonald et al. 1996, p. 783). Plants that make
frozen hamburger patties can produce up to 10,000 pounds
per hour using ‘‘a continuous system of grinding, blending,
forming, freezing, and packaging such that the product
flow never stops’’ (Romans et al. 2001, p. 665).
1
Wholesome Meat Act. 81 Stat. 584. United States, 1967.
Risk, anti-reflexivity, and ethical neutralization in industrial food processing
Outbreaks
Thousands of illnesses have been linked to beef con-
sumption, particularly ground beef. The Center for Science
in the Public Interest counts 428 outbreaks associated with
beef between 1998 and 2007 involving 9,824 illnesses
(DeWaal et al. 2009). The pathogen of greatest concern is
Escherichia coli (E. coli) O157:H7. The most notable
outbreak was the 1993 case linked to Jack in the Box
hamburgers that sickened 732 people across four states in
the Pacific Northwest. Of those who became ill, 195 were
hospitalized and four children died. Since that time, there
have been numerous beef recalls for suspected E. coli
O157:H7 contamination (CDC 2011; FSIS 2011). The two
largest cases by volume were linked to Hudson Foods and
Topps Meat.
The Hudson Foods Company of Arkansas was a supplier
for Burger King, Boston Market, and Wal-Mart, with
annual sales of approximately $90 million (Cooper 1997).
In 1997, the company was linked to 16 cases of E. coli
O157:H7 in Colorado (FSIS 1997). An investigation found
that Hudson engaged in ‘‘reworking,’’ a practice of mixing
meat from one day into the next day’s run, but did not
assign a new batch number. Poor recordkeeping prevented
full trace-back of the contaminated meat. The company’s
microbial testing program was also found deficient. As a
result, the USDA requested a 25 million pound recall,
making it the largest Class I (highest risk) recall for ground
beef to date.
Ten years later, similar issues arose in the case of Topps
Meat Company, a leading patty producer in New Jersey
and a core supplier to Wal-Mart with annual sales of
$90 million (Linstedt 2007). In 2007, Topps hamburgers
were found to be contaminated with E. coli O157:H7 and
linked to 40 confirmed illnesses in eight US states and 45
illnesses and one death in five Canadian provinces (Reiser
2007a). Similar to the Hudson case, investigators found
that Topps reworked their meat and failed to keep adequate
records (CDC 2007; Reiser 2007a). Investigators also
found that Topps did not maintain an adequate testing
program. The USDA requested a Class I recall of nearly
22 million pounds.
There are several specific practices linked to the spread
of E. coli in ground beef. First, the primary cause of E. coli
is commonly thought to be cross-contamination in
slaughter facilities during hide removal (Brichta-Harhay
et al. 2008). Investigations of Hudson and Topps suggest
that this may have been the root of their contamination as
well. Another related issue is production speed. As the pace
of production increases, particularly during slaughter, both
workers and inspectors make an increasing number of
mistakes (Hennessy 2005; Hughlett 2010). An inspector
was quoted as saying ‘‘people are tired and I think the
291
process puts the whole inspection (system) at risk’’ (Hauter
2008, p. 45).
In addition, commingling of sources remains an
important factor in widespread outbreaks. At the time of
Hudson’s recall, its quality assistance director acknowl-
edged that ‘‘the way ground meat is processed…a little
poison goes a long way’’ (Galosich 1997b). When ground
beef goes to a patty making plant, the facility regrinds the
product with other sources of beef. One epidemiological
study found that: (1) the raw ingredients used by one
company were sourced from 11 different companies, (2)
these source companies were located in two different
states, and (3) each of these companies sourced their
ingredients from other companies (Armstrong et al. 1996).
Similarly, when ground beef goes to a grocer, it may be
re-ground with two-day old products from their shelves,
as well as leftover table trimmings from their in-store
processing.
Industrial scales of production increase the extent of
contamination and the number of illnesses. Concentration
in meatpacking leads to larger lots of ground beef being
produced with the same machinery. An increase in lot size
has the potential to increase the volume of contaminated
meat (Armstrong et al. 1996). Government testing has
found that ground beef from larger plants ‘‘has a higher
prevalence of pathogens than the ground beef from small
plants’’ (Food & Water Watch 2009, p. 37). Due to industry
consolidation, larger numbers of hamburger patties are
coming from a smaller number of processors. When con-
tamination occurs, a larger number of consumers across a
wide geographic area become at risk.
Responses
The magnitude of the Hudson and Topps recalls contrib-
uted to widespread news coverage, complaints from con-
sumer groups, and Congressional hearings, all of which
focused on food safety governance rather than production
systems. Industry groups, such as the National Meat
Association and the American Meat Institute, played a
major role in deflecting attention away from ground beef
processors and toward other sectors in the supply chain.
They focused blame upstream, highlighting how cattle shed
pathogenic strains of E. coli. They also directed blame
downstream to retailers that sell suspect hamburger meat.
