Possible Complete Digest of Labor

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SUBMITTED TO:
ATTY. PORFIRIO PANGANIBAN

ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
LABOR LAW REFRESHER
2021-2022
FRIDAY 6-9 PM
SUBMITTED BY:
THOMMY L. OIDE
I.D. No.: R001-2021
LABOR REFRESHER
FRIDAY 6-9 PM
CASE DIGEST IN LABOR
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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CASE TITLES PAGE

NO.
I. 2019 CASES
1. Dominic Inocentes, Jeffrey Inocentes, Joseph Cornelio and 10

Reymark Catangui, vs. R. Syjuco Construction, Inc., G.R. No.
237020, July 29, 2019.
2. TELEPHILIPPINES, INC., v. Ferrando H. Jacolbe, G.R. No. 11

233999, February 18, 2019
II. 2018 Cases
3. PRINCESS TALENT CENTER PRODUCTION, INC., and/or 13

Luchi Singh Moldes, vs. Desiree T. Masagca, G.R. No. 191310,
April 11, 2018.
4. Laya, vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018) 14
5. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram, G.R. No. 17730, 16

June 5, 2017
6. Retirement (Laya, vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 17
2018)
7. Redundancy (American Power Conversion Corporation vs. Lim, 19

G.R. No. 214291, January 11, 2018)
8. Employment contract (De Roca vs. Dabuyan, et al., G.R. No. 21

215281, March 5, 2018)
9. FASAP Case: Retrenchment (G.R. No. 178083/A.M. No. 11- 22

10-1-SC, March 13, 2018)
III. 2017 Cases
10. Employer-Employee Relationship (Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs.

Puedan, G.R. No. 220617, January 30, 2017) 25
11. Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No.

206390, January 30, 2017 26
11. Lu vs. Enopia, G.R. No. 197899, March 6, 2017 27

12. Lu vs. Enopia, G.R. No. 197899, March 6, 2017
Page 3 of 111
29
13. Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa
Suyapa Farm (Namasufa-Naflu-Kmu), G.R. No. 202091, June 7, 31
2017
14. Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No.

206390, January 30, 2017 32
15. Maula vs. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., G.R. No. 207838,
January 25, 2017 33
16. Bravo vs. Urios College (Now Father Saturnino Urios
University), G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017
35
17. BDO Unibank, Inc. vs. Nerbes, G.R. No. 208735, July 19, 2017
18. Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM-Katipunan, 36

G.R. No. 221493, August 2, 2017
19. BDO Unibank, Inc. vs. Nerbes, G.R. No. 208735, July 19, 2017 37
38
21. Maula vs. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., G.R. No. 207838,
January 25, 2017
40
22. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. Crown Ship management Inc.
vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 199977, January 25, 2017
41
23. Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc., and Maersk Co. IOM Ltd. vs.
Ramos, G.R. No. 184256, January 18, 2017
41
25. Hoegh Fleet Services Phils., Inc., vs. Turallo, G.R. No. 230481, 43
July 26, 2017
26. Atienza vs. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., et al., G.R.
44
No. 191049, August 7, 2017
27. Status Maritime Corporation and Admibros Ship management

Co., Ltd. vs. Doctolero, G.R. No. 198968, January 18, 2017 45
28. Caderao vs. Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al./Senator

Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al. vs. Caderao, G.R. No. 224532/G.R. No. 46
224565, June 21, 2017
29. Hoegh Fleet Services Phils., Inc., vs. Turallo, G.R. No. 230481, 46
July 26, 2017
Page 4 of 111
30. TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. vs. Patino, G.R. No. 210289, March
20, 2017 48
31. Aldaba vs. Career Philippines, Ship management, Inc., Columbia

Ship management Ltd., and/or Verlou Carmelito, G.R. No. 218842,
June 21, 2017 49
32. Gomez vs. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 220002,
August 2, 2017 50
33.Jebsens Maritime, Inc., et al. vs. Rapiz, G.R. No. 218871. January
11, 2017 51
34. Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., G.R. No.
212098, July 26, 2017
35. Perea vs. Elburg Ship management Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. 52
No. 206178, August 9, 2017
36.Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., G.R. No. 53

212098, July 26, 2017
37. TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. vs. Patino, G.R. No. 210289, March 54
20, 2017
38. Caderao vs. Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al./Senator 55

Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al. vs. Caderao, G.R. No. 224532/G.R. No.
224565, June 21, 2017
56
39.North Sea Marine Services Corporation vs. Enriquez, G.R. No.
201806, August 14, 2017
57
40. Maunlad Trans Inc., Carnival Cruise Lines vs. Isidro, G.R. No.
222699, July 24, 2017
41. TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. vs. Patino, G.R. No. 210289, March 58
20, 2017
42. Gomez vs. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 220002,
August 2, 2017 59
43. C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., Fr.

Romeo Nimez, CICM vs. Perez, G.R. No. 220506, January 18, 2017 60
44. United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. vs. Valmores, G.R. No. 201018,
July 12, 2017 61

University), G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017 62

Page 5 of 111
Romeo Nimez, CICM vs. Perez, G.R. No. 220506, January 18, 2017 63

Romeo Nimez, CICM vs. Perez, G.R. No. 220506, January 18, 2017
64
48. Turks Shawarma Company vs. Pajaron, G.R. No. 207156.
January 16, 2017
65
49. Barsolo vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 187950. January
11, 2017
66
50. Grieg Philippines, Inc. Grieg Shipping Group vs. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 228296, July 26, 2017
51. Barsolo vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 187950. January 67
11, 2017
52. Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. vs. Heirs of Ganal, G.R. No.
220168, June 7, 2017 68
220168, June 7, 2017 68
54. Seapower Shipping, Ent., Inc. vs. Heirs of Warren M. Sabanal,

69
G.R. No. 198544, June 19, 2017
220168, June 7, 2017 71
No. 191049, August 7, 2017 72
57. Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No.

213137, March 1, 2017 73
58. Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No.

213137, March 1, 2017
74
59. Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017
60. Cosue vs. Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, et al., 75

G.R. No. 230664, July 24, 2017
61. Brown vs. Marswin Marketing, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 206981, 75
March 15, 2017
62. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. vs. Grave, G.R. No. 196650, 76
June 7, 2017
Page 6 of 111
63. Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. vs. Tanguin, G.R. No. 221096, June 28, 77
2017
64. Nueva Ecija II Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. vs. Mapagu, G.R. 78
No. 196084, February 15, 2017
79
65. Javines vs. Xlibris a.k.a. Author Solutions, Inc., G.R. No.
214301, June 7, 2017
79
212098, July 26, 2017
80
67. Genpact Services, Inc. vs. Santosfalceso, G.R. No. 227695, July
31, 2017
68. Adtel, Inc. vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017 81
69. Sta. Ana vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., G.R. No. 208459,
February 15, 2017 82
70. Panaligan vs. Phyvita Enterprises Corporation, G.R. No. 202086,

June 21, 2017 83
71. PJ Lhuillier, Inc. vs. Camacho, G.R. No. 223073, February 22,
2017 85

University), G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017 85
73. E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) vs. Ando, G.R. No. 214183, February 20,
2017 86
74. Herma Shipyard, Inc. vs. Oliveros, G.R. No. 208936, April 17, 87
2017
75. E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) vs. Ando, G.R. No. 214183, February 20, 87
2017
76. E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) vs. Ando, G.R. No. 214183, February 20,
88
2017
77. De La Salle Araneta University vs. Bernardom, G.R. No.

90
190809, February 13, 2017
78.De La Salle Araneta University vs. Bernardom, G.R. No. 190809,

February 13, 2017 91
79. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram, G.R. No.

217730, June 5, 2017 92
Page 7 of 111
80. Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017 94
81.Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017

95
82. Madridejos vs. Nyk-Fil Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No.
204262, June 7, 2017
96
212098, July 26, 2017
97
No. 191049, August 7, 2017
99
85. Romana vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 192442,
August 9, 2017
100
86. Ambassador Hotel, Inc. vs. Social Security System, G.R. No.
194137, June 21, 2017
102
87. Zambrano vs. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing
Corporation/Pacific Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. 103
No. 224099, June 21, 2017
88. Philippine National Bank vs. Dalmacio/ Dalmacio vs. Philippine 104
National Bank, G.R. No. 202308/G.R. No. 202357, July 5, 2017

G.R. No. 230664, July 24, 2017

G.R. No. 230664, July 24, 2017
91. United Polyresins, Inc. vs. Pinuela, G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 106
2017
92. Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM-Katipunan, 107

G.R. No. 221493, August 2, 2017
93. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. Crown Shipmanagement Inc.

vs. De Leon, G.R. No. 199977, January 25, 2017 108
94. Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of

Management Faculty Association, G.R. No. 207971, January 23,
2017 109
95. De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. vs. Bigkis Manggagawa sa

De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc., G.R. No. 192648, March 15, 110
2017
96. Chateu Royale Sports and Country Club, Inc. vs. Balba, G.R. No. 112
Page 8 of 111
197492, January 18, 2017
97. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services 113

Corporation, G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017
98. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services 114

Corporation, G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017
99. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services

Corporation, G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017 115
101. Philippine National Bank vs. Dalmacio/ Dalmacio vs. Philippine 115
Ramos, G.R. No. 184256, January 18, 2017 116
103. Javines vs. Xlibris a.k.a. Author Solutions, Inc., G.R. No.
214301, June 7, 2017
118
118
106. Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017 119
107. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. vs. Grave, G.R. No. 196650,
June 7, 2017 120
108. Ibon vs. Genghis Khan Security Services and/or Marietta 120
Vallespin, G.R. No. 221085, June 19, 2017
109. Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. vs. Tanguin, G.R. No. 221096, June 28,
2017 121
110. Andres vs. Diamon H Marine Services & Shipping Agency,

Inc., et al., G.R. No. 217345, July 12, 2017 122
111. Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., et al. vs. Cual, G.R. No.
207684, July 17, 2017 123
124
125
125
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127
128
128
130
I. 2019 CASES
a. Regular and project employee; distinguished, Burden to prove project employment;
Termination; Valid cause and observance of due process. DOMINIC INOCENTES,
JEFFREY INOCENTES, JOSEPH CORNELIO AND REYMARK
CATANGUI, vs. R. SYJUCO CONSTRUCTION, INC. (RSCI) / ARCH.
RYAN I. SYJUCO, G.R. No. 237020, July 29, 2019.
FACTS: Petitioners Dominic, Reymark, Jeffrey, and Joseph filed a complaint against R. Syjuco
Construction, Inc. (RSCI) and its owner, Ryan Syjuco claimed that RSCI, a construction
corporation, employed them as construction workers with shifts from 7PM to 7AM every night.
Despite this work circumstance, they purportedly never received night differential, overtime pay,
rest day pay, service incentive leave pay, ECOLA, 13th month pay as well as holiday premium
pay; and, neither did they receive the mandated minimum wage. Also, that for more than a year,
they worked for respondents on a no-work-no-pay basis. Respondents countered, in their
Position Paper, that they engaged petitioners in 2009 Dominic and Reymark, in 2010 Jeffrey, and
in 2012 Joseph as carpenters. They asserted that petitioners were under project employment and
that they did not work continuously because their assignments depended on the availability of
projects. In their Reply, petitioners denied having to work for respondents on a project basis.
They claim that respondents did not present any employment contract evidencing that
petitioner’s work was coterminous with any project that respondents contracted. Also, they said
that respondents did not report to the DOLE the termination of their supposed project
employment. Petitioners remained firm that they were regular employees and that they were
terminated without any valid cause and without observance of due process of law. LA rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal but nevertheless ordered RSCI to pay all
petitioners the underpayment of salaries, overtime pay as well as 13th month pay. On appeal, the
NLRC partly granted the appeal. It ruled that petitioners were regular employees and that RSCI
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illegally dismissed them. The NLRC ratiocinated that Policy Instruction No. 20 requires the
employer of project employees to report to the DOLE certain matters including the duration and
specific work to be done by the employee which must be made clear at the time of hiring as well
as the dismissal of employees upon the completion of every project. That failure of the employer
to comply with such reporting would establish that the employees are not project employees. It
ruled that far the non-compliance by respondents with the reportorial requirement, petitioners
were proved to be regular employees and may not be dismissed without valid cause and
observance of the due process of law. The CA annulled and set aside the decision of the NLRC,
and it reinstated the LA decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are regular employees and that they were illegally
dismissed.
HELD: YES. The Labor Code defines a regular employee as (a) one that has been engaged to
perform tasks usually necessary or desirable in the employer's usual business or trade — without
falling within the category of either a fixed, a project, or a seasonal employee; or (b) one that has
been engaged for a least a year, with respect to the activity he or she is engaged, and the work of
the employee remains while such activity exists. On the other hand, a project employee is one
whose employment has been fixed for a specified project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which is made known at the time of the engagement of the employee. The Court
stressed that a project employee is assigned to a project that starts and ends at a determined or
determinable time. The Court elucidated therein that the principal test to determine if an
employee is a project employee is — whether he or she is assigned to carry out a particular
project or undertaking, which duration or scope was specified at the time of engagement. In this
case, to ascertain whether petitioners were project employees, as claimed by respondents, it is
primordial to determine whether notice was given them that they were being engaged just for a
specific project, which notice must be made at the time of hiring. However, no such prior notice
was given by respondents. The Court notes that the summary of project assignments relied by the
CA cannot be considered as the needed notice because it only listed down the projects from
where petitioners were previously assigned but nowhere did it indicate that petitioners were
informed or were aware that they were hired for a project or undertaking only. Also, the fact that
respondents did not submit a report with the DOLE (anent the termination of petitioners'
employment due to alleged project completion) further bolsters that petitioners were not project
employees. The Court explained that the failure on the part of the employer to file with the
DOLE a termination report every time a project or its phase is completed is an indication that the
workers are not project employees but regular ones. b. The repeated and successive rehiring of
project employees do not qualify them as regular employees, as length of service is not the
controlling determinant of the employment tenure of a project employee, but whether the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, its completion has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. The employee's entitlement to
monetary claims, the burden of proof is shifted from the employer or the employee, depending
on the monetary claim
b. TELEPHILIPPINES, INC., v. FERRANDO H. JACOLBE, G.R. No.

233999, February 18, 2019
FACTS: TP is a corporation engaged in the business of providing contact center services to its
various offshore corporate clients through its customer service representatives (CSRs). On June
18, 2007, TP hired Jacolbe as a CSR tasked to resolve customer’s questions and issues promptly
and efficiently, in accordance with set performance standards and protocol. Sometime in 2009,
TP assigned Jacolbe to its Priceline account. For TP to properly assess his work performance,
Jacolbe was required to meet the key performance metric targets of, among others, an Average
Handle Time (AHT) of 7.0 minutes or below. The AHT refers to the average time spent by a
CSR with the customer on the phone; it is computed using a formula, and is recorded on a daily
and weekly basis. On January 22, 2013, Jacolbe's supervisor, Mr. Philip Charles Go, issued an
Incident Report for failure of Jacolbe to hit the 7-minute AHT goal agreed upon for the 3rd week
of January while he was under TP's Performance Improvement Plan (PIP). Records show that
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Jacolbe was placed under the PIP after he failed to meet the 7-minute AHT target in two
previous instances. Subsequently, TP's Human Resources Department (HRD) sent Jacolbe a
letter (Notice to Explain) informing him of its receipt of the Incident Report, and further stating
that his "work performance for the last 6 months is unsatisfactory due to his consistent failure to
meet the AHT Goal, which, if proven true, would constitute as an offense against its code of
conduct warranting the termination of his employment. The Notice also directed him to explain,
in writing, why he should not be subjected to appropriate corrective action. In compliance with
the directive, Jacolbe submitted letters explaining that since he was hired in 2007, he had never
intentionally disconnected a call to meet the prescribed AHT mark. Unsatisfied with his
explanations, TP issued Jacolbe a Letter (Notice of Termination) dismissing him from work for
failure to meet account specific performance metrics or certification requirements. Aggrieved,
Jacolbe filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and monetary claims against TP, pointing out that
while the Incident Report noted his failure to hit the 7-minute AHT mark in two instances, TP
dismissed him allegedly for unsatisfactory work performance for the last 6 months based on the
HRD's Notice to Explain. He argued that if indeed he committed the said infractions, the same
did not constitute serious misconduct warranting his dismissal, citing his award as Top Agent for
December 2012 which negated the alleged unsatisfactory work performance for the last 6
months. LA found Jacolbe to have been illegally dismissed and found that TP failed to fully
apprise Jacolbe of the specific violation of company rules he had committed. On appeal, NLRC
reversed and set aside the LA ruling and held Jacolbe’s dismissal as valid. The NLRC found that
Jacolbe had, in fact, consistently failed to meet the 7-minute AHT mark, starting from January
2012 up to his dismissal in March 2013, in violation of company-prescribed work standards. CA
set aside the NLRC ruling and ordered TP to reinstate Jacolbe or pay him separation pay in lieu
thereof. According to the CA, meeting the prescribed AHT metric is only one of the determining
factors in evaluating a CSR's performance and, in fact, Jacolbe was awarded as Top Agent in
December 2012 which thus contradicts the charge of poor performance. In any case, assuming
that his failure to meet the 7-minute AHT mark from January 2012 to March 2013 showed
inefficiency, the CA held that the same does not appear to be gross and habitual so as to warrant
dismissal from employment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jacolbe was illegally dismissed.
HELD: NO. A valid dismissal necessitates compliance with both substantive and procedural due
process requirements. Substantive due process mandates that an employee may be dismissed
based only on just or authorized causes under Articles 297, 298, and 299 of the Labor Code. On
the other hand, procedural due process requires the employer to comply with the requirements of
notice and hearing before effecting the dismissal. In all cases involving termination of
employment, the burden of proving the existence of the above valid causes rests upon the
employer. The quantum of proof required in these cases is substantial evidence. Jurisprudence
instructs that gross inefficiency is analogous to gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article
297 (e) in relation to Article 297 (b) of the Labor Code for both involve specific acts of omission
on the part of the employee resulting in damage to the employer or to his business, and
constituting, therefore, just cause to dismiss an employee. In this case, records reveal that
Jacolbe's AHT scores for 62 consecutive weeks, or from January 2012 up to his dismissal in
March 2013, were well above the 7 minutes or lower AHT mark. As he had been having
difficulty meeting the same, TP allowed him to continue in its employ and even enrolled him in
its SMART Action and Performance Improvement Plans twice to help him improve his AHT
scores. This notwithstanding, Jacolbe's AHT scores remained well above the 7-minute AHT
mark. Undoubtedly, Jacolbe's repeated and consistent failure to meet the prescribed AHT mark
over a prolonged period of time falls squarely under the concept of gross inefficiency and is
analogous to gross and habitual neglect of duty under Article 297 of the Labor Code, which
justified his dismissal. The Court finds that TP sufficiently observed the standards of procedural
due process in effecting Jacolbe's dismissal. First, TP issued Jacolbe a Notice to Explain
specifying the ground for his possible dismissal. The Notice also directed Jacolbe to explain, in
writing, why he should not be subjected to appropriate corrective action. Second, Jacolbe was
able to submit letters explaining his side, albeit he did not fully address the charge of consistently
failing to meet the AHT metric. Third, a disciplinary conference was held which provided
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Jacolbe another opportunity to explain his side. And fourth, TP served a written Notice of
Termination after verifying the violation committed, i.e., failure to meet account specific
performance metrics or certification requirements.
II. 2018 Cases.

a. Liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims.
PRINCESS TALENT CENTER PRODUCTION, INC., AND/OR LUCHI
SINGH MOLDES, vs. DESIREE T. MASAGCA, G.R. No. 191310, APRIL 11,
2018.
FACTS: An Employment Contract was executed in February 2003 between respondent and
petitioner PTCPI as the Philippine Agent of SAENCO, the Korean principal/promoter.
Respondent left for Korea in September 2003 and worked there as a singer for 9 months, until
her repatriation to the Philippines in June 2004. Believing that the termination of her contract
was unlawful and premature, respondent filed a complaint against petitioners and SAENCO with
the NLRC. For 9 months, respondent worked at Seaman's Seven Pub in Ulsan, South Korea —
not at Siheung Tourist Hotel Night Club in Siheung, South Korea as stated in her Employment
Contract — without receiving any salary from SAENCO. Respondent subsisted on the 20%
commission that she received for every lady's drink the customers purchased for her. Worse,
respondent had to remit half of her commission to petitioner Moldes for the payment of the
fictitious loan. When respondent failed to remit any amount to petitioner Moldes in May 2004,
petitioner Moldes demanded that respondent pay the balance of the loan supposedly amounting
to US$10,600.00. To dispute the loan, respondent engaged the legal services of Fortun, Narvasa
& Salazar, a Philippine law firm, which managed to obtain copies of respondent's Employment
Contract and Overseas Filipino Worker Information Sheet. It was only then when respondent
discovered that her employment was just for six months and that her monthly compensation was
US$600.00, not just US$400.00. Respondent further narrated that on June 13, 2004, petitioner
Moldes went to South Korea and paid the salaries of all the performers, except respondent.
Petitioner Moldes personally handed respondent a copy of the loan document for US$10,600.00
and demanded that respondent terminate the services of her legal counsel in the Philippines.
When respondent refused to do as petitioner Moldes directed, petitioner Moldes withheld
respondent's salary. Park Sun Na (Park), President of SAENCO, went to the club where
respondent worked, dragged respondent outside, and brought respondent to his office in Seoul
where he tried to intimidate respondent into apologizing to petitioner Moldes and dismissing her
counsel in the Philippines. However, respondent did not relent. Subsequently, Park turned
respondent over to the South Korean immigration authorities for deportation on the ground of
overstaying in South Korea with an expired visa. It was only at that moment when respondent
found out that petitioner Moldes did not renew her visa. LA rendered a Decision dismissing
respondent’s complaint. Respondents appealed before the NLRC and it ruled in favor of the
respondent. However, the NLRC reversed its previous Decision. According to the NLRC, they
agree with petitioners and SAENCO's argument that respondent was given a copy of her
employment contract prior to her departure for Korea because respondent was required to submit
a copy thereof to the Philippine Labor Office upon her arrival in Korea. We are also convinced
that respondent read and understood the terms and conditions of her Model Employment
Contract. On the basis of the foregoing, respondent's contention that she did not know the terms
and conditions of her Model Employment Contract, in particular the provision which states that
her contract and her visa is valid only for six (6) months, lacks credence. Thus, it can be
concluded that she was not dismissed at all by petitioners and SAENCO as her employment
contract merely expired. On appeal, the CA took a liberal approach by excusing the technical
lapses of respondent's appeal before the NLRC for the sake of substantial justice. The appellate
court then held that respondent was dismissed from employment without just cause and without
procedural due process, and that petitioners and SAENCO were solidarily liable to pay
respondent her unpaid salaries for one year and attorney's fees.
Page 13 of 111
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed and that petitioners and SANECO
were solidarily liable to pay the respondent.
HELD: YES. The Court finds that respondent was illegally dismissed. Dismissal from
employment has two facets: first, the legality of the act of dismissal, which constitutes
substantive due process; and, second, the legality of the manner of dismissal, which constitutes
procedural due process. The burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
disciplinary action was made for lawful cause or that the termination of employment was valid.
From its findings herein that (1) respondent's Employment Contract had been extended for
another six months, ending on September 5, 2004; and (2) respondent was illegally dismissed
and repatriated to the Philippines in June 2004, the Court next proceeds to rule on the liabilities
of petitioners and SAENCO to respondent. Respondent's monetary claims against petitioners and
SAENCO is governed by Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as The Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides: Section 10. In case of termination
of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest at twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less. The Court finds
that respondent had been paid her salaries for the nine months she worked in Ulsan, South Korea,
so she is no longer entitled to an award of the same. It is a settled rule of evidence that the one
who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even where the plaintiff must allege
nonpayment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather
than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment. In the case at bar, petitioners submitted nine cash
vouchers with respondent's signature. That the nine cash vouchers did not bear the name of
SAENCO and its Tax Identification Number is insignificant as there is no legal basis for
requiring such. The vouchers clearly state that these were "salary full payment" for the months of
October 5, 2003 to June 5, 2004 for US$600.00 to respondent and each of the vouchers was
signed received by respondent. After carefully examining respondent's signatures on the nine
cash vouchers, and even comparing them to respondent's signatures on all the pages of her
Employment Contract, the Court observes that respondent's signatures on all documents appear
to be consistently the same. The consistency and similarity of respondent's signatures on all the
documents supports the genuineness of said signatures. At this point, the burden of evidence has
shifted to respondent to negate payment of her salaries.
b. Retirement i. Refusal to retire. Laya, vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 205813, January
10, 2018
FACTS: On June 1, 2001, petitioner Laya Jr. was hired by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank
as its Chief Legal Counsel with a rank of Vice President. According to the petitioner, he was
made aware of the retirement plan of respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) only after he
had long been employed and was shown a photocopy of the Retirement Plan Rules and
Regulations, but PVB's President Ricardo A. Balbido, Jr. had told him then that his request for
extension of his service would be denied "to avoid precedence." He sought the reconsideration of
the denial of the request for the extension of his retirement, but PVB certified his retirement from
the service as of July 1, 2007 on March 6, 2008. On December 24, 2008, the petitioner filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal against PVB and Balbido, Jr. in the NLRC to protest his
unexpected retirement. The LA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for illegal
dismissal. The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, and it affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's
complaint. On appeal, the CA promulgated the now assailed decision, holding that the
petitioner's acceptance of his appointment as Chief Legal Officer of PVB signified his
conformity to the retirement program; that he could not have been unaware of the retirement
program which had been in effect since January 1, 1996; that the lowering of the retirement age
through the retirement plan was a recognized exception under the provisions of Article 287 of
the Labor Code; that considering his failure to adduce evidence showing that PVB had acted
maliciously in applying the provisions of the retirement plan to him and in denying his request
for the extension of his service, PVB's implementation of the retirement plan was a valid exercise
of its management prerogative. Petitioner argued that the CA and the NLRC had erroneously
Page 14 of 111
applied laws and legal principles intended for corporations in the private sector to a public
instrumentality like PVB. PVB maintains that it is not a public or government entity for several
reasons, namely: (1) the Government does not own a single share in it; (2) the Government has
no appointee or representative in the Board of Directors, and is not involved in its management;
and (3) it does not administer government funds. Through its comment, the OSG presents an
opinion favorable to the position of the petitioner, opining upon the authority of Boy Scouts of
the Philippines v. Commission on Audit and Article 44 of the Civil Code that PVB is a public
corporation created in the public interest, and a government instrumentality with juridical
personality; hence, the law governing the petitioner's compulsory retirement age was Republic
Act No. 8291, and the compulsory retirement age for him should be 65 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Laya Jr. was validly retired by PVB at age 60
HELD: NO. The retirement of employees in the private sector is governed by Article 287 of the
Labor Code: Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement
age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may
have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements:
Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and
other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein. In the absence of a retirement plan
or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee
upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is
hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay x x x. Under the provision, the
employers and employees may agree to fix the retirement age for the latter, and to embody their
agreement in either their collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) or their employment
contracts. Retirement plans allowing employers to retire employees who have not yet reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of
security of tenure, provided that the retirement benefits are not lower than those prescribed by
law. Obviously, the mere mention of the retirement plan in the letter of appointment did not
sufficiently inform the petitioner of the contents or details of the retirement program. To construe
from the petitioner's acceptance of his appointment that he had acquiesced to be retired earlier
than the compulsory age of 65 years would, therefore, not be warranted. This is because
retirement should be the result of the bilateral act of both the employer and the employee based
on their voluntary agreement that the employee agrees to sever his employment upon reaching a
certain age. That the petitioner might be well aware of the existence of the retirement program at
the time of his engagement did not suffice. His implied knowledge, regardless of duration, did
not equate to the voluntary acceptance required by law in granting an early retirement age option
to the employee. The law demanded more than a passive acquiescence on the part of the
employee, considering that his early retirement age option involved conceding the constitutional
right to security of tenure.
ii. Retirement plan vs. Labor Code
1. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram. G.R. No. 217730,

June 5, 2017
FACTS: A Complaint was filed by Hassaram against PAL for illegal dismissal and the payment
of retirement benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. He claimed that he had applied for
retirement from PAL in August 2000 after rendering 24 years of service as a pilot, but that his
application was denied. Instead, PAL informed him that he had lost his employment in the
company as of 9 June 1998, in view of his failure to comply with the Return to Work Order
issued by the Secretary of Labor against members of the Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines (ALPAP) on 7 June 1998. Before the LA, Hassaram argued that he was not covered
by the Secretary's Return to Work Order; hence, PAL had no valid ground for his dismissal. He
asserted that on 9 June 1998, he was already on his way to Taipei to report for work at Eva Air,
pursuant to a four-year contract approved by PAL itself. Petitioner further claimed that his
Page 15 of 111
arrangement with PAL allowed him to go on leave without pay while working for Eva Air, with
the right to accrue seniority and retire from PAL during the period of his leave. PAL contended
that (a) the LA had no jurisdiction over the case, which was a mere offshoot of ALPAP's strike, a
matter over which the Secretary of Labor had already assumed jurisdiction; (b) the Complaint
should be considered barred by res judicata, forum shopping, and prescription; (c) the case
should be suspended while PAL was under receivership; and (d) if at all, Hassaram was entitled
only to retirement benefits of P5,000 for every year of service pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and ALPAP. The LA awarded retirement benefits
and attorney's fees to Hassaram. It explained that Hassaram did not defy the Return to Work
Order, as he was in fact already on leave when the order was implemented. As to the
computation of benefits, the LA ruled that Article 287 of the Labor Code should be applied,
since the statute provided better benefits than the PAL-ALPAP CBA. PAL appealed the LA's
Decision to the NLRC. The NLRC initially affirmed the LA's Decision to award retirement
benefits to Hassaram under Article 287 of the Labor Code. Before the CA, Hassaram asserted
that the NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when the
latter reversed its previous ruling and set aside the Decision of the LA. While admitting that he
received P4,456,817.75 under the Plan, he maintained that his receipt of that sum did not
preclude him from claiming retirement benefits from PAL, since that amount represented only a
return of his share in a distinct and separate provident fund established for PAL pilots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amount received by Hassaram under the Plan should be deemed part
of his retirement pay.
HELD: YES. We rule for petitioner. It is clear from the provisions of the Plan that it is the
company that contributes to a "retirement fund" for the account of the pilots. These contributions
comprise the benefits received by the latter upon retirement, separation from service, or
disability. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the Phils, the PAL Pilots'
Retirement Benefit Plan is a retirement fund raised from contributions exclusively from PAL of
amounts equivalent to 20% of each pilot's gross monthly pay. Based on the foregoing
characterization, the Court included the amount received from the Plan in the computation of the
retirement pay of the pilot involved in that case. The same rule was later applied to Elegir v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc.: Apart from the abovementioned benefit, the petitioner is also entitled to
the equity of the retirement fund under PAL Pilots' Retirement Benefit Plan, which pertains to
the retirement fund raised from contributions exclusively from PAL of amounts equivalent to
20% of each pilot's gross monthly pay. The CA declared that Hassaram was entitled to retirement
benefits under Article 287, because the benefits provided under that provision were supposedly
superior to those granted to him under the PAL retirement plans. We disagree. It is clear from the
records that Hassaram is a member of ALPAP and as such, is entitled to benefits from both the
retirement plans under the 1967 PAL-ALPAP CBA and the Plan. Article 287 would entitle a
retiring pilot to the equivalent of only 22.5 days of his monthly salary for every year of service.
This scheme was thus considered by the Court as inferior to the retirement plans granted by PAL
to the latter's pilots in Elegir and PAL: Comparing the benefits under the two (2) retirement
schemes, it can readily be perceived that the 22.5 days’ worth of salary for every year of service
provided under Article 287 of the Labor Code cannot match the 240% of salary or almost two
and a half worth of monthly salary per year of service provided under the PAL Pilots' Retirement
Benefit Plan, which will be further added to the P125,000.00 to which the petitioner is entitled
under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan. Clearly then, it is to the petitioner's advantage that
PAL's retirement plans were applied in the computation of his retirement benefits. Following the
above pronouncement, we therefore declare that Hassaram's retirement benefits must be
computed based on the retirement plans of PAL, and not on Article 287 of the Labor Code.
c. Retirement (Laya, vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 205813, January 10, 2018)
FACTS: On June 1, 2001, petitioner Laya Jr. was hired by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank
as its Chief Legal Counsel with a rank of Vice President. According to the petitioner, he was
made aware of the retirement plan of respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) only after he
had long been employed and was shown a photocopy of the Retirement Plan Rules and
Page 16 of 111
Regulations, but PVB's President Ricardo A. Balbido, Jr. had told him then that his request for
extension of his service would be denied "to avoid precedence." He sought the reconsideration of
the denial of the request for the extension of his retirement, but PVB certified his retirement from
the service as of July 1, 2007 on March 6, 2008. On December 24, 2008, the petitioner filed his
complaint for illegal dismissal against PVB and Balbido, Jr. in the NLRC to protest his
unexpected retirement. The LA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for illegal
dismissal. The petitioner appealed to the NLRC, and it affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner's
complaint. On appeal, the CA promulgated the now assailed decision, holding that the
petitioner's acceptance of his appointment as Chief Legal Officer of PVB signified his
conformity to the retirement program; that he could not have been unaware of the retirement
program which had been in effect since January 1, 1996; that the lowering of the retirement age
through the retirement plan was a recognized exception under the provisions of Article 287 of
the Labor Code; that considering his failure to adduce evidence showing that PVB had acted
maliciously in applying the provisions of the retirement plan to him and in denying his request
for the extension of his service, PVB's implementation of the retirement plan was a valid exercise
of its management prerogative. Petitioner argued that the CA and the NLRC had erroneously
applied laws and legal principles intended for corporations in the private sector to a public
instrumentality like PVB. PVB maintains that it is not a public or government entity for several
reasons, namely: (1) the Government does not own a single share in it; (2) the Government has
no appointee or representative in the Board of Directors, and is not involved in its management;
and (3) it does not administer government funds. Through its comment, the OSG presents an
opinion favorable to the position of the petitioner, opining upon the authority of Boy Scouts of
the Philippines v. Commission on Audit and Article 44 of the Civil Code that PVB is a public
corporation created in the public interest, and a government instrumentality with juridical
personality; hence, the law governing the petitioner's compulsory retirement age was Republic
Act No. 8291, and the compulsory retirement age for him should be 65 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Laya Jr. was validly retired by PVB at age 60
RULING: NO. The retirement of employees in the private sector is governed by Article 287 of
the Labor Code: Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable
employment contract. In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such
retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining
agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an employee's retirement benefits
under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided
therein. In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of
employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more,
but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age,
who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay x x x. Under the provision, the employers and employees may agree to fix the
retirement age for the latter, and to embody their agreement in either their collective bargaining
agreements (CBAs) or their employment contracts. Retirement plans allowing employers to
retire employees who have not yet reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per
se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure, provided that the retirement
benefits are not lower than those prescribed by law. Obviously, the mere mention of the
retirement plan in the letter of appointment did not sufficiently inform the petitioner of the
contents or details of the retirement program. To construe from the petitioner's acceptance of his
appointment that he had acquiesced to be retired earlier than the compulsory age of 65 years
would, therefore, not be warranted. This is because retirement should be the result of the bilateral
act of both the employer and the employee based on their voluntary agreement that the employee
agrees to sever his employment upon reaching a certain age. That the petitioner might be well
aware of the existence of the retirement program at the time of his engagement did not suffice.
His implied knowledge, regardless of duration, did not equate to the voluntary acceptance
required by law in granting an early retirement age option to the employee. The law demanded
more than a passive acquiescence on the part of the employee, considering that his early
retirement age option involved conceding the constitutional right to security of tenure.
Page 17 of 111
d. Redundancy i. Redundancy carried out by persons belonging to related

companies;Labor claims against related companies. American Power Conversion
Corporation vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214291, January 11, 2018
FACTS: In an e-mail message, Truong announced respondent's appointment together with the
appointment of David Shao (Shao) as Regional Manager for South ASEAN, which covered
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei. Truong noted respondent's "steady and principled
leadership" since he "joined APC Philippines in 1998". In 2005, Truong was replaced by
petitioner George Kong (Kong). During their stint with Kong, respondent and Shao supposedly
discovered irregularities committed by Kong, which sometime in late August, 2005 they reported
to Leanne Cunnold (Cunnold), General Manager for APC South and Kong's immediate superior.
Cunnold took up the matter with petitioner Alicia Hendy (Hendy), Human Resource Director for
APCP BV. Respondent and Shao also took the matter directly to David Plumer (Plumer), Vice
President for Asia Pacific of APC Japan, who advised them to discuss the matter directly with
Kong. Upon being apprised of the issues against him, Kong on September 8, 2005 sent three e-
mail messages to respondent and the other six members of the sales and marketing team
indicating his displeasure and that he took the matter quite personally. In the last of his e-mail
messages, he remarked — "and finally, thank you for the 7 knives in my back." Thereafter, Kong
arrived in the country and met with respondent on October 17, 2005, where he informed the
latter of a supposed company restructuring which rendered his position as Regional Manager for
North ASEAN redundant. Respondent was furnished by the Human Resource Manager of APCP
BV Maximo del Ponso, Jr. (del Ponso) with a Termination Letter of even date. The reason
behind the redundancy s stated in the letter is that the changing directions of the business, and
pursuant to need to realign and streamline the APAC Sales organization, the management
decided to reconfigure APAC Sales function and as a result of such, it declared the position of
Regional Manager – North ASEAN as redundant. Respondent’s counsel proceeded to the DOLE
to verify if petitioners gave the requisite notice of termination due to redundancy. In a
Certification, the DOLE through NCR Assistant Regional Director Ma. Celeste M. Valderrama
confirmed that there was no record on file — from September 1, 2005 up to November 30, 2005
— of a notice of termination filed by any of the petitioners. Respondent was paid severance pay,
but in a written demand, he sought reinstatement, the payment of backwages and
allowances/benefits, and damages for his claimed malicious and illegal termination. In a written
reply by APCC's counsel, petitioners refused to accede. Likewise, in a letter to respondent,
APCP BV through Hendy acknowledged to respondent that should he be questioned about the
use by APCC of his private bank account, petitioners will "offer the fullest possible accounting
of its past actions." Respondent filed a labor case against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and
recovery of money claims. In his Position Paper and other pleadings, respondent claimed that he
was illegally dismissed by petitioners using a fabricated and contrived
restructuring/reorganization/redundancy program. The LA rendered its Decision in favor of
respondent. Petitioners appealed before the NLRC, and it ruled to grant the Appeal and rule in
favor of the petitioners. It ruled that the LA failed to take into consideration that the restructuring
implemented by APC was organizational, meaning it affected not only APC (Philippines) B.V.
but also APC ASEAN and APC Asia Pacific. The Labor Arbiter failed to take into consideration
the APC ASEAN organizational chart presented by respondents, which showed that APC's
ASEAN organization was divided into Enterprise Sales and Transactional Sales (from the former
grouping based on territorial boundaries), consistent with the organizational changes in the APC
Asia Pacific sales organization. Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the
NLRC. Thus, he filed a petitioner for certiorari before the CA. The CA reversed and set aside the
decision and resolution of the NLRC. It ruled that redundancy is an authorized cause for the
termination of employment, as provided by Article 283 of the Labor Code. Redundancy exists
when the service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet
the demands of the business enterprise. A reasonably redundant position is one rendered
superfluous by any number of factors, such as over hiring of workers, decreased volume of
business, dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company or
phasing out of service activity priorly undertaken by the business. Among the requisites of a
valid redundancy program are: (1) the good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant
Page 18 of 111
position; and (2) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared
redundant and accordingly established. Likewise, settled is the fact that the declaration of
redundant positions is a management prerogative, an exercise of business judgment by the
employer. It is however not enough for a company to merely declare that positions have become
redundant. It must produce adequate proof of such redundancy to justify the dismissal of the
affected employees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Lim on the ground of redundancy is tenable.
HELD: NO. When respondent was hired directly by APCC, an American entity that was not
registered to conduct business here, to sell its products and services here, he was tossed over to
another APC corporation, APCPI (now APCP BV), a Philippine-registered manufacturing
corporation, where he was ostensibly included in the list of employees and the payroll. In other
words, APCC sanctioned the use of APCP BV as respondent's cover, from where he conducted
his sales operations for APCC. To further conceal and promote APCC's covert sales operations
here, respondent was required to create a petty cash fund using his own personal bank account to
answer for the daily expenses and operations of the American Power Conversion Philippine
Sales Office. Thus, APCC conducted business here as an unregistered and unregulated
enterprise. When respondent joined APCC, he was merely in his early twenties, as admitted by
Truong in his email message announcing respondent's appointment as Regional Manager for
APC North ASEAN. He cannot be faulted for acceding to APCC's condition at the outset that he
use his personal bank account for APCC's operations in the meantime; during the incipient phase
of his employment, he must have been operating under the impression that since APCC's sales
and marketing operations were new in the country, it needed time to formalize its operations and
secure a license to do business here. And with this hope, he innocently went about doing his
work. Indeed, APCC had the sole responsibility of complying with domestic laws if it wanted to
continue — as it did — doing business here. It was not respondent's concern to perform
administrative and compliance work that APCC, through APCP BV, was more than capable of
doing; his only job was to sell APCC's products and services. Given that respondent made
repeated requests for APCC to formalize and legalize its presence here, it could be that the latter
may have repeatedly assured or misrepresented to the former that it would do so — which kept
respondent toward the uncomplaining performance of his work. And when he was ostensibly
absorbed into the APCP BV payroll, respondent must have thought that APCC had remedied the
situation. Which it did not. Meanwhile, respondent continued as its employee, doing sales work
for it. He remained an APCP BV employee on paper, and continued to do business unregulated
and untaxed, using his personal bank account to conceal APCC's income. And from a labor
standpoint, they are all guilty of violating the Labor Code as a result of their concerted acts of
fraud and misrepresentation upon the respondent, using him and placing him in a precarious
position without risk to themselves, and thus deliberately disregarding their fundamental
obligation to afford protection to labor and insure the safety of their employees. For this gross
violation of the fundamental policy of the Labor Code, petitioners must be held liable to pay
backwages, damages, and attorney's fees.
e. Employment contract.Employment contract cannot take effect outside of the contracting

