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Anarchist Sociology and the Legacy of Peter Kropotkin

Article in Theory in Action · January 2017
DOI: 10.3798/tia.1937-0237.1704

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Gary L. Grizzle
Theory in Action, Vol. 10, No. 1, January (© 2017)
DOI:10.3798/tia.1937-0237.1704

Anarchist Sociology and the Legacy of Peter Kropotkin

Gary L. Grizzle*

Hasta la fecha, el pensamiento anarquista ha recibido poca atención

en la corriente principal de la sociología debido en gran parte al
fracaso de los estudiosos anarquistas para articular una perspectiva
analítica a la par con las que actualmente definen nuestra disciplina.
Este trabajo sugiere que los puntos de vista del anarquista ruso Pedro
Kropotkin (1842-1921) proporcionan una base útil para el desarrollo
de tal perspectiva. Con ese fin, el autor ofrece una sinopsis de los
puntos de vista de Kropotkin sobre el análisis social; ofrece un marco
analítico anarquista rudimentario derivado de esos puntos de vista;
delinea los méritos más importantes del marco propuesto como base
para la práctica de la sociología; y comentarios sobre el futuro de la
sociología anarquista kropotkiana. [Article copies available for a fee
from The Transformative Studies Institute. E-mail address:
journal@transformativestudies.org Website:
http://www.transformativestudies.org ©2017 by The Transformative
Studies Institute. All rights reserved.]

KEYWORDS: Peter Kropotkin, Anarchist Sociology, Sociological

Theory.

A pesar de la relevancia de sus puntos de vista para la comprensión de la

sociedad, los teóricos anarquistas tuvieron poca influencia en el
desarrollo temprano de las ciencias sociales. Mac Laughlin (1986)
atribuyó esto al hecho de que estas ciencias se establecieron en
instituciones apoyadas por el Estado en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX;
un contexto en el que se asumía que el Estado-nación era a la vez natural
y progresista. En consecuencia, afirmó, las nacientes ciencias sociales
excluyeron a los anarquistas de sus filas, por considerarlos traidores y sus
ideas utópicas. Si bien el desprecio deliberado por los anarquistas y sus
ideas es sin duda menos común hoy en día

*
Gary L. Grizzle has a Ph.D. in Sociology from Northwestern University and is
currently Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Sociology & Criminology, Barry
University. His research interests include marriage and the family, religion, urban myths,

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and anarchist theory. Address correspondence to: Gary Grizzle, Department of Sociology
and Criminology, Barry University, 11300 Northeast Second Avenue, Miami Shores, FL
33161; e-mail: ggrizzle@barry.edu.

1937-0229 ©2017 Transformative Studies Institute

Más que en el pasado, el pensamiento anarquista sigue recibiendo poca
atención en la sociología convencional. Ha habido, sin embargo, dos
notables
intenta poner fin a esta historia de abandono en nuestra disciplina.1
Purkis (2004) comenzó lamentando la continua falta de atención al
pensamiento anarquista por parte de los sociólogos y delineando los
desafíos teóricos, metodológicos e institucionales para su amplio
reconocimiento. Sin embargo, continuó observando que la aparición a
finales del siglo XX del caos y las teorías postestructurales podría ser un
buen augurio para el futuro de este tipo de pensamiento en sociología.
Específicamente, señaló que estas perspectivas analíticas crean espacio
para otras interpretaciones no deterministas y centradas en el poder de los
acontecimientos, incluidas las de los anarquistas. La presencia de este
espacio, junto con la utilidad del pensamiento anarquista para abordar
cuestiones de poder y opresión, llevó a Purkis a proponer que "la
oportunidad de que surja una sociología anarquista en un contexto
contemporáneo no debe ser subestimada" (p. 54).2
Williams y Shantz (2011) reconocieron los esfuerzos de Purkis (2004)
y otros para introducir el pensamiento anarquista en la sociología
convencional, pero encontraron que estos esfuerzos eran deficientes en el
sentido de que "casi siempre están en abstracto, nunca haciendo
referencia a un conjunto específico de ideas o erudición" (p. 10). En un
intento por ayudar a remediar esta situación, estos autores, después de
identificar una serie de formas que la sociología anarquista podría
asumir, propusieron una versión en la que los sociólogos estudian la
libertad, el antiautoritarismo, la acción directa, la ayuda mutua y la
descentralización con miras a aumentar su ocurrencia tanto dentro como
fuera de la sociología. Williams y Shantz reconocieron fácilmente que su
versión de la sociología anarquista no es más que una de las muchas
posibilidades. Sin embargo, lo presentaron como un paso razonable y
oportuno hacia la fusión de las tradiciones anarquistas y sociológicas.
Los trabajos citados anteriormente y sus referentes han contribuido en
gran medida a situar las preocupaciones anarquistas dentro del discurso
sociológico contemporáneo y a comprender cómo podríamos anarquistar
nuestras búsquedas. Dicho esto, para que la sociología anarquista
combine de manera óptima la teoría y la práctica, su crítica del poder y su
erudición politizada deben estar integradas en una perspectiva analítica
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Gary L. Grizzle
integral a la par de las que actualmente definen nuestra disciplina. Si bien
la perspectiva de tal perspectiva está implícita en los trabajos de muchos
académicos anarquistas, y explícita en el trabajo de Williams y Shantz
(2011) quienes la identificaron como una de las formas que la sociología
anarquista podría asumir, es una perspectiva que sigue sin cumplirse.
El propósito de este trabajo es sugerir que los puntos de vista del
anarquista ruso Pedro Kropotkin (1842-1921) proporcionan una base útil
para la sociología anarquista paradigmática a menudo esperada pero aún
no realizada.

