Dr.

RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL

LAW UNIVERSITY

ACADEMIC SESSION: 2023-2024

CYBER LAW

CYBER SECURITY ISSUES IN ELECTIONS: A CHALLENGE

TO DEMOCRACY IN A DIGITALISED WORLD

Submitted to: Submitted by:

Dr. Amandeep Singh Saddhvi Nayak

Associate Professor (Law) 200101114

RMLNLU 7th semester (Section B)

B.A.LLB.(Hons.)
 CONTENTS

S.NO. Topic Pg.NO.

1. Declaration 3
2. Acknowledgement 4

3. Introduction 7

4. Cyber Threats in Elections 7-9

5. Issues 9-13

6. Questions Raised 13

7. Judgement 13-15

8. Conclusion 15-16
 DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the project work entitled “Cyber Security

Issues in Elections” submitted to the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya
National Law University, Lucknow is a record of an original
work done by me under the guidance of Dr. Amandeep Singh,
faculty of law, the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law
University and this project is submitted in the partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the award of the degree of B.A.L.L.B
(Hons.). The results embodied in this have not been submitted to
any other University or Institute for the award of any degree or
diploma.
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This research paper would not have been accomplished without the
generous contributions of individuals. First of all, I express my gratitude
to the Almighty, who aided me with his strength, wisdom and patience to
complete this project as a term paper.

Additionally, I express my gratitude and deep regards to my teacher Dr.

Amandeep Singh for giving me the freedom to work on “Cyber
Security Issues in Elections” and also for his exemplary guidance,
monitoring and constant encouragement throughout the course of this
research paper.

I would also like to thank the authorities of Dr. Madhu Limaye Library
who provided the remote access of the library to provide the research
material.

Moreover, I also thank all my batchmates and seniors who aided me

along the way, and my family and friends for their constant
encouragement without which this assignment would not have been
possible.

I know that despite my best effort some discrepancies might have crept
in which I believe my humble professor would forgive.

THANKING YOU ALL.

Saddhvi Nayak.
 INTRODUCTION
“Cyber-Security is much more than a matter of IT.” ― Stephane Nappo.

Information and communication technologies are increasingly prevalent in electoral management

and democratic processes. These technologies offer numerous new opportunities, but also new
threats. Cyber-security is currently one of the greatest electoral challenges, even for countries
without any form of electronic voting.

Cyber-security relates to protecting internet-connected systems, networks, software, and data

from unauthorized access or exploitation. It is also used here to include the security of offline
election technologies and protect the integrity of the electoral process from disinformation and
influence operations.1 Elections rely on varying combinations of manual and technology-based
procedures. As neither truly un-hackable technology nor entirely tamper-proof manual processes
exist, an essential task in election administration involves the management and mitigation of
manipulation risks through a range of integrity, audit, and control measures. While countries
around the world have long-standing best practices for integrity measures for paper-based and
manual processes, recent events have highlighted the need to address the risks that emerge from
the ever-increasing use of technology in elections.

Vulnerabilities in the electoral process that make it prone to successful or alleged attacks include
the technology (devices, software, networks) itself as well as inadequate procedures and human
factors such as poorly trained staff.2 Election managers and stakeholders often have neither the
resources nor the expertise to defend themselves from sophisticated cyber threats. Cybersecurity
expert bodies generally have limited electoral expertise, and may not always give high priority to
defending against election-related threats. They may instead focus on protecting critical
infrastructures such as the military, public utilities, or high-level economic targets from cyber-
attacks.

1
Sam van der Staak and Peter Wolf, ―Cyber-security in Elections: Models of Interagency Collaboration‖ Available
at Last accessed on Oct 27,2022.
2
Ibid.
 CYBER THREATS IN ELECTIONS

Cyber threats in elections include threats to all possible technology based on hostile and/or
illegal acts designed to undermine the integrity of the electoral process. Cyber threats fall
broadly into two categories:

a) Attacks targeting election-related technologies; and

b) Disinformation campaigns targeting the perceived integrity of the electoral process.