parties.
De Roca vs. Dabuyan, et al., G.R. No. 215281, March 5, 2018
FACTS: In 2012, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against "RAF
Mansion Hotel Old Management and New Management and Victoriano Ewayan." Later, private
respondents amended the complaint and included petitioner Rolando De Roca as [co]-
respondent. Summons was sent through registered mail to petitioner but it was returned.
Thereafter, a conference was set but only complainants attended. Thus, another summons was
issued and personally served to petitioner by the bailiff of the NLRC as evidenced by the latter's
return. Despite service of summons, petitioner did not attend the subsequent hearings prompting
the LA to direct private respondents to submit their position paper. Private respondents submitted
their position paper, and on the same day, petitioner filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of
Page 19 of 111
lack of jurisdiction. He alleged that, while he was the owner of RAF Mansion Hotel building, the
same was being leased by Victoriano Ewayan, the owner of Oceanics Travel and Tour Agency.
Petitioner claims that Ewayan was the employer of private respondents. Consequently, he
asserted that there was no employer-employee relationship between him and private respondents
and the LA had no jurisdiction. LA rendered a decision directing petitioner, among others, to pay
backwages and other monetary award to private respondents. Instead of filing an appeal before
NLRC, petitioner instituted the petition for annulment of judgment referred to above, which the
NLRC dismissed as it was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary period prescribed under the
2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, where he
argued that he was never an employer of the respondents, as he was merely the owner of the
premises which were leased out to and occupied by respondents' true employer, Victoriano
Ewayan (Ewayan), who owned Oceanic Travel and Tours Agency which operated the RAF
Mansion Hotel where respondents were employed as cook, waitress, and housekeeper; and that
his inclusion in the labor case was borne of malice which is shown by the fact that when the
labor complaint was filed, he was not originally impleaded as a respondent, and was made so
only after respondents discovered that their employer had already absconded — in which case he
was impleaded under the pretext that he constituted the "new management of RAF Mansion
Hotel." The CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a lessor of a hotel business can be held liable for the labor obligation of
the lessee who also used the name of the hotel in his operations.
HELD: NO. All throughout the proceedings, petitioner has insisted that he was not the employer
of respondents; that he did not hire the respondents, nor pay their salaries, nor exercise
supervision or control over them, nor did he have the power to terminate their services. In
support of his claim, he attached copies of a lease agreement executed by him and Oceanic Tours
and Travel Agency (Oceanic) represented by Ewayan through his attorney-in-fact Marilou
Buenafe. The agreement would show that petitioner was the owner of a building called the RAF
Mansion Hotel in Roxas Boulevard, Baclaran, Parañaque City; that Oceanic agreed to lease the
entire premises of RAF Mansion Hotel, including the elevator, water pump, airconditioning
units, and existing furnishings and all items found in the hotel and included in the inventory list
attached to the lease agreement, except for certain portions of the building where petitioner
conducted his personal business and which were leased out to other occupants, including a bank;
that the lease would be for a period of five years; that the monthly rental would be P450,000.00;
and that all expenses, utilities, maintenance, and taxes — except real property taxes — incurred
and due on the leased building would be for the lessee's account. Thus, it would appear from the
facts on record and the evidence that petitioner's building was an existing hotel called the "RAF
Mansion Hotel," which Oceanic agreed to continue to operate under the same name. There is no
connection between petitioner and Oceanic other than through the lease agreement executed by
them; they are not partners in the operation of RAF Mansion Hotel. It just so happens that
Oceanic decided to continue operating the hotel using the original name — "RAF Mansion
Hotel." Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case
where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or
by stipulation or by provision of law." The contract of employment between respondents, on the
one hand, and Oceanic and Ewayan on the other, is effective only between them; it does not
extend to petitioner, who is not a party thereto. His only role is as lessor of the premises which
Oceanic leased to operate as a hotel; he cannot be deemed as respondent's employer — not even
under the pretext that he took over as the "new management" of the hotel operated by Oceanic.
Thus, to allow respondents to recover their monetary claims from petitioner would necessarily
result in their unjust enrichment.
f. Retrenchment 1. Audited financial statement (AFS); AFS may not be presented; 2.

Judicial notice of losses; 3. Rehiring of some of the retrenched employees; 4.
Rehabilitation; 5. Quitclaim
FASAP Case: G.R. No. 178083/A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, March 13, 2018
Page 20 of 111
FACTS: PAL retrenched cabin crew personnel in a retrenchment and demotion scheme of June
15, 1998 which was made effective on July 15, 1998. The LA found the retrenchment illegal.
However, he NLRC set aside the LA’s findings of illegal retrenchment. The CA affirmed the
decision of the NLRC. FASAP appealed to the SC. Resolving the appeal, the 3rd Division of the
SC promulgated its Decision reversing the decision by the CA, and entering a new one, finding
PAL guilty of unlawful retrenchment. The SC 3rd Division deferred from the decision of the CA,
instead, the 3rd Division of the SC disbelieved the veracity of PAL’s claim of severe financial
losses, and concluded that PAL had not established its severe financial losses because of its non-
presentation of audited financial statements. It further concluded that PAL had implemented the
retrenchment program in bad faith, and had not used fair and reasonable criteria in selecting the
employees to be retrenched. Upon conclusion of the oral arguments, the Court directed the
parties to explore a possible settlement and to submit their respective memoranda. The parties
did not reach any settlement; hence, the SC, through the Special 3rd Division, resolved the issues
on the merits through the resolution denying PA’s motion for reconsideration. FASAP contends
that a Second Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading; that PAL failed to prove
that it had complied with the requirements for a valid retrenchment by not submitting its audited
financial statements; that PAL had immediately terminated the employees without prior resort to
less drastic measures; and that PAL did not observe any criteria in selecting the employees to be
retrenched.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not submission of audited financial statement (AFS) is still required when
complainants admitted the loss.
(2) Whether or not judicial notice applies in this case.
(3) Whether or not rehiring of some of the retrenched employees after the company under
rehabilitation has recovered indicates bad faith in retrenchment.
(4) Whether or not execution of quitclaim is illegal.
HELD:
(1) NO. Evidently, FASAP's express recognition of PAL's grave financial situation meant that
such situation no longer needed to be proved, the same having become a judicial admission in
the context of the issues between the parties. As a rule, indeed, admissions made by parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case are conclusive, and
do not require further evidence to prove them. By FASAP's admission of PAL's severe financial
woes, PAL was relieved of its burden to prove its dire financial condition to justify the
retrenchment. Thusly, PAL should not be taken to task for the non-submission of its audited
financial statements in the early part of the proceedings inasmuch as the non-submission had
been rendered irrelevant. In the cited cases, the employers had to establish that they were
incurring serious business losses because it was the very issue, if not intricately related to the
main issue presented in the original complaints. In contrast, the sole issue herein as presented by
FASAP to the Labor Arbiter was the "manner of retrenchment," not the basis for retrenchment.
FASAP itself, in representation of the retrenched employees, had admitted in its position paper,
as well as in its reply and memorandum submitted to the Labor Arbiter the fact of serious
financial losses hounding PAL. In reality, PAL was not remiss by not proving serious business
losses. FASAP's admission of PAL's financial distress already established the latter's precarious
financial state.
(2) YES. The July 22, 2008 decision recognized that PAL underwent corporate rehabilitation. In
seeming inconsistency, however, the Special Third Division refused to accept that PAL had
incurred serious financial losses. After having been placed under corporate rehabilitation and its
rehabilitation plan having been approved by the SEC on June 23, 2008, PAL's dire financial
predicament could not be doubted. Incidentally, the SEC's order of approval came a week after
PAL had sent out notices of termination to the affected employees. It is thus difficult to ignore
the fact that PAL had then been experiencing difficulty in meeting its financial obligations long
before its rehabilitation. Also, the Court cannot be blind and indifferent to current events
Page 21 of 111
affecting the society and the country's economy, but must take them into serious consideration in
its adjudication of pending cases. In that regard, Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
recognizes that the courts have discretionary authority to take judicial notice of matters that are
of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to
judges because of their judicial functions. The principle is based on convenience and expediency
in securing and introducing evidence on matters that are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are
not bona fide disputed. Indeed, the Labor Arbiter properly took cognizance of PAL's substantial
financial losses during the Asian financial crisis of 1997. On its part, the NLRC recognized the
grave financial distress of PAL based on its ongoing rehabilitation/receivership. The CA likewise
found that PAL had implemented a retrenchment program to counter its tremendous business
losses that the strikes of the pilot's union had aggravated. Such recognitions could not be justly
ignored or denied, especially after PAL's financial and operational difficulties had attracted so
much public attention that even President Estrada had to intervene in order to save PAL as the
country's flag carrier.
(3) NO. The rehiring of previously retrenched employees should not invalidate a retrenchment
program, the rehiring being an exercise of the employer's right to continue its business. Contrary
to the statement in the dissent that the implementation of Plan 22 instead of Plan 14 indicated
bad faith, PAL reasonably demonstrated that the recall was devoid of bad faith or of an attempt
on its part to circumvent its affected employees' right to security of tenure. Far from being
tainted with bad faith, the recall signified PAL's reluctance to part with the retrenched
employees. Indeed, the prevailing unfavorable conditions had only compelled it to implement the
retrenchment.
(4) NO. The retrenched employees signed valid quitclaims. In EDI Staffbuilders International,
Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, we laid down the basic contents of valid and
effective quitclaims and waivers, to wit: In order to prevent disputes on the validity and
enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of employees under Philippine laws, said agreements
should contain the following: 1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement; 2. The
benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding amounts, which the employees are
giving up in consideration of the fixed compromise amount; 3. A statement that the employer has
clearly explained to the employee in English, Filipino, or in the dialect known to the employees
— that by signing the waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to
receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and 4. A statement that the employees
signed and executed the document voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of the
document and that their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress,
intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person. The release and quitclaim signed by the
affected employees substantially satisfied the aforestated requirements. The consideration was
clearly indicated in the document in the English language, including the benefits that the
employees would be relinquishing in exchange for the amounts to be received. There is no
question that the employees who had occupied the position of flight crew knew and understood
the English language. Hence, they fully comprehended the terms used in the release and
quitclaim that they signed. Indeed, not all quitclaims are per se invalid or against public policy.
A quitclaim is invalid or contrary to public policy only: (1) where there is clear proof that the
waiver was wrangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person; or (2) where the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on their face. Based on these standards, we uphold the release and
quitclaims signed by the retrenched employees herein.
III. 2017 Cases

Page 22 of 111
a. Employer-Employee Relationship. Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Puedan, G.R. No.

220617, January 30, 2017
FACTS: For its part, ODSI averred that it is a company engaged in the business of buying,
selling, distributing, and marketing of goods and commodities of every kind and it enters into all
kinds of contracts for the acquisition thereof. ODSI admitted that on various dates, it hired
respondents as its employees and assigned them to execute the Distributorship Agreement it
entered with NPI. However, the business relationship between NPI and ODSI turned sour when
the former's sales department badgered the latter regarding the sales targets. Eventually, NPI
downsized its marketing and promotional support from ODSI which resulted to business reverses
and in the latter's filing of a petition for corporate rehabilitation and, subsequently, the closure of
its Nestlé unit due to the termination of the Distributorship Agreement and the failure of
rehabilitation. ODSI argued that respondents were not dismissed but merely put in floating
status. On the other hand, NPI did not file any position paper or appear in the scheduled
conferences. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, but nevertheless, ordered ODSI
and NPI to pay respondents nominal damages plus attorney's fees amounting to ten percent
(10%) of the total monetary awards. The LA found that: (a) respondents were unable to prove
that they were NPI employees; and (b) respondents were not illegally dismissed as ODSI had
indeed closed down its operations due to business losses. Respondents appealed to the NLRC.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling and, accordingly, ordered ODSI and NPI to pay
each of the respondents. The NLRC found that while ODSI indeed shut down its operations, it
failed to prove that such closure was due to serious business losses as it did not present evidence.
NPI filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, essentially insisting that: (a) it was deprived of
due process before the tribunals a quo; and (b) there was no employeremployee relationship
between NPI and respondents. The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling. As regards the substantive
issue, the CA ruled that despite ODSI and NPI's contract being denominated as a
"Distributorship Agreement," it contained provisions demonstrating a labor-only contracting
arrangement between them, as well as NPI's exercise of control over the business of ODSI.
ISSUE: Whether or not ODSI is a labor-only contractor of NPI, and consequently, NPI is
respondent’s true employer, thus deemed jointly and severally liable with ODSI for respondents’
monetary claims.
HELD: NO. Both the NLRC and the CA held that based on the provisions of the Distributorship
Agreement between them, ODSI is merely a labor-only contractor of NPI. However, a closer
examination of the Distributorship Agreement reveals that the relationship of NPI and ODSI is
not that of a principal and a contractor, but that of a seller and a buyer/reseller. As stipulated in
the Distributorship Agreement, NPI agreed to sell its products to ODSI at discounted prices,
which in turn will be re-sold to identified customers, ensuring in the process the integrity and
quality of the said products based on the standards agreed upon by the parties. As aptly explained
by NPI, the goods it manufactures are distributed to the market through various distributors, e.g.,
ODSI, that in turn, re-sell the same to designated outlets through its own employees such as the
respondents. Therefore, the reselling activities allegedly performed by the respondents properly
pertain to ODSI, whose principal business consists of the "buying, selling, distributing, and
marketing goods and commodities of every kind" and "entering into all kinds of contracts for the
acquisition of such goods and commodities." The aforementioned stipulations in the
Distributorship Agreement hardly demonstrate control on the part of NPI over the means and
methods by which ODSI performs its business, nor were they intended to dictate how ODSI shall
conduct its business as a distributor. Otherwise stated, the stipulations in the Distributorship
Agreement do not operate to control or fix the methodology on how ODSI should do its business
as a distributor of NPI products, but merely provide rules of conduct or guidelines towards the
achievement of a mutually desired result —which in this case is the sale of NPI products to the
end consumer. Thus, the foregoing circumstances show that ODSI was not a labor-only
contractor of NPI; hence, the latter cannot be deemed the true employer of respondents. As a
consequence, NPI cannot be held jointly and severally liable to ODSI's monetary obligations
towards respondents.
Page 23 of 111
i. Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No. 206390,

January 30, 2017
FACTS: Valencia alleged that he applied for work with Classique Vinyl but was told by the
latter's personnel office to proceed to CMS, a local manpower agency, and therein submit the
requirements for employment. Upon submission thereof, CMS made him sign a contract of
employment but no copy of the same was given to him. He then proceeded to Classique Vinyl
for interview and thereafter started working for the company in June 2005 as felitizer operator.
Valencia claimed that he worked 12 hours a day from Monday to Saturday and was receiving
P187.52 for the first eight hours and an overtime pay of P117.20 for the next four hours, or
beyond the then minimum wage mandated by law. He further averred that he worked for
Classique Vinyl for four years until his dismissal. Hence, by operation of law, he had already
attained the status of a regular employee of his true employer, Classique Vinyl, since according
to him, CMS is a mere labor-only contractor. Valencia, therefore, argued that Classique Vinyl
should be held guilty of illegal dismissal for failing to comply with the twin-notice requirement
when it dismissed him from the service and be made to pay for his monetary claims. Classique
Vinyl denied having hired Valencia and instead pointed to CMS as the one who actually
selected, engaged, and contracted out Valencia's services. It averred that CMS would only deploy
Valencia to Classique Vinyl whenever there was an urgent specific task or temporary work and
these occasions took place sometime in the years 2005, 2007, 2009 and 2010. It stressed that
Valencia's deployment to Classique Vinyl was intermittent and limited to three to four months
only in each specific year. Classique Vinyl further contended that Valencia's performance was
exclusively and directly supervised by CMS and that his wages and other benefits were also paid
by the said agency. At any rate, Classique Vinyl insisted that Valencia's true employer was CMS,
the latter being an independent contractor as shown by the fact that it was duly incorporated and
registered not only with the SEC but also with the Department of Labor and Employment; and,
that it has substantial capital or investment in connection with the work performed and services
rendered by its employees to clients. CMS, on the other hand, denied any employer-employee
relationship between it and Valencia. It contended that after it deployed Valencia to Classique
Vinyl, it was already the latter which exercised full control and supervision over him. Also,
Valencia's wages were paid by Classique Vinyl only that it was CMS which physically handed
the same to Valencia. LA rendered its decision in favor of the respondents as Valencia failed to
establish that he was actually illegally dismissed. Valencia promptly appealed to the NLRC.
Applying the four-fold test, the NLRC, however, declared CMS as Valencia's employer.
Accordingly, the NLRC held that there is no basis for Valencia to hold Classique Vinyl liable for
his alleged illegal dismissal as well as for his money claims. Hence, the NLRC dismissed
Valencia's appeal and affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. When Valencia sought recourse
from the CA, the said court rendered a Decision denying his Petition for Certiorari and affirming
the ruling of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between Valencia and

Classique Vinyl.
HELD: NO. The issue is essentially a question of fact. The Court is not a trier of facts and will
not review the factual findings of the lower tribunals as these are generally binding and
conclusive. While there are recognized exceptions, none of them applies in this case. Even if
otherwise, the Court is not inclined to depart from the uniform findings of the Labor Arbiter, the
NLRC and the CA. The burden of proof rests upon the party who asserts the affirmative of an
issue. Since it is Valencia here who is claiming to be an employee of Classique Vinyl, it is thus
incumbent upon him to proffer evidence to prove the existence of employer-employee
relationship between them. He needs to show by substantial evidence that he was indeed an
employee of the company against which he claims illegal dismissal. Corollary, the burden to
prove the elements of an employer-employee relationship, viz.: (1) the selection and engagement
of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power of
control, lies upon Valencia. In fact, most of Valencia's allegations even militate against his claim
that Classique Vinyl was his true employer. For one, Valencia stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay
that his application was actually received and processed by CMS which required him to submit
Page 24 of 111
the necessary requirements for employment. Upon submission thereof, it was CMS that caused
him to sign an employment contract, which upon perusal, is actually a contract between him and
CMS. It was only after he was engaged as a contractual employee of CMS that he was deployed
to Classique Vinyl. Clearly, Valencia's selection and engagement was undertaken by CMS and
conversely, this negates the existence of such element insofar as Classique Vinyl is concerned. It
bears to state, in addition, that as opposed to Valencia's argument, the lack of notarization of the
said employment contract did not adversely affect its veracity and effectiveness since
significantly, Valencia does not deny having signed the same.The CA, therefore, did not err in
relying on the said employment contract in its determination of the merits of this case. For
another, Valencia himself acknowledged that the pay slips 26 he submitted do not bear the name
of Classique Vinyl. Aside from the afore-mentioned inconsistent allegations of Valencia, his
claim that his work was supervised by Classique Vinyl does not hold water. Again, the Court
finds the same as a self-serving assertion unworthy of credence. On the other hand, the
employment contract which Valencia signed with CMS categorically states that the latter
possessed not only the power of control but also of dismissal over him. Clearly, therefore, no
error can be attributed on the part of the labor tribunals and the CA in ruling out the existence of
employer-employee relationship between Valencia and Classique Vinyl.
ii. Element of Control
FACTS: Petitioners (now herein respondents) were hired from January 20, 1994 to March 20,
1996 as crew members of the fishing mother boat owned by respondent Joaquin "Jake" Lu
(herein petitioner Lu) who is the sole proprietor of Mommy Gina Tuna Resources [MGTR]
based in General Santos City. Sometime in August 1997, Lu proposed the signing of a Joint
Venture Fishing Agreement between them, but petitioners refused to sign the same as they
opposed the one-year term provided in the agreement. According to petitioners, during their
dialogue on August 18, 1997, Lu terminated their services right there and then because of their
refusal to sign the agreement. On the other hand, Lu alleged that the master fisherman (piado)
Ruben Salili informed him that petitioners still refused to sign the agreement and have decided to
return the vessel F/B MG-28. Petitioners filed their complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary
claims and damages. Despite serious efforts made by the LA, the case was not amicably settled.
In their Position Paper, petitioners alleged that their refusal to sign the Joint Venture Fishing
Agreement is not a just cause for their termination. Petitioners also asked for a refund of the
amount that was taken out of their 50% income share for the repair and maintenance of boat as
well as the purchase of fishing materials, as Lu should not benefit from such deduction. On the
other hand, Lu denied having dismissed petitioners, claiming that their relationship was one of
joint venture where he provided the vessel and other fishing paraphernalia, while petitioners, as
industrial partners, provided labor by fishing in the high seas. Lu alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship as its elements were not present, viz.: it was the piado who hired
petitioners; they were not paid wages but shares in the catch, which they themselves determine;
they were not subject to his discipline; and respondent had no control over the day-to-day fishing
operations, although they stayed in contact through respondent's radio operator or checker. Lu
also claimed that petitioners should not be reimbursed for their share in the expenses since it was
their joint venture that shouldered these expenses. LA rendered a decision dismissing the case for
lack of merit finding that there was no employer-employee relationship existing between
petitioner and the respondents, but a joint venture. In so ruling, the LA found that: (1)
respondents were not hired by petitioner as the hiring was done by the piado or master
fisherman; (2) the earnings of the fishermen from the labor were in the form of wages they
earned based on their respective shares; (3) they were never disciplined nor sanctioned by the
petitioner; and, (4) the income-sharing and expense splitting was no doubt a working set up in
the nature of an industrial partnership. While petitioner issued memos, orders and directions,
however, those who were related more on the aspect of management and supervision of activities
after the actual work was already done for purposes of order in hauling and sorting of fishes, and
thus, not in the nature of control as to the means and method by which the actual fishing
operations were conducted as the same was left to the hands of the master fisherman.
Page 25 of 111
Respondents appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the LA decision. CA rendered its decision
reversing the NLRC decision. The CA found that petitioner exercised control over respondents
based on the following: (1) respondents were the fishermen crew members of petitioner's fishing
vessel, thus, their services to the latter were so indispensable and necessary that without them,
petitioner's deep-sea fishing industry would not have come to existence much less fruition; (2) he
had control over the entire fishing operations undertaken by the respondents through the master
fisherman (piado) and the assistant master fisherman (assistant piado) employed by him; (3)
respondents were paid based on a percentage share of the fish catch did not in any way affect
their regular employment status; and (4) petitioner had already invested millions of pesos in its
deep-sea fishing industry, hence, it is highly improbable that he had no control over respondents'
fishing operations.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and

respondents.
HELD: YES. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following

elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the power to
control the worker's conduct; (3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power of
dismissal. We find all these elements present in this case. It was established that petitioner
exercised control over respondents. It should be remembered that the control test merely calls for
the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential
that the employer actually supervises the performance of duties by the employee. It is enough
that the former has a right to wield the power. Petitioner admitted in his pleadings that he had
contact with respondents at sea via the former's radio operator and their checker. He claimed that
the use of the radio was only for the purpose of receiving requisitions for the needs of the
fishermen in the high seas and to receive reports of fish catch so that they can then send service
boats to haul the same. However, such communication would establish that he was constantly
monitoring or checking the progress of respondents' fishing operations throughout the duration
thereof, which showed their control and supervision over respondents' activities. Consequently,
the Court give more credence to respondents' allegations in their petition filed with the CA on
how such control was exercised. Such allegations are more in consonance with the fact that, as
the CA found, MGTR had already invested millions of pesos in its deep-sea fishing industry. The
payment of respondents' wages based on the percentage share of the fish catch would not be
sufficient to negate the employeremployee relationship existing between them.
iii. Remittance with SSS as proof of employment
FACTS: Petitioners (now herein respondents) were hired from January 20, 1994 to March 20,
1996 as crew members of the fishing mother boat owned by respondent Joaquin "Jake" Lu
(herein petitioner Lu) who is the sole proprietor of Mommy Gina Tuna Resources [MGTR]
based in General Santos City. Sometime in August 1997, Lu proposed the signing of a Joint
Venture Fishing Agreement between them, but petitioners refused to sign the same as they
opposed the one-year term provided in the agreement. According to petitioners, during their
dialogue on August 18, 1997, Lu terminated their services right there and then because of their
refusal to sign the agreement. On the other hand, Lu alleged that the master fisherman (piado)
Ruben Salili informed him that petitioners still refused to sign the agreement and have decided to
return the vessel F/B MG-28. Petitioners filed their complaint for illegal dismissal, monetary
claims and damages. Despite serious efforts made by the LA, the case was not amicably settled.
In their Position Paper, petitioners alleged that their refusal to sign the Joint Venture Fishing
Agreement is not a just cause for their termination. Petitioners also asked for a refund of the
amount that was taken out of their 50% income share for the repair and maintenance of boat as
well as the purchase of fishing materials, as Lu should not benefit from such deduction. On the
other hand, Lu denied having dismissed petitioners, claiming that their relationship was one of
joint venture where he provided the vessel and other fishing paraphernalia, while petitioners, as
industrial partners, provided labor by fishing in the high seas. Lu alleged that there was no
Page 26 of 111
employer-employee relationship as its elements were not present, viz.: it was the piado who hired
petitioners; they were not paid wages but shares in the catch, which they themselves determine;
they were not subject to his discipline; and respondent had no control over the day-to-day fishing
operations, although they stayed in contact through respondent's radio operator or checker. Lu
also claimed that petitioners should not be reimbursed for their share in the expenses since it was
their joint venture that shouldered these expenses. LA rendered a decision dismissing the case for
lack of merit finding that there was no employer-employee relationship existing between
petitioner and the respondents, but a joint venture. In so ruling, the LA found that: (1)
respondents were not hired by petitioner as the hiring was done by the piado or master
fisherman; (2) the earnings of the fishermen from the labor were in the form of wages they
earned based on their respective shares; (3) they were never disciplined nor sanctioned by the
petitioner; and, (4) the income-sharing and expense splitting was no doubt a working set up in
the nature of an industrial partnership. While petitioner issued memos, orders and directions,
however, those who were related more on the aspect of management and supervision of activities
after the actual work was already done for purposes of order in hauling and sorting of fishes, and
thus, not in the nature of control as to the means and method by which the actual fishing
operations were conducted as the same was left to the hands of the master fisherman.
Respondents appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the LA decision. CA rendered its decision
reversing the NLRC decision. The CA found that petitioner exercised control over respondents
based on the following: (1) respondents were the fishermen crew members of petitioner's fishing
vessel, thus, their services to the latter were so indispensable and necessary that without them,
petitioner's deep-sea fishing industry would not have come to existence much less fruition; (2) he
had control over the entire fishing operations undertaken by the respondents through the master
fisherman (piado) and the assistant master fisherman (assistant piado) employed by him; (3)
respondents were paid based on a percentage share of the fish catch did not in any way affect
their regular employment status; and (4) petitioner had already invested millions of pesos in its
deep-sea fishing industry, hence, it is highly improbable that he had no control over respondents'
fishing operations.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between petitioner and

respondents.
HELD: YES. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following

elements are considered: (1) the selection and engagement of the workers; (2) the power to
control the worker's conduct; (3) the payment of wages by whatever means; and (4) the power of
dismissal. We find all these elements present in this case. It was established that petitioner
exercised control over respondents. It should be remembered that the control test merely calls for
the existence of the right to control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential
that the employer actually supervises the performance of duties by the employee. It is enough
that the former has a right to wield the power. Petitioner admitted in his pleadings that he had
contact with respondents at sea via the former's radio operator and their checker. He claimed that
the use of the radio was only for the purpose of receiving requisitions for the needs of the
fishermen in the high seas and to receive reports of fish catch so that they can then send service
boats to haul the same. However, such communication would establish that he was constantly
monitoring or checking the progress of respondents' fishing operations throughout the duration
thereof, which showed their control and supervision over respondents' activities. Consequently,
the Court give more credence to respondents' allegations in their petition filed with the CA on
how such control was exercised. Such allegations are more in consonance with the fact that, as
the CA found, MGTR had already invested millions of pesos in its deep-sea fishing industry. The
payment of respondents' wages based on the percentage share of the fish catch would not be
sufficient to negate the employer-employee relationship existing between them.
Page 27 of 111
iv. Imposition of disciplinary action; company policy
1. Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa

Farm (Namasufa-Naflu-Kmu), G.R. No. 202091, June 7, 2017
FACTS: Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger with
Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in 2008. FBAC was engaged in the buying,
marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas. Respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa
Suyapa Farm (NAMASUF ANAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA) is a labor organization affiliated
with the National Federation of Labor Unions and Kilusang Mayo Uno. On March 14, 2008, the
private respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUF A-NAFLU-KMU), a
legitimate labor organization, filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Department of
Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI in Davao City. It sought to represent all rank-
and-file employees, numbering around one hundred forty, of packing plant 90 (PP 90) of Fresh
Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). NAMASUFA claimed that there was no existing
union in the aforementioned establishment. FBAC filed an Opposition to the Petition. It argued
that there exists no employer-employee relationship between it and the workers involved. It
alleged that members of NAMASUFA are actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services
(A2Y), a duly licensed independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter.
NAMASUFA said that its members were former workers of Stanfilco before FBAC took over its
operations sometime in 2002. The said former employees were then required to join the
Compostela Banana Packing Plant Workers' Cooperative (CBPPWC) before they were hired and
allowed to work at the Packing Plant of FBAC. It further alleged that the members of
NAMASUFA were working at the packing plant long before A2Y came. The DOLE Med-
Arbiter issued an Order granting the Petition for Certification Election of NAMASUF A and
declared that Sumifru was the employer of the workers concerned. It applied the four fold test.
On the first factor, (selection and engagement of the employer), it is apparent that the staff of
respondent FBAC advised those who are interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become
members first of CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it. On the second factor (payment of
wages), while the respondent emphasized that that workers are paid by A2Y Contracting
Services, this at best is but an administrative arrangement. On the third factor, (the power of
dismissal), respondent FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against erring
workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary authority over them. Finally, on the fourth
factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent FBAC gives instructions to the
workers on how to go about their work is sufficient indication that it exercises control over their
movements. The workers are instructed as to what time they are supposed to report and what
time they are supposed to return. They were required to fill up monitoring sheets as they go
about their jobs and even the materials which they used in the packing plant were supplied by
FBAC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sumifru is the employer of the workers engaged by the cooperative.
HELD: YES. The Med-Arbiter found, based on documents submitted by the parties, that
Sumifru gave instructions to the workers on how to go about their work, what time they were
supposed to report for work, required monitoring sheets as they went about their jobs, and
provided the materials used in the packing plant. In affirming the Med-Arbiter, the DOLE
Secretary relied on the documents submitted by the parties and ascertained that Sumifru indeed
exercised control over the workers in PP 90. The DOLE Secretary found that the element of
control was present because Sumifru required monitoring sheets and imposed disciplinary
actions for non-compliance with "No Helmet - No Entry" "No ID - No Entry" policies.
b. Due Process in Labor Cases and c. Labor-Only Contracting
i. Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No. 206390,

January 30, 2017
Page 28 of 111
FACTS: Valencia applied for work with Classique Vinyl through the intervention of CMS, a
local manpower agency. The CMS made him sign a contract of employment and thereafter, he
then proceeded to work for Classique Vinyl as a fertilizer operator and extruder operator. He
alleged that he was neither paid his holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13th month pay
and that his benefits were either not paid or not properly remitted. He further averred that he
worked for Classique Vinyl for four years until his dismissal. Hence, by operation of law, he had
already attained the status of a regular employee of Classique Vinyl. Valencia, therefore, argued
that Classique Vinyl should be held guilty of illegal dismissal for failing to comply with the
twin-notice requirement when it dismissed him from the service and be made to pay for his
monetary claims. On the other hand, Classique Vinyl asserted that there was no employer-
employee relationship between it and Valencia, hence, it could not have illegally dismissed the
latter nor can it be held liable for Valencia’s monetary claims. Classique Vinyl insisted that
Valencia’s true employer was CMS. However, any employer-employee relationship between
CMS and Valencia was also being denied by CMS on the ground that it was Classique Vinyl
which exercised full control and supervision over him. Petitioner Valencia filed with the Labor
Arbiter a Complaint for Underpayment of Salary and Overtime Pay; Non-Payment of Holiday
Pay, Service Incentive Leave Pay, 13th Month Pay; Regularization; and illegal dismissal against
respondents. The LA dismissed the said complaint on the ground that there is no substantial
evidence to prove the petitioner’s complaint. Valencia promptly appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), which held lack of basis for Valencia to hold Classique Vinyl
liable for his alleged illegal dismissal as well as for his money claims. NLRC affirmed the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Valencia appealed to the CA which, however, also affirmed the
ruling of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship between Valencia and Classique

Vinyl.
HELD: NO. In order to determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the

following elements had been consistently applied: (1) the selection and engagement; (2) payment
of wages; (3) power of dismissal and; (4) the power of control. The burden to prove such
elements lies upon Valencia. In this case, Valencia failed to present competent evidence,
documentary or otherwise, to support his claimed employer- employee relationship between him
and Classique Vinyl. All he advanced were mere factual assertions unsupported by proof.
Valencia stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that his application was actually received and
processed by CMS which required him to submit the necessary requirements for employment.
Upon submission thereof, it was CMS that caused him to sign an employment contract, which
upon perusal, is actually a contract between him and CMS. It was only after he was engaged as a
contractual employee of CMS that he was deployed to Classique Vinyl. Clearly, Valencia's
selection and engagement was undertaken by CMS and conversely, this negates the existence of
such element insofar as Classique Vinyl is concerned. Also, hiis claim that his work was
supervised by Classique Vinyl does not hold water. The employment contract which Valencia
signed with CMS categorically states that the latter possessed not only the power of control but
also of dismissal over him. Further, the Court finds Valencia's argument that neither Classique
Vinyl nor CMS was able to present proof that the latter is a legitimate independent contractor
untenable. "Generally, the presumption is that the contractor is a labor-only [contractor] unless
such contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital, investment,
tools and the like." Here, to prove that CMS was a legitimate contractor, Classique Vinyl
presented the former's Certificate of Registration with the Department of Trade and Industry and,
License as private recruitment and placement agency from the Department of Labor and
Employment. Indeed, these documents are not conclusive evidence of the status of CMS as a
contractor. However, such fact of registration of CMS prevented the legal presumption of it
being a mere labor-only contractor from arising. In any event, it must be stressed that "in labor-
only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive
purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The facts of this case, however, failed to
establish that there is any circumvention of labor laws as to call for the creation by the statute of
an employer-employee relationship between Classique Vinyl and Valencia.
Page 29 of 111
d. Serious misconduct
i. Maula vs. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., G.R. No. 207838, January 25,
2017
FACTS: Petitioner Maula was hired by respondent as Operation Staff. His duties include, but are
not limited to, documentation, checker, dispatcher or air freight coordinator. In February 18,
2009, the respondent’s HRD required him and some other employees to sign a form sub-titled
“Personal Data for New Hires.” When he inquired about it he was told it was nothing but merely
for the twenty-peso increase which the company owner allegedly wanted to see. He could not
help but entertain doubts on the scheme as they were hurriedly made to sign the same. Petitioner,
together with some other concerned employees, questioned the document and aired their side
voicing their apprehensions against the designation “For New Hires” since they were long time
regular employees earning monthly salary/wages and not daily wage earners. The respondent
company’s manager, Amador Cabrera, retorted: “Ay wala yan walang kwenta yan.” On March
25, 2009, in the evening, a supposed problem cropped up. A misroute of cargo was reported and
the company cast the whole blame on the petitioner. It was alleged that he erroneously wrote the
label on the box – the name and destination, and allegedly was the one who checked the cargo.
The imputation is quite absurd because it was the client who actually wrote the name and
destination, whereas, it was not the petitioner but his co-employee who checked the cargo. The
following day, he received a memorandum charging him with “negligence in performing duties.”
On April 2, 2009 he was instructed by the HR manager to proceed to his former office for him to
train his replacement. The following day, an attempt to serve another memorandum was made on
him. This time he was made to explain by the HR Manager why he did not perform his former
work and not report to his reassignment. It only validated his apprehension of a set-up. For how
could he be at two places at the same time (his former work is situated in Sucat, Parañaque,
whereas, his new assignment is in FTI, Taguig City). It bears emphasizing that the directive for
him to continue discharging his former duties was merely verbal. At this point, petitioner lost his
composure. Exasperated, he refused to receive the memorandum and thus retorted “Seguro na-
abnormal na ang utak mo” as it dawned on him that they were out looking for every means
possible to pin him down. Nonetheless, he reported to his reassignment in FTI Taguig on April 3,
2009. There he was served with the memorandum suspending him from work for 30 days
effective April 4, 2009 for alleged “Serious misconduct and willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work.”
On May 4, 2009, he reported to the office only to be refused entry. Instead, a dismissal letter was
handed to him. Petitioner Maula filed a complaint against respondent Ximex and its officers for
illegal dismissal and other money claims. LA and NLRC found that petitioner was illegally
dismissed. CA reversed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maula’s inflammatory language constitutes serious misconduct which
warrants his dismissal.
HELD: NO. The Court held that respondent manifestly failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged
act constitutes serious misconduct. Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The
misconduct, to be serious within the meaning of the Labor Code, must be of such a grave and
aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Thus, for misconduct or improper
behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit
to continue working for the employer. While this Court held in past decisions that accusatory and
inflammatory language used by an employee to the employer or superior can be a ground for
dismissal or termination, the circumstances peculiar to this case find the previous rulings
inapplicable. The admittedly insulting and unbecoming language uttered by petitioner to the HR
Manager on April 3, 2009 should be viewed with reasonable leniency in light of the fact that it
was committed under an emotionally charged state. We agree with the labor arbiter and the
Page 30 of 111
NLRC that the on-the-spur-of-the-moment outburst of petitioner, he having reached his breaking
point, was due to what he perceived as successive retaliatory and orchestrated actions of
respondent. Indeed, there was only lapse in judgment rather than a premeditated defiance of
authority. Further, petitioner’s purported “thug-like” demeanor is not serious in nature. Despite
the “grave embarrassment” supposedly caused on Gorospe, she did not even take any separate
action independent of the company. Likewise, respondent did not elaborate exactly how and to
what extent that its “nature of business” and “industrial peace” were damaged by petitioner’s
misconduct. It was not shown in detail that he has become unfit to continue working for the
company and that the continuance of his services is patently inimical to respondent’s interest.
This Court likewise found the penalty of dismissal too harsh. Not every case of insubordination
or willful disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal because the
penalty to be imposed on an erring employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his or
her offense. Petitioner’s termination from employment is also inappropriate considering that he
had been with respondent company for seven (7) years and he had no previous derogatory
record. It is settled that notwithstanding the existence of a just cause, dismissal should not be
imposed, as it is too severe a penalty, if the employee had been employed for a considerable
length of time in the service of his or her employer, and such employment is untainted by any
kind of dishonesty and irregularity.
ii. No serious misconduct but there is loss of trust
1. Bravo vs. Urios College (Now Father Saturnino Urios University),