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To that end, I will begin with a brief synopsis of Kropotkin’s distinctive

approach to social analysis followed by the delineation of a rudimentary
analytical framework derived from that approach. I will then turn to a
discussion of the most important merits of the proposed framework
before closing with a commentary on the future of Kropotkian anarchist
sociology.

KROPOTKIN’S APPROACH TO SOCIAL ANALYSIS

As an anarchist theorist who was estranged from the social sciences of

his day, Peter Kropotkin did not always present his views in conventional
scholarly formats or forums. On the contrary, he frequently presented
them in regrettably brief booklets, pamphlets, and political tracts.
Nevertheless, a comprehensive approach to social analysis can be
gleaned from Kropotkin’s surviving statements on the goal of social
inquiry, the methodology of social inquiry, human nature, social change,
authority, and anarchism. The following paragraphs will introduce
Kropotkin’s views on each of these issues in turn.

The Goal of Social Inquiry

Peter Kropotkin expressed his views on the goal of social inquiry in his
pamphlet Modern Science and Anarchism (Kropotkin [1903] 2002e). In
this work he proposed that the search for knowledge has proven to be
most successful when it is directed toward achieving specific practical
ends. In keeping with this proposition, Kropotkin identified two
pragmatic objectives for those who study society. The first objective was
to determine “what forms of social life assure to a given society, and then
to mankind generally, the greatest amount of happiness, and hence also
the greatest amount of vitality” (p. 153). The second objective was to
then utilize this knowledge in an effort to “foresee the future steps of
mankind on the road to liberty, equality, and fraternity, with a view to
realizing the greatest sum of happiness for every unit of human society”
(p. 192).
Thus, Kropotkin declared that the goal of social inquiry should be to
contribute to the development of collectively beneficial social
arrangements.

The Methodology of Social Inquiry

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Gary L. Grizzle

Modern Science and Anarchism (Kropotkin [1903] 2002e) also

contains an expression of Peter Kropotkin’s views on the methodology of
social inquiry. Kropotkin began his discussion of this issue by rejecting
the then still resonant metaphysical and dialectical approaches to
knowledge on the grounds that they had contributed nothing to our
understanding of the natural world; knowledge of that world having been
obtained not through metaphysical or dialectical reasoning but through a
process of controlled observation. As Kropotkin’s conception of the
natural world included “the life of human societies and their economic,
political and moral problems” (p. 150), he concluded that those studying
society should employ the same investigative method as other natural
scientists: the scientific-inductive method. While Kropotkin was neither
the only nor the first scholar to promote adoption of the scientific method
by social analysts, he differed from many of his peers and predecessors in
that he cautioned against attempting to identify absolute social laws;
something he felt nineteenth century political economists in particular
were wont to do. This warning was based on his conviction that science
had clearly established that all laws of nature are conditional and can
only take the form: “If certain conditions in nature are at work, certain
things will happen” (p. 179).
Thus, Kropotkin recommended a circumspect form of positivism as the
appropriate methodology for social inquiry.

Human Nature

Peter Kropotkin presented his views on human nature in his book

Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (Kropotkin [1902] N.d.). In this
volume he claimed that natural selection occurs at both the individual and
the species level, a process which results in biological organisms being
endowed with a combination of egocentric and altruistic propensities.
Kropotkin went on to proclaim that, contrary to the teachings of most
evolutionists, the latter propensities are dominant in the overwhelming
majority of species; the only exceptions being the comparatively few
species in which individuals live in isolation from one another. Such is
the case, he explained, because “those species which best know how to
combine, and to avoid competition, have the best chances of survival and
of a further progressive development” (p. 76). It therefore follows,
Kropotkin contended, that altruistic propensities must be particularly
developed in humans owing to their relative defenselessness and
subsequent need to organize collectively; a contention he supported with
a rather extensive account of mutual aid through the ages.
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 Theory in Action

Thus, Kropotkin posited a view of human nature in which the potential

for cooperation is paramount.

Social Change

Peter Kropotkin articulated his views on social change most concisely

in the pamphlet Modern Science and Anarchism (Kropotkin [1903]
2002e). In that seminal work Kropotkin argued that such change has been
driven in large measure by conflict between two ever-present forces. One
force consists of the masses striving to freely develop the institutions
“necessary to make social life at all possible -- to insure peace amongst
men, to settle any disputes that might arise, and to help one another in
everything requiring cooperative effort” (p. 146). The other force consists
of power-seeking minorities determined to establish authority over these
institutions “in order that they might reign over the people, hold them in
subjection, and compel them to work for the masters” (p. 147). Kropotkin
maintained that conflict between these opposing forces has resulted in a
recurring process of social change, a process he described as follows:

Then again it always happened that institutions -- even those

established originally with the object of securing equality, peace and
mutual aid -- in the course of time became petrified, lost their
original meaning, came under the control of the ruling minority, and
became in the end a constraint upon the individual in his endeavors
for further development. Then men would rise against these
institutions (p. 147).