However, primary attention was focused on the USDA,
slaughterhouses, and consumers.
Microbial testing and Hazard Analysis and Critical
Control Points (HACCP) regulation, instituted after the
Jack in the Box outbreak, represent the official responses to
E. coli O157:H7 outbreaks associated with beef. As doc-
umented elsewhere (e.g., Fortin 2003; Schuller 1998;
Stearns 2005), HACCP regulations were created according
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to industry’s terms. Behind closed doors, industry leaders
had great ‘‘capacity to persuade and coerce’’ others
involved in rule-making (Juska et al. 2000, p. 264). Rather
than a system of direct oversight, HACCP relies on a
system of audits (Dunn 2007). HACCP did not include a
statutory change, which means that the USDA can only
‘‘recommend’’ a recall when contamination is found.
Despite their influence in creating HACCP, industry asso-
ciations have been critical of its implementation. For
example, the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS)
has been criticized for slowness in completing microbial
tests and for their tacit approval of suspect practices.
Examining discourse associated with the Hudson and
Topps cases reveals similar patterns in responses to out-
breaks. Regarding Hudson Foods, employees claimed that
their facility was modern, advanced, and well maintained,
suggesting that the source of the problem lay elsewhere.
The business community portrayed the plant as a ‘‘little
guy’’ getting picked on. An industry consultant said that
Hudson had become a whipping post (Galosich 1997a).
Others outside the food sector stated that ‘‘there’s always
somebody … trying to downgrade the meat industry’’ and
that the case was blown out of proportion as ‘‘nobody’s
died’’ (Belluck 1997). Despite claims that they were rig-
orous in protecting food safety (Cooper 1997), Hudson
refused to recall their product until the FSIS threatened to
withdraw its inspectors, which would shut down the plant.
After the 2007 outbreak, Topps was portrayed as an
upstanding community citizen—a family-run business that
had operated for nearly 70 years without incident. Ignored
was the fact that the company had been owned and oper-
ated by an investment firm for 4 years prior to the out-
break. While Hudson’s recall took place during the early
stages of HACCP, when it had yet to be fully implemented,
the outbreak associated with Topps required public expla-
nation. The USDA took two approaches: the Under
Secretary for Food Safety pointed to the lack of recall
authority, while investigators blamed plant employees for
lying. More serious problems were revealed after the
Associated Press (Gold 2008) used the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act to find that Topps used damaged equipment,
did not follow their own sanitation procedures, and had an
incomplete HACCP plan. Moreover, their testing protocol
was designed to never find pathogens and to never slow the
production process (Gold 2008).
Repeated recalls and outbreaks have forced the gov-
ernment to respond, however food safety regulation
remains weak. In 1997, there were eight recalls for ground
beef. In 2007, there were 24 ground beef recalls, with more
than 83% for E. coli O157:H7 (FSIS 2011). To avert cri-
tique, the Undersecretary argued on national television that
recalls demonstrate that ‘‘we are on the job … and we
respond when we find problems’’ (Sarasota Herald-Tribune
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D. Stuart, M. R. Worosz
2007). The agency also made public claims that it would
reexamine HACCP and increase testing (FSIS 2007; Reiser
2007b). Rather than addressing large-scale production, the
FSIS focused on the procedures in small plants. A 75%
expansion of their testing program was well publicized
(FSIS 2009), but the lack of statistical significance was
overlooked. For example, only ‘‘0.0002% of ground beef is
actually used by FSIS for E. coli 0157:H7 detection’’
(Dodd and Powell 2009, p. 744).
Within the meat industry, technological fixes remain the
primary mechanism to minimize future outbreaks. Most
large meatpackers have adopted ‘‘interventions.’’ Inter-
ventions include carcass cleaning with steam-pasteuriza-
tion and decontamination activities that take place after
hide removal, such as the use of organic acid, acidified
sodium chlorite, acidified calcium sulfate, gaseous ammo-
nia, and irradiation (FSIS 2007). Some of these interven-
tions, however, have a negative effect. For example, when
rinses are applied over large areas of a carcass, they can
spread contamination and render it invisible, although still
present in sufficient quantities to be harmful (Hauter 2008;
Juska et al. 2003). Showing a commitment to new tech-
nologies has averted calls for substantive changes that
might reduce efficiency and profitability, such as slowing
line speeds, reducing the amount of commingling, holding
products until confirmation of a test result, and allowing
buyers to retest incoming products (Moss 2009a).
Emphasizing advanced food safety technologies also serves
to shift the onus of food safety onto consumers.