Attacks targeting election-related technologies

The main targets of hacking attacks against election-related technology include voter registration
technologies, voting, vote counting technologies, result transmission, and aggregation
technologies, websites for result publication and other online election-related services,
institutional and private email accounts and communication systems, and broader national
infrastructure, including e-government systems, power grid, and communication links. During
Indonesia’s 2018 regional elections, there were attempts to hack the results data web page of the
General Elections Commission, as well as the Telegram and WhatsApp accounts of key election
administration staff via weaknesses in the mobile text messaging systems. The attempts sought to
gain access to and block the usage of those services in order to disrupt the election process.3

A common misperception is that only countries with electronic voting or other high-profile
election technologies are at risk of a cyber-attack. However, all elections depend on information
and communication technology (ICT) tools, from voter registration to an electoral management
body’s (EMB) website. Therefore, while the type of cyber risks, adversaries, and attack vectors
vary between countries, EMBs—as well as high-level office holders, security agencies, and
democracy assistance providers—now agree on the need to invest more in understanding,
preventing, and mitigating the risks that new technologies bring to democratic processes and
elections.

3
Indonesia election mired in claims of foreign hacking and 'ghost' voters available at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/19/indonesia-election-mired-in-claims-of-foreign-hacking-andghost-
voters Last accessed on 27th Oct, 2022.
A second misperception is that an EMB is the main (or even sole) agency responsible for cyber-
security in elections. However, cyber threats against elections and democracy arise in a variety of
forms that fall under the jurisdiction of many different actors:

i. Cyber-attacks against election-related infrastructure aimed at breaching the

confidentiality, integrity, and availability of election technology and data;
ii. disinformation campaigns that attempt to undermine the credibility of the electoral
administration and democratic institutions;
iii. Cyber-attacks against electoral stakeholders, parties, candidates, media, and campaigns;
iv. Disinformation campaigns designed to shape the political debate.

Addressing these cyber threats often requires more than the implementation of technical
mitigation measures by the EMB or any other single entity.

EMBs are commonly responsible for protecting the integrity of their own systems and for
upholding the trust and credibility of their institution. Hacking attacks against electoral
stakeholders, such as political parties and candidates, and undue influence over the political
debate are more commonly a grey area over which other state agencies have jurisdiction;
alternatively, there may be no regulation and/or clear mandate for countermeasures.

Disinformation campaigns targeting the perceived integrity of the electoral process

Disinformation is deliberate—often covertly—spreading false, misleading, or inaccurate

information with the intent to cause harm by influencing public opinion. Disinformation in
elections can be spread by either domestic or international actors. Foreign actors may use
disinformation as part of influence(orinformation) operations, a discipline traditionally used in
military contexts that has been increasingly applied to elections. Such operations often
exaggerate and misrepresent publicly known and debated issues. EMBs’ mandate only entails
countermeasures against disinformation campaigns if they specifically concern the electoral
process and its administration.

Two types of information operations are particularly relevant to EMBs since they attempt to
influence elections. Such operations often utilize online and social media mechanisms to reach
voters. First, disinformation can seek to suppress voter turnout, for example through false claims
that polling stations are closed or elections are delayed due to weather, violence, and other
factors, or claims that votes can be cast online or by telephone where this is not the case. In 2011,
Canada experienced the Robocall scandal, in which thousands of voters in almost 250 ridings
(constituencies) across the country reported receiving automated phone messages falsely telling
them that their polling stations had been changed. This information operation aimed to suppress
voter turnout. Elections Canada’s investigations found that domestic political actors were
responsible. The incident prompted Elections Canada to set up an Election Integrity Office to
identify domestic and international cyber threats, assess risks and set up systems to track and
prevent cyber-attacks by foreign actors, political operatives, or individuals who might want to
disrupt elections or manipulate the results.

Second, disinformation can also aim to undermine trust in electoral processes, institutions, and
technologies by spreading rumours of manipulation and malfeasance. Where perceptions of
electoral integrity are traditionally high, even pointing to small shortcomings may seriously
damage this perception.