According to Kropotkin, this process found late nineteenth century life

dominated by the State and the church; ruling minority entities the
dictatorial practices of which he found so loathsome that he referred to
them as “the two inveterate enemies of freedom” (p, 169). Once again,
Kropotkin noted, the masses sought to regain their sovereignty, this time
by turning to voluntary associations (worker cooperatives, charitable
foundations, community alliances, and the like) to meet their needs
independent of, and oftentimes in direct opposition to, these entities.
Before long, he asserted, the growth of such associations created a
situation wherein “what formerly belonged without a shadow of doubt to
the functions of the State, or the church, enters now into the domain of
free organization” (p. 169). Kropotkin read this development as a sign
that the masses were making progress in what remains the latest chapter
in their ongoing quest for autonomy.
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Gary L. Grizzle

Thus, Kropotkin proposed that conflict between the sovereigntyminded

masses and power-seeking minorities plays a singular role in the
definition and redefinition of social arrangements.

Authority

Peter Kropotkin volunteered his views on authority in a variety of

formats and forums over the course of his lifetime. In doing so, he
invariably expressed a profound antipathy for authority in all its forms.
This antipathy was based on two convictions.
First, as is evident from his previously cited comments on social
change, Kropotkin was convinced that authority inevitably becomes a
means for promoting the interests of power-seeking minorities over the
welfare of the masses. In his view such had been the case at the hands of
sorcerers, warlords, and monarchs in earlier eras; such was the case at the
hands of State and church functionaries in his era; and such would be the
case at the hands of future usurpers as long as authority exists.
Second, Kropotkin was convinced that the existence of authority gives
rise to humanity’s least praiseworthy potentials. He expressed his
concern regarding the impact of authority on those with access to it most
succinctly when discussing the petty tyranny of prison guards; a tyranny
he attributed to the fact that “you cannot give an individual any authority
without corrupting him. He will abuse it” (Kropotkin [1887] 2002f:227).
He expressed his concern regarding the impact of authority on those
subject to it equally succinctly when he proclaimed: “In a society based
on exploitation and servitude human nature is degraded” (Kropotkin
[1909] 2002c:104).
Thus, Kropotkin deemed authority to be both prone to hegemonic
abuse and inimical to the human spirit.

Anarchism

Peter Kropotkin disseminated his views on anarchism in numerous

works meant to illuminate the principles of that much-maligned political
philosophy. In one such work he suggested that the defining
characteristic of an anarchist society would be that:

All the mutual relations of its members are regulated, not by laws,
not by authorities, whether self-imposed or elected, but by mutual
agreements between the members of that society and by a sum of
social customs and habits—not petrified by law, routine, or
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superstition, but continually developing and continually readjusted

in accordance with the ever-growing requirements of a free life
stimulated by the progress of science, invention, and the steady
growth of higher ideals (Kropotkin [1903] 2002e:157).

In another such work he suggested that a society founded upon the

principles of anarchism would consist of:

An interwoven network, composed of an infinite variety of groups

and federations of all sizes and degrees, local, regional, national and
international -- temporary or more or less permanent -- for all
possible purposes: production, consumption and exchange,
communications, sanitary arrangements, education, mutual
protection, defense of the territory, and so on; and, on the other side,
for the satisfaction of an ever-increasing number of scientific,
artistic, literary and sociable needs (Kropotkin [1905] 2002a:284).

In short, Peter Kropotkin described an anarchist society as one in

which institutional authority has been abolished and all social
arrangements are the product of mutual agreements established within
and between an ever-changing assortment of voluntary associations of
every size and purpose. In response to vociferous critics who insisted that
a society without authority is doomed to failure, Kropotkin offered the
following observations.
First, mutual agreements would be a sufficient basis for social
organization. In fact, he noted, the anthropological record indicates that
for millennia humans lived in complex societies in which relations were
not governed by authority. Rather, they were regulated by “customs,
habits and usages, made sacred by constant repetition, and acquired by
each person in childhood, exactly as he learned how to obtain his food by
hunting, cattle-rearing, or agriculture” (Kropotkin [1886] 2002d:201) —
regulatory practices the likes of which have, he claimed, resurfaced
whenever and wherever the masses have managed to escape the clutches
of power-seeking minorities.
Second, mutual agreements would be an efficient basis for social
organization. Indeed, he suggested, in a society regulated through such
agreements social arrangements would be far more efficient than they are
under authoritarian forms in that they would “result from an
everchanging adjustment and readjustment of equilibrium between the
multitudes of forces and influences, and this adjustment would be the

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Gary L. Grizzle

easier to obtain as none of the forces would enjoy a special protection”