Industry discourse surrounding consumers and E. coli
focus on two core issues: food handling and attitudes
toward ionizing radiation. Both industry and the govern-
ment regularly cite consumer failure to follow sound hand
washing, preparation, and storage guidelines, and most
importantly, their failure to cook ground beef to its
‘‘proper’’ temperature (i.e., 160F). Currently, the industry
argues that its only viable alternative is to completely
destroy pathogens with irradiation. While some acknowl-
edge that irradiation creates product quality problems and
plant retrofit concerns, it is consumers’ unwillingness to
buy irradiated meat that is cited as preventing widespread
adoption of this pathogen destroying technology. Overall,
industry leaders in the beef sector have stymied attempts to
substantially address food safety and have shifted attention
and responsibility onto other parties in the agrifood system.
Bagged salad greens
The industrialization of salad
Bagged salads first originated in the San Francisco area in
1986 and were produced at a small scale. Upon realizing
the potential of this product, in 1989 Fresh Express created
Risk, anti-reflexivity, and ethical neutralization in industrial food processing
the first large-scale processed salad production system.
Dole and other large-scale processors quickly followed.
This value-added product allowed processors to pay
farmers relatively little for salad greens while adding
considerable value through processing and packaging.
Salad greens are processed at large scales with minimal
labor. Greens are mechanically harvested, sent to central-
ized processing facilities, and then washed, chopped, and
packaged by machines. For restaurants this dramatically
cuts down the labor involved in salad preparation. Pre-
processed salad greens also save time and labor for con-
sumers eating at home. Sales of bagged salads increased
approximately 560% between 1993 and 1999 (ERS 2001).
Between 2005 and 2007, sales grew from $2.4 billion to
$3.9 billion and are estimated to continue to grow by 204%
between 2008 and 2012 (Mintel 2008b). With over
$2.5 billion in annual US sales (Consumer Reports 2006),
processed greens are highly lucrative for companies like
Dole and Fresh Express who together control 72% of the
processed salads market (Mintel 2008b).
To provide large quantities of greens, production vol-
umes have been maximized and labor reduced at the farm
level (Friedland et al. 1981). Technological changes
include the adoption of mechanical mowers to cut greens.
In the past many workers harvested greens by hand. Now,
only one worker is required to mow greens while another
may walk in front of the mower to inspect for wildlife,
animal feces, or foreign objects. Harvesting is commonly
done at night to maximize freshness. Greens collected by
mowers go into large bins and are trucked to processing
plants.
To produce large quantities of greens at low cost,
industrial processors designed production systems that
maximized processing volumes and minimized labor.
Companies therefore have only a few centralized facilities
with mechanical processing. Companies harvest and buy
greens from dispersed regions and ship them to large
facilities where the greens are mixed together. For exam-
ple, Dole has four vegetable processing plants in the US:
one in California, Arizona, Ohio, and North Carolina.
Therefore, lettuce and greens grown on farms throughout
the US will be processed at one of these four facilities.
While salad processing facilities vary in design, many
function based on the same principles using similar
equipment. Salad materials move at high speeds along
conveyer belts and/or through large tubes. The process is
highly mechanized, producing thousands of bags of salad
per hour. The greens brought into the facility are mixed
together in a series of one or more vats of water called
‘‘flumes.’’ A flume usually contains chlorinated water to
kill bacteria. Either before or after the flumes, greens are
sorted on conveyer belts to remove debris. Then, the greens
are cut to size and washed multiple times. Lastly, the
293
greens are spun in industrial-sized salad spinners (centri-
fuge dryers) and then packaged for distribution.
Outbreaks
In recent years, widespread outbreaks of foodborne illness
and massive recalls have been associated with processed
salad greens. The largest outbreak occurred in 2006 when
close to 200 illnesses and at least 3 deaths from E. coli
O157:H7 were traced to bagged spinach with a Dole label
from California (CDC 2010). These illnesses and deaths
occurred in 26 US states and Canada. In the same year,
71 individuals across five states became ill from E. coli
O157:H7 traced to processed lettuce served at Taco Bell
restaurants (CDC 2010). Bacterial contamination in salad
products continues to be an issue with more recalls,
including three recalls by Fresh Express between May and
August of 2010. Recalls often involve tens of thousands of
bags of salad distributed nationwide. For example, the
August 2010 Fresh Express recall involved over 30,000
bags with 22 different product labels distributed in at least
26 states (FDA 2010).
These outbreaks have been linked to large-scale
processing systems. According to the Community Alliance
with Family Farmers, of all the outbreaks of E. coli
O157:H7 from salad greens traced back to California since
1995, processed products were responsible for over 98% of
all illnesses (CAFF 2008). Changes in processing, includ-
ing consolidation and mass distribution, have been spe-
cifically cited by scientists at the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention as a factor contributing to the
increasing prevalence of foodborne disease from produce
(Altekruse et al. 1997). According to one news report, Dole
and Fresh Express truck their greens to ‘‘centralized pro-
cessing plants where tainted and untainted leaves can be
mixed during chopping, washing, and bagging,’’ thus
increasing the likelihood for larger and more widespread
outbreaks (Engel and Lin 2007).
