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Criminal Law Mcqs Semester 1
Criminal Law Mcqs Semester 1
Criminal Law Mcqs Semester 1
4. The duty to act based on endangerment, as set out by the House of Lords in R v. Miller
[1983] 2 AC 161, was subsequently extended by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in
R v. Evans [ 2009] EWCA Crim 650–but in what way?
(a) To situations where D creates a dangerous situation.
(b) To situations where D contributes to the creation of a dangerous situation.
(c) To situations where D sets fire to property.
(d) To situations where D carries bladed items.
(e) To situations where D uses controlled substances.
3.Which of the below summaries accurately captures the material facts and legal principle
arising from the case of Yip Chiu-Cheung [1995] 1 AC 111
(a) D conspired with E to export drugs. E was an undercover police officer who had agreed to
the criminal conspiracy in order to catch criminal drug traffickers. Although E had a good
motive, and so was not ‘morally guilty’, he still legally intended to export drugs with D.
Therefore, E had still conspired with D and D was guilty of conspiracy to export drugs. Mens
rea concerns legal, not moral guilt and a good motive is irrelevant.
(b) D conspired with E to export drugs. E was an undercover police officer who had agreed to
the criminal conspiracy in order to catch criminal drug traffickers. However, E had a good
motive and so E could not be said to intend to export the drugs. As a result, D had not
conspired with someone who had the mens rea for exporting drugs and so could not be
guilty of the conspiracy either.
(c) D carried out a sexual act on V whilst on a ship docked in an English port. The act he
committed was not a criminal offence in his own country and so he did not know that what
he was doing was a criminal offence. As a result, D did not have the mens rea for the offence
and so could not be guilty.
(d) D carried out a sexual act on V whilst on a ship docked in an English port. The act he
committed was not a criminal offence in his own country and so he did not know what he
was doing was a criminal offence. However, he did intend to do that sexual act. Since he
intended the sexual act, he had the mens rea for the offence. Since he had also carried out
the act, he had actus reus for the offence. D was guilty of the offence because mens rea
relates to the state of mind needed to do the act. Knowledge that the act is an offence is not
necessary.
(e) V was terminally ill. D, a doctor, administered a lethal dose of a drug to end V’s life in
order to end her suffering. D still had the mens rea for murder – an intention to kill or cause
serious bodily harm. The fact that D had, what would be viewed by many as a ‘good motive’
was irrelevant. Mens rea concerns legal, not moral guilt.
4. Select the statement that is not a potential mens rea for a criminal offence
(a) intention
(b) belief
(c) damaged
(d) recklessness
(e) dishonesty
5.Different offences will have different requirements in terms of mens rea. Which one of
the following statements accurately and fully states the available mens rea requirements
for the nominated offence?
(a) Murder: intention or recklessness as to causing death or serious bodily harm
(b) Rape: A intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another (B)... A does not
honestly believe that B consents
(c) Criminal damage: D intentionally destroys or damages property belonging to another
(d) Murder: intention to cause death
(e) Criminal damage: D intends to destroy or damage property belonging to another or is
reckless as to whether such property would be destroyed or damaged.
Homicide MCQ’S:
1. What is the full actus reus of murder?
(a) Conduct from a person or corporation causing the death of another person.
(b) Conduct causing serious harm to another person.
(c) Conduct causing the unlawful killing of another person under the Queen’s peace.
(d) Conduct causing death to another person or a foetus.
(e) Conduct which risks causing death to another person.
3. Part of the mens rea of murder does not correspond with its actus reus. Which part?
(a) Intention to kill.
(b) Intention to cause GBH/‘really serious harm’.
(c) Wilful blindness as to killing.
(d) Wilful blindness as to causing GBH/‘really serious harm’.
(e) Intention to kill or recklessness as to killing.
4. Ideally, how should the mens rea of murder be defined so as to correspond with its
actus reus?
(a) Intention to kill.
5. Murder may sanction constructive liability in that D can be convicted of murder where
D’s mens rea for that crime does not correspond with its actus reus. Which principle of
criminal law does such a conviction abrogate?
(a) Principle of fair warning.
(b) Principle of stare decisis.
(c) Principle of fair labelling.
(d) The harm principle.
(e)Principle of minimal criminalisation.
(a) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of either: a duty of care (acts);
or duty to act, which doubles as a duty of care (omissions).
(b) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of a negligent breach of duty.
(c) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of reasonable foresight that
the breach gave rise to an obvious and serious risk of death.
(d) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of causation.
(e) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of gross negligence.
13. Following R v. Golds [2016] UKSC 61, what does ‘substantial’ now mean in the
‘substantial impairment’ test under diminished responsibility?
(a) Less than total impairment, but more than minimal impairment.
(b) Total impairment.
(c) Less than minimal impairment
(d) ‘Significant’, ‘appreciable’ or ‘weighty’ impairment.
(e)Any of the above –the UKSC in R v. Golds left ‘substantial’ undefined.