G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017
FACTS: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College. In 2002, he was
likewise designated as the school’s comptroller. For school year 2001-2002, the College
organized a committee to formulate a new ranking system for nonacademic employees, by
reason of which the position of Comptroller was classified as a middle management position. As
a result, his salary scale was adjusted to reflect the new ranking system. For the next school year
2002-2003, another committee was formed to adopt yet another new ranking system. Meanwhile,
the College decided to undertake a structural reorganization. It organized a committee to review
the ranking system implemented for 2001-2002, and it found that the ranking system caused
salary distortions among several employees, and that there were discrepancies in the salary
adjustments of some employees, including Bravo. The committee discovered that the
Comptroller’s Office solely prepared and implemented the salary adjustment schedule without
prior approval from the Human Resources Department. Thus, Bravo received a show cause
memo requiring him to explain in writing why his services should not be terminated for his
alleged acts of serious misconduct. A committee was organized to investigate, which later found
Bravo guilty of serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the sum representing
overpayment of his salary. Ten days later, he was notified of the College’s decision to terminate
his services. The Labor Arbiter dismissed his complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit,
while the NLRC found that he was illegally dismissed. The CA, on appeal, ruled that the College
had substantial basis to dismiss him from service since he occupied a highly sensitive position as
the school’s comptroller.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner Bravo’s employment was terminated for a just cause.
HELD: Yes, he was validly dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. A dismissal based
on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code
entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions: that the employee whose services are to be
terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence, and that there must be the presence of
some basis for the loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file
employee. His position of responsibility on delicate financial matters entailed a substantial
amount of trust from respondent. The entire payroll account depended on the accuracy of the
classifications made by the Comptroller. It was reasonable for the employer to trust that he had
Page 31 of 111
basis for his computations especially with respect to his own compensation. The preparation of
the payroll is a sensitive matter requiring attention to detail. Not only does the payroll involve
the company’s finances, it also affects the welfare of all other employees who rely on their
monthly salaries. Petitioner’s act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper
authorization is a clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. In addition, there was
no reason for the Comptroller’s Office to undertake the preparation of its own summary table
because this was a function that exclusively pertained to the Human Resources Department.
iii. No serious misconduct
FACTS: Respondents Nerbes and Suravilla were employees of Equitable PCI Bank (now BDO
Unibank, Inc.) (bank) and members of Equitable PCI Bank Employees Union (EPCIBEU), a
legitimate labor union and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of the bank. Petitioner bank essentially argues that it validly dismissed Nerbes and
Suravilla from employment because they committed serious misconduct and willful disobedience
when they failed to return to work despite orders for them to do so. Nerbes and Suravilla counter
that as duly-elected officers of the union they are entitled to be on full-time leave. According to
Nerbes and Suravilla, Department Order No. 09 allows them to immediately assume their
respective positions upon resolution of the election protests of the losing candidates and that the
appeal to the BLR filed by their opponents could not have stayed the execution of their
proclamation as such appeal is not the appeal contemplated under Department Order No. 09.
ISSUE: Whether Nerbes and Suravilla's refusal to report to work despite the bank's order for
them to do so constitutes disobedience of such a willful character as to justify their dismissal
from service.
HELD: No. Refusal to return to work was not characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude
to warrant dismissal. Article 296, of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for the
termination of the employment of an employee. Under Article 296(a), serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work is a just cause for dismissal. Misconduct is defined as an improper or
wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. To be a valid cause for dismissal, such misconduct must be of grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant. The misconduct must also be related to the
performance of the employee's duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the
employer and that the employee's act or conduct was performed with wrongful intent.On the
other hand, valid dismissal on the ground of willful disobedience requires the concurrence of
twin requisites: (1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or intentional, the
willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude; and (2) the order violated
must have been reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to the duties
which he had been engaged to discharge. As correctly held by the CA, the return to work order
made by the bank is reasonable and lawful, and the act required for Nerbes and Suravilla relates
to the performance of their duties. The point of contention is whether their refusal to return to
work was willful or intentional and, if so, whether such willful or intentional conduct is attended
by a wrongful and perverse attitude. In this case, Nerbes and Suravilla's failure to report for work
despite the disapproval of their application for leave was clearly intentional. However, though
their refusal to do so may have been intentional, such was not characterized by a wrongful and
perverse attitude or with deliberate disregard of their duties as such. At the time Nerbes and
Suravilla notified the bank of their intent to avail of their union leaves, they were already
proclaimed as winners and in fact took their respective oaths of office. Following the terms of
the parties' CBA, which has the strength of law as between them, Nerbes and Suravilla, as duly-
Page 32 of 111
elected union officers, were entitled to take their union leaves. That Nerbes and Suravilla were
indeed entitled to such privilege is tacitly recognized by the bank itself when it continued to pay
them their full salaries, despite not reporting for work. The Court finds that the penalty of
dismissal in this case is harsh and severe. Not every case of insubordination or willful
disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal because the penalty to
be imposed on an erring employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his or her offense.
iv. Disrespect towards superior
1. Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM Katipunan, G.R.

No. 221493, August 2, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner Sterling averred that on June 26, 2010, their supervisor Mercy Vinoya
(Vinoya), found Respondent Raymond Esponga and his co-employees about to take a nap on the
sheeter machine. She called their attention and prohibited them from taking a nap thereon for
safety reasons. Esponga and his co-employees then transferred to the mango tree near the staff
house. When Vinoya passed by the staff house, she heard Esponga utter, "Huwag maingay, puro
bawal. " She then confronted Esponga, who responded in a loud and disrespectful tone, "Puro
kayo bawal, bakit bawal ba magpahinga?” When Vinoya turned away, Esponga gave her the
"dirty finger" sign in front of his co-employees and said "Wala ka pala eh, puro ka dakdak. Baka
pag ako nagsalita hindi mo kayanin. " After being served a notice to explain and several
hearings, Sterling dismissed Esponga for gross and serious misconduct. In the illegal dismissal
case filed by Esponga, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Esponga, stating that Sterling failed to
discharge the burden of proof. NLRC reversed the ruling, stating that the acts of Esponga were
all violations of the Company Code of Conduct. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
NLRC’s ruling, stating that the utterances and gesture did not constitute gross misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether the cause of esponga’s dismissal amounts to serious misconduct.
HELD: YES. Under Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code, serious misconduct by the employee
justifies the employer in terminating his or her employment. Misconduct is defined as an
improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not
mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal within the text and meaning
of Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employee's misconduct must be serious, i.e., of such grave
and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Additionally, the misconduct
must be related to the performance of the employee's duties showing him to be unfit to continue
working for the employer. Further, and equally important and required, the act or conduct must
have been performed with wrongful intent. To summarize, for misconduct or improper behavior
to be a just cause for dismissal, the following elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be
serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee
has become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed
with wrongful intent. In the case at bench, the charge of serious misconduct is duly substantiated
by the evidence on record. Primarily, in a number of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that
the utterance of obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior is not only destructive of
the morale of his co-employees and a violation of the company rules and regulations, but also
constitutes gross misconduct. In de La Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
dismissed employee shouted, "Sayang ang pagka-professional mo!" and "Putang ina mo" at the
company physician when the latter refused to give him a referral slip. Likewise, in Autobus
Workers' Union (AWU) v. National Labor Relations Commission, the dismissed employee told
his supervisor "Gago ka" and taunted the latter by saying, "Bakit anong gusto mo, tang ina mo."
Moreover, in Asian Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor, the
dismissed employee made false and malicious statements against the foreman (his superior) by
telling his co-employees: "If you don't give a goat to the foreman, you will be terminated. If you
want to remain in this company, you have to give a goat." The dismissed employee therein
likewise posted a notice in the comfort room of the company premises, which read: "Notice to all
Sander — Those who want to remain in this company, you must give anything to your foreman."
Page 33 of 111
In Reynolds Philippines Corporation v. Eslava, the dismissed employee circulated several letters
to the members of the company's board of directors calling the executive vice-president and
general manager a "big fool," "anti-Filipino" and accusing him of "mismanagement, inefficiency,
lack of planning and foresight, petty favoritism, dictatorial policies, one-man rule, contemptuous
attitude to labor, anti-Filipino utterances and activities." Hence, it is well-settled that accusatory
and inflammatory language used by an employee towards his employer or superior can be a
ground for dismissal or termination. Further, Esponga's assailed conduct was related to his work.
Vinoya did not prohibit him from taking a nap. She merely reminded him that he could not do so
on the sheeter machine for safety reasons. Esponga's acts reflect an unwillingness to comply with
reasonable management directives. Finally, contrary to the CA's pronouncement, the Court finds
that Esponga was motivated by wrongful intent. To reiterate, Vinoya prohibited Esponga from
sleeping on the sheeter machine. Later on, when Vinoya was passing by, Esponga uttered
"Huwag maingay, puro bawal." When she confronted him, he retorted "Puro kayo bawal, bakit
bawal ba magpahinga?" Not contented, Esponga gave her supervisor the "dirty finger" sign and
said "Wala ka pala eh, puro ka dakdak. Baka pag ako nagsalita hindi mo kayanin." It must be
noted that he committed all these acts in front of his co-employees, which evidently showed that
he intended to disrespect and humiliate his supervisor. "An aggrieved employee who wants to
unburden himself of his disappointments and frustrations in his job or relations with his
immediate superior would normally approach said superior directly or otherwise ask some other
officer possibly to mediate and discuss the problem with the end in view of settling their
differences without causing ferocious conflicts. No matter how the employee dislikes his
employer professionally, and even if he is in a confrontational disposition, he cannot afford to be
disrespectful and dare to talk with an unguarded tongue and/or with a baleful pen."
e. Willful disobedience
i. Disobedience is not willful
from service.\
HELD: NO. Refusal to return to work was not characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude
Page 34 of 111
ii. Penalty is too harsh
from service.
HELD: NO. Refusal to return to work was not characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude
Page 35 of 111
It is settled that notwithstanding the existence of a just cause, dismissal should not be imposed,
as it is too severe a penalty, if the employee had been employed for a considerable length of time
in the service of his or her employer, and such employment is untainted by any kind of
dishonesty and irregularity.We note that aside from the subject incident, Nerbes and Suravilla
were not previously charged with any other offense or irregularity. Considering the surrounding
facts, termination of Nerbes and Suravilla's services was a disproportionately heavy penalty.
f. Totality of Infractions
i. Maula vs. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., G.R. No. 207838, January 25,
2017
FACTS: Petitioner Maula was hired by respondent as Operation Staff. His duties include, but are
not limited to, documentation, checker, dispatcher or air freight coordinator. Respondent
contends that aside from petitioner’s disrespectful remark against Gorospe, he also committed
several prior intentional misconduct, to wit: erroneous packaging of a cargo of respondent’s
client, abandoning work after logging in, failing to teach the rudiments of his job to the new
employees assigned to his group despite orders from his superior, and refusing to accept the
management’s order on the transfer of assignment.
ISSUE: Whether or not the doctrine of infractions is applicable to the instant case.
HELD: NO. The Court held that respondent cannot invoke the principle of totality of infractions
considering that petitioner’s alleged previous acts of misconduct were not established in
accordance with the requirements of procedural due process. In fact, respondent conceded that he
“was not even censured for any infraction in the past.” It admitted that “the March 25, 2009
incident that petitioner was referring to could not be construed as laying the predicate for his
dismissal, because he was not penalized for the misrouting incident when he had adequately and
satisfactorily explained his side. Neither was he penalized for the other memoranda previously or
subsequently issued to him.”
g. Disability Benefits
Page 36 of 111
i. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. Crown Ship management Inc. vs. De

Leon, G.R. No. 199977, January 25, 2017
FACTS: Respondent Wilfredo T. de Leon worked for petitioner Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc. (Scanmar) as a seafarer aboard the vessels of its principal, Crown Shipmanagement, Inc. He
was repatriated on 13 September 2005 after completing his nine-month Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract. For 22 years in the service, there
was no account of any ailment he had contracted. Prior to his next deployment, De Leon reported
to Scanmar's office on 17 November 2005 for a pre-employment medical examination. Noticing
that respondent dragged his right leg, the company physician referred him to a neurologist for
consultation, management, and clearance. In the meantime, the status of respondent in his
Medical Examination Certificate was marked "pending." Thereafter, Scanmar no longer heard
from De Leon. Two years later, in December 2007, it received a letter from him asking for
disability benefits amounting to USD60,000. It did not reply to the letter, prompting him to file a
Complaint with the LA for disability benefits and attorney's fees. In response, petitioners raised
three main contentions. First, they belied the claim of respondent that he experienced an illness
aboard M/V Thuleland, given the absence of any such entry in the vessel's logbook. Second,
petitioners highlighted the fact that when he disembarked, De Leon did not complain of any
illness, request medical assistance, or submit himself to a post-employment medical examination
within three days from his disembarkation, as required by his POEA Contract. Third, petitioners
asserted that he had failed to address his "pending" status and to follow the company physician's
advice for him to consult a neurologist. The LA ruled in favor of De Leon, awarding him USD
60,000 disability benefits and attorney's fees. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Leon is entitled to disability benefits.
HELD: NO. To be entitled to disability benefits, this Court refers to the provisions of the POEA
Contract, as it sets forth the minimum rights of a seafarer and the concomitant obligations of an
employer. Under Section 20 (B) thereof, these are the requirements for compensability: (1) the
seafarer must have submitted to a mandatory post-employment medical examination within three
working days upon return; (2) the injury must have existed during the term of the seafarer's
employment contract; and (3) the injury must be work-related. De Leon reneged on his
obligation to submit to a post-employment medical examination within three days from
disembarkation. The LA, the NLRC, and the CA excused him from complying with this
requirement, reasoning that he had not been medically repatriated. This excuse does not hold
water. In the past, the Court has consistently held that the three-day rule must be observed by all
those claiming disability benefits, including seafarers who disembarked upon the completion of
contract. The rationale for the rule is that reporting the illness or injury within three days from
repatriation fairly makes it easier for a physician to determine the cause of the illness or injury.
De Leon did not prove that he had suffered his injury during the term of his contract. In the
recital of their rulings, none of the tribunals a quo discussed any particular sickness that De Leon
suffered while at sea, which was a factual question that should have been for the labor tribunals
to resolve. In this case, respondent adduced insufficient proof that he experienced his injury or its
symptoms during the term of his contract. De Leon failed to show that his injury was work-
related. Applying the same analytical method to the case at bar, this Court observes that all the
tribunals below relied on the mere fact of the 22-year employment of De Leon as the causative
factor that triggered his radiculopathy. They did not even specify his duties as a seafarer
throughout his employment. Not only did claimant fail to portray his actual work; he also failed
to describe the nature, extent, and treatment of his radiculopathy. Drs. Reyes, Luna, Geslani, and
Guevara, who issued medical opinions on his condition, stated that their patient was unfit for sea
service without discussing what caused his injury.
Page 37 of 111
ii. Compensation for disability
1. Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc., and Maersk Co. IOM Ltd. vs. Ramos,
G.R. No. 184256, January 18, 2017
FACTS: The petitioners had employed the respondent as an Able Seaman without interruption
since 1995. They had redeployed him each time under a new contract upon being subjected to
the Physical Employment Medical Examination (PEME) that always found him fit for work. For
his last employment contract, he was again hired by the petitioners as an Able Seaman on board
the vessel M/S Laura Maersk. He suddenly felt pain in his lower back and abdomen while in the
performance of his duty. He also experienced difficulty and pain when urinating. He reported his
condition to his superior officer, who brought him to the Dulsco Medical Clinic in Dubai, which,
upon medical examination, diagnosed his condition as "Dysuria, with loin pain and back pain."
He was treated thereat, and was later on discharged and allowed to return to the vessel. However,
despite treatment in Dubai, his condition did not improve but became worse. He was medically
repatriated and was disembarked on January 12, 2013. The company designated physicians, Dr.
Karen Frances Hao-Quan (Dr. Quan) and Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim), referred him to an
urologist. On further evaluation of his health condition, the respondent was diagnosed to be
suffering from kidney stones and vertigo. He went to St. Luke's Medical Center where he was
diagnosed to be suffering with nephrolithiasis, diabetic nephropathy, osteoarthritis, lumbosacral
spine radiculopathy, and benign positional vertigo. Dr. Jacinto issued a medical assessment in
writing declaring the respondent's condition as rendering him physically unfit to return to work
as a seafarer. Subsequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Arbitration Office of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to recover permanent disability compensation
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), payment of sick wages for 120 days,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and other benefits under the law. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in respondent’s favor. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to disability benefits considering that he did
not give any notice to the petitioner of his intent to secure the medical opinion of a third
physician.
HELD: NO. Under the POEA-SEC, when the seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury
while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work should be determined by the
company-designated physician. However, if the physician appointed by the seafarer makes a
finding contrary to that of the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third physician
might be agreed upon jointly by the employer and the seafarer, and the third physician's decision
would be final and binding on both parties. In this case, the records do not indicate that the
parties jointly sought the opinion of a third physician for the determination and assessment of the
respondent's disability or the absence thereof. The failure of the respondent to give notice to the
petitioners of his intent to submit himself to a third physician for evaluation negated the need for
the determination by a third physician. For this reason, the filing of the respondent's claim for
disability was premature. The need for the evaluation of the respondent's condition by the third
physician arose after his physician declared him unfit for seafaring duties. He could not initiate
his claim for disability solely on that basis. He should have instead set in motion the process of
submitting himself to the assessment by the third physician by first serving the notice of his
intent to do so on the petitioners.
iii. Disability refers to loss or impairment of earning capacity and not to pain or
injury
G.R. No. 184256, January 18, 2017
FACTS: The petitioners had employed the respondent as an Able Seaman without interruption
since 1995. They had redeployed him each time under a new contract upon being subjected to
Page 38 of 111
the Physical Employment Medical Examination (PEME) that always found him fit for work. For
his last employment contract, he was again hired by the petitioners as an Able Seaman on board
the vessel M/S Laura Maersk. He suddenly felt pain in his lower back and abdomen while in the
performance of his duty. He also experienced difficulty and pain when urinating. He reported his
condition to his superior officer, who brought him to the Dulsco Medical Clinic in Dubai, which,
upon medical examination, diagnosed his condition as "Dysuria, with loin pain and back pain."
He was treated thereat, and was later on discharged and allowed to return to the vessel. However,
despite treatment in Dubai, his condition did not improve but became worse. He was medically
repatriated and was disembarked on January 12, 2013. The companydesignated physicians, Dr.
Karen Frances Hao-Quan (Dr. Quan) and Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim), referred him to an
urologist. On further evaluation of his health condition, the respondent was diagnosed to be
suffering from kidney stones and vertigo. He went to St. Luke's Medical Center where he was
diagnosed to be suffering with nephrolithiasis, diabetic nephropathy, osteoarthritis, lumbosacral
spine radiculopathy, and benign positional vertigo. Dr. Jacinto issued a medical assessment in
writing declaring the respondent's condition as rendering him physically unfit to return to work
as a seafarer. Subsequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Arbitration Office of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to recover permanent disability compensation
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), payment of sick wages for 120 days,
moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and other benefits under the law. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in respondent’s favor. The CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to disability benefits considering that he did
not give any notice to the petitioner of his intent to secure the medical opinion of a third
physician.
HELD: NO. Under the POEA-SEC, when the seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury
while on board the vessel, his fitness or unfitness for work should be determined by the
company-designated physician. However, if the physician appointed by the seafarer makes a
finding contrary to that of the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third physician
might be agreed upon jointly by the employer and the seafarer, and the third physician's decision
would be final and binding on both parties. In this case, the records do not indicate that the
parties jointly sought the opinion of a third physician for the determination and assessment of the
respondent's disability or the absence thereof. The failure of the respondent to give notice to the
petitioners of his intent to submit himself to a third physician for evaluation negated the need for
the determination by a third physician. For this reason, the filing of the respondent's claim for
disability was premature. The need for the evaluation of the respondent's condition by the third
physician arose after his physician declared him unfit for seafaring duties. He could not initiate
his claim for disability solely on that basis. He should have instead set in motion the process of
submitting himself to the assessment by the third physician by first serving the notice of his
intent to do so on the petitioners.
iv. Permanent Total Disability
1. Hoegh Fleet Services Phils., Inc., vs. Turallo, G.R. No. 230481, July
26, 2017
FACTS: On 9 November 2012, petitioners hired Turallo as a Messman on board vessel "Hoegh
Tokyo" for nine (9) months. Sometime in September 2013 while on board the vessel, Turallo felt
pain on the upper back of his body and chest pain, which was reported to his superiors on 23
September 2013, as evidenced by the "Incident/Accidents Personnel" signed by Turallo's
department head and the master of the vessel. On 24 September 2013, Turallo was referred to a
doctor by the ship's captain. Said referral also mentioned that Turallo was discharged from the
ship on 23 September 2013. Upon arrival in Manila, Turallo was referred to the company-
designated physician, diagnosed Turallo with "Acromioclavicular Joint Arthritis; Bicep Tear and
Cuff Tear, Left Shoulder; Cervical Spondylosis Secondary to C4-C5, C5-C6; Disc Protrusion;
Rule Out Ischemic Heart Disease." On 23 May and 2 June 2014, grievance proceedings were
held between the parties at the AMOSUP, where the petitioners offered the amount of Thirty
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty One US Dollars (US$30,231.00) corresponding to a Grade 8
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disability compensation based on the maximum amount of Ninety Thousand US Dollars

(US$90,000.00). Turallo, however, proposed the settlement amount of Sixty Thousand US
Dollars (US$60,000.00). The parties failed to reach an agreement. Turallo then filed a Notice to
Arbitrate with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. At this point, petitioners increased
their offer from Thirty Thousand Two Hundred Thirty One US Dollars (US$30,231.00) to Fifty
Thousand US Dollars (US$50,000.00) plus allowances for further medical treatments and
expenses. Turallo, however still refused to accept such amount. Despite efforts to arrive at an
agreement, the parties failed to settle their differences, hence, they were directed to submit their
pleadings and evidence for the resolution of the issues before the panel of arbitrators.
ISSUE: Whether or not Turillo is considered totally and permanently disabled.
HELD: YES, as provided for in the POEA-SEC law. Under Section 32 thereof, Turallo is
entitled
to a total and permanent disability compensation. Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC,
only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and
permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14,
hence, partial and permanent, would incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties
for a period of more than 120 or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment,
then he is, under legal contemplation, totally and permanently disabled. In other words, an
impediment should be characterized as partial and permanent not only under the Schedule of
Disabilities found in Section 32 of the POEA-SEC but should be so under the relevant provisions
of the Labor Code and the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC) implementing
Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code. That while the seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he is
not precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that he
is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in
gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed
totally and permanently disabled. Moreover, the company-designated physician is expected to
arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the
period of 120 or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition
remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
2. 120-day rule; 240-day rule
a. Crystal Shipping doctrine
i. Atienza vs. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No.
191049, August 7, 2017
FACTS: In the course of his employment contract, petitioner complained of severe headaches,
nausea, and double vision which the foreign port doctors diagnosed to be right cavernous sinus
inflammation or Tolosa Hunt Syndrome (THS). As a result, petitioner was repatriated on
February 4, 2005 and referred to a company-designated physician, Doctor Nicomedes G. Cruz
(Dr. Cruz), who confirmed the findings and advised him to continue the medication prescribed
by the foreign doctors. On June 28, 2005, Dr. Cruz issued a certification declaring petitioner fit
to resume work. Dissatisfied, petitioner consulted an independent physician, Dr. Paul Matthew
D. Pasco (Dr. Pasco), who, on the other hand, assessed his illness as a Grade IV disability and
declared him unfit for sea duty.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s disability is compensable?
HELD: YES. In the case at bar, petitioner was found by both the company-designated and
independent physicians to have This during the term of his employment contract that caused his
eventual repatriation on February 4, 2005. This is a rare neurologic disorder characterized by
severe headache and pain often preceding weakness and painful paralysis of certain eye muscles.
Its exact cause was unknown but the disease was thought to be associated with inflammation of
the area behind the eyes. A possible risk factor for THS is a recent viral infection. Considering
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further his constant exposure to different temperature and unpredictable weather conditions that
accompanied his work on board an ocean-going vessel, the likelihood to suffer a viral infection -
a possible risk factor is not far from impossible, more so when no less than petitioner's
independent physician, Dr. Pasco, diagnosed him to be suffering from cavernous sinus. In this
case, the NLRC failed to account for the foregoing rules on seafarers' compensation and instead,
cavalierly dismissed petitioner's claim on the supposition that petitioner failed to show a
reasonable connection between his illness and his work as an Able Seaman, even if the records
show otherwise. More significantly, the NLRC did not account for the employer's failure to
comply with the 120 day-rule, by virtue of which the law conclusively presumes the seafarer's
disability to be total and permanent. Thus, for these reasons, the Court finds that the NLRC's
ruling is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and hence, should have been corrected by the CA
through certiorari. Accordingly, the CA's ruling must be reversed and set aside.
b. Filing before the lapse of 120 days
i. Status Maritime Corporation and Admibros Ship management Co.,

Ltd. vs. Doctolero, G.R. No. 198968, January 18, 2017
FACTS: On July 28, 2006, Status Maritime hired Doctolero as Chief Officer on board the vessel
M/V Dimitris Manios. On October 28, 2006, while Doctolero was on board, he experienced
chest and abdominal pains. He was brought to a medical clinic in Vera Cruz, Mexico and no
clear diagnosis was made then he resumed work on board the vessel. However, in the evening of
the same day he complained again of abdominal pain, which he was brought to Clinic San Luis
in Mexico, and he was diagnosed from “Esophago-Gastritis-Duodenitis”. Based on the
assessment of the attending physician, Dr, Jorge Hernandez Bustor recommended for his
repatriation. On November 16, 2006, the company designated physician evaluated Doctolero’s
condition and found normal diagnostic tests. On January 22, 2007, Doctolero filed a complaint in
the (NLRC) National Labor Relation Commission demanding the petitioner for payment of total
and permanent disability benefits, reimbursement of hospital expenses, sick wage allowance,
moral and exemplary damages and legal interest on his claims, on account of illness suffered
while working on board. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and the
initial diagnosis of gastro-duodenitis was not listed as an occupational illness in the POEA-SEC
and no evidence that shows such illness is aggravated by the working conditions on board of the
vessel. On appeal, the NLRC found no basis for award of sickness allowance and disability pay.
But the petitioner are ordered to reimburse the respondent’s cost of his medical treatment. The
respondent assailed the decision of the NLRC in the Court of Appeals, and ordered the petitioner
to pay the permanent and total disability benefits, moral exemplary damages, reimbursement of
the hospital expenses in Mexico City, legal interest on the monetary awards, sick wage
allowance and attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Doctolero is entitled to claim the permanent and total disability benefits
from the petitioner.
HELD: NO. Since permanent and total disability as defined in Article 198 (c) (1) of the Labor
Code, to wit, (c) The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent; (1) Temporary
total disability lasting continuously for more than 120 days except as otherwise provided for in
the Rules. In order for a seafarer claim for total and permanent disability benefits to prosper, any
of the following conditions shall be present: 1. The company-designated physician failed to issue
a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-
day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary
total disability hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days. 2. 240 days had lapsed
without any certification issued by the company designated physician. 3. The company-
designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240 days period, as
the case may be, but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under section 20-B (3) of the
POEA-SEC are a contrary opinion. 4. The company-designated physician acknowledged that he
is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with
his employer, believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well. 5. The
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company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is
a dispute on disability grading. 6. The company-designated physician determined that his
medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-
choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B (3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise
and declared him unfit to work. 7. The company-designated physician declared him totally and
permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits. 8. The
company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-
day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said
periods. The Supreme Court ruled the reversal and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals
awarding permanent disability benefits to the respondent and reinstate the decision of NLRC and
order the respondent to pay the costs of suit.
c. Caderao vs. Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al./Senator Crewing
(Manila), Inc., et al. vs. Caderao, G.R. No. 224532/G.R. No. 224565, June 21,
2017
FACTS: Aquanaut is among SCMI's foreign principals. Balatero was initially engaged by the
respondents as an able-bodied seaman on April 12, 1997. He had worked his way up to become
2nd Officer and had boarded 18 of the respondents' ships. On December 22, 2013, Balatero
experienced chest pains, with palpitations and shortness of breath. On January 2, 2014, Balatero
suffered from similar symptoms. He was taken to Odense University Hospital (Odense) in
Denmark, diagnosed to have an elevated blood pressure, prescribed anti-hypertensive medicines,
and discharged thereafter. Balatero disembarked from the ship and arrived in Manila for post-
medical examination and was referred to Metropolitan Medical Center under the care of
company-designated physician, Dr. Richard Olalia (Dr. Olalia). In the Medical Report dated
January 8, 2014, Dr. Olalia found Balatero to be suffering from "Uncontrolled Hypertension;
Unstable Angina; To Consider Coronary Artery Disease [CAD]; Dyslipidemia," the etiologies of
which were multi-factorial but not work-related. Balatero filed before the NLRC a complaint for
permanent total disability compensation, sickness allowance, damages and attorney's fees. The
LA granted the petition of Balatero. The LA, however, denied Balatero 's claim for moral and
exemplary damages, as there was inadequate evidence of bad faith on the part of the respondents.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. The CA, however, denying Balatero' s
claims for permanent total disability compensation and attorney's fees, and ordering SCMI and
Aquanaut to solidarily pay him the amount of US$20,900.00 corresponding to Grade 7 Disability
Rating benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not Balatero is entitled to permanent total disability compensation.
HELD: YES. Balatero is entitled to such compensation. Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC,
only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and
permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14,
not precluded from earning [or] doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that
he is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging
in gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed
remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled. In Balatero's
case, the company-designated doctor had made a final Grade 7 Disability Rating beyond 120
days from repatriation. In legal contemplation, such partial disability was by then already
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deemed permanent. As a result thereof, the issue of non-referral to a third doctor is rendered
inconsequential. The Court notes too that as pointed out by Balatero, Department of Health
(DOH) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2007-0025 recommends non-issuance of fit-to-work
certifications to seafarers "with acute or chronic cardiovascular condition limiting physical
activity, requiring more than two (2) maintenance oral medicines and close monitoring, or
causing significant disability," specifically those (1) suffering from CAD, (2) has undergone
Coronary Angioplasty within six months, with history of Uncontrolled Diabetes Mellitus,
Hypertension and Dyslipidemia, and (3) Hypertension requiring three or more drugs, among
others. Balatero falls within the foregoing category.fac It also bears stressing that jurisprudence
is replete with doctrines granting permanent total disability compensation to seafarers, who
suffered from either cardiovascular diseases or hypertension, and were under the treatment of or
issued fit-to-work certifications by company-designated doctors beyond 120 or 240 days from
their repatriation.
d. Hoegh Fleet Services Phils., Inc., vs. Turallo, G.R. No. 230481, July 26, 2017
FACTS: On 9 November 2012, petitioners hired Turallo as a Messman on board vessel "Hoegh
Tokyo" for nine (9) months. Sometime in September 2013 while on board the vessel, Turallo felt
pain on the upper back of his body and chest pain, which was reported to his superiors on 23
September 2013, as evidenced by the "Incident/Accidents Personnel" signed by Turallo's
department head and the master of the vessel. On 24 September 2013, Turallo was referred to a
doctor by the ship's captain. Said referral also mentioned that Turallo was discharged from the
ship on 23 September 2013. Upon arrival in Manila, Turallo was referred to the company-
designated physician, diagnosed Turallo with "Acromioclavicular Joint Arthritis; Bicep Tear and
Cuff Tear, Left Shoulder; Cervical Spondylosis Secondary to C4-C5, C5-C6; Disc Protrusion;
Rule Out Ischemic Heart Disease." On 23 May and 2 June 2014, grievance proceedings were
held between the parties at the AMOSUP, where the petitioners offered the amount of Thirty
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty One US Dollars (US$30,231.00) corresponding to a Grade 8
disability compensation based on the maximum amount of Ninety Thousand US Dollars
(US$90,000.00). Turallo, however, proposed the settlement amount of Sixty Thousand US
Dollars (US$60,000.00). The parties failed to reach an agreement. Turallo then filed a Notice to
Arbitrate with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. At this point, petitioners increased
their offer from Thirty Thousand Two Hundred Thirty One US Dollars (US$30,231.00) to Fifty
Thousand US Dollars (US$50,000.00) plus allowances for further medical treatments and
expenses. Turallo, however still refused to accept such amount. Despite efforts to arrive at an
agreement, the parties failed to settle their differences, hence, they were directed to submit their
pleadings and evidence for the resolution of the issues before the panel of arbitrators.
ISSUE: Whether or not Turillo is considered totally and permanently disabled.
HELD: YES, as provided for in the POEA-SEC law. Under Section 32 thereof, Turallo is
entitled to a total and permanent disability compensation. Indeed, under Section 32 of the POEA-
SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total
and permanent. However, if those injuries or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14,
not precluded from earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that he
is accustomed or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in
gainful employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed
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remains unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
e. TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. vs. Patino, G.R. No. 210289, March 20, 2017
FACTS: TSM, for and in behalf of its foreign principal, DNAS, entered into a Contract of
Employment6 with respondent for a period of six months as GP2/OS (General Purpose
2/Ordinary Seaman) for the vessel Nord Nightingale. On May 20, 2010, while working on board
the vessel, respondent injured his right hand while securing a mooring rope. He was brought to a
medical facility in Istanbul, Turkey, where X-ray showed a fracture on his 5th metacarpal bone.
Respondent's right hand was placed in a cast and thereafter he was repatriated. Upon arrival in
Manila on May 24, 2010, petitioners referred respondents to the company-designated physician,
Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), for further treatment. After extensive medical treatments,
therapy, and follow-up examinations, Dr. Cruz, on August 17, 2010, rendered an interim
assessment of respondent's disability under the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
- Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC),8 at Grade 10, or loss of grasping power for
small objects between the fold of the finger of one hand. In his position paper, respondent asked
for permanent total disability benefits in the sum of US$80,000.00 under the Associated Marine
Officers and Seamen's Union of the Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement (AMOSUP
CBA) since, according to him, he never recovered completely nor returned to his usual duties
and responsibilities, as attested by the medical findings of Dr. Escutin, his own physician.
Petitioners, however, claimed that respondent is only entitled to US$10,075.00 corresponding to
Grade 10 disability under the POEA-SEC, as assessed, on the other hand, by Dr. Cruz who made
an extensive evaluation of respondent's injury. They maintained that this assessment deserves
greater weight than the belated medical report rendered by Dr. Escutin after a single examination
on respondent. Petitioners also stressed that respondent cannot claim benefits under the CBA
since he has not proven that he is a member of AMOSUP.
ISSUE: Whether or not Patino is entitled to total and permanent disability.
HELD: NO. Respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability compensation. "To
stress, the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-
designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of
the said period, he fails to make such declaration." In the absence of a third and binding opinion,
the Court has no option but to hold Dr. Cruz's assessment of respondent's disability final and
binding. On the basis of the medical records and the results obtained from the medical treatments
Dr. Cruz arrived at a definite assessment of respondent's condition. Having extensively
monitored and treated respondent's injury, the company-designated physician’s diagnosis
deserves more weight than respondent's own doctor. In sum, respondent is not entitled to total
and permanent disability compensation. The filing of his complaint is premature and in breach of
his contractual obligation with the petitioners. Dr. Cruz's Grade 10 disability rating prevails for
failure to properly dispute it in accordance with an agreed procedure. Respondent is thus entitled
to the amount corresponding to Grade 10 based on the certification issued by Dr. Cruz.
f. Aldaba vs. Career Philippines, Ship management, Inc., Columbia Ship

Management Ltd., and/or g. Verlou Carmelito, G.R. No. 218842, June 21,
2017
FACTS: Petitioner was hired by the respondent as a seafarer on one of its ships. In the
performance of his duties, petitioner was accidentally hit by metal chains where he fell and
sustained back injuries. Petitioner was examined in Hongkong where he was declared unfit to
work and was repatriated. Upon his arrival to Manila, he was referred to the company-designated
physician and was given a grade 8 disability. Petitioner sought an orthopedic surgeon and was
diagnosed of permanent disability. Petitioner demanded for benefits of permanent disability but
respondents did not heed the demands. Petitioner filed to the courts praying for permanent
disability benefits.
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ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled permanent disability benefits.
HELD: YES, petitioner is entitled to permanent diasability benefits. In Elburg Shipmanagement