Interview respondents with inside knowledge of salad
processing largely agreed that specific factors make pro-
cessed greens inherently ‘‘less safe’’ than heads or bunches
of greens. First, mechanical harvesting increases chances
that other material (e.g., animal feces) could be collected
and brought into the processing plant. Compared to hand
harvesting, mechanization reduces the chances that con-
tamination will be identified. Second, due to centralization,
contamination from one farm can spread to impact large
quantities of greens within flumes. Food safety scientists
agree that the legal levels of chlorine that may be used in
flumes are not high enough to kill all bacteria present.
A fecal clump in a flume may take up to an hour to wash
through, while up to 5,000 bags of salad may be contam-
inated in these high-speed systems. Multiple washings
123
294
following this exposure will not remove or kill all patho-
gens. Therefore, this system may be mass producing small
traces of pathogens that can impact hundreds or even
thousands of consumers. Third, industry insiders agree that
the bag itself can serve as an incubator to culture bacteria,
especially if exposed to warm temperatures.
Responses
Following the 2006 spinach outbreak, a long investigation
was initiated to trace contamination. This investigation later
proved largely inconclusive regarding how cattle manure
appeared inside the salad processing plant. In the meantime,
many groups looked for someone or something to blame
(Todd et al. 2007). Initially, individuals in the salad industry
blamed organic production and the use of manure. While the
processing plant linked to the outbreak was used for organic
products, the spinach in question was not organically pro-
duced. In addition, the use of raw manure is prohibited in
organic production and there are stringent guidelines for
composting to kill bacteria. Many also pointed fingers at
wildlife and ‘‘dirty’’ farm workers. While this was not a
position taken public by the produce industry, interviews
indicated a common belief that the affected consumers
should have washed their spinach more thoroughly.
Blame was also directed toward the government for a
lack of food safety oversight; however, the produce
industry in California quickly rejected any form of gov-
ernment regulation. Prior to the outbreak, no formal food
safety rules existed for produce. Government agencies do
not specifically regulate produce as they do meat, dairy,
eggs, and other foods. After the outbreak, various groups in
California mobilized to address food safety for produce.
While consumer groups and state legislators moved to
pass new food safety standards, agribusiness supporters
thwarted their attempts. Proposed rules were labeled as
‘‘draconian’’ by leaders in the produce industry. They
claimed that government regulations would impair
California agriculture and that industry should create their
own rules. Agribusiness loyalists stalled bills in legislative
committees and movements to create new food safety
standards collapsed after Governor Schwarzenegger pub-
licly supported the produce industry’s efforts to create their
own rules.
In 2007, the California produce industry introduced new
food safety rules as a part of the California Leafy Greens
Marketing Agreement (LGMA). The LGMA remains
‘‘voluntary’’ but now includes 99% of the volume of leafy
greens in the state (LGMA 2010). Personal interviews
revealed that a team of industry ‘‘experts,’’ including
leaders from large processing firms, created the rules
behind closed doors. New standards under the LGMA
focus on specific aspects of production at the farm level.
123
D. Stuart, M. R. Worosz
Much attention is given to worker hygiene: what is allowed
on the farm, personal attire, and cleanliness. Additional
measures focus on cleaning farm equipment and monitor-
ing bathroom use and hand washing. Another central focus
is the role of wildlife and livestock. While little evidence
supports that wildlife constitute a serious threat to food
safety (Beretti and Stuart 2008), certain animals have been
designated as ‘‘animals of significant risk’’ in new stan-
dards and farmers have adopted a variety of eradication
measures (Stuart 2008, 2009). These standards focus on the
farm level and fail to address centralized processing and
cross-contamination.
Interviews with leafy greens growers and other industry
insiders indicate a strong belief that LGMA rules focus
more on increasing the image of safety, rather than
addressing actual risks. Responding to a reported 18-year
low in consumer confidence (FMI 2007), the produce
industry has focused efforts on boosting their image.
A produce association representative explained that the
new food safety standards are part of a ‘‘process to win
back the confidence of consumers’’ (Wood 2007). Partici-
pants of the LGMA rule-making process admitted there
was a lack of scientific evidence to support rules and that
certain measures were included because they ‘‘look good’’
rather than known effectiveness. A veteran food safety
auditor claimed that, in his opinion, about 70% of the items
on food safety checklists are irrelevant to food safety.
In addition to LGMA rules, processing facilities have
expanded their own food safety programs and, as seen in the
meat industry, have adopted technological fixes. Most
processors adopted HACCP as their guide as well as new
trace-back systems. A range of technologies have been
explored and/or added to processing systems. These include
the use of a chlorophyll sensor to identify and remove non-
plant materials and new washing agents, such as ozone.