RUSSIA’S MEDDLING IN THE U.S. ELECTIONS

In 2019, the U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee found evidence of Russian interference and
media manipulation in the 2016 American presidential election. The CIA, FBI, and National
Security Agency jointly stated with high confidence that the Russian Government directed the
compromise of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, including from U.S. political
organizations in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections to harm the campaign of Hillary Clinton,
boosting the candidacy of Donald J. Trump.4

According to the special counsel investigation, Robert Mueller’s Report on the Investigation into
Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election, the first method of Russian interference
used the Internet Research Agency, a Kremlin-linked troll farm, to wage ―a social media
campaign that favored presidential candidate Donald J. Trump and disparaged presidential
candidate Hillary Clinton.5
4
DHS Press Office: Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on Election Security, available at < https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-
department-homeland-security-and-office-director-national> Last accessed on Nov 3,2022.
5
Mark Mazetti, Mueller Reveals Trump’s Efforts to Thwart Russian Inquiry in Highly Anticipated Report, available
at < https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/politics/mueller-report-russian-interference-donald-trump.html> Last
accessed on Oct 28, 2022.
Russia’s Internet Research Agency, Saint Petersburg, created thousands of social media accounts
that purported to be Americans supporting radical political groups and planned or promoted
events supporting Trump and against Clinton; they reached millions of social media users
between 2013 and 2017. Fabricated articles and disinformation were spread from Russian
government-controlled media, and promoted on social media. 6 Facebook, Whatsapp, Telegraph,
YouTube and Twitter were used, but also Reddit, Tumblr, Pinterest, Medium, YouTube, Vine,
and Google+ among other sites.

This started multiple investigations into the campaign of President Donald J. Trump. At the root
of these inquiries are concerns about the security of the U.S. electoral process and fears that a
rival power could influence an election’s results.7

One of the incidents that were highlighted was that of Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta
who received a phishing email masked as an alert from Google that another user had tried to
access his account. It contained a link to a page where Podesta could change his password. He
shares the email with a staffer from the campaign’s help desk. The staffer replies with a typo -
instead of typing “This is an illegitimate email”, the staffer types “This is a legitimate email”.
Podesta follows the instructions and types a new password, allowing hackers to access his
emails.8 The emails were passed to the WikiLeaks website, which published them before the U.S.
election. This further dominated the news bulletins and damaged Clinton’s campaign.

The Russian effort involved overt activities by government agencies, state-backed media, and
paid internet ―trolls as well as covert operations, including illicit cyber activities conducted by
intelligence agents. The Russian government used state-funded media outlets, including the
website and radio broadcaster Sputnik and television network Russia Today, to disadvantage the
Clinton presidential campaign, the 2017 U.S. intelligence report said. Russia Today’s portrayal
of Clinton during the run-up to the election, it found was consistently negative and focused on

6
Vesoulis A and Simon A, ―Here's Who Found That Russia Meddled in the 2016 Election‖ (Time, 16 July 2018) <
https://time.com/5340060/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-summit-russia-meddling/>Llast accessed on Nov 1, 2022.
7
Russia, Trump, and the 2016 U.S. Election‖ (Council on Foreign Relations), available at <
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-election> Last accessed on Nov 2, 2022.
8
2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts, available at https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-
presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/index.html Last accessed on Nov 2, 2022.
her leaked emails and accused her of corruption, poor physical and mental health, and ties to
Islamic extremism.9

Russia also took its influence campaign to highly trafficked social media channels, including
Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. A Russian entity with links to the Kremlin known as the
Internet Research Agency (IRA) is reported to have hired hundreds of trolls to post false news
stories and socially divisive content on these and other platforms. Facebook, for instance, said
the IRA posted the content that reached more than 140 million of its users.

BRAZIL ELECTION: USE OF WHATSAPP TO SPREAD FAKE NEWS

In Brazil election, there was the use of WhatsApp to send fake news, and the reason for using
WhatsApp was that it was not just used as a private messaging app in Brazil. Many mobile phone
networks allow unlimited WhatsApp access to subscribers, so even people who cannot afford an
internet plan can use it.10

Using WhatsApp, a Facebook-owned messaging service, Bolsonaro supporters delivered an

onslaught of daily misinformation straight to millions of Brazilians’ phones. 11 They included
doctored photos portraying senior Workers Party members celebrating with Communist Fidel
Castro after the Cuban Revolution, audio clips manipulated to misrepresent Haddad’s policies,
and fake ―fact-checks discrediting authentic news stories.