Phils., Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., 28 this Court set forth the following guidelines, to wit: 1. The
company-designated physician must issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer's disability
grading within a period of 120 days from the time the seafarer reported to him; 2. If the
company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days, without
any justifiable reason, then the seafarer's disability becomes permanent and total; 3. If the
company-designated physician fails to give his assessment within the period of 120 days with a
sufficient justification (e.g. seafarer required further medical treatment or seafarer was
uncooperative), then the period of diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The
employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period; and 4. If the company-designated physician still fails to give
his assessment within the extended period of 240 days, then the seafarer's disability becomes
permanent and total, regardless of any justification. In the present case, the company-designated
physician was only able to issue a certification declaring respondent to be entitled to a disability
rating of Grade 8 on the 163rd day that petitioner was undergoing continuous medical treatment,
which is beyond the period of 120 days, without justifiable reason. It must be remembered that
the employer has the burden to prove that the company-designated physician has sufficient
justification to extend the period. In this case, the respondents failed to do so. Therefore, the
company-designated physician, failing to give his assessment within the period of 120 days,
without justifiable reason, makes the disability of petitioner permanent and total.
g. Gomez vs. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 220002, August 2,
2017
FACTS: Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., in behalf of its principal, Golden Union Shipping
Company, hired petitioner Eugenio M. Gomez as an Ordinary Seaman in the vessel M/V Elena
VE for a period of 11 months, with a basic monthly compensation of US$583.00. On February
29, 2012, at about 8:00 a.m., the Chief Officer of the vessel told petitioner to remove the ice
from the lower and upper decks of the ship. While performing this task, petitioner accidentally
slipped and hit his lower back on the steel deck. Petitioner was immediately in pain, but thought
it was just temporary. He rested a moment and then continued to work despite the pain. He
reported the incident to his superior when he asked for pain relievers. On July 24, 2012, the
company-designated doctor, Dr. Ma. Dolores Tay, submitted a medical report16 to Captain
Eleazar Diaz, president of respondent Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., stating that petitioner
can walk without difficulty, but petitioner complained about a mild pain on the left buttock area
on prolonged sitting or standing; mild activities are allowed; and the interim disability
assessment is Grade 8 based on the POEA Contract Schedule of Disability. The Labor Arbiter
held that petitioner was permanently and totally disabled and that he could no longer resume sea
duty. The Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner's employment was covered by the ITF Uniform
"TCC" Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), and petitioner is entitled to disability
compensation under Section 21 (a) and (b) thereof in the amount of US$156,816.00. The NLRC
affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is totally and permanently disabled.
HELD: NO. A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the
company-designated physician within the periods he/she is allowed to do so, or upon the
expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either
fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In this case, the treatment of the
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petitioner's injury required spine surgery and physical therapy which extended beyond the initial
120-day period into the maximum 240-day treatment period. The company-designated doctor's
medical report dated September 11, 2017 (made 195 days from the time petitioner was injured on
February 29, 2012) stated that petitioner failed the functional capacity test and recommended that
petitioner continue therapy for two to three months. Petitioner filed his complaint on September
13, 2012 or 197 days from the date he was injured, and, therefore, before the lapse of the
maximum 240-day treatment period within which the company-designated physician should
assess the fitness of petitioner to return to work. Since the company-designated doctor has not
declared that petitioner is not fit to work within the 240-day period, and the 240-day period has
not lapsed when petitioner filed his complaint, the petitioner cannot be legally presumed as
permanently and totally disabled to be entitled to permanent total disability. To reiterate, the rule
is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated
physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the same,
he/she fails to make such declaration.
3. When findings of company physician prevail
a. Jebsens Maritime, Inc., et al. vs. Rapiz, G.R. No. 218871. January 11,
2017
FACTS: On March 16, 2011, Jebsens, on behalf of its foreign principal, Sea Chefs, engaged the
services of respondent to work on board the M/V Mercury as a buffet cook for a period of nine
(9) months with a basic monthly salary of $501.00. On March 30, 2011, respondent boarded the
said vessel. However, in September 2011, respondent was diagnosed with “Tendovaginitis
Dequevain” which caused his medical repatriation since it was not possible for him to work
without using his right forearm. On October 14, 2011, respondent was repatriated to the
Philippines and after a lengthy treatment, the company-designated physician gave him a
disability rating of Grade 11. Dissatisfied, respondent consulted an independent physician, who
classified his condition as a Grade 10 disability. Thereafter, respondent requested petitioners to
pay him total and permanent disability benefits, which the latter did not heed, thus, constraining
the former to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
(NCMB). As the parties failed to amicably settle the case, the parties submitted the same to the
Office of the Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (VA) for adjudication. Respondent argued that he is
entitled to permanent and total disability benefits as he was unable to work as a cook for a period
of 120 days from his medical repatriation. On the other hand, petitioners maintained that
respondent is only entitled to Grade 11 disability benefits pursuant to the classification made by
the company-designated physician. The Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators ruled in respondent’s
favor which was later on affirmed by the CA. Petitioner’s moved for reconsideration, which was,
however, denied in a Resolution dated June 5, 2015; hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held that respondent is entitled to permanent and total
HELD: The petition is meritorious. In the case at bar, the VA and the CA’s award of permanent
and total disability benefits in respondent’s favor was heavily anchored on his failure to obtain
any gainful employment for more than 120 days after his medical repatriation. However, in Ace
Navigation Company v. Garcia, the Court explained that the companydesignated physician is
given an additional 120 days, or a total of 240 days from repatriation, to give the seafarer further
treatment and, thereafter, make a declaration as to the nature of the latter’s disability. A
temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the company physician
within the period he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical
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treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent
disability. In the present case, while the initial 120- day treatment or temporary total disability
period was exceeded, the companydesignated doctor duly made a declaration well within the
extended 240-day period that the petitioner was fit to work. In Elburg Ship Management Phils.
Inc. v. Quiogue, Jr., the Court further clarified that for the company-designated physician to avail
of the extended 240-day period, he must first perform some significant act to justify an
extension; otherwise, the seafarer’s disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent
and total. Accordingly, the Court laid down the following guidelines that shall govern seafarer’s
claims for permanent and total disability benefits: (1) the company-designated physician must
issue a final medical assessment on the seafarer’s disability grading within a period of 120 days
from the time the seafarer reported to him; (2) if the company-designated physician fails to give
his assessment within the period of 120 days, without any justifiable reason, then the seafarer’s
disability becomes permanent and total; (3) if the company-designated physician fails to give his
assessment within the period of 120 days with a sufficient justification, then the period of
diagnosis and treatment shall be extended to 240 days. The employer has the burden to prove
that the companydesignated physician has sufficient justification to extend the period; and (4) if
the company-designated physician still fails to give his assessment within the extended period of
240 days, then the seafarer’s disability becomes permanent and total, regardless of any
justification.
4. Findings of company physician vs. private doctor
a. Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., G.R. No. 212098,
July 26, 2017
FACTS: On June 21, 2011, petitioner Julio C. Espere was hired as a Bosun, a ship's officer in
charge of equipment and the crew by respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. (NFD)
for and on behalf of its foreign principal Target Ship Management Pte Ltd. on board the vessel M
V. Kalpana Prem, for a period of nine (9) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$730.00.
Prior to his employment and embarkation, petitioner underwent a Pre-Employment Medical
Examination where he was pronounced "Fit For Sea Duty." Around five (5) months into his
deployment, petitioner complained that he was feeling dizzy, had body malaise and chills. In
Vancouver, Canada, he was diagnosed of suffering from "uncontrolled hypertension, malaise,
NYD, and psychosomatic illness". He was also declared unfit for duty and was repatriated back
to the Philippines. On May 16, 2012, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents claiming
disability benefits for permanent disability and damages. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
but the NLRC favored the employee. During the pendency of the petition before the CA, the LA,
on July 30, 2013, issued a Writ of Execution. In compliance with the writ, respondents deposited
the judgment award before the NLRC Cashier.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employee should restitute the executed award to the employer.
HELD: YES. SC held that the employee was unable to present substantial evidence to show that
his work conditions caused or, at the least, increased the risk of contracting his illness. Neither
was he able to prove that his illness was preexisting and that it was aggravated by the nature of
his employment. Thus, the LA and the CA correctly ruled that he is not entitled to any disability
compensation. In view of respondents' prior satisfaction of the writ of execution issued by the
LA while the case was pending with the CA, coupled with petitioner's admission that he "had
already received the full judgment award of this case,"60 the latter, having been proven not
entitled to such an award, should, thus, return the same to respondents. This is in consonance
with Section 18, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, as amended by En Banc
Resolution Nos. 11-12, Series of 2012 and 05-14, Series of 2014, which provides:
RESTITUTION. - Where the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by
the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court with finality and restitution is so ordered, the Labor
Arbiter shall, on motion, issue such order of restitution of the executed award, except
reinstatement wages paid pending appeal.
Page 47 of 111
b. Perea vs. Elburg Ship management Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No.
206178, August 9, 2017
FACTS: Perea entered into a Contract of Employment with Elburg Shipmanagement
Philippines, Inc. (Elburg) under its principal Augustea Atlantica SRL/Italy. Perea was hired as a
fitter and was deployed to work aboard MV Lemno. While repairing apipe, Perea had difficulty
breathing. The following day, he had chest pains with palpitations. He was seen by a doctor that
same afternoon and was advised to take medication and to rest for three (3) consecutive days.
However, he did not feel any better even after resting and taking medications; thus, he asked to
be repatriated. A few days later, Perea was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch he was
holding exploded. He hit his left shoulder and twisted his fingers in trying to avoid the explosion.
He took a pain reliever to ease the pain but three days later, he found that two of his fingers had
grown numb. He was sent to a medical facility in Tuzla, Turkey because of continued chest
pains. He was pronounced to have soft tissue trauma and was told to rest, avoid exertion, and
avoid using his right arm. The following day, he was transferred to SEMA Hospital where he
was declared to be suffering from “[C]ubital [T]unnel Syndrome, soft, tissue injury of the right
elbow.” The treatment proposed was to put his right arm in a sling and to rest for recovery for 10
days. He was soon repatriated to the Philippines. After conducting laboratory examinations and
other medical procedures on Perea, company-designated physicians Dr. Karen Hao-Quan (Dr.
Hao-Quan) and Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim) gave an initial impression, “To Consider Cubital
Tunnel Syndrome, Right; Hypertension; Rule Out Ischemic Heart Disease” and recommended
that a Dipyridamole Thallium Scan be conducted. In a letter to Elburg, Dr. Hao-Quan stated that
the cause of hypertension was not work-related and opined that Perea’s estimated length of
treatment would be approximately three to four months. Perea filed a complaint for
underpayment of his sick leave pay, permanent disability benefits, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees. Perea consulted Dr. Antonio C. Pascual (Dr. Pascual),
an internist, cardiologist, and echocardiographer, who diagnosed him with “Uncontrolled
Hypertension [and] Coronary Artery Disease.” Dr. Pascual found Perea to be medically unfit to
work as a seafarer. After a series of examinations, Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim certified that Perea
was cleared of the injuries that caused his repatriation. The parties met for mediation proceedings
and a possible compromise agreement but were unsuccessful They were then directed to submit
their respective position papers, together with their supporting evidence. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed Perea’s complaint for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the Collective
Bargaining Agreement could not apply to Perea’s claim for disability benefits because its
effectivity period was only from March 28, 2008 to December 31, 2009. The Collective
Bargaining Agreement had already lapsed by the time Perea was repatriated to the Philippines by
late May 2010. The Labor Arbiter ruled that while Section 32-A of the POEA Contract provided
that hypertension may be compensable, this was applicable only if it caused “impairment of
function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart and brain, resulting in permanent disability.” The
Labor Arbiter held that Perea’s hypertension did not impair the functions of his organs, as
evidenced by Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim’s medical reports. Between the findings of Dr. Hao-
Quan and Dr. Lim and those of Dr. Pascual, the Labor Arbiter gave more weight to the findings
of the company-designated physicians who concluded that Perea was not suffering from
coronary disease based on the results of a coronary angiogram.
ISSUE: Whether or not the medical findings of company-designated physician who conducted
extensive examination prevail over private physician who examined the seafarer only once and
did not order medical tests?
HELD: Medical findings of company designated physician prevails. For an illness or injury to
be compensable under the POEA Contract, it must have been work-related and acquired during
the term of the seafarer’s contract. Work-related illness is defined as “any sickness resulting to
disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this
Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. Hypertension classified as primary or essential
is considered compensable if it causes impairment of function[s] of body organs like kidneys,
Page 48 of 111
heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability; Provided, that, the following documents
substantiate it: (a) chest x-ray report, (b) ECG report, (c) blood chemistry report, (d) funduscopy
report, and (f) C-T scan. As between the findings made by the company-designated physicians
who conducted an extensive examination on the petitioner and Dr. Pascual who saw petitioner on
only one occasion and did not even order that medical tests be done to support his declaration
that petitioner is unfit to work as [a] seaman, the company-designated physicians’ findings that
petitioner has been cleared for work should prevail. The court further held that the doctor who
have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and
regularly monitored and actually treated the seafarer’s illness, is more qualified to assess the
seafarer’s disability.
5. Return of award
a. Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., G.R. No. 212098,
July 26, 2017
charge of equipment and the crew by respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. (NFD)
for and on behalf of its foreign principal Target Ship Management Pte Ltd. on board the vessel M
V. Kalpana Prem, for a period of nine (9) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$730.00.
Prior to his employment and embarkation, petitioner underwent a Pre-Employment Medical
Examination where he was pronounced "Fit For Sea Duty." Around five (5) months into his
Vancouver, Canada, he was diagnosed of suffering from "uncontrolled hypertension, malaise,
NYD, and psychosomatic illness". He was also declared unfit for duty and was repatriated back
to the Philippines. On May 16, 2012, petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents claiming
disability benefits for permanent disability and damages. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint
but the NLRC favored the employee. During the pendency of the petition before the CA, the LA,
on July 30, 2013, issued a Writ of Execution. In compliance with the writ, respondents deposited
the judgment award before the NLRC Cashier.
HELD:: YES. SC held that the employee was unable to present substantial evidence to show that
6. Vergara Doctrine
a. TSM Shipping Philippines Inc. v Patino, GR No.210289, March 20,

2017
FACTS: On January 13, 2010, TSM, for and in behalf of its foreign principal, DNAS, entered
into a Contract of Employment with respondent for a period of six months as GP2/OS. On May
20, 2010, while working on board the vessel, respondent injured his right hand while securing a
Page 49 of 111
mooring rope. He was brought to a medical facility in Istanbul, Turkey, where X-ray showed a
fracture on his 5th metacarpal bone. Respondent's right hand was placed in a cast and thereafter
he was repatriated. After extensive medical treatments, therapy, and follow-up examinations, Dr.
Cruz, on August 17, 2010, rendered an interim assessment of respondent's disability under the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration - Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC), at Grade 10, or loss of grasping power for small objects between the fold of the finger of
one hand. Despite continuing physical therapy sessions with the company-designated physician,
respondent filed on September 8, 2010 a complaint with the NLRC against petitioners for total
and permanent disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. Labor Arbiter awarded
respondent total and permanent disability benefits under the AMOSUP CBA in the amount of
US$80,000.00, sickness allowance of US$1,732.00, attorney's fees equivalent to 1 0% of the
award or US$8,173.20, and moral and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00,
respectively. NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that respondent is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits because his injury had rendered him incapable of using his right hand, based
on the last medical report of Dr. Cruz. CA dimissed the petition for certiorari affirming the
decision of NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Patino can be granted full disability benefits
HELD: SC found merit in the petition. As provided in Vergara v Hammonia Maritime Services
Ince., SC ruled that Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, Section 2, Rule X of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation Implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, and
Section 20 B(3) of the POEA-SEC must be read in harmony with each other. The Court held,
“As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the
company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment.
For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary
total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until
he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is
exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention,
then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of240 day, subject
to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical condition.” In this case, upon respondent's repatriation on
May 24, 2010, he was given extensive medical attention by the company-designated physician.
On August 17, 2010, an interim assessment of Grade 10 was given by Dr. Cruz as respondent
was still undergoing further treatment and physical therapy. However, on September 8, 2010, or
107 days since repatriation, respondent filed a complaint tor total and permanent disability
benefits. During this time, he was considered under temporary total disability inasmuch as the
120/240-day period had not yet lapsed. Evidently, the complaint was prematurely filed.
Moreover, it is significant to note that when he filed his complaint, respondent was armed only
with the interim medical assessment of the company designated physician and his belief that his
injury had already rendered him permanently disabled. It was only after the filing of such
complaint or on November 9, 2010 that he sought the opinion of Dr. Escutin, his own physician.
As such the Labor Arbiter should have dismissed at the first instance the complaint for lack of
cause of action.
7. Third Doctor
a. Caderao v. Senator Crewing (Manila) Inc. et al./ Senator Crewing

(Manila) Inc. et al. v Caderao, GR No. 224565, June 21, 2017
FACTS: Balatero was initially engaged by the respondents as an able-bodied seaman on April
12, 1997. He had worked his way up to become 2nd Officer and had boarded 18 of the
respondents' ships. On July 31, 2013, after having been found as ''fit to work" upon compliance
with the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME), Balatero boarded MV MSC
Page 50 of 111
Flaminia for 6 months. On December 22, 2013, Balatero experienced chest pains, with
palpitations and shortness of breath. Balatero was later referred to Cardinal Santos Medical
Center under the care of Dr. Roy Garrido (Dr. Garrido), an interventional cardiologist. Balatero
underwent Coronary Angiogram and Aortogram, which revealed that he had "Severe [CAD] of
the [Left Anterior Descending]. Balatero demanded permanent total disability benefits, which the
respondents denied on the ground that after treatment and rehabilitation, the company-designated
doctor had assessed Balatero with a disability of Grade 7 (Moderate Residuals of Disorders)
under the POEA SEC. Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Balatero. NLRC affirmed the decision of
LA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Balatero’s petition can be given credence.
HELD: The Court partially grants Balatero's petition. It bears stressing that the parties did not
refer the divergent medical assessments of their respective doctors to a third doctor, whose
findings should have been final and binding pursuant to Section 20(A)(3) of the 2010 POEA
SEC. For failure to refer the two conflicting medical findings to a third doctor mutually agreed
upon by the parties, the CA ruled that Balatero breached a contractual obligation. Consequently,
the assessment of the company-designated doctor was held as binding. The Court examined the
pleadings filed by the respondents and notes that nowhere did they categorically state the date
when the company-designated doctor had issued Balatero's final disability rating. Further, the
respondents did not attach or completely quote the medical report of the company-designated
doctor. Hence, in the LA, NLRC and CA decisions, specific references to, and details about the
aforecited date and medical report are conspicuously absent as well. From the herein assailed
decision, however, it can be inferred that the company-designated doctor declared Balatero fit for
sea duties upon the conclusion of the Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty on
February of 2014 and successive consultations thereafter. 60 To this, Balatero disagreed, thus, he
sought the opinion of Dr. Lara-Orencia, who issued a Medical Certificate,61 dated June 3, 2014,
refuting the company-designated doctor's fit-to-work assessment of Balatero. On account of Dr.
Lara-Orencia's findings, Balatero demanded for total and permanent disability compensation,
which the respondents denied contending that only a Grade 7 Disability rating was proper.
Viewed in the foregoing context, it can be concluded that as of June 3, 2014, which was more
than 120 days from Balatero's repatriation, no final disability rating was yet issued by the
respondents, sans proof too that the latter sought for an extension to further determine the
seafarer's fitness to work. Dr. Olalia's Medical Report, dated January 8, 2014, which negated the
work-relatedness of Balatero's medical condition, was issued merely in the interim considering
that tests and procedures were still to be performed. The said report cannot be considered as the
final disability rating issued by the company-designated doctor. In Balatero's case, the company-
designated doctor had made a final Grade 7 Disability Rating beyond 120 days from repatriation.
In legal contemplation, such partial disability was by then already deemed permanent. As a result
thereof, the issue of non-referral to a third doctor is rendered inconsequential.
b. North Sea Marine Services Corporation v Enriquez, GR No. 201806,

August 14, 2017
FACTS: On February 27, 2008, petitioner North Sea Marine Services Corporation, for and on
behalf of its foreign principal, petitioner Carnival Cruise Lines, entered into a Contract of
Employment with respondent for a period of six months. On September 2, 2008, while in the
performance of his duties, respondent experienced nape pains that radiated to his upper back.
The ship doctor diagnosed him to be suffering from mechanical back pains and prescribed him
with medicines. An orthopedic specialist recommended Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of
respondent's cervical spine, which test revealed that he was suffering from Cervical Spondylosis
with Thickening of the Posterior Longitudinal Ligament. Respondent filed a Complaint with the
NLRC seeking to recover permanent disability compensation in the amount of US$80,000.00
under the International Transport Workers' Federation Cruise Ship Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. NLRC reversed the ruling
of the Labor Arbiter. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling.
Page 51 of 111
ISSUE: W/N CA committed serious error in awarding respondent full disability benefits despite
the timely fit to work assessment of Dr. Rabago.
HELD: SC found merit in the petition. It is clearly provided in the POEA-SEC that in order to
claim disability benefits, it is the company-designated physician who must proclaim that the
seafarer suffered a permanent disability, whether total or partial, due to either injury or illness,
during the term of his employment. If the doctor appointed by the seafarer makes a finding
contrary to that of the assessment of the company-designated physician, a third doctor may be
agreed jointly between the employer and seafarer whose decision shall be binding on both of
them. In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc.,28 the Court pronounced that while a
seafarer has the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose
decision must prevail must be done in accordance with this agreed procedure. The Court went on
to emphasize that failure to observe this will make the company-designated physician's
assessment final and binding. Upon repatriation on October 5, 2008, respondent's condition was
medically evaluated and treated by the company-designated physicians. Respondent was
subjected to continuous medical examination by Dr. Rabago, underwent surgery under the care
of an orthopedic specialist, and received physical therapy from a physiatrist. On December 17,
2008, Dr. Rabago, the orthopedic surgeon, and the physiatrist assessed respondent fit to resume
sea duties. On February 25, 2009, respondent sought an independent opinion from Dr. Garduce
who assessed him to be unfit for sea duties. However, respondent did not refer these conflicting
assessments to a third doctor in accordance with the mandated procedure. In fine, the company-
designated physician's assessment was not effectively disputed; hence, the Court has no option
but to declare Dr. Rabago's fit to work declaration as final and binding.
8. Ailment not complained of at the time of repatriation
a. Maunlad Trans Inc. Carnival Cruise Lines, v. Isidro, GR No. 222699,

July 24, 2017
FACTS: Sometime in November 2009, respondent figured in an accident while lifting heavy
food provisions. When his right knee became swollen and he experienced pain, respondent
reported his situation to the ship's physician for medical examination. On November 20, 2009,
respondent's condition was diagnosed as "Right Knee Synovitis, Meniscal, Chondromalacia".
Consequently, on February 12,2010, he was ordered repatriated to the Philippines. Respondent
arrived on February 16, 2010. Three days after his repatriation or on February 19, 2010,
respondent was admitted as an out-patient at the Metropolitan Medical Center (MMC) and was
attended to by the company-designated doctor, Dr. Mylene Cruz Balbon. On his initial
evaluation on February 22, 2010, respondent's knee synovitis was not mentioned in his past
medical history. On June 28, 2010, respondent was reported to have been cleared cardiac-wise
and the psoriatic lesions on both legs have decreased in size and redness. The Labor Arbiter (LA)
issued his Decision dated January 27, 2011, finding respondent to be entitled to compensation
equivalent to Grade 12 disability grading. NLRC modified LA’s ruling. CA denied the petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can claim for disability benefits.
HELD: NO. Petition is meritorious. Given this standard, petitioners cannot be held liable for the
alleged knee injury suffered by respondent. While the facts, as found by the CA and the NLRC,
point to the existence of a knee injury which respondent suffered in November 2009, during the
term of his employment contract and while on board the vessel, such knee injury was not the
ailment complained of by respondent upon repatriation to the Philippines and is, likewise, not the
illness for which he was given medical treatment. In fact, upon termination of his six-month
contract, respondent was advised to consult a dermatologist for his skin eruptions which he
started experiencing in December 2009 and which worsened by the last week of January 2010.
That respondent did not complain of, and was not treated for, the alleged knee injury is evident
from the medical reports submitted by the company-designated physician detailing the progress
of respondent's skin condition. The CA's observations that petitioners knew of respondent's knee
Page 52 of 111
injury and that the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz-Balbon, was cognizant of the same
are off-tangent as it may very well happen that the swelling of respondent's knee had been
resolved, hence, the absence of further medical complaint from respondent. Also, the
certification issued by Dr. Cruz-Balbon referred to by the CA does not at all pertain to
respondent's alleged knee injury but solely on respondent's skin condition which was diagnosed
to be psoriasis vulgaris. The only instance when respondent's alleged knee injury again surfaced
after repatriation was when respondent consulted his doctor of choice, Dr. Jacinto. But even then,
We cannot lend credence to the certification issued by Dr. Jacinto in the manner and faith
accorded thereto by the CA. For one, Dr. Jacinto examined respondent only once and only after
four months have passed from his repatriation. For another, despite the alleged recommendation
that respondent undergo an MRI and surgery, the record does not show that said procedures were
ever conducted on respondent. At the very least, the results of said MRI, if one had been taken,
should have been shown to establish the existence of the alleged unresolved knee injury, but
none appears to have been submitted. Neither was there any evidence of medical examinations or
tests submitted that would support Dr. Jacinto's conclusion that respondent is unfit for sea duty,
in whatever capacity as a seaman if respondent claims entitlement to permanent and total
v. Temporary total disability
1. TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. vs. Patino, GR No. 210289, March 20, 2017
FACTS: On January 13, 2010, TSM, for and in behalf of its foreign principal, DNAS, entered
into a Contract of Employment with respondent for a period of six months as GP2/OS. On May
20, 2010, while working on board the vessel, respondent injured his right hand while securing a
mooring rope. He was brought to a medical facility in Istanbul, Turkey, where X-ray showed a
fracture on his 5th metacarpal bone. Respondent's right hand was placed in a cast and thereafter
he was repatriated. After extensive medical treatments, therapy, and follow-up examinations, Dr.
Cruz, on August 17, 2010, rendered an interim assessment of respondent's disability under the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration - Standard Employment Contract (POEA-
SEC), at Grade 10, or loss of grasping power for small objects between the fold of the finger of
one hand. Despite continuing physical therapy sessions with the company-designated physician,
respondent filed on September 8, 2010 a complaint with the NLRC against petitioners for total
and permanent disability benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. Labor Arbiter awarded
respondent total and permanent disability benefits under the AMOSUP CBA in the amount of
US$80,000.00, sickness allowance of US$1,732.00, attorney's fees equivalent to 1 0% of the
award or US$8,173.20, and moral and exemplary damages of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00,
respectively. NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that respondent is entitled to permanent total
disability benefits because his injury had rendered him incapable of using his right hand, based
on the last medical report of Dr. Cruz. CA dimissed the petition for certiorari affirming the
decision of NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Patino can be granted full disability benefits
HELD; SC found merit in the petition. As provided in Vergara v Hammonia Maritime Services
Ince., SC ruled that Article 192(c)(1) of the Labor Code, Section 2, Rule X of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation Implementing Title II, Book IV of the Labor Code, and
Section 20 B(3) of the POEA-SEC must be read in harmony with each other. The Court held,
“As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the
company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment.
For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the seaman is on temporary
total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic wage during this period until
he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard
Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If the 120 days initial period is
exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention,
then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of240 day, subject
Page 53 of 111
to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total
disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such
declaration is justified by his medical condition.” In this case, upon respondent's repatriation on
May 24, 2010, he was given extensive medical attention by the company-designated physician.
On August 17, 2010, an interim assessment of Grade 10 was given by Dr. Cruz as respondent
was still undergoing further treatment and physical therapy. However, on September 8, 2010, or
107 days since repatriation, respondent filed a complaint tor total and permanent disability
benefits. During this time, he was considered under temporary total disability inasmuch as the
120/240-day period had not yet lapsed. Evidently, the complaint was prematurely filed.
Moreover, it is significant to note that when he filed his complaint, respondent was armed only
with the interim medical assessment of the company designated physician and his belief that his
injury had already rendered him permanently disabled. It was only after the filing of such
complaint or on November 9, 2010 that he sought the opinion of Dr. Escutin, his own physician.
As such the Labor Arbiter should have dismissed at the first instance the complaint for lack of
cause of action.
vi. Partial Permanent Disability
1. Gomez vs. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., GR No. 220002, August

2, 2017
FACTS: On October 12, 2011, Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., in behalf of its principal,
Golden Union Shipping Company, hired petitioner Eugenio M. Gomez as an Ordinary Seaman
in the vessel M/V Elena VE for a period of 11 months. On February 29, 2012, at about 8:00 a.m.,
the Chief Officer of the vessel told petitioner to remove the ice from the lower and upper decks
of the ship. While performing this task, petitioner accidentally slipped and hit his lower back on
the steel deck. Petitioner was immediately in pain, but thought it was just temporary. He rested a
moment and then continued to work despite the pain. Petitioner was referred to the company's
accredited doctors at the International Health Aide Diagnostic Services, Inc. (IHADS) for
medical evaluation. He underwent six sessions of physical therapy, but the pain in his lumbar
area still persisted. Petitioner asked respondents for payment of his disability benefits, but
respondents refused. Labor Arbiter ruled that the petitioner was permanently and totally disabled
and that he could no longer resume sea duty. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision. CA partially
granted the petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is proper to award disability benefits to petitioner Gomez considering
that he was not declared fit to work within the period allowed by law.
HELD: A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the
companydesignated physician within the periods he/she is allowed to do so, or upon the
expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either
fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability. In this case, the treatment of
petitioner's injury required spine surgery and physical therapy which extended beyond the initial
120-day period into the maximum 240-day treatment period. The company-designated doctor's
medical report dated September 11, 2017 (made 195 days from the time petitioner was injured on
February 29, 2012) stated that petitioner failed the functional capacity test and recommended that
petitioner continue therapy for two to three months. Petitioner filed his complaint on September
13, 2012 or 197 days from the date he was injured, and, therefore, before the lapse of the
maximum 240-day treatment period within which the company-designated physician should
assess the fitness of petitioner to return to work. Since the company-designated doctor has not
declared that petitioner is not fit to work within the 240-day period, and the 240-day period has
not lapsed when petitioner filed his complaint, the petitioner cannot be legally presumed as
permanently and totally disabled to be entitled to permanent total disability. To reiterate, the rule
is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated
physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the same,
he/she fails to make such declaration. However, considering that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,
and the Court of Appeals all found petitioner Gomez to be disabled due to a work-related injury,
Page 54 of 111
this fact is now binding on the respondents and this Court. The Court concurs with the Court of
Appeals' finding that petitioner suffers from a partial permanent disability grade of 8 given by
the company-designated doctor based on the POEA SEC Schedule of Disability. The disability
grade is in accordance with Section 20-A (6) of the POEA SEC, which states: "The disability
shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under Section 32 of this Contract, and
shall not be measured or determined by the number of days a seafarer is under treatment or the
number of days in which sickness allowance is paid." Petitioner should have raised the issue on
the medical reports being hearsay evidence before the Labor Arbiter. As a general rule, points of
law, theories, and arguments not brought below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and
will not be considered by this Court; otherwise, a denial of the respondent's right to due process
will result. In the interest of justice, however, the Court may consider and resolve issues not
raised below if it is necessary for the complete adjudication of the rights and obligations of the
parties, and it falls within the issues found by the parties,
h. Backwages i. Computation
1. C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., Fr. Romeo

Nimez, CICM vs. Perez, GR No. 220506, January 18, 2017
FACTS: This controversy is an offshoot of an illegal dismissal case filed by the respondent
against the petitioners. In its June 16, 2008 Decision, the LA recognized respondent's right to
receive from the petitioners backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Thus, it
ordered the petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate amount of P286,670.58. The LA decision
was affirmed by the NLRC, by the CA and by this Court in G.R. No. 200490. The decision
became final and executory on October 4, 2012, as evidenced by the Entry of Judgment.
Consequently, respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. The petitioners opposed
and moved for the issuance of a certificate of satisfaction of judgment, alleging that their
obligation had been satisfied by the release of the cash bond in the amount of P272,337.05 to
respondent. In its July 10, 2014 Order, the LA ruled that the cash bond posted by the petitioners
was insufficient to satisfy their obligation.
ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC exercised grave abuse of discretion on the computation of
backwages.
HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition. In this case, respondent remained an employee
of the petitioners pending her partial appeal. Her employment was only severed when this Court,
in G.R. No. 200490, affirmed with finality the rulings of the CA and the labor tribunals declaring
her right to separation pay instead of actual reinstatement. Accordingly, she is entitled to have
her backwages and separation pay computed until October 4, 2012, the date when the judgment
of this Court became final and executory, as certified by the Clerk of Court, per the Entry of
Judgment in G.R. No. 200490. The Court would not have expected the CA and the NLRC to rule
contrary to the above pronouncements. If it were otherwise, all employees who are similarly
situated will be forced to relinquish early on their fight for reinstatement, a remedy, which the
law prefers over severance of employment relation. Furthermore, to favor the petitioners'
position is nothing short of a derogation of the State's policy to protect the rights of workers and
their welfare under Article II, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution. The petitioners, nonetheless,
claim that it was not their fault why the amounts due ballooned to the present level. They are
mistaken. Suffice it to state that had they not illegally dismissed respondent, they will not be
where they are today. They took the risk and must suffer the consequences. Finally, the Court
disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that a recomputation would violate the doctrine of
immutability of judgment. It has been settled that no essential change is made by a
recomputation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality
of dismissal declared in that decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs
continue to add on until full satisfaction thereof. The recomputation of the awards stemming
from an illegal dismissal case does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final
decision being implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of the
Page 55 of 111
monetary consequences of the dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments.
2. United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. vs. Valmores, GR No. 201018, July 12, 2017
FACTS: UCCI hired the respondent as its Senior Utilities Inspector with a monthly salary of
P11,194.00. He then became a member of the United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. Employees' Labor
Organization (UELO) until his expulsion sometime in 1995. Due to the expulsion, UELO
formally demanded that UCCI terminate the services of the respondent pursuant to the union
security clause of the CBA. UCCI dismissed him on February 22, 1996. He then filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal in the NLRC. After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter dismissed
his complaint for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the computation of backwages is in accordance with law
HELD: The extent of the backwages to be awarded to an illegally dismissed employee has been
set in Article 27924 of the Labor Code, viz.: Article 279. Security of Tenure. - In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause
or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be
entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. The settled rule is that full back wages shall be pegged at the wage rate at the time
of the employee's dismissal, unqualified by any deductions and increases. The base figure for the
computation of backwages should include not only the basic salary but also the regular
allowances being received, such as the emergency living allowances and the 13th month pay
mandated by the law. The purpose for this is to compensate the worker for what he has lost
because of his dismissal, and to set the price or penalty on the employer for illegally dismissing
his employee.
ii. Not due when dismissal is for just cause
1. Bravo vs. Urios College (Now Fr. Saturnino Urios University), GR No.
198066, June 7, 2017
FACTS: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College, now called
Father Saturnino Urios University. Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new
"ranking system for non-academic employees for school year 2001-2002. The proposed ranking
system for school year 2001—2002 was presented to Bravo for comments. Bravo recommended
that "the position of Comptroller should be classified as a middle management position.
Meanwhile, Urios College decided to undertake a structural reorganization.20 During this period,
Bravo occupied the Comptroller position in a "holdover" capacity until May 31, 2003. He was
reappointed to the same position, which expired on May 31, 2004. Bravo was then designated as
a full-time teacher in the college department for school year 2004-2005. The committee
recommended, among others, that Bravo be administratively charged for serious misconduct or
willful breach of trust under Article 282 of the Labor Code. Bravo allegedly misclassified several
positions and miscomputed his and other employees' salaries. Thus, this complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bravo may be granted back wages/ separation pay
HELD: To warrant termination of employment under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code, the
misconduct must be serious or "of such grave and aggravated character. In this case, it appears
that petitioner was neither induced nor motivated by any wrongful intent. He believed in good
faith that respondent had accepted and approved his recommendations on the proposed ranking
scale for school year 2001-2002. Nevertheless, due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's
employment may be terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article
Page 56 of 111
297(a), of the Labor Code. Under Article 294 of the Labor Code, the reliefs of an illegally
dismissed employee are reinstatement and full backwages. "Backwages is a form of relief that
restores the income that was lost by reason of [the employee's] dismissal" from employment.129
It is "computed from the time that [the employee's] compensation was withheld until his actual
reinstatement." However, when reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay is awarded.
Considering that there was a just cause for terminating petitioner from employment, there is no
basis to award him separation pay and backwages. There are also no factual and legal bases to
award attorney's fees to petitioner.
i. Affidavit of service i. Effect of failure to append
C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., Fr. Romeo Nimez,

CICM vs. Perez, GR No. 220506, January 18, 2017
ISSUE: Whether or not NLRC exercised grave abuse of discretion on the computation of
backwages.
Page 57 of 111
j. Immutability of judgment i. Re-computation of award
C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., Fr. Romeo

Nimez, CICM vs. Perez, GR No. 220506, January 18, 2017
ISSUE: W/N NLRC exercised grave abuse of discretion on the computation of backwages
k. Supersedeas Bond i. Motion to reduce bond.