Fresh Express recently announced the use of a new acid
rinse, called ‘‘FreshRinse,’’ claiming it is more effective
than chlorine (Neuman 2010). In addition, irradiation has
been developed and approved by the FDA for iceberg let-
tuce and spinach (Harris 2008). However, limitations exist
regarding the use of irradiation for greens: current tech-
nologies are expensive, would slow production rates, and
may impact taste and texture. Overall, despite attention
from food system critics (e.g., Nestle 2006; Pollan 2006;
Schlosser 2006), very little attention has been focused on
the role of centralized processing in recent outbreaks.
Risk, reflexivity, and anti-reflexivity in industrial
food processing
Drawing from the work of Beck (1992), we have illustrated
how technological and organizational changes in
Risk, anti-reflexivity, and ethical neutralization in industrial food processing
industrialized food production have resulted in unforeseen
risks, namely unprecedented widespread outbreaks of
foodborne illness. Strategic decisions to increase produc-
tivity and decrease labor have resulted in large-scale,
concentrated, and high-speed production systems that
commingle food from many sources. As illustrated by Beck
(1992, p.40), decisions made for economic purposes that do
not consider the range of possible consequences can lead to
catastrophic outcomes: ‘‘modernization risks occur around
systemic causes that coincide with the motor of progress
and profit. They relate to the scale and expansion of haz-
ards.’’ In this case, processing systems aimed to maximize
profits have resulted in outbreaks of foodborne illness
impacting many consumers across wide geographical
areas. This provides further evidence to support the work of
Charles Perrow (1999) on normal accidents, where system
complexity, coupling, and systemic flaws can lead to
widespread disasters.
In a risk society, citizens become increasingly aware of
harms associated with industrial processes and begin to
question institutions and call for change. While this paper
does not focus on consumers, in recent decades more
consumers have become aware of the side effects of
industrial food production, including foodborne illness.
More consumers have become skeptical of industrial pro-
duction and choose to support food from local, small-scale
sources that they know and trust (Hendrickson and Hef-
fernan 2002; Lockie 2006). However, these alternative
markets involve a small portion of the total food supply.
Many consumers remain dependent on and/or complacent
about cheap industrial food. Even in cases where we do
find increasing consumer reflexivity (Chen 2008), we do
not find a similar level of reflexivity among the food pro-
cessors responsible for the majority of the food supply.
Despite repeated outbreaks of foodborne illness, indus-
trial food processors have not shown signs of reflexivity.
Technological fixes, in both ground beef and salad pro-
cessing, serve to divert attention away from ongoing
problems with cross-contamination. New technologies can
reduce the amount of bacteria that survive within pro-
cessing systems; however, this reduction remains inade-
quate because any small amounts of contamination will be
amplified through cross-contamination. The USDA’s HA-
ACP program increases microbial testing, but may be lar-
gely ineffective due to increased vulnerability from the
amplification of any low level contamination (Juska et al.
2003). In addition, testing large volumes of food becomes
complex and less effective because contamination is not
uniformly distributed. Technological innovations represent
un-reflexive, end-of-pipe treatments that do not address
issues with production designs.
According to Beck et al. (2003) a reflexive response
involves a realization that quick fixes will not solve
295
problems and that systems need to be restructured to adapt
to side effects. Reorganizing production to better protect
consumers would entail transitioning to a more decentral-
ized system that avoids large-scale cross-contamination
(DeLind and Howard, 2008). While foodborne illness has
also been associated with products from small-scale pro-
ducers and processors, in these cases significantly fewer
consumers are impacted and supply chains are shorter
making tracing quicker and easier. Processing smaller
volumes of food and at slower speeds can increase the
effectiveness of inspection and testing, reduce cross-con-
tamination, and allow for more adaptive capacity as
problems emerge. However, responses from the ground
beef and salad industries have not shown signs of reflex-
ivity in these terms. In addition, the State remains largely
captured by industry interests, limiting the range of pos-
sible government actions. Therefore, reactions to outbreaks
show a continued reliance on modernist views of problem
solving through technological fixes. Due to a lack of
reflexivity, current responses may reinforce or exacerbate
problems. For example, new requirements from HAACP
and marketing agreements create financial hardship for
smaller producers and may further contribute to industry
consolidation and concentration (Worosz et al. 2008b).
Food processors and agribusiness leaders have not only
avoided reflexively changing production systems, but have
engaged in anti-reflexivity movements to thwart progres-
sive food safety reform. As illustrated in each case, the
food industry has greatly influenced responses to out-
breaks. They have framed issues to protect their image and
have strategically influenced policy makers and shaped or
created food safety rules to suit production goals. Industry
leaders continue to impede and/or weaken government
responses to foodborne illness and efforts to address out-
breaks avoid significant changes in production systems.
Anti-reflexivity movements have been very successful:
concentrated production systems remain in place, food
safety laws remain weak, and productivity and profits
continue to be prioritized over consumer protection.