(Kropotkin [1905] 2002a:284).
Last, mutual agreements would be a liberating basis for social
organization. That is, he declared, in a society regulated through such
agreements the individual would enjoy more freedom than is conceivable
under authoritarian forms in that “the liberty of the individual will be
limited by no laws, no bonds – by nothing else but his own social habits
and the necessity, which everyone feels, of finding cooperation, support,
and sympathy among his neighbors” (Kropotkin [1899] 2002b:63).
Thus, Kropotkin championed anarchism as a viable and desirable
alternative to authoritarian social forms.
The preceding synthesis, culled from his lifework as an anarchist
activist and scholar, reveals that Peter Kropotkin bequeathed the
ingredients for a social theory not unlike those of the most esteemed
theorists in the current pantheon of sociologists. Reminiscent of those
theorists, Kropotkin identified a signature: (1) agenda for social analysts;
(2) methodology for social analysis; (3) ontology of the social world; (4)
theory of social dynamics; and (5) ideal social form toward which
humanity should strive. The following section seeks to delineate a
rudimentary anarchist analytical framework derived from this bequest.

THE FRAMEWORK

The essentials of an anarchist sociology rooted in the views of Peter

Kropotkin can be encapsulated in five basic postulates. Those postulates
are as follows.
Sociology is an ameliorative discipline. The goal of sociology is to
contribute to the development of collectively beneficial social
arrangements. Therefore, sociologists should critically evaluate social
practices in terms of their impact on the common good and thereby seek
to envision potential pathways to collective prosperity.
Social laws are always conditional. The nature and dynamics of social
arrangements are peculiar to the conditions under which they occur.
Therefore, sociologists should eschew abstract theories in favor of
treatments that take the form: Under these specific circumstances the
workings of this particular social practice are as follows.
Authority is never benign. Authority is unnecessary, prone to
hegemonic abuse, and inimical to the human spirit. Therefore,
sociologists should consider authority in all its forms to be a gratuitous
and pernicious imposition on the sovereignty of the population under its

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domain and its presence to be a defining characteristic of the contexts in

which it is found.
Antiauthoritarianism is ubiquitous. Throughout history the masses
have sought to meet their needs and purposes through freely developed
institutions and have consistently repudiated authoritarian entities and
their practices. Therefore, sociologists should consider
antiauthoritarianism to be a significant and ever-present influence on the
nature and dynamics of social arrangements.
Anarchism is feasible. Mutual agreements are a sufficient, efficient,
liberating, and historically familiar means for regulating collective
activity. Therefore, sociologists should consider anarchism to be a
practicable basis for social order.

The Merits of the Proposed Framework

The theoretical expression of Peter Kropotkin’s views proffered in the

previous section should be of some interest to a wide range of
sociologists in that it represents a potentially worthy addition to the
analytical perspectives that currently dominate mainstream sociology; an
addition notable for both its unique thematic implications and its
faithfulness to a number of our discipline’s most commendable practices.
The ensuing paragraphs will address the most important merits of the
proposed framework beginning with the identification of some heretofore
underexplored lines of inquiry that it would introduce into contemporary
sociological discourse.
The problematization of authority. This framework maintains that
authority in all its forms is a gratuitous and pernicious imposition on the
sovereignty of the population under its domain. If this is the case,
sociologists need to abandon their normalization of authority. That is,
sociologists need to abandon the notion that authority is vital to the
maintenance of social harmony as Hobbes and his intellectual
descendants would have it, as well as the notion that authority is a
conceivably innocuous basis for social organization as Durkheim, Marx,
Weber, and legions of contemporary sociologists would seemingly have
it. The prevalence of these two notions has resulted in a mainstream
sociology that, while it oftentimes scrutinizes select authoritarian entities
and their dictates (governmental policies, church dogmas, organizational
procedures, and the like), rarely scrutinizes the existence of authority
itself. The proposed framework suggests that our discipline would
therefore benefit from a reconsideration of its remarkably benevolent
approach to authority.
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Gary L. Grizzle