Brazil is the latest country to learn that social media can undermine the democratic process.
Numerous studies have confirmed that a toxic blend of data mismanagement, targeted
advertisement and online misinformation also influenced the outcomes of the United Kingdom’s
Brexit vote and the 2016 U.S. presidential race. Brazil’s WhatsApp election scandal should be a
wake-up call, particularly for other developing world democracies, as revealed in research
recently presented at the United Nations’ Internet Governance Forum. That’s because the

9
Russia’s RT: The Network Implicated in U.S. Election Meddling, available at <
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/world/europe/russias-rt-the-network-implicated-in-us-electionmeddling.html>
Last accessed on Nov 4, 2022.
10
Magenta M, Gragnani J and Souza F, ―How WhatsApp Is Being Abused in Brazil's Elections‖ (BBC News, 24
October 2018) available at < https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45956557> Last accessed on October 27, 2022.
11
Belli L, ―Opinion: WhatsApp Skewed Brazilian Election, Showing Social Media's Danger to Democracy‖ (PBS,
5 December 2018) < https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-electionshowing-social-
medias-danger-to-democracy> Last accessed on October 27, 2022.
conditions that allowed fake news to thrive in Brazil exist in many Latin American, African, and
Asian countries.

Internet access is very expensive in Brazil. A broadband connection can cost up to 15 percent of
a household’s income and mobile plans with unlimited data, common in rich countries, are rare.
Instead, mobile carriers entice users by offering ―zero-rating plans with free access to specific
applications, typically Facebook, WhatsApp, and Twitter. Nearly three-quarters of Brazilian
internet users had these prepaid mobile-internet plans in 2020, according to the technology
research center CETIC. Most Brazilians, therefore, have unlimited social media access but very
little access to the rest of the internet. This likely explains why 95 percent of all Brazilian
internet users say they mostly go online for messaging apps and social media. Yet the ―rest of
the internet is precisely where Brazilians might have verified the political news sent to them on
WhatsApp during the 2018 election. Essentially, fact-checking is too expensive for the average
Brazilian.12

CYBER-SECURITY AND ELECTIONS IN INDIA

Electronic voting and Internet voting often first come to mind when we think about new
technology in elections, but in fact, technologies have been adopted at all stages of the
management and contestation of elections, by a variety of different actors. The Election
Commission (EC), tasked with maintaining the sanctity of India’s electoral process, has taken
several steps to ensure the inviolability of the technical infrastructure, which includes the
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs), voter database, voting software, and IT systems.

Reliability Of EVMs

Despite their successful use, some political parties in India have raised baseless doubts about
their reliability. These machines are produced by Bharat Electronics Limited and the Electronics
Corporation of India Limited, public-sector units both, which produce sensitive equipment for
India’s defence and space sector, such as electronic warfare and radar systems. Besides, they are
stand-alone machines, which cannot be connected to any network. A committee, consisting of
technical experts and defence scientists, has certified the software, 13 which makes the EVMs hard

12
Ibid.
13
Election Commission of India, Manual on Risk Management, 20 September 2018, <
https://eci.gov.in/files/file/6929-manual-on-risk-management/> accessed October 29, 2022.
to hack. Individual machines can theoretically be tampered with, though there has been no
evidence of this. Now with the mandatory use of the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail
(VVPAT) machines, this doubt too will be eliminated.

Specialised Initiatives On Cyber Security

In 2017, the EC created the new post of Chief Information Security Officer whose job is to
supervise various measures, such as conducting regular cyber security drills and ensuring various
EC offices’ compliance with cyber security measures. 14 The EC has also held workshops in six
cities across the country to train its staff in cyber hygiene, such as not responding to phishing
emails, which can compromise the EC’s computer network.15

Foreign Funded Propaganda

This is beginning to be a problem in India as well. During the 2017 Doklam crisis, and in the
aftermath of the Pulwama attack, a sustained anti-India propaganda campaign by the Chinese
state media and Pakistan Army’s Inter-Services Public Relations misrepresented India’s military
actions and questioned Indian military capabilities. This foreign adversarial propaganda was so
well integrated into cyberspace that it was virtually impossible to tell it apart from ongoing
politically motivated disinformation campaigns, launched by India’s rival political parties.

A related problem has been the spread of fake news, particularly through the WhatsApp. In the
run-up to the elections, social media platforms have been full of false news posts, targeting
Prime Minister and other major political leaders. Tackling this issue has been challenging for
India.