Techniques of neutralization
Identifying specific techniques of neutralization (Sykes and
Matza 1957) can help to explain more explicitly how anti-
reflexivity movements defend the continuation of industrial-
scale food processing despite ongoing issues with food safety.
Processors may use these techniques to convince themselves
or others that their actions do not constitute unethical behav-
ior. For both ground beef and bagged salads, we explore how
denial of responsibility, denial of the victim, and appeals to
higher loyalties play an important role in neutralizing ethical
questions about industrial food production.
123
296
Denial of responsibility: where to point the finger
Industry organizations typically have the loudest voice
following foodborne disease outbreaks and use this plat-
form to deny responsibility and divert attention to other
parties. Regarding ground beef, these groups successfully
frame discourse such that any concerns about production
practices that reach the public sphere are disregarded.
The cases of Hudson and Topps illustrate how blame is
shifted away from the processors and toward seemingly
more powerful entities: slaughterhouses and the USDA.
Hamburger plants claim they are not at fault because
tainted meat comes from outside sources and they have no
way to know if raw product is contaminated. As a Hudson
spokesperson stated, it may not even be possible to deter-
mine how many sources of beef are in a batch (Galosich
1997b). Furthering this suggestion of innocence, conver-
sations following the outbreaks associated with Hudson
and Topps evoked a sense of domestic quality and com-
munity embeddedness (Murdoch et al. 2000). Ignoring
fundamental problems, the State has largely supported
industry goals, but has also been the target of industry
critique. Industry groups accuse the USDA of giving too
little attention to slaughterhouses and for not controlling
E. coli elsewhere in the supply chain, yet they do not
support increased oversight or authority. By shifting blame
to other parties, including the USDA, the meat industry has
continued to protect its ‘‘right’’ to police itself and maintain
large-scale production systems.
Similarly, the salad processing industry has directed the
bulk of the blame towards growers and wildlife, both
upstream factors out of their control. This has resulted in
new food safety requirements for growers focused on
worker hygiene and keeping wildlife away from crops.
This puts tremendous pressure on growers to solve food
safety problems. Some processors require growers to sign
liability waivers to accept blame for future outbreaks traced
to their produce. This diverts attention away from the role
of processing. A former salad industry executive stated:
The processors were smart to blame the growers
straight away. They are also the major players behind
the LGMA. They point the finger at the growers, but
it is really the flume that is the problem. It just shows
you who has the PR and the muscle here.
Processors continue to use high-volume systems where
large quantities of greens can be cross-contaminated in
the flume water. According to industry insiders, blaming
growers and wildlife was a strategic move to divert
attention away from flaws in processing. Focusing on
up-stream sources of contamination served to justify the
continued use of high-volume production systems. Proces-
sors successfully shifted the responsibility to crop growers,
123
D. Stuart, M. R. Worosz
who now struggle to meet new food safety standards
(Stuart 2009).
Denial of the victim: improper consumer food handling
There is a long history of food companies denying the
existence of true victims of foodborne illness, typically
through claims that consumers brought illness upon
themselves by not preparing food properly. Regarding
ground beef, most discourse centers on insufficient cooking
temperatures. Following the outbreak associated with
Hudson Foods a representative of the Beef Industry
Council on Food Safety stated, ‘‘people need to know how
to handle and cook beef’’ (O’Dwyer’s PR Services Report
1997). According to Texas Food Industry Association v.
Espy,2 traditional American cooking of beef, somewhere
between rare and medium (i.e., up to 150F), is not suffi-
cient to kill pathogenic E. coli; therefore, it remains an
adulterant despite industry attempts to blame consumers
for not cooking meat sufficiently. In addition, industry
groups fault consumers who resist the adoption of tech-
nologies to remove or kill pathogens (e.g., irradiation).
Labor advances this notion of consumer responsibility via
neutralization (Umphress and Bingham 2010). In claiming
that they take all necessary precautions, workers help to
facilitate the transfer of culpability. The conversation sur-
rounding the Hudson case illustrates a more underhanded
approach, denying the status of victims altogether, except
in the case of death. This position negates the gravity and
the burden of all other acute and chronic health conse-
quences from E. coli 0157:H7 infection (e.g., kidney fail-
ure, coma, loss of bowel and bladder function) (see, e.g.,
Moss 2009b; Roberts et al. 2009). Overall, the meat
industry continues to find ways to blame consumers for
their own illness.
In the case of processed salad greens, denial of the
victim is less visible but still present. Following the 2006
spinach outbreak the processing industry did not publicly
fault consumers, although some growers and processors
felt that consumers failed to adequately wash their spinach.
One grower stated: ‘‘just because it says triple washed
doesn’t mean it is clean. Consumers need to wash it.’’ This
suggests that consumers are either ignorant or lazy.