14. Following R v. Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281, what counts as a ‘recognised medical
condition’ (RMC) under diminished responsibility?
(a) Anything that is contained in the World Health Organization’s International Classification
of Diseases (ICD-11) or the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders.
(b) Presence on the World Health Organization’s International Classification of
Diseases(ICD-11)or the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorder is a necessary, but not always sufficient, requirement to raise the issue
of diminished responsibility –although if a condition is not yet contained in either of these
two glossaries it may still count as an RMC in a diminished responsibility case if a body of
medical opinion gives evidence in court that it should be an RMC.
(c) Anything that is contained in the World Health Organization’s International Classification
of Diseases (ICD-11), but not the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders.
(d) Anything that is contained in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but not the World Health Organization’s International
Classification of Diseases (ICD-11).
(e) Anything counts as an RMC provided one medical expert gives evidence as to this in a
diminished responsibility case.
15. In loss of control, the final test –D’s loss of self-control must be objectively
understandable–dictates that which circumstances of D can be attributed to the
reasonable person?
(a) In building up the context of the triggering event, all of D’s circumstances are relevant.
But only D’s age and sex are then relevant to determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-
restraint in the context of that triggering event.
(b) All of D’s circumstances are relevant in building up the context of the triggering event,
and then determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint in the context of that
triggering event.
(c) Only D’s age and sex are relevant in building up the context of the triggering event, and
then determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint in the context of that triggering
event.
(d) None of D’s circumstances are relevant in building up the context of the triggering
event, and then determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint in the context of
that triggering event.
(e) Only D’s age, but not D’s sex, is relevant in building up the context of the triggering event,
and then determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint in the context of that
triggering event.
Rape MCQ’s:
1.What is the actus reus of rape?
(a) Non-consensual penile penetration of V’s vagina.
(b) Non-consensual penetration of V’s anus.
(c) Non-consensual penile penetration of V’s vagina, anus or mouth.
(d) Non-consensual penetration of V’s vagina.
(e) Non-consensual penile penetration of V’s vagina and anus.
2. What is the legal authority for the existence of the offence of rape?
(a) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 74.
(b) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75.
(c) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76.
(d) Sexual Offences Act2003, s. 1.
(e) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 79.
3. What is the legal authority for the existence of the conclusive (i.e. irrebuttable)
presumptions against consent in the law of English sexual offences?
4. What is the legal authority for the existence of the evidential (i.e. rebuttable)
presumptions against consent in the law of English sexual offences?
(a) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1.
(b) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 74.
(c) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75.
(d) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76.
(e) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 79.
5. What is the legal authority for the existence of the general definition of consent in the
law of English sexual offences?
(a) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 79.
(b) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76.
(c) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75.
(d) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 74.
(e) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1.
6. How did the Sexual Offences Act 2003 expand the definition of rape?
(a) It made rape a non-penile-penetrative offence, thereby encompassing female
perpetrators.
(b) It included oral penetration for the first time.
(c) It included anal penetration for the first time.
(d) It included vaginal penetration for the first time.
(e)All of the above.
8. If one of the circumstances in the conclusive presumptions against consent in the Sexual
Offences Act 2003 is found, what is conclusively presumed?
(a) That V did not consent.
(b) That D did not believe that V consented
(c) That V did not consent, and D did not believe that V consented.
(d) That D did not have a reasonable belief that V consented.
9. Under the conclusive presumptions against consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003,
how have the courts interpreted intentional deception as to the ‘nature’ of the actin rape
cases?
(a) ‘Nature’ means that V must have believed a non-sexual act was taking place.
(b) ‘Nature’ means that V must have believed the act was sexual but was deceived as to one
or more of its physical aspects –like condom use or ejaculation.
(c) ‘Nature’ means that V must have believed the act was sexual but was deceived as to one
or more of the surrounding circumstances –like disease transmission.
(d) ‘Nature’ means that V must have believed that act was sexual, but that D was a different
person.
(e) Nature’ means that V must have believed that act was sexual but served a non-sexual
purpose.
10. Under the general definition of consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which factors
can vitiate V’s freedom to choose to consent?
(a) Only physical coercion in the form of violence.
(b) Only non-physical coercion in the form of threats of violence, blackmail, improper
offers, or financial threats.
(c) Only non-physical coercion in the form of psychological pressure from D.
(d) Only deception by D.
(e) All of the above.
11. According to R v. Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971, what is now the test for
determining whether a deception is capable of vitiating consent under the general
definition of consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003?
(a) Was the active deception so closely connected to the nature or purpose of the sexual
intercourse, rather than the broad circumstances?
(b) Was the active deception or failure to disclose so closely connected to the nature or
purpose of the sexual intercourse, rather than the broad circumstances?
(c) Was the active deception so closely connected to the nature or purpose of the sexual
intercourse, or, alternatively, the broad circumstances?