The parsing of social structures. This framework asserts that as a

gratuitous and pernicious imposition on the sovereignty of the population
under its domain, the presence of authority is a defining characteristic of
the contexts in which it is found. If this is the case, sociologists need to
make a qualitative distinction between what we might call — based upon
Kropotkin’s depictions — authoritarian and egalitarian structures, with
the former characterized by hierarchical practices and the latter
characterized by collegial practices. This distinction would be useful in
that it would introduce a dichotomization of social structures that would
add a new dimension to many sociological typologies resulting in
additional but empty cells in some instances (when all included structures
are authoritarian as would be the case with typologies of the State, for
example) and additional populated cells in other instances (when some
included structures are authoritarian and some are egalitarian as would be
the case with typologies of religion, for example) thereby illuminating
similarities between structures oftentimes treated as unlike entities and
differences between structures oftentimes treated as like entities. In
addition, this distinction would provide analytical direction for our
treatments of the newly classified social structures in that it would call
for all authoritarian structures (wherein order is imposed) to be
approached from conflict oriented perspectives and all egalitarian
structures (wherein order is freely negotiated) to be approached from
functionalist oriented perspectives, irrespective of any other qualities
they may or may not have in common. 3 Attendant upon the previous
points, this distinction would expose the potential perils of conflating
egalitarian and authoritarian forms in our scholarly endeavors, there
being perhaps less essential continuity between many broadly grouped
structures (clans and nuclear families, aboriginal religions and churches,
or Protestantism and Catholicism, for example) than is sometimes
assumed. None of this is meant to suggest that existing constructs and
analyses should be categorically dismissed. However, the proposed
framework does suggest that our discipline would benefit from more
careful consideration of the impact of authority on the nature and
dynamics of social structures and the implications of this impact for its
treatment of such structures; past, present, and future.
Antiauthoritarianism as a social force. This framework posits that
antiauthoritarianism is a significant and ever-present influence on the
nature and dynamics of social arrangements. If this is the case,
sociologists need to recognize the importance of this disposition as a
force in contemporary society. We know that this disposition is operative
in some contexts as scholars have noted the presence of antiauthoritarian
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sentiments in female asexuality (Fahs 2010); alternative sexual identities

(Carr 1999); transient populations (Amster 1999); Amish culture (Foster
1997); popular culture (Purkis and Bowen 2004); progressive educational
philosophies (Gribble 2004); feminism (Kornegger 1979); queer politics
(Shepard 2012); contemporary social movements (Epstein 2001;
Goaman 2004; Graeber 2002; Morland 2004; Pallister-Wilkins 2009;
Turner 1998); conservative beliefs in America (Davis 1947; Lipset 1955;
Lownde 2002); and the American ethos itself (DeLeon 1978). 4 In
addition, we have some evidence that this disposition might be reshaping
existing institutions as other scholars have noted a diminishing
recognition of institutional authority in families (Thornton and
YoungDeMarco 2001); religions (Chaves 1994); and healthcare settings
(Timmermans and Oh 2010). While the preceding works are largely
descriptive and do not fully explore the prevalence, vitality, or influence
of antiauthoritarianism in the contexts they describe, much less in society
as a whole, they do at least suggest its presence and its potential as a
catalyst for social change. The proposed framework suggests that our
discipline would therefore benefit from greater and more exacting
consideration of the role that antiauthoritarianism has played, and more
importantly continues to play, in shaping identities, families,
organizations, religions, politics, and countless other cultural
manifestations.
The promise of anarchism. This framework contends that anarchism is
a practicable basis for social order. If this is the case, sociologists need to
recognize free organization as a viable means for regulating
contemporary collective life and hence reconsider the exaltation of the
State so often found in our discourses — an exaltation exemplified in
Blau’s (2007) pronouncement that: “Only governments can ensure,
through laws and policies, the provision of universal public goods, such
as a safe supply of water, affordable health care and housing” (p. 1074). 5
Williams and Shantz (2011) suggested that evidence of the feasibility of
free organization as an alternative to the State and other authoritarian
entities can be found in past and present voluntary associations which
have met the needs of their memberships through unfettered mutual
agreements: associations such as guilds, mutual aid societies, self-help
groups, neighborhood watches, and hobby clubs. While these and other
anarchist scholars, including Kropotkin, have been regrettably vague
regarding the intricacies of free organization on a global scale (nebulous
references to federations of voluntary associations being the norm) their
work does at least suggest that collective needs can be met in the absence
of authoritarian forms. The proposed framework suggests that our
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Gary L. Grizzle

discipline would therefore benefit from further consideration of the

possibility that we can order our relations — from the interpersonal to the
international — through free organization.6
Although there are likely additional (though perhaps lesser) thematic
implications of the proposed anarchist framework, the preceding should
suffice to demonstrate that one merit of this framework is that it would
introduce novel approaches to authority, social structures, social
dynamics, and social possibilities into mainstream sociology; approaches
that would augment, and in many cases challenge, our current
understandings of myriad structures and processes.
As noted earlier, the proffered theoretical expression of Peter
Kropotkin’s views is notable not only for its unique thematic
implications, but for its faithfulness to a number of our discipline’s most
commendable practices as well. Foremost among those practices are the
following.
Critical analysis. This framework calls for sociologists to critically
evaluate social practices in terms of their impact on the common good;
an approach to social analysis that was prevalent from the nineteenth
through the early part of the twentieth century but one that is far less
pervasive today. This is not to deny the existence of critical sociology, or
to suggest that the works of other contemporary sociologists have no
critical implications, or even to imply that there hasn’t been some
movement in this direction in recent years. Rather, this is simply to note
that value-laden sociology is still marginalized to the point that one can
read article after article in the journals that currently define our discipline
without encountering a work which takes an overtly judgmental stand on
the issue under consideration no matter how abhorrent that issue might
be.7 This state of affairs, however useful for legitimating sociology as a
science, effectively renders its practitioners “morally adrift” to borrow a
fitting term from Mills (1959). Therefore, another merit of the proposed
framework is its commitment to our discipline’s morally engaged roots.
Imaginative thinking. This framework calls for sociologists to not only
critically evaluate social practices but to utilize the results of such
evaluations as a basis for envisioning potential pathways to collective
prosperity, one of which, it argues, is anarchism. While this visionary
approach to social analysis was commonplace among early social
thinkers, it is an approach that is far less common today. This is certainly
not to suggest that the works of contemporary sociologists are irrelevant
to envisioning a better future. Nor is it to ignore the efforts of some
advocates of a public sociology to move our discipline in this direction.
Rather, this is simply to note that examination of our most prestigious
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journals reveals that they continue to show little interest in — and