Page 58 of 111
Turks Shawarma Company vs. Pajaron, GR No. 207156, January 16,

2017
FACTS: Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service crew and Larry
A. Carbonilla (Carbonilla) in April 2007 as head crew. Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010,
Zeñarosa asked him to sign a piece of paper stating that he was receiving the correct amount of
wages and that he had no claims whatsoever from petitioners. Disagreeing to the truthfulness of
the statements, Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zeñarosa to fire him from work.
Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in June 2008, he had an altercation with his
supervisor Conchita Marcillana (Marcillana) while at work. When the incident was brought to
the attention of Zeñarosa, he was immediately dismissed from service. He was also asked by
Zeñarosa to sign a piece of paper acknowledging his debt amounting to P7,000.00. Thus, they
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's
version and held them constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. Due to alleged non-
availability of counsel, Zeñarosa himself filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum and
Motion to Reduce Bond with the NLRC. NLRC denied such motion and dismissed the appeal for
non-perfection. CA affirmed NRLC’s decision.
ISSUE: W/N the denial of the motion to reduce bond by the NLRC is erroneous
HELD: Petition has no merit. Sections 4 and 6 of Rule VI of the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the NLRC, which were in effect when petitioners filed their appeal, provide: No
motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds, and upon the posting
of a bond in a reasonable amount. The mere filing of a motion to reduce bond without complying
with the requisites in the preceding paragraphs shall not stop the running of the period to perfect
an appeal. However, the Court, in special and justified circumstances, has relaxed the
requirement of posting a supersedeas bond for the perfection of an appeal on technical
considerations to give way to equity and justice.24 Thus, under Section 6 of Rule VI of the 2005
NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, the reduction of the appeal bond is allowed, subject to the
following conditions: (1) the motion to reduce the bond shall be based on meritorious grounds;
and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award is posted by the appellant.
Compliance with these two conditions will stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. In
the case at bar, petitioners filed a Motion to Reduce Bond together with their Notice of Appeal
and posted a cash bond ofP15,000.00 within the 10-day reglementary period to appeal. The CA
correctly found that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners'
motion to reduce bond as such motion was not predicated on meritorious and reasonable grounds
and the amount tendered is not reasonable in relation to the award. l. Compensability of illness
i. No automatic compensability
1. Barsolo vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 187950. January 11,
2017
FACTS: Cristina Barsolo’s deceased husband, Manuel, was employed as a seaman by various
companies from 1988 to 2002. Vela International Marine Ltd, was his last employer before he
died in 2006. After his separation from employment with vela, Manual was diagnosed with
hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis. When he died on
September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed myocardial infarction as his cause of death.
Believing that the cause of Manuel’s death was work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Social Security System SSS
denied her claim on the ground that there was no longer an Er-Ee relationship at the time of
Manuel’s death and that his being a smoker increased his risk of contracting the illness. Cristina
appealed her case to the Employee’s Compensation Commission which denied the said appeal
for lack of merit. The Commission held that Cristina was unable to establish that her husband’s
case fell under any of the above circumstances. And since Manuel was a smoker, the
Commission believed that Manuel’s smoking habits precipitated the manifestation of his
Page 59 of 111
Myocardial Infarction. Aggrieved, Cristina filed a Petition for review before the Court of Appeal
which was denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that while there was no doubt
that MI was a compensable disease, Cristina failed to prove a causal relationship between
Manuel’s work and the illness that brought about his death. The Court of Appeals agreed with
the Commission that Manuel’s smoking which dates as far back as 1973, may have contributed
to the development of his heart ailment. Cristina moved for reconsideration, but her motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals. She then files a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not there shall be automatic compensability for the death of Manuel Barsolo.
HELD: NO. There is NO automatic compensability for the death of any employee. For
myocardial infarction to be considered a compensable occupational disease, any of the three
conditions must be proven by substantial evidence: a) If the heart disease was known to have
been present during employment there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly
precipitated by the unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work; b) The strain of work that
brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient severity and must be followed within twenty-
four (24) hours by the clinical signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship; c) If a
person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to strain of work showed
signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the performance of his work and such symptoms
and signs persisted, it is reasonable to claim a causal relationship. Petitioner failed to offer proof
that her husband’s work caused his heart problem. Thus, the petitioner shall not be entitled to
compensation.
ii. Grieg Philippines, Inc. Grieg Shipping Group vs. Gonzales, G.R. No.
228296, July 26, 2017
FACTS: Michael John Gonzales is a seafarer and was deployed to the general cargo vessel Star
Florida after he was rehired for a 9-month contract. In August 2013, while aboard said vessel,
Gonzales was advised to take paracetamol and to rest after he experiences shortness of breath,
pain in his left leg, fatigue, fever and headache. A week later, Gonzales sought medical attention
in South Korea after he experiences the same symptoms. With his medical tests showing normal
results, he was given medication and sent back to work in Star Florida.The following month, his
past symptoms returned this time, with added symptom of black tarry stools. Gonzales was
confined in a hospital in Indonesia where he was initially diagnosed with “pancytopenia suspect
aplastic anemia”. Gonzales was declared unfit for sea duty and was repatriated. Gonzales was
admitted at the Metropolitan medical Center after his medical repatriation. The company
physicians diagnosed him with acute promyelocytic leukemia. They declared that Gonzales’
leukemia was not work-related; although for humanitarian reasons, Grieg, Star Florida’s
shipping agent continued to pay for his treatment. Grieg claimed that Gonzales suddenly stopped
consulting the company physicians. Gonzales denied this, claiming that he informed Grieg that
he would be unable to attend the scheduled appointment because he was still raising money to
travel from his hometown to Manila. Gonzales further claimed that his request to reschedule his
appointment was granted, and thus, was surprised when he was notified that Grieg had
discontinued his treatment. Gonzales sought a second opinion from an independent physician,
Dr. Trinidad, who certified that his leukemia was work-related. On July 15, 2014, after his
disability claims were refused, Gonzales filed a complaint against Grieg before the Labor
Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter found that Gonzales’ leukemia was work-related and that it had
permanently incapacitated him to work as a seafarer. Grieg appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision
before the NLRC. NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It also denied Grieg’s Motion
for Reconsideration. Prompting Grieg to file a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals,
which was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzales shall be awarded claim for disability benefits.
HELD: YES. The 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration- Standard

Employment Contract defines work-related illness as “any sickness resulting to disability or
Page 60 of 111
death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this Contract with the
conditions set therein satisfied.” The relevant portions of Section 32-A are as follows: Section
32-A. Occupational Diseases.— For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death
to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied: 1. The seafarer’s work must
involve the risks described herein; 2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s
exposure to the described risks; 3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it; and 4. There was no notorious negligence on
the part of the seafarer. Benzene is a widely used chemical and is mainly used as a “starting
material in making other chemicals, including plastics, lubricants, rubbers, dyes, detergents,
drugs, and pesticides”. To prove that he contracted his illness due to his job, Gonzales provided
his functions as an Ordinary Seaman aboard Star Florida, and his job involves removing rust
accumulations and refinishing affected areas of the ship with chemical and paint to retard the
oxidation process. This menat that he was frequently exposed to harmful chemicals and cleaning
aids which may have contained benzene. For illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that
the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer.
It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the employee
and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to the
establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any preexisting condition he might have had.
Gonzales was able to satisfy the conditions under Section 32-A and establish a reasonable
linkage between his job as an Ordinary Seaman and his leukemia. Thus, Gonzales shall be
awarded disability benefits.
m. Work-related Death
i. Barsolo vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 187950. January 11, 2017
FACTS: Cristina Barsolo’s deceased husband, Manuel, was employed as a seaman by various
companies from 1988 to 2002. Vela International Marine Ltd, was his last employer before he
died in 2006. After his separation from employment with vela, Manual was diagnosed with
hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis. When he died on
September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed myocardial infarction as his cause of death.
Believing that the cause of Manuel’s death was work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death
benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with the Social Security System SSS
denied her claim on the ground that there was no longer an Er-Ee relationship at the time of
Manuel’s death and that his being a smoker increased his risk of contracting the illness. Cristina
appealed her case to the Employee’s Compensation Commission which denied the said appeal
for lack of merit. The Commission held that Cristina was unable to establish that her husband’s
case fell under any of the above circumstances. And since Manuel was a smoker, the
Commission believed that Manuel’s smoking habits precipitated the manifestation of his
Myocardial Infarction. Aggrieved, Cristina filed a Petition for review before the Court of Appeal
which was denied for lack of merit. The Court of Appeals ruled that while there was no doubt
that MI was a compensable disease, Cristina failed to prove a causal relationship between
Manuel’s work and the illness that brought about his death. The Court of Appeals agreed with
the Commission that Manuel’s smoking which dates as far back as 1973, may have contributed
to the development of his heart ailment. Cristina moved for reconsideration, but her motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals. She then files a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Page 61 of 111
ISSUE: Whether or not the illness which cause the death of her husband had relation with his
occupation.
HELD: NO. Manuel’s illness which caused his death had no relation with his occupation. On
petitioner’s insistence that Manuel’s case falls under the third condition, this Court disagrees. For
a claim under this condition to prosper, there must be proof that: first, the person was
asymptomatic before beginning employment and second, he had displayed symptoms during the
performance of his duties. Such symptoms should have persisted long enough to establish that
his work caused his heart problem. However, petitioner offered no proof that her husband
suffered any of the symptoms during his employment. All she managed to prove was that her
husband went to the Philippine Heart Center and was treated for Hypertensive Cardiovascular
Disease from April 2, 2003 to January 9, 2004, four months after his contract with Vela ended on
December 6, 2002. The Medical Certificate did not help petitioner’s cause, as this only shows
that Manuel was already suffering from hypertension even before his pre-employment
examination, and that he did not contract it during his employment with Vela. Having had a
preexisting cardiovascular disease classifies him under the first condition. However, for a claim
under the first category to prosper, petitioner must show that there was an acute exacerbation of
the heart disease caused by the unusual strain of work. Petitioner failed to adduce any proof that
her husband experienced any symptom of a heart ailment while employed with Vela, much less
any sign that his heart condition was aggravated by his job. Since there was no showing that her
husband showed any sign or symptom of cardiac injury during the performance of his functions,
petitioner clearly failed to show that her husband’s employment caused the disease or that his
working conditions aggravated his existing heart ailment.
ii. Death compensation

220168, June 7, 2017
FACTS: Ricardo Ganal was an oiler of the vessel MV Stadt Hamburg. A party was organized
for the crewmen of the said ship on April 15, 2012 which Ganal attended. Around 3 o’clock in
the morning of April 16, 2012, the ship captain noticed that Ganal was already drunk and ordered
him to return to his cabin and rest. Ganal ignored the captain’s order. Thus, several security
personnel were summoned and attempted to accompany Ganal back to his cabin, but he refused.
They then tried to restrain him, but he resisted and, when he found the chance to escape, he ran
towards the ship’s railings and jumped overboard and straight into the sea. The crew members
attempted to help him but failed. Ganal was later found dead and floating in the water. Ganal’s
wife, Gemma Boragay, filed a claim for death benefits but was denied by Marlow Navigation
Philippines, Inc. Thus, Boragay filed with the NLRC a complaint for recovery of death and other
benefits, unpaid salaries for the remaining period of Ganal’s contract, as well as moral and
exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The LA held
they failed to present evidence to substantiate their allegations also, Marlow Navigation was able
to present documentary evidence that Ganal wilffully jumped overboard. Nonetheless, the LA
ordered Marlow Navigation to pay the Heir of Ganal, the amount of US$5,000 as financial
assistance. The Heirs of Ganal, filed an appeal with the NLRC, which was denied. Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC also denied it. Which prompted the respondent
to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held that Ganal jumped into the sea while he was
intoxicated and deprived of his consciousness and mental faculties to comprehend the
consequence of his own action and keep in mind is own personal safety. Petitioners field a
Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are entitled to death and other benefits.
HELD: NO. The respondents are NOT entitled to death and other benefits, According to the
provisions of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of
Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, as amended, the death of a seafarer by reason
of any work-related injury or illness during the term of his employment is compensable. The
Page 62 of 111
occasion where Ganal took alcoholic drink was a grill party organized by the ship officers of MV
Stadt Hamburg. It was a social event and Ganal attended not because he was performing his duty
as a seaman, but he was doing an act for his own personal benefit. Even if the Court were to
adopt a liberal view and consider the grill party as an incidental to Ganal’s work as a seaman, his
death during such occasion may not be considered as having arisen out of his employment as it
was the direct consequence of his decision to jump into the water without coercion nor
compulsion form any of the ship officers or crew members. The death of Ganal was not by
reason of any work-related injury or illness. Thus, the respondents, his heirs are not entitled to
death and other benefits.
iii. Suicide of seafarer

220168, June 7, 2017
attempted to help him but failed. Ganal was later on found dead and floating in the water.
Ganal’s wife, Gemma Boragay, filed a claim for death benefits but was denied by marlow
Navigation Philippines, Inc. Thus, Boragay filed with the NLRC a complaint for recovery of
death and other benefits, unpaid salaries for the remaining period of Ganal’s contract, as well as
moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The
LA held they failed to present evidence to substantiate their allegations also, Marlow Navigation
was able to present documentary evidence that Ganal wilffully jumped overboard. Nonetheless,
the LA ordered Marlow Navigation to pay the Heir of Ganal, the amount of US$5,000 as
financial assistance. The Heirs of Ganal, filed an appeal with the NLRC, which was denied.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC also denied it. Which prompted
the respondent to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held that Ganal jumped into the
sea while he was intoxicated and deprived of his consciousness and mental faculties to
comprehend the consequence of his own action and keep in mind is own personal safety.
Petitioners field a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ganal committed suicide. Can Marlow Navigation be held responsible
for his death?
HELD: NO. Ganal did not commit suicide. While herein petitioners were able to prove that
Ganal jumped into the open sea while in a state of intoxication, they failed to meet the burden of
proving that Ganal intended to terminate his own life. Petitioners do not carry the burden of
establishing that Ganal had the intention of committing suicide. Petitioners’ only burden is to
prove that Ganal’s acts are voluntary and willful and, if so, the former are exempt from liability
as the latter becomes responsible for all the consequences of his actions. Indeed, Ganal may have
had no intention to end his own life. For all we know he was just being playful. Nonetheless, he
acted with notorious negligence. Notorious negligence has been defined as something more than
mere or simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the
employee to disregard his own personal safety. In any case, regardless of Ganal’s motives,
petitioners were able to prove that his act of jumping was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners
should not be held responsible for the logical consequence of Ganal’s act of jumping overboard.
Page 63 of 111
2. Burden of proof; Strange behavior
a. Seapower Shipping, Ent., Inc. vs. Heirs of Warren M. Sabanal, G.R.

No. 198544, June 19, 2017
FACTS: Seapower hired Warren Saban as Third Mate onboard MT Montana. Sometime in
September 1995, during voyage, Sabanal started exhibiting unusual behavior. This prompted the
captain to set double guards on him. Because of Sabanal’s condition, the captain relieved him of
his shift and allowed him to sleep in the cabin guarded. The following day, the captain wanted to
supervise Sabanal and he observed that he was “rather better”. Later that same day, Sabana l
requested the sailor-on-guard that he be allowed to return to the deck for some fresh air. Once on
deck, Sabanal suddenlt ran to the stern and jumped to the sea. Sabanal’s body was never
recovered.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Heirs of Warren Sabanal are entitled to death and other benefits.
HELD: NO, the Heirs of Warren Sabanal are not entitled to death and other benefits. Under the
POEA-SEC, the employer is generally liable for death compensation benefits when a seafarer
dies during the term of employment. This rule, however, is not absolute. Part II, Section C(6) of
the POEA- SEC exempts the employer from liability if it can successfully prove that the
seafarer’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. The
Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and Court of Appeals all agree that the evidence presented sufficiently
establish that Sabanal indeed jumped into the sea. The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that
Sabanal’s act was not a willful one because he was not in his right mental state when he
committed the act. Evidence of insanity or mental sickness may be presented to negate the
requirement of willfulness as a matter of counter-defense. But the burden of evidence is then
shifted to the claimant to prove that the seafarer was of unsound mind. The question, therefore, is
whether Elvira was able to prove by substantial evidence that Sabanal has lost full control of his
faculties when he jumped overboard. Or, more precisely, whether his unusual behavior prior to
the incident is such substantial evidence. Elvira did not present any evidence to support her claim
that Sabanal was already insane when he jumped overboard. Similar to the claimant in Agile, she
only relied on the strange behavior of Sabanal as detailed by the ship captain in the ship log and
master’s report. However, as we already held, while such behavior may be indicative of a
possible mental disorder, it is insufficient to prove that Sabanal had lost full control of his
faculties. In order for insanity to prosper as a counter-defense, the claimant must substantially
prove that the seafarer suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act
or complete absence of the power to discern the consequences of his action. Mere abnormality of
the mental faculties does not foreclose willfulness. In fact, the ship log shows Sabanal was still
able to correct maps and type the declarations of the crew hours before he jumped overboard.
The captain observed that Sabanal did not appear to have any problems while performing these
simple tasks, while the sailor-on-guard reported that Sabanal did not show any signs of unrest
immediately before the incident. These circumstances, coupled with the legal presumption of
sanity, tend to belie Elvira’s claim that Sabanal no longer exercised any control over his own
senses and mental faculties.
iv. Notorious negligence; "in the course of"

220168, June 7, 2017
Page 64 of 111
attempted to help him but failed. Ganal was later on found dead and floating in the water.
Ganal’s wife, Gemma Boragay, filed a claim for death benefits but was denied by marlow
Navigation Philippines, Inc. Thus, Boragay filed with the NLRC a complaint for recovery of
death and other benefits, unpaid salaries for the remaining period of Ganal’s contract, as well as
moral and exemplary damages. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The
LA held they failed to present evidence to substantiate their allegations also, Marlow Navigation
was able to present documentary evidence that Ganal wilffully jumped overboard. Nonetheless,
the LA ordered Marlow Navigation to pay the Heir of Ganal, the amount of US$5,000 as
financial assistance. The Heirs of Ganal, filed an appeal with the NLRC, which was denied.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the NLRC also denied it. Which prompted
the respondent to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA held that Ganal jumped into the
sea while he was intoxicated and deprived of his consciousness and mental faculties to
comprehend the consequence of his own action and keep in mind is own personal safety.
Petitioners field a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied. Hence, the petition for review
on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is negligence on the part of Ganal.
HELD: YES. There is negligence on the part of Ganal. Indeed, Ganal may have had no intention
to end his own life. For all we know he was just being playful. Nonetheless, he acted with
notorious negligence. Notorious negligence has been defined as something more than mere or
simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to
disregard his own personal safety. In any case, regardless of Ganal’s motives, petitioners were
able to prove that his act of jumping was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners should not be held
responsible for the logical consequence of Ganal’s act of jumping overboard.
2. Atienza vs. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No.
191049, August 7, 2017
FACTS: Tomas Atienza was employed as an Able Seaman by respondent Orophil Shipping
International Co., Inc. and was assigned at the M/V Cape Apricot. In the course of his
employment, petitioner complained of severe headaches, nausea, and double vision which the
foreign port doctors diagnosed as Tolosa Hunt Syndrome. Petitioner was repatriate don February
4, 2005, and referred to a company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, who confirmed the finding
and advised him to continue the medication prescribed to him. On June 28, 2005, Dr. Curs issued
a certificate declaring the petitioner fit to resume work. Atienza consulted an independent
physician, Dr. Pasco, who assessed his illnessas a Grade IV disability and declared him unfit for
sea duty. Petitioner filed a complaint against Orophil for payment of benefits of disability and
other benefits.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atienza’s illness was contracted as a result of the exposure of the
seafarer to certain risks in the course of his work.
HELD: NO. Atienza’s illness was not contracted as result of the exposure of the seafarer to
certain risks in the course of his work. While only probability and not absolute and direct
connection is required, it must be emphasized that “probability of work connection must at least
be anchored on credible information and not on self-serving allegations.” Here, petitioner has
failed to provide the required credible information upon which the Court could have based its
assessment of the probability of his claim. He alleges that he underwent physical exertion while
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on duty, and that he was on call 24 hours a day to keep track of weather conditions. His
allegations are insufficient, since the records are bereft of any proof that these risks caused or
aggravated his specific illness. It must also be noted that petitioner has not denied the allegation
that he suffered from the same illness in 1996, prior to his employment as a seafarer onboard the
vessels operated by respondents in 1999. There is likewise medical evidence that Tolosa Hunt
Syndrome recurs randomly or without any distinct pattern. This fact further militates against his
claim that his disease had a reasonable connection with his work. Given the failure of petitioner
to discharge his evidentiary burden under Section 32-A, it is evident that his disability cannot be
considered compensable.
n. Resignation
i. Defense of resignation by employer
1. Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No. 213137,

March 1, 2017
FACTS: Flordeliza Llanes Grande was employed by PNTC as Director for Maritime Training.
In September 2010, she was given an additional post of Assistant Vice-President for Training
Department. In February 2011, several employees of PNTC including Grande were placed under
preventive suspension in view of the anomalies in the enlistment of students. On March 1, 2011,
the VP for Corporate Affairs, Frederick Pios, called Grande for a meeting. Pios told Grande that
PNTC’s President, Atty Fabia, is asking her to tender her resignation form the school in view of
the discovery of anomalies in the Registration Department that reportedly involved her. Pios
assured Grande of absolution form the alleged anomalies if she would resign. Grande prepared
her resignation letter, signed it and filed it with the Office of the PNTC President. The
respondent accomplished for her the necessary exit clearance. Following the filing of the
resignation letter, Grande, accompanied by her counsel, filed. A police blotter for a complaint for
unjust vexation against Pios. The next day, March 2, 2022, they (Grande and counsel) filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement with full backwages and other
claims. In her position paper, petitioner alleged that she was forced to resign form her
employment. On the other hand, respondent claimed that petitioner voluntarily resigned to evade
the pending administrative charge against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Grande voluntarily resigned and not illegally dismissed.
HELD: NO, Grande did not voluntarily resign. The acts of the petitioner (Grande) before and
after she tendered her resignation would show that undue force was exerted upon her: (1) the
resignation letter of petitioner was terse and curt, giving the impression that it was hurriedly and
grudgingly written; (2) she was in the thick of preparation for an upcoming visit and inspection
from the Maritime Training Council; it was also around that time that she had just requested for
the acquisition of textbooks and teaching aids, a fact which is incongruent with her sudden
resignation from work; (3) in the evening, she filed an incident report/police blotter before the
Intramuros Police Station; and (4) the following day she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal".
While indeed there was no employment of force, there was the presence of undue influence
exerted on petitioner for her to leave her employment. The conversation showed that respondent
wanted to terminate petitioner's employment but would want it to appear that she voluntarily
resigned. With an order coming from the President of PNTC, no less, undue influence and
pressure was exerted upon petitioner. Also, as a sign that respondent really wanted petitioner to
go is the fact that the former immediately issued the latter her clearance showing the signatures
from different departments of the school. In the case at bar, petitioner's letter of resignation and
the circumstances antecedent and contemporaneous to the filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are substantial proof of petitioner's involuntary resignation. Taken together, the above
circumstances are substantial proof that petitioner's resignation was voluntary.
ii. Clear and convincing evidence

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1. Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No. 213137,

March 1, 2017
FACTS: Flordeliza Llanes Grande was employed by PNTC as Director for Maritime Training.
In September 2010, she was given an additional post of Assistant Vice-President for Training
Department. In February 2011, several employees of PNTC including Grande were placed under
preventive suspension in view of the anomalies in the enlistment of students. On March 1, 2011,
the VP for Corporate Affairs, Frederick Pios, called Grande for a meeting. Pios told Grande that
PNTC’s President, Atty Fabia, is asking her to tender her resignation form the school in view of
the discovery of anomalies in the Registration Department that reportedly involved her. Pios
assured Grande of absolution form the alleged anomalies if she would resign. Grande prepared
her resignation letter, signed it and filed it with the Office of the PNTC President. The
respondent accomplished for her the necessary exit clearance. Following the filing of the
resignation letter, Grande, accompanied by her counsel, filed. A police blotter for a complaint for
unjust vexation against Pios. The next day, March 2, 2022, they (Grande and counsel) filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement with full backwages and other
claims. In her position paper, petitioner alleged that she was forced to resign form her
employment. On the other hand, respondent claimed that petitioner voluntarily resigned to evade
the pending administrative charge against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not Grande voluntarily resigned and not illegally dismissed.
HELD: NO, Grande did not voluntarily resigned. The acts of the petitioner (Grande) before and
after she tendered her resignation would show that undue force was exerted upon her: (1) the
resignation letter of petitioner was terse and curt, giving the impression that it was hurriedly and
grudgingly written; (2) she was in the thick of preparation for an upcoming visit and inspection
from the Maritime Training Council; it was also around that time that she had just requested for
the acquisition of textbooks and teaching aids, a fact which is incongruent with her sudden
resignation from work; (3) in the evening, she filed an incident report/police blotter before the
Intramuros Police Station; and (4) the following day she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal".
While indeed there was no employment of force, there was the presence of undue influence
exerted on petitioner for her to leave her employment. The conversation showed that respondent
wanted to terminate petitioner's employment but would want it to appear that she voluntarily
resigned. With an order coming from the President of PNTC, no less, undue influence and
pressure was exerted upon petitioner. Also, as a sign that respondent really wanted petitioner to
go is the fact that the former immediately issued the latter her clearance showing the signatures
from different departments of the school. In the case at bar, petitioner's letter of resignation and
the circumstances antecedent and contemporaneous to the filing of the complaint for illegal
dismissal are substantial proof of petitioner's involuntary resignation. Taken together, the above
circumstances are substantial proof that petitioner's resignation was voluntary.
iii. Forced resignation
FACTS: Luis Doble Jr. was initially hired by respondent ABB Inc. as Junior Design Engineer.
During almost nineteen years of his employment with ABB, Doble rose through the ranks and
promoted until he become Vice-President and Local Division Manager of Power System
Division, the last position he held at the time of his dismissal. As a matter of company policy,
ABB conducts yearly performance and development appraisal of all its employees. On March 2,
2012, Doble was called by respondent ABB Country manager and President Nitin Desai and was
informed that his performance rating for 2011 is one of unsatisfactory performance.
Subsequently, a company Executive Assistant informed Doble that he has a meeting with ABB
President Desai. During the meeting, President Desai explained that the Global and Regional
Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of lossess and level of
discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option for Doble to resign.
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Thereafter, HR Manager Miranda told Doble that he would be paid separation pay equivalent to
75% of his monthly pay for every year of service, provided he would submit a letter of
resignation, and gave him until 12:45 pm within which to decide. Doble asked why he should be
the one to made to resign. Desai said that it was the decision fo the management and left him
alone in the conference room. Doble submitted his letter of resignation where he originally
indicated the phrase “as per your instruction”. He was made to revise the letter by deleting such
phrase to which he did. The revised resignation letter was accepted by the company in writing.
ISSUE: Whether or not Doble was deemed to have been forced to resign.
HELD: NO. Doble was not forced to resign. He voluntarily resigned. ABB and Desai were able
to prove by substantial evidence that Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown by the following
documents: (1) affidavit of ABB’s HR Manager, (2) the resignation letter; the letter of intent to
purchase service vehicle and ABB’s acceptance letter, (3) the Employee Clearance Sheet; (4) the
Certificate of Employment; (5) photocopy of Bank of the Philippine islands manager’s check in
the amount of P2,009,822.72 representing the separation benefit.; (6) Employee Final Pay
Computation, showing payment of leave credits, rice subsidy and bonuses, amounting to
P805,399.35 and (7) the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim for a consideration of the total sum of
P2,815,222.07. Since Doble claims to have been forced to resign, it is incumbent upon him to
prove with clear and convincing evidence that his resignation was not voluntary but was actually
a case of constructive dismissal. Doble failed to present substantial documentary or testimonial
evidence to corroborate his claim of constructive dismissal. It is well settled that when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, bare allegations of constructive dismissal cannot be
given credence.
iv. Option to resign
1. Cosue vs. Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, et al., G.R.

No. 230664, July 24, 2017
FACTS: Edward Cosue was a regular employee of FIDC, performing work as a

janitor/maintenance staff. Around 5pm of July 10, 2014, respondent Germino, Head of FIDC’s
Property Management Division, asked petitioner to stay in the FIDC’s building to watch over the
generator due to the frequent power outage and to assist the guards on duty since they were
newly hired. Petitioner agreed. According to Cosue, at around 9pm on July 10, 2014, he saw 2
security guards (OIC and Gomez), together with an unidentified man, on their way to the
electrical room. They had a knapsack which did not look heavy. When they left the room,
petitioner saw Gomez, carrying a knapsack which, by this time, appeared to be containing
something heavy. The next morning, he borrowed the key to the electrical room and together
with fellow maintenance personnel, Joel Alcallaga, looked for the electrical wires that were
stored therein. The wires were no longer there. By this time, Cosue was convinces that the 2
security guards took the wires. At 1pm, he was summons by Germino who verbally informed
him that he was suspended from July 16, 2014 to August 13, 2004, on suspicion that he stole the
electrical wires. Cosue filed a complaint against FIDC, Germino and FIDC President Antonio
Fernando for illegal dismissal and underpayment of salaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cosue was illegally dismissed.
HELD: NO. Cosue was not illegally dismissed. Petitioner’s claim of constructive dismissal fails,
Bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, as in
this case, cannot be given credence. Records do not show any demotion in rank or a diminution
in pay made against Cosue. Neither was there any act of clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain committed by respondents against petitioner which would justify or force him to
terminate his employment form the company. o. Abandonment of work
i. Immediate filing of illegal dismissal

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1. Brown vs. Marswin Marketing, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 206981, March
15, 2017
FACTS On June 7, 2010, Brown filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of salary
and 13thmonth pay as well as claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
against Marswin Marketing, Inc. and Sany Tan, its owner and President. He prayer for
reinstatement with full backwages and payment of his other monetary claims. He alleged that on
October 5, 2009, Marswin employed petitioner as building maintenance/ electrician and was
tasked to maintain its sanitation and make necessary electrical repairs thereon. Furthermore, that
on May 28, 20l0, he reported at the Main Office of Marswin, and was told that it was already his
last day of work. Allegedly, he was made to sign a document that he did not understand; and
thereafter he was no longer admitted back to work. Thus, he insisted that he was terminated
without due process of law. Marswin/Tan admitted that they employed Brown as electrician; that
during his eightmonth stay, Marswin received negative reports on Brown's work ethics,
competence, and efficiency. On May 28, 20l0, they summoned him at its Main Office to
purportedly discuss the complaints of the Warehouse Manager and the Warehouse Supervisor
however he left the meeting and no longer returned to work. Consequently, he was considered to
have abandoned his post. As evidence, they attached in their position paper a sinumpaang
salaysay executed by Bernadette Azucena, the company’s Accounting Supervisor and Human
resource head, attesting to the alleged complaints she received and the events that transpired
during the said meeting. The labor arbiter declared Brown’s dismissal illegal. The LA noted that
no actual complaints or reports against him in support of the alleged complaints was submitted.
The LA was also unconvinced that Brown left Marswin's premises and abandoned his work
considering that he filed this illegal dismissal case; and his employer failed to notify him to
report back to work. NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, it
annulled and set aside the NLRC Resolutions and declared that Brown was not dismissed there
being no evidence proving that Brown was actually dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Brown abandoned his work
HELD: NO. In order for the employer to discharge its burden to prove that the employee
committed abandonment, which constitutes neglect of duty, and is a just cause for dismissal, the
employer must prove that the employee (1) failed to report for work or had been absent without
valid reason; and (2) had a clear intention to discontinue his or her employment. The second
requirement must be manifested by overt acts and is more determinative in concluding that the
employee is guilty of abandonment. This is because abandonment is a matter of intention and
cannot be lightly presumed form indefinite acts. Apart from the allegation of abandonment,
Marswin/Tan presented no evidence proving that Brown failed to return without justifiable
reasons and had clear intention to discontinue his work. In addition, on June 7, 2010, or just 10
days after Brown’s last day at work, he already filed an illegal dismissal suit against his
employer. Such filing conveys his desire to return, and strengthens his assertion that he did not
abandon his work.
2. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. vs. Grave, G.R. No. 196650, June 7,
2017
FACTS: The petitioner – a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing security
services – employed and posted the respondents at the premises of Ibiden Philippines, Inc.
(Ibiden) located in the First Philippine Industrial Park in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The controversy
started when the petitioner implemented an action plan as part of its operational and manpower
supervision enhancement program geared towards the gradual replacement of security guards at
Ibiden. Pursuant to the action plan, it issued separate "Notice(s) to Return to Unit" to the
respondents in July and August2008 directing them to report to its head office and to update their
documents for reassignment. On August 14, 2008, the respondents filed their complaint against
the petitioner for constructive dismissal in Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV of the NLRC,
claiming that the implementation of the action plan was a retaliatory measure against them for
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bringing several complaints along with other employees of the petitioner to recover unpaid
holiday pay and 13th month pay. The LA dismissed the complaint. The return-to-work notices
issued by the petitioner belied the respondents' charge of illegal dismissal, opining that a security
guard could be considered as having been constructively dismissed only when he had been
placed on floating status for a period of more than six months. However, the NLRC and the CA
concluded that there was illegal or constructive dismissal in this case as the private respondents
were not given new assignments immediately after being placed on reserved status; that the lack
of any indication from the "Notices to Return to Unit" of their re-assignments was a badge of bad
faith; and that the timing was off because the action plan was implemented by the petitioner after
the respondents had filed the complaints for their monetary claims against the petitioner and
received a favorable decision thereon.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents abandoned their work.
HELD YES. The act of some of the respodnents of gaining employment as security guards
elsewhere constituted abandonment of their employment with the petitioner. Abandonment
requires the concurrence of two elements, namely: one, the employee must have failed to report
for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and two, there must have
been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship
manifested by some overt act. Although mere absence or failure to report for work, even after
notice to return, does not necessarily amount to abandonment, the law requires that there be clear
proof of deliberate and unjustified intent on the part of the employee to sever the employer-
employee relationship. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly presumed
from certain equivocal acts. In other words, the operative act is still the employee’s ultimate act
of putting an end to his employment. Contrary to the finding of the CA, the respondents intended
to sever their employeremployee relationship with the petitioner because they applied for and
obtained employment with other security agencies while they were on reserved status. Their
having done so constituted a clear and unequivocal intent to abandon and sever employment with
the petitioner. Thereby, the filing of their complaint for illegal dismissal was inconsistent with
the established fact of their abandonment.
ii. Premature filing of labor case
1. Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. vs. Tanguin, G.R. No. 221096, June 28, 2017
FACTS Tanguin averred that on October 26, 2010, she was placed on preventive suspension by
Marivic Lucasan (Lucasan), Human Resources Manager, for allegedly forcing her coemployees
to buy silver jewelry from her during office hours and inside the company premises. On the same
date, she was directed by Lucasan to submit her written explanation on the matter. Tanguin
admitted that she was selling silver jewelry, but she denied that she did so during office hours.
On October 30, 2010, she was barred by a security guard from entering the company premises.
She was informed by her coemployees, namely Khena Nama, Jordan Lopez and Rose Marie
Esquejo that they were forced to write letters against her, or else they would be terminated from
their work. For their part, Claudia's Kitchen and Enzo Squillantini, its President, (petitioners)
countered that in October 2010, they received reports from some employees that Tanguin was
allegedly forcing some of them to buy silver jewelry from her during office hours and inside the
company premises, which the latter admitted. In order to conduct a thorough investigation, she
was placed under preventive suspension On October 27, 2010, the petitioners sent Tanguin a
letter requiring her to submit a written explanation as to why she should not be charged for
conducting business within the company premises and during office hours. During her
suspension, the petitioners discovered her habitual tardiness and gross negligence in the
computation of the total number of hours worked by her co-employees. Tanguin, however, failed
to act on these notices. The LA ruled that Tanguin's preventive suspension was justified because,
as supervisor, she was in possession of the company's cash fund and collections. It stressed that
she was not illegally dismissed. Nevertheless, the LA ordered the petitioners to pay Tanguin her
unpaid salary. The NLRC partly granted Tanguin's appeal. It opined that there was no scintilla of
proof that she was dismissed from service. It pointed out that it was she who chose not to report
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for work despite receipt of notices requiring her to report to the head office. It found, however,
that Tanguin did not abandoned her work when she failed to report for work despite notice. It
stated that the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal negated the claim for abandonment.
The NLRC concluded that there was neither dismissal nor abandonment. Thus, she should be
resintated to her former position, but without backwages. The CA modified the NLRC ruling. It
ruled that petitioners did not dismiss her employment as evidenced by several notices sent to her
requiring her to report back to work and explain the charges against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was abandonment.
HELD NO. There was neither dismissal nor abandonment. At the time Tanguin initiated the
illegal dismissal case, the complaint had no basis. The status quo ante was that she was being
asked to explain the accusation against her. Instead of complying, she opted to file a complaint
for illegal dismissal. It was premature, if not pre-emptive, which the Court cannot tolerate nor
accommodate. At this time, her plea for reinstatement, backwages and/or separation pay cannot
be granted. Respondent should return to work and answer the complaints against her, and the
petitioners should accept her, without prejudice to the result of the investigation against her.
p. Petition for Certiorari i. Reglementary period vs. Petition for review on certiorari
1. Nueva Ecija II Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. vs. Mapagu, G.R. No.
196084, February 15, 2017
FACTS Respondent Elmer B. Mapagu was employed with NEEC as a data processor since May
1983. NEEC is an electric cooperative which supplies electricity to households in Nueva Ecija,
including Aliaga, where Mapagu resisdes. Upon the request of the NEEC Board of Directors, the
National Electrification Administration (NEA) conducted a special audit on the power bills and
accounts receivables of the consumers, as well as related internal control and procedure, of
NEEC. The audit revealed unaccounted consumption or readings which have accumulated due to
under-reading and under-billing in prior years or months. Mapagu denied the under oath that his
electric meter was under-read and under-billed. He asserted that he no meter reading from
November 2002 to April 2005. He also argued that he availed of the amnesty offered and given
by the NEEC officer in Charge General manager Jun Capulong in connection with employees’
meter problems. Since the charges have been condoned, pardoned and disregarded, Mapagu
maintains that he cannot be charged with unaccounted consumption. The IAC held that while the
charges of under-reading and under- billing were not established, Mapagu failed to observe the
highest degree of honesty as an employee. He did not take action to correct his kWhr
consumption despite knowledge that he has no reading from 2002 to 2005. To the IAC, this was
proof that Mapagu consented to the anomaly for his own benefit. Nevertheless, and for
humanitarian reasons, the IAC recommended that Mapagu only be suspended for two years, on
the condition that he execute a waiver in favor of NEEC management against the filing of any
legal action regarding his suspension. He was also ordered to pay his unbilled consumption
worth P87,666.17. On January 2, 2007, however, Mapagu received a Notice of Dismissal from
service. Hence, he filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of allowances against
petitioners. The LA ruled in favor of petitioners. Stating that NEEC discharged its burden of
proving that Mapagu was lawfully dismissed, LA dismissed Mapagus Complaint for lack of
merit. The NLRC reversed and set aside the ruling of the LA. It held that under the
circumstances and facts of the case, the penalty of dismissal is unwarranted. According to the
NLRC, while the law does not condone wrongdoing by an employee, it urges a moderation of the
sanction that may be applied to him where a penalty less punitive would suffice. The CA
dismissed the petition outright. It found that petitioners failed to sign the attached Verification
and Certification against Forum Shopping and held that a defective verification and certification
is equivalent to non-compliance with the Rules. It also constitutes valid cause for dismissal of the
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari was, filed before the CA within the
reglementary period
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HELD: YES. Petitioners failed to comply with the provisions on Rule 45 They confuse petitions
for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. It is the latter
which is required to be filed within a period of not later than 60 days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution. If a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed, the 60-day
period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the motion. A party litigant wishing to file a
petition for review on certiorari must do so within 15 days from notice of the judgment, final
order or resolution sought to be appealed. Here, petitioners received the Resolution of the CA
denying their Motion for Reconsideration on March 17, 2011. Under the Rules, they have until
April 1, 2011 to file the petition. However, they filed the same only on May 6, 2011. This was 50
days beyond the 15-day period provided under Section 2, Rule 45 and 30 days beyond the
extension asked for. Even if petitioners were given the maximum period of extension of 30 days,
their petition before us still cannot stand. The Rules allow only for a maximum period of 45 days
within which an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on certiorari.
ii. Consideration of errors not assigned; opening entire case for review
1. Javines vs. Xlibris a.k.a. Author Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 214301,
June 7, 2017
FACTS: Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as Operations Manager on September 1, 2011.
Approximately 10 months after, the former was terminated for falsifying/tampering three meal
receipts. The falsification was discovered on July 5, 2012 when Javines submitted the meal
receipts for reimbursement to the finance department. Prompted by said discovery, the
company's Finance Officer prepared an incident report on the same day. Consequently, a Notice
to Explain was issued on July 6, 2012 to Javines for alleged violation of Sections 9.5 and 9.6 of
the Employee's Code of Conduct and charging him with acts constituting dishonesty. Xlibris
obtained certified copies of the meal receipts tampered. Javines submitted his written
explanation, denying having tampered the receipts. He explained that as Operations Manager, he
is responsible for securing reimbursement for expenses incurred by the supervisors under him.
He further explained that it is the supervisors who submitt the receipts to him and for which, he
prepares a reimbursement request. Once the reimbursement is made, Javines distributes the cash
to the supervisor concerned. Javines argued that while he prepares the request for
reimbursement, he has no knowledge or part in the tampered receipts. On July 13, 2012, an
administrative hearing was held. Javines failed to explain why and how the incident transpired.
Instead,he requested for further investigation since, at that time, he allegedly could not recall
who submitted the receipts to him. Consequently, on the same day, notices to explain were sent
to the supervisors under Javines. In their written accounts, the supervisors denied participation in
the tampered receipts. On July 27, 2012, Xlibris terminated Javines' employment through an
"end of employment notice. Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The complaint
was, however, dismissed by the Labor Arbiter who found that Javines' dismissal was for just
cause and with due process. On appeal, the NLRC modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Javines failed to move for reconsideration of the NLRC's decision while Xlibris' motion for
partial reconsideration was denied. Thus, only Xlibris elevated the case to the CA on certiorari
on the sole issue that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that it failed to comply
with the requirements of procedural due process. Javines reiterated his position that he was not
afforded procedural due process because his request for further investigation for purposes of
identifying the source of the questioned meal receipts was never granted. Additionally, Javines
questioned the cause of his dismissal on the argument that Xlibris failed to prove by substantial
evidence the misconduct imputed against him. The CA partially granted the petition. However,
the CA reduced the award of nominal damages from Php10, 000 to Php1, 000 considering that
the altered meal receipts show a discrepancy of Php 10,010. The CA denied Javines' motion for
reconsideration, prompting the latter to file the instant Petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Javines’ was correct in arguing that the petition for certiorari filed by
Xlibris throws open the entire case for review.
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HELD: NO. Javines' insistence that the petition for certiorari filed by Xlibris throws open the
entire case for review such that the issue of whether or not he was dismissed for just cause ought
to have been addressed by the CA is entirely misplaced. While it is true that the appellate court is
given broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider
errors not assigned, it has authority to do so in the following instances: (a) when the question
affects jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors
within contemplation of law; (c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case, or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding
dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some
bearing on the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored; (e)
matters closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters upon which the determination of a
question properly assigned is dependent. None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant
case. Thus, the CA cannot be faulted for no longer discussing the issue of whether indeed there
exists just cause for his dismissal. Instead, in the petition for certiorari filed before the CA,
Xlibris only questioned the award of nominal damages for failure to comply with procedural due
process. Neither Xlibris nor Javines further questioned the CA's award on this point. As such, the
issue as to whether the requirements of procedural due process to constitute a valid dismissal
were complied with has been resolved with finality.
iii. Execution pending certiorari
1. Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., G.R. No. 212098,
July 26, 2017
FACTS On June 21, 2011, petitioner Julio Espere was hired as a Bosun, a ship’s officer in
charge of equipment and crew by respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. for and in
behalf of its foreign principal Target Ship Management Pte Ltd. On board the vessel M.V.
Kalpana Prem, for a period of 9 months, with a basic monthly salary of US$730.00. Prior to his
employment and embarkation, petitioner underwent a Pre-employment medical examination
where he was pronounced “Fit For Sea Duty.” Around 5 months into his deployment, petitioner
complained that he was feeling dizu, had body malaise and chills. In Vancouver, Canada, he was
diagnosed of “uncontrolled hypertension,” “malaise NYD,” and “psychosomatic illness”. He was
also declared unfit for duty and was repatriated back to the Philippines. On May 16, 2012,
petitioner filed a complaint against respodnents claiming disability benefits for permanent
disability and damages. The LA dismissed the complaint. While the NLRC favored the
employee. During the pendency of the petitioner before the CA, the LA, on July 30, 2013, issued
a Writ of Execution. In compliance with the writ, respondents deposited the judgment award
before the NLRC Cashier.
already received the full judgment award of this case," the latter, having been proven not entitled
to such an award, should, thus, return the same to respondents. This is in consonance with
Section 18, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure.
iv. Filing Motion for Reconsideration