Twitter, Facebook, and WhatsApp, where such malicious content is typically posted, have taken
several deterrent measures. They introduced transparency standards for political advertising and
clearly labeled content as sponsored to distinguish it from that posted by regular users. They
partnered with fact-checking websites, deployed Artificial Intelligence (AI), and appointed a
grievance officer.16A campaign they launched helps internet users verify content on social media
14
Election Commission of India, ‗Cyber Security Newsletter, May 2018, < https://eci.gov.in/files/category/981-
cyber-security-newsletter/> accessed October 27, 2022.
15
Election Commission of India, ‗ECI Cyber Bulletin, November 2018 https://eci.gov.in/files/file/9089-eci-cyber-
bulletin-november-2018/> accessed October 27, 2022.
16
Facebook for media, Working to Stop Misinformation and False News, 7 April 2017, <
https://www.facebook.com/formedia/blog/working-to-stop-misinformation-and-false-news> accessed October 31,
platforms. They also work with the EC to implement a Voluntary Code of Ethics to report details
of political advertisements and prohibit any political canvassing-related content 48 hours before
voting.17

These are important steps, but still small compared to the scale at which malicious content is
spreading through social media because such pages continue to proliferate in ever-new avatars.

The government, therefore, needs to initiate additional measures for the long term. They can:
convene an all-party initiative to design a code of conduct for using social media platforms,
including for political campaigns and advertising. The animosity between political parties and
lack of trust in the government may impede this; design a content code, specifically to tackle
fake news, on the lines of India’s Programme and Advertising Codes for television, and provide
an ombudsman for internet users to report objectionable content, like the Broadcasting Content
Complaints Council, which examines content-related complaints against cable television. This
will also avoid the bias which has crept into many social media companies’ content code: earlier
this year, supporters of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had accused the micro-blogging site,
Twitter, of removing pro-BJP content from its platform.

Political Parties and Cyber Security

While political parties have enthusiastically used social media to reach out to voters, some
leaders are well-versed in the nuances of cyber security used in their political campaigns and the
basics of cyber hygiene. In fact, cyber security figures as an issue in the election manifestos of
only three parties – the BJP, INC, and the Communist Party of India (Marxist). Of these, only the
INC and CPI (M) have promised to take steps to counter the spread of fake news and punish
those who misuse digital and social media.

Many of these issues will continue to matter well beyond the elections. If democracy must stay
alive and well, the sanctity of the election process must be preserved. Ever newer threats will
emerge as technology acquires newer sophistication – and the environment will need constant
vigilance. For now, the noise and dust generated should not be in vain for technical reasons.
2022.
17
Election Commission of India, Social Media Platforms present Voluntary Code of Ethics for the 2019 General
Election to Election Commission of India, 20 March 2019, https://eci.gov.in/files/file/9467-social-media-platforms-
present-voluntary-code-of-ethics-for-the-2019-general-election-to-election-commission-of-india/> accessed
November 1, 2022.
 SUGGESTIONS AND WAY FORWARD FOR INDIA

What does India need to do?

 Limit the unrestrained export of data.

 work with social media platforms to create reasonable ways to regulate online hate and
fake speech while balancing the need to protect freedom of expression. There is also a
need to define ―hate and fake in digital discourse.
 Ensure no unauthorized alteration happens in the voter registries.
 study the abuse—potential and actual—by technology platforms of their dominant
position.
 India also needs new rules and norms on political advertising and sale of data to third
parties.
 For cyber risks, firstly, the EC needs to establish a cyber-security unit and train officers
and political staffers in basic cyber hygiene.
 Secondly, it must work towards greater international cooperation with tech companies.
 Thirdly, domestic law must recognize and punish cyber interference in elections.
 We also need reforms in the Indian Penal Code and IT Act, 2000 to better define a
―cybercrime".

CONCLUSION

Free and open elections are the foundation of our democratic societies. Protecting the integrity of
our elections is therefore an absolute priority. The process of electing a new government is
always fraught with impediments. Violence, booth capturing, and identity erasure have been
parring for the course in elections past in India. With political parties using social media to drive
communication strategies and data analytics for targeted political campaigns, the possibility of
rogue actors and adversarial states exploiting digital technology to harm the integrity of the
election process, cannot be ruled out. Regimes are busy building digital dictatorships—from
China’s Citizen Score initiative to Singapore’s ―data-controlled society.

American allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections and the role
of firms like Cambridge Analytica demonstrate how elections can be manipulated by malicious
actors through a) targeting of election infrastructure, and b) propaganda operations aimed at
influencing voter behavior. Such instances have made cyber security a critical part of Indian
electioneering. Bringing it about requires a well-crafted, long-term policy response from the state
and private sector.

We need to build strong cyber-security for our elections and election processes based on a
comprehensive approach that includes resilience, deterrence, and a diplomatic response where
state actors are involved. Cooperation and information exchange between all relevant authorities
is more crucial than ever now. Experience sharing across Member States on cyber incidents is
essential. If democracy must stay alive and well, the sanctity of the election process must be
preserved. Ever newer threats will emerge as technology acquires newer sophistication – and the
environment will need constant vigilance.

REFERNCES

 Sam van der Staak and Peter Wolf, ―Cyber-security in Elections: Models of Interagency
Collaboration.
 Indonesia election mired in claims of foreign hacking and 'ghost' voters available at
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/19/indonesia-election-mired-in-claims-of-
foreign-hacking-andghost-voters
 DHS Press Office: Joint Statement from the Department Of Homeland Security and
Office of the Director of National Intelligence on Election Security, available at <
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2016/10/07/joint-statement-department-homeland-security-
and-office-director-national>
 Mark Mazetti, Mueller Reveals Trump’s Efforts to Thwart Russian Inquiry in Highly
Anticipated Report, available at <
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/18/us/politics/mueller-report-russian-interference-
donald-trump.html>
 Vesoulis A and Simon A, ―Here's Who Found That Russia Meddled in the 2016
Election‖ (Time, 16 July 2018) < https://time.com/5340060/donald-trump-vladimir-putin-
summit-russia-meddling/>
 Russia, Trump, and the 2016 U.S. Election‖ (Council on Foreign Relations), available at
< https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/russia-trump-and-2016-us-election>
 2016 Presidential Campaign Hacking Fast Facts, available at
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/12/26/us/2016-presidential-campaign-hacking-fast-facts/
index.html
 Russia’s RT: The Network Implicated in U.S. Election Meddling, available at <
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/07/world/europe/russias-rt-the-network-implicated-in-
us-electionmeddling.html>
 Magenta M, Gragnani J and Souza F, ―How WhatsApp Is Being Abused in Brazil's
Elections‖ (BBC News, 24 October 2018) available at <
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-45956557>
 Belli L, ―Opinion: WhatsApp Skewed Brazilian Election, Showing Social Media's
Danger to Democracy‖ (PBS, 5 December 2018) <
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/whatsapp-skewed-brazilian-electionshowing-
social-medias-danger-to-democracy>
 Election Commission of India, Manual on Risk Management, 20 September 2018, <
https://eci.gov.in/files/file/6929-manual-on-risk-management/>
 Election Commission of India, ‗Cyber Security Newsletter, May 2018, <
https://eci.gov.in/files/category/981-cyber-security-newsletter/>
 Election Commission of India, ‗ECI Cyber Bulletin, November 2018
https://eci.gov.in/files/file/9089-eci-cyber-bulletin-november-2018/>
 Facebook for media, Working to Stop Misinformation and False News, 7 April 2017, <
https://www.facebook.com/formedia/blog/working-to-stop-misinformation-and-false-
news>
 Election Commission of India, Social Media Platforms present Voluntary Code of Ethics
for the 2019 General Election to Election Commission of India, 20 March 2019,
https://eci.gov.in/files/file/9467-social-media-platforms-present-voluntary-code-of-ethics-
for-the-2019-general-election-to-election-commission-of-india/>
 Election Commission of India, ‗Cyber Security Newsletter, May 2018, <
https://eci.gov.in/files/category/981-cyber-security-newsletter/>
 Election Commission of India, ‗ECI Cyber Bulletin, November 2018
https://eci.gov.in/files/file/9089-eci-cyber-bulletin-november-2018/>
 Facebook for media, Working to Stop Misinformation and False News, 7 April 2017, <
https://www.facebook.com/formedia/blog/working-to-stop-misinformation-and-false-
news>
 Election Commission of India, Social Media Platforms present Voluntary Code of Ethics
for the 2019 General Election to Election Commission of India, 20 March 2019,
https://eci.gov.in/files/file/9467-social-media-platforms-present-voluntary-code-of-ethics-
for-the-2019-general-election-to-election-commission-of-india/>