thereby continue to marginalize — works that overtly address what Mills
(1959) identified as one of the essential questions that social scientists
should be endeavoring to answer: “What are now the possible futures of
human affairs?” (p. 174). Therefore, an additional merit of the proposed
framework is its recognition of the centrality of the sociological
imagination to our calling.
Analytical contextuality. This framework calls for sociologists to
approach their subject matter with the recognition that nature and
dynamics of social arrangements are peculiar to the conditions under
which they occur; a recognition that would direct attention to the
historical, structural, and motivational particulars of the milieu under
consideration. And, as Mills (1959) noted, attention to such particulars
would result in analyses that avoid the respective pitfalls of what he
termed grand theory and abstracted empiricism; orientations to
sociological analysis the legacies of which persist to this day, albeit with
grand theories being a good bit less grand and abstracted empiricism
incorporating a wider range of methodologies. Therefore, a further merit
of the proposed framework is its emphasis on contextualized
theorization.
Analytical inclusivity. This framework calls for sociologists to embrace
a wide range of analytical strategies. To begin with, it calls for
sociologists to utilize conflict orientations and their methodologies under
some conditions (when addressing structures governed by authority) and
functionalist orientations and their methodologies under other conditions
(when addressing structures regulated through mutual agreements). In
addition, with its emphasis on the fluidity of social order which
characterizes free organization at all levels, this framework would be
amenable to interactionist perspectives and their methodologies as well.
Consequently, sociologists who adopt this framework would follow in the
footsteps of the classic social scientists whom Mills (1959) lauded for
their conviction that “methods are methods for some range of problems;
theories are theories of some range of phenomena” (p. 121). Therefore, a
final merit of the proposed framework for the purpose of this work is its
openness to a diversity of analytical possibilities.

THE FUTURE OF KROPOTKIAN ANARCHIST SOCIOLOGY

Thus far I have presented a rudimentary analytical framework derived

from the views of the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin in order to
demonstrate that those views provide a useful foundation for the oft
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Gary L. Grizzle

anticipated but as yet unrealized paradigmatic anarchist sociology; a

foundation that would introduce a number of heretofore underexplored
themes into mainstream sociology while moving our discipline closer to
the methodical humanistic sociology envisioned by Mills (1959). I
realize, however, that this or any other analytical framework rooted in the
views of Kropotkin will encounter skepticism on the part of
contemporary sociologists as those views were conceived and
promulgated outside of conventional academic circles and in a world far
different from our own. Such skepticism will no doubt be exacerbated by
the fact that I have been able to marshal only minimal empirical support
for those views and their implications — a shortcoming that is not
particularly surprising given the persistent neglect of anarchist thought in
the social sciences. In any event, sociologists are likely to raise a number
of concerns regarding the validity of Kropotkin’s views and their
relevance to our contemporary context. The remainder of this work seeks
to first anticipate and then briefly speak to the most important such
concerns.
One likely concern regarding Kropotkin’s views would be that they
exaggerate the gratuitousness and perniciousness of authority. After all,
some scholars might argue, the masses have at times been less than
proficient and far from munificent in their attempts to establish and
maintain order through freely developed institutions, thus creating the
need for some form of intercession. Such scholars might also argue that
any ill effects of authority — hegemonic abuse, egoism, servility — are
more indicative of its violability than its inescapable malevolence.
A second likely concern regarding Kropotkin’s views would be that
they inflate the differences between what I have called egalitarian and
authoritarian structures. Thus, some scholars might echo Dahrendorf’s
(1958) claim that in all social structures there exist superordinate and
subordinate positions the presence of which result in an inherent (if
sometimes dormant) basis for conflict and coercion, thereby rendering all
structures authoritarian to some degree.
A third likely concern regarding Kropotkin’s views would be that they
presume antiauthoritarianism to be far more prevalent and influential
than it is, or ever has been. Hence, some scholars might note that neither
Kropotkin nor anyone else has documented that this disposition has been
widespread in any society, past or present. Such scholars might also note
that finding antiauthoritarianism operative in select contexts such as
those cited earlier in this work is not a sound basis for concluding that it
constitutes a significant social force.