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1. Genpact Services, Inc. vs. Santosfalceso, G.R. No. 227695, July 31,
2017
FACTS Genpact Services, Inc is engaged in business process outsourcing, particularly servicing
various multinational clients, including Allstate Insurance Company. On different dates from
2007 to 2011, Genpact hired respondents Santos-Falceso, Mendoza and Mariano to various
positions to service its Allstate accounts. However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its account
with Genpact, resulting in respondents being placed on floating status, and eventually terminated
from service. This prompted respondents to file a complaint before the NLRC for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of separation pay, damages and attorney’s fees against Genpact and/or
its Country Manager, Reyes. They alleged that after Allstate terminated its contract with
Genpact, they were initially placed on “benching” status with pay, and after 5 months, Genpact
gave them the option to either “voluntarily resign” or to “be involuntarily terminated on the
ground of redundancy” with severance pay of ½ month basic salary for every year of service, in
either case. Left without the option to continue their employment with Genpact, respondents
chose the latter option and were made to sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any and all
forms of monetary benefits. In this light, respondents argued that the termination of Genpact and
Allstate's agreement neither amounted to a closure of business nor justified their retrenchment.
Respondents further contended that Genpact failed to observe the requirements of procedural due
process as there was no showing that the latter served proper notice to the DOLE thirty (30) days
before they were terminated from service, and that they were not accorded the chance to seek
other employment opportunities. The LA dismissed respondents’ complaint for lack of merit. he
LA found that respondents' termination from service was due to the untimely cessation of the
operations of Genpact's client, Allstate, wherein respondents were assigned. This was affirmed
by the NLRC. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari purely on procedural grounds. It held
that petitioners’ failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to elevating
the case to the CA is a datal infirmity which rendered their petitioner for certiorari before the
latter court dismissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision is still
mandatory before filing petition for certiorari when the resolution of the NLRC states that no
further motion shall be entertained.
HELD: NO. The rule requiring a filing of a motion for reconsideration before a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 can prosper admits exceptions. Among the exceptions is under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless and where petitioner was deprived
of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief. This is attendant in this case. The
dispositive portion of the NLRC Resolution stating that “No further motion of similar import
shall be entertained’ explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer
entertain any further motions for reconsideration.
v. Extension to file 1. Heavy workload of counsel
a. Adtel, Inc. vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017
FACTS Adtel, a domestic corporation, terminated respondent from the company. Respondent
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter dismissed
respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal. On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC ruled that Adtel
illegally dismissed respondent. A motion for reconsideration was filed but it was denied by the
NLRC. Fifteen (15) days after the last day for filing or the 75th day, Adtel filed its petition for
certiorari with the CA. The CA denied the motion for extension and dismissed Adtel's petition
for certiorari for being filed beyond the reglementary period. The CA ruled that Adtel had until 7
April 2009 to file its petition for certiorari. Instead of filing the petition for certiorari, Adtel filed
a motion for extension of time on 7 April 2009 and subsequently filed its petition for certiorari
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on 22 April 2009, the last day of the extended period prayed for by Adtel. The CA held that the
reglementary period to file a petition for certiorari can no longer be extended.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition was filed within the reglementary period.
HELD: NO. A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC states that in cases where a motion for reconsideration was
timely filed, the filing of a petition for certiorari questioning the resolution denying the motion
for reconsideration must be made not later than sixty (60) days from the notice of the denial of
the motion. In Laguna Metts Corporation, this Court ruled that the 60- day period was non-
extendible and the CA no longer had the authority to grant the motion for extension in view of
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4 of Rule 65. Therefore, the rule is that in filing
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a motion for extension is a prohibited pleading. However,
in exceptional or meritorious cases, the Court may grant an extension anchored on special or
compelling reasons.
q. Loss of trust and confidence / Willful breach of trust i. Failure to establish breach of
trust
1. Sta. Ana vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., G.R. No. 208459, February 15,
2017 Sta. Ana vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., G.R. No. 208459. February 15,
2017. Del Castillo, J:
FACTS: Julieta Sta. Ana was hired by MJCI as outlet teller of its off-track betting (OTB)
station in Tayuman, Manila. It was found out by MCJI that its treasury department has been
illegally appropriating funds and lending it out to the employees of the latter corporation. The
Special Disciplinary Committee of MJCI found Sta. Ana conduting her lending business during
office hours and using the funds and personnel of MCJI; thus, she was found guilty of dishonesty
and other fraudulent acts. On her defense, she alleged that he started her lending business 15
years agio prior to the takeover of the new management of MCJI and she sold her fishing vessels
2 years ago to finance her lending business. Her employment was eventually terminated by MCJI
on the ground of willful breach of trust and confidence.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal on the ground of willful breach of trust and confidence was
proper.
HELD: NO. Sta. Ana was not validly dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence.
The court held that it is a cardinal rule that loss of trust and confidence should be genuine, and
not simulated; it must arise from dishonest or deceitful conduct and must not be arbitrarily
asserted in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. While proof beyond reasonable doubt is
not required, loss of trust must have some basis or such reasonable ground for one to believe that
the employee committed the infraction, and the latter’s participation makes him or her totally
unworthy of the trust demanded by the position. Here, MCJI failed to prove that Sta. Ana
committed willful breach of its trust. Particularly, it failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its
employee for her personal business during officer hours, and used its money; without authority,
to lend money to another. Hence, to dismiss her on the ground of loss of trust and confidence is
unwarranted.
ii. Actual and willful breach supported by substantial evidence
1. Panaligan vs. Phyvita Enterprises Corporation, G.R. No. 202086,

June 21, 2017
FACTS: Panaligan et al (petitioner) were employees of Phyvita Enterprises corp. (respondent).

Panaligan was employed as a room boy at Phyvita Enterprises corp. Sometime in January 2005,
respondent discovered that the amount of 180,000 including some receipts and payroll were
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missing. While the police investigation was pending, the petitioner together with some
employees filed a complaint before the DOLE against respondent for (1) underpayment of
wages, (2) non payment of special and legal holidays, (3) 5 days service incentive leave, (4)
night shift differential pay, (5) no pay slip, (6) signing of blank payroll. In the interim, the
respondent accused the petitioner of theft and stated that the latter is responsible for the loss of
the money and properties. Later, respondent terminated the employer-employee relationship
between them and the petitioner based on loss of trust and confidence. On June 2005, respondent
filed a criminal complaint of theft against the petitioner, but the same was dismissed by the city
prosecutor, there being no sufficient evidence. On Nov 2006 petitioner filed a complaint with the
LA alleging that they were illegally dismissed. Respondent, on their defense, stated that the
dismissal was legal because the allege criminal complaint was enough evidence to produce a
substantial evidence. The LA ruled in favor of the respondent. NLRC reversed the decision of
LA and decided in favor of petitioner. CA reversed the decision of NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed.
HELD: YES. Loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of employment, is
premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by
management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The betrayal
of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized. For an employer to
validly dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence under Article 282 (c)
of the Labor Code, the employer must observe the following guidelines: 1) loss of confidence
should not be simulated; 2) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are improper,
illegal or unjustified; 3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence
to the contrary; and 4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken
in bad faith. More importantly, it must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on
clearly established facts. Thus, in order to dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence, the employee must be guilty of an actual and willful breach of duty duly supported
by substantial evidence. 16 Substantial evidence is that amount of evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. In termination cases, the burden of proof
rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause. 18 In the case at bar,
PHYVITA failed to adduce substantial evidence that would clearly demonstrate that
PANALIGAN, et al., have committed serious misconduct or have performed actions that would
warrant the loss of trust and confidence reposed upon them by their employer. Contrary to the
findings of the Court of Appeals and the Labor Arbiter, no substantial evidence supports the
allegation of theft leveled by PHYVITA against PANALIGAN, et al. — the said criminal act
being the underlying reason for the dismissal of the latter from being employees of the former.
iii. Managerial employee
1. PJ Lhuillier, Inc. vs. Camacho, G.R. No. 223073, February 22, 2017
FACTS: On July 25, 2011, petitioner P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. (PJLI), the owner and operator of the
"Cebuana Lhuillier" chain of pawnshops, hired petitioner Feliciano Vizcarra (Vizcarra) as PLJI's
Regional Manager for Northern and Central Luzon pawnshop operations and respondent Hector
Oriel Cimagala Camacho (Camacho) as Area Operations Manager (AOM) for Area 213,
covering the province of Pangasinan. Camacho was assigned to administer and oversee the
operations of PJLI's pawnshop branches in the area. On May 15, 2012, Vizcarra received several
text messages from some personnel assigned in Area 213, reporting that Camacho brought along
an unauthorized person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation (pull-out of "rematado"
pawned items) from the different branches of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop in Pangasinan. On
May 18, 2012, Vizcarra issued a show cause memorandum directing Camacho to explain why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him for violating PJLI's Code of Conduct and
Discipline which prohibited the bringing along of non-employees during the QTP operations.
Camacho, in his Memorandum, apologized and explained that the violation was an oversight on
his part for lack of sleep and rest. With busy official schedules on the following day, he
requested his mother's personal driver, Jose Marasigan (Marasigan) to drive him back to
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Pangasinan. He admitted that Marasigan rode with him in the service vehicle during the QTP
operations. On June 14, 2012, the Formal Investigation Committee issued the Report of Formal
Investigation. The committee concluded that Camacho was guilty as charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not Camacho was illegally dismissed.
HELD: NO. Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to dismiss an employee
for committing fraud or for willful breach of trust reposed by the employer on the employee.
Loss of confidence, however, is never intended to provide the employer with a blank check for
terminating its employees. "Loss of trust and confidence" should not be loosely applied in
justifying the termination of an employee. Certain guidelines must be observed for the employer
to cite loss of trust and confidence as a ground for termination. Loss of confidence should not be
simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal, or
unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify earlier action
taken in bad faith." For loss of trust and confidence to be valid ground for termination, the
employer must establish that: (1) the employee holds a position of trust and confidence; and (2)
the act complained against justifies the loss of trust and confidence. The law contemplates two
(2) classes of positions of trust. The first class consists of managerial employees. They are as
those who are vested with the power or prerogative to lay down management policies and to hire,
transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or effectively
recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists of cashiers, auditors, property
custodians, etc. who, in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle
significant amounts of money or property. He was primarily responsible for administering and
controlling the operations of branches in his assigned area, ensuring cost efficiency, manpower
productivity and competitiveneness. He was also responsible for overseeing/monitoring the
overall security and integrity in the area, including branch personnel safety, in coordination with
PJLI's Security Services Division. In fact, as stated by the CA, his position required the utmost
trust and confidence as it entailed the custody, handling, or care and protection of PJLI's
property. Furthermore, as AOM, he was among those employees authorized to participate in the
QTP operations. He was tasked in overseeing the safe transport and handling of company assets
during the said operations. Clearly from the foregoing, it can be deduced that Camacho held a
managerial position and, therefore, enjoyed the full trust and confidence of his superiors. As a
managerial employee, he was "bound by more exacting work ethics" and should live up to this
high standard of responsibility." Simply put, his act was without justification. For this
transgression, petitioner P JLI was placed in a difficult position of withdrawing the trust and
confidence that it reposed on respondent Camacho and eventually deciding to end his
employment. "Unlike other just causes for dismissal, trust in an employee, once lost is difficult,
if not impossible, to regain." P JLI cannot be compelled to retain Camacho who committed acts
inimical to its interests. A company has the right to dismiss its employees if only as a measure of
self-protection.
2. Must be exercised without abuse of discretion
a. Bravo vs. Urios College (Now Father Saturnino Urios University),

G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017
FACTS: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College,now called Father
Saturnino Urios University. IN addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was
designated as the school’s comptroller from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2002. Urios College
organized a committee to formulate a new “ranking system for non-academic employees for
school year 2001-2002.” Under the proposed system, the position of Comptroller was classified
as an office head while the position of Vice-President for Finance was classified as middle
management. The proposed system was presented for Bravo for comments. Bravo commented
that “the position of Comptroller should be classified as a middle management position because
it was informally merged with the position of Vice President for Finance.” In addition, the
Comptroller and the VicePresident for Finance performed similar functions. Bravo further
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suggested that since he assumed the duties of Comptroller and Vice-President for Finance, his
salary scale should be upgraded. Later, Bravo obtained his employee ranking slip which showed
his evaluation score and the change of his rank “from office head to middle manager-level IV.”
The change, however, was merely superimposed. The implementation of the new ranking system
for non-academic employees and administrators and the corresponding schedule of salary
adjustments were reflected on the October 15, 2001 payroll. This was opposed by several
individuals within the school. In 2004, Urios College organized a committee to review the
ranking system implemented. In its report, the committee found that the Comptroller’s Office
solely prepared and implemented the salary adjustment schedule without prior approval from the
Human Resources Department. Thereafter, it recommended that Bravo be administratively
charged for serious misconduct or willful breach of trust under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
Bravo allegedly misclassified several positions and miscomputed his and other employees’
salaries. Bravo was found guilty of serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the
sum of P179,319.16, representing overpayment of his monthly salary. He received a copy of the
investigation committee’s decision on July 15, 2005. On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified
Bravo of its decision to terminate his services for serious misconduct and loss of trust and
confidence. Upon receipt of the termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive
Labor Arbiter Pelaez a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of
separation pay, damages, and attorney’s fees. The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
The NLRC found that Bravo’s dismissal from service was illegal. There was no clear showing
that Bravo violated any school policy. Moreover, Bravo received the increased salary in good
faith. It also found that the college failed to afford Bravo the opportunity to be heard and to
defend himself with the assistance of counsel. The CA reversed the NLRC’s Resolution and
reinstated the decision of Labor Arbiter. It ruled that Urios College had substantial basis to
dismiss Bravo from service on the ground of serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.
It noted that managerial employees can be dismissed from service when the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the alleged misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bravo was illegally dismissed by Urios College.
HELD: NO. Petitioner’s dismissal from employment was valid. A dismissal based on willful
breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the
concurrence of two conditions. First, the employee whose services are to be terminated must
occupy a position of trust and confidence. There are 2 types of positions in which trust and
confidence are reposed by the employer, namely, managerial employees and fiduciary rank-and-
file employees. Managerial employees are considered to occupy positions of trust and confidence
because they are “entrusted with confidential and delicate maaters.” The second condition that
must be satisfied is the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and confidence. This means
that "the employer must establish the existence of an act justifying the loss of trust and
confidence." Otherwise, employees will be left at the mercy of their employers. Different rules
apply in determining whether loss of trust and confidence may validly be used as a justification
in termination cases. Managerial employees are treated differently than fiduciary rank-and-file
employees. Although a less stringent degree of proof is required in termination cases involving
managerial employees, employers may not invoke the ground of loss of trust and confidence
arbitrarily. The prerogative of employers in dismissing a managerial employee “must be
exercised without abuse of discretion.” Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate
without proper authorization is a clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
r. Project employment.i. Usually necessary and desirable
FACTS: On May 16, 2011, respondent Fortunato B. Ando, Jr. (Ando) filed a complaint against
petitioner E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) and its President, Eulalio Ganzon, for illegal dismissal and
money claims for: underpayment of salary, overtime pay, and 13th month pay; nonpayment of
holiday pay and service incentive leave; illegal deduction; and attorneys fees. He alleged that he
was a regular employee working as a finishing carpenter in the construction business of EGI; he
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was repeatedly hired from January 21, 2010 until April 30, 2011 when he was terminated
without prior notice and hearing; his daily salary of ₱292.00 was below the amount required by
law; and wage deductions were made without his consent, such as rent for the barracks located in
the job site and payment for insurance premium. On the other hand, EGI countered his
contention that, as proven by the three (3) project employment contract, Ando was engaged as a
project worker (Formworker-2) in Bahay Pamulinawen Project in Laoag, Ilocos Norte from June
1, 2010 to September 30, 20107and from January 3, 2011 to February 28, 20118 as well as in
EGI-West Insula Project in Quezon City, Metro Manila from February 22, 2011 to March 31,
2011; he was paid the correct salary based on the Wage Order applicable in the region; he
already received the 13th month pay for 2010 but the claim for 2011 was not yet processed at the
time the complaint was filed; and he voluntarily agreed to pay ₱500.00 monthly for the cost of
the barracks, beds, water, electricity, and other expenses of his stay at the job site. The Labor
Arbiter declared Ando a project employee of EGI but granted some of his money claims. Both
parties elevated the case to the NLRC, which dismissed the appeals filed and affirmed in toto the
Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Ando filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. He
then filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA, which granted the same annuling the assailed NLRC
resolutions dated May 25, 2012 and July 17, 2012, . EGI's motion for reconsideration was
denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Fortunato B. Ando, Jr., is a regular or a project worker of E.
GANZON, INC., (EIG).
HELD: Fortunato B. Ando, Jr., is a project worker of E. GANZON, INC., (EIG). In the case at
bar, The Court held that the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when
it sustained the Labor Arbiter's finding that Ando is not a regular employee but a project
employee of EGI. The terms regular, project, seasonal and casual employment are taken from
Article 280 of the Labor Code, as amended. Under Art. 280, project employment is one which
"has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee." To be considered as project-
based, the employer has the burden of proof to show that: (a) the employee was assigned to carry
out a specific project or undertaking and (b) the duration and scope of which were specified at
the time the employee was engaged for such project or undertaking. It must be proved that the
particular work/service to be performed as well as its duration are defined in the employment
agreement and made clear to the employee who was informed thereof at the time of hiring. As
the assigned project or phase begins and ends at determined or determinable times, the services
of the project employee may be lawfully terminated at its completion. In this case, the three
project employment contracts signed by Ando explicitly stipulated the agreement "to engage
[his] services as a Project Worker" and that: [His] services with the Project will end upon
completion of the phase of work for which [he was] hired for and is tentatively set on (written
date). However, this could be extended or shortened depending on the work phasing. The
foregoing considered, EGI did not violate any requirement of procedural due process by failing
to give Ando advance notice of his termination. Prior notice of termination is not part of
procedural due process if the termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or
phase thereof for which the project employee was engaged.Such completion automatically
terminates the employment and the employer is, under the law, only required to render a report to
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) on the termination of employment.
Therefore, the petition is granted and the February 28, 2014 Decision and September 4, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside. The decision of the labor arbiter is
reinstated.
2. Herma Shipyard, Inc. vs. Oliveros, G.R. No. 208936, April 17, 2017
FACTS: Herma Shipyard, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of shipbuilding
and repair. The respondents were its employees occupying various positions such as welder,
leadman, pipe fitter, laborer, helper, etc. On June 17, 2009, the respondents filed before the
Regional Arbitration Branch III, San Fernando City, Pampanga a complaint for illegal dismissal,
regularization, and non-payment of service incentive leave pay with prayer for the payment of
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full back wages and attorney's fees against petitioners. Respondents alleged that they are Herma
Shipyard's regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks usually necessary
and desirable in its business. On various dates, however, petitioners dismissed them from
employment. Respondents further alleged that as a condition to their continuous and
uninterrupted employment, petitioners made them sign employment contracts for a fixed period
ranging from one to four months to make it appear that they were project-based employees. Per
respondents, petitioners resorted to this scheme to defeat their right to security of tenure, but in
truth there was never a time when they ceased working for Henna Shipyard due to expiration of
project-based employment contracts. In fact, if they were indeed project employees, petitioners
should have reported to the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) the completion of
such project. But petitioners have never submitted such report to the DOLE. For their defense,
petitioners argued that respondents were its project-based employees in its shipbuilding projects
and that the specific project for which they were hired had already been completed. In support,
thereof, Herma Shipyard presented contracts of employment, some of which are written in the
vernacular and denominated as Kasuduang Paglilingkod (Pang-Proyektong Kawani)
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents were project-based employees and not regular
employees
HELD: According to Art, 280. The provisions of written agreement for the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season. The services of project-based employees are co-terminous with the project and may be
terminated upon the end or completion of the project or a phase thereof for which they were
hired. The principal test in determining whether particular employees were engaged as project-
based employees, as distinguished from regular employees, is whether they were assigned to
carry out a specific project or undertaking, the duration and scope of which was specified at, and
made known to them, at the time of their engagement. It is crucial that the employees were
informed of their status 8rS project employees at the time of hiring and that the period of their
employment must be knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon by the parties, without any force,
duress, or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employees or any other
circumstances vitiating their consent. It is settled, however, that project-based employees may or
may not be performing tasks usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer. The fact that the job is usually necessary or desirable in the business operation of the
employer does not automatically imply regular employment; neither does it impair the validity of
the project employment contract stipulating ~ fixed duration of employment. As this Court held
in ALU-TUCP vs National Labor Relations Commission. In sum, the CA erred in disregarding
the project employment contracts and in concluding that respondents have become regular
employees because they were performing tasks necessary and desirable to the business of Henna
Shipyard and were repeatedly rehired. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, which have expertise in
their specific and specialized jurisdiction, did not err, much less commit grave abuse of
discretion in holding that respondents were project-based employees. Their uniform conclusion
is supported by substantial evidence and should, therefore, be accorded not only respect, but
even finality.
ii. Length of service

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time the complaint was filed; and he voluntarily agreed to pay 500.00 ₱ monthly for the cost of
denied.
ISSUE: Is the length of service determinant of employment of project employee.
HELD: NO. Ando's tenure as a project employee remained definite because there was certainty
of completion or termination of the Bahay Pamulinawen and the West Insula Projects. The
project employment contracts sufficiently apprised him that his security of tenure with EGI
would only last as long as the specific projects he was assigned to were subsisting. When the
projects were completed, he was validly terminated from employment since his engagement was
coterminous thereto. The fact that Ando was required to render services necessary or desirable in
the operation of EGI's business for more than a year does not in any way impair the validity of
his project employment contracts. Time and again, We have held that the length of service
through repeated and successive rehiring is not the controlling determinant of the employment
tenure of a project employee. The rehiring of construction workers on a project-to-project basis
does not confer upon them regular employment status as it is only dictated by the practical
consideration that experienced construction workers are more preferred. In Ando's case, he was
rehired precisely because of his previous experience working with the other phases of the
project. EGI took into account similarity of working environment. Moreover It is widely known
that in the construction industry, a project employee's work depends on the availability of
projects, necessarily the duration of his employment. It is not permanent but coterminous with
the work to which he is assigned. It would be extremely burdensome for the employer, who
depends on the availability of projects, to carry him as a permanent employee and pay him wages
even if there are no projects for him to work on. The rationale behind this is that once the project
is completed it would be unjust to require the employer to maintain these employees in their
payroll. To do so would make the employee a privileged retainer who collects payment from his
employer for work not done. This is extremely unfair to the employers and amounts to labor
coddling at the expense of management.
iii. Repeated and successive re-hiring
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time the complaint was filed; and he voluntarily agreed to pay 500.00 ₱ monthly for the cost of
denied.
ISSUE: Is the successive hiring determinant of employment of project employee.
HELD: NO. Ando's tenure as a project employee remained definite because there was certainty
of completion or termination of the Bahay Pamulinawen and the West Insula Projects. The
project employment contracts sufficiently apprised him that his security of tenure with EGI
would only last as long as the specific projects he was assigned to were subsisting. When the
projects were completed, he was validly terminated from employment since his engagement was
coterminous thereto. The fact that Ando was required to render services necessary or desirable in
the operation of EGI's business for more than a year does not in any way impair the validity of
his project employment contracts. Time and again, We have held that the length of service
through repeated and successive rehiring is not the controlling determinant of the employment
tenure of a project employee. The rehiring of construction workers on a project-to-project basis
does not confer upon them regular employment status as it is only dictated by the practical
consideration that experienced construction workers are more preferred. In Ando's case, he was
rehired precisely because of his previous experience working with the other phases of the
project. EGI took into account similarity of working environment. Moreover It is widely known
that in the construction industry, a project employee's work depends on the availability of
projects, necessarily the duration of his employment. It is not permanent but coterminous with
the work to which he is assigned. It would be extremely burdensome for the employer, who
depends on the availability of projects, to carry him as a permanent employee and pay him wages
even if there are no projects for him to work on. The rationale behind this is that once the project
is completed it would be unjust to require the employer to maintain these employees in their
payroll. To do so would make the employee a privileged retainer who collects payment from his
employer for work not done. This is extremely unfair to the employers and amounts to labor
coddling at the expense of management.
s. Retirement
i. Continued engagement after retirement
1. De La Salle Araneta University vs. Bernardo, G.R. No. 190809,

February 13, 2017
Page 82 of 111
FACTS: Respondent Juanito C. Bernardo started working as a part-time professional lecturer at

De La Salle Araneta University on June 1, 1974 for two semesters and the summer for the school
year 1974-1975 with an hourly rate of P20.00. Bernardo then took a leave of absence from June
1,1975 to October 31,1977 after being assigned by the Philippine Government to work in Papua
New Guinea. After returning in 1977, he resumed teaching at DLS-AU up until October 12, 2003
at the end of the first semester for school year 2003-2004. However, on November 8, 2003, DLS-
AU informed Bernardo who was already 75 years old at that time that he could no longer teach at
the school anymore by reason of implementing the retirement age limit for their faculty
members. Bernard had no other choice but to retire. Prior to his retirement, Bernardo was being
paid at an hourly rate of P246.50. After seeking advice from the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) regarding his entitlement to retirement benefits after 27 years of
employment, the DOLE through its Public Assistance Center and Legal Service Office, opined
that respondent was entitled to receive benefits under RA 7641 or the “New Retirement Law”,
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. In a letter dated February 12,2004, Dr. Bautista
stated that Bernardo was not entitled to receive any kind of separation pay or benefits by reason
that only full-time permanent faculty of DLS-AU can receive postemployment benefits as
mandated by their policy and Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Bernardo then filed a
complaint for non-payment of retirement benefits and damages against DLS-AU and Dr.
Bautista. However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled that the claim for
retirement benefits/pay is already barred by prescription. The Labor Arbiter held that upon
reaching the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65), Bernardo was effectively separated
from the service and such time is when his cause of action accrued. He should have sought the
payment of such benefits/pay within three (3) years from such time but instead, he belatedly
sought the payment of his retirement benefits/pay when he filed the complaint only ten (10)
years after his cause of action accrued. For failure to do so, his claim for the retirement
benefits/pay should be forfeited. Respondent then appealed to NLRC with the latter reversing the
Labor Arbiter's ruling and stating that Bernardo filed his complaint for retirement benefits on
time since although DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista knew that Bernardo already reached the
compulsory age of retirement of 65 years old, still extended Bernardo's employment. Thus,
Bernardo's cause of action for payment of his retirement benefits accrued only on November 8,
2003, when he was informed by DLSAU that his contract would no longer be renewed and he
was deemed separated from employment. The principle of estoppel was also applicable against
DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista who could not validly claim prescription when they were the ones
who permitted Bernardo to work beyond retirement age. As to Bernardo's entitlement to
retirement benefits, the NLRC held untenable the contention that Bernardo is not entitled to
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 7641 since he is just a part time employee. The
retirement law does not exclude a part time employee from enjoying retirement benefits as the
Republic Act No. 7641 explicitly states "all employees in the private sector, regardless of their
position, designation, or status, and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid"
(Section 1, Rules Implementing the New Retirement Law) (Underlined for emphasis) with the
only exceptions are employees covered by the Civil Service Law; domestic helpers and persons
in the personal service of another; and employees in retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations regularly employing not more than ten employees. Clearly,
Bernardo does not fall under any of the exceptions. NLRC also commented that the retirement
law should be construed liberally in favor of the employee, and all doubts as to the intent of the
laws should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purpose. The DLS-AU
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. However, the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and reaffirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, the
instant petition presented to the Court
ISSUE: Whether or not part-time employees are excluded from the coverage of those entitled to
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 7541.
HELD: NO, Art. 302 (287) of the Labor Code as amended by RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay
Law provides that “Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in
the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.” The only
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exceptions are those working in the retail, service and agricultural establishments or operations
employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are exempted from the coverage.
Thereafter, through a Labor Advisory dated October 24,1996, then Secretary of Labor Leonardo
A. Quisimbing (Secretary Quisimbing), provided Guidelines for the Effective Implementation of
RA 7641 pertinent to the issue: “RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay Law shall apply to all
employees in the private sector, regardless of their position, designation or status and irrespective
of the method by which their wages are paid. They shall include part-time employees, employees
of service and other job contractors and domestic helpers or persons in the personal service of
another.” Furthermore, the provisions of Republic Act No. 7641 and its Implementing Rules are
plain, direct, unambiguous, and need no further interpretation since it does not include part-time
employees. Under the rule of statutory construction of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the
express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
ii. Estoppel
1. De La Salle Araneta University vs. Bernardo, G.R. No. 190809,

February 13, 2017
FACTS: Respondent Juanito C. Bernardo started working as a part-time professional lecturer at

De La Salle Araneta University on June 1, 1974 for two semesters and the summer for the school
year 1974-1975 with an hourly rate of P20.00. Bernardo then took a leave of absence from June
1,1975 to October 31,1977 after being assigned by the Philippine Government to work in Papua
New Guinea. After returning in 1977, he resumed teaching at DLS-AU up until October 12, 2003
at the end of the first semester for school year 2003-2004. However, on November 8, 2003, DLS-
AU informed Bernardo who was already 75 years old at that time that he could no longer teach at
the school anymore by reason of implementing the retirement age limit for their faculty
members. Bernard had no other choice but to retire. Prior to his retirement, Bernardo was being
paid at an hourly rate of P246.50. After seeking advice from the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) regarding his entitlement to retirement benefits after 27 years of
employment, the DOLE through its Public Assistance Center and Legal Service Office, opined
that respondent was entitled to receive benefits under RA 7641 or the “New Retirement Law”,
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.In a letter dated February 12,2004, Dr. Bautista
stated that Bernardo was not entitled to receive any kind of separation pay or benefits by reason
that only full-time permanent faculty of DLS-AU can receive postemployment benefits as
mandated by their policy and Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Bernardo then filed a
complaint for non-payment of retirement benefits and damages against DLS-AU and Dr.
Bautista. However, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and ruled that the claim for
retirement benefits/pay is already barred by prescription. The Labor Arbiter held that upon
reaching the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65), Bernardo was effectively separated
from the service and such time is when his cause of action accrued. He should have sought the
payment of such benefits/pay within three (3) years from such time but instead, he belatedly
sought the payment of his retirement benefits/pay when he filed the complaint only ten (10)
years after his cause of action accrued. For failure to do so, his claim for the retirement
benefits/pay should be forfeited. Respondent then appealed to NLRC with the latter reversing the
Labor Arbiter's ruling and stating that Bernardo filed his complaint for retirement benefits on
time since although DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista knew that Bernardo already reached the
compulsory age of retirement of 65 years old, still extended Bernardo's employment. Thus,
Bernardo's cause of action for payment of his retirement benefits accrued only on November 8,
2003, when he was informed by DLSAU that his contract would no longer be renewed and he
was deemed separated from employment. The principle of estoppel was also applicable against
DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista who could not validly claim prescription when they were the ones
who permitted Bernardo to work beyond retirement age. As to Bernardo's entitlement to
retirement benefits, the NLRC held untenable the contention that Bernardo is not entitled to
retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 7641 since he is just a part time employee. The
retirement law does not exclude a part time employee from enjoying retirement benefits as the
Republic Act No. 7641 explicitly states "all employees in the private sector, regardless of their
position, designation, or status, and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid"
Page 84 of 111
(Section 1, Rules Implementing the New Retirement Law) (Underlined for emphasis) with the
only exceptions are employees covered by the Civil Service Law; domestic helpers and persons
in the personal service of another; and employees in retail, service and agricultural
establishments or operations regularly employing not more than ten employees. Clearly,
Bernardo does not fall under any of the exceptions. NLRC also commented that the retirement
law should be construed liberally in favor of the employee, and all doubts as to the intent of the
laws should be resolved in favor of the retiree to achieve its humanitarian purpose. The DLS-AU
then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals. However, the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit and reaffirmed the decision of the NLRC. Hence, the
instant petition presented to the Court
ISSUE: Whether or not De La Salle Araneta is estopped.
HELD: The equitable doctrine of estoppel is thus applicable against DLS-AU. In Planters
Development Bank v. Spouses Lopez,28 we expounded on the principle of estoppels as follows:
Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever a party has, by his own
declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe that a particular
thing is true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it. The concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary for the principle of equitable estoppel to apply: (a) conduct amounting to
false representation or concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the
impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert; (b) intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted
upon, or at least influenced by the other party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
actual facts. Inaction or silence may under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation, so
as to raise an equitable estoppel. When the silence is of such a character and under such
circumstances that it would become a fraud on the other party to permit the party who has kept
silent to deny what his silence has induced the other to believe and act on, it will operate as an
estoppel. This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in conscience he
ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he ought to remain
silent. DLS-AU, in this case, not only kept its silence that Bernardo had already reached the
compulsory retirement age of 65 years old, but even continuously offered him contracts of
employment for the next 10 years. It should not be allowed to escape its obligation to pay
Bernardo's retirement benefits by putting entirely the blame for the deferred claim on Bernardo's
shoulders.
iii. Retirement plan vs. Labor Code
1. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram, G.R. No. 217730,