Blaming the consumer for their own illness may become
less common with leafy greens now that trace-back
mechanisms and DNA tests provide more information
about the sources of contamination. Regarding leafy greens
contamination, Michael Doyle at the Center for Food
Safety stated that until recently ‘‘the industry believed the
2
Texas Food Industry Association et al. v. Mike Espy et al. 870 F.
Supp. 143: United States District Court, W.D. Texas, December 13,
1994.
Risk, anti-reflexivity, and ethical neutralization in industrial food processing
major problems were not in the fields or the processing
facilities but in homes and restaurants where cross-con-
tamination with beef products was occurring.’’ He states
that now with DNA tests they ‘‘have a smoking gun.’’
Doyle says: ‘‘We have definitive data to show industry that
the problems go back to the fields and processing plants’’
(Burros 2006). Denial of the victim may become less vis-
ible publicly; however, it remains a common and powerful
narrative within the food industry.
Appeal to higher loyalties: profitability, efficiency,
and technology
The beef industry has shown its concern about food safety
by adopting new technologies. However, like many other
industries, it remains loyal to capitalist logic. Thus, inno-
vative tools and designs are applied to maximize output
and minimize cost. An inherent side effect is continued
outbreaks and recalls. Maintaining current high-volume
processing systems has been prioritized over approaches
that may reduce cross-contamination. Both Hudson and
Topps, for example, were leading producers of ground beef
patties. They both had modern plants with technologies
designed to make processing safer, yet they had lapses in
compliance with sanitation rules that they created them-
selves. They both followed industry standards of practice;
however, these rules were designed to prioritize profit-
ability over food safety. While they were generally com-
pliant with federal regulations, both took short cuts to
decrease costs. Even though it is well known that ground
beef from large-scale facilities may lead to extensive
contamination, no attempts have been made to limit the
number of sources per lot, redesign production lines,
reduce line speeds, or restructure the production process.
While HACCP is touted as a science-based food safety
system, it does not engage in substantive assessment and/or
structural modifications. Instead, by focusing on individual
plants, the FSIS makes it possible to disregard systemic
issues and to maintain business as usual, prioritizing effi-
ciency and profitability.
In the salad greens sector, processing companies con-
tinue to prioritize profitability in decision making, which
limits their actions to address food safety. While bagged
salads may be less safe than unprocessed produce, pro-
duction is justified because the product remains popular
and highly lucrative. A former manager at a processing
facility admitted that ‘‘heads of lettuce are much safer’’ but
that ‘‘bagged products aren’t going anywhere because they
make more money for the industry.’’ However, food safety
cannot be ignored. The 2007 low in consumer confidence
forced the produce industry to act. New food safety mea-
sures are widely explained as a compromise between
raising consumer confidence and maintaining the bottom
297
line. A representative from a retailer association claimed:
‘‘food safety is our number one concern because we can’t
afford food safety problems.’’ Industry insiders admit that
they only adopt food safety measures that are ‘‘practical,’’
and will not consider restructuring or adopting measures
that would reduce profitability. One executive claimed:
‘‘we want safe products, but with no additional cost to the
system.’’
Most companies will not consider changes that do not
enhance efficiency and/or profitability. These loyalties
support the continuation of high-volume, concentrated food
production systems. Appealing to efficiency and profit-
ability not only guides industrial decision-making, but may
also serve to rationalize behavior to policy makers and
consumers. The US government continues to succumb to
industry appeals to maintain profitable food production
systems, despite increasing evidence of negative external-
ities (Nestle 2003). While we did not include consumers in
our analysis, we encourage further research that may reveal
how certain groups of consumers may support efficient and
profitable food production systems, despite widespread
outbreaks of foodborne illness or other associated impacts.
There are many possible explanations, including: (1) blind
trust in the food system, (2) fatalism, (3) valuing price over
safety, (4) cognitive dissonance, and (5) recall fatigue.
Moreover, consumer support may simply be the outcome
of industry efforts to mask flaws in production.
Appeals to technology also serve to neutralize ethical
questions in food production. In both the ground beef and
bagged salads sectors, the adoption of technology served to
legitimize industry responses to outbreaks. In each case
‘‘technophilia’’ (Burkhardt 1992) acted as a guiding prin-
ciple, as seen through technological fixes such as new
washing agents. Processors continue to promote their use
of the best science and technologies to eliminate, detect,
and trace contamination, often serving as a means of
competition between companies who promote their food
safety programs. Those who share a strong belief in mod-
ernist notions of technological optimism may regard these
measures as sufficient. However, this appeal to technology
overlooks the role of production designs while promoting
the image of processors taking every precaution to prevent
foodborne illness. This appeal to technology serves to
neutralize ethical questions that may otherwise cause
greater public concern about industrial food production.
Together, these techniques help to explain the success of
food processing companies in impeding more reflexive
responses to widespread outbreaks of foodborne illness.
These techniques can neutralize ethical questions that
would otherwise emerge in response to food safety issues.