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A final likely concern regarding Kropotkin’s views for the purposes of

this work would be that they overestimate the practicability of anarchism
in our contemporary context. Accordingly, some scholars might point out
that the examples of successful voluntary associations provided by
Kropotkin and other anarchists are too dated and/or limited in scope to
constitute convincing evidence that a network of such associations can
feasibly negotiate order in our increasingly complex, contentious, and (as
many students of postmodernism would have it) depthless world.8
All of the foregoing concerns are entirely reasonable and warrant
carefully vetted responses. Unfortunately, we are currently not in a
position to offer such responses because neither anarchist scholars nor
their detractors have compiled a body of evidence suitable for answering
these misgivings, leaving us with little more than plausible extrapolations
and conjectures on both sides of the issues under consideration. Given
this state of affairs, we need to carefully scrutinize each of these issues
before we can pass judgement on the usefulness of Kropotkin’s views as
the basis for an analytical perspective in contemporary sociology. More
precisely, we need to do the following.
We need to examine the notion that authority is both unnecessary and
malevolent. That is, we need to examine the extent to which: (1) past and
present populations have effectively and humanely met their needs
through free organization (effectively and humanely in comparison to
populations ruled by authoritarian entities at any rate); (2) authority
routinely becomes a means for advancing the interests of those with
access to it at the expense of those subject to it; and (3) authority
promotes the expression of humankind’s less admirable potentials in the
contexts in which it is exercised. Ultimately, we need to determine
whether one can make the case that the existence of authority needlessly
fosters minority privilege at the expense of collective well-being. The
results of our examinations would then serve as a basis for appraising
Kropotkin’s condemnation of all forms of authority.
We need to explore the notion that there is a useful distinction to be
made between what I have called egalitarian and authoritarian structures.
Specifically, we need to search for evidence that there have been and,
more importantly, continue to be structures in which participation and
compliance are meaningfully voluntary, thus distinguishing them from
the authoritarian forms we know to exist. In searching for such evidence,
it will be important that we differentiate between guidance (wherein
followership is granted) and authority (wherein followership is exacted)
lest we mistake leadership for tyranny. 9 Essentially, we need to determine
whether or not genuinely egalitarian structures exist either because they
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Gary L. Grizzle

lack superordinate positions or because such positions lack the

supremacy of authority. The results of our explorations would then serve
as a basis for evaluating Kropotkin’s partitioning of social structures.
We need to investigate the notion that antiauthoritarianism is a robust
force in contemporary society. Most importantly, we need to measure
both how widespread this disposition is and how large a role it plays in
the day-to-day choices of citizens: choices regarding personal
relationships, organizational affiliations, religious practices, political
pursuits, and so on. In doing so, it will be critical that we distinguish
between antiauthoritarianism per se and alienation, anomy, or any other
identifiable social condition — distinctions that have historically been
given disappointingly short shrift by anarchist scholars — lest we
mistake malady for agency.10 In other words, we need to determine the
extent to which antiauthoritarianism constitutes a discrete and vital
motivational force in society. The results of our investigations would then
serve as a basis for judging Kropotkin’s claims regarding the
sovereignty-mindedness of the masses and its potential to shape social
life.
Finally, we need to assess the notion that anarchism is a practicable
alternative to authoritarian forms. To that end, we need to envisage a
world in which a network of voluntary associations regulates collective
life through unfettered mutual agreements and compare that imagined
world to the known world of authoritarian forms. The anarchist sociology
of William and Shantz (2011) provides a promising agenda for
accomplishing this task with its emphasis on studying contexts in which
people have successfully maintained freedom, practiced
antiauthoritarianism, engaged in direct action, provided mutual aid, and
embraced decentralization. Through the implementation of this agenda
we might develop a model of modern free organization that can be used
to assess the likelihood that we can effectively organize our families;
satisfy our physical, spiritual, and intellectual needs; protect ourselves
from those who wish us harm; and respect our differences; all in the
absence of authoritarian bodies and practices. The results of our
assessment would then serve as a basis for weighing Kropotkin’s
assertions regarding the viability and desirability of anarchism.
In sum, while this work hopefully belies Carter’s (1971) claim that
anarchist thought suffers from the “lack of any outstanding theoretical
exponent” (p. 1), there is admittedly much to be done before we can
confidently pursue a Kropotkian anarchist sociology — much to be done
before we can confidently problematize authority and define social
structures based upon its presence or absence, examine the ways in which
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antiauthoritarianism shapes social arrangements at every level, and begin

to realize the possibilities of free organization. Even so, we can take
solace in the fact that we already possess a plethora of information
pertinent to the proposed inquiries, albeit strewn across a range of
disciplines and subject areas. Such information can be found in classical
sociological works; historical accounts; ethnographies; cultural studies;
organizational analyses; surveys; interviews; and, of course, theoretical
and empirical treatments of the dynamics of authority (many of the most
important of which, it might be noted, were produced by social
psychologists in the middle of the twentieth century) to name but a few
of our most promising sources. This existing information will
undoubtedly need to be supplemented by new and better targeted studies,
but it nonetheless constitutes a useful starting point for a research agenda
that promises to contribute to this and myriad other sociological
discourses.
In closing, I want to emphasize that while I recognize the provisional
nature of the foregoing and the lamentably inescapable need for
painstaking research along the lines just described, I do so not owing to a
lack of confidence in Peter Kropotkin’s views or in the proposed
anarchist framework as a preliminary theoretical expression of those
views. Rather, I do so in recognition of the primitive state of anarchist
studies in sociology and the failure of anarchist scholars to empirically
verify the fundamental precepts of even their most comprehensive social
theorist: a failure that has no doubt contributed greatly to the virtual
invisibility of anarchist thought in our discipline today. The need for such
verification was certainly not lost on Kropotkin who once said of
anarchism: “Its method of investigation is that of the exact natural
sciences, and, if it pretends to be scientific, every conclusion it comes to
must be verified by the method by which every scientific conclusion
must be verified” (Kropotkin [1903] 2002e:150). If this work results in
even a modest number of sociologists participating in the proposed
verification process; augmenting the proffered expression of Kropotkin’s
views; pursuing alternative anarchist analytical frameworks; or merely
according anarchist thought and its implications more careful
consideration, it will have served its purpose.