June 5, 2017
FACTS: The case stemmed from a Complaint filed by Hassaram against PAL for illegal
dismissal and the payment of retirement benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. He claimed that
he had applied for retirement from PAL in August 2000 after rendering 24 years of service as a
pilot, but that his application was denied. Instead, PAL informed him that he had lost his
employment in the company as of 9 June 1998, in view of his failure to comply with the Return
to Work Order issued by the Secretary of Labor against members of the Airline Pilots
Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) on 7 June 1998. Before the Labor Arbiter (LA),
Hassaram argued that he was not covered by the Secretary's Return to Work Order; hence, PAL
had no valid ground for his dismissal. He asserted that on 9 June 1998, he was already on his
way to Taipei to report for work at Eva Air, pursuant to a four-year contract approved by PAL
itself. Petitioner further claimed that his arrangement with PAL allowed him to go on leave
without pay while working for Eva Air, with the right to accrue seniority and retire from PAL
during the period of his leave. In its Position Paper, PAL contended that (a) the LA had no
jurisdiction over the case, which was a mere off-shoot of ALPAP's strike, a matter over which
the Secretary of Labor had already assumed jurisdiction; (b) the Complaint should be considered
barred by res judicata, forum shopping, and prescription; (c) the case should be suspended while
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PAL was under receivership; and (d) if at all, Hassaram was entitled only to retirement benefits
of 5,000 for every year of service ₱ pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between PAL and ALPAP. LA awarded retirement benefits and attorney's fees to Hassaram.
Hassaram did not defy the Return to Work Order, as he was in fact already on leave when the
order was implemented. As to the computation of benefits, the LA ruled that Article 287 of the
Labor Code should be applied, since the statute provided better benefits than the PALALPAP
CBA. Hassaram's other claims, on the other hand, were dismissed. The NLRC granted PAL's
Motion for Reconsideration. Reversing its earlier Decision, it set aside the ruling of the LA on
account of Hassaram's receipt of retirement benefits under the Plan. This payment, according to
the NLRC, was sufficient to discharge his claim for retirement pay. The CA issued the assailed
Decision reversing the NLRC and reinstating the ruling of the LA. The appellate court declared
that the funds received under the Plan were not the retirement benefits contemplated by law.
Hence, it ruled that Hassaram was still entitled to receive retirement benefits in the amount of 2,
₱ 111,984.60 pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Whether the amount received by Hassaram under the Plan should be deemed part of his
retirement pay.
HELD: Yes, it is deemed part of his retirement pay. No, retirement pay should be computed on
the basis of the retirement plans provided by PAL. It is clear from the provisions of the Plan that
it is the company that contributes to a "retirement fund" for the account of the pilots. These
contributions comprise the benefits received by the latter upon retirement, separation from
service, or disability. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the Phils. the
Court utilized these provisions to explain the nature of the Plan: The PAL Pilots' Retirement
Benefit Plan is a retirement fund raised from contributions exclusively from [PALI of amounts
equivalent to 20% of each pilot's gross monthly pay. Upon retirement, each pilot stands to
receive the full amount of the contribution. In sum, therefore, the pilot gets an amount equivalent
to 240% of his gross monthly income for every year of service he rendered to petitioner. This is
in addition to the amount of not less than 100,000.00 that he shall receive under the 1967
Retirement Plan.47 ₱ (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted) Based on the foregoing
characterization, the Court included the amount received from the Plan in the computation of the
retirement pay of the pilot involved in that case. The same rule was later applied to Elegir v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc.: Consistent with the purpose of the law, the CA correctly ruled for the
computation of the petitioner's retirement benefits based on the two (2) PAL retirement plans
because it is under the same that he will reap the most benefits. Under the PAL-ALPAP
Retirement Plan, the petitioner, who qualified for late retirement after rendering more than
twenty (20) years of service as a pilot, is entitled to a lump sum payment of 125,000.00 for his ₱
twenty-five (25) years of service to PAL. xxx.
t. MCLE Compliance of counsel
i. Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017
FACTS: On March 2, 2012, Doble was called by respondent Country Manager and President
Nitin Desai, and was informed that his performance rating for 2011 was 1, which is equivalent to
unsatisfactory performance. On March 13, 2012, at about 10:45 AM, a company Executive
Assistant informed Doble that he has a meeting with ABB Inc. President Desai and Country
Human Resource (HR) Manager Marivic Miranda at 11:45 AM in the Luzon Conference Room
of ABB Inc. During the meeting, ABB Inc. Presdent Desai explained to Doble that the Global
and Regional Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses
and level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option for
Doble to resign. Thereafter, HR manager Miranda told Doble that he would be paid separation
pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided he would submit
a letter of resignation, and gave him until 12:45 PM within which to decide. Shocked by the
abrupt decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be the one made to resign.
Miranda said that it was the decision of the management and left him alone in the conference
room to decide whether or not to resign. At this juncture, the parties gave contrasting accounts on
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the ensuing events which led to the termination of Doble’s employment. On March 26, 2012,
Doble filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of
backwages, other monetary claims and damages. In a decision dated November 29, 2012, the
labor Arbiter held that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was involuntary,
and ordered ABB Inc. to pay his backwages and separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer
feasible. Aggrieved by the decision of the Labor arbiter, ABB Inc. and Desai filed an appeal,
whereas Doble filed a partial appeal from the dismissal of his monetary claims. In a decision
dated June 26, 2013, the two commissioners of the NLRC 6th division voted to grant the appeal
filed by ABB Inc. and Desai, and to dismiss the partial appeal of Doble. They found that the
resignation of Doble being voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award
of other monetary claims, damages and attorney’s fees. However, one NLRC Commissioner
dissented. Doble filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied with the NLRC
decision and resolution, Doble filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA.
The CA dismissed outright the petition for Certiorari because “the assailed NLRC Decision and
Resolution attached are mere certified photocopies and not duplicate originals or certified true
copies”, and petitioner’s counsel’s MCLE Compliance NO. III-0006542 does not appear to have
complied with the 4th MCLE compliance period. Disgruntled with the Resolutions of the CA,
Doble filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES: Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration which
dismissed the petition for Certiorari on the ground that petitioner’s counsel had conceded his
inability to comply with the MCLE requirement.
HELD: YES. The CA also gravely erred in denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground that petitioner’s counsel had
conceded his inability to comply with the MCLE requirement. On point is People v. Arrojado
where it was held that the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and
date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal
of the case. Granted that the petition for Certiorari was filed before the CA on October 29, 2013
even before the effectivity of En Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M.
No. 1922, it bears to stress that petitioner’s counsel later submitted Receipts of Attendance in the
MCLE Lecture Series for his MCLE Compliance IV on March 3, 2014 and the Certificate of
Compliance albeit on January 26, 2015. Hence the CA erred in issuing the November 28, 2014
Resolution denying Doble’s motion for reconsideration, there being no more reason not to
reinstate the petition for certiorari based on procedural defects which have already been
corrected. The Court agrees with the NLRC that ABB Inc. and Desai were able to prove by
substantial evidence that Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown by the following documents (1)
the affidavit of ABB Inc.’s HR Manager Miranda; (2) the resignation letter; (3) the Employee
Clearance Sheet; (4) the Certificate of Employment; (5) photocopy of BPI’s manager’s check
representing the separation benefit; (6) Employee Final Pay Computation showing in the
payment of leave credits, rice subsidy and bonuses; and, (7) the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim.
u. Certified true copy vs. certified photocopy
FACTS: On March 2, 2012, Doble was called by respondent Country Manager and President
Nitin Desai, and was informed that his performance rating for 2011 was 1, which is equivalent to
unsatisfactory performance. On March 13, 2012, at about 10:45 AM, a company Executive
Assistant informed Doble that he has a meeting with ABB Inc. President Desai and Country
Human Resource (HR) Manager Marivic Miranda at 11:45 AM in the Luzon Conference Room
of ABB Inc. During the meeting, ABB Inc. Presdent Desai explained to Doble that the Global
and Regional Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses
and level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option for
Doble to resign. Thereafter, HR manager Miranda told Doble that he would be paid separation
pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided he would submit
a letter of resignation, and gave him until 12:45 PM within which to decide. Shocked by the
Page 87 of 111
abrupt decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be the one made to resign.
Miranda said that it was the decision of the management and left him alone in the conference
room to decide whether or not to resign. At this juncture, the parties gave contrasting accounts on
the ensuing events which led to the termination of Doble’s employment. On March 26, 2012,
Doble filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of
backwages, other monetary claims and damages. In a decision dated November 29, 2012, the
labor Arbiter held that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was involuntary,
and ordered ABB Inc. to pay his backwages and separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer
feasible. Aggrieved by the decision of the Labor arbiter, ABB Inc. and Desai filed an appeal,
whereas Doble filed a partial appeal from the dismissal of his monetary claims. In a decision
dated June 26, 2013, the two commissioners of the NLRC 6th division voted to grant the appeal
filed by ABB Inc. and Desai, and to dismiss the partial appeal of Doble. They found that the
resignation of Doble being voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award
of other monetary claims, damages and attorney’s fees. However, one NLRC Commissioner
dissented. Doble filed for motion for reconsideration but was denied. Dissatisfied with the NLRC
decision and resolution, Doble filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA.
The CA dismissed outright the petition for Certiorari because “the assailed NLRC Decision and
Resolution attached are mere certified photocopies and not duplicate originals or certified true
copies”, and petitioner’s counsel’s MCLE Compliance NO. III-0006542 does not appear to have
complied with the 4th MCLE compliance period. Disgruntled with the Resolutions of the CA,
Doble filed this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the assailed
NLRC decision and Resolution attached thereto are mere photocopies and not duplicate originals
or true copies.
HELD: The petition is partly impressed with merit on procedural grounds, but still devoid of
substantive merit. On procedural aspect, the court rules that the CA gravely erred when it
dismissed outright the Petition for Certiorari and refused to reinstate the same, despite the fact
that the two defects noted in the minute Resolution have already been substantially rectified. The
CA gravely erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that the assailed NLRC Decision and
Resolution attached thereto are mere “certified photocopies” and not duplicate originals or
certified true copies. The CA’s inordinate nitpicking on procedural requirements is contrary to
the ruling in COCA Cola Bottlers Phils Inc v. Cabalo: The problem presented is not novel. In
fact, it is a fairly recurrent one in petitions for certiorari of NLRC decisions as it seems to be the
practice of the NLRC to issue certified “Xerox copies’ only instead of certified “True copies”.
We have, however, put an end to this issue in Quintano v. NLRC when we declared that there is
no substantial distinction between a photocopy or a “xerox copier” and a “true copy” for as long
as the photocopy is certified by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved
or his duly authorized representative and that the same is a faithful reproduction of the original.
In this case, a perusal of the attached NLRC Decision and Resolution shows that they are indeed
certified photocopies of the said decision and resolution. Each page has been certified by the
NLRC 6th Division’s Deputy Clerk of Court who is undisputedly the proper officer to make such
certification. Moreover, the attached copies appear to be faithful reproductions thereof. Thus,
there is substantial compliance with Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which provides that
any petition filed under Rule 65 should be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment,
order, or resolution subject thereof.
v. Work-related illness i. No automatic compensability
1. Madridejos vs. Nyk-Fil Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204262,

June 7, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner Madridejos was a Filipino seafarer hired by respondent NYK-Fil Ship
Management, Inc. (NYK-FIL), a registered local manning agency operating by virtue of
Philippine laws for its foreign principal, International Cruise Services, Limited. Madridejos
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signed an employment contract with NYK-FIL as a Demi Chef. Madridejos commenced to work
aboard the vessel. Two (2) weeks after, he claimed that he suddenly slipped on a metal stairway
and fell down, hitting his abdomen and chest on a metal pipe. He was brought to the ship doctor
and was diagnosed to have a sebaceous cyst to the right of the umbilicus. After two (2) months,
NYK-FIL terminated Madridejos' services through its foreign principal. Madridejos insisted that
he did not finish his employment contract with NYK-FIL due to his unwanted health condition.
Not being at fault for the pre-termination of his employment contract, he made demands upon
NYKFILto pay his disability benefits
ISSUE: Whether or not Madridejos entitled to disability benefits?
HELD: NO. Madridejos cannot claim disability benefits since he was not medically repatriated.
Even assuming that Madridejos was medically repatriated, he still cannot claim for disability
benefits since his sebaceous cyst was not work-related. Illnesses not listed as an occupational
disease under Section 32 of the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Amended
Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board
Ocean-Going Vessels are disputably presumed to be work- related. However, seafarers must
prove through substantial evidence the correlation between their illness and the nature of their
work for their claim for disability benefits to prosper. For an illness to be compensable, it is not
necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered
by the seafarer. It is enough that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by the
employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have contributed to
the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have
had. Madridejos cannot solely rely on the disputable presumption. For his failure to substantiate
his claim that his cyst was either workrelated or work-aggravated, this Court cannot grant him
relief. For this reason, this Court cannot presuppose that it is work-related. Furthermore, it was
already settled that Madridejos was not repatriated due to his alleged medical condition but due
to the expiration of his contract as a probationary employee. Clearly, it becomes unnecessary for
NYK-FIL to overcome the disputable presumption that Madridejos' illness was workrelated.
ii. Reasonable connection
1. Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., G.R. No. 212098,
July 26, 2017
charge of equipment and the crew. , by respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. for
and in behalf of its foreign principal Target Ship Management Pte Ltd. on board the vessel M V.
Kalpana Prem, for a period of nine (9) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$730.00. Prior
to his employment and embarkation, petitioner underwent a Pre-Employment Medical
Examination where he was pronounced "Fit For Sea Duty”. Around five (5) months into his
Vancouver, Canada, he was diagnosed of suffering from "uncontrolled hypertension", "malaise
NYD", and "psychosomatic illness". He was also declared unfit for duty and was repatriated
back to the Philippines. On May 16, 2012, petitioner filed a complaint against respondents
claiming disability benefits for permanent disability and damages. LA dismissed the complaint.
The NLRC favored the employee. During the pendency of the petition before the CA, the LA, on
July 30, 2013, issued a Writ of Execution. In compliance with the writ, respondents deposited the
judgment award before the NLRC Cashier.
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iii. Presumption of work-relatedness; presumption of compensability
1. Atienza vs. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No.
191049, August 7, 2017
FACTS: This petition for review on Certiorari assails the CA decision which affirmed the
resolution of the NLRC reversing the LA ruling for the payment of disability benefits to
petitioner Tomas P. Atienza. Respondent Orophil Shipping International Co. (Orophil), as the
agent of co-respondent Hakuho Kisen Co. (Hakuho), employed petitioner as a seaman. As a
seaman, petitioner was required to be on-call twenty-four (24) hours a day to observe and record
weather and sea conditions and keep watch at sea during navigation. He was constantly exposed
to cold, heat, and other elements of nature. Later, petitioner was repatriated after complaining of
severe headaches, nausea, and double vision. The company-designated physician diagnosed him
to be suffering from right cavernous sinus inflammation or Tolosa Hunt Syndrome (THS), a rare
neurologic disorder with unknown cause but associated with inflammation of the area behind the
eyes, in which a recent viral infection is a possible risk factor. Petitioner filed a claim for
disability benefits and asserted that his illness was workrelated and compensable because the
nature of his work aggravated his condition. In their defense, respondent and Hakuho denied the
claim for disability benefits and asserted that the company designated physician declared him as
fit to work. It also argued that the illness was not work related adding that Atienza concealed the
fact that he had previously suffered from THS.
ISSUE: Whether or not the nature of the work of petitioner as seaman aggravate the illness so as
to be compensable?
HELD: Yes. The nature of the work aggravated the illness. Section 32-A of the 2000 POEASEC
provides that for an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable,
all of the conditions therein must be satisfied. On the other hand, Section 20 (B) (4) of the 2000
POEA-SEC declares that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of the Contract are disputably
presumed as work related. The Court ruled that there is a need to satisfactorily show the four (4)
conditions under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC in order for the disputably presumed
disease resulting in disability to be compensable. Compensability does not depend on whether
the injury or disease was pre-existing at the time of the employment but rather if the disease or
injury is workrelated or aggravated his condition. Applying to the case at bar, the Court held that
it is reasonable to conclude that petitioner's illness was most probably aggravated due to the
peculiar nature of his work. The activities necessarily entail the use of eye muscles that can cause
an eye strain as in fact, he experienced headache, nausea, and double vision that worsened when
he looked at his right side. Considering further his constant exposure to different temperature and
unpredictable weather conditions that accompanied his work on board an ocean-going vessel, the
likelihood to suffer a viral infection - a possible risk factor - is not far from impossible. While
petitioner's illness appears to have been preexisting, his work exposed him to the risk of
aggravating the same. Thus, the illness was compensable.
2. Romana vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 192442,

August 9, 2017
Page 90 of 111
FACTS: This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of Court of Appeals
which affirmed the rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Labor Arbiter
dismissing the claim for disability benefits of petitioner Benedict N. Romana. Respondents
Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (MMC), Eduardo Manese and/or Princess Cruise Lines Ltd.
employed petitioner as a medical fitter aboard M/V Golden Princess. Petitioner alleged that a
metal ceiling fell and wounded his head while walking along the ship alley. He allegedly
experienced headache and blurring of vision as a result thereof. Upon consultation, a specialist
found a tumor at the left side of his brain, for which he underwent craniectomy. When
repatriated, the company-designated physician declared that the illness is not work-related.
Petitioner insisted that the illness is work-related. He claimed that the illness was aggravated by
the incident and his exposure to different chemicals, formaldehyde, hydrocarbons, fumes, and
other deleterious emissions, and to changes of temperature of extreme hot and freezing colds at
the engine room and deck areas. For their part, the respondents denied the claim contending that
brain tumor is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner proved compliance with the conditions for compensability
to be entitled for disability benefits?
HELD: NO. The petitioner failed to comply with the conditions for compensability. For both
listed occupational disease and a non-listed illness and their resulting injury to be compensable,
the seafarer must sufficiently show by substantial evidence compliance with the conditions for
compensability. For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be
compensable, all of the following conditions must be satisfied: (1) The seafarer's work must
involve the risks described herein; (2) The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's
exposure to the described risks; (3) The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and
under such other factors necessary to contract it; (4) There was no notorious negligence on the
part of the seafarer. The seafarer will, in all instances, have to prove compliance with the
conditions for compensability, whether or not the work-relatedness of his illness is disputed by
the employer. He has to prove that the illness he suffered was work-related and that it must have
existed during the term of his contract. In this case, petitioner's brain tumor is a benign tumor,
slow-growing and well-defined. Medical studies show that brain tumors arise from cells in the
linings of blood vessels. Its exact cause is unknown and no risk factor accounting for the
majority of brain tumors has been identified. As records show, the company-designated
physician, after due assessment of petitioner's condition, found that his illness was caused by an
abnormal growth of tissue in the brain's blood vessels (brain tumor) and therefore not
workrelated. Hence, petitioner’s brain tumor is not compensable because of failure to comply
with the conditions for compensability.
w. SSS Contributions i. Acquittal from criminal case and extinguishment of civil liability
1. Ambassador Hotel, Inc. vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 194137,
June 21, 2017
FACTS: SSS filed a complaint with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Quezon City against
Ambassador Hotel and its officers for non-remittance of SSS Contributions and penalty liabilities
for the period from June 1999 to March 2001. Yolanda Chan (President of the Hotel) and other
officers were charged for the violation of Section 22(a), in relation to Section 22(d) and Section
28 (e) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended by RA No. 8282. Only Yolanda was arrested.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. RTC held that Yolanda could not be held criminally
liable for the non-payment of SSS contributions because she was not performing the duties of the
hotel’s president from June 1999 to March 2001. The RTC, however, ruled that the acquittal of
Yolanda did not absolve Ambassador Hotel from its civil liabilities.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ambassador Hotel should pay its civil liabilities (including
nonremittance of SSS contributions) even their president (Yolanda) acquitted from the said
criminal case.
Page 91 of 111
HELD: Under Section 8(c) of R.A. No. 8282, an employer is defined as "any person, natural or
juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries on in the Philippines any trade, business, industry,
undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under his
orders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions,
branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government."
Ambassador Hotel, as a juridical entity, is still bound by the provisions of R.A. No. 8282.
Section 22 (a) thereof states: Remittance of Contributions. (a) The contributions imposed in the
preceding section shall be remitted to the SSS within the first ten (10) days of each calendar
month following the month for which they are applicable or within such time as the Commission
may prescribe. Every employer required to deduct and to remit such contributions shall be liable
for their payment and if any contribution is not paid to the SSS as herein prescribed, he shall pay
besides the contribution a penalty thereon of three percent (3%) per month from the date the
contribution falls due until paid. If deemed expedient and advisable by the Commission, the
collection and remittance of contributions shall be made quarterly or semiannually in advance,
the contributions payable by the employees to be advanced by their respective employers:
Provided, that upon separation of an employee, any contribution so paid in advance but not due
shall be credited or refunded to his employer.
x. Closure of business
i. Piercing the veil; alter ego doctrine
1. Zambrano vs. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation/Pacific

Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 224099, June 21, 2017
FACTS: The petitioners averred that they were employees of private respondent Phil. Carpet.
On January 3, 2011, they were notified of the termination of their employment effective
February 3, 2011 on the ground of cessation of operation due to serious business losses. They
were of the belief that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation of due process
because the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere pretense to transfer its operations to its wholly
owned and controlled corporation, Pacific Carpet. They claimed that the job orders of some
regular clients of Phil Carpet were transferred to Pacific Carpetl and that from October to
November 2011, several machines were moved from the premises of Phil Carpet to Pacific
Carpet. They asserted that their dismissal constituted unfair labor practice as it involved the mass
dismissal of all union officers and members of the PHILCEA. In its defense. Phil Carpet
countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased operations because there had been a
steady decline in the demand of its products due to the global recession, stiffer competition, and
the effects of a changing market. Based on the Audited Financial Statements conducted by SGC
& Co., it incurred losses of P4,100,000 in 2006; P12,800,000 in 2007; P53,280,000 in 2008; and
P47,790,000 in 2009. As of the end of October 2010, unedited losses already amounted to
P26,590,000. Thus in order to stem the bleeding, the company implemented several cost-cutting
measures, including voluntary redundancy and early retirement program. In 2007, the car carpet
division was closed. Moreover, from a high production capacity of about 6,000 square meters of
carpet a month in 2002, its final production capacity steadily went down to an average of 350
square meters per month for 2009 and 2010. The petitioners and the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) were served written notices one (1) month before the intended closure of
the company. The petitioners ·were also paid their separation pay and they voluntarily executed
their respective Release and Quitclaim before the DOLE officials. LA dismissed which was
affirmed by both the NLRC and CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil should apply in the case at
bar.
HELD: NO. A corporation is an artificial being created by oepration of law. It possesses the
right of succession and such powers, attributes, and properties expressly authorized by law or
incident to its existence. It has a personality separate and distinct from the persons composing it,
as well as from any other legal entity to which it may be related. Equally well-settled is the
Page 92 of 111
principle that the corporate mask may be removed or the corporate veil pierced when the
corporation is just an alter ego of a person or of another corporation. Although ownership by one
corporation of all or a great majority of stocks of another corporation and their interlocking
directorates may serve as indicia of control, by themselves and without more, these
circumstances are sufficient to establish an alter ego relationship or connection between Phil
Carpet on the one hand and Pacific Carpet on the other hand that will justify the latter’s
corporate cover. This Court has declared that “mere ownership by a single stockholder or by
another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not of itself
sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality.” It has likewise ruled that
the existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough
justification to pierce the veil of corporation fiction in the absence of fraud or other public policy
considerations.
y. Redundancy
i. Philippine National Bank vs. Dalmacio/ Dalmacio vs. Philippine

FACTS: The cases stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of separation
pay retirement benefits, illegal deduction, nonpayment of provident fund with prayer for
damages and attorney’s fees filed by Jumelito T. Dalmacio and Emma R. Martinez as a result of
their separation from PNB way back September 15, 2005 due to PNB’s implementation of its
program. Dalmacio and Martinez were hired as utility worker and communication equipment
operator, respectively, by the National Service Corporation, subsidiary of PNB. years later,
Dalmacio became an Infromation Technology officer of PNB, while Martinez became a Junior
IT Field Analyst. Dalmacio claims that PNB’s redundancy program was not valid as it did not
apply fair and reasonable criteria concluding that Dalmacio’s position had become redundant.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that PNB complied with the law and jurisprudence in terminating the
services of the complainants on the ground of redundancy. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s
decision adn ruled that there is no showing of bad faith on PNB’s part in undertaking the
redundancy program. Dalmacio and Martinez’s Motion for Reconsideration having been denied
by the NLRC, Dalmacio filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. The CA affirmed in part the
resolution of the NLRC. It held that even after he ceased working with the PNB, Dalmacio was
not left jobless as he readily accepted a job offer with Technopaq who employed him for three
years. Only after he ceased working in technopaq that he conveniently filed a case for illegal
dismissal against PNB claiming other monetary benefits allegedly due him and after receiving
substantial amount of separation pay. Hence, the CA suspected the intention of Dalmacio in
filing the complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB validly implemented its redundancy program

HELD: The petition as denied. A position is redundant when it is superfluous and superfluity of
a position or positions could be the result of a number of factors, such as the over hiring of
workers, a decrease in the volume of business or the dropping of a particular line or service
previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. PNB’s action is within the ambit of
“management prerogative” to upgrade and enhance the computer system of the bank. Dalmacio,
being an IT officer whose job is to maintain the computer system of PNB, his position has
become patently redundant uponPNB’s engagement of the contract service with Technopaq.
Finding no other alternative, PNB was constrained to terminate Dalmacio who thereafter posed
no objection thereto, consented to and willingly received the hefty separation pay given to him.
Moreover, records have it that PNB faithfully complied with the legal procedures provided under
Article 283 of the Labor Code as evidenced by the individual notices of termination served and
received by the petitioner as well as the Establishment Termination Report filed by PNB with the
DOLE. Likewise, records show that PNB complied with the procedure requirements. PNB
servied Dalmacio and Martinez notices of termination informing them that their termination due
to redundancy shall be effective September 15, 2005. PNB also filed an Establishment
Termination Report with the Regional Office of the DOLE, in order to report complainants’
termination.
Page 93 of 111
z. Burden of proof in illegal dismissal case
i. Cosue vs. Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, et al., G.R.

No. 230664, July 24, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner started working for respondent Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation
(FIDC) on August 23, 1993 as a construction worker. He subsequently became a regular
employee of FIDC, performing work as janitor/maintenance staff. Around 5 p.m. of July 10,
2014, respondent Germino, as Head of FIDC’s Property Management Division, asked petitioner
to stay in the FIDC’s building to watch over the generator due to the frequent power outage, and
to assist the guards on duty since they were newly hired. Petitioner agreed. According to
petitioner, around 9 p.m. on July 10, 2014, he saw two security guards, together with an
unidentified man, on their way to the electrical room. They had a knapsack which did not look
heavy. When they left the room, petitioner saw one of them carrying the knapsack which, by this
time, appeared to contain something heavy. The next morning, petitioner borrowed the key to the
electrical room and together with fellow maintenance personnel, Alcallaga, looked for the
electrical wires that were stored therein. Unfortunately, the wires were no longer there. Petitioner
was convinced that the two guards and their unidentified companion took the wires. At 1 p.m., he
was summoned by Germino who verbally informed him that he was suspended from July 16,
2014 to August 13, 2014 on suspicion that he stole the electrical wires. Beginning July 16, 2014
until August 13, 2014, he was no longer allowed to work. Thus, on October 9, 2014, he filed a
Complaint against FIDC, Germino and FIDC President, for actual illegal dismissal and
underpayment of salaries, with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. In
his Position Paper, petitioner additionally made claims for underpayment of his holiday pay, 13th
month pay and service incentive leave pay. He sought to recover on the alleged underpayments
for the period covering “three (3) years backward from the time of the filing of (his) complaint.”
Following an investigation, Germino issued a memorandum of suspension to petitioner for
obtaining the keys to the electrical room and entering without permission, and for leaving his
post and joining Alcallaga in the electrical room. Petitioner was suspended for twenty-five (25)
days from July 16, 2014 to August 13, 2014, pending further investigation. Petitioner returned to
FIDC on August 13, 2014, but was told to come back as Germino was on leave. When petitioner
came back on August 27, 2014, he was able to speak to Germino and they agreed that he would
voluntarily resign. However, petitioner did not file his resignation, and eventually instituted his
Complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondents argued that there was no illegal dismissal as there
was an agreement between FIDC and petitioner that the latter would just resign. As petitioner
reneged on this agreement and chose to be absent, he should be considered absent without leave.
As for petitioner’s money claims, FIDC averred that petitioner was entitled to receive only his
latest unpaid salary, if any, and his pro rata 13thmonth pay. The LA held that other than
petitioner’s general assertion that he was dismissed, no evidence was presented to support such
claim. The LA stressed that the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal
dismissal cases could not be applied as respondents denied dismissing petitioner. The LA,
however, found no reason to conclude that petitioner abandoned his job, absent proof of
petitioner’s clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Backwages were not
awarded as there was neither dismissal nor abandonment. However, finding that there was
underpayment of salaries, the LA awarded salary differentials computed at P8,819.01. The
NLRC, in its resolution, affirmed LA’s decision. Affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal
cases applies in the present case
HELD: No. The rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioner was
burdened to prove his allegation that respondents dismissed him from his employment. It must
be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive, and convincing. However,
in the case at bar, the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases
finds no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the petitioner. In illegal
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dismissal cases, where the employers the burden to prove that the termination was for a valid
authorized cause, the employee must first establish by substantial evidence of the fact of
dismissal from service.
aa. Graceful exit
i. Cosue vs. Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, et al., G.R.

No. 230664, July 24, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner started working for respondent Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation
(FIDC) on August 23, 1993 as a construction worker. He subsequently became a regular
employee of FIDC, performing work as janitor/maintenance staff. Around 5 p.m. of July 10,
2014, respondent Germino, as Head of FIDC’s Property Management Division, asked petitioner
to stay in the FIDC’s building to watch over the generator due to the frequent power outage, and
to assist the guards on duty since they were newly hired. Petitioner agreed. According to
petitioner, around 9 p.m. on July 10, 2014, he saw two security guards, together with an
unidentified man, on their way to the electrical room. They had a knapsack which did not look
heavy. When they left the room, petitioner saw one of them carrying the knapsack which, by this
time, appeared to contain something heavy. The next morning, petitioner borrowed the key to the
electrical room and together with fellow maintenance personnel, Alcallaga, looked for the
electrical wires that were stored therein. Unfortunately, the wires were no longer there. Petitioner
was convinced that the two guards and their unidentified companion took the wires. At 1 p.m., he
was summoned by Germino who verbally informed him that he was suspended from July 16,
2014 to August 13, 2014 on suspicion that he stole the electrical wires. Beginning July 16, 2014
until August 13, 2014, he was no longer allowed to work. Thus, on October 9, 2014, he filed a
Complaint against FIDC, Germino and FIDC President, for actual illegal dismissal and
underpayment of salaries, with prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. In
his Position Paper, petitioner additionally made claims for underpayment of his holiday pay, 13th
month pay and service incentive leave pay. He sought to recover on the alleged underpayments
for the period covering “three (3) years backward from the time of the filing of (his) complaint.”
Following an investigation, Germino issued a memorandum of suspension to petitioner for
obtaining the keys to the electrical room and entering without permission, and for leaving his
post and joining Alcallaga in the electrical room. Petitioner was suspended for twenty-five (25)
days from July 16, 2014 to August 13, 2014, pending further investigation. Petitioner returned to
FIDC on August 13, 2014, but was told to come back as Germino was on leave. When petitioner
came back on August 27, 2014, he was able to speak to Germino and they agreed that he would
voluntarily resign. However, petitioner did not file his resignation, and eventually instituted his
Complaint for illegal dismissal. Respondents argued that there was no illegal dismissal as there
was an agreement between FIDC and petitioner that the latter would just resign. As petitioner
reneged on this agreement and chose to be absent, he should be considered absent without leave.
As for petitioner’s money claims, FIDC averred that petitioner was entitled to receive only his
latest unpaid salary, if any, and his pro rata 13thmonth pay. The LA held that other than
petitioner’s general assertion that he was dismissed, no evidence was presented to support such
claim. The LA stressed that the rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal
dismissal cases could not be applied as respondents denied dismissing petitioner. The LA,
however, found no reason to conclude that petitioner abandoned his job, absent proof of
petitioner’s clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Backwages were not
awarded as there was neither dismissal nor abandonment. However, finding that there was
underpayment of salaries, the LA awarded salary differentials computed at P8,819.01. The
NLRC, in its resolution, affirmed LA’s decision. Affirmed by CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not giving the employee the graceful exit or face administrative
investigation constitutes constructive dismissal
HELD: NO. Claim of constructive dismissal fails. Bare allegations of constructive dismissal,
when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, as in this case, cannot be given credence. The
Supreme Court ruled that FIDC’s decision to give Cosue a graceful exit is perfectly within the
Page 95 of 111
company’s discretion. It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the
employer grants the employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter’s
employment record.
bb. Expulsion or impeachment of union officer
i. No loss of union membership
1. United Polyresins, Inc. vs. Pinuela, G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) is a registered domestic corporation doing
business in San Pedro, Laguna, while petitioners Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and Julito Uy Soon are its
corporate officers. Respondent Marcelino Pinuela was employed by UPI in 1987. He became a
member of the labor union, Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA), and was elected
President thereof in May, 2005 and slated to serve until the end of 2007. The collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) then existing between UPI and PORFA provided that: Section 3.
The Company shall grant to the Union the amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) free of interest as the union's capital for establishing a cooperative to meet the
needs of its members. Said loan shall fall due and become payable at the same date that this
Bargaining Agreement expires, to wit - December 31, 2007. In the event of nonpayment, all
officers and members will be personally accountable. In case of additional funds, they can make
a written request [addressed] to the President of the company. The CBA likewise contained a
union security clause which provided that employees who cease to be PORFA members in good
standing by reason of resignation or expulsion shall not be retained in the employ of UPI. Upon
his assumption as union President, respondent wrote the former union President, Geoffrey Cielo
(Cielo), to turn over the records, papers, documents and financial statements of the union. Cielo
surrendered the union's bank account documents, among others, which indicated that the union
had an available P78,723.60 cash balance. Cielo likewise submitted a Financial Report indicating
that the union had P208,623.60 in cash and P159,500.00 in receivables. Finding that the bank
documents and Cielo's report did not match, and Cielo unable to explain the discrepancies, the
union's Executive Committee, which was headed by respondent, resolved to hire a certified
public accountant to conduct an audit of the union's finances. In a December 1, 2005 report, the
accountant concluded that the union's finances, income, and disbursements for the years 2003
and 2004 were not properly documented, recorded, and reported. He recommended that the
union officers "take a seminar on basic bookkeeping and accounting;"6 that the union adopt
and/or install the necessary accounting and internal control systems; that the union prepare the
proper financial statements; and that the officers take corrective measures in financial
management as an integral part of sound management.
ISSUE: Whether or not a union officer can be expelled from membership based on provisions on
impeachment.
HELD: The Supreme Court denied the petition. Respondent's expulsion from PORFA is
grounded on Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the union's Constitution, which
provides: ARTICLE-XV IMPEACHMENT AND RECALL Section 1. Any of the following
shall be ground for the impeachment or recall of the union officers. e. Misappropriation of union
funds and property. This is without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate criminal or civil
action against the responsible officer/(s) by any interested party f. Willful violation of any
provision of the constitution or rules, regulations, measures, resolution(s) and decision of the
union However, these provisions refer to impeachment and recall of union officers, and not
expulsion from union membership. This is made clear by Section 2(e) of the same Article XV,
which provides that "(t)he union officers impeached shall 'IPSO FACTO' to [sic] be considered
resigned or ousted from office and shall no longer be elected nor appointed to any position in the
union." In short, any officer found guilty of violating these provisions shall simply be removed,
impeached or recalled, from office, but not expelled or stripped of union membership. It was
therefore error on the part of PORFA and petitioners to terminate respondent's employment
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based on Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the union's Constitution. Such a ground
does not constitute just cause for termination. A review of the PORFA Constitution itself reveals
that the only provision authorizing removal from the union is found in Article X, Section 6, that
is, on the ground of failure to pay union dues, special assessments, fines, and other mandatory
charges.38 On the other hand, grounds for disqualification from membership may be found in
Article IV. These provisions do not apply in respondent's case. Although he was eventually
charged with estafa,a crime involving moral turpitude, 41still, he has not been convicted of the
crime. For this reason, he may not be disqualified as union member. Thus, for what he is charged
with, respondent may not be penalized with expulsion from the union, since this is not authorized
and provided for under PORFA's Constitution.
cc. Testimony
i. Recantation
1. Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM-Katipunan, G.R.

No. 221493, August 2, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner Sterling averred that on June 26, 2010, their supervisor Mercy Vinoya
(Vinoya), found Respondent Raymond Esponga and his co-employees about to take a nap on the
sheeter machine. She called their attention and prohibited them from taking a nap thereon for
safety reasons. Esponga and his co-employees then transferred to the mango tree near the staff
house. When Vinoya passed by the staff house, she heard Esponga utter, "Huwag maingay, puro
bawal. " She then confronted Esponga, who responded in a loud and disrespectful tone, "Puro
kayo bawal, bakit bawal ba magpahinga?” When Vinoya turned away, Esponga gave her the
"dirty finger" sign in front of his co-employees and said "Wala ka pala eh, puro ka dakdak. Baka
pag ako nagsalita hindi mo kayanin." After being served a notice to explain and several hearings,
Sterling dismissed Esponga for gross and serious misconduct. In the illegal dismissal case filed
by Esponga, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Esponga, stating that Sterling failed to discharge
the burden of proof. NLRC reversed the ruling, stating that the acts of Esponga were all
violations of the Company Code of Conduct. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed NLRC’s
ruling, stating that the utterances and gesture did not constitute gross misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not Pesimo’s retraction has probative value
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court ruled in this case saying that recantation does not necessarily
cancel an earlier declaration. The rule is settled that in cases where the previous testimony is
made by the same witness, the test to decide which testimony to believe is on of comparison
coupled with the application of the general rules of evidence. A testimony solemnly given in
court should not be set aside and disregarded lightly, and before this can be done, bothe the
previous testimony and the subsequent one should be carefully compared and juxtaposed, the
circumstances under each was made, carefully and keenly scrutinized, and the reasons and
motices for the change discriminately analyzed. In this case, Pesimo’s earlier statement was
more credible as there was no proof, much less an allegation. that the same was made under
force or intimidation. It must be noted that Pesimo’s recantation was amde only after Esponga
came to see her. Nevertheless, in a text message she sent to Vinoya on January 24, 2011, pesimo
did not deny the contents of her earlier statement. She merely expressed concern over Esponga’s
discovery that she had executed a sworn statement corroborating Vinoya’s narration of the
incident. Thus, her earlier statement prevails over her subsequent recantation.
dd. Post-Employment Medical Examination
i. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. Crown Shipmanagement Inc. vs. De

Leon, G.R. No. 199977, January 25, 2017
Page 97 of 111
FACTS: Respondent, who worked for petitioner as a seafarer, was repatriated after completing
the nine-month POEA Standard Employment Contract. It was revealed that he had not incurred
any ailment for his 22-year employment as a seafarer. He went to petitioner for his medical
examination for his next deployment. However, after seeing him dragging his leg, petitioner
recommended him to consult to a neurologist and secure a clearance. Petitioner never heard
anything from him until after two years when he asked for disability benefits from the petitioner.
He claims that on his last duty as a Third Mate, he began feeling something was wrong with his
body. He said that he had consulted private doctors for check-up and they found that he was
suffering from radiculopathy which he presented as evidence to the Labor Arbiter. In response,
petitioners raised three main contentions. First, they belied the claim of respondent that he
experienced an illness aboard M/V Thule land, given the absence of any such entry in the
vessel's logbook. Second, petitioners highlighted the fact that when he disembarked De Leon did
not complain of any illness, request medical assistance, or submit himself to a postemployment
medical examination within three days from his disembarkation, as required by his POEA
Contract. Third, petitioners asserted that he had failed to address his "pending" status and to
follow the company physician's advice for him to consult a neurologist. LA ruled in favor of the
respondent De Leon granting him the USD60,000 disability benefits. NLRC affirmed the ruling.
In CA, the appellate court dismissed the motion for certiorari of the petitioner echoing the
uniform analyses of the LA and the NLRC that the causative circumstances leading to De Leon's
permanent disability must have transpired during the 22 years of his employment. The CA
declared that seafarers may recover money claims even if their ailment appeared only after their
repatriation.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA erred in affirming the ruling of LA and NLRC granting disability
benefits to respondent De Leon
HELD: YES. To be entitled to disability benefits, Supreme Court refers to the provisions of the
POEA Contract, as it sets forth the minimum rights of a seafarer and the concomitant obligations
of an employer. Under Section 20 (B) thereof, these are the requirements for compensability: (1)
the seafarer must have submitted to a mandatory post-employment medical examination within
three working days upon return; (2) the injury must have existed during the term of the seafarer's
employment contract; and (3) the injury must be work-related. In the present case, SC ruled that
the following requirements were not present. It is undisputed that he did not submit to a
mandatory post-employment medical examination within three working days upon return.
Second, respondent adduced insufficient proof that he experienced his injury or its symptoms
during the term of his contract. The pieces of documentary evidence presented, however, bear
dates well past the disembarkation of respondent. SC also held that the narration of De Leon that
he felt that something was wrong with his body is too general to be worthy of adjudicative
attention. On the third requisite, SC belied the observations of the lower tribunals on the mere
fact of the 22-year employment of De Leon as the causative factor that triggered his
radiculopathy. SC held that De Leon failed to show before the labor tribunals his functions as a
seafarer, as well as the nature of his ailment.
ee. Cancellation of union registration
i. Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of Management

Faculty Association, G.R. No. 207971, January 23, 2017
FACTS: On May 16, 2007, respondent filed a petition for certification election6 seeking to
represent a bargaining unit in AIM consisting of forty faculty members. Petitioner opposed the
petition, claiming that respondent's members are neither rank-and-file nor supervisory, but
rather, and managerial employees. On July 11, 2007, petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of
respondent's certificate of registration on the grounds of misrepresentation in registration and
that respondent is composed of managerial employees who are prohibited from organizing as a
union.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the members of AIMFA are disqualified from joining, assisting or
forming a labor organization
HELD: YES. Jurisprudence already provides that “in case of alleged includion of disqualified
employees in a union, the proper procedure for an employer like petition is to directly file a
petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to representation, false
statement of fraud under the circumstances enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code. AIM
was therefore correct in filing a petition for cancellation of respondent’s certificate of
registration. Petitioner's sole ground for seeking cancellation of respondent’s certificate of
registration - that is members are managerial employees and for this reason, its registration is
thus a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of Article 245 of the Labor Code which
declares that managerial employees are inelligible to join any labor organization.
ii. De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. vs. Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo

Memorial School, Inc., G.R. No. 192648, March 15, 2017
FACTS: De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. is a domestic corporation duly-organized and

existing under the laws of the Philippines. De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center and De
Ocampo Memorial College. Under the aforementioned institution is Bigkis Manggagawa ng De
Ocampo Medical Center a union which was granted Union Registration No. on September 26,
2003. Another permit was issued for Bigkis Manggagawa ng De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc.
dated December 5, 2003; Union Registration/Certificate of Creation of Local Chapter No. NCR-l
2-CC-002-2003, declaring that they are legitimate organization. A Petition for Cancellation of
Certificate of Registration with the Department of Labor and Employment - National Capital
Region was filed by De Ocampo against Bigkis Manggagawa ng De Ocampo Memorial School,
Inc. dated March 4, 2004. Stating in the petition the grounds of revocation of registration 1.)
Misrepresentation of declaring the officers and members 2.) Mixed membership of rank file 3.)
Inappropriate bargaining unit. A Comment-Opposition was then filed by BMDOMSI, denying
De Ocampo's allegations and claiming that the latter only wants to impede the formation of the
union. A decision of Acting Regional Director Ciriaco A. Lagunzad III of the DOLE-NCR ruled
that BMDOMSI committed misrepresentation by making it appear that the bargaining unit is
composed of faculty and technical employees, dated July 26, 2004. The respondents then filed an
appeal to Bureau of Labor Relations. On December 29, 2004, a decision was released by BLR
reversing the Regional Director's finding of misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in
BMDOMSI’s application for registration. According to BLR the petitioner failed to present
proof to support its allegation of mixed membership within respondent union. Certiorari was
filed by the petitioner to the CA seeking to annul and set aside the BLR Decision as well as the
Resolution dated January 24, 2005 denying its motion for reconsideration. CA affirmed the
Decision of the BLR. It ruled that there was no misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in the
application for registration. The respondents were able to substantiate that there have been no
misrepresentation as the members appearing in the minutes of the general membership meeting
BMDOMSI Union, and the list of members who attended the meeting and ratified the union
constitution and by-laws, are in truth employees of the school, though some service the hospital.
Although, the CA observed that the members of the union, who are from academic, non-
academic, and general services, do not perform work of the same nature and these factors dictate
the separation of the categories of employees for purposes of collective bargaining, the CA
reasoned that such lack of mutuality and commonality of interest of the union members is not
among the grounds for cancellation of union registration under Article 247 of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ocampo Bigkis Manggagawa ng De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc.
Union Registration should be revoked
HELD: NO. The respondents did not violate any regulation for them to have grounds for
cancelation of their Union Registration. BMDOMSI Union was able to testify to the court that
there were no misrepresentation, mixed membership and inappropriate bargaining unit in their
union. The CA ruled the according to Article 247 of the Labor Code provides: Art. 247. Grounds
for Cancellation of Union Registration. The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of
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union registration: 1.) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption
or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification,
and the list of members who took part in the ratification; 2.)Misrepresentation, false statements
or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election of officers, and the
list of voters; 3.) Voluntary dissolution by the members. The petitioner was not able to establish
to the court the violation alleged to the respondents, wherefore CA decision favored for
BMDOMSI, and declaring the petition denied for lack of merit ff. Security of tenure.
gg. Management prerogative
i. Transfer of employee
1. Chateu Royale Sports and Country Club, Inc. vs. Balba, G.R. No.
197492, January 18, 2017
FACTS: Petitioner Chateau Royale hired respondents as Account Executives. They were then
promoted to Account Managers after almost a year. As part of their duties, respondents were
instructed by the Director of Sales and Marketing to forward all proposals, event orders and
contracts for an orderly and systematic bookings in the operation of the petitioner’ s business.
However, they failed to comply with the directive. Accordingly, a notice to explain was served
on them, to which they promptly responded. After investigation, respondents were found to have
committed acts of insubordination, and that they were suspended for seven (7) days. However,
said suspension order was lifted before its implementation. Respondents then filed a complaint
for illegal suspension and non-payment of allowances and commissions. Respondents amended
their complaint to include constructive dismissal based on their information from the Chief
Financial Officer of the petitioner on the latter’s plan to transfer them to the Manila Office. The
proposed transfer was prompted by the shortage of personnel at the Manila Office as a result of
the resignation of three account managers and the director of sales and marketing. Despite
attempts to convince them to accept the transfer to Manila, they declined because their families
were living in Nasugbu, Batangas. LA found that respondents had been constructively dismissed.
NLRC reversed the same and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. CA granted the petition
for certiorari and set aside NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer of respondents constitutes constructive dismissal.
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner was able to discharge its burden, and
thus established that, contrary to the claim of the respondents that they had been constructively
dismissed, their transfer had been an exercise of the petitioner’s legitimate management
prerogative. First, the resignations of the account managers and the director of sales and
marketing in the Manila office brought about the immediate need for their replacements with
personnel having commensurate experiences and skills. With the positions held by the resigned
sales personnel being undoubtedly crucial to the operations and business of the petitioner, the
resignations gave rise to an urgent and genuine business necessity that fully warranted the
transfer from the Nasugbu, Batangas office to the main office in Manila of the respondents,
undoubtedly the best suited to perform the tasks assigned to the resigned employees because of
their being themselves account managers who had recently attended seminars and trainings as
such. Secondly, although the respondents’ transfer to Manila might be potentially inconvenient
for them because it would entail additional expenses on their part aside from their being forced to
be away from their families, it was neither unreasonable nor oppressive. The petitioner rightly
points out that the transfer would be without demotion in rank, or without diminution of benefits
and salaries. Instead, the transfer would open the way for their eventual career growth, with the
corresponding increases in pay. Thirdly, the respondents did not show by substantial evidence
that the petitioner was acting in bad faith or had ill-motive in ordering their transfer. In contrast,
the urgency and genuine business necessity justifying the transfer negated bad faith on the part of
the petitioner. Lastly, the respondents, by having voluntarily affixed their signatures on their
respective letters of appointment, acceded to the terms and conditions of employment
incorporated therein. One of the terms and conditions thus incorporated was the prerogative of
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management to transfer and re-assign its employees from one job to another “as it may deem
necessary or advisable.”
hh. Termination of employment
i. Stipulation to terminate is void

1. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services Corporation,
G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017
FACTS: Grand Placement, a licensed recruitment agency, employed Dagasdas as anetwork

technician on behalf of Industrial Management Technology Methods (ITM), whereby he is to be
deployed to in Saudi Arabia under a 1-year contract. Dagasdas contended that while the contract
specified thathe was employed as a network technician, he was actually engaged as a civil
engineer and said former position was only for the purpose of securing a visa. When he arrived
in Saudi Arabia, he signed a new employment contract with ITM which stipulated that the latter
contracted him as a Superintendent and he was placed under a 3-month probationary period. He
reported to the worksite but was given tasks suited for a Mechanical Engineer which were
foreign to the job applied for. He was the temporarily given the position of Civil Construction
Engineer. ITM gave him a termination notice indicating that he was dismissed pursuant to clause
17.4.3 of his contract, which provided that ITM reserved the right to terminate any employee
within the three-month probationary period without need of any notice to the employee. Thus, he
returned tothe Philippines and filed a case for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dagasdas was validly dismissed from work.
HELD: NO. Dagasdas was not validly dismissed. Security of tenure remains even if employees,
particularly OFWs, work in a different jurisdiction. Thus, even if a Filipino is employed abroad,
he or she is entitled to security of tenure. In this case, prior to his deployment and while still in
the PH, Dagasdas was made to sign a POEA-approved contract with GPGS, on behalf of ITM;
and, upon arrival in Saudi Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment contract. Nonetheless,
this new contract, which was used as basis for dismissing Dagasdas, is void for being in violation
of his right to security of tenure. To allow employers to reserve a right to terminate employees
without cause is violative of the guarantee of security of tenure. Article 297 of the Labor Code
provides for the just causes for dismissing an employee but ITM terminated Dagasdas for
violating a clause in the new contract. The clause is contrary to law because to allow employers
to reserve a right to terminate employees without cause is violative of the guarantee of security
of tenure.Moreover, even if Dagasdas was a probationary employee, his termination must still be
with a valid clause. Furthermore, the new contract was not shown to have been processed
through the POEA. It also breached Dagasdas' original contract as it was entered into even before
the expiration of the original contract approved by the POEA
ii. Employment contract
i. Lex loci contractus

1. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services Corporation,
G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017
FACTS: Grand Placement, a licensed recruitment agency, employed Dagasdas as anetwork

technician on behalf of Industrial Management Technology Methods (ITM), whereby he is to be
deployed to in Saudi Arabia under a 1-year contract. Dagasdas contended that while the contract
specified thathe was employed as a network technician, he was actually engaged as a civil
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engineer and said former position was only for the purpose of securing a visa. When he arrived
in Saudi Arabia, he signed a new employment contract with ITM which stipulated that the latter
contracted him as a Superintendent and he was placed under a 3-month probationary period. He
reported to the worksite but was given tasks suited for a Mechanical Engineer which were
foreign to the job applied for. He was the temporarily given the position of Civil Construction
Engineer. ITM gave him a termination notice indicating that he was dismissed pursuant to clause
17.4.3 of his contract, which provided that ITM reserved the right to terminate any employee
within the three-month probationary period without need of any notice to the employee. Thus, he
returned to the Philippines and filed a case for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudi Arabian Law should apply.
HELD: NO. The new contract was not shown to have been processed through the POEA. Under
our Labor Code, unless, the employment contract of an OFW is processed through the POEA,
the same does not bind the concerned OFW because if the contract is not reveiewed by the
POEA, certainl the State has no means of determining the suitability of foreign laws to our
overseas workers. The new contract also breached Dagasdas’s original contract as it was entered
into even before the expiration of the original contract approved by the POEA. Therefore, it
cannot supersede the original contract, its terms and conditions, including reserving in favor of
the employer, the right to terminate an employee without notice during the probationary period,
are void.
jj. Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
i. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services Corporation,

G.R. No. 205727, January 18, 2017
FACTS: Dagasdas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against GPGS in relation to his
termination from employment in Saudi Arabia. Before his repatriation, Dagasdas signed a
Statement of Quitclaim with Final Settlement stating that he was paid all the salaries and benefits
for his services. Ultimately, the CA, in holding that Dagasdas' dismissal was legal, gave credence
to Dagasdas' Statement of Quitclaim and Final Settlement. It ruled that for having voluntarily
accepted money from his employer, Dagasdas accepted his termination and released his
employer from future financial obligations arising from his past employment with it. In his
defense, Dagasdas claims that the CA should have closely examined his quitclaim because he
only signed it to afford his plane ticket for his repatriation. On the other hand, GPGS maintains
that Dagasdas' quitclaim is valid as there is no showing that he was compelled to sign it.
ISSUE: Whether prior execution of a Quitclaim precludes an employee from filing a complaint
for illegal dismissal.
HELD: NO. While it is shown that Dagasdas executed a waiver in favor of his employer, the
same does not preclude him from filing this suit. Generally, the employee's waiver or quitclaim
cannot prevent the employee from demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled, and from
filing an illegal dismissal case. This is because waiver or quitclaim is looked upon with disfavor,
and is frowned upon for being contrary to public policy. Unless it can be established that the
person executing the waiver voluntarily did so, with full understanding of its contents, and with
reasonable and credible consideration, the same is not a valid and binding undertaking.
Moreover, the burden to prove that the waiver or quitclaim was voluntarily executed is with the
employer. In this case, however, GPGS did not successfully discharge its burden. It failed to
show that Dagasdas indeed voluntarily waived his claims against the employer. Indeed, even if
Dagasdas signed a quitclaim, it does not necessarily follow that he freely and voluntarily agreed
to waive all his claims against his employer. Verily, this quitclaim, under the semblance of a
final settlement, cannot absolve GPGS from liability arising from the employment contract of
Dagasdas.
ii. Improperly notarized release and quitclaim; effects

Page 102 of 111
FACTS: In connection to a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Doble against ABB Inc., the
CA ultimately ruled in favor of ABB Inc., holding that Doble voluntarily resigned as evidenced
by a Receipt, Release and Quitclaim bearing his signature. In this appeal before the Supreme
Court, Doble alleges the document as void because it was made to appear that he appeared
before a notary public on April 10, 2012 when in fact he already filed an illegal dismissal
complaint on March 26, 2012.
ISSUE: Whether an improperly notarized release and quitclaim proves that a questioned
separation from employment is illegal.
HELD: NO. Regardless of the fact that it was improperly notarized, the subject quitclaim is a
valid and binding contract between Doble and ABB, Inc., since the authenticity and due
execution thereof is undisputed. Such lack of proper notarization does not render a private
document void or without legal effect, but merely exposes the notary public to prosecution for
possible violation of notarial laws, as well as the one who caused the same for falsification of
public document.
iii. Allegation of "forced to sign"
1. Philippine National Bank vs. Dalmacio/ Dalmacio vs. Philippine

National Bank, G.R. No. 202308/G.R.No. 202357, July 5, 2017
FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims filed by
Dalmacio as a result of his separation from PNB due to PNB's implemention of its redundancy
program. In connection therewith, he signed a Deed of Quitclaim and Release. The Labor
Arbiter, later on affirmed by the NLRC, ruled that PNB complied with the law and jurisprudence
in terminating the services of the complainants on the ground of redundancy. On Petition for
Certiorari with the CA, the CA ruled that the Deed of Quitclaim and Release which Dalmacio
signed militates against his reinstatement. Dalmacio insists that he was forced to sign the subject
deed, hence, this case.
ISSUE: Whether the act of Dalmacio of signing a Deed of Quitclaim and Release militates
against his reinstatement.
HELD: NO. Generally, deeds of release, waiver or quitclaims cannot bar employees from
demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their
dismissal since quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary to
public policy. Where, however, the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily, with a full
understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the
transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking. The requisites for a
valid quitclaim are: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (2) that
the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. Not having sufficiently proved that he was forced to sign
said Deed of Quitclaim and Release, Dalmacio cannot expediently argue that quitclaims are
looked upon with disfavor and considered ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of a
worker's legal rights. Indeed, it cannot even be said that Dalmacio did not fully understand the
consequences of signing the Deed of Quitclaim and Release. He is not an illiterate person who
needs special protection. He held a responsible position at PNB as an IT officer. It is thus safe to
say that he understood the contents of the Deed of Quitclaim and Release. There is also no
showing that the execution thereof was tainted with deceit or coercion. Although he claims that
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he was "forced to sign" the quitclaim, he nonetheless signed it. In doing so, Dalmacio was
compelled by his own personal circumstances, not by an act attributable to PNB.
kk. Appeal i. One-day late due to unforeseen events; Perfection
G.R. No. 184256, January 18, 2017
FACTS: In relation to a labor complaint, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner on May
15, 2003. On 28 July 2003, respondent filed a Manifestation stating that on July 21 2003, his
counsel's messenger tried to file with the NLRC a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum of
Appeal. However, upon arriving at around four o' clock in the afternoon, the messenger found
that the NLRC office was already closed due to a jeepney strike. He then decided to file and
serve copies of the notice with memorandum by registered mail. It was only on the next day, July
22 2003, that the filing of the rest of the copies and the payment of fees were completed. In reply
to respondent's Manifestation, petitioners filed a Motion for Outright Dismissal on the ground
that the appeal had been filed out of time. This claim notwithstanding, the NLRC granted
respondent’s appeal which was affirmed by the CA, hence, this case. Petitioners argue that
respondent did not perfect his appeal before the NLRC, considering his failure to file copies of
the Notice of Appeal with Memorandum of Appeal and to pay the necessary fees to the NLRC
on time.
ISSUE: Whether respondent perfected his appeal to the NLRC.
HELD: YES. The failure of respondent to file his appeal before the NLRC must be
contextualized. The Court quotes with favor its findings, as affirmed by the CA: As regards the
first issue, there is no question that July 21, 2003 was supposed to be the last day for the filing by
Complainant of his appeal form the Labor Arbiter's Decision. Incidentally, a working "day" at
the NLRC-NCR consists of eight (8) hours of work from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Complainant,
therefore, had until 5:00 p.m. of July 21, 2003 to perfect his appeal. Notably, his counsel's
messenger reached the NLRC NCR at 4:00 p.m. of that day for the sole purpose of perfecting
Complainant's appeal. Unfortunately, however, the NLRC NCR closed its Office at 3:30 p.m.,
earlier than the normal closing time of 5:00 p.m., because of a jeepney strike. Clearly, it was not
Complainant's fault that he was not able to perfect his appeal on July 21, 2003, the latter part of
said day having been declared non-working by NLRC NCR, itself. It is only just and fair,
therefore, that Complainant should be given until the next working day to perfect his appeal. In
any case, the Court has always held that the "[c]ourts have the prerogative to relax procedural
rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to
speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to due process."
ii. Finality of decision for failure to appeal
1. Javines vs. Xlibris a.k.a. Author Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 214301,
June 7, 2017
iii. Consideration of errors not assigned on appeal 1. Javines vs. Xlibris a.k.a.
Author Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 214301, June 7, 2017
FACTS: Javines, an Operations Manager in Xlibris, was terminated for falsifying or tampering3
meal receipts. The falsification was discovered when Javines submitted the meal receipts for
reimbursement to the finance department. A Notice to Explain was issued to him for allegedly
violating some provisions of the Employee's Code of Conduct and charging him with dishonesty.
Xlibris obtained certified copies of the meal receipts and notified Javines that some receipts were
tampered. Subsequently, Javines submitted his written explanation, denying having tampered the
receipts. He explained that it is the supervisors who submit the receipts to him and for which, he
prepares a reimbursement request; that while he prepares the request for reimbursement, he has
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no knowledge or part in the tampered receipts. An administrative hearing then was held in
which, Javines failed to explain why and how the incident transpired. Consequently, on the same
day, notices to explain were sent to the supervisors under Javines. The supervisors then denied
participation in the tampered receipts. X-libris terminated Javines' employment through an "end
of employment notice."Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC'S finding that Javines was dismissed for just cause became
final.
HELD: It became FINAL. It is undisputed that from this unanimous finding, Javines failed to
move for reconsideration nor challenged said ruling before the CA. Consequently, the NLRC
decision finding Javines to have been dismissed for just cause became final. For failure to file the
requisite petition before the CA, the NLRC decision had attained finality and had been placed
beyond the appellate court's power of review. Although appeal is an essential part of judicial
process, the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory
privilege. Settled are the rules that a decision becomes final as against a party who does not
appeal the same and an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the court below. Hence,
the finding that Javines was dismissed for just cause must be upheld. Javines' insistence that the
petition for certiorari filed by Xlibris throws open the entire case for review such that the issue of
whether or not he was dismissed for just cause ought to have been addressed by the CA is
entirely misplaced. While it is true that the appellate court is given broad discretionary power to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned, it has authority
to do so in the following instances: (a) when the question affects jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c)
matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of
the case, or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d)
matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue submitted that
the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored; (e) matters closely related to an error
assigned; and (f) matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is
dependent. None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant case. Thus, the CA cannot be
faulted for no longer discussing the issue of whether indeed there exists just cause for his
dismissal. Instead, in the petition for certiorari filed before the CA, Xlibris only questioned the
award of nominal damages for failure to comply with procedural due process. Emphatically,
neither Xlibris nor Javines further questioned the CA's award on this point. As such, the issue as
to whether the requirements of procedural due process to constitute a valid dismissal were
complied with has been resolved with finality. In any event, such involves a question of fact
which the Court does not allow in a petition filed under Rule 45. It has been consistently held
that the jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 is generally
limited to reviewing errors of law and does not extend to a re-evaluation of the sufficiency of
evidence upon which the courts a quo had based its determination. What is more, findings of fact
of labor tribunals when affirmed by the CA bind this Court. We find no compelling reason in this
case to depart from the foregoing settled rules.
ll. Authority of counsel i. Presumed authorized
G.R. No. 184256, January 18, 2017
FACTS: In relation to a labor complaint, petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
arguing for the first time that respondent's appeal filed with the NLRC was not perfected within
the reglementary period. They alleged that they received a copy of the Manifestation of
respondent denying that he had authorized the Sapalo Velez Bundang & Bulilan Law Offices
(SVBB) to continue representing him after the issuance of the LA's Decision. Hence, they argued
respondent was not bound by the notice of appeal or by the decisions rendered by the NLRC.
The CA held that respondent did not present any proof in support of his Manifestation that the
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SVBB had no authority to represent him before the NLRC or in the continuation of the case in
court. The appellate court then ruled that the "presumption that SVBB is authorized to represent
him before the NLRC and in the case at bar stands."
ISSUE: Whether counsel of respondent was authorized to represent the latter after the LA had
rendered its Decision on May 15, 2003.
HELD: YES. Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides a presumption on a lawyer's
appearance on behalf of a client: SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. - An attorney is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written
power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding
judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require
any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under
which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who
employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney willfully
appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Aside from the presumption of authority to represent a client in all stages of litigation, an
attorney's appearance is also presumed to be with the previous knowledge and consent of the
litigant until the contrary is shown. This presumption is strong, as the "mere denial by a party
that he has authorized an attorney to appear for him, in the absence of a compelling reason, is
insufficient to overcome the presumption, especially when denial comes after the rendition of an
adverse judgment." In his Manifestation, private respondent averred that he ceased
communications with the SVBB after 15 May 2003; that he did not cause the re-filing of his
case; and that he did not sign any document for the continuation of his case. However, he gave
no cogent reason for this disavowal. As pointed out by the CA, he presented no evidence other
than the denial in his Manifestation. Moreover, respondent only sent his Manifestation
disclaiming the SVBB's authority on 1 February 2007. It was submitted almost four years after
the LA had dismissed his complaint for having been prematurely filed. By that time, through the
SVBB's efforts, the NLRC had already rendered a Decision favorable to respondent. It puzzles
the Court why respondent would renounce the authority of his supposed counsel at this late
stage. The attempt of petitioners to use this circumstance to their advantage - in order to avoid
payment of liability - should not be given any weight by the Court.
mm. Separation benefits i. Acceptance; Estoppel
FACTS: In relation to a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Doble against ABB, Inc., the CA
ultimately ruled in favor of ABB Inc., finding that Doble’s acts of executing a resignation letter,
signing a Receipt, Release and Quitclaim, and accepting separation benefits, among others, prove
that his separation from employment was voluntary on his part.
ISSUE: Whether acceptance of separation benefits contradicts a claim for illegal dismissal.
RULING: Concededly, under prevailing jurisprudence, a deed of release of quitclaim does not
bar an employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled. Employees who
received their separation pay are not barred from contesting the legality of their dismissal, and
the acceptance of such benefits would not amount to estoppel. The basic reason for this is that
such quitclaims and/or complete releases are null and void for being contrary to public policy. Be
that as it may, not all quitclaims are invalid and against public policy. "If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is a clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. " Cases abound where the Court gave effect to quitclaims executed by the employees
when the employer is able to prove the following requisites: (1) the employee executes a deed of
Page 106 of 111
quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (3) the
consideration of the quitclaim is credible and reasonable; and (4) the contract is not contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals or goods customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law. ABB, Inc. and Desai proved by substantial evidence the presence of all
these requisites through the following documents: (1) the affidavit of ABB, Inc. 's HR Manager
Miranda;48 (2) the Certificate of Employment; (3) photocopy of Bank of the Philippine Islands
manager's check in the amount of 2,009,822.72, representing the separation ₱ benefit; (4)
Employee Final Pay Computation, showing payment of leave credits, rice subsidy and bonuses,
amounting to 805,399.35; and (5) the Receipt, Release and ₱ Quitclaim for a consideration of the
total sum of 2,815,222.07. ₱
nn. Constructive dismissal
FACTS: Doble was a multi-awarded and high-achieving employee of ABB. Inc. Allegedly,
without reason, however, Doble was separated from employment which led to his filing of the
present complaint for constructive dismissal. He insisted, among others, that he was
constructively dismissed because he was threatened, detained as if he were a prisoner,
unreasonably pressured and compelled to write a resignation letter for more than eight (8) hours
inside the company office. In ABB’s part, it denied Doble’s claims maintaining that his
separation from employment was voluntary as evidenced by his submission of his resignation
letter as well as signing a Receipt, Release and Quitclaim.
ISSUE: Whether simple factual allegations of constructive dismissal is sufficient to obtain a

favorable judgment.
HELD: NO. Apart from his bare and self-serving allegations, Doble failed to present substantial
documentary or testimonial evidence to corroborate the same. It is well settled that bare
allegations of constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be
given credence. Neither can it be held that Doble was constructively dismissed because there is
no evidence on record of any act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain towards him
which rendered his continued employment unbearable or forced him to terminate his
employment from ABB, Inc., much less a claim of demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and
other benefits.
ii. Constructive dismissal in relation to off-detail period
1. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. vs. Grave, G.R. No. 196650, June 7,
2017
FACTS: The petitioner — a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing security
services — employed and posted the respondents at the premises of Ibiden Philippines, Inc.
(Ibiden) located in the First Philippine Industrial Park in Sto. Tomas, Batangas. The controversy
started when the petitioner implemented an action plan as part of its operational and manpower
supervision enhancement program geared towards the gradual replacement of security guards at
Ibiden. Pursuant to the action plan, it issued separate "Notice(s) to Return to Unit" to the
respondents directing them to report to its head office and to update their documents for re-
assignment. On August 14, 2008, the respondents filed their complaint against the petitioner for
constructive dismissal in Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV of the NLRC, claiming that the
implementation of the action plan was a retaliatory measure against them for bringing several
complaints along with other employees of the petitioner to recover unpaid holiday pay and 13th
month pay. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of evidence substantiating the
allegation of illegal dismissal. He declared that the return to work notices issued by the petitioner
belied the respondents' charge of illegal dismissal, opining that a security guard could be
considered as having been constructively dismissed only when he had been placed on floating
Page 107 of 111
status for a period of more than six months. The decision of the Labor Arbiter was reversed by
the NLRC. The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were dismissed illegally based on the Notice to Return to
Unit.
HELD: A security guard placed on reserved or off-detail status is deemed constructively

dismissed only if the status should last more than six months. Any claim of constructive
dismissal must be established by clear and positive evidence. Security guards, like other
employees in the private sector, are entitled to security of tenure. However, their situation should
be differentiated from that of other employees or workers. The employment of security guards
generally depends on their employers' contracts with clients who are third parties to the
employment relationship, and the requirements of the latter for security services and what will be
beneficial to them dictate the posting of the security guards. It is also relevant to mention that
their employers retain the management prerogative to change their assignments and postings, and
to decide to temporarily relieve them of their assignments. In other words, their security of
tenure, though it shields them from demotions in rank or diminutions of salaries, benefits and
other privileges, does not vest them with the right to their positions or assignments that will
prevent their transfers or re-assignments (unless the transfers or reassignments are motivated by
discrimination or bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient
cause). Such peculiar conditions of their employment render inevitable that some of them just
have to undergo periods of reserved or off-detail status that should not by any means equate to
their dismissal. Only when the period of their reserved or off-detail status exceeds the reasonable
period of six months without re-assignment should the affected security guards be regarded as
dismissed. Indeed, there should be no indefinite lay-offs. After the period of six months, the
employers should either recall the affected security guards to work or consider them permanently
retrenched pursuant to the requirements of the law; otherwise, the employers would be held to
have dismissed them, and would be liable for such dismissals. Here, the respondents had actually
abandoned their employment and had severed their employment relationship with the petitioner
themselves. Despite having been notified of the need for them to appear before the petitioner's
head office to update their documents for purposes of reposting, they refused to receive the
notices, and did not sign the same, without first knowing the contents of the memo. Thus, the
respondents intended to sever their employer-employee relationship with the petitioner because
they applied for and obtained employment with other security agencies while they were on
reserved status. Their having done so constituted a clear and unequivocal intent to abandon and
sever their employment with the petitioner. Thereby, the filing of their complaint for illegal
dismissal was inconsistent with the established fact of their abandonment.
oo. Off-detail status
i. Return to work order should indicate specific assignment
1. Ibon vs. Genghis Khan Security Services and/or Marietta Vallespin,

G.R. No. 221085, June 19, 2017
Page 108 of 111
FACTS: Ravengar G. Ibon was employed as a security guard by Genghis Khan Security
Services (respondent). He was initially assigned to a certain Mr. Solis in New Manila, Quezon
City. In July 2008, he was transferred to the 5th Avenue Condominium in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City, in September 2008 and was posted there until May 2009. In June 2009, petitioner was
transferred to the Aspen Tower Condominium until his last duty on October 4, 2010. Thereafter,
respondent promised to provide him a new assignment, which, however, did not happen.
Petitioner asserts that he has been illegally dismissed as he was put on floating status without any
assignment to new work, while respondent here claims that they had actually suspended
petitioner for sleeping on the job. Further, they assert that they sent letters to petitioner requiring
him to report back to work and that it offered reinstatement during the proceedings before the
LA, which petitioner turned down
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was constructively dismissed?
HELD: Temporary displacement or temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally allowed
in a situation where a security agency's client decided not to renew their service contract with the
agency and no post is available for the relieved security guard. Such situation does not normally
result in a constructive dismissal. Nonetheless, when the floating status lasts for more than six
(6) months, the employee may be considered to have been constructively dismissed. Security
guard on floating status must be assigned to a specific posting. Petitioner was last deployed on
October 4, 2010. Thus, it was incumbent upon respondent to show that he was redeployed within
six (6) months from the said date. Otherwise, petitioner would be deemed to have been
constructively dismissed. A holistic analysis of the Court's disposition in JFLP Investigation
reveals that: [1] an employer must assign the security guard to another posting within six (6)
months from his last deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed;
and [2] the security guard must be assigned to a specific or particular client. A general return-to-
work order does not suffice. In Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation v. Serrano
(Exocet Security), the Court absolved the employer even if the security guard was on a floating
status for more than six (6) months because the latter refused the reassignment to another client,
to wit: Respondent should have deployed petitioner to a specific client within six (6) months
from his last assignment. The correspondence allegedly sent to petitioner merely required him to
explain why he did not report to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if
petitioner actually received the letters of respondent, he was still constructively dismissed
because none of these letters indicated his reassignment to another client.
pp. Separation pay
i. Separation pay where there is no dismissal
1. Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. vs. Tanguin, G.R. No.221096, June 28, 2017
FACTS: Tanguin, an employee of Claudia’s Kitchen, was preventively suspended while an

investigation is being conducted against her for reports that she was forcing her coemployees to
buy silver jewelry from her during office hours and inside company premises. Thereafter, she
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Claudia’s Kitchen denied having dismissed Tanguin, and
presented notices they sent to Tanguin: (1) requiring her to answer the charges against her; and
(2) reminding her that she was still an employee and directing her to report back to work.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tanguin is entitled to separation pay.

Page 109 of 111
HELD: NO. As a rule, no separation pay may be awarded to an employee who was not
dismissed. Since Tanguin was not dismissed, she is not entitled to payment of separation pay. In
this regard, it is only proper for Tanguin to report back to work and for Claudia’s Kitchen to
accept her, without prejudice to the on-going investigation against her.
qq. Post employment medical examination for seafarers
i. Mandatory reporting upon repatriation
1. Andres vs. Diamon H Marine Services & Shipping Agency, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 217345, July 12, 2017
FACTS: Wilmer O. De Andres was hired by agency Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping
Agency, Inc. for and in behalf of its Taiwanese principal, Wu Chun Hua. On February 1, 2008,
he entered into an Employment Contract, wherein it was stipulated that he would be working in
the fishing vessel, Yi Man En No. 2; that he would receive a monthly salary of NT$17 ,280.00;
and that the duration of the contract was for two years. De Andres claimed that before he
departed for Taiwan, he was made to sign a Contract of Agreement. At the vessel, he was tasked
to work as a wiper, messman and bosun, and was also required to throw the fishnet, dive in the
sea, and repair the nets. De Andres added that he and his Filipino crewmates were made to work
for almost twenty-four hours a day. They later discovered that the document they signed before
leaving for Taiwan set aside the POEA-approved contract. He averred that this agreement
reduced their salaries, increased their workload, and showed that the Filipino crewmates were
abused and taken advantage of. On February 27, 2009, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening,
De Andres was tasked by the master to lower the nets for the shipping operation. While he was
lowering the nets, he was accidentally hit by big waves, which caused him to be thrown out of
the vessel together with the fishing nets. While struggling from the big waves, De Andres was
pulled by the moving vessel with his left leg entangled by the fishing nets. As a consequence, he
sustained an open fracture of the distal tibia and fibula. De Andres was brought to Keelong
Hospital in Taiwan and underwent surgical operation. De Andres averred that he repeatedly
asked for repatriation as no one would attend to his needs in Taiwan, but his plea fell on deaf
ears. almost a year after his accident, De Andres was informed by the respondents that he was
free to go home. He was surprised by this decision because he had been requesting for his
repatriation since his injury. De Andres later discovered that his repatriation was not due to his
medical condition, but due to the expiration of his employment contract. Before he was
repatriated, De Andres was made to sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), stipulating that
the respondents agreed to pay him NT$40,000.00 and gave him a plane ticket back to the
Philippines, and that, in return, he would not file any complaint against the respondents in the
future. De Andres claimed, however, that he was forced to sign the agreement as he would not be
able to return to the Philippines if he would not sign it. On February 5, 2010, he arrived in
Manila, but no representatives from Diamond H fetched him. De Andres filed the subject
complaint against the respondents before the LA for permanent and total disability benefits,
sickness allowances, salary differentials, labor insurance as provided in the contract, moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. In its Decision, the LA ruled in favor of De
Andres. It explained that even though his contract expired, the respondents still had the
obligation to provide medical attention because he suffered permanent and total disability.
NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling. It stated that De Andres failed to comply with the
mandatory reportorial requirement. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling. It wrote that De Andres
indeed failed to comply with the mandatory reportorial requirement. De Andres moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to comply with the reportorial requirement under the
POEA Contract.
HELD: YES. The respondents failed to provide a post-employment medical examination by a

company-designated physician. In this case, De Andres' accident occurred on February 27, 2009.
He sustained an open fracture injury over his left lower leg with an 8 cm. open wound, which
Page 110 of 111
resulted in bone exposure and active bleeding. Instead of immediately repatriating him when his
condition permitted, the respondents kept him in Taiwan for almost a year and they waited for
his contract to expire. Obviously, the delayed repatriation was intended to show that he returned
due to his expired contract, and not for medical reasons. Nonetheless, even if a seafarer's contract
expired, it does not release the employer from its obligations under the POEA-SEC when there is
a claim for disability benefits due to an injury suffered during the term of the employment
contract. Accordingly, Section 20 (B) (3) must still be complied with. The Court is of the view
that the account of De Andres is more credible. The fact that he reported to Diamond H on the
next working day from his repatriation and met Purification show that he was sincere in asserting
his claim against the respondents for disability benefits. Before he could even commence the
procedure laid down under Section 20 (B) (3), however, Purification pre-empted him and bluntly
told him that Diamond H would not entertain any of his claims and that he should find a lawyer
instead. Thus, De Andres was no longer given an opportunity to submit himself to a post-
employment medical examination by a company-designated physician. In fine, the exception to
the reportorial requirement applies in this case because the seafarer was prevented by the
employer from submitting himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-
designated physician. Thus, the disability claim of De Andres is not forfeited. Under Section 20
(B) (3), the first procedure to determine the validity of a seafarer's claim for disability benefits is
to refer him to a company-designated physician of the employer who shall conduct the medical
examination. As earlier mentioned, the respondents did not comply with the initial stage because
they failed to refer De Andres to a company-designated physician despite his timely reporting.
They blindly relied on the MOA to cast away De Andres even though he was clearly asserting
his disability claim. As discussed earlier, the MOA was an invalid quitclaim. Thus, the
respondents cannot shield themselves from liability. Moreover, they could not present any
medical assessment of a company-designated physician. The respondents have no legitimate
means to refute his claim for permanent and total disability benefits. The Court laments that the
employer of a seafarer resorted to insensitive quitclaims to avoid any disability claims. Section
20 (B) (3) specifically outlines the procedure in determining the proper compensation of a
seafarer's disability. The rigorous process therein aims to provide a fair and definitive assessment
on the seafarer's medical condition and to ensure that they will receive a just compensation for
their injuries. At the same time, it protects the interest of the employer by ensuring that only
genuine disability or injuries shall be entitled to compensation.
rr. Res judicata
i. Issue preclusion rule; collateral estoppel; law of the case doctrine; supervening
event
1. Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., et al. vs. Cual, G.R. No. 207684,
July 17, 2017
FACTS: Respondents were all included in a retrenchment program embarked by Philtranco in

2006-2007 on the ground that it was suffering business losses. Consequently, they filed a labor
complaint for illegal dismissal alleging that they were not absorbed by Philtranco despite the fact
that the company was hiring new employees. LA only found Olivar to have been illegally
dismissed because of the failure of the other respondents to sign the verification and certification
of non-forum shopping of the complaint and position paper. Respondents then filed a second
NLRC case. LA found respondents to have been illegally dismissed stating that the first NLRC
case is binding upon Philtranco. NLRC reversed LA’s decision but CA reinstated LA’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not CA is correct in reinstating LA’s decision that the first NLRC case is
binding upon Philtranco.
HELD: The second NLRC case is not a continuation of the first from which other respondents
were excluded. The matter of whether or not Philtranco sufficiently proved its alleged business
losses when it embarked on its retrenchment program is a question of fact. While both cases are
separate, it does not mean that previously decided cases have no bearing on the second NLRC
Page 111 of 111
case. SC held that the LA’s decision in the first NLRC case, finding Philtranco’s retrenchment
program to be illegal, constitutes res judicata in the concept of collateral estoppel or issue
preclusion wherein it is defined as preclusion of relitigation of a particular fact of issue in
another action between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. Conclusiveness
of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue, judicially
passed upon and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The dictum laid
down in the earlier final judgment or order becomes conclusive and continues to be binding
between the same parties. The invalidity of the retrenchment in the first case has attained finality.
Moreover, records show that the decision was adjudicated on the merits. Absolute identity of
parties Is not required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this
principle. In both cases, the issue of WON complainant was illegally dismissed is hinged on the
validity of Philtranco’s retrenchment program. Without a doubt, the interests of all the
complainants are intertwined on that factual question. The submission of Philtranco of its audited
financial statements for 2006 and 2007 in the second case cannot be considered supervening
event. At the time retrenchment program was effected in 2007, Philtranco had no basis and was
unaware of the true state of its finances. The records annexed to the case showing that Philtranco
hired new employees were taken to belie Philtranco’s claim that it is exercised the retrenchment
of respondents in good faith.

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Page 1 of 111

ATTY. PORFIRIO PANGANIBAN

CASE DIGEST IN LABOR

CASE TITLES PAGE

1. Dominic Inocentes, Jeffrey Inocentes, Joseph Cornelio and 10

2. TELEPHILIPPINES, INC., v. Ferrando H. Jacolbe, G.R. No. 11

II. 2018 Cases

3. PRINCESS TALENT CENTER PRODUCTION, INC., and/or 13

5. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram, G.R. No. 17730, 16

7. Redundancy (American Power Conversion Corporation vs. Lim, 19

8. Employment contract (De Roca vs. Dabuyan, et al., G.R. No. 21

9. FASAP Case: Retrenchment (G.R. No. 178083/A.M. No. 11- 22

III. 2017 Cases

10. Employer-Employee Relationship (Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs.

11. Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No.

11. Lu vs. Enopia, G.R. No. 197899, March 6, 2017 27

14. Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No.

18. Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM-Katipunan, 36

27. Status Maritime Corporation and Admibros Ship management

28. Caderao vs. Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al./Senator

31. Aldaba vs. Career Philippines, Ship management, Inc., Columbia

36.Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., G.R. No. 53

38. Caderao vs. Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al./Senator 55

43. C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., Fr.

45. Bravo vs. Urios College (Now Father Saturnino Urios

46. C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., Fr.

47. C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., Fr.

54. Seapower Shipping, Ent., Inc. vs. Heirs of Warren M. Sabanal,

57. Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No.

58. Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No.

60. Cosue vs. Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, et al., 75

70. Panaligan vs. Phyvita Enterprises Corporation, G.R. No. 202086,

72. Bravo vs. Urios College (Now Father Saturnino Urios

77. De La Salle Araneta University vs. Bernardom, G.R. No.

78.De La Salle Araneta University vs. Bernardom, G.R. No. 190809,

79. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram, G.R. No.

81.Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017

89. Cosue vs. Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, et al., 105

90. Cosue vs. Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, et al., 105

92. Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM-Katipunan, 107

93. Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. Crown Shipmanagement Inc.

94. Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of

95. De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. vs. Bigkis Manggagawa sa

197492, January 18, 2017

97. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services 113

98. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services 114

99. Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services

110. Andres vs. Diamon H Marine Services & Shipping Agency,

b. TELEPHILIPPINES, INC., v. FERRANDO H. JACOLBE, G.R. No.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jacolbe was illegally dismissed.

II. 2018 Cases.

ii. Retirement plan vs. Labor Code

1. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram. G.R. No. 217730,

d. Redundancy i. Redundancy carried out by persons belonging to related

e. Employment contract.Employment contract cannot take effect outside of the contracting

De Roca vs. Dabuyan, et al., G.R. No. 215281, March 5, 2018

f. Retrenchment 1. Audited financial statement (AFS); AFS may not be presented; 2.

III. 2017 Cases

a. Employer-Employee Relationship. Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Puedan, G.R. No.

i. Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No. 206390,

ISSUE: Whether or not there is an employer-employee relationship between Valencia and

ii. Element of Control