They divert attention away from the continued use of risky
production designs, despite unprecedented wide-scale
outbreaks. While we suggest that these techniques of
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neutralization play an important role in preventing more
reflexive responses, additional case studies are needed to
further explore these and other techniques used by industry
as well as their effectiveness among consumers and policy
makers.
Conclusions
These case studies illustrate that responses to outbreaks of
foodborne illness thus far do not constitute reflexive
change. Current approaches to address foodborne illness
confirm Latour’s observation that ‘‘all the indicators, far
from showing a second [reflexive] modernization, bear
witness to an expansion of modernization with a ven-
geance’’ (2003, p. 45). Within food production systems
industrial leaders continue to cling to modern notions of
productionism, economies of scale, and technological
solutions while successfully thwarting movements to more
holistically protect consumers. While evidence of reflexive
modernization remains absent in this case, the concept still
represents a powerful narrative to shift attention towards
associated side effects and what alternative responses
might involve (Latour 2003).
According to Beck and others (Beck 1992; Beck et al.
1994; 2003), reflexive modernization involves not only
new forms of organization but also new perspectives.
Increasing reflexivity in food production would entail a
holistic and adaptive approach. System designers would be
mindful of relationships and would address sources of
problems rather than treating symptoms. This is clearly not
the case with current approaches. The food industry con-
tinues to ignore complex relationships in food systems,
using quick technological fixes to address problems. Critics
of technological fixes argue that they do not solve problems
and that ignoring systemic issues while blindly following
notions of technological progress will only result in more
problems in the future (Scott 2011). Regarding foodborne
illness, Waltner-Toews (1996, p. 178) explains that: ‘‘any
methods proposed to control food-borne diseases that
ignore this complexity are unlikely to be sustainable, and
indeed, will likely create more problems—and more seri-
ous problems—than they solve.’’
This discussion takes on greater significance when
examining new food safety legislation. After years of
debate (Worosz 2009), the FDA Food Safety Moderniza-
tion Act (FSMA) was finally signed into law on January 4,
2011. Like the rules governing beef, the FSMA does not
call for reflexively restructuring or re-conceptualizing food
production. Instead, it calls for a more comprehensive and
coordinated ‘‘system of food safety oversight’’ and focuses
on monitoring, enforcement, and the use of ‘‘the best
available science’’ (Hamburg 2011). Given that it is subject
123
D. Stuart, M. R. Worosz
to the Statutory-Pay-As-You-Go Act and the state of the
US budget, it remains uncertain if there will be sufficient
funding for existing programs and very unlikely that new
mandates will be fully implemented. If implemented, the
FSMA is likely to place additional burdens on small and
very small producers (Knutson and Ribera 2011). Regula-
tions have yet to be drafted, but if they follow previous
trends in rule making, they are expected to cause financial
hardship for smaller and alternative producers and to
consequently further consolidation. These approaches
remain un-reflexive, reinforce current problems, and pro-
vide further evidence that anti-reflexivity movements
continue to impede significant reform.
In this paper we have furthered previous discussions
about food safety (e.g., Juska et al. 2003; Delind and Howard
2008) by specifically illustrating how economically efficient
industrial designs have resulted in widespread outbreaks,
how current responses to outbreaks lack reflexivity, and how
powerful anti-reflexivity movements use ethical neutral-
ization to thwart significant reform. As the externalities
associated with productionism, profit-orientation, and
technological optimism in food systems are further exposed,
more citizens may begin to question whether these tenets of
industrialization should direct food production. As stated by
Weis (2010, pp. 317–318): ‘‘the deceptive efficiency of
industrial capitalist agriculture and its manifestation in
cheap bountiful food have long overshadowed the instability
and inequalities of the system. This illusion is beginning to
crack…’’ Despite these trends, whether we will eventually
witness a reflexive response to negative externalities largely
depends on exposing and countering the strong forces and
ideologies that continue to support industrial food produc-
tion. Further research on anti-reflexivity movements and
techniques of neutralization may facilitate this exposure and
foster re-conceptualizing and re-structuring food production
systems.
Acknowledgments The authors would like to acknowledge the
Alabama and Michigan Agricultural Experiment Stations. Funding
for research in California was made possible through an award from
the Estuarine Reserves Division, Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management, National Ocean Service, United States
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Additional
funding for research in California was provided through a National
Science Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant.
Lastly, we greatly appreciate comments from reviewers, and espe-
cially the Editor, Harvey James.
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Author Biographies
Diana Stuart Ph.D., is an assistant professor at Michigan State
University with a joint appointment through the Department of
Sociology and the Kellogg Biological Station. Her research focuses
on the adoption of agricultural practices, food systems, science and
technology, and environmental issues.
Michelle Worosz Ph.D., is an assistant professor at Auburn
University in the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural
Sociology. Her research focuses on the sociology of food and
agricultural systems and issues related to science and technology.
123