ENDNOTES
1
El Oxford Dictionary of Sociology (Scott y Gordon 2009) proporcionó
una descripción adecuada de la historia del pensamiento anarquista en
sociología cuando señaló: "Los sociólogos han ignorado o criticado en
gran medida la filosofía anarquista, sin embargo, alberga toda una
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Gary L. Grizzle

tradición de organización social y una teoría sistemática de cómo

funcionan las sociedades" (p. 21). número arábigo
For a kindred attempt to position anarchist thought in anthropology, see
Graeber (2004). 3
Kropotkin himself was no stranger to functional analysis, at least when
it came to societies unencumbered by authority. In fact, in his book
Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (Kropotkin [1902] N.d.) he depicted a
number of practices in early egalitarian societies as functional responses
to collective needs. Among the practices so depicted were communal
feasts, the ceremonial redistribution of wealth, and ritualized suicide. 4
Williams and Shantz (2011) suggested that the mistrust of major
institutions in the West revealed in decades of survey research is evidence
of a pervasive, if inarticulate, antiauthoritarianism. However, given that
such mistrust is open to a range of alternative interpretations, it
warraPara un intento afín de posicionar el pensamiento anarquista en la
antropología, véase Graeber (2004).nts only passing mention in this
context. 5
Other striking examples of the exaltation of the State can be found in
the more bristling reactions to Burawoy’s (2004, 2005) vision of public
sociology: a vision that has been taken to task for, among other things, its
failure to recognize the State as a viable means for realizing social
change (Brint 2005); its failure to recognize the State as a necessary
means for realizing social change (Etzioni 2006; Turner 2005); and its
outright demonization of the State (Brady 2004). Examples of more
implicit exaltation of the State can be found in a long line of treatments
of electoral participation which define low voter turnout as pathological
and which characterize nonvoters as little more than an alienated (though
sometimes significant) minority (Dean 1960; Hastings 1956; Horton and
Thompson 1962; Olsen 1969; Southwell 2008; Thompson and Horton
1960). Such exaltation is of course also evident in our ongoing
inattention to anarchist thought and its implications. 6
It is interesting to observe that, while clearly no anarchist himself,
Durkheim was also mindful of the importance of free organization. In
fact, in his vision of organic solidarity he prioritized the role of such
organization, in the form of voluntary associations of employers and
workers, over the State with regard to the regulation of economic matters,
having noted that: “Political society as a whole, or the state, clearly
cannot discharge this function. Economic life, because it is very special
and is daily becoming increasingly specialized, lies outside their
authority and sphere of action” (Durkheim [1893] 1984:xxxv). 7

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For a particularly telling example of this penchant for nonjudgmental

analysis of even the most heinous issues, see Campbell (2009) who had
the following to say regarding genocide: “Classifying genocide as a type
of deviance, then, if it does not replace social science with evaluation,
obscures its moralistic nature” (p. 151). His finer point being that
genocide occurs “not when moral evaluations are disregarded by its
perpetrators, but when they are present and applied. Genocide is
moralistic, then, and can be explained with a theory of social control” (p.
151). Campbell then presented a convincing treatment of genocide as a
form of social control; a convincing treatment of deliberate and
astounding moral disinterestedness. 8
Kropotkin’s views on the goals and methods of social analysis, while
less commonly embraced today than they once were, seem unlikely to be
the primary basis for someone rejecting the proposed anarchist analytical
framework, I have therefore chosen to omit discussion of the concerns
that some contemporary sociologists might have regarding those views. 9
The importance of this distinction can be seen in reference to the
traditional rabbit hunt of the Northern Paiute, for instance. Such hunts
were directed by “rabbit bosses” who were “bosses” in the sense that
they directed the hunt but perhaps lacked authority in the sense that no
one was compelled to join the hunt or to remain in the hunt once they had
joined. In addition, rabbit bosses had no more influence than anyone else
in other realms of collective life (which had their own “bosses”) and they
were readily replaced if their hunting prowess came into question. See
Steward and Wheeler-Voegelin (1974) for a discussion of social
organization among this population. 10
One seldom recognized social condition that might be mistaken for
antiauthoritarianism is the petulant and theatrical narcissism that Lasch
(1979) saw emerging in the latter half of the twentieth century and that
seems all the more pervasive today; a condition that has little to do with
commitment to enduring principles of any kind.

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