(d) Was the active deception or failure to disclose so closely connected to the nature or
purpose of the sexual intercourse, or, alternatively, the broad circumstances?
(e) Was the active deception or failure to disclose connected to D’s marital status,
political or religious views, status, employment, or wealth.
12. Following cases like R v. Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 256 and R v. Kamki [ 2013] EWCA Crim
2335, can V give consent to sexual intercourse where V is voluntarily intoxicated but not
unconscious?
(a) No –a drunken ‘consent’ is never consent.
(b) Always –a drunken consent is consent every time.
(c) Yes –but a drunken consent is only consent where V’s inhibitions were merely
lowered, such that voluntary intoxication made it easier for V to consent.
(d) Yes –but a drunken consent is only consent where V retained capacity to choose to
consent, including any reduced inhibitions; and this will depend on factors like the extent of
V’s intoxication and degree of consciousness, along with the effect of this on V’s
knowledge and understanding of the act.
(e) Yes –but a drunken consent is only consent where D and V are friends or partners.
13. The ‘reasonable belief in consent’ test in the mens rea of rape allows the jury to take
into account:
(a) D’s age, sexual experience, or learning disability, along with any steps taken by D to
ascertain whether V consented.
(b) D’s age, sexual experience, learning disability, or any other character defect (including
mental disorder), along with any steps taken by D to ascertain whether V consented.
(c) No circumstances of D and no steps taken to ascertain consent.
(d) D’s age and sex only, along with any steps taken by D to ascertain whether V consented.
(e) Any circumstances or beliefs of D, along with any steps taken by D to ascertain
whether V consented.
2. What is the difference, if any, between the offences of assault and battery.
(a)There is no difference: the labels are interchangeable and mean the same thing.
(b) Battery requires D to have made some physical contact with V; whereas assault
merely requires D to have caused V to apprehend such contact.
(c) Assault requires D to have made some physical contact with V; whereas battery
merely requires D to have caused V to apprehend such contact.
(d)Assault requires D to have made some physical contact with V; whereas battery
requires D to have caused more than transient or trifling harm to V.
(e) Battery requires D to have made some physical contact with V; whereas assault
requires D to have caused more than transient or trifling harm to V.
4 .Part of the actus reus of s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 does not
correspond with its mens rea. Which part?
(a) Causing an assault.
(b) Causing a battery.
(c) Causing grievous bodily harm.
5. Ideally, how should the mens rea of s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 be
defined so as to correspond with its actus reus?
(a) Intention or recklessness as to causing assault or battery, and intention or recklessness as
to causing actual bodily harm.
(b) Intention or recklessness as to causing assault or battery, and intention or recklessness as
to causing grievous bodily harm.
(c) Intention or recklessness as to causing assault.
(d) Intention or recklessness as to causing battery.
(e)Intention or recklessness as to causing assault or battery.
7.What is the mens rea for s.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861?
(a) D must intend to cause grievous bodily harm.
(b) D must intend to cause, or be reckless as to causing, an unlawful wound; or, intend to
inflict, or be reckless as to inflicting, grievous bodily harm.
(c) D must intend to cause, or be reckless as to causing, some kind of harm.
(d)D must intend to cause, or be reckless as to causing, an assault or battery.
(e)D must intend to cause, or be reckless as to causing, actual bodily harm.
9. Unders.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, in order to be reckless as to the risk
of transmitting a sexually transmitted disease to V, what level of knowledge of that
disease must D have?
(a) No knowledge that D has the disease.
(b) Actual knowledge that D has the disease.
(c) Constructive knowledge that D has the disease.
(d) Tacit knowledge that D has the disease.
(e) Any of the above.
(b) Assault, battery and ss.47, 20and 18Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
(c) Assault, battery and s.47 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
(d) Assault, battery and ss.47and 20Offences Against the Person Act 1861.
(e) Assault and battery.
11. Which of the following is the best description of the decision in R v. Brown
[1994] 1 AC 212?
(a) Branding a person’s buttocks, at their request, is not an offence against the person.
(b) Sexual gratification is against the criminal law.
(c) It is not in the public interest that a person should wound or cause actual bodily harm to
another for no good reason.
(d) It is not for the criminal law to regulate the conduct of individuals in private.
(e) Homosexuality is wrong.
12. Which of the following statements best represents the law following the
decisions in R v. Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103and R v. Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706?
(a) V may consent to the risk of acquiring a sexually transmitted disease and at the core of
V’s consent is the knowledge(obtained from D)that D had that disease.
(b) V may consent to acquiring a sexually transmitted disease and at the core of V’s consent
is the knowledge that D had that disease.
(c) D does not have to tell V about D’s STD-positive status.
(d)V may consent to the risk of acquiring a sexually transmitted disease and at the core of
V’s consent is the knowledge (obtained from others, not D) that D had that disease.
(e)V may consent to acquiring a sexually transmitted disease and at the core of V’s consent is
the knowledge (obtained from others, not D) that D had